NapoleonPart Twosession v

Sixth Coalition

NapoleonPart Twosession v

Sixth Coalition

Built 1898-1913 by the Kaiser to Celebrate the Sixth Coalition’s Victory

My star was fading. I felt the reins slipping out of my grasp, and could do nothing to stop it.

--Napoleon

major topics for this session

I. Down, But Not Out

II. Hit ‘im Again! He’s Corsican

III. Lützen and Bautzen

IV. Dresden

1813 CampaignLeipzig

16-19 October

1814 Campaign

I. Down, But Not Out

I. Down, But Not Out

The campaign of 1813 proved to be one of the longest, most expensive and ultimately decisive of all the struggles of the Napoleonic Wars. Following the cataclysm of 1812, Napoleon was desperately attempting to regain the initiative and repair the damage sustained by both his armies and his reputation in the depths of Russia. For their part, the Russians--joined successively by the Swedes, Prussians and Austrians besides a number of German princelings--were determined to liberate Germany from the shackles of the French connection and to carry the war to the very frontiers of France itself. With his Empire crumbling away in Central Europe, over 200,000 troops and several of his ablest subordinates tied down in conducting a deteriorating struggle in Spain, his ports blockaded by the Royal Navy, his allies falling away--Napoleon was faced with one of the greatest challenges of his career.

Chandler, p. 865

The true issue was simply one of survival, but in early 1813 no thought of ultimate catastrophe yet darkened the Emperor’s mind and he steadfastly refused all suggestions of negotiating a compromise peace. He was still convinced that complete victory was attainable--and indeed at certain moments during the first part of the campaign such an outcome seemed distinctly possible. In the end, however, a combination of awakening German nationalism and fast exhausting French resources resulted in heavy defeat and the loss of almost all terrain lying to the east of the Rhine.

Chandler, p. 865

Notwithstanding the immense losses Napoleon suffered in Russia, his extraordinary administrative skills enabled him to rebuild his army by the spring of 1813.

Fremont-Barnes, Napoleon, p. 36

Rearming

✦ 19 December 1812-the day after he arrived in Paris-”I am extremely pleased with the spirit of the nation. The people are prepared to make every kind of sacrifice,” he wrote to Murat

✦ 31December--only 13 days after his return--he notified Berthier, “on Sunday I reviewed about 25-30,000 troops”

✦ he had bought nearly 5,000 horses and had contracted for 5,000 more in France, 2,000 from Warsaw, nearly 5,000 from Hanover with more to come from Prussia and Hamburg

✦ early January 1813-“Come spring I shall march with an army larger than the Grand Army at the beginning of the [last] campaign,” he wrote the Danish king

✦ 31 January-250,000 conscripts and volunteers were being trained and equipped

✦ mobile columns were rounding up an estimated 100,000 conscripts who had fled the colors

✦ rich young gentlemen had volunteered as cavalry, each with his own mount, weapons & servants

✦ the gendarmerie had been culled to provide troops and horses

✦ 40,000 naval gunners were transferred to the artillery

Osprey, French Napoleonic Infantryman 1803-15, PLATE G

The thousands of teenagers pressed into service after the Russian campaign were nicknamed the Marie-Louises after the equally young empress who signed their conscription decrees in Napoleon’s absence. Through necessity, the uniform was stripped down to its most basic…[but the shako was still ornate, seen here in its foul-weather cover]…. ‘On taking the field, everyone reduced his kit to the smallest possible dimensions, ridding himself of all useless articles’ A well-packed haversack (1) might contain spare shoes (2) [note the condition of the pair he’s wearing!] a change of shirt (3) a sewing kit (4) containing needles, thread, awl and also a bag of cleaning brushes….The soldier’s few personal possessions including a spoon (5) comb (6), playing cards (7), pocket knife (8), tobacco pouch (9), pipe (10), and a handkerchief could be kept in his coat’s internal pockets.[note also the oiled rag wrapped around his musket’s lock to keep it dry in wet weather and “dinner” hanging from his haversack]

COLOUR PLATE COMMENTARY, pp. 62-63

The renascence of military might continued despite two unforeseen blows. One was the treachery of General Yorck whose Prussian corps, at least 17,000 men and 60 guns, formed Marshal Macdonald’s rear guard to Tilsit. Having fought little in the campaign Yorck defected to Wittgenstein’s corps under terms said to have been negotiated mainly by Carl von Clausewitz* who had joined the Russian service shortly after the Prussian-French treaty of 1812. Yorck shortly would take his force back to Prussia to form the nucleus of a new army allied with Russia. The other event was Marshal Murat’s impulsive decision at Posen to leave the Grand Army and return to his Neapolitan kingdom. Each blow was disappointing, neither an immediate disaster. “I find Murat’s conduct very extravagant--I can think of nothing similar,” Napoleon wrote Viceroy Eugène. “This is a brave man in battle, but he lacks intelligence and moral courage.” Napoleon gave the command to Eugène: “I am annoyed at not having given it to you upon my departure.” Eugène was to send as many redundant generals as possible to France along with battalion cadres necessary to build new regiments.

Asprey, pp. 282-283

*Clausewitz would become famous for his On War, a work still widely read by military professionals

It is difficult to fault either Napoleon’s or the French nation’s incredible activity during these four months, but there were some major drawbacks. The officers and non-commissioned officers needed to train recruits…were in very short supply. Equally serious was a shortage of horses. Napoleon’s initial claims of availability soon proved [overly optimistic]. Contracts signed outside of France failed to be met in whole or in part, nor did the home country live up to expectations. By early February the army had received only 11,000 mounts, a very serious situation in view of cavalry, artillery and supply requirements. To worsen matters, the troops lacked nearly everything from crossbelts to sabers, cooking utensils, water bottles, shoes, shirts, often muskets and bayonets. Quartermasters were short of wagons, cannon needed carriages and caissons.

