NATIONALISM AND COMMUNISM IN ROMANIA

The Personalized Dictatorship of Nicolae Ceaşescu

CRISTINA – ANDREEA GOLOMOZ

ADINA – GABRIELA MOISEI

VADIM – OCTAVIAN CUCU

CRISTIAN DRĂGAN

SPE I

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Contents

Introduction..............................................................................................................p.3

The Historical Evolution towards “Ceauşescu’s Dynastic Communism………p.3

Theories of National Communism and National Stalinism……………………..p.5

Nationalism under Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej…………………………………...p.7

“Ceusescuism” – The Unique Dictatorship of Nicolae Ceauşescu……………..p.10

The Fall of Ceauşescu’s Regime………………………………………………….p.15

Minorities under Communism…………………………………………………...p.20

Conclusions…………………………………………………………………….….p.22

Bibliography………………………………………………………………………p.23

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Introduction

The case of the Romanian communism was the unique result of the interplay between

“traditional values, elements of Marxist classics and the particular (and peculiar)

personal aspects”1of its dictator, Nicolae Ceauşescu. The development of the national

awareness in the communist Romania played as an important role as Marxism-

Leninism itself. This could be explained partly by the fact that Ceauşescu aimed at

mobilizing the entire nation in the name of the politics and economics generated

homogenization and party by the lack of legitimacy of RCP, handicap that had to be

recovered in order to gain the desired authority. But perhaps the crucial issue in

illustrating the “national question” in the Romanian communism was Ceauşescu’s

idiosyncrasy and his very uncommon ways to gain and keep power. Analysing to

what extent did each of this elements influence Ceauşescu’s regime and whether the

“national conscious” was truly the reasoning of the RCP or only a way of satisfying

the General Secretary’s megalomania is specifically the aim of this paper.

The Historical Evolution towards “Ceauşescu’s Dynastic Communism”2

In order to have a better understanding of Ceausescu’s regime and his approach to the

nationalistic issue, we should start by a brief examination of communism beginnings

in Romania and the leadership of Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej.

After the Second World War, the Romanian Communist Party was not enjoying a

popular position among the Romanian people and the Groza Government faced many

problems in what may concern its international recognition. After its “enlargement”

and the introduction of two democratic ministers, Groza Government was finally

accepted by the USA and the UK. Once it was officially acknowledged, Groza’s

Government faced two essential strategic problems: Romania’s participation to Paris

Peace Conference and organizing parliamentary elections. In this context, RCP uses a

line that would become a leitmotiv in the communist discourse. Lucreţiu Pătrăşcanu

opens the Transylvanian issue, saying that it belongs entirely to the Romanian people

1 Trond GILBERG, Narionalism and Communism in Romania: The Rise and Fall of Ceausescu’s Personal Dictatorship, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1990, p. 492 Vladimir TISMĂNEANU, Stalinism pentru eternitate, trad. Cristina Petrescu si Dragoş Petrescu, Bucureşti, Polirom, 2005, p.223

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and that the Hungarian demands are totally unacceptable. Pătrăşcanu’s speech was, in

fact, meant to sensitize the masses and to gain the sympathy of PNŢ voters.

Furthermore, the result of the parliamentary elections on November the 19th 1946 was

fabricated and consequently, PCR won with 79, 86% of the votes cast. A famous

quote of Stalin says that “those who cast the votes decide nothing; those who count

the votes decide everything.” This was indeed the case of the elections and by this

means a new step in the consolidation of the communist regime in Romania.

Stalin believed that the American “Marshall Plan” was created in order to detach the

states in the USSR hegemony from Kremlin. In order to stop this, he decided to found

Cominform3 and to impose the socialist model of Stalinism in all of the countries

under the soviet domination. On December the 30th 1947 the Romanian Communist

Party took power by forcing the king to abdicate and Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej

became secretary-general of the party. The leadership of Gheorghiu-Dej encountered

a period of struggle for power in the RCP, being challenged by influential names such

as Ana Pauker and Vasile Luca.

During a visit to Moscow, Stalin advised Gheorghiu-Dej to adopt a position of

tolerance in what may concern the nationalistic issue inside the party (as two of

party’s leaders were of different nationality: Ana Pauker was Jewish and Vasile Luca

was Hungarian). The words of Stalin regarded the general aim of the communist

party, that of being a social class party, not a race and xenophobic one. Only in this

way the party could become bigger and bigger.

The Popular Republic of Romania started a period of imitation and subordination to

USSR. Policies like nationalizing the most important industrial, banking and

transportation enterprises, introducing planned centralized economy, reorganizing

education after the soviet model and collectivization of agriculture were enforced by

the RCP.

