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Nationalism, national movements and the dissolution of the Austro -Hungarian
Monarchy. Case study: the activity and discourse of the Romanian National Party
of Transylvania 1900-1914
BySzele Aron
-Central European University-2008
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Introduction
The subject chosen for research has had a turbulent historiographical past, and can
be considered quite controversial, in more ways than one. Interpretative strategies of
different nationality and political affiliation went abou t rendering the Romanian political
elite of Transylvania in altogether dissimilar fashion. But most agree that their special
brand of regionally developed nationalism and political activism were paramount in the
developments which took place and reverberat ed into Hungarian and Romanian history.
This generation of politicians was instrumental in the development of a discourse of
contestation towards the centre, based on mass politics and territorial nationalism 1. This
dissertation will focus on showing how T ransylvanian Romanian nationalism and
national-political elite diachronically altered its discourse, spawning, from the same root,
ideologies that ranged from dynastic loyalty, to democracy and populist nationalism.
The rendition of the Romanian national movement of Transylvania during its
activist phase by Romanian historiography has been plagued by inconsistencies. The
official account on the events which ingrained itself after the war in the collective
mindset of Romanian historiography was one of unbr idled triumphalism, and a vision of
solidarity was projected onto the movement on all levels. This interpretation was to be
perpetuated by the post-1945 history-writing, with a single, but paradigmatic twist: it
gradually phased out the subject. Works such as the would-be magnum opus of
1 Carl E. Schorske, Fin-de-Siėcle Vienna: Politics and Culture, New York, Vintage Books, 1980
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Transylvanian history, Pascu and Daicoviciu’s Treaty on Transilvanian History 2 did not
say much on the subject, and the volume’s rampant nationalist outlook was to be a
hallmark for the historiography of years to follow. Th e tunnel-vision of the authors,
which saw a direct line of continuity and progression between the Memorandist
movement and the events of winter 1918 left little open for debate. The activist period,
with ideologically dangerous characters in the forefron t such as Maniu and Goga was to
be relegated, and would remain an almost taboo subject for much time. In later years
(until the late 1980’s), a mere handful of articles and special works sought to explore the
problem, among them Lucian Boia’s 3, Keith Hitchins’4, Liviu Maior’s5 and Stelian
Mandrut’s6. The latter two are quite constricted due to ideological pressure, concentrate
solely on the factual side of the matter, and present the Romanian elite in an un -
contextualized fashion. The problems of this inte rpretative strategy were threefold: first
and foremost, it presents events in an overly nationalistic manner. Secondly, the RNP’s
2 Daicoviciu, C., Pascu, Şt., Din istoria Transilvaniei , Bucureşti, Editura Academiei, 1960, vol.2.
3 Boia ,Lucian, Contribuţii privind criza PNR şi trecerea de la pasivism la activ ism (1893-1905), in Studiide Istorie, tom 24, nr.5., pp. 963-984, Bucuresti, 1971; Boia, Lucian, Contribuţii la istoria miscăriinaţionale ale românilor din Transilvania în anii 1900-1914, in Studii de Istorie, tom 25, nr.4., pp. 783-801,Bucuresti, 1972
4 Hitchins, Keith, Mit şi realitate in istoriografia română , Bucureşti, Humanitas, 2000
5 Maior, Liviu, Mişcarea naţională română din Transilvania (1900 -1914), Cluj, Editura Dacia, 1986;Maior, Liviu, Alexandru Vaida-Voievod între Belvedere şi Versaill es, Bucureşti, Editura Sincron, 1993;Maior, Liviu, Programul politic al mişcării naţionale române din Transilvania între 1881 -1914 si luptapentru realizarea lui, Cluj Napoca, Editura Dacia, 1980
6 Mândruţ, Stelian, Mişcarea natională şi activitatea p arlamentară a deputaţilor PNR din Transilvaniaîntre 1905-1920, Oradea, Fundaţia Culturală "Cele Trei Criş uri", 1995; Mândruţ, Stelian, Relaţia dintregruparea federalistă a PNR şi cabinetul militar al lui Franz Ferdinand (1905 -1910), in Istoria ca lectură alumii, 1994, p. 289-99
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leading intelligentsia was not depicted as acting in the right context, that of the late
Austro-Hungarian Monarchy’s political scene ( ideological and language barriers are to
blame here, besides the interpretative lacuna). Lastly, from a methodological viewpoint,
the authors did not attempt to employ any other tools than the empirical ones. The subject
is in stringent need of an investigation that would apply novel methods, as those of
intellectual history.