Asprey, p. 284

The cavalry posed altogether different problems; here the difficulties were mainly shortage of time and suitable horses. While an infantry conscript could be shaken into some sort of shape within a few months, a cavalry recruit took considerably longer to train to a reasonable standard; yet the need for new cavalrymen was pressing, for the French mounted arm had virtually ceased to exist by the end of 1812. Great difficulty was also experienced in procuring even a proportion of the required number of horses. Many of the most famous horse-producing areas of Europe lay in Prussia and central Germany, but the coolness and subsequent defection of Prussia and sundry other smaller states deprived the French army of many of its remount sources. This weakness was never remedied, and no small part of Napoleon’s eventual failure in 1813 was due to his understrength cavalry force. Deprived of vital intelligence through the paucity of his cavalry patrol and unable to follow up his victories with the usual hell-for-leather pursuits, Napoleon was to find himself faced by almost insuperable obstacles.

Chandler, p. 868

Napoleon was an intrepid rider who usually rode stallions – even though they can be positively dangerous when bad-tempered. He galloped with a sense of daring and freedom unusual in someone so methodical. Even at breakneck speed, no obstacle worried him. The memoirs of his staff and courtiers show that on a horse Napoleon feared little, while his attitude towards day-to-day stable welfare was often enlightened. He forbade his soldiers to dock the tails of their horses, a practice then prevalent in the British army, and horse-buyers were instructed to avoid purchasing horses with cut tails either for Napoleon or the French cavalry. Cropped tails saved effort in grooming, but a brush-like stump did not swish away troublesome flies and other insects and also upset the horses’ balance. In Britain this cruel custom was not banned until 1949.

http://www.jill-hamilton.com/pdf/marengo-the-myth-of-napoleons-horse.pdf

Napoleon’s Horsemanship

On battlefield after battlefield, he demonstrated an uncanny ability to be at the right place at the right time. At Salamanca, he personally sent into action every single Allied division. This method of control required, however, not only the ability to foresee where he would be needed, but also many expensive horses, superb practical horsemanship and in himself the hard physical condition of a steeplechase jockey.1

1 Wellington has been accused of having a ‘poor seat’; he was perhaps not a pretty rider. But he could probably move faster and farther than any other senior commander in European history. Maxwell, II, 28, says that on 16 June 1815, ‘The Duke had ridden from Brussels 5 miles beyond Quatre Bras, 29 miles, then 7 miles to Ligny and back, 43 miles in all, before the battle began, and remained in the saddle till nightfall.’

Jac Weller, Wellington at Waterloo, p. 27

Wellington’s Horsemanship

II. Hit ‘im Again, He’s Corsican

Austria’s Indispensable Man✦ his father was the Austrian ambassador to the

three Rhenish electors, Archbishops of Trier, Mainz & Köln

✦ 1788-at age 15, began studying law at Strasbourg

✦ 1795-married the granddaughter of Maria Teresa’s Chancellor Kaunitz

✦ 1803-05--ambassador to Saxony and Prussia

✦ 1806-in Paris, had affairs with Pauline, Caroline & Hortense!

✦ 1809-interned during the War of the Fourth Coalition, thereafter made Austrian Minister of State

✦ 1810-after Wagram, engineered a French alliance and Napoleon’s marriage to Marie-Louise

✦ 1812-as the Russian Campaign developed, he began his move to neutrality

Prince Klemens Wenzel von Metternich

Klemens Wenzel Nepomuk Lothar, Fürst von Metternich-Winneburg zu Beilstein

1773 –1859

Napoleon naïvely hoped that his marriage to an Austrian princess would be a firm link between their two countries. His Austrian in-laws regarded Maria Louisa only as a temporary sacrifice, tossed to the Corsican ogre. However, Austria had never recovered from her financial and military losses in 1809 and knew that another defeat could destroy her. Her foreign minister, Metternich, was aristocratic, courageous, devious as a basket of snakes, and a sworn foe of the French Revolution---”a gangrene which must be burnt out with a hot iron.” He chose to prepare Austria for war, while remaining ostensibly neutral, thus hoping to force both sides to bid high for Austrian support. He further planned to then demand such humiliating concessions from France that Napoleon would automatically reject them. Meanwhile, he briskly pretended friendship, sending Schwarzenberg to Paris “to the side of his commander in chief.” (En route, Schwarzenberg would urge Napoleon’s German allies to send the emperor as few troops as possible---and especially to send no cavalry, which Napoleon particularly needed.) Metternich himself intrigued murkily with Murat.

Esposito & Elting, after MAP 126

Austrian Soldier Diplomat✦ 1788-entered the Imperial cavalry, fought the Turks

✦ 1793-decorated for leading a cavalry charge that killed and wounded 3,000 French and brought back 32 guns

✦ 1800-the only Austrian general to emerge with distinction from the defeat at Hohenlinden

✦ 1805--before Mack surrendered at Ulm, his cavalry cut their way through to freedom

✦ 1809-fought at Wagram, then was sent to Paris to negotiate Napoleon’s marriage to Marie Louise

✦ 1812-at Napoleon’s request, he commanded the Austrian forces in the Russian campaign

✦ initially, he ably defended the French right flank in Volhynia

✦ as the campaign disintegrated, he fell back to protect Austria’s territory in Galicia

Karl Philipp Fürst zu Schwarzenberg (Charles Philip, Prince of Schwarzenberg )

1771 – 1820

Prussian Traitor or Patriot?✦ his father was an army officer under Frederick the Great

✦ the family were Kashubians from Pomerania

✦ 1772-joined Frederick’s army but cashiered after 7 years for criticizing his superior’s recruiting methods. Served in the Dutch and French armies until Frederick’s death

✦ 1794--back in the Prussian army, won honors in putting down Kosciuszko’s Polish uprising. Later developed Prussia’s light infantry and the tactic of skirmishing

✦ 1806-fought ably in the disastrous Jena campaign

✦ 1807-after Tilsit, led in the reorganization of Prussia’s army. Became commander of the contingent Prussia was forced to send on the Russian campaign

