2ND EXAM COVERAGE CASE COMPILATION
NATURAL RESOURCES (Atty. Edison Batacan/Atty. Christina Tan)2ND
EXAM COVERAGE CASE COMPILATION
33
IGTIBEN v. REPUBLICG.R. No. 158449 October 22, 2004Republic of
the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaSECOND DIVISIONG. R. NO. 158449
October 22, 2004LUNINGNING P. DEL ROSARIO-IGTIBEN, JOSE REYES
IGTIBEN, JOSE DEL ROSARIO IGTIBEN, JR. and THERESA TOPACIO
MEDINA,petitioners,vs.REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE COURT OF
APPEALS,respondents.D E C I S I O NCHICO-NAZARIO,J.:This petition
for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
assails the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
68546,1which set aside the decision of the Municipal Circuit Trial
Court of Silang-Amadeo Cavite in LRC Case No. 98-133 (LRA Record
No. N-69787)2and dismissed petitioners application for registration
of a parcel of land.On 08 January 1998, petitioners filed with the
trial court an application for registration of land under
Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property
Registration Decree. The application covered a parcel of land with
an area of 2,988 square meters, situated in Barangay Malabag,
Silang, Cavite, and more particularly described as Lot 5442, Cad
452-D, Silang Cadastre, Ap-04-007007 (hereinafter referred to as
the Subject Property). Petitioners alleged that they acquired the
Subject Property by purchase, and that they, by themselves and
through their predecessors-in-interest, had been in actual,
continuous, uninterrupted, open, public, and adverse possession of
the Subject Property in the concept of owner for more that 30
years.3No opposition was filed against the application and so
petitioners proceeded with the presentation of their evidence. The
State was represented in the proceedings by Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor Jose M. Velasco, Jr.4Based on the testimonial and
documentary evidence presented, the trial court traced the history
of possession of the Subject Property back to 1958, when the
Subject Property was first declared for tax purposes by Justina
Hintog.5Teodoro Calanog came into possession of the Subject
Property in 1968. In the same year, the Subject Property was
transferred to spouses Alfredo Tonido and Agatona Calanog. Agatona
Calanog allegedly inherited the Subject Property from Teodoro
Calanog, her father; on the other hand, Alfredo Tonido supposedly
purchased the same property also from Teodoro Calanog, his
father-in-law. Alfredo Tonido planted the Subject Property with
palay, sayote, coffee, guyabano and other fruit bearing trees.
After the demise of Agatona Calanog, the rest of the Tonido family,
consisting of Alfredo and his children, Samuel, Elizabeth,
Benjamin, Imelda and Esther, shared possession of the Subject
Property.6On 21 November 1995, the Tonido family sold the Subject
Property to petitioners, as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute
Sale.7The history of possession of the Subject Property, as related
above, was supported by tax declarations in the name of petitioners
and their predecessors-in-interest from 1958 to 1998.8On 15 August
2000, the trial court rendered a decision approving petitioners
application for registration of the Subject Property. The Republic
of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor
General, appealed the decision of the trial court to the Court of
Appeals.In its appeal, the Republic alleged that the trial court
erred in approving the application for registration despite
petitioners failure to prove open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of the Subject Property since
12 June 1945, or earlier, as required by Section 48(b) of
Commonwealth Act No. 141, otherwise known as the Public Land Act,
as amended by PD No. 1073. Moreover, petitioners also failed to
produce muniments of title to tack their possession to those of
their predecessors-in-interest in compliance with the prescriptive
period required by law.9On 20 December 2002, the Court of Appeals
rendered a decision finding the appeal meritorious, setting aside
the decision of the trial court, and dismissing the application for
registration of petitioners.10The Court of Appeals denied
petitioners Motion for Reconsideration in its resolution dated 22
May 2003.11Petitioners filed this petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court praying that the decision of
the Court of Appeals be set aside and that the decision of the
trial court, approving petitioners application for registration of
the Subject Property, be reinstated.12In the original application
filed by petitioners before the trial court, they claim that they
are entitled to confirmation and registration of their title to the
Subject Property in accordance with Section 14 of the Property
Registration Decree, although they had not identified under which
specific paragraph of the said Section.13Section 14 of the Property
Registration Decree reads SEC. 14. Who may apply. The following
persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an
application for registration of title to land, whether personally
or through their duly authorized representatives:(1) Those who by
themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation
of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona
fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.(2) Those
who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under
the provisions of existing laws.(3) Those who have acquired
ownership of private lands or abandoned river beds by right of
accession or accretion under the existing laws.(4) Those who have
acquired ownership of land in any other manner provided for by
law.By the allegation of petitioners in their application of
actual, continuous, uninterrupted, open, public, and adverse
possession of the Subject Property in the concept of owner, by
themselves and through their predecessors-in-interest, for a given
period of time, it can be logically presumed that their claim to
the right to register the Subject Property was based on Section 14,
paragraph (1) of the Property Registration Decree.However,
subsequent pleadings filed by both petitioners and respondent
Republic before the Court of Appeals and this Court, discuss mainly
the Public Land Act, thus, establishing that the application for
registration filed by petitioners before the trial court is
essentially an application for judicial confirmation of their
imperfect or incomplete title over the Subject Property, governed
by Sections 47 to 57 of the Public Land Act.Proceedings under the
Property Registration Decree and the Public Land Act are the same
in that both are against the whole world, both take the nature of
judicial proceedings, and the decree of registration issued for
both is conclusive and final. They differ mainly in that under the
Property Registration Decree, there already exists a title which
the court only needs to confirm. On the other hand, under the
Public Land Act, there exists a presumption that the land applied
for still pertains to the State, and that the occupants and
possessors can only claim an interest in the land by virtue of
their imperfect title or continuous, open, and notorious possession
thereof. Nonetheless, in the end, the two laws arrive at the same
goal, namely, a Torrens title, which aims at complete
extinguishment, once and for all, of rights adverse to the record
title.14In general, an applicant for judicial confirmation of an
imperfect or incomplete title under the Public Land Act must be
able to prove that: (1) the land is alienable public land; and (2)
his open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of the same must either be since time immemorial or for
the period prescribed in the Public Land Act.15The finding of fact
of the trial court that the Subject Property is alienable public
land is undisputed. What is to be determined herein is whether
petitioners have complied with the period of possession and
occupation required by the Public Land Act.The provision of the
Public Land Act that is particularly relevant to petitioners
application is Section 48(b). Through the years, Section 48(b) of
the Public Land Act has been amended several times. The case of
Republic v. Doldol16provides a summary of these amendments, as
followsx x x. The original Section 48(b) of C.A. No. 141 provided
for possession and occupation of lands of the public domain since
July 26, 1894. This was superseded by R.A. No. 1942, which provided
for a simple thirty-year prescriptive period of occupation by an
applicant for judicial confirmation of imperfect title. The same,
however, has already been amended by Presidential Decree No. 1073,
approved on January 25, 1977. As amended, Section 48(b) now
reads:(b) Those who by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of
the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or
ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding
the filing of the application for confirmation of title, except
when prevented by wars or force majeure. Those shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions
essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a
certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.Section
48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by PD No. 1073, presently
requires, for judicial confirmation of an imperfect or incomplete
title, the possession and occupation of the piece of land by the
applicants, by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest, since 12 June 1945 or earlier. This
provision is in total conformity with Section 14(1) of the Property
Registration Decree heretofore cited.In the case at bar, the Court
of Appeals correctly ruled that petitioners have failed to comply
with the period of possession and occupation of the Subject
Property, as required by both the Property Registration Decree and
the Public Land Act. In its decision, the Court of Appeals held
that Indeed, the earliest period that the applicants could claim
ownership over the property is in 1958, which is the earliest date
Justina Hintog, the previous owner/occupant, declared the property
for taxation purposes. This is far later than June 12, 1945, the
date prescribed by law that the applicants possession under claim
of ownership should have begun at the latest.17Petitioners
maintain, however, that RA No. 6940, enacted on 28 March 1990, has
repealed by implication Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as
amended by PD No. 1073, and has effectively reduced the required
period of possession and occupation of the land to thirty years
prior to the filing of the application for confirmation of an
imperfect or incomplete title.Petitioners arguments are without
merit. This Court has already laid down the standard for repeals by
implication, as follows It has been the constant holding of this
Court that repeals by implication are not favored and will not be
so declared unless it be manifest that the legislature so intended.