As Trond Gilberg observes4, during the period 1953-1956 Romania acknowledged a

“gradual shift toward a more national stance”. Gheorghiu-Dej was repeatedly accused

3 The Communist Information Bureau4 Trond GILBERG, Op. Cit., p. 48

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by Ana Pauker of being “national communist” and of having different views from the

ones “dictated” by the soviets. There are arguments that, in fact, Gheorghiu-Dej was

not looking towards a “critical reaction to the soviet imperialism”5 and that he was

just protecting his leadership, especially when Khrushchev condemned Stalin’s

regime and tried to eliminate the hierarchy established in the communist parties

during it. One of these would be the reclusion of Lucreţiu Pătrăşcanu, one of the most

important exponents of the national movement in the RCP.

The Hungarian Revolution of 1956 alarmed the Romanian leadership, mainly because

it saw how fast the communist regimes had fallen dawn and because the Hungarian

minority in Romania could somehow enter this anti-communist movement. The

Hungarian resignation of the Warsaw Pact pushed USSR towards a military

intervention in order to suppress the revolution. The Romanian leaders helped the

USSR by imprisoning Imre Nagy, the head of the Hungarian revolution, using the

justification of offering political asylum.

Likewise, towards the end of the era of Gheorghe Gheoghiu-Dej, statements about the

importance of national sovereignty have opened, with a clear reference to the Soviet

incorporation of Bessarabia in 1940.

After the death of Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej in 1965, the ascent to power of Nicolae

Ceausescu was a significant step in the consolidation of Romanian nationalism and

national communism. Having a stronger personality, Ceauşescu went deeper in

distancing his leadership from Moscow. He started on the path that ha been firstly

walked by Gheorghiu-Dej, but his reasons are much more complex than a simple

diversion in order to reassure a position.

Theories of National Communism and National Stalinism

Nationalism has always been a difficult issue for communists. Karl Marx himself was

very little concerned with the question of nationality and nationalism. For him, the

distinctive characteristic of the communist movement was exactly its non-national

character. A famous sentence from the Communist Manifesto explains precisely that it

makes no actual sense to support the nationalist feelings, as communism is directed 5 Vladimir TISMĂNEANU, Op. Cit., p. 55

5

towards solving the issues of the workers. As Karl Marx put it, “The workers have no

country” and there has to be a national liberation in order to have an efficient

revolution among the proletarians.

Although the emergence of the nations, nation states and national awareness is an

“invention” of capitalist descent, Lenin saw the national question as a way of

conducting the frustrations, dissatisfactions and the unfulfilled dreams towards the

revolutionary energy needed in order to reach the social democracy in Russia. As a

reaction to national oppression by tsarists, the Russian Marxists called for the right of

nations to self-determination. Lenin was quick to grasp the “usefulness of nationalism

to the revolutionary cause”6.

We have seen the pure theories of nationalism developed by Marx and Lenin

themselves. Peculiar enough, these might have never been applied in the Romanian

issue of nationalism, as Ceausescu followed an uncommon meaning of the “question”.

As Vladimir Tismăneanu asserted, a very important distinction between national

communism and national Stalinism has to be made7. As this author defined them, the

first one, the national communism, is a “critical reaction to the soviet imperialism, to

their hegemony plans and to the rigid orthodox ideology”. This movement could be

understood as relatively innovative, flexible and tolerant in communism. It

encouraged the intellectual creativity and the “theoretical heresies”, it offered

alternatives to the Stalinist model, whether they were more moderate or more radical

ones. Its main features are the denying of the “universal recipe”, the right of every

party to have its own strategy disregarding the soviet interests and even, in some

cases, accepting the principle of political plurality. The most important figures in the

national communism were Josip Broz Tito (Yugoslavia), Imre Nagy (Hungary),

Alexander Dubcek (Czechoslovakia) and Palmiro Togliatti (Italy).

On the other hand, national Stalinism stood against any form of liberalization or

democratization and was, to some extent, the opposite of national communism. In

spite of this aspect, national communism and national Stalinism can coexist, as the

leader personal preferences and interests change or as he is somehow internally of

externally forced to take these different “attitudes”.

6 Robert R. KING, Minorities under Communism: Nationalities as a Source of Tension among Balkan Communist States, Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 19737 Vladimir TISMĂNEANU, Op. Cit, p. 55

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Ceauşescu’s regime borrows the characteristics of both these orientations, even if it

may sound illogical. It was due the dictator’s strange personality and to the way he

sometimes went to the extremes feelings like pride or like paranoia.

Nationalism and Communism in Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej’s Regime

The first steps in Romania's move away from Soviet domination derived from the

Tito-Stalin split of 1948. Party leader Gheorghe Gheorgiu-Dej used the crisis to purge

all potential opponents out of the renamed "Romanian Workers Party." Even as

Gheorgiu-Dej joined Russian attacks on the Yugoslav "national road to socialism," he

was positioning Romania to take its own road while Russia was distracted by Tito.