The Transylvanian political intelligentsia developed among the many turn -of-the-
century nationalist groups of the Austro -Hungarian Monarchy, the internal socio -political
conditions formatting its perceptions and Weltanschauung. The thesis will show how,
through the method of a case study, what was the nationalities groups response to the
challenge coming from the centre. The Romanian National Party of Transylvania was a
party of this typology, exhibiting nationalist ideology at the level of discourse, making a
nationalist cause its sole purpose of being. But what sort of nationalism was it? At a
closer examination we can discover that Carl E. Schorske’s description of the nat ionalist
discourse in turn-of-century Austria resembles the Romanian one quite well. It is no
longer an elitist nation-building mid-nineteenth century nationalism, but a new one, one
that is infused with elements of democracy, and mass politics. It no long er took its
support from elites of the bourgeoisie, but from masses of disenfranchised would -be
citizens that all have almost manifest anti -statal ideas; its activist political tactics between
1900 and the beginning of the World War show this.
The study of the history of a turn-of-the century Austro-Hungarian nationalist
movement or party has to take into consideration a variety of factors. In the first place,
setting it in the correct political atmosphere and conditions is paramount. This lends to a
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much better understanding not only of the activity and reactions of the party as a whole
and its individual members, but suggests the motivation behind the actions. Secondly, the
correct social-economical context must be laid down. Also, contextualizing the
movement in the accurate intellectual -cultural milieu is also essential for a nuanced and
balanced treatment of the subject matter.
In order to aid this purpose, The thesis will be broken down into three chapters.
The first chapter will focus upon a gener al outline and problematized analysis of the
structural problems of the Austro -Hungarian Monarchy. It will undertake a short
institutional, political and societal investigation into the ailments of the state, in order to
set the correct framework. The perc eived problems recognized by society itself, and the
proposed solution will be dissected in a synthetic -systematic manner.
The second chapter will describe and analyze the intellectual and mental
atmosphere of the fin-de-siécle imperial society, with a specific focus on the Hungarian
side. It will treat the changes in theme and topicality from the 1895 to 1914, when the
political crisis of liberalism developed and became acute. The influence upon Romanian
thinkers and mentality will be analyzed, and the y will be contextually integrated into this
larger framework of contestation against the establishment. The complex interplay of
influence and imitation of ideas and streams of thought between Romanian, Hungarian
and other political thinkers will be resear ched.
The third part of the thesis will revolve around the concrete political activity of
the RNP after 1895. In this period, after the failure of the Memorandist movement, the
party entered into a new phase of its existence, in which it repudiated the t raditional
passivist tactics and engaged in a voluntarist, mass -oriented nationalist-democratic
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political agitation, formally known as the “activist period”. In this epoch, they racked up
their greatest successes ( such as the 1905 elections), but also fel l into a state of deep
disunity. While pioneering a new style in politics, they came under criticism from inside
their own line, for the circle of “Steely Youngsters” gathered around a young nationalist
poet, Octavian Goga. The bitter in -fighting, expressed through the press organs of the two
sides, the Tribuna ( later Romanul and others) and the Gazeta Transilvaniei will also be
analyzed from the viewpoint of linguistic topography and discursive practices. A seminal
analysis of the intellectual sources pro duced by the contributors to this debate must be
done, coupled with a dissection of their political speeches. The concrete factual facet will
not be disregarded, it will also be integrated in a problematized fashion into the contents
of this chapter.