Such a doctrine goes as far back as United States v. Reyes, a 1908
decision. It is necessary then before such a repeal is deemed to
exist, that it be shown that the statutes or statutory provisions
deal with the same subject matter and that the latter be
inconsistent with the former. There must be a showing of repugnancy
clear and convincing in character. The language used in the latter
statute must be such as to render it irreconcilable with what had
been formerly enacted. An inconsistency that falls short of that
standard does not suffice. What is needed is a manifest indication
of the legislative purpose to repeal.18In herein case, Section
48(b) of the Public Land Act and the provisions of RA No. 6940 do
not even address the same subject matter.In the Public Land Act,
the ways by which the State may dispose of agricultural lands is
enumerated, to wit SEC. 11. Public lands suitable for agricultural
purposes can be disposed of only as follows 1. For homestead
settlement;2. By sale;3. By lease; and4. By confirmation of
imperfect or incomplete titles:(a) By judicial legalization;(b) By
administrative legalization (free patent).Each mode of disposition
is appropriately covered by separate chapters of the Public Land
Act since the specific requirements and application procedure
differ for every mode. More particularly, the confirmation of
imperfect or incomplete titles may be done two ways, either by: (a)
administrative legalization or free patents under Chapter VII of
the Public Land Act; or (b) judicial legalization or judicial
confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles under Chapter VIII
of the same Act. Having filed their application before the courts,
petitioners have pursued a judicial legalization or judicial
confirmation of their title to the Subject Property.Petitioners
primarily base their arguments on the amendment by RA No. 6940 of
Section 44 of the Public Land Act, to read as follows SEC. 44. Any
natural-born citizen of the Philippines who is not the owner of
more than twelve (12) hectares and who, for at least thirty (30)
years prior to the effectivity of this amendatory Act, has
continuously occupied and cultivated, either by himself or through
his predecessors-in-interest a tract or tracts of agricultural
public land subject to disposition, who shall have paid the real
estate tax thereon while the same has not been occupied by any
person shall be entitled, under the provisions of this Chapter, to
have a free patent issued to him for such tract or tracts of such
land not to exceed twelve (12) hectares.While the above-quoted
provision does provide for a 30-year period of occupation and
cultivation of the land, Section 44 of the Public Land Act applies
to free patents, and not to judicial confirmation of an imperfect
or incomplete title to which Section 48(b) applies.The distinction
between Sections 44 and 48(b) of the Public Land Act was recognized
by Mr. Justice Puno, in his separate opinion in the case of Cruz v.
Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources,19in which he
discussed the development of the Regalian doctrine in the
Philippine legal system Registration under the Public Land Act and
Land Registration Act recognizes the concept of ownership under the
civil law. This ownership is based on adverse possession for a
specified period, and harkens to Section 44 of the Public Land Act
on administrative legalization (free patent) of imperfect or
incomplete titles and Section 48(b) and (c) of the same Act on the
judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles.The
remaining provisions of RA No. 6940 amend Sections 44 and 47 of the
Public Land Act by extending the periods for filing of applications
for free patents and for judicial confirmation of imperfect or
incomplete titles, respectively, to 31 December 2000. Except for
extending the period for filing of applications for judicial
confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles, RA No. 6940 does
not touch on the other provisions under Chapter VIII of the Public
Land Act, such as Section 48(b) and the prescriptive period
provided therein.Consequently, applying the standard provided by
this Court on repeal by implication, there can be no conflict or
inconsistency between Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act and the
provisions of RA No. 6940 that would give rise to a repeal of the
former by the latter.The subsequent effectivity of RA No. 9176 on
01 January 2001 does not affect the position of this Court on the
issues discussed herein. Once again, Section 47 is the only
provision under Chapter VIII of the Public Land Act amended by RA
No. 9176 by further extending the period for filing of applications
for judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles to 31
December 2020. The other provisions of the Public Land Act amended
by RA No. 9176, such as Sections 44 and 45, already refer to free
patents under Chapter VII. Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as
amended by PD No. 1073, and the prescriptive period provided
therein still remain unchanged.IN ALL:(1) Section 44 of the Public
Land Act, as amended by RA No. 6940, which provides for a
prescriptive period of thirty (30) years possession, applies only
to applications for free patents;(2) The case at bar is a judicial
application for confirmation of an imperfect or incomplete title
over the Subject Property covered by Section 48(b) of the Public
Land Act; and(3) Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act requires for
judicial confirmation of an imperfect or incomplete title the
continuous possession of the land since 12 June 1945, or earlier,
which petitioners herein failed to comply with.WHEREFORE,the
petition is herebyDENIEDfor lack of merit. The CourtAFFIRMSthe
assailed decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 68546,
which reversed the decision of the lower court in LRC Case No.
98-133 (LRA Record No. N-69787) and dismissed the application for
land title of petitioners. No cost.SO ORDERED.
REPUBLIC v. JEREMIASG.R. No. 156117 May 26, 2005Republic of the
PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaSECOND DIVISIONG.R. No. 156117 May
26, 2005REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,petitioner,vs.JEREMIAS AND
DAVID HERBIETO,respondents.D E C I S I O NCHICO-NAZARIO,J.:Before
this Court is a Petition for Review onCertiorari, under Rule 45 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, seeking the reversal of the
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 67625, dated 22
November 2002,1which affirmed the Judgment of the Municipal Trial
Court (MTC) of Consolacion, Cebu, dated 21 December 1999,2granting
the application for land registration of the
respondents.Respondents in the present Petition are the Herbieto
brothers, Jeremias and David, who filed with the MTC, on 23
September 1998, a single application for registration of two
parcels of land, Lots No. 8422 and 8423, located in Cabangahan,
Consolacion, Cebu (Subject Lots). They claimed to be owners in fee
simple of the Subject Lots, which they purchased from their
parents, spouses Gregorio Herbieto and Isabel Owatan, on 25 June
1976.3Together with their application for registration, respondents
submitted the following set of documents:(a) Advance Survey Plan of
Lot No. 8422, in the name of respondent Jeremias; and Advance
Survey Plan of Lot No. 8423, in the name of respondent David;4(b)
The technical descriptions of the Subject Lots;5(c) Certifications
by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)
dispensing with the need for Surveyor's Certificates for the
Subject Lots;6(d) Certifications by the Register of Deeds of Cebu
City on the absence of certificates of title covering the Subject
Lots;7(e) Certifications by the Community Environment and Natural
Resources Office (CENRO) of the DENR on its finding that the
Subject Lots are alienable and disposable, by virtue of Forestry
Administrative Order No. 4-1063, dated 25 June 1963;8(f) Certified
True Copies of Assessment of Real Property (ARP) No. 941800301831,
in the name of Jeremias, covering Lot No. 8422, issued in 1994; and
ARP No. 941800301833, in the name of David, covering Lot No. 8423,
also issued in 1994;9and(g) Deed of Definite Sale executed on 25
June 1976 by spouses Gregorio Herbieto and Isabel Owatan selling
the Subject Lots and the improvements thereon to their sons and
respondents herein, Jeremias and David, forP1,000. Lot No. 8422 was
sold to Jeremias, while Lot No. 8423 was sold to David.10On 11
December 1998, the petitioner Republic of the Philippines
(Republic) filed an Opposition to the respondents' application for
registration of the Subject Lots arguing that: (1) Respondents
failed to comply with the period of adverse possession of the
Subject Lots required by law; (2) Respondents' muniments of title
were not genuine and did not constitute competent and sufficient
evidence ofbona fideacquisition of the Subject Lots; and (3) The
Subject Lots were part of the public domain belonging to the
Republic and were not subject to private appropriation.11The MTC
set the initial hearing on 03 September 1999 at 8:30 a.m.12All
owners of the land adjoining the Subject Lots were sent copies of
the Notice of Initial Hearing.13A copy of the Notice was also
posted on 27 July 1999 in a conspicuous place on the Subject Lots,
as well as on the bulletin board of the municipal building of
Consolacion, Cebu, where the Subject Lots were located.14Finally,
the Notice was also published in the Official Gazette on 02 August
199915andThe Freeman Banat Newson 19 December 1999.16During the
initial hearing on 03 September 1999, the MTC issued an Order of
Special Default,17with only petitioner Republic opposing the
application for registration of the Subject Lots. The respondents,
through their counsel, proceeded to offer and mark documentary
evidence to prove jurisdictional facts. The MTC commissioned the
Clerk of Court to receive further evidence from the respondents and
to submit a Report to the MTC after 30 days.On 21 December 1999,
the MTC promulgated its Judgment ordering the registration and
confirmation of the title of respondent Jeremias over Lot No. 8422
and of respondent David over Lot No. 8423. It subsequently issued
an Order on 02 February 2000 declaring its Judgment, dated 21
December 1999, final and executory, and directing the Administrator
of the Land Registration Authority (LRA) to issue a decree of
registration for the Subject Lots.18Petitioner Republic appealed
the MTC Judgment, dated 21 December 1999, to the Court of
Appeals.19The Court of Appeals, in its Decision, dated 22 November
2002, affirmed the appealed MTC Judgment reasoning thus:In the case
at bar, there can be no question that the land sought to be
registered has been classified as within the alienable and
disposable zone since June 25, 1963. Article 1113 in relation to
Article 1137 of the Civil Code, respectively provides that "All
things which are within the commerce of men are susceptible of
prescription, unless otherwise provided. Property of the State or
any of its subdivisions of patrimonial character shall not be the
object of prescription" and that "Ownership and other real rights
over immovables also prescribe through uninterrupted adverse
possession thereof for thirty years, without need of title or of
good faith."As testified to by the appellees in the case at bench,
their parents already acquired the subject parcels of lands,
subject matter of this application, since 1950 and that they
cultivated the same and planted it with jackfruits, bamboos,
coconuts, and other trees (Judgment dated December 21, 1999, p. 6).
In short, it is undisputed that herein appellees or their
predecessors-in-interest had occupied and possessed the subject
land openly, continuously, exclusively, and adversely since 1950.
Consequently, even assuming arguendo that appellees' possession can
be reckoned only from June 25, 1963 or from the time the subject
lots had been classified as within the alienable and disposable
zone, still the argument of the appellant does not hold water.As
earlier stressed, the subject property, being alienable since 1963
as shown by CENRO Report dated June 23, 1963, may now be the object
of prescription, thus susceptible of private ownership. By express
provision of Article 1137, appellees are, with much greater right,
entitled to apply for its registration, as provided by Section
14(4) of P.D. 1529 which allows individuals to own land in any
manner provided by law. Again, even considering that possession of
appelless should only be reckoned from 1963, the year when CENRO
declared the subject lands alienable, herein appellees have been
possessing the subject parcels of land in open, continuous, and in
the concept of an owner, for 35 years already when they filed the
instant application for registration of title to the land in 1998.
As such, this court finds no reason to disturb the finding of the
courta quo.20The Republic filed the present Petition for the review
and reversal of the Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated 22
November 2002, on the basis of the following
arguments:First,respondents failed to establish that they and their
predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, and adverse
possession of the Subject Lots in the concept of owners since 12
June 1945 or earlier. According to the petitioner Republic,
possession of the Subject Lots prior to 25 June 1963 cannot be
considered in determining compliance with the periods of possession
required by law. The Subject Lots were classified as alienable and
disposable only on 25 June 1963, per CENRO's certification. It also
alleges that the Court of Appeals, in applying the 30-year
acquisitive prescription period, had overlooked the ruling
inRepublic v. Doldol,21where this Court declared that Commonwealth
Act No. 141, otherwise known as the Public Land Act, as amended and
as it is presently phrased, requires that possession of land of the
public domain must be from 12 June 1945 or earlier, for the same to
be acquired through judicial confirmation of imperfect
title.Second,the application for registration suffers from fatal
infirmity as the subject of the application consisted of two
parcels of land individually and separately owned by two
applicants. Petitioner Republic contends that it is implicit in the
provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the
Property Registration Decree, as amended, that the application for
registration of title to land shall be filed by a single applicant;
multiple applicants may file a single application only in case they
are co-owners. While an application may cover two parcels of land,
it is allowed only when the subject parcels of land belong to the
same applicant or applicants (in case the subject parcels of land
are co-owned) and are situated within the same province. Where the
authority of the courts to proceed is conferred by a statute and
when the manner of obtaining jurisdiction is mandatory, it must be
strictly complied with or the proceedings will be utterly void.
Since the respondents failed to comply with the procedure for land
registration under the Property Registration Decree, the
proceedings held before the MTC is void, as the latter did not
acquire jurisdiction over it.IJurisdictionAddressing first the
issue of jurisdiction, this Court finds that the MTC had no
jurisdiction to proceed with and hear the application for
registration filed by the respondents but for reasons different
from those presented by petitioner Republic.A. The misjoinder of
causes of action and parties does not affect the jurisdiction of
the MTC to hear and proceed with respondents' application for
registration.Respondents filed a single application for
registration of the Subject Lots even though they were not
co-owners. Respondents Jeremias and David were actually seeking the
individual and separate registration of Lots No. 8422 and 8423,
respectively.Petitioner Republic believes that the procedural
irregularity committed by the respondents was fatal to their case,
depriving the MTC of jurisdiction to proceed with and hear their
application for registration of the Subject Lots, based on this
Court's pronouncement inDirector of Lands v. Court of Appeals,22to
wit:. . . In view of these multiple omissions which constitute
non-compliance with the above-cited sections of the Act, We rule
that said defects have not invested the Court with the authority or
jurisdiction to proceed with the case because the manner or mode of
obtaining jurisdiction as prescribed by the statute which is
mandatory has not been strictly followed, thereby rendering all
proceedings utterly null and void.This Court, however, disagrees
with petitioner Republic in this regard. This procedural lapse
committed by the respondents should not affect the jurisdiction of
the MTC to proceed with and hear their application for registration
of the Subject Lots.The Property Registration Decree23recognizes
and expressly allows the following situations: (1) the filing of a
single application by several applicants for as long as they are
co-owners of the parcel of land sought to be registered;24and (2)
the filing of a single application for registration of several
parcels of land provided that the same are located within the same
province.25The Property Registration Decree is silent, however, as
to the present situation wherein two applicants filed a single
application for two parcels of land, but are seeking the separate
and individual registration of the parcels of land in their
respective names.Since the Property Registration Decree failed to
provide for such a situation, then this Court refers to the Rules
of Court to determine the proper course of action. Section 34 of
the Property Registration Decree itself provides that, "[t]he Rules
of Court shall, insofar as not inconsistent with the provisions of
this Decree, be applicable to land registration and cadastral cases
by analogy or in a suppletory character and whenever practicable
and convenient."Considering every application for land registration
filed in strict accordance with the Property Registration Decree as
a single cause of action, then the defect in the joint application
for registration filed by the respondents with the MTC constitutes
a misjoinder of causes of action and parties. Instead of a single
or joint application for registration, respondents Jeremias and
David, more appropriately, should have filed separate applications
for registration of Lots No. 8422 and 8423, respectively.Misjoinder
of causes of action and parties do not involve a question of
jurisdiction of the court to hear and proceed with the case.26They
are not even accepted grounds for dismissal thereof.27Instead,
under the Rules of Court, the misjoinder of causes of action and
parties involve an implied admission of the court's jurisdiction.
It acknowledges the power of the court, acting upon the motion of a
party to the case or on its own initiative, to order the severance
of the misjoined cause of action, to be proceeded with separately
(in case of misjoinder of causes of action); and/or the dropping of
a party and the severance of any claim against said misjoined
party, also to be proceeded with separately (in case of misjoinder
of parties).The misjoinder of causes of action and parties in the
present Petition may have been corrected by the MTCmotu propioor on
motion of the petitioner Republic. It is regrettable, however, that
the MTC failed to detect the misjoinder when the application for
registration was still pending before it; and more regrettable that
the petitioner Republic did not call the attention of the MTC to
the fact by filing a motion for severance of the causes of action
and parties, raising the issue of misjoinder only before this
Court.B. Respondents, however, failed to comply with the
publication requirements mandated by the Property Registration
Decree, thus, the MTC was not invested with jurisdiction as a land
registration court.Although the misjoinder of causes of action and
parties in the present Petition did not affect the jurisdiction of
the MTC over the land registration proceeding, this Court,
nonetheless, has discovered a defect in the publication of the
Notice of Initial Hearing, which bars the MTC from assuming
jurisdiction to hear and proceed with respondents' application for
registration.A land registration case is a proceedingin rem,28and
jurisdictionin remcannot be acquired unless there be constructive
seizure of the land through publication and service of
notice.29Section 23 of the Property Registration Decree requires
that the public be given Notice of the Initial Hearing of the
application for land registration by means of (1) publication; (2)
mailing; and (3) posting. Publication of the Notice of Initial
Hearing shall be made in the following manner:1. By publication.
Upon receipt of the order of the court setting the time for initial
hearing, the Commissioner of Land Registration shall cause a notice
of initial hearing to be published once in the Official Gazette and
once in a newspaper of general circulation in the
Philippines:Provided,however, that the publication in the Official
Gazette shall be sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court.
Said notice shall be addressed to all persons appearing to have an
interest in the land involved including the adjoining owners so far
as known, and "to all whom it may concern." Said notice shall also
require all persons concerned to appear in court at a certain date
and time to show cause why the prayer of said application shall not
be granted.Even as this Court concedes that the aforequoted Section
23(1) of the Property Registration Decree expressly provides that
publication in the Official Gazette shall be sufficient to confer
jurisdiction upon the land registration court, it still affirms its
declaration inDirector of Lands v. Court of Appeals30that
publication in a newspaper of general circulation is mandatory for
the land registration court to validly confirm and register the
title of the applicant or applicants. That Section 23 of the
Property Registration Decree enumerated and described in detail the
requirements of publication, mailing, and posting of the Notice of
Initial Hearing, then all such requirements, including publication
of the Notice in a newspaper of general circulation, is essential
and imperative, and must be strictly complied with. In the same
case, this Court expounded on the reason behind the compulsory
publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing in a newspaper of
general circulation, thus It may be asked why publication in a
newspaper of general circulation should be deemed mandatory when
the law already requires notice by publication in the Official
Gazette as well as by mailing and posting, all of which have
already been complied with in the case at hand. The reason is due
process and the reality that the Official Gazette is not as widely
read and circulated as newspaper and is oftentimes delayed in its
circulation, such that the notices published therein may not reach
the interested parties on time, if at all. Additionally, such
parties may not be owners of neighboring properties, and may in
fact not own any other real estate. In sum, the all encompassingin
remnature of land registration cases, the consequences of default
orders issued against the whole world and the objective of
disseminating the notice in as wide a manner as possible demand a
mandatory construction of the requirements for publication, mailing
and posting.31In the instant Petition, the initial hearing was set
by the MTC, and was in fact held, on 03 September 1999 at 8:30 a.m.
While the Notice thereof was printed in the issue of the Official
Gazette, dated 02 August 1999, and officially released on 10 August
1999, it was published inThe Freeman Banat News, a daily newspaper
printed in Cebu City and circulated in the province and cities of
Cebu and in the rest of Visayas and Mindanao, only on 19 December
1999, more than three months after the initial hearing.Indubitably,
such publication of the Notice, way after the date of the initial
hearing, would already be worthless and ineffective. Whoever read
the Notice as it was published inThe Freeman Banat Newsand had a
claim to the Subject Lots was deprived of due process for it was
already too late for him to appear before the MTC on the day of the
initial hearing to oppose respondents' application for
registration, and to present his claim and evidence in support of
such claim. Worse, as the Notice itself states, should the
claimant-oppositor fail to appear before the MTC on the date of
initial hearing, he would be in default and would forever be barred
from contesting respondents' application for registration and even
the registration decree that may be issued pursuant thereto. In
fact, the MTC did issue an Order of Special Default on 03 September
1999.The late publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing in the
newspaper of general circulation is tantamount to no publication at
all, having the same ultimate result. Owing to such defect in the
publication of the Notice, the MTC failed to constructively seize
the Subject Lots and to acquire jurisdiction over respondents'
application for registration thereof. Therefore, the MTC Judgment,
dated 21 December 1999, ordering the registration and confirmation
of the title of respondents Jeremias and David over Lots No. 8422
and 8423, respectively; as well as the MTC Order, dated 02 February
2000, declaring its Judgment of 21 December 1999 final and
executory, and directing the LRA Administrator to issue a decree of
registration for the Subject Lots, are both null and void for
having been issued by the MTC without jurisdiction.IIPeriod
ofPossessionRespondents failed to comply with the required period
of possession of the Subject Lots for the judicial confirmation or
legalization of imperfect or incomplete title.While this Court has
already found that the MTC did not have jurisdiction to hear and
proceed with respondents' application for registration, this Court
nevertheless deems it necessary to resolve the legal issue on the
required period of possession for acquiring title to public
land.Respondents' application filed with the MTC did not state the
statutory basis for their title to the Subject Lots. They only
alleged therein that they obtained title to the Subject Lots by
purchase from their parents, spouses Gregorio Herbieto and Isabel
Owatan, on 25 June 1976. Respondent Jeremias, in his testimony,
claimed that his parents had been in possession of the Subject Lots
in the concept of an owner since 1950.32Yet, according to the
DENR-CENRO Certification, submitted by respondents themselves, the
Subject Lots are "within Alienable and Disposable, Block I, Project
No. 28 per LC Map No. 2545 of Consolacion, Cebu certified under
Forestry Administrative Order No. 4-1063, dated June 25, 1963.
Likewise, it is outside Kotkot-Lusaran Mananga Watershed Forest
Reservation per Presidential Proclamation No. 932 dated June 29,
1992."33The Subject Lots are thus clearly part of the public
domain, classified as alienable and disposable as of 25 June
1963.As already well-settled in jurisprudence, no public land can
be acquired by private persons without any grant, express or
implied, from the government;34and it is indispensable that the
person claiming title to public land should show that his title was
acquired from the State or any other mode of acquisition recognized
by law.35The Public Land Act, as amended, governs lands of the
public domain, except timber and mineral lands, friar lands, and
privately-owned lands which reverted to the State.36It explicitly
enumerates the means by which public lands may be disposed, as
follows:(1) For homestead settlement;(2) By sale;(3) By lease;(4)
By confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles;(a) By judicial
legalization; or(b) By administrative legalization (free
patent).37Each mode of disposition is appropriately covered by
separate chapters of the Public Land Act because there are specific
requirements and application procedure for every mode.38Since
respondents herein filed their application before the MTC,39then it
can be reasonably inferred that they are seeking the judicial
confirmation or legalization of their imperfect or incomplete title
over the Subject Lots.Judicial confirmation or legalization of
imperfect or incomplete title to land, not exceeding 144
hectares,40may be availed of by persons identified under Section 48
of the Public Land Act, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1073,
which reads Section 48. The following-described citizens of the
Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to
own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have
not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First
Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation
of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title
thereafter, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:(a) [Repealed
by Presidential Decree No. 1073].(b) Those who by themselves or
through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of
agricultural lands of the public domain, under abona fideclaim of
acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier,
immediately preceding the filing of the applications for
confirmation of title, except when prevented by war orforce
majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all
the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be
entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this
chapter.(c) Members of the national cultural minorities who by
themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation
of lands of the public domain suitable to agriculture whether
disposable or not, under abona fideclaim of ownership since June
12, 1945 shall be entitled to the rights granted in subsection (b)
hereof.Not being members of any national cultural minorities,
respondents may only be entitled to judicial confirmation or
legalization of their imperfect or incomplete title under Section
48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended. Section 48(b), as
amended, now requires adverse possession of the land since 12 June
1945 or earlier. In the present Petition, the Subject Lots became
alienable and disposable only on 25 June 1963. Any period of
possession prior to the date when the Subject Lots were classified
as alienable and disposable is inconsequential and should be
excluded from the computation of the period of possession; such
possession can never ripen into ownership and unless the land had
been classified as alienable and disposable, the rules on
confirmation of imperfect title shall not apply thereto.41It is
very apparent then that respondents could not have complied with
the period of possession required by Section 48(b) of the Public
Land Act, as amended, to acquire imperfect or incomplete title to
the Subject Lots that may be judicially confirmed or legalized.The
confirmation of respondents' title by the Court of Appeals was
based on the erroneous supposition that respondents were claiming
title to the Subject Lots under the Property Registration Decree.
According to the Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated 22
November 2002, Section 14(4) of the Property Registration Decree
allows individuals to own land in any other manner provided by law.
It then ruled that the respondents, having possessed the Subject
Lots, by themselves and through their predecessors-in-interest,
since 25 June 1963 to 23 September 1998, when they filed their
application, have acquired title to the Subject Lots by
extraordinary prescription under Article 1113, in relation to
Article 1137, both of the Civil Code.42The Court of Appeals
overlooked the difference between the Property Registration Decree
and the Public Land Act. Under the Property Registration Decree,
there already exists a title which is confirmed by the court; while
under the Public Land Act, the presumption always is that the land
applied for pertains to the State, and that the occupants and
possessors only claim an interest in the same by virtue of their
imperfect title or continuous, open, and notorious possession.43As
established by this Court in the preceding paragraphs, the Subject
Lots respondents wish to register are undoubtedly alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain and respondents may have
acquired title thereto only under the provisions of the Public Land
Act.However, it must be clarified herein that even though
respondents may acquire imperfect or incomplete title to the
Subject Lots under the Public Land Act, their application for
judicial confirmation or legalization thereof must be in accordance
with the Property Registration Decree, for Section 50 of the Public
Land Act reads SEC. 50. Any person or persons, or their legal
representatives or successors in right, claiming any lands or
interest in lands under the provisions of this chapter, must in
every case present an application to the proper Court of First
Instance, praying that the validity of the alleged title or claim
be inquired into and that a certificate of title be issued to them
under the provisions of the Land Registration Act.44Hence,
respondents' application for registration of the Subject Lots must
have complied with the substantial requirements under Section 48(b)
of the Public Land Act and the procedural requirements under the
Property Registration Decree.Moreover, provisions of the Civil Code
on prescription of ownership and other real rights apply in general
to all types of land, while the Public Land Act specifically
governs lands of the public domain. Relative to one another, the
Public Land Act may be considered a special law45that must take
precedence over the Civil Code, a general law. It is an established
rule of statutory construction that between a general law and a
special law, the special law prevails Generalia specialibus non
derogant.46WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, the instant Petition
is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
67625, dated 22 November 2002, is REVERSED. The Judgment of the MTC
of Consolacion, Cebu in LRC Case No. N-75, dated 21 December 1999,
and its Order, dated 02 February 2000 are declared NULL AND VOID.
Respondents' application for registration is DISMISSED.SO
ORDERED.REPUBLIC v. DE GUZMANG.R. No. 137887, February 28,
2000Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaFIRST
DIVISIONG.R. No. 137887 February 28, 2000REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES,petitioner,vs.DAMIAN ERMITAO DE GUZMAN, DEOGRACIAS
ERMITAO DE GUZMAN, ZENAIDA ERMITAO DE GUZMAN, ALICIA ERMITAO DE
GUZMAN, SALVADOR ERMITAO DE GUZMAN, DOMINGA ERMITAO, NATIVIDAD
ENCARNACION, MELBA E. TORRES, FLORA MANALO, SOCORRO DELA ROSA, JOSE
ERMITAO, ESMERANDO ERMITAO, TRICOM DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION and
FILOMENO ERMITAO,respondents.YNARES-SANTIAGO,J.:Before us is a
Petition for Review onCertiorariof a decision of the Court of
Appeals1affirming the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of
Tagaytay, Branch 18, in LRC Cases No. TG-362 and TG-396.2The facts
are simple:Conflicting applications for confirmation of imperfect
title were filed by Norma Almanzor and private respondent Salvador
De Guzman over parcels of land located in Silang, Cavite. After
trial on the merits, the lower court rendered judgment in favor of
private respondent De Guzman, to wit WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby
rendered by this Court as follows:(1) In LRC Case No. TG-362, this
Court hereby denies the application for registration of the parcels
of land mentioned therein by applicant Norma R. Almanzor for lack
of factual and legal bases;(2) In LRC Case No. 396, this Court
hereby approves the petition for registration and thus places under
the operation of Act 141, Act 946 and/or P.D. 1529, otherwise known
as the Property Registration Law, the land described in Plan
Psu-67537-Amd-2 and containing an area of 308,638 square meters, as
supported by its technical descriptions now forming parts of the
records of these cases, in addition to other proofs adduced in the
names of petitioners Damian Ermitao De Guzman, Deogracias Ermitao
De Guzman, Zenaida Ermitao De Guzman, Alicia Ermitao De Guzman and
Salvador De Guzman, all married, of legal age and with residence
and postal addresses at Magallanes Street, Carmona, Cavite, subject
to the claims of oppositors Dominga Ermitao, Natividad Encarnacion,
Melba E. Torres, Flora Manalo, Socorro de la Rosa, Jose Ermitao and
Esmeranso Ermitao under an instrument entitled "Waiver of Rights
with Conformity" the terms and conditions of which are hereby
ordered by this Court to be annotated at the back of the
certificates of title to be issued to the petitioners pursuant to
the judgment of this Court.SO ORDERED.3As earlier mentioned, on
appeal to the Court of Appeals, said judgment was affirmed and the
petition for registration of private respondents over the subject
parcels of land was approved.Hence, the instant Petition, anchored
upon the following assignments of error ITHE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN
NOT FINDING THAT THE DE GUZMANS HAVE NOT SUBMITTED PROOF OF THEIR
FEE SIMPLE TITLE OR POSSESSION IN THE MANNER AND FOR THE LENGTH OF
TIME REQUIRED BY LAW TO JUSTIFY CONFIRMATION OF AN IMPERFECT
TITLE.
IITHE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT THE DE GUZMANS
HAVE NOT OVERTHROWN THE PRESUMPTION THAT THE LANDS ARE PORTIONS OF
THE PUBLIC DOMAIN BELONGING TO THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES.4We
find merit in the instant Petition.It is not disputed that the
subject parcels of land were released as agricultural land only in
19655while the petition for confirmation of imperfect title was
filed by private respondents only in 1991.6Thus the period of
occupancy of the subject parcels of land from 1965 until the time
the application was filed in 1991 was only twenty six (26) years,
four (4) years short of the required thirty (30) year period
possession requirement underSec.14,P.D.29andR.A.No.6940.In finding
that private respondents' possession of the subject property
complied with law, the Court of Appeals reasoned out that (W)hile
it is true that the land became alienable and disposable only in
December, 1965, however, records indicate that as early as 1928,
Pedro Ermitao, appellees' predecessor-in-interest, was already in
possession of the property, cultivating it and planting various
crops thereon. It follows that appellees' possession as of the time
of the filing of the petition in 1991 when tacked to Pedro
Ermitao's possession is 63 years or more than the required 30 years
period of possession. The land, which is agricultural, has been
converted to private property.7We disagree.The Court of Appeals'
consideration of the period of possession prior to the time the
subject land was released as agricultural is in direct
contravention of the pronouncement inAlmeda vs.Court of Appeals,8to
wit The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the private
respondents had not qualified for a grant under Section 48(b) of
the Public Land Act because theirpossession of the land while it
was still inalienable forest land, or before it was declared
alienable and disposable land of the public domain on January 13,
1968, could not ripen into private ownership, and should be
excluded from the computation of the 30-year open and continuous
possession in concept of ownerrequired under Section 48(b) of Com.
Act 141. It accords with our ruling inDirector of Lands vs.Court of
Appeals,Ibarra Bishar, et al., 178 SCRA 708, that:Unless and until
the land classified as forest is released in an official
proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the
disposable lands of the public domain, the rules on confirmation of
imperfect title do not apply (Amunategui vs. Director of Forestry,
126 SCRA 69; Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA 689;
Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, 133 SCRA 701; Republic vs.
Court of Appeals, 148 SCRA 480; Vallarta vs. Intermediate Appellate
Court, 151 SCRA 679).Thus possession of forest lands, however long,
cannot ripen into private ownership (Vamo vs. Government, 41 Phil.
161 [1920]; Adorable vs. Director of Forestry, 17 Phil. 410
[1960]). A parcel of forest land is within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forestry and beyond the power and
jurisdiction of the cadastral court to register under the Torrens
System (Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 89 SCRA 648; Republic vs.
Vera, 120 SCRA 210 [1983]; Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals,
129 SCRA 689 [1984]). (emphasis ours)So, too, is the Court of
Appeals' reliance on the case ofDirector of Land Management
vs.Court of Appeals9misplaced. There, while the period of
possession of the applicant's predecessor-in-interest was tacked to
his own possession to comply with the required thirty year period
possession requirement, the land involved therein was not forest
land but alienable public land. On the other hand, in the case
before us, the property subject of private respondents' application
was only declared alienable in 1965. Prior to such date, the same
was forest land incapable of private appropriation. It was not
registrable and possession thereof, no matter how lengthy, could
not convert it into private property, (unless) and until such lands
were reclassified and considered disposable and alienable.10In
summary, therefore, prior to its declaration as alienable land in
1965, any occupation or possession thereon cannot be considered in
the counting of the thirty year possession requirement. This is in
accord with the ruling inAlmeda vs.Court of Appeals, (supra), and
because the rules on the confirmation of imperfect titles do not
apply unless and until the land classified as forest land is
released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may
form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public
domain.11While we acknowledge the Court of Appeals' finding that
private respondents and their predecessors-in-interest have been in
possession of the subject land for sixty three (63) years at the
time of the application of their petition, our hands are tied by
the applicable laws and jurisprudence in giving practical relief to
them. The fact remains that from the time the subject land was
declared alienable until the time of their application, private
respondents' occupation thereof was only twenty six (26) years. We
cannot consider their thirty seven (37) years of possession prior
to the release of the land as alienable because absent the fact of
declassification prior to the possession and cultivation in good
faith by petitioner, the property occupied by him remained
classified as forest or timberland,which he could not have acquired
by prescription. Further, jurisprudence is replete with cases which
reiterate that forest lands or forest reserves are not capable of
private appropriation and possession thereof, however long, cannot
convert them into private property. Possession of the land by
private respondents, whether spanning decades or centuries, could
never ripen into ownership. This Court is constrained to abide by
the latinmaxim"(d)ura lex, sed lex".12WHEREFORE, the instant
Petition is GRANTED and the February 26, 1998 decision of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 48785 as well as that of the Regional
Trial Court of Cavite, Branch 38, in LRC Case No. TG-396 are both
REVERSED. Judgment is rendered dismissing LRC Case No. 396 for
failure of the applicants therein to comply with the thirty year
occupancy and possessory requirements of law for confirmation of
imperfect title. No pronouncement as to costs.1wphi1.ntSO
ORDERED.MARTINEZ v. CAG.R. No. 170409 January 28, 2008Republic of
the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaSECOND DIVISIONG.R. No. 170409
January 28, 2008GREGORIA MARTINEZ,1, petitioner,vs.HON. COURT OF
APPEALS, HEIRS OF MELANIO MEDINA, SR., MELANIO MEDINA, JR.,
NORBERTO MEDINA, ERMITANO MEDINA, ALBERTO MEDINA, SENEN MEDINA,
ANTONIO MEDINA, MANOLO MEDINA, and ARTURO MEDINA,respondents.D E C
I S I O NTINGA,J.:The present petition originally stemmed from a
Complaint2filed by private respondents against petitioner,3seeking
the cancellation of titles over the parcels of land
involved.4Subject of the complaint are three (3) parcels of land
with areas of approximately 10,064; 48,000; and 5,784 sq m, all
situated in Bangkal, Carmona, Cavite and covered respectively by
Original Certificates of Title (OCT Nos.) No. P-5518, No. P-5519,
and No. P-5482.5Respondents are the heirs of the late Melanio
Medina, Sr. who during his lifetime inherited the properties from
his mother, Rosa Martinez Emitao, who in turn inherited them from
her own mother, Celedonia Martinez (Celedonia). The complaint
alleged that sometime in 1992, petitioner, whose real name as
appearing in her birth certificate is Gregoria Merquines,
represented herself as Gregoria Martinez and as thus one of the
descendants of Celedonia, and under that name applied for free
patents over the properties with the Community Environmental and
Natural Resources Office of Bacoor, Cavite. Unbeknownst to private
respondents, the corresponding OCTs were thus issued in the name of
Gregoria Martinez. When private respondents later filed an
application for land registration over the same properties,
petitioner opposed the same. This impelled private respondents to
file the instant complaint.6The complaint was heard by the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Imus, Cavite, Branch 20.7The only issue raised
at the trial was whether the free patents and land titles should be
annulled due to fraud and misrepresentation in their
procurement.8After weighing the evidence of both sides, the trial
court rendered a Decision9ordering the cancellation of petitioners
titles. It found that the true surname of petitioner Gregoria is
Merquines and not Martinez, a surname which petitioner used for the
first time when she applied for the free patents. The RTC observed
that no other document was presented to show that petitioner used
the surname Martinez in any of her previous transactions; that the
surname indicated in her birth certificate is Merquines; that she
was born on 17 November 1924 to spouses Pablo Merquines and Bartola
Cardona; and that the records of marriage of the Local Civil
Registrar of Carmona, Cavite recorded the marriage of Gregoria
Merquines, daughter of Pablo Merquines and Bartola Cardona, to Jose
Restrivera on 13 July 1941.The trial court further endeavored to
trace the lineage of petitioner. The baptismal certificate of her
father, Pablo Merquines, showed that he was born on 26 June 1897 to
the spouses Faustino Merquines and Juana Sarmiento, while the
baptismal certificate of her mother, Bartola Cardona, showed that
she was born on 28 August 1898 to spouses Gaspar Cardona and
Antonia Realon. Even the birth certificates of petitioners
siblings, Crispina, born on 20 January 1920 and Dominador, born on
4 October 1931, showed that they bore the surname Merquines.
Moreover, the birth certificates of the children of petitioner and
her husband Jose Restrivera namely, Norberto and Jaime Restrivera,
showed that the surname of their mother is Merquines and not
Martinez.10The trial court observed that notwithstanding the
misrepresentations of petitioner in her free patent applications,
private respondents were not necessarily entitled to the automatic
reconveyance of the subject lots.11It simply disposed of the case
in this wise:WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby
rendered ordering the cancellation of OCT Nos. P-5518, P-5519 and
P-5482 issued in the name of defendant.SO ORDERED.12Only petitioner
interposed an appeal from the trial courts decision to the Court of
Appeals.Before the Court of Appeals, petitioner challenged the
findings of fact of the trial court concerning the fraud and
misrepresentations which she committed. The appellate court made
short shrift of the challenge as follows:13From the evidence extant
on record, it is at once apparent that appellant committed fraud
and misrepresentation in her application for free patent which
later became the basis for the issuance of the certificates of
title in her name. More than the issue of the use of the surname
"Martinez," her fraudulent act consists essentially in
misrepresenting before the Community Environment and Natural
Resources Office of Bacoor, Cavite that she is the heir of
Celedonia Martinez whom she admitted in her Answer as the original
absolute owner of the subject parcels of land. She testified in
open court that Celedonia Martinez is her grandmother, being the
mother of her father Pablo Merquines.The documentary evidence
adduced by appellles, however, particularly her fathers baptismal
certificate plainly shows that he is the son of spouses Faustino
Merquines and Juana Sarmiento. Her mother Bartola Cadona was also
shown in her baptismal certificate to be the child of spouses
Gaspar Cardona and Antonia Realon. These documents indubitably show
that neither of appellants parents is the child of Celodonia
Martinez and she is not in [anyway] related by blood to the latter.
Thus, not only was her application for patents tainted with fraud,
she also committed perjury in this case when she lied bold-faced
about her lineage which was disproved by the documentary evidence
relative to her ancestors.14Petitioner also assigned two other
errors which, however, were neither raised in her answer as
defenses nor otherwise litigated during the trial. She argued in
the main that the trial court erred in adjudicating the case
although an indispensable party in the person of the State through
the director of lands was not impleaded,15and that the titles
secured were already indefeasible in view of the lapse of one year
from the issuance of the titles.16Sustaining the jurisdiction of
the lower court, the Court of Appeals remarked that the
jurisdiction of the court is determined by the allegations in the
complaint. In their complaint, private respondents asserted private
ownership over the subject lands as they had been in possession of
and had been cultivating the same for more than 60 years.17The
appellate court also noted that the issues were not raised in the
petitioners answer and in the subsequent proceedings.18Concerning
the alleged indefeasibility of the titles issued to petitioner, the
Court of Appeals ruled that the argument is untenable since
petitioner employed fraud in the proceedings which led to the
issuance of the free patents and the titles.19Before this Court,
petitioner reiterates the same two issues previously raised for the
first time before the appellate court.We sustain the Court of
Appeals.It is a well-settled principle that points of law,
theories, issues and arguments not adequately brought to the
attention of the trial court need not be, and ordinarily will not
be, considered by a reviewing court as they cannot be raised for
the first time on appeal20because this would be offensive to the
basic rules of fair play, justice and due process.21On this point
alone, the petition could be denied outright. Nonetheless, like the
Court of Appeals, we deign to decide the case on the merits.Public
lands suitable for agricultural purposes can be disposed of only by
homestead patent, sale, lease, judicial confirmation of imperfect
or incomplete titles, and administrative legalization or free
patent.22One claiming private rights as basis of ownership must
prove compliance with the Public Land Act which prescribes the
substantive as well as the procedural requirements for acquisition
of public lands.23Each mode of disposition is appropriately covered
by a separate chapter of the Public Land Act. There are specific
requirements and application procedures for every mode.24The
confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles to alienable and
disposable agricultural land of the public domain may be done in
two ways: judicial legalization or judicial confirmation of
imperfect or incomplete titles under Chapter VIII, and
administrative legalization or free patent under Chapter VII of the
Public Land Act.Any citizen of the Philippines, occupying lands of
the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest
therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may
apply with the RTC of the province where the land is located for
confirmation of his/her claim and the issuance of a certificate of
title therefor under the Property Registration Decree.25Such
applicants must by themselves or through their predecessors in
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of alienable and disposable agricultural
lands of the public domain,26under abona fideclaim of acquisition
or ownership, since 12 June 1945,27except when prevented by war
orforce majeure, shall be conclusively presumed to have performed
all the conditions essential to a Government grant.28At present,
such applications for judicial confirmation of imperfect or
incomplete titles must be filed prior to 31 December 2020; and must
cover an area of up to 12 hectares only.29When the conditions
specified in Section 48(b)30of the Public Land Act are complied
with, the possessor is deemed to have acquired, by operation of
law, a right to a grant, without the necessity of a certificate of
title being issued. The land, therefore, ceased to be of the public
domain, and beyond the authority of the director of lands to
dispose of. The application for confirmation is a mere formality,
the lack of which does not affect the legal sufficiency of the
title as would be evidenced by the patent and the Torrens title to
be issued upon the strength of said patent.31For all legal intents
and purposes, the land is segregated from the public domain,
because the beneficiary is "conclusively presumed to have performed
all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be
entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this
chapter."Section 44, Chapter VII of the Public Land Act provides
that the applicant for administrative confirmation of imperfect
title must be a natural born citizen of the Philippines who is not
the owner of more than 12 hectares and who, for at least 30 years
prior to the effectivity of Republic Act No. 6940 amending the
Public Land Act,32has continuously occupied and cultivated, either
by himself or through his predecessor-in-interest, a tract or
tracts of agricultural public land subject to disposition, who
shall have paid the real estate tax thereon while the same has not
been occupied by any person shall be entitled to a free patent over
such land/s not to exceed 12 hectares.Turning again to the first
issue raised by petitioner, it is apparent that her insistence that
the State through the director of lands is an indispensable party
flows from her failure to recognize that private respondents action
is one for declaration of nullity of title which is different from
an action for reversion of title to the State. In the latter case
the director of lands needs to be impleaded, unlike in the first.
Thus, we reiterated inEvangelista v. Santiago:33An ordinary civil
action for declaration of nullity of free patents and certificates
of title is not the same as an action for reversion. The difference
between them lies in the allegations as to the character of
ownership of the realty whose title is sought to be nullified. In
an action for reversion, the pertinent allegations in the complaint
would admit State ownership of the disputed land. Hence, inGabila
v. Barriga[41 SCRA 131], where the plaintiff in his complaint
admits that he has no right to demand the cancellation or amendment
of the defendants title because even if the title were canceled or
amended the ownership of the land embraced therein or of the
portion affected by the amendment would revert to the public
domain, we ruled that the action was for reversion and that the
only person or entity entitled to relief would be the Director of
Lands.On the other hand, a cause of action for declaration of
nullity of free patent and certificate of title would require
allegations of the plaintiffs ownership of the contested lot prior
to the issuance of such free patent and certificate of title as
well as the defendants fraud or mistake, as the case may be, in
successfully obtaining these documents of title over the parcel of
land claimed by plaintiff. In such a case, the nullity arises
strictly not from the fraud or deceit but from the fact that the
land is beyond the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Lands to bestow
and whatever patent or certificate of title obtained therefore is
consequently voidab initio. The real party-in-interest is not the
State but the plaintiff who alleges a pre-existing right of
ownership over the parcel of land in question even before the grant
of title to the defendant.34In an earlier case,35in reversing the
dismissal of the complaint by the trial court, this Court stressed
that the allegations of the complaint present an action for
nullification of free patent and title, not an action for reversion
of title which has to be instituted by the Solicitor General.It is
true that the trial court opined that the next step following the
cancellation of petitioners titles is an action for the reversion
of the disputed lands back to the public domain.36Said observation,
found in the body only and not in the dispositive portion of the
decision, does not detract from, but in fact even bolsters, the
real nature of the complaint as an action for nullification of
title.Now, the second issue. Petitioner claims that her titles are
already indefeasible and incontrovertible following the lapse of
one year following their issuance.InApuyan v. Haldeman,37also cited
by petitioner, it was held that a certificate of title issued on
the basis of a free patent procured through fraud or in violation
of the law may be cancelled, as such title is not cloaked with
indefeasibility.It was likewise held inMeneses v. Court of
Appeals38that the principle of indefeasibility of title is
unavailing where fraud attended the issuance of the free patents
and titles.WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV. No. 70458 is AFFIRMED. Costs
against petitioner.SO ORDERED.
TAN v. REPUBLICG.R. No. 177797 December 4, 2008Republic of the
PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaTHIRD DIVISIONG.R. No. 177797
December 4, 2008SPS. PEDRO TAN and NENA ACERO
TAN,petitioner,vs.REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,respondent.D E C I S
I O NCHICO-NAZARIO,J.:This case is a Petition for Review
onCertiorariunder Rule 45 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision1dated 28
February 2006 and Resolution2dated 12 April 2007 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 71534. In its assailed Decision, the
appellate court reversed and set aside the Decision3dated 9 May
2001 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Misamis Oriental,
10thJudicial Region, Branch 39, Cagayan de Oro City, in LRC Case
No. N-2000-055, and ordered herein petitioners, spouses Pedro and
Nena Tan (spouses Tan), to return the parcel of land known as Lot
1794, Ap-10-002707, Pls-923, with an area of 215,698 square meters,
located in Calingagan, Villanueva, Misamis Oriental (subject
property) to herein respondent, Republic of the Philippines
(Republic). In its assailed Resolution, the appellate court denied
the spouses Tans Motion for Reconsideration.The factual milieu of
this case is as follows:The spouses Tan were natural-born Filipino
citizens, who became Australian citizens on 9 February 1984.4They
seek to have the subject property registered in their names.The
subject property was declared alienable and disposable on 31
December 1925, as established by a Certification5dated 14 August
2000 issued by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR), Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO),
Cagayan de Oro City.Prior to the spouses Tan, the subject property
was in the possession of Lucio and Juanito Neri and their
respective spouses. Lucio and Juanito Neri had declared the subject
property for taxation purposes in their names under Tax
Declarations No. 8035 (1952),6No. 15247and No. 1523 (1955).8The
spouses Tan acquired the subject property from Lucio and Juanito
Neri and their spouses by virtue of a duly notarized Deed of Sale
of Unregistered Real Estate Property9dated 26 June 1970. The
spouses Tan took immediate possession of the subject property on
which they planted rubber, gemelina, and other fruit-bearing trees.
They declared the subject property for taxation purposes in their
names, as evidenced by Tax Declarations No. 501210(1971); No.
11155,11No. 10599,12No. 1059813(1974); No. 1170414(1976); No.
0122415(1980); No. 0631616(1983); and No. 94300017(2000); and paid
realty taxes thereon.However, a certain Patermateo Casio (Casio)
claimed a portion of the subject property, prompting the spouses
Tan to file a Complaint for Quieting of Title against him before
the RTC of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 24, where it was docketed as
Civil Case No. 88-204. On 29 August 1989, the RTC rendered a
Decision18in Civil Case No. 88-204 favoring the spouses Tan and
declaring their title to the subject property thus "quieted." Casio
appealed the said RTC Decision to the Court of Appeals where it was
docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 26225. In a Resolution19dated 15
November 1990, the appellate court dismissed CA-G.R. CV No. 26225
for lack of interest to prosecute. Casio elevated his case to this
Court via a Petition for Review on Certiorari, docketed as
UDK-10332. In a Resolution20dated 13 March 1991 in UDK-10332, the
Court denied Casios Petition for being insufficient in form and
substance. The said Resolution became final and executory on 3 June
1991.21Refusing to give up, Casio filed an Application for Free
Patent on the subject property before the Bureau of Lands.22On 8
December 1999, Casios application was ordered cancelled23by Officer
Ruth G. Sabijon of DENR-CENRO, Cagayan de Oro City, upon the
request of herein petitioner Pedro Tan, the declared owner of the
subject property pursuant to the 29 August 1989 Decision of the RTC
in Civil Case No. 88-204. Similarly, survey plan Csd-10-002779
prepared in the name of Casio was also ordered cancelled24by the
Office of the Regional Executive Director, DENR, Region X,
Macabalan, Cagayan de Oro City.In 2000, the spouses Tan filed their
Application for Registration of Title25to the subject property
before the RTC of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 39, where it was
docketed as LRC Case No. N-2000-055. The application of the spouses
Tan invoked the provisions of Act No. 49626and/or Section 48 of
Commonwealth Act No. 141,27as amended. In compliance with the
request28of the Land Registration Authority (LRA) dated 29 August
2000, the spouses Tan filed on 5 October 2000 an Amended
Application for Registration of Title29to the subject property.The
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) entered its appearance in LRC
Case No. N-2000-055 on behalf of the Republic, but failed to submit
a written opposition to the application of the spouses Tan.When no
opposition to the application of the spouses Tan was filed by the
time of the initial hearing of LRC Case No. N-2000-055, the RTC
issued on 23 April 2001 an order of general default, except as
against the Republic. Thereafter, the spouses Tan were allowed to
present their evidenceex-parte.After the establishment of the
jurisdictional facts, the RTC heard the testimony of John B. Acero
(Acero), nephew and lone witness of the spouses Tan. Acero
recounted the facts already presented above and affirmed that the
spouses Tans possession of the subject property had been open,
public, adverse and continuous.30After Aceros testimony, the
spouses Tan already made a formal offer of evidence, which was
admitted by the court a quo.31On 9 May 2001, the RTC rendered a
Decision in LRC Case No. N-2000-055 granting the application of the
spouses Tan, the dispositive portion of which reads:WHEREFORE,
[Spouses Tan] having conclusively established to the satisfaction
of this Court their ownership of the [subject property], Lot 1794,
Pls-923, situated in Villanueva, Misamis Oriental, should be as it
is hereby adjudicated to the [Spouses Tan] with address at #166
Capistrano Street, Cagayan de Oro City.Once this judgment becomes
final, let the Order for the issuance of decree and corresponding
Certificate of Title issue in accordance with Presidential Decree
No. 1529, as amended.32In its appeal of the afore-mentioned RTC
Decision to the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 71534,
the Republic made the following assignment of errors:I. The trial
court erred in ruling that [herein petitioners Spouses Tan] and
their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous and
notorious possession of subject property for the period required by
law.II. The trial court erred in granting the application for land
registration despite the fact that there is a disparity between the
area as stated in [the Spouses Tans] application and the tax
declarations of Juanito Neri, Lucio Neri, and [herein petitioner
Pedro Tan].III. The trial court erred in granting the application
for land registration despite the fact that [the Spouses Tan]
failed to present the original tracing cloth plan.IV. The trial
court erred in relying on the Decision dated [29 August 1989] by
the RTC-Branch 24, Cagayan de Oro City which declared [the Spouses
Tans] "title" on the subject [property] "quieted."V. The trial
court erred in not finding that [the Spouses Tan] failed to
overcome the presumption that all lands form part of the public
domain.33On 28 February 2006, the Court of Appeals rendered a
Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 71534 granting the appeal of the
Republic, and reversing and setting aside the 9 May 2001 Decision
of the RTC on the ground that the spouses Tan failed to comply with
Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, otherwise known as the
Public Land Act, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1073, which
requires possession of the subject property to start on or prior to
12 June 1945.34Hence, the appellate court ordered the spouses Tan
to return the subject property to the Republic.The spouses Tan
filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the foregoing Decision of the
Court of Appeals. To refute the finding of the appellate court that
they and their predecessors-in-interest did not possess the subject
property by 12 June 1945 or earlier, the spouses Tan attached to
their Motion a copy ofTax Declaration No. 4627covering the subject
property issued in1948in the name of their predecessor-in-interest,
Lucio Neri. They called attention to the statement in Tax
Declaration No. 4627 that it cancelledTax Declaration No. 2948.