During the 1950s Romanian national identity suffered considerably. The leading

figures of Romanian literature, history and culture were censored and suppressed, and

Russian language and literature studies flourished under state sponsorship. Romanian

history books were rewritten to emphasize Slavic influences and Romanian scientists

credited Russians with extravagant claims. Russian became a required course in all

schools in 1948, and in 1953 a spelling reform removed elements from the language

that were too clearly Roman or Latin in origin.

The death of Stalin introduced strains in the Russian-Romanian relation. Gheorgiu-

Dej rejected Khrushchev's de-Stalinization policies, in part to prevent Khrushchev

from installing his own allies in positions of power in Romania. By attacking Stalin’s

leadership of the CPSU8, Khrushchev implicitly brought into question Moscow’s

supremacy within the international movement. Indeed, many communist parties - the

Chinese, French, Italian, Albanian, and Romanian - began to question Soviet policies.

As a result, the Romanian communist leadership proved concentrated on constructing

a platform for anti-de-Stalinization around the concepts of industrialization,

autonomy, sovereignty, and national pride. The point for Gheorghiu-Dej was to

maintain close relations with the Soviet leaders without supporting their efforts to

discredit Stalin’s style of government.

The Romanian communist leaders realized that methods needed to be dramatically

revised, in order not to loose popular support, so a kind of relaxation in national

8 The Famous 20th Congress of CPSU, when Nikita Khrushchev condemned the Stalinists crimes.

7

policy was introduced after 1953. One of the first measures taken was the decision to

end the construction of the “Canal” between the Danube River and the Black Sea, a

huge operation imposed by Stalin, but convenient for Gheorghiu-Dej’s repressive

policy.9 Moreover the rhythm of collectivization was slowed down, for the moment.

Besides these measures, after 1952 when Gheorghiu-Dej designated himself as prime-

minister, as well as party’s first secretary, he gradually adopted economic and foreign

policies that served Romania’s national interests rather than those of international

socialism as defined by the Soviet leaders.

Dej resigned as prime minister in 1955 but assumed the equivalent position of

president of the State Council in 1961. Following an even more determined

independent course, he overcame the objections of the other Soviet-bloc countries,

which wanted Romania’s economy to remain primarily agricultural, and pursued a

far-reaching program of industrialization. In the mid-1960s Gheorghiu-Dej also

demonstrated Romania’s independence from Soviet domination by forming cordial

relations with non-communist nations and with the People’s Republic of China, which

had become increasingly alienated from the Soviet Union. Also, Gheorghiu Dej

removed the first Russian councillors from the administrative positions.

As early as 1955, Romanian Communists were speaking of a separate Romanian road

to socialism, code words for reduced Soviet Russian influence. At the same time,

Gheorgiu-Dej supported Russian intervention in Hungary and Poland in 1956. His

superficial loyalty led to the departure of the last Russian troops in 1958. No sooner

had the Red Army left the country than Romania approached the West for new

economic supports.1958 is also the year when our country subscribed to a first pact on

oil with the United States.

Krushchev's reorganization of Comecon in 1955 had already created friction: under

that plan, each country would devote its economy to what it did best, and Romania

was identified as a source of cereal grains. Romanian leaders rejected becoming an

agricultural breadbasket whose output would feed workers in industrializing

Communist states like Czechoslovakia and Poland. Romania preferred to pursue

economic self-sufficiency. In 1956 the last joint Russian-Romanian enterprise was

9 Used as a concentration camp

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closed (SOVROMS) and by 1957 other socialist states were complaining about

Romanian protectionism.

Western loans and contracts helped neutralize Russian influence. The Western share

of goods entering Romania doubled, from 21 percent in 1958 to 40 percent in 1965.

Russia's share fell from 53 percent to 38 percent in the same period. Russian cultural

centres closed, and streets and institutions named for Russian heroes were renamed.

The first distancing from the „Big Brother” occurred due to the CAER plans that

harmed Romania’s economy. This plan meant a dividing of the socialist camp into

states with industrial vocation and other orientated more towards agriculture and

extractive industry. Nevertheless, Dej disapproved Romania’s subordination to East

Germany or Czechoslovakia. Independence begins with the economical

independence.10

The Soviet-Chinese split of 1960 created another opportunity to widen the gap

between Moscow and Bucharest. Another important step was the distancing of

Romanian’s economical thought from the Soviet direction, and culminated with the

so-called „declaration of independence”11of 1963, proclaimed by the Romanian

Communist Party’s Central Committee, which emphasized the national economic

development.

By criticizing Khrushchev's interpretation of the dispute, Gheorgiu-Dej achieved three

things. Abroad, he attracted support from Russia's rivals, both the West and

Communist China. At home, he could portray himself as the advocate of a Romanian

national Communism that kept the Russians at arms length. Finally, his popularity

favoured the closing of a commercial pact in June 1964 with the US, stressing again

the coldness occurred in the Soviet-Romanian relations.

.

Gheorgiu-Dej died in 1965 and was succeeded by his protégé, Nicolae Ceausescu,

who continued his policies, at least at the beginning of his leadership. Although in the

end of Dej’s regime and also in the beginning of comrade Ceauesescu’s rule Romania

enjoyed a slight freedom, things were about to change in a matter of few years.

10 Pierre DU BOIS, Ceauşescu la putere, trad. Ioana Ilie, Bucureşti, Humanitas, 2008, p. 3911 Trond GILBERG, Op. Cit., p.49

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“Ceusescuism” – Romania Under The Dictatorship of Nicolae Ceauşescu

The death of Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej in 1965 brings a period of struggle for

succession in PMR Even if Nicolae Ceauşescu was not seen as the best candidate, his

humble origins and his great ambition helped him to take into his hands Romania’s

internal and external leadership. He was considered to be very easy to control by the

other polls of power in the party and the most loyal follower of Gheorghiu-Dej. Soon

had everybody realized that, in fact, under Nicolae Ceauşescu, nationalism and

megalomania would gain astonishing proportions.

At the end of the 1960s and in 1970s he was described by the western information

channels as the “rebel” who dares to put first the national interests rather than that of

the soviets. “The myth of national communism”12 was being built in Romania; it was

being exploited as much as it could be by an ambitious, unscrupulousness and

almighty dictator.

In his very beginnings, Ceauşescu followed the “liberalization movement”13 initiated

by his predecessor. After the black years of Stalinism, the change was considered a

miracle and the entire Bucharest it is said to have been won by optimist feelings14.

But the new leader had very strong convictions in the “real socialism”. Ceauşescu was

educated in the Leninist values and he was not prepared or willing to leave them. He

persistently showed attachment to the centrally planned economy and to the formation

of the “new man”. Dreaming of having full control, he chose Stalin over USSR and he

remained always a “Stalinist”. However, his nationalistic deviation became a secret of

Polichinelle in the country and he used them like a trump card whenever in need for

legitimacy and authority.

Ceauşescu’s nationalism has a circular logic and explains very efficiently the

indissoluble link that was supposed to exist between the dictator and people. The

leader was at the same time the true holder of the “general will” of the nation and the

one that was entitled to shape the nation. In other words, Ceauşescu was the nation

and the nation was Ceauşescu and absolutely no one, not even the USSR, could

12 Vladimir TISMĂNEANU, Op. Cit., p.22313 Pierre DU BOIS, Op. Cit., p. 11314 Alexandru PALEOLOGU, Souvenir merveilleux d’un ambassadeur des Golans, Paris, 1990, p.184The author referred to the Romanian intellectuals perception and spirits in the times of “liberalization”.

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interfere or mediate this relationship. As this happens, even the word “opposition”

becomes nothing more than an “empty box”15, with no actual purpose.

As each of the elements that are blended together in “Ceausescuism” give the

specificities of this regime. We shall analyse them piece by piece in order to have a

good perception of the whole and of their interaction.

Traditional Romanian Nationalism and Chauvinism

Ceausescu has incorporated elements of traditional Romanian nationalism in his

ideology and has cultivated this feeling to the extreme, as chauvinism. This is evident

from his continuous reference to the great heroes of Romanian history, such as

Stephen the Great and Michael the Brave. Romanian historiography was utilized in

order to describe his fame and his grandeur in comparison with the heroes of the past,

with their honoured legendary position.16

Additionally, Ceauşescu thought that he would gain the entire trust of his people by

claming that he descends his authority from the history and from the nation

themselves. In such a position of “hero of the nation”, the terror he exercised was

perfectly legitimate. Moreover, he admired most of all the figure of Vlad Ţepeş, who

is known to have been a bloodthirsty tyrant and who committed cruel crimes against

his subjects. The communist dictator thought highly of himself and dreamt of being

remembered as the greatest Romanian leader of all times.

Romanian nationalism has turned easily to chauvinism, as such dreams require

radical attitudes. Consequently, the major ethic minorities, the Magyars, the Germans

and the Jews, have experienced policies that were to reduce their ethnic homogeneity

by dispersion. Furthermore, their expression of native language in literature, art, and

in primary and secondary education institutions had encountered many problems. The

Lutheran churches in Transylvania, the Catholic churches in Banat and Magyars

Catholic and Calvinist churches had been closed.17 Directly or indirectly, in the

dictator’s speeches such themes of xenophobic meaning were raised.

15 Jean-Paul Sartre, quoted in Norberto BOBBIO, Left and Right, translated by Allan Cameron, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1997 In the original context, the expression “empty boxes” was used by Jean-Paul Sartre to explain the lost of meaning in the dichotomy between Left and Right. 16 Trond GILBERG, Op. Cit., p. 5117 Pierre DU BOIS, Op. Cit., p. 41

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Isolationism and Autarky

One of the most important side effects of the emphasis on nationalism and on the

Romanian national heritage was a form of isolationism, both economically and

socially. Ceauşescu denigrated and rejected external influences and used censorship

against the Western way of thinking.