Johann David Ludwig Graf Yorck von Wartenburg

1759 - 1830

Prussian Traitor or Patriot?✦ his father was an army officer under Frederick the Great

✦ the family were Kashubians from Pomerania

✦ 1772-joined Frederick’s army but cashiered after 7 years for criticizing his superior’s recruiting methods. Served in the Dutch and French armies until Frederick’s death

✦ 1794--back in the Prussian army, won honors in putting down Kosciuszko’s Polish uprising. Later developed Prussia’s light infantry and the tactic of skirmishing

✦ 1806-fought ably in the disastrous Jena campaign

✦ 1807-after Tilsit, led in the reorganization of Prussia’s army. Became commander of the contingent Prussia was forced to send on the Russian campaign

✦ December 1812-after it became clear that the campaign was doomed, he changed sides

✦ he began Prussia’s shift to the Sixth Coalition

Johann David Ludwig Graf Yorck von Wartenburg

1759 - 1830

The Convention of Tauroggen

30 December 1812

Since Jena, the regenerating political activities of the statesman Stein, the military reforms of Scharnhorst, the patriotic cultural influence of Arndt and Körner, and the pervasive, secret power of the Tugendbund or League of Virtue, had between them produced an entirely new popular atmosphere, and by 1813 Prussia was ripe for revolt. The fact was amply demonstrated when the Provincial Assembly of East Prussia---without reference to Berlin---declared its support for General Yorck and announced its defiance of Napoleon. So widespread became this defiant mood that the monarchy was compelled to follow suit. In late February the Convention of Kalisch between Prussia and Russia was secretly ratified; by it Prussia promised to enter the war on the side of the Allies in the very near future...while Russia undertook to see that Prussia would be restored to her pre-1806 boundaries. The Tsar guaranteed to provide 150,000 soldiers; Frederick William to field at least 80,000 more.

Chandler, pp. 870 & 872

The prospect of continued war appalled the states of the Confederation of the Rhine. They had pledged Napoleon loyalty; in return, he had increased their territory and prestige (at the expense of Austria and Prussia), and left their internal affairs alone. But now the Russians were moving westward, while Yorck’s and Schwarzenberg’s defections hinted that Prussia and Austria were about to again switch sides. Prussian “liberation,” Russian occupation, and French vengeance seemed equally dreadful. Eventually, each did what seemed safest. Baden, Hesse, Nassau, Westphalia, and Frankfurt---being under the guns of French fortresses---promptly raised new contingencies for Napoleon. His country partially overrun, the King of Saxony fled to Bavaria, ordering his army to remain neutral. At Austria’s urging, Bavaria and Württemberg considered neutrality.

Esposito & Elting, after MAP 126

! 1807-Napoleon limited by treaty the Prussian army to 42,000 men

! late 1812-as his Grande Armée disintegrated, he authorized a further 33,000. Now these became his enemies!

! Scharnhorst had already created a clever ploy to “beat” the ceiling, the so-called Krumpersystem

! a proportion of the regulars were retired each year, replaced by recruits who were trained, then placed in reserve

! February 1813-33,000 reservists were thus produced

! but the greatest surge would come from the unofficial militias, the Freikorps

Auf Vorposten: Heinrich Hartmann (liegend, links) Theodor Körner (sitzend, mitte) und Friedrich Friesen (stehend, rechts) als Lützower Jäger (Gemälde von Georg Friedrich Kersting 1815)

Krumpersystem und Freikorps

Körner

We will consider this rising tide of German nationalism in more detail during our next session.

The Russians were momentarily exhausted. Happily convinced that he was truly a military genius, Alexander felt a divine mission to become the liberator of Europe and the champion of its “legitimate” rulers. At the same time, strictly in the interests of international justice, he would extend Russia’s frontiers. Kutusov favored letting England fight France. He had much popular support, and temporarily restrained Alexander.

Esposito & Elting, after MAP 126

Once the Grand Army had retreated across the Niemen River Kutusov had halted his advance owing to casualties and a high sickness rate from lack of food and cold weather. His army now numbered only around 40,000 effectives (not counting Platov’s Cossacks). Kutusov was old and tired (he would soon die[ 28 April 1813]), he had done his duty, Russia was free of enemy, it was time for peace.

Asprey, pp. 286-287

England and the “Second American Revolution”✦ 1 June 1812-President Madison had struggled unsuccessfully to keep his “War Hawk” wing of

the (Jeffersonian) Republican party under control. They almost declared war on France as well as Britain!

✦ Lord Liverpool’s government had just been formed after the assassination of his predecessor

✦ now Britain had to divide her meager land forces between Wellington’s Peninsular War and the defense of her North American and Caribbean possessions

✦ her overwhelming naval superiority would soon limit US ability to interfere with her commerce as well as producing a crushing blockade of our commerce (New England almost seceded in 1814)

✦ 1813-due to this Second Front, Britain could only contribute her financial and diplomatic resources to the Sixth Coalition (beyond her very important Spanish offensive)

✦ in North America, Britain’s Indian allies, the Canadian militia, supported by a modest number of British regular units, soon put the American forces on the defensive except on Lake Erie

✦ December 1814-with Napoleon gone, having abdicated in April, Britain turned her full fury on the “impudent Yankees,” drove our navy from the seas, burned DC and was preparing to conquer New Orleans when we sued for peace on the basis of status quo ante bellum

III.Lützen and Bautzen

III.Lützen and Bautzen

EUGENE

Elbe River

Oder River

Vistula River

With Blücher massing around Dresden, the Elbe River was no longer a tenable line of defense. Eugene therefore swung his right flank behind the lower Saale River. He had neither held as much ground nor gained as much time as Napoleon had desired, but he had built up an effective army and now occupied a strong position.

Saale River

EUGENE

Elbe River

Oder River

Vistula River

With Blücher massing around Dresden, the Elbe River was no longer a tenable line of defense. Eugene therefore swung his right flank behind the lower Saale River. He had neither held as much ground nor gained as much time as Napoleon had desired, but he had built up an effective army and now occupied a strong position.

Saale River

Wittgenstein … linked up with Blücher. Nevertheless, the Allies found themselves considerably overextended. They had to leave detachments to besiege the various Polish and German fortresses, and Kutusov (now dying) stubbornly held most of the Russian army at Kalish. On 19 April came a rumor that Napoleon was advancing

! descended from a medieval family from the Rhineland whose lands (since the 1300s!) were lost in 1792 to France, then given to the Grand Duchy of Hesse Darmstadt in 1806 (Rheinbund)

Sayn and Wittgenstein ca. 1450

Russia’s General VEET•gen•SHTAYN

! descended from a medieval family from the Rhineland whose lands (since the 1300s!) were lost in 1792 to France, then given to the Grand Duchy of Hesse Darmstadt in 1806 (Rheinbund)

! 1769-born near Kiev in the Ukraine. His family had been military service nobility to the tsars since Peter the Great

! 1793-fought Kosciuszko as a major of a Ukrainian light cavalry regiment

! 1805-a major general at Austerlitz; 1806, fought the Turks; 1807, fought Napoleon at Friedland

! 1812-defended St. Petersburg in the 1st & 2nd battles of Polotsk. Awarded the Cross of St George

! 1813-age 44, takes command of the Russian army after the death of Kutusov

Ludwig Adolph Peter, Prince Wittgenstein

(Pyotr Khristianovich Wittgenstein) (German: Ludwig Adolph Peter Fürst zu Sayn-Wittgenstein Russian:

Пётр Христиа́нович Ви́тгенштейн)

1769 - 1843

Russia’s General VEET•gen•SHTAYN

Gebhard Leberecht von BlücherFürst von Wahlstatt *

German pronunciation: 

[ˈɡɛphaɐ̯t ˈleːbəʁɛçt fɔn ˈblʏçɐ]

1742 – 1819

! 1658-began as a Swedish hussar (age 16). Born in Rostock, Mecklenburg, just west of Swedish Pomerania

During the Napoleonic Wars, the Prussian general Prince Blücher defeated a French army under Marshal Macdonald at the Katzbach, a small river in the Battle of Katzbach on 26 August 1813. In honor of this victory Blücher received the title Prince of Wahlstatt on 3 June 1814.

! 1658-began as a Swedish hussar (age 16). Born in Rostock, Mecklenburg, just west of Swedish Pomerania

! captured during the Seven Years War, he “turned his coat” and became a hussar for Frederick the Great

! In peace, however, his ardent spirit led him into excesses of all kinds, such as mock execution of a priest suspected of supporting Polish uprisings in 1772. Due to this, he was passed over for promotion to Major. Blücher sent in a rude letter of resignation, which Frederick the Great granted in 1773: Der Rittmeister von Blücher kann sich zum Teufel scheren (Cavalry Captain von Blücher can go to the devil)

! 1789-received the Pour le Mérit (the Blue Max)

! 1801-made general (age 59)

! 1806-fought at Jena-Auerstadt, ably, but outnumbered

! during the “humiliation” became leader of the Patriots

During the Napoleonic Wars, the Prussian general Prince Blücher defeated a French army under Marshal Macdonald at the Katzbach, a small river in the Battle of Katzbach on 26 August 1813. In honor of this victory Blücher received the title Prince of Wahlstatt on 3 June 1814.

! 1658-began as a Swedish hussar (age 16). Born in Rostock, Mecklenburg, just west of Swedish Pomerania

! captured during the Seven Years War, he “turned his coat” and became a hussar for Frederick the Great

! In peace, however, his ardent spirit led him into excesses of all kinds, such as mock execution of a priest suspected of supporting Polish uprisings in 1772. Due to this, he was passed over for promotion to Major. Blücher sent in a rude letter of resignation, which Frederick the Great granted in 1773: Der Rittmeister von Blücher kann sich zum Teufel scheren (Cavalry Captain von Blücher can go to the devil)

! 1789-received the Pour le Mérit (the Blue Max)

! 1801-made general (age 59)

! 1806-fought at Jena-Auerstadt, ably, but outnumbered

! during the “humiliation” became leader of the Patriots

"Marschall Vorwärts"(1863)

What use did Napoleon think to make of [the] considerable armament [built up after his failure in Russia]? For some time a master plan had been formulating in his mind, and although circumstances made it impossible to put it into execution it is important to grasp its main outlines [emphasis added] as the Emperor never completely forgot it….

Chandler, p. 875

Bonaparte’s Strategic Plan for 1813

The Master Plan

The Master Plan ✦ “...press back over the Elbe and

march on Berlin

BERLIN

The Master Plan ✦ “...press back over the Elbe and

march on Berlin

✦ “...establish the seat of war between the Elbe and the Oder, moving under the protection of the fortresses of Torgau, Wittenberg, Magdeburg and Hamburg BERLIN

TORGAUWITTENBERG

MAGDEBURG

HAMBURG

The Master Plan ✦ “...press back over the Elbe and

march on Berlin

✦ “...establish the seat of war between the Elbe and the Oder, moving under the protection of the fortresses of Torgau, Wittenberg, Magdeburg and Hamburg

✦ “if circumstances permitted he would then relieve the fortresses besieged on the Vistula--Danzig, Thorn and Modlin

✦ “If this vast plan succeeded, it could be hoped that the coalition would be disorganized and that all the princes of Germany would confirm their fidelity and alliances with France.”

Vistula RiverBERLIN

TORGAUWITTENBERG

MAGDEBURG

HAMBURG

DANZIG

THORN

MODLIN

Montholon, Mémoires de Napoléon, quoted in Chandler, Ibid.

The Constraining Circumstances

(1)Napoleon considered that he needed 300,000 men to make the plan foolproof, and by April his numbers were still far below that figure.

(2)He doubted whether the raw material of his new forces would be capable of much sustained marching.

(3)His reliance on the assistance of the Confederation of the Rhine and the south German states proved overoptimistic, for both Saxony and Bavaria proved understandably hesitant.

(4)The enemy was still advancing in the Dresden area, and there would not be sufficient French troops available to assure the Saale line if the Army of the Main set out on its ambitious project.

Chandler, p. 876

Elbe River

Oder River

LEIPZIG CAMPAIGNSituation 25 April 1813, and Concentrations Prior to the Battle of Lützen10 0 10 20 30

MILES

Saale River

BERLIN

LEIPZIG

DRESDEN

Blücher and Wittgenstein...began shifting into closer contact. They knew they would be outnumbered, and could see only two courses of action: to retire behind the Elbe… , or to attack Napoleon when he advanced across the Saale….if they could catch [him] astride the steep-banked Saale, they might be able to destroy his leading corps. East of the river the terrain was open, favoring their superiority in cavalry (four to one) and artillery (almost two to one). Their well-trained, now largely veteran soldiers should be individually and collectively superior to the French conscripts.

Elbe River

Oder River

LEIPZIG CAMPAIGNSituation 25 April 1813, and Concentrations Prior to the Battle of Lützen10 0 10 20 30

MILES

Saale River

BERLIN

LEIPZIG

DRESDEN

With Kutusov dying, Alexander decreed that the overall command should go to Wittgenstein, the youngest of the ranking generals in both armies. Blücher was agreeable, but Tormassov and Miloradovich asserted their seniority. Lacking character enough to discipline them, Alexander placed them under his personal command, leaving Wittgenstein only his own corps, the Prussians and Winzengerode. A hot Allied debate over future plans ended in quick decision when Napoleon was reported to be in Weissenfels. The Allies began assembling between Leipzig and Al tenburg . I f Napo leon ’s advance continued, they would advance on Lützen to strike his right flank. In the ensuing confusion, Bülow was left without orders.

(1) Lauriston’s corps drives Kleist out of Leipzig

(2) Winzegorode, Yorck and Blücher attack Ney, who is retreating on Lützen to “bait the trap”

(3) Napoleon springs the trap with a double envelopment. Marmont’s Grande Batterie devastates

(4) Wittgenstein counterattacks

(5) Napoleon puts in the Guard, driving the Allies from the field

Wittgenstein and Blücher were in danger of suffering another defeat on the scale of Austerlitz, but the green and exhausted French troops, who had been marching and fighting all day long, could not follow through. In addition, darkness was closing in as night approached. This allowed the allied force to retreat in good order. The lack of French cavalry meant there would be no pursuit.

Wikipedia

Napoleon reached the field at 2:30 P.M. He found the situation critical. Ney’s weary and shaken corps was on the point of dissolution, while Marshal Bertrand had halted his advance aga ins t B lücher ’s l e f t on d i scover ing Milodoradovich approaching Zeitz. Marmont, too, was hard pressed by the Allies. It was a moment calling for personal leadership---and Napoleon proved more than equal to the occasion. Riding among the wavering conscripts, the Emperor exhorted and cajoled them back into their ranks and then repeatedly led them up toward the enemy. The effect of his presence was almost magical. New confidence and resolution flooded back into his troops. “This was probably the day, of his whole career, on which Napoleon incurred the greatest personal danger on the field of battle,” recorded Marmont. “He exposed himself constantly, leading the men of defeated IIIrd Corps back to the charge.” From all sides rang cries of “Vive l’Empereur!” “Hardly a wounded man passed before Bonaparte without saluting him with the accustomed vivat. Even those who had lost a limb, who would in a few hours be the prey of death, rendered him this homage.”

Chandler, p. 884< ZEITZ

< LUTZEN

BATTLE OF LUTZENSituation About 1100, 2 May 1813

1 0 1 2 3 4 6

1

5 7

BATTLE OF LUTZENSituation About 1830, 2 May 1813

BATTLE OF LUTZENSituation About 1100, 2 May 1813

1 0 1 2 3 4 6

1

5 7

BATTLE OF LUTZENSituation About 1830, 2 May 1813

T h e A l l i e s w e n t h u r r i e d l y t o t h e rear….Lacking cavalry, Napoleon could not pursue effectively. French losses seem to have been approximately 20,000; Allied, 20,000. Though the effective Allied propaganda system claimed that Napoleon had been completely surprised and practically defeated, the legend of Napoleonic invincibility was largely re-established.

Esposito & Elting, MAP 129

Soldiers, I am pleased with you! You have fulfilled my hopes! In a single day you have overturned all these murderous conspiracies. We shall throw these Tartars back to their dreadful country that they ought not to have left. Let them stay in their frozen deserts, home of slavery, barbarism and corruption where man is reduced to the level of a beast.

--Napoleon--3 May 1813

(30,000)

(115,000)

(84,000)

(96,000)

(30,000)

(115,000)

(84,000)

(96,000)Lützen

Leaving Ney’s crippled corps at Lützen to reorganize, Napoleon followed (0300, 3 May) the Allied retreat….having the initiative and superior forces, on 4 May he began forming a second army...under Ney. Initially, Ney would secure Torgau...and raise the siege of Wittenberg. Concurrently, he would constitute a potential threat to Berlin, which--Napoleon hoped--would cause the Prussians to break away northward. In that case, the Emperor should be able to destroy the Allies in detail; in the meantime, he would continue his drive on Dresden.

(30,000)

(115,000)

(84,000)

(96,000)

On 7 May, the Allies began recrossing the Elbe. Russian attempts to destroy the Dresden bridges were bungled, the French advance guard capturing a good many pontons.