The interpretative strategy that will be used will combine the methods of political
and intellectual history, appending it with the correct factual framework, in order to give
an accurate account of the utilage mentale of the protagonists. The social proveni ence of
the new nationalists will be analyzed on the broad level of the Austro -Hungarian
Monarchy. The social transformations by 1900 lead to a development of a new category
of politically educated, mostly urban category. One of the reasons for this was
industrialization and the spread of education, coupled with bureaucratization and the
development of the varying modes of communication, infrastructure. On a political level,
these advances were due to the liberal nationalist elite governing both halves of t he
Monarchy. As much as they were the initiators of these developments, the liberal elites
found themselves close to being displaced through them. At the turn of the century, the
whole establishment in Austria and in Hungary came under heavy criticism. The reason
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was the barring of the accession to power of large sections of the population, who had
newly acquired political conscience. These categories started to view the liberal
governments and their ideologies as a - and anti-national, ossified and as a sel f-enclosed
caste. Another ingredient of this dispute was the Imperial House of Habsburg, that tried
to make use of the crisis of the establishment, in order to re -legitimate itself on new, mass
basis, preaching a direct connection between itself and its su bjects.
On the level of ideology and mental mechanisms, there is a noticeable shift from
the elitist nationalism, rationality and meritocracy of the mid -nineteenth century towards
a more mass-oriented political specter, infused with the influence of cult ural circles that
preached the resurgence of sentiment. Fin-de-siecle populist nationalisms, such as the
Romanian one, can be fitted into this milieu, and the change of topicality in discourse
thus finds a motivation. The political language on which this political debate between the
old and the new was again to be based was nationalism, for it was this ideology that gave
the foundation for criticism.
Having already established the main factors of the transition towards the so -called
“crisis of liberalism” as being social-intellectual and partly, political, there must be
undertaken a seminal investigation of the linguistic topoi used by this new political elite.
The elements of the meta-language revolved mainly around the old national debates, but
were appended with a biological, organic understanding of the nation. Diverse
psychological and fenotipical characterologies competed against each other in a social
Darwinist scheme, in which all tried to assign themselves the role of the fittest to survive.
Diverse component nations and ethnicities of the Monarchy became classified according
to these varying and rivaling taxonomies. This discourse was grafted onto previous
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schemes that envisaged a Habsburg realm broken up into a federative state. One of the
finest exponents of this type of discourse was the Romanian politician and theorist Aurel
C. Popovici7. His meta-theory is centered around the combination of the federalist and
bio-political aspects, both ordered neatly so as to assure a total satisfaction of t he needs of
his nation ( as he saw them) and those of the Imperial centre. It thus comes as little
surprise that he was one of the recurring participants of the so -called “Belvedere Circle”,
gathered around the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, and at the same tim e, was publicly
praised by radical populist nationalists such as Karl Lueger.
Even ideologies that claimed a supra -national or a-national lineage, such as the
already-mentioned imperial loyalist Weltanschauung, or the socialist one, had to take into
consideration the national question. They reinterpreted their discourse in such a way that
it would allot sufficient space to ethnicity, and informally recognized it as a dividing
factor in society. They tried to appease nationalism through this tactic and use it as a
centripetal force, rather than treating it as a centrifugal one.
These main discursive leitmotifs formed the core of the political language in
which ideology expressed itself around 1900 in the Austro -Hungarian Monarchy. They
combined ( at a symbolic level) to herald a new era in politics, epitomized by the entry of
the masses onto the political stage with the 1907 law for universal manhood suffrage. The
complex interplay between these new nationalisms, the increasingly powerless liberal
political elites ( who loose all representativity), and the revanchard imperial centre
format the political discourse between 1900 and the eve of the First World War. By its
meta-language, social origin and political affiliation, the RNP belongs to these new
nationalist groups, that contributed much to the weakening, at the level of legitimacy and
7 A. C. Popovici, Stat si Natiune, Bucuresti: Albatros, 1998
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perception, of the old power -structure. The analysis of its activity and political
vocabulary will correctly situate and contextualize it thusly. This will then lend it self to
the formation of a more complete and nuanced picture of the turn -of-the century Austro-
Hungarian society, which will correctly situate the Romanian political activity and
intellectual production.