Self-sufficient in ideological and cultural matters, he would do the same mistake in

the economic field and this would result in one of his biggest errors. He was obsessed

with the idea that Romania must pay off all its debts and become truly independent.

As he was keen on saving as much money as he could, population came to be

deprived of essential goods and service.

In matters of economics, Romanian communists could not accept that an isolated

country would fail in taking advantage of the market, internal or external, of getting in

contact with the newest technology and of improving its status by confronting with

the hard competition.

Vladimir Tismaneanu18 saw in Ceauşescu’s anti-soviet attitude the evidence of his

crafty way of thinking and of his enormous ego. He was trying to gain more credit by

promoting the image of a “rebel” against the imperialism of USSR and make the

proof of his national heroism. In August 1968, when the soviet army entered

Czechoslovakia in order to end the experiment of the “socialism with a human face”,

the Romanian leader publicly denounced the Russian action as being “a rude

aggression”. It was only a “political illusion”19. Actually, his support for the

Czechoslovaks had its origin in the constant fear from the “common enemy” and not

at all in having the same beliefs of liberalization. The Romanian-Russian conflict

stayed always in the proper parameters accepted and tolerated by the soviets. In fact,

after only few days from his speech, Ceauşescu reaffirmed Romania’s position in the

communist block. Hence, the Romanian leader was not sharing the national

communist ideals for a fresh view of socialism. On the contrary, this episode is

nothing more than an attempt to acquire more power and “legitimacy” on an internal

base.

18 Vladimir TISMĂNEANU, Arheologia terorii, Bucureşti, Curtea Veche Publishing, 2008, p. 30019 Vladimir TISMĂNEANU, Stalinism pentru eternitate, trad. Cristina Petrescu si Dragoş Petrescu, Bucureşti, Polirom, 2005, p.235

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The Personality Cult and Megalomania

The Ceauşescu personality cult has reached ridiculous heights. The General Secretary

is described as the national hero, the greatest thinker, statesman and spokesman

Romania had ever seen.

Communism came to be a religion and Ceauşescu a living God, “the sun that provides

others with warmth and inspiration.”20 The public appearances of the dictator were

carefully orchestrated. Masses surged forward, rhythmically chanting “Ceauşescu and

the people” or simply “Ceauşescu, Ceauşescu”. Children demonstrated with white

flags, young girls in national costumes gave him flowers and in the eyes of everyone

he had to be the “true son of Romania”. On January 26th, when it was Ceauşescu’s

birthday, the whole country celebrated this remarkable event. At the meetings and

rallies, he enjoyed effusively applauses that were sometimes cut off with a sweep of

hand by the dictator, just as to show off his great power.

His megalomania interfered in very diverse fields and had terrible consequences. In

culture and art, censorship was brutally manifesting, giving permission to be

published only to those prose and poetry that were preaching up the first communist

of the country. Dissidents sometimes succeed in having their work published by

writing it in a cryptic way. It is not clear if this happened because the communist

could not get themselves the meaning of the texts or if they did not consider them to

be threatening their cause.

In order to build his own “sanctuaries”, Ceauşescu has demolished a substantial part

of the central city of Bucharest. The “glory of the epoch of Ceauşescu” had to remain

printed on “Bucharest’s face” and, in a way or another, it happened. Old monasteries,

churches and other architectural monuments have been razed or moved. The new

boulevards are flanked by gigantic buildings that were very poor architecturally

compared with the old ones.

The Romanian dictator found the inspiration for building the new political and

architectural centre of Bucharest while he was visiting Pyongyang.21 The People’s

20 Trond GILBERG, Op. Cit., p. 5421 While visiting North Korea, Ceausescu was very impressed with Kim II Sung’s architectural project, as he was, in fact, with the entire “cultural revolution”.

13

House is a metaphor of the entire system, through its pyramidal volume it explicitly

means “a perfect coordinated hierarchy”22. The name of the monument is an argument

of the populism emphasis in the regime. The good communist citizen deserved the

greatness of “his” house. Nevertheless, he was not allowed to enter it. He could access

only the enormous square in front of the building, where mass assemblies and

marches were organised. By appearing at the balcony, Ceauşescu could have a direct

contact with the people, becoming at the same time part of the monument and

absorbing part of its legitimacy.23 He dreamt of being immortal. This was the ambition

behind the “Pharaonic building of The People’s House.”24

Ceauşescu was sometimes described as a “Modern Cesar”, as he was very fond of a

type of Byzantine pomp and of monarchical symbols. On the 28th of March 1974 he

became the first president of Romania and he received the “presidential sceptre”, as a

very clear sign of a dynastic scenario.

Marxist Elements in Ceausescuism

While many aspects of “Ceausescuism” are of idiosyncratic and national origin, there

are also a number of elements that can be identified as Marxist. Centralized power,

exercised through a hierarchical party organization, would be, perhaps, the main such

features.

Secondly, the change from top down was specific to all Marxist-Leninist system.

Revolution was above all, above individuals and above their individual rights.

Ceauşescu, as Lenin, believed that masses could not be entrusted political actions and

that a forceful hand should take the political power and implement meaningful

policies.

Besides that, in matters of Economics, public ownership of the means of production,

collectivization of agriculture and forced industrialization are, of course, common to

most of the communist countries.

But there were differences in enforcing the Marxist elements. They came merely from

Gheorghe LEAHU, Bucureştiul disparut, Editura Arta Grafica, 1995, p.11922 Constantin PETCU, Totalitarian City: Bucharest 1980-9, semio-clinical files 23 Constantin PETCU, Op. Cit.24 Pierre DU BOIS, Op. Cit., p. 152

14

Ceauşescu’s style of leadership, based on personal preferences, nepotism and

submission. It was a system uniquely suited to personal power and “uniquely ill-

equipped for the needs of a modern society”25.

The Fall of Ceausescu’s Personal Dictatorship

Why did Ceausescu stay in power for such a long period (1965-1989)?

Ceausescu seemed to base his policy on national interest rather than on supporting the

Soviet bloc. In fact, power and ideology intermingled in the functioning of

Ceausescu’s personal dictatorship. The ideology interfered with elements from

nationalist populism, social demagogy and firm attachment to the basic concepts of

Stalinism.

In 1966, in order to enforce the regime’s popularity, Ceausescu resisted the Soviet

plans to strengthen the Warsaw Pact over the armed forces or its members. Later on,

in 1968 he “refused” to follow other Warsaw pact member states in their intruding

into Czechoslovakia in order to kill from birth the idea of establishing a liberal

communism there. Still, this did not imply Ceausescu ever endorsed “the Prague

spring”. He even made sure that information from the Czech and Western press,

related to the subject did not reach our country. This measure led to his appreciation

in West who turned its face towards Romania and supplied us with technology and

loans, things which were unattainable for other communist satellites.

Therefore, in 1972 Romania joined the World Bank and the International Monetary

Fund, in 1973 it obtained preferential trading status from the European Economic

Community and in 1975 was awarded Most Favored Nation trading status, by the

United States.26 It was only later on revealed by general Ion Pacepa, head of the the

Foreign Intelligence Department that actually 70% of the commercial attaches in

Romanian embassies were intelligence officers and that the others collaborated with

his agency. This meant that the ambassadors although following the Soviet policies,

sometimes appeared to diverge from Moscow, in order to receive important aid from

the Western democracies.

25 Trond GILBERG, Op. Cit., p. 5626 Tom GALLAGHER, Theft of a Nation, Romania since Communism, London, C. Hurst & Co. Ltd, 2005, p.58

15

By legitimizing his power, and keeping amicable relations to important chiefs of

states (Richard Nixon) and officials (Charles de Gaulle, Tony Benn- British

diplomat), Ceausescu misguided international opinion.

Internal measures taken by Ceausescu to sustain his regime

In the beginning of his rule Ceausescu seemed to be open to the liberalization of arts,

national literature and science, to the content of intelighentia, giving the elite the

impression of a possible collaboration. This proved to be, after a while, a façade, as

the dictator’s final goal was to get rid of those (even Party members) who could have

dreamed of a “human-faced” communism.

The intellectual elite were to become soon the target of oppression and censorship,

many of those who refused to serve the “national interest”, being forced to leave the

country. Ceausescu and the party’s apparatus also focused on the population in

Transylvania, more acquainted with the Western ideas and the liberal views of the

communist leader, Imre Nagy, by imposing an even higher censorship there.

Another important measure taken by Ceausescu to strengthen his regime was to offer

important positions in the Party to members of his family (nepotism). Moreover, he

often made rotations in the political structures in order to prevent the forming of

coalitions against him.

Besides this, Ceausescu considerably enlarged the number of the Party members, by

offering function to his relatives or to people with no political initiative and with no or

poor education, in order to have more control.

He also reformed the political structure of the state apparatus in such a way that he

concentrated the whole power in his hands, and made his removal almost impossible

to accomplish.

Another important consideration was that Romania lacked a democratic tradition and

the Romanian worker was interested mostly in the daily living. Furthermore, the

former landless peasants saw an improvement in their life under communism, until

1980’s, due to their incorporation into a new, large working class, who received

16

material support from the state. The regime tried to make the social element, known

as “homo sovieticus”, numerically dominant and it almost succeeded.27

Any other form of opposition was dispersed and was not numerous or strong enough

to change anything. The continuous censorship and repression was a more than

intimidating factor for those who did not approve of the Comrade’s policies and a

kafkanian feeling of fear prevailed in society. On top of that, any contact with the

outside world or politics was tampered and the access to free media or radio stations

(like Free Europe, BBC) was thoroughly limited.

The Fall of Ceausescu’s Personal Dictatorship

The dictator’s real image started to transpire in a short period after his election.

In 1969, Ceausescu stipulated that the election of the Romanian General Secretary

should no longer be the responsibility of the Central Committee, but instead, that of

delegates at the Party Congress. This meant that his removal was to be decided by his

close party peers, thing unlikely to happen under the given circumstances.

On top of that, Ceauşescu proclaimed himself as President of Romania and was

photographed carrying a scepter. Many of the party members disapproved of the

dictator’s abuse of power nevertheless did not dare to challenge him on the basis of

socialist legality.

A turning-point for the regime was Ceausescu’s visit to North Koreea in 1971 where

he found a derivation of communism that suited his character. Following the model of

Kim II Sung regime, Ceausescu wanted to take Romania to the next level of

“development” in a short time by stressing out the need for a rapid, heavy, industrial

economy. Firstly, a huge oil-refining industry was created, although our country did

not have the capacity to make it profitable due to the lack of reserves. Secondly, far

more steel plants than needed were created.

This fight for achieving ideological goals was “much ado about nothing”28 in the end

as it centered economy on overproduction of bulk rather than quality, and exported to

unreliable Third World Markets. Ceausescu hoped to create a society dominated by

27 Tom GALLAGHER, Op. Cit., p. 6028 Title of Shakespearian play (1600 ad.)

17

proletarian values, with miners and steel workers at the pyramid’s basis. The high-

technology sector was neglected as well as the Service sector; no experiments in

market economics were allowed.

Another gross mistake of the dictator was to remove specialists and good economists29

from important positions, and place instead family members, most probably with no

or insufficient education. For example, Elena, President Ceausescu’s wife received

minimal education, still she acquired a doctorate in Chemical engineering and various

honor degrees.

Also, this heavy industrialization led Romania to gathering an impressive foreign debt

that rose from $3.6 billion to $ 10.2 billion between 1977 and 1981. Adding to this the

mass import of crude oil in order to support the largely-extended petroleum industry

(80% of the quantity needed), Romania was almost in economical collapse.

As a consequence Ceausescu took the unfortunate decision, in 1982 to pay off all

external debts by year 1990. He accomplished it but at enormous cost to the economy

and the Romanian people. In order to see to his goal, Ceausescu drastically cut down

imports from the West for food, medicines and spare parts, and resolved to export

anything that could be sold abroad. Food exports to the Soviet Union flourished while

a strict rationing system was introduced on our territory.

Still, according to Silviu Brucan30, Ceausescu’s second half of rule would have been

characterized by political stability if he would have had respected the unwritten social

contract, made with workers.

Considering the fact that Romania consisted mostly of a peasant population,

Ceausescu’s plan of systematization - destroying large rural areas and inhabited

villages in order to transform them in industrial centers, was a great hit for the normal

peasant. This also implied a shift of the peasantry to urban areas and the massive

constructions of agro-industrial complexes for them to live in. Besides, the

transformation of the collective peasantry into an extension of the urban working-

29 As, for example, Alexandru Bârlădeanu30 Party activist, editor of “The letter of the six”, political analyst in post –communist era

18

class, made them dependent on the state for all their needs.

Other reasons for discontent were the harsh working conditions and the low payment,

which evolved into the unsuccessful manifestations among miners in Jiu Valley in

1977 and among workers in the Braşov tractor plant - 1987.

A 1981 law allowed imprisonment for mistakes committed at the workplace.

Likewise, other draconic measures were initiated by Ceausescu to keep the people

under his authority. After 1984, most women workers were monthly submitted to

medical checks for pregnancy. Ceausescu believed that a nation, in order to be strong

and influent, must also consist of a great population.

From 1966 abortion had been declared illegal and no contraceptives could be found

on market. In the 1966-1989 periods, records show that 11,000 women died following

illegal abortions.31

The unfounded social engineering projects (House of the People, the grey workers

blocks, etc) and also the numerous human rights abuses draw the attention of the

West.

Taking a forward step inside the causes of Ceausescu’s fall we can witness an even

deeper destabilization of Ceausescu’s legitimacy, at same time with remarkable

changes occurred in the Soviet Union from mid 1980’s onwards. Mikhail Gorbachev

revealed a “human face of the communist system”, foreseeing revolutionary thoughts.

(Perestroika and glasnost politics). The aversion towards religious beliefs and the

persecution of religious practices were also of great importance in the context of a

profound traditional Romanian society. Still, the Orthodox Church was not destroyed

by communist regulations as it was used in the controlling of masses.

The willingness of many intellectuals and of the Orthodox Church to be compliant

with the Party, showed the low resistance the Party encountered. Besides this factor,

the absence of a strong democratic tradition in Romania, and the special attention paid

to Transylvania, considered to be more oriented to Western ideas, also eased the

Communist rule.31 Tom GALLAGHER. Op. Cit., p 67

19

Opposition to Ceausescu’ s regime was a silent one despite the immense suffering he

caused to different sectors of society, especially in the 1980’s when his dictatorship

entered a fully irrational, totalitarian phase.

The fear he inoculated to the people, did not let any place for political activism or

large manifests. Ceausescu ruled the country as his own private domain, loosing touch

even with his party colleagues, who finally decided to withdraw their support and

dispose of him.

But the main factor in the collapse of communism in Romania was the failure in

economic realm. The emphasis on heavy industrialization and urbanization led to the

underdevelopment of our country, placing it behind states as Greece, Portugal or

Spain. However, the most retrograde effect of the communist era was to create a

largely dependent population, which received most of the material requirements from

the state.

The overthrow of Nicolae Ceausescu and Elena Ceausescu culminated in the end with

a hastily improvised revolution in December 1989.

Minorities under Communism

During the first stage of the communist regime, the Soviet model imposed by the

Soviet Union supposed an internationalist spirit, denying nationalism. Nevertheless,

tensions were latent and there were some violent outbursts such as the manifestations

of students in Cluj during the spring and summer of 1946. The adhesion of

Hungarians as well as Jews to the communist party must be seen as a way for these

minorities to preserve their identity, hoping to impose Moscow on Bucharest.

The emphasis on internationalism until the 1960s and on communist nationalism

during the next period did not encourage better consideration either for minorities in

the first phase or for the Romanian majority in the following one. In fact, the policy of

the Romanian communists tended since the beginning to use minorities to consolidate

the regime or the personal rule of the Ceausescu family.

20

The Romanisation of Transylvanian cities only became an imperative policy goal

under Ceausescu. In 1968 the Hungarian Autonomous Region was abolished and in

1972 Ceausescu was speaking openly of the need of national and social

homogenization.

Policies designed to create “a single-working people” were understood by Hungarians

as an attempt to assimilate them at a time when state education in the Hungarian

language was forbidden.

In the 1970’s and 1980’s the demographic profile of cities like Târgu Mureş, Cluj,

Oradea, once strongly Hungarian in character, began to be altered. This was also due

to Ceausescu’s policy of encouraging the coming of Moldavian immigrants and their

settling in Transylvania. The demolition of Hungarian districts to make way for the

high-rise flats to accommodate new-comers was seen by Hungarians dissidents a

“systematization” policy meant to create a more uniform society.32

Besides this, the decision to assign Transylvanian Hungarian graduates jobs in places

far away from their own ethnic communities, aroused the anger of the minorities. As a

result, many well-educated Transylvanian Hungarian chose emigration to Hungary

instead in the 1980’s. Romanians in general, and those living together with the

Hungarian communities, refused to react to the challenges invented by the regime,

thus the interethnic relations marked by a spirit of mutual assistance during the 1980s.

This tolerance supposes both differentiations through complementarities, as well as

elements of similarity. The complementarities and differentiations are manifest at the

linguistic and religious levels, while there are similarities at different levels such as

lifestyle, territorial organization, agriculture and manufacturing techniques, economic

practices. To these, we may add the joint celebration of important religious events, of

the habits and customs related to the life cycle, mixed marriages etc.

Conclusions

32 Tom GALLAGHER. Op. Cit., pp. 62-63

21

The Romanian version of communism not only incorporates some of the worst

Stalinist concepts – the overcentralization of the economy, mass oppression and the

cult of personality - but it combines these phenomena with elements of an

exaggerated idiosyncrasy. The communist system in this country is totally permeated

by corruption, gigantism and boundless idolatry if its leader. Nicolae Ceauşescu

wanted to leave a lasting imprint on the history of the Romanian nation, thus he did

not hesitate to replace monuments, to destroy historic towns and city centres or to

transform art in a eulogy for himself.

Romania went out of step with its neighbours – including the Soviet Union. While

several countries in Eastern Europe seemed to be moving away from the vestiges of

Stalinism, the Romanian communist system went in opposite direction, to the

“irreversible” totalitarianism.

Nicolae Ceauşescu was concerned primarily with the expansion of his personal

power. He was fascinated with the idea of autocratic ideological dictatorship, not with

pure nationalism or with the “revisionism” of national communism. Nevertheless,

nationalism played an extremely important role in “Ceausescuism”. As Andrei

Brezianu says, “the regime set forth the idea that being a Romanian and a Communist

was one and the same thing”.33

We should ask ourselves, like others have done before, “Who was, in fact,

Ceauşescu? Was he a Communist? Was he a Stalinist? Was he obsessed by the lack of

legitimacy? Was he representing a doctrine?” Some would say that he did not

represent anything at all. He was just the Romanian living proof that power tens to

corrupt, and that “absolute power corrupts absolutely”34.

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33 Andrei BREZIANU, in Romania: A Case of “Dynastic” Communism, edited by James Finn, New York, Freedom House, , 1989, p.8 34 Gheorghe SENCOVICI, in Romania: A Case of “Dynastic” Communism, edited by James Finn, New York, Freedom House, , 1989, p. 19

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