DRESDEN

Lützen

(30,000)

(115,000)

(84,000)

(96,000)

…(9 May), in a brilliant, surprise assault crossings, utilizing captured pontons and the wreckage of a stone bridge, Napoleon seized two bridgeheads on the east bank at Dresden. The Allies, already worried by Ney’s activities, withdrew tamely. After much squabbling (the Prussians wanted to cover Berlin; the Russians, Breslau and Warsaw), the Allies decided to attempt another battle before retreating behind the Oder River. A strong position east of Bautzen was selected, and Russian engineers were sent ahead to prepare it.

DRESDEN

Lützen

Breslau

BERLIN

(30,000)

(115,000)

(84,000)

(96,000)

…(9 May), in a brilliant, surprise assault crossings, utilizing captured pontons and the wreckage of a stone bridge, Napoleon seized two bridgeheads on the east bank at Dresden. The Allies, already worried by Ney’s activities, withdrew tamely. After much squabbling (the Prussians wanted to cover Berlin; the Russians, Breslau and Warsaw), the Allies decided to attempt another battle before retreating behind the Oder River. A strong position east of Bautzen was selected, and Russian engineers were sent ahead to prepare it.

DRESDEN

BautzenLützen

Breslau

BERLIN

Deutsch: Schlacht bei Bautzen 1813. Napoleon auf einem weißen Pferd, umgeben von seinen Offizieren, empfängt einen Boten.English: Battle of Bautzen (1813). Napoleon on white horse surrounded by his officers, receives a messenger.

Wittgenstein drew his men up in two strong defensive lines along a 10-kilometre front, with strongpoints in villages and along ridges.

By the 19th, Bonaparte had set up his plan to pin the enemy to their lines and then bottle them up with Ney's men but, concerned that the Prusso-Russians had more men on the field than they actually had, the emperor would not spring his trap until they had been softened up.

The next day the attack began around midday. Hours of heavy fighting saw the French overpowering the first defensive lines and seizing the town of Bautzen itself.

By nightfall, the French were ready to cut the defenders off from their line of retreat but Ney became confused and his faulty positioning left the door open for the Allies to escape.

Fighting on the 21st was hard and after several hours the initial success of the renewed French attacks began to lose impetus.

Again Ney became distracted by tactical matters - the seizing of the village of Preititz - and lost sight of the strategic importance of his sealing the Allies in.

By 4pm, however, the Prusso-Russians were being pushed back and when the Imperial Guard was sent in they began an all-out retreat.

While Bautzen was a success for Bonaparte it was not a decisive result. Both armies lost some 20,000 men but Ney's failure to cut the line of retreat robbed the French of complete victory.

http://www.napoleonguide.com/battle_bautzen.htm

! the Blöserwasser is a marshy stream running through the Allied positions before joining the Spree

! the Allies planned to contain Napoleon’s attack; then to counterattack, envelop his left flank, and drive him into the mountains along the Austrian frontier

Blöserwasser

! the Blöserwasser is a marshy stream running through the Allied positions before joining the Spree

! the Allies planned to contain Napoleon’s attack; then to counterattack, envelop his left flank, and drive him into the mountains along the Austrian frontier

! Napoleon’s main concern was to fix and distract the Allies long enough for Ney’s enveloping maneuver (which could not be delivered in strength before 21 May) to develop

Blöserwasser

! the Blöserwasser is a marshy stream running through the Allied positions before joining the Spree

! the Allies planned to contain Napoleon’s attack; then to counterattack, envelop his left flank, and drive him into the mountains along the Austrian frontier

! Napoleon’s main concern was to fix and distract the Allies long enough for Ney’s enveloping maneuver (which could not be delivered in strength before 21 May) to develop

! the Allied position being too strong for a frontal attack, he spent the morning of the 20th maneuvering his left and center into their assault positions

! 1200- the French artillery opened heavily

! 1500-Oudinot confirmed the tsar’s fears by driving deep into the ridges on the Allied left

! 1700-Macdonald and Marmont pinched out Bautzen, forcing Miloradovich to retire

Blöserwasser

Spree

Rive

r

BATTLE OF BAUTZENSituation Early 20 May 1813 andAdvance of Napoleon’s Forces Prior to Dark

BATTLE OF BAUTZENSituation at Noon 21 May 1813, Allied Routes of Withdrawal and French Pursuit

SYMBOL FOR MARSHY GROUND

Spree

Rive

r

For the 21st, Napoleon ordered Oudinot to attack vigorously at daybreak, so as to distract all possible enemy troops. Macdonald would support him; Marmont and Soult would stand ready to extend Ney’s attack. Ney would seize Dresha, then advance toward Weissenberg. Subsequent developments are difficult to unravel.

BATTLE OF BAUTZENSituation Early 20 May 1813 andAdvance of Napoleon’s Forces Prior to Dark

BATTLE OF BAUTZENSituation at Noon 21 May 1813, Allied Routes of Withdrawal and French Pursuit

Spree

Rive

r

Ney energetically snarled the situation….Despite splendid fighting, Blücher and Yorck were steadily driven in, Maison penetrating southward through Plieskowitz. However, Kleist managed to drive the unsupported Souham back on Gleina, and Ney lost his remaining wits….Almost trapped, but keeping their men under tight control, Blücher and Yorck slipped out past Ney.

BATTLE OF BAUTZENSituation Early 20 May 1813 andAdvance of Napoleon’s Forces Prior to Dark

BATTLE OF BAUTZENSituation at Noon 21 May 1813, Allied Routes of Withdrawal and French Pursuit

DRESHA

WEISENBERG

Spree

Rive

r

BATTLE OF BAUTZENSituation Early 20 May 1813 andAdvance of Napoleon’s Forces Prior to Dark

BATTLE OF BAUTZENSituation at Noon 21 May 1813, Allied Routes of Withdrawal and French Pursuit

DRESHA

WEISENBERG

Pleading lack of cavalry, Ney hesitated to pursue…. Hoping to retrieve Ney’s failure, at 1600 Napoleon thrust at the Allied center with the Guard and Latour-Maubourg, but the Allies were already withdrawing in good order. Each side had lost approximately 20,000 men; Napoleon’s only trophies were wrecked guns and wounded prisoners. He had planned an annihilating hammer blow, but, because of Ney’s blunderings, had won only an ordinary victory.

Esposito and Elting, MAP131

Why did the Emperor agree to an armistice after he had won two important battles and had the enemy on the run? Scores of his detractors, following Baron Jomini’s malicious lead, have gleefully pointed out that, such was the deplorable state of the allied forces, had he continued his pursuit...he would have won his “decisive victory” to finish the war. Whew! The Allies had indeed suffered heavy casualties but the reverse side of the coin was that ample reinforcements would soon fill the gaps….Defeat had resulted in retreat, not rout….. And the French army? Notwithstanding inspired and incredibly brave battle performances the cost in men, horses, weapons, ammunition and materiel had been heavy. Time was necessary to repair the damage and rest the troops. Above all Napoleon desperately needed more horses….Without the tactical impetus provided by trained cavalry and fast-moving artillery Napoleon was unlikely ever to find that elusive “decisive battle.”

Asprey, pp. 304-305

at the beginning ofthe armistice

4 June

Even supposing his army was combat-ready [on 4 June] which it was not, an end-play around the enemy’s right at Schweidnitz would have been not only a formidable but a dangerous undertaking.

Asprey, p. 305

at the beginning ofthe armistice

4 June

Even supposing his army was combat-ready [on 4 June] which it was not, an end-play around the enemy’s right at Schweidnitz would have been not only a formidable but a dangerous undertaking.

Asprey, p. 305Schweidnitz

I want peace which is of more concern to me than to anyone else… but I shall not make either a dishonorable peace or one that would bring an even more violent war within six months.

--Napoleon to General SavaryDresden

12 June 1813

IV. Dresden

Battle of Dresden26-27 August 1813

✦ Napoleon was well aware that he couldn’t count on his south German allies and especially his father-in-law Francis, the emperor of Austria

✦ “...Napoleon was not dealing so much with the Austrian emperor as with a very shrewd, cunning, unscrupulous and altogether nasty piece of work named Klemens von Metternich”-Asprey, p. 306

✦ 26 June-at Dresden, Metternich, Austria’s 40-year-old foreign minister, maintaining the façade of neutrality, offered his services as peacemaker

✦ his terms: in return for peace, France must agree that

✦ the Grand Duchy of Warsaw be given to Russia

✦ Prussia gets her 1806 boundaries, including the fortress of Danzig

✦ the Confederation of the Rhine be dissolved

✦ Austria would get Dalmatia (the “Yugoslav” coast), Salzburg and Tyrol, and the Venetian provinces Prince Klemens Wenzel von Metternich

Klemens Wenzel Nepomuk Lothar, Fürst von Metternich-Winneburg zu Beilstein

1773 – 1859

Napoleon was understandably furious--if this was the result of his winning two important battles, what would have been the result had he lost them? “Everything makes me think that Austria...would like to profit from [present] circumstances to recover her losses in recent wars….It appears...she had deployed 60,000-80,000 soldiers at Prague.” As one result he was forming a large corps at Würzburg under Marshal Augereau’s command.

Asprey, pp.307-308

at the beginning ofthe armistice

4 June

at the end of the armistice16 August

PRAGUE< AUGEREAU

at the beginning ofthe armistice

4 June

at the end of the armistice16 August

The Emperor appears to have formulated his plan of action only shortly before the reopening of the campaign. Eventually he conceived of a two-part plan. ...the French army would be generally divided into two wings. The larger (numbering the 200,000 men...would adopt a strategic defensive based upon the Saxon capital of Dresden….Dresden itself, with its great depots and camps, formed the kingpin of the entire system…. The second part of the army was entrusted to Oudinot, he was given command over almost 120,000 men...this force was intended to launch a heavy attack northward against Berlin and thereafter tackle Bernadotte’s army. In this scheme we can detect traces of the original master plan of April, as well as a vindictive desire to see a disloyal monarch and a treacherous ex-marshal heavily punished.

Chandler, p. 902

DRESDEN

OUDINOT

BERLIN

“[Napoleon] suddenly realized that a golden opportunity to rout the Army of Bohemia was presenting itself. With almost all his forces drawn up to the south of Dresden, Schwarzenberg was exposing his communications to a sudden blow through Königstein and Pirna.

op. cit, p. 904

“If this plan was to succeed it was vital that:1) St Cyr should continue to defy and pin the Allies at Dresden until Napoleon’s master stroke could fully develop2) It was also important that Macdonald should succeed in keeping Blücher fully occupied away to the east,3) and that Oudinot should continue to dominate Bernadotte to the south of Berlin.

“In the event, however,complications arose on all these sectors which eventually ruined the plan’s implementation.”

op. cit, p. 905

The Allied plan for the battle on the 27th was to mass two thirds of their strength in the center, leaving generals Bianchi and Wittgenstein with approximately 25,000 apiece to hold the left and right wings respectively.

Day Two

For his part, Napoleon was planning a holding action in the center and a double envelopment of the enemy flanks...

Day Two

For his part, Napoleon was planning a holding action in the center and a double envelopment of the enemy flanks...

Day Two

The French attack on the right opened at six in the morning. [It] quickly drove Wittgenstein’s sodden and dispirited troops out of the Blasewitz woods and began to bend back the right of the Allied line.

Day Two

Murat was making famous progress on the other flank. Bianchi proved incapable of withstanding the fury of Marshal Victor’s attack; his line broke, and a large part of his command found… their backs to the swollen Weisseritz….As the key bridge at Plauen had already fallen into French hands, the Allied center was relegated to the role of helpless spectators as Bianchi’s men were driven into the river….my midafternoon the Allied left had ceased to exist. Thirteen thousand prisoners fell into French hands in the sector, and all the rest of Bianchi’s troops were dead or scattered.