The Romanian National Party, in its last phase of existence, provides an excellent
case study, that provides much insight into the complex interaction between a nationalist
centre and a nationalist periphery. The competition for the preservation and continuation
of their respective identities resulted in an pendular motion, bringing them periodically
closer, but in the end, resulting in a complete divorce between the parties. This break at
the mental level was one of the major factors contributing to the dissolution of the
established order of the Dualist nexus at the end of 1918.
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Chapter One
The Political Crisis of Liberalism in Hungary
Factors of Crisis
The deep factors that lead to the upheaval on the political level have to be
searched for at the social level. It was the disparity betw een a changing society and a
political system unwilling ( and partially unable, because of its rigidity) to yield that
caused the crisis to occur. The ethnic strife grafted itself over this development, giving
the debate a particular, Austro-Hungarian, flavor.
The urbanization process was by 1900 in full swing in Dualist Hungary. A large
sector of the population, around a quarter of the total resided in towns or cities by this
period8. Around 24,2 % of the population was involved in industry, and the perc entage of
populous dependent on agriculture for subsistence decreased from 82 % to 62,4% 9. Social
mobility had therefore increased substantially, resulting at a high level of people
available for potential activation in the field of politics. At the same t ime, wealth was still
unevenly distributed among the population. A good example for this was the fact that the
top 5 banking and financial holdings controlled over 57% of the industrial capital stock,
8 Ibidem., p. 4119 Andrew C. Janos, The Politics of Backwardness in Hungary 1825 -1945, pp. 149-152
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investing in 220 of the 250 largest companies 10. Still, improving living standards and
medical conditions, alongside the nascent industrialization of the country, resulted in a
high rate of social transformation.
The most important development for the problems analyzed in this thesis is the
evolvement of public education. The law for compulsory primary education introduced in
1868 had returned impressive results. By 1913, 86% of the children that were of the
schooling age were enrolled in some form of educational facility 11. The majority of these
institutions were operated by the state, although confessional schools still held a sizeable
share of the whole. The proportion of illiteracy was also reduced, but was uneven; the
ethnic divide affected it quite unambiguously. For example, only 20,7% and 17,6% of
Hungarians, respectively Germans living on the territory of Hungary were illiterate, to a
30,3% Slovakian and a staggering 66,9% Romanian percentage 12. Nonetheless, the
schooling system had made important strides, and far overshadowing all of its
counterparts in eastern and southern neighbor states. The drive was initially toward
creating a moderately literate laboring class, that would respond better to state control.
The Hungarian ( primary) school system, loosely based on the Humboldtian paradigm,
was divided into two levels of basic and intermediate education. Its mission was to spread
the “humanist cultural norm” as efficiently as possible. But from the outset, its partition
into gymnasiums, which granted direct access to universities, that conferred the votin g
right- census, and commercial schools, which did not, reflected the fault lines of
Hungarian society. However, the simple spread of base knowledge about the functioning
of the state, Hungarian history, literature and vernacular were compulsory subjects
10 Ibidem., p. 15111 Peter Hanak (ed.), Magyarorszag tortenete , vol. 7, tom. II., p. 42412 Ibidem., p. 424
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throughout, rigorously enforced by the Educational Inspectorates of the state. This was
done in accordance with the cultural policies of the liberal state, that wished to forge the
nation in its own image, and according to its own value -system. The desire for an
ethnically homogenous society was also quite alluring, and was pursued as a desiderate
all throughout the period, with the means of educational and cultural policy.
Another factor, in close relation with the latter, was the spread of the means of
communication and information, alongside cultural products. Around 1913, there were
about 2000 periodicals and newspapers appearing in Hungary yearly ( with around 1500
being in Hungarian)13. Information was reaching the masