National and European Identities Complementary or Antagonistic

8/17/2019 National and European Identities Complementary or Antagonistic

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National and European identities: complementary or antagonistic?

Draft paper, please do not quote without permission

by

Laurent Licata

Université Libre de Bruxelles

[email protected]

Paper prepared for the Conference on ‘Europeanisation and Multiple Identities’,

9-10 June 2000, EUI/RSC, Florence, Italy


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Introduction

The development of a sense of European identity is currently one of the main concerns of

European Union institutions, and is at the core of this conference. There may be several reasons

why this issue attracts so much attention. The decline in average support for the EU during the

last decade is certainly one of them (Eurobarometer n° 50). It seems that public opinion did not

accompany the institutional reforms or, worse, reacted against them. In order to account for thislack of public support, many voices blamed the “symbolic deficit” of the EU (Mathieu, 1994). In

their present state, European institutions are too distant from the people; their decisions, in the

rare cases in which people are aware of them, are resented as extraneous actions rather than as the

expression of a collective will. In addition, the recent economic and political advances do nothave much meaning for the average European. In brief, it can be argued that the relationship

between the people and the EU is a rather cold one. According to this kind of critique thisrelationship should become a warm one, endowed with clear meaning: people should identify

with the EU so that they will support its political project and participate in its development(Albarran Cano, 1999). These three elements – identity, meaning and participation – are seen as

necessarily linked: identity and meaning being the necessary conditions for effective

participation. In other words, identification is considered important because it conditions thedevelopment of a European citizenship.

In the present paper I shall briefly trace the origins of this conception of identity by referring to

the way theorists of nationalism have described its development in the framework of Nation-

building. In the process, I shall examine how some social psychology models can contribute to a

better understanding of what these phenomena can imply for European integration. I will presentsome survey results regarding the relationships between regional, national and European levels of

identification; expectations and attitudes towards the future evolution of the EU; and the factors

that best predict European identification. Finally I shall discuss the implications of the theoreticalreflection and of some of these results for the European integration project.

European Citizenship

Traditionally, citizenship is described as a two dimensional concept. The vertical dimension links

the individual to the state and refers to the concept of sovereignty. Despite some noticeabledifferences among European countries regarding the criteria of attribution of this status (jussanguinis, jus solis, etc.), it is a de facto citizenship: people usually get it automatically. The

horizontal dimension links the community of citizens. It rests on the exercise of democratic

representation. It is the basis of concrete rights and duties. Whilst the vertical dimension is passive, the horizontal axis demands active participation from citizens (Telò, 1995).

At the time being, European citizenship exists as an official status, which was implementedthrough the Maastricht treaty. On the vertical dimension, European citizenship is also a de facto

status that derives from the belonging to a member state. But this new status introduces a novelty

in the traditional conception of citizenship, as European individuals are both directly linked to


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their national state and to the European Union: they have a double citizenship. European

citizenship is a “second layer” citizenship that gives the individual specific rights linked to the

integration process (individual mobility, diplomatic protection by other member states, right to

elect the European Parliament, etc.). On the horizontal dimension, active participation in the process of collective will formation is also encouraged, most noticeably through the role of the

political parties at the European level. The current debate about the future of the union relates to

the question of the evolution of this status: should it remain a double citizenship or should itevolve towards a unique “supranational” European citizenship in the framework of a federal

Europe?

This double citizenship has objectively existed since 1992, a long enough time for specialists to

analyse its implications but a very short one for people to adapt themselves to this new “reality”.

There may be an important gap between objective and subjective realities. Hence, participation inthe 1999 European elections was disappointingly low in most European countries.

When the subjective aspects of citizenship is at stake, one cannot avoid raising the question ofidentity. Even though these two ideas are conceptually distinct, they are tightly linked, even

confused in discourses from and about the European Union. For example, one finds as an

introduction to the Second report of the European Commission on Citizenship of Union (1997):

“Citizenship of the Union conferred on nationals of all Member States by the Maastricht Treaty ismeant to make the process of European integration more relevant to individual citizens byincreasing their participation, strengthening the protection of their rights and promoting the idea

of an European identity.” (cited in Albarran Cano, 1999). A sense of European identity is

sometimes seen as a means of developing citizenship; sometimes, the creation of the “Citizen of

the EU” is listed among other measures meant to promote European identity (Strauss, 1999).