Unfortunately, no copy of Tax Declaration No. 2948 was available
even in the Office of the Archive of the Province of Misamis
Oriental. The spouses Tan asserted that judicial notice may be
taken of the fact that land assessment is revised by the government
every four years; and since Tax Declaration No. 4627 was issued in
the year 1948, it can be presupposed that Tax Declaration No. 2948
was issued in the year 1944.The Court of Appeals denied the Motion
for Reconsideration of the spouses Tan in a Resolution dated 12
April 2007.The spouses Tan now come before this Court raising the
sole issue ofwhether or not [the Spouses Tan] have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of
the subject [property], under a bona fide claim of acquisition or
ownership, since [12 June 1945], or earlier, immediately preceding
the filing of the application for confirmation of title.35The Court
rules in the negative and, thus, finds the present Petition devoid
of merit.To recall, the spouses Tan filed before the RTC their
Application for Registration of Title to the subject property in
the year 2000 generally invoking the provisions of Act No. 496
and/or Section 48 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended.The
Public Land Act,36as amended by Presidential Decree No.
1073,37governs lands of the public domain, except timber and
mineral lands, friar lands, and privately owned lands which
reverted to the State.38It explicitly enumerates the means by which
public lands may be disposed of, to wit:(1) For homestead
settlement;(2) By sale;(3) By lease; and(4) By confirmation of
imperfect or incomplete titles;(a) By judicial legalization.(b) By
administrative legalization (free patent).39Each mode of
disposition is appropriately covered by separate chapters of the
Public Land Act because there are specific requirements and
application procedure for every mode.40Since the spouses Tan filed
their application before the RTC, then it can be reasonably
inferred that they are seeking thejudicial confirmation or
legalization of their imperfect or incomplete titleover the subject
property.Judicial confirmation or legalization of imperfect or
incomplete title to land, not exceeding 144 hectares, may be
availed of by persons identified under Section 48 of the Public
Land Act, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1073,41which reads
Section 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines,
occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such
lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been
perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of
the province where the land is located for confirmation of their
claims and the issuance of a certificate of title thereafter, under
the Land Registration Act, to wit:(a) [Repealed by Presidential
Decree No. 1073].(b) Those who by themselves or through their
predecessors-in- interesthave been in open, continuous, exclusive,
and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of
the public domain, under abona fideclaim of acquisition of
ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding
the filing of the application for confirmation of title, except
when prevented by war orforce majeure. These shall be conclusively
presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a
Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title
under the provisions of this chapter.(c) Members of the national
cultural minorities who by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession and occupation of lands of the public
domain suitable to agriculture whether disposable or not, under
abona fideclaim of ownership since June 12, 1945 shall be entitled
to the rights granted in subsection (b) hereof. (Emphasis
supplied.)Not being members of any national cultural minorities,
spouses Tan may only be entitled to judicial confirmation or
legalization of their imperfect or incomplete title under Section
48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended.The Court notes that
Presidential Decree No. 1073, amending the Public Land Act,
clarified Section 48, paragraph "b" thereof, by specifically
declaring that it applied only to alienable and disposable lands of
the public domain. Thus, based on the said provision of
Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, the two requisites which the
applicants must comply with for the grant of their Application for
Registration of Title are: (1) the land applied for is alienable
and disposable; and (2) the applicants and their
predecessors-in-interest have occupied and possessed the land
openly, continuously, exclusively, and adversely since 12 June
1945.42To prove that the land subject of an application for
registration is alienable, an applicant must conclusively establish
the existence of a positive act of the government such as a
presidential proclamation or an executive order or administrative
action, investigation reports of the Bureau of Lands investigator
or a legislative act or statute. Until then, the rules on
confirmation of imperfect title do not apply.43In the case at bar,
the spouses Tan presented a Certification from the DENR-CENRO,
Cagayan de Oro City, dated 14 August 2000, to prove the
alienability and disposability of the subject property. The said
Certification stated that the subject property became alienable and
disposable on31 December 1925. A certification from the DENR that a
lot is alienable and disposable is sufficient to establish the true
nature and character of the property and enjoys a presumption of
regularity in the absence of contradictory evidence.44Considering
that no evidence was presented to disprove the contents of the
aforesaid DENR-CENRO Certification, this Court is duty-bound to
uphold the same.Nonetheless, even when the spouses Tan were able to
sufficiently prove that the subject property is part of the
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain as early as 31
December 1925, they still failed to satisfactorily establish
compliance with the second requisite for judicial confirmation of
imperfect or incomplete title,i.e., open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of the subject property since
12 June 1945 or earlier.Through the years, Section 48(b) of the
Public Land Act has been amended several times.Republic v.
Doldol45provides a summary of these amendments:The original Section
48(b) of C.A. No. 141 provided for possession and occupation of
lands of the public domainsince July 26, 1894. This was superseded
by R.A. No. 1942, which provided for asimple thirty-year
prescriptive periodof occupation by an applicant for judicial
confirmation of imperfect title. The same, however, has already
been amended by Presidential Decree 1073, approved on January 25,
1977. As amended, Section 48(b) now reads:(b) Those who by
themselves or through their predecessors-in- interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona
fide claim of acquisition or ownership, since June 12, 1945 or
earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the application for
confirmation of title except when prevented by wars or force
majeure. Those shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all
the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be
entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this
chapter.Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by PD No.
1073, presently requires, for judicial confirmation of an imperfect
or incomplete title, the possession and occupation of the piece of
land by the applicants, by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest, since 12 June 1945 or earlier. This
provision is in total conformity with Section 14(1) of the Property
Registration Decree heretofore cited. (Emphasis ours.)As the law
now stands, a mere showing of possession for thirty years or more
is not sufficient. It must be shown, too, that possession and
occupation had started on 12 June 1945 or earlier.46It is worth
mentioning that in this case, even the spouses Tan do not dispute
that the true reckoning period for judicial confirmation of an
imperfect or incomplete title is on or before 12 June 1945. They
also admit that based on the previous evidence on record, their
possession and occupation of the subject property fall short of the
period prescribed by law. The earliest evidence of possession and
occupation of the subject property can be traced back to a tax
declaration issued in the name of their predecessors-in-interest
only in 1952. However, the spouses Tan are now asking the kind
indulgence of this Court to take into account Tax Declaration No.
4627 issued in 1948, which they had attached to their Motion for
Reconsideration before the Court of Appeals but which the appellate
court refused to consider. Just as they had argued before the Court
of Appeals, the spouses Tan point out that Tax Declaration No. 4627
was not newly issued but cancelled Tax Declaration No. 2948; and
should the Court take judicial notice of the fact that tax
assessments are revised every four years, then Tax Declaration No.
2948 covering the subject property was issued as early as
1944.Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court explicitly
provides:SEC. 34.Offer of evidence. The court shall consider no
evidence which has not been formally offered. The purpose for which
the evidence is offered must be specified.On the basis thereof, it
is clear that evidence should have been presented during trial
before the RTC; evidence not formally offered should not be
considered. In this case, it bears stressing that Tax Declaration
No. 4627 was only submitted by the Spouses Tan together with their
Motion for Reconsideration of the 28 February 2006 Decision of the
Court of Appeals. The reason given by the Spouses Tan why they
belatedly procured such evidence was because at the time of trial
the only evidence available at hand was the 1952 tax declaration.
More so, they also believed in good faith that they had met the
30-year period required by law. They failed to realize that under
Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, a mere
showing of possession for thirty years or more is not sufficient
because what the law requires is possession and occupation on or
before 12 June 1945. This Court, however, finds the reason given by
the spouses Tan unsatisfactory. The spouses Tan filed their
application for registration of title to the subject property under
the provisions of Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as
amended. It is incumbent upon them as applicants to carefully know
the requirements of the said law.Thus, following the rule
enunciated in Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, this
Court cannot take into consideration Tax Declaration No. 4627 as it
was only submitted by the Spouses Tan when they filed their Motion
for Reconsideration of the 28 February 2006 Decision of the
appellate court.And even if this Court, in the interest of
substantial justice, fairness and equity, admits and take into
consideration Tax Declaration No. 4627, issued in 1948, it would
still be insufficient to establish open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of the subject property by the
Spouses Tan and their predecessors-in-interest since 12 June 1945
or earlier.Tax Declaration No. 4627 was only issued in 1948, three
years after 12 June 1945, the cut-off date under the law for
acquiring imperfect or incomplete title to public land. For the
Court to conclude from the face of Tax Declaration No. 4627 alone
that the subject property had been declared for tax purposes before
12 June 1945 would already be too much of a stretch and would
require it to rely on mere presuppositions and conjectures. The
Court cannot simply take judicial notice that the government
revises tax assessments