Day Two

Murat was making famous progress on the other flank. Bianchi proved incapable of withstanding the fury of Marshal Victor’s attack; his line broke, and a large part of his command found… their backs to the swollen Weisseritz….As the key bridge at Plauen had already fallen into French hands, the Allied center was relegated to the role of helpless spectators as Bianchi’s men were driven into the river….my midafternoon the Allied left had ceased to exist. Thirteen thousand prisoners fell into French hands in the sector, and all the rest of Bianchi’s troops were dead or scattered.

Day Two

Murat was making famous progress on the other flank. Bianchi proved incapable of withstanding the fury of Marshal Victor’s attack; his line broke, and a large part of his command found… their backs to the swollen Weisseritz….As the key bridge at Plauen had already fallen into French hands, the Allied center was relegated to the role of helpless spectators as Bianchi’s men were driven into the river….my midafternoon the Allied left had ceased to exist. Thirteen thousand prisoners fell into French hands in the sector, and all the rest of Bianchi’s troops were dead or scattered.

Day Two

However, the battle in the center was not g o i n g s o w e l l f o r t h e s e v e r e l y outnumbered St. Cyr and Marmont. Three assaults failed...and when Napoleon rode back to Dresden at 4:00 P.M. he fully anticipated a third day’s fighting on the morrow.

Day Two

The Allied commanders, however, had experienced enough….a cannonball narrowly missed the Tsar Alexander, and this narrow escape dampened what little ardor the Allied high command could still muster….Accordingly, orders were issued for an overnight retreat toward Bohemia.

Day Two

Over the two days’ fighting the Allies had lost some 38,000 men; the French had emerged lightly with barely 10,000 casualties. It appeared that the legend of French invincibility had been fully re-established.

Chandler, pp. 910-911

Day Two

Victory at Dresden, but…

Early on the 28th , French patrols had found nothing at Dresden but a handful of rear guards facing them. Napoleon had at once set about organizing a pursuit; if only Vandamme could reach Teplitz ahead of the enemy, the Army of Bohemia would be hopelessly trapped amid the mountains. However the Emperor was far from well; furthermore, distressing details of Oudinot’s failure against Bülow on the 23rd had now reached headquarters. No sooner had these been assimilated than news of another blow arrived. In complete disobedience of his orders, it appeared that Macdonald had rashly pushed ahead over the Katzbach [River]pursuing Blücher…. By the end of the 26th , Macdonald’s army had suffered a severe and costly defeat (losing 15,000 prisoners and 100 cannon) completely reversing the strategic situation…. Napoleon’s success at Dresden was already being overshadowed by the failures of his subordinates on other sectors. His mind filled with the need to devise new measures to offset these setbacks, Napoleon returned to Dresden on the afternoon of the 28th , leaving the pursuit of Schwarzenberg to his underlings.

After the Battle of Dresden and Situationof 30 August During Battle of Kulm

“In the absence of the master, the French pursuit of the various columns of the Allied army proceeded with fair élan but insufficient coordination. As a result Vandamme’s corps became increasingly isolated….falling back toward Kulm. Here on the 30th , he suddenly...found himself beset from the rear….with only 32,000 troops...to oppose 54,000 Allies...although over half his men escaped the commander of 1st Corps and 13,000 of his troops fell into Allied hands….

Chandler, p.912

After the Battle of Dresden and Situationof 30 August During Battle of Kulm

KULM

“In the absence of the master, the French pursuit of the various columns of the Allied army proceeded with fair élan but insufficient coordination. As a result Vandamme’s corps became increasingly isolated….falling back toward Kulm. Here on the 30th , he suddenly...found himself beset from the rear….with only 32,000 troops...to oppose 54,000 Allies...although over half his men escaped the commander of 1st Corps and 13,000 of his troops fell into Allied hands….

Chandler, p.912

After the Battle of Dresden and Situationof 30 August During Battle of Kulm

Situation Evening of 30 Aug 1813 AfterVandamme’s defeat at Kulm

OUDINOT

MACDONALD

Situation Evening of 30 Aug 1813 AfterVandamme’s defeat at Kulm

In the Allied camp, of course, there was much rejoicing fraught with heartfelt relief….Thus Dresden joined Lützen and Bautzen on the growing list of practically valueless French victories.

Chandler, p.912

OUDINOT

MACDONALD

The Trachtenberg Plan was concocted by Allied commanders [at this point]. The plan advocated avoiding direct engagement with the French emperor, Napoleon I. This resulted from fear of the Emperor's now legendary prowess in battle. Consequently the Allies planned to engage and defeat the French Marshals and Generals separately, and thus weaken his army while they built up an overwhelming force even he could not defeat. It was decided upon after a series of defeats and near disasters by the Coalition at Napoleon's hands at the battles of Lützen, Bautzen and Dresden. The plan ultimately worked and at the Battle of Leipzig, where the Allies had a considerable numerical advantage, the Emperor was soundly defeated and driven out of Germany, across the Rhine back into France itself. The plan was the work of the Austrian chief of staff of the allied coalition, Radetzky.*

Wikipedia* In whose honor the Radetzky March was named. It will become the military theme song of 19th century Austria.

More generally, like Hitler’s from December 1941, Napoleon’s inherent weaknesses had become more apparent from mid-1813, once he faced united opposition in the Sixth Coalition, and the Formation of the Seventh Coalition in 1815 was part of this process. Indeed, war followed politics. Once Austria, Prussia, Russia and Britain cooperated effectively, as they did from 1813, Napoleon was rapidly defeated, although his own inappropriate and indifferently executed strategy in 1813 contributed greatly to the defeat. The Waterloo campaign was a reprise of the situation in 1813-1814, Napoleon’s assumption that a military victory could translate into political success was seriously flawed. It reflected a failure to understand the general European context as well as the limitations of French resources and will.

Black, The Battle of Waterloo, p. 152