Identity is relevant to the two dimensions of citizenship. On the vertical dimension, the State

defines the conditions of inclusion in the nation. In turn, identification with the nation conditionsloyalty to the State. On the horizontal dimension, identification with the nation insures a sense of

common good so that people are more likely to act as community members, to put collective

interests before their own (de Tocqueville, 1961). Of course, these two dimensions are

interrelated as the State derives its legitimacy from the fact that it is an emanation of the

community.

The development of national identification

In order to identify the factors that could facilitate the development of a European identity, onemust examine how such a sentiment emerged in the case of Nation-states. The example of

nationalism is worthy of our attention for a variety of reasons. First of all because, as a historical

fact, studying nationalism allows us to trace the origins of national identification while

highlighting the dangers inherent to their application. But also because, as an ideology (Billig,1996), nationalism exerts an influence on lay people's representations of their geopolitical

identities. The nationalist model is so widespread in modern societies that it is often confused

with a natural state: " a man must have a nationality as he must have a nose and two ears; a

deficiency in any of these particulars is not inconceivable and does from time to time occur, but

only as a result of some disaster, and it is itself a disaster of a kind" (Gellner, 1983, p. 6). In linewith social representations theory (Moscovici, 1961), the representation of the nation is


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objectified, so that people refer to it as if it was a real, concrete object. Hence, one can expect

nations to serve as anchors in the construction of social representations linked to a European

identity. This is the social cognitive process through which new elements are incorporated into

the network of pre-existing categories (Moscovici, 1961; Palmonari and Doise, 1986). Togetherwith objectification, anchoring is a major process in the creation of a social representation. It

ensues that people will use their representation of the nation to make sense of the new level of

identification they have to cope with. In addition, this sense of obviousness can also shapeexperts and decision makers' representations of what Europe should become.

Despite important divergences regarding the origins of nations, most scholars acknowledge the

fact that the initiative of a nation's creation generally emanates from very small minorities (elites)

who frame and diffuse a discourse designated to convince the masses that they belong to a

common entity (Brass, 1979; Breuilly, 1982; Gellner, 1983; Smith, 1991). As Pérez-Agote (1999) puts it: " … we have to conceive the nation as a definition of reality, historically produced by its

elites, which has reached, through certain mechanisms, an important social diffusion and whichmaintains itself depending on similar or distinct mechanisms" (p. 23).

In this sense, the geopolitical entity is always the product of a "classification struggle" (lutte des

classements) which purpose is to impose a legitimate definition of the divisions of the social

world (Bourdieu, 1982). Imposing a vision of the social world creates meaning and consensusover this meaning, especially over the group's identity and unity, a process which in fact producesthe reality of the group's identity and unity. As such the nationalist discourse is a performative

process because diffusing the belief in the group's definition equates with forming a social

aggregate with the conscience of belonging. When all the individuals accept the definition, the

social group is fully realised (Pérez-Agote, 1999).

This definition can take diverse forms depending on the particular context in which it is shaped

and diffused, but it generally possesses invariant features. Hence, Gellner (1983) proposed twominimal conditions for a nation to exist:

• Two men are of the same nation if and only if they share the same culture;

• Two men are of the same nation if and only if they recognise each other as belonging to thesame nation.

Culture and homogeneity

Nationalism generally involves references to a culture that is supposed to be shared by all the

members of a nation. As such, nationalist discourse often acquires its legitimacy in the name offolk culture, secular traditions, and unquestionable symbols. In fact, as many authors remarked

(Brass, 1979; Gellner, 1983; see Jaffrelot, 1991 for a review), the nationalist process rather

implies a radical transformation of pre-existing cultures that were much more diverse and manyof the allegedly secular traditions are in fact artificially constructed (Hobsbawm and Ranger,

1983; Thiesse, 1999). A new culture is shaped and is spread across the whole national territory.

The new "high" culture usually borrows from one or some of the ancient local cultures. In social

psychological terms, it is a case of cognitive anchoring. References to ancient folklore or


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traditions facilitate the adoption of the "high" culture as it insures that it will make sense for most

people.

Through the nation building process, the implicit identifications that prevailed in localcommunities are made explicit (Azzi, 1998). Implicit identification prevailed in situations where

the individual was immersed in his group’s culture, behaving and thinking according to itsvalues, symbols, and cultural rules, but without being aware of it. In these cases, culture was

lived, but not represented. These cultures were very diverse and flexible. The rigidity of

nationalist discourse must be understood as a reaction to the versatility of the implicit form ofcultural identity. It exerts social pressure on individuals in order to fix a precise idea of their

cultural group in their mind (Azzi and Klein, 1998).

This imposition through different means - large scale education systems, mass media,

administrations, routine use of national symbols (Billig, 1995) etc. - of common cultural

references that are supposed to provide a content to the group's identity leads to a homogenisationof the national cultural space (Smith, 1991). The ultimate goal is close correspondences betweenthe community of people (the nation), a culture, and a state (Gellner, 1983).

Identity and dif ferentiation

Gellner's second condition for the existence of a nation - Two men are of the same nation if andonly if they recognise each other as belonging to the same nation - points to the fact that a shared

culture is a necessary but not sufficient criteria to form a nation. In addition, people must be

conscious of the fact that they share a common identity. As Bar-Tal pointed out about socialgroups in general (Bar-Tal, 1990), "there may be an important difference for the group between

the situations when a belief is held by one member of the group, or even by all the members, who

are not aware of sharing this belief, and the situations when a belief is held by all the members ora portion of them, who are aware of this sharing" (p. 1). According to this author, these group

beliefs - which, in the case of nationalism, form a shared culture - serve, among other functions,

to mark the group's boundaries; to differentiate the in-group from the out-group. As such a groupexists if its members share at least one fundamental group belief: "We are a group".

This aspect of groups and nations formation clearly relates to the cognitive process of

categorisation. That is the process through which individuals reduce the complexity of the stimuli

they get from the physical world by classifying them in a limited number of categories. This process implies both the maximisation of differences between members - objects or people - of

different categories (differentiation) and the minimisation of differences among members of the

same category.Henri Tajfel placed the categorisation process at the heart of social identity theory, which he used

to explain large-scale intergroup relations. However, this theory does not reduce this issue tocognitive factors as his most quoted definition of social identity reveals: "… that part of the

individual's self concept which derives from his knowledge of his membership of a social group

(or groups) together with the value and emotional significance attached to that membership"

(Tajfel, 1981, p.255). Evaluative and affective dimensions are also part of the picture. Hence,

according to Tajfel, the groups an individual belongs to are part of this individual's self-concept.As people are motivated to gain or to maintain a sense of positive self-esteem, they also strive to

gain or maintain a sense of positive social identity. Following SIT, the only way to do so is to


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engage in favourable social comparisons with other social groups: people want their group to

appear as different and superior to others. Hence people tend to show an in-group favouring bias

when comparing their in-group to out-groups (but see (Hinkle and Brown, 1990). Conversely,

there is empirical evidence that people tend to identify more strongly with high status groups thanwith low status groups (Ellemers, 1993).

In the realm of ethnic or national groups, Tajfel's propositions stand in agreement with theories

regarding the importance of group boundaries in the process of their definition. Hence,Armstrong postulates that ethnic groups tend to define themselves, not by referring to their own

characteristics, but by exclusion, through the comparison with "strangers" (Armstrong, 1982).

However, it is very unlikely that these individual psychological processes, even if they are

universal, could on their own account for the existence of shared beliefs about large-scale groups

(Cinnerella, 1996). Social representational processes always mediate people's perceptions oflarge-scale social categories. In other words, intra-individual processes cannot thoroughly explain

homogenisation and differentiation at the collective level (Azzi, 1998a). Some politicalideologies and discourses may trigger these mechanisms by imposing a particular representation

of the group whilst others may prevent them to happen.

Embedded identities

According to Self-categorisation theory (Turner, Hogg et al., 1987), which developed thecognitive aspects of social identity theory, there is a functional antagonism between different

levels of categorisation. It means that only one categorisation can be salient at one time. For

example, if group categorisation is salient, then the perception of individual differences is

inhibited, as is the perception of inter-group similarities. One could apply this principle to therelationship between local subgroups and the nation. In effect, nation building has implied an

antagonism between sub-ordinate ethnic groups and the super-ordinate national group.

Nationalism imposes an exclusive identification with the nation. It promotes a direct relationship between the individual and the State and does not recognise the legitimacy of intermediate

entities.

Again we should not imply from the existence of this intra-individual mechanism of functional

antagonism that the historical antagonism between super-ordinate (national) and subordinate(ethnic or regional) levels of social identification is natural. This antagonism may not be due to

mechanisms linked to the cognitive categorisation process as much as it may be produced by

political ideologies (Azzi, 1998). Political ideologies can amplify these cognitive mechanisms as

well as they can inhibit them.

Instrumental motives

According to some authors, instrumental motives lay at the core of ethnic or nationalist

movements (Glazer and Moynihan, 1975; Brass, 1979). Hence, Glazer and Moynihan present theethnic group as an interest group that uses values and symbols to legitimise its claims. In that

view, ethnicity or nationalism are strategic choices adopted to defend social, economic, or

political interests. The perception of potential gains or losses that could result from themembership in a social group may therefore condition people's identification with it.

When dealing with super-ordinate categories, subordinate group's interest as well as individual

interests can condition identification. It has been proposed, for example, that the enthusiastic


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support that the Italians give to the EU be due to the fact that they have the most to gain

economically (Cinnerella, 1997). Similarly, Mlicki and Ellemers, proposed that the strong

European identification reported by their polish students is due to their aspiration for political

change (Mlicki and Ellemers, 1996).

European identification

There are different lessons to learn from what precedes. First of all, in a pragmatic sense, it

follows that, in order to promote a sense of European identification as strong and durable as thesense of national identification that resulted from nation building processes, the E.U. would have

to :

• Construct a culture that every European would be likely to adopt. If we refer to socialrepresentation theory, it implies that this European overarching culture should featureelements that would enable people from the different cultural groups to anchor the new

culture in their familiar frame of reference.

• Diffuse this culture and encourage the integration of pre-existing cultures in order tohomogenise the European cultural space.

• Encourage comparisons with out-groups.

• Affirm the superiority and distinctiveness of Europe compared to other geopolitical entities.

• Convince people that the unification process will promote their individual and/or collectiveinterests.

There are many reasons for doubting the desirability, let alone the feasibility of this program. I

shall not discuss them as the topic that is being treated regards how the nationalist model caninfluence people's relationship with Europe.

If we rest on the assumption that people derive their vision of the European integration from their

knowledge of the nation-state model, it follows that they will expect this process to lead to a

standardisation of the European space. Inasmuch as people already identify with other

subordinate groups - most of all to their nations -, one can predict that the prospect ofstandardisation will lead to negative evaluations and condition people's identification with

Europe (Sanchez-Mazas, 1996). Conversely, one can argue that a representation of Europe as

complementary to the nation should lead to a stronger European identification.

Some results

We conducted an exploratory questionnaire survey, with French-speaking Belgian undergraduate

psychology students (N = 269)1. Questionnaires were administered during social psychology

seminar sessions. Questions tapped (among others) identifications, perception of the control

Belgium has on EU decision making, attitudes towards European unification; and predictionsregarding the evolution of the EU (homogenisation / preservation of diversity). There are of

course important limitations inherent to this kind of survey. Hence, it should be kept in mind that

this sample is neither representative of the Belgian youth nor of the whole Belgian population, let

1 Three questionnaires were administered in three sessions. The total number of participants is 269, although only 89of them completed the three questionnaires.


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alone the European population. It does not allow for generalisations. In addition, this is a

correlational study, which does not allow for clear identification of causal relationships. The aim

of this research was to identify relationships between variables. It was carried out, in the prospect

of a potential international survey, to identify relevant variables and build efficient research tools.

Identification wi th the region, the nation and Europe

Three identification variables were calculated by averaging 8 items2 (Cronbach's alphas: region =

.82; nation = .88; Europe = .85). Results shown in table 1 reveal that, in average, national andEuropean identifications are not significantly different while regional identification is weaker. It

also shows that the three identification variables are positively correlated. People who identify

with one level usually also identify with the others. This suggests that the three levels of

identification are not seen as antagonistic.

(insert Table 1)

In addition, both Belgian and European identification correlate with an item explicitly addressing

the issue of the compatibility Vs antagonism between national and European identifications (see

Table 2). It shows that the more people identify with Belgium, the more they believe thisidentification is compatible with European identification. Although it is a weak correlation, it

implies that people who identify with Europe also believe that European identity is compatible

with national identity. Similar results are obtained with an item explicitly addressing theindependence between Belgian and European identifications: the more people identify (with

Europe and with Belgium), the more they believe those are not independent levels of

identification.

(insert Table 2)

Identification and attitude towards immigrants

Participants were told that the proportion of strangers in Belgium was currently 8,9 % and were

then asked to state the proportion that they believed was desirable for Belgium (adapted fromSanchez-Mazas, 1996). Three groups were then constituted according to participants' answer to

that question: people who desire less strangers (xenophobic); people who think the proportion of

strangers should remain more or less the same (status quo); and people who desire more strangers

(xenophiles)3. One way analyses of variance were carried out with this categorisation as an

independent variable and the three levels of identification as dependent variables. No significant

result was found with the national and regional identification variables. But there was a

significant difference with the European identification variable: the xenophobes (6,92) tend toidentify more with Europe than the xenophiles (5,39) and the status quo (5,89. F = 3,89; p = .02).

2 I feel attached to the Belgian / Brussels or Walloon / European soil; I would miss Belgium if I had to leave it

forever; My destiny is linked to every other Belgian's one; I have strong feelings of solidarity with all the other

Belgians; I don't have clear feelings about the fact that I am Belgian (rev.); Being Belgian is something I rarely think

about (rev.); There is no reason to be proud to be Belgian (rev.); I am proud to tell my friends I am Belgian (1 =totally disagree, 11 = totally agree).

3 This was done as this variable's distribution was not a normal one.


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Predictions regarding the evolut ion of the European Union

A list of propositions describing the possible evolution of the European Union was submitted to

the participants. They had to indicated on 11 points bipolar scales whether they thought each

possibility was probable (1 = very unlikely, 11 = very likely) and to express their attitude towardseach particular evolution (1 = very unfavourable, 11 = very favourable). Table 3 summarises the

mean results obtained for each item according to these two dimensions (probability and attitude).

(insert Table 3)

Despite some apparent inconsistencies regarding the items related to education, it seems that

most possible evolutions in the direction of an increasing uniformity in the European space are

both seen as unlikely to happen and judged negatively. In average, participants believe that theirnation's symbols are still going to be used in the future, that language and culture will not be

standardised and that the Belgian state will preserve its sovereignty, and they agree with this

evolution. The only thing they think is unlikely to happen but desirable is the adoption of a

common History course. More interesting are the two predictions that are judged both likely tohappen and unfavourable as they reveal a perception of threat. These items relate to the loss of

national states' power and to the lack of respect for local cultures.

The relationships between these predictions, their judgements and European identification, wereexamined (Table 4).

(insert Table 4)

Table 4 shows that participants who identify with Europe also tend to believe that both European

and national hymns will be played on sport or diplomatic events, that Nation-states will retain

sovereignty over their territories and that school programs will continue to be defined by eachcountry. In terms of attitude, they tend to express positive attitudes towards these predictions

(except the correlation with the last item, which is not significant). In addition, while they don't

believe more than others that the unification process will lead to a cultural standardisation, theytend to hold less negative attitudes towards this prospect.

Together with the relationships between levels of identification and their correlation with the

representation of these relationships (Tables 1 and 2), these results confirm the fact that a strongEuropean identification is linked to the belief that the unification process will preserve the

nation's importance and with a positive attitude towards this preservation. Paradoxically, high

European identifiers display less reluctance towards European cultural standardisation. It is possible that the political and cultural domains are being dissociated. In effect, it appears that

culture is not represented as a political issue. For instance, in the framework of a wordassociation task with Europe as the inductive term, culture was generally associated with

positively evaluated terms such as exchange, languages, diversity, meetings, holidays, open mind,communication, etc. In cultural domains, European identification is seen as promoting personal,

regional and national interests (see table 5 below).

Instrumental motives

Participants were asked whether they believed that the current changes regarding "the distribution

of political power", "the distribution of economic resources" and "the cultural domain" would

either threaten or promote their interests at the personal, regional and national levels.


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(insert Table 5)

These results show that European unification is generally seen as promoting rather than

threatening people's interests (general mean = 6.78). This is particularly true in the culturaldomain. It is the national level that is judged to benefit the most from the European unification.And it is in the cultural domain that these benefits are the most acknowledged.

It should be noted here that these results must be interpreted by taking the Belgian context into

account. In effect, our sample is issued from a small country and it is possible that small countries

see more political and economic opportunities in European integration than large ones (see below). In addition, Belgium does not possess a distinctive and prestigious culture, which could

explain that integration is not envisioned as threatening in this domain.

We examined the relationship between European identification and the "perceived interest"

variables. No significant correlation was found, which suggests that European identification does

not depend on the perception of potential gains or losses implied by being part of Europe, be it atthe individual, regional or a national levels. There does not seem to be direct instrumental

motives behind these participants' identification with Europe.

Perceived status and relative power of the nation over European decision making

Until now, we have addressed this issue as if European unification only affected the relationship

between vertical levels of inclusion. A horizontal dimension must also be taken into account: the

relationship between regions and between nations. We will limit ourselves to the internationalrelations issue. The relative situation of an individual's nation among other nations might

condition her perception of the unification process. Hence the perception of one's nation as low

status compared to others could lead to envision unification as an opportunity to improve this

status. In the same line of arguments, perceiving one's nation as having not enough power overthe EU's decision making compared to others could lead to envision the unification process as an

opportunity to increase this power. Both eventualities would represent instrumental motives

susceptible to increase identification with Europe.

Participants were asked to rate each of the 15 member states according to their status in different

domains - political power, military power, history, culture, diplomacy, economy, quality of life,

human rights - by attributing a score between 0 and 10 for each domain. Then they had to judgethe power each state had over EU's decision making in different domains - political decisions,

financial decisions, relations with non member dates, economic decisions, employment policy,

cultural affairs - on a bipolar 9 points scale (from "not enough" to "too much power"). Global

measures of perceived status and of judgement of power were then calculated4 (see Table 6).

(insert Table 6)

4 Global status: high Cronbach alphas were found for each country: (min = .78 Great Britain; max = .88 Sweden;global mean = .845).

Judgement of power: high Cronbach alphas were found for each country: (min = .78 Luxembourg; max = .88 Sweden;global mean = .824).


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In average all the countries are attributed positive statuses, but France, Great Britain and

Germany are clearly perceived as higher status countries. Those three countries are the only ones

to be judged as having too much power over the EU's decision making.

On average, Belgium is considered as a medium status country (not significantly different fromthe general mean value). It is judged as having not enough power, but this value is not

significantly different from the general mean value either.

We examined the relationships between these measures and the identification measures.

(insert Table 7)

Results presented in Table 7 show that Belgium's perceived status is correlated with the

judgement of its decisional power: the higher the status, the stronger the perceived power. This isalso true for all other member states (with the exception of Greece). Perceived status of Belgium

is positively correlated with national identification but is not linked to European identification.

On the other hand, judgement of Belgium's power is not correlated with national identification, but is negatively correlated with European identification. The more participants judged theircountry as not having enough decisional power, the more they identified with Europe. This

tendency reveals an instrumental motive that is independent from symbolic factors. This

interpretation is supported by the fact that the judgement over decisional power is also negatively

correlated with the valence attributed to changes due to the unification process at the national (-.229) and at the regional (-.232) levels. The more people judge Belgium not to have enoughdecisional power, the more they tend to believe that the unification process will bring positive

changes to their region and their nation. It is also negatively correlated with the personal interests

(see before) in the political (-.209) and the economic (-.229) domains. People who think Belgium

does not have enough power tend to believe the unification process will promote their personal

interests in the political and economic realms.

Variables that best predict European identif ication

Various linear regression analyses were performed with European identification as the dependentvariable and a number of factors combinations: regional and national identifications, perceived

interests, importance and valence of changes due to the unification process, perceived status of

Belgium, judgement of Belgium's power, and probability and valence of predictions regarding theevolution of the EU. This statistical analysis allows for the identification of independent effects

of the factor variables.

The best model we found explains a fair proportion of the variance in European identification (R 2

= .49; F = 17.78; p < .0001). It shows positive effects of national identification (Beta = .38; T =4.54; p < .0001) and of attitude towards cultural homogenisation (Beta = .27; T = 3.19; p < .01),and negative effects of the judgement of Belgian control over EU decision-making (Beta = -.31;

T = -3.72; p < .001) and of the belief that the unification process will lead to a loss in national

sovereignty (Beta = -.40; T = -4.78; p < .0001).

This analysis shows that European identification is linked to different kinds of factors:

identification (with the nation), instrumental motive (decisional power of the nation), future

expectations (subsistence of national sovereignty) and attitude (towards cultural standardisation).Conversely, participants who identify weakly with Europe also tend to identify weakly with the

nation, to believe that their country has enough decisional power, believe that European


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unification will lead to a loss of national sovereignty and hold negative attitudes towards cultural

standardisation. Among these factors, the perceived threat of a loss of national sovereignty and

national identification have the most important weights.

Discussion

In brief, these research results showed that the regional, national and European levels of

identification were seen as complementary rather than antagonistic. Moreover, it appeared thatEuropean identification was linked to the extent to which national and European identities were

judged as compatible. In addition, participants who expected national sovereignty to subsist and

local cultures to be respected tended to express stronger European identification. However, EU

identification was also linked to a less negative attitude towards cultural standardisation. Finally,despite the fact that direct measures of instrumental motives appeared to be independent from

identification, it was found that people's belief that Belgium's decisional power over EU decision

making was insufficient also lead to stronger EU identifications. We interpreted this last result asrevealing the existence of an instrumental motive, assuming that participants expected the on-going European integration to increase Belgium's decisional power.

These results suggest that, in order to develop a sense of European identity, European integration

should be presented as a process that will preservve national sovereignty, as the possibility of its

disappearance appears to be threatening. Integration should also bring benefits for the nation, atleast in the political realm.

These conclusions should of course be taken with caution, first of all because of the limits

inherent to this kind of method. But also because these results might only make sense in theframework of the Belgian situation. Belgium comprises two main linguistic communities - the

Dutch speaking (Flemings) and the French speaking (Walloons and Brusselers) - that havedifferent relationships with the Nation-state. Large-scale survey data showe that the Flemish

Region and Community provide a large part of its inhabitants with their primary level ofidentification (39%) while a majority of Walloons (55 %) and of Brusselers (61%) primarily

identify with Belgium (De Winter, Frognier et al., 1998). Identification with the Walloon or

Brussels Region or with the French-speaking Community is a marginal phenomenon in Wallonia

and in Brussels. Other empirical findings show that many Flemings express regionalist attitudes

(32,8 %) whilst regionalism only concerns 19,1 % of the Walloons (Maddens, Beerten et al.,1998). From a French speaking perspective, in a situation where regional autonomy is at the

agenda of many Flemish politicians, Europe can be seen as a solution to preserve Belgium from

splitting into separate entities. One could predict that region would be a more significant group

for Flemish subjects.Whatever subordinate level of inclusion to be taken into account, preserving its existence withinEurope certainly limits the extent to which Europe's political and cultural space can behomogenised. Now, if we go back to the nation building example, that would imply that a strong

European identity will probably not develop. There are two remarks I would like to express here.

First, the fact that cultural homogenisation and inter-group differentiation were used in order to

promote national identification during the nation building process does not imply that those arenecessary conditions for the development of this sentiment. There might be other ways to

promote identification with a social category; perception of interdependence or common destiny

might serve this purpose. Regarding the contribution of social psychology to the European

identity issue, it should be emphasised that the isomorphism between intra-individual


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psychological mechanisms and large-scale social groups' phenomena does neither mean that

these phenomena derive from psychological mechanisms nor that they are natural and

unavoidable. Political actors may take advantage of these mechanisms and endeavour to

maximise their effects whilst others may aim to inhibit them, depending on the political projectthey hold (Klein and Azzi, 1999).

Second, going back to the introduction of this paper, it should be reminded that the central

question, in my point of view, is not how to develop a sense of European identity but how to promote active citizenship in the European context. If a sense of identity seems to be necessary to

attain such an objective, it might not imply the kind of "warm" identification that characterised

nationalism. In addition our finding that xenophobe attitudes were linked to European

identification rather than to national identification is indicative of the dangers that such activation

represents.

As Habermas (1992) and Ferry (1992) advocated, what is needed is a consensus over a definite

set of political values and principles (constitutional patriotism); the other aspects of culture mustnot indispensably be shared. Trying to discover the common roots of European identity or

creating a large homogenous cultural space equates with reproducing the nationalist model at the

European level. If we take into account, on the one hand, the fact that nationalism did not only bring positive outcomes and that identifications with subordinate groups subsist, we can concludethat developing a "mild" identification with Europe on the basis of a common political culture

might stand as a realistic solution to promote active European citizenship.

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Tables

Table 1: Means and correlations between regional, national and European identifications.

Mean

(Min. = 1; Max.= 11)

National identification European

identification

Regional identification 4,80a ,674** ,390**

National identification 5,51b ,438**

European identification 5,96b

N = 182

*p < .05**p < .01


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Table 2: Means of the "explicit relationships" items and correlations with the identificationvariables

Mean

(Min. = 1;

Max. = 11)

National identification Europeanidentification

The more one feels Belgian, the more one should

feel European

5,87 ,347** ,1452*

Feeling Belgian and feeling European are two

independent things

6,12 -,199** -,239**

N = 182

*p < .05

**p < .01


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Table 3: Estimations of probability and attitudes towards possible evolutions of the EU

Probabi-lity

Attitude

Positive Negative

Likely • A European hymn will be played in additionto the national hymn on diplomatic or sport events

(7,71; 7,88).

• Member states will adopt a common school program defined by the EU (6,63; 6,54)

• National states will lose their power in favourof a European "super-state" (6,26; 5,11).

• European unification will not lead to a greaterrespect of European regions' local cultures * (6,01;

3,12).

Unlikely • All EU children will study the same Historycourse (5,17; 6,97).

• School programs will not be defined bymember states any more * (4,63, 4,84).

• Each country's national hymn will notcontinue to be played alone * (4,59; 5,14).

• The EU will adopt a European hymn andsuppress the use of national hymns (4,20; 4,61).

• The EU will promote the use of a singlelanguage in every member state (4,73; 4,82).

• European unification will lead to thestandardisation of member state's cultures (4,78;

3,31).

• Nation states will not retain sovereignty overtheir territory * (4,42; 4,42).

• Citizens will not address their claims tonational institutions any more * (3,80; 4,34).

164 < N < 167

*Reverted items have been reworded for the sake of clarity.

(mean on the probability scale; mean on the attitude scale)


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Table 4: Correlation between European identification and the judgements of probability and

valence of predictions.

Probability Valence

A European hymn will be played in addition to the

national hymn on diplomatic or sports occasions.

.25** .35**

All EU children will study the same History course. .12 .24*

European unification will lead to the standardisation of

member state's cultures.

.10 .20*

Nation states will not retain sovereignty over theirterritory.

-.32** -.34**

School programs will not be defined by member states

any more.

-.21* -.16

N = 106

*p ≤ .05

**p ≤ .01


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Table 5: Judgement of the European unification as promoting or threatening personal, regional

and national interests in the political, economic and cultural domains (1 = will threaten my personal / my region's / my country's interests; 11 will promote my (…) interests).

Domain Level

Personal Regional National F p Domain

means*

Political 6,41a 6,34a 6,86b 8,47 .000 6,53a

Economic 6,28a 6,43a 6,82b 9.32 .000 6,51a

Culture 7,42a 7,07b 7,43a 5,63 .004 7,31b

Means by Level 6,70a 6,61a 7,04b 11,49 .000 6,78

N = 167

*F = 22,03; P = .000

With the exception of the Domain means column, repeated measures Manova tests have been performed with the

level dimension as factor.


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Table 6: Means of perceived status (0 = very low status; 10 = very high status) and judgement of

power (1 = not enough power; 9 = too much power) for each member statePerceived status Judgement of

decisional power

Correlation

France 7.57 5.98 ,258*

Great Britain 7.56 5.82 ,310*

Germany 7.27 5.76 ,407*

Italy 6.56 4.58 ,169*

The Netherlands 6.53 4.78 ,367*

Belgium 6.45 4.52 ,294*Spain 6.31 4.45 ,254*

Austria 6.22 4.50 ,198*

Greece 6.05 4.06 ,101

Sweden 6.05 4.26 ,302*

Luxembourg 6.02 4.38 ,330*

Denmark 6.00 4.31 ,196*

Finland 5.91 4.30 ,284*

Ireland 5.82 4.27 ,281*

Portugal 5.63 3.98 292*

General Mean 6,40 4,66

Countries are presented in decreasing order according to their perceived status. They were presented in French

alphabetic order to participants.

*p < .05


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Table 7: Correlation between national and European identifications, perceived status of Belgium

and judgement of decisional powerJudgement of

Belgium's decisional

power

National

identification

European

identification

Perceived status of

Belgium

.294** .211*

N = 127

-.027

N = 127

Judgement of

Belgium's decisional

power

.066

N = 117

-.266**

N = 117

* p≤

.05** p ≤ .01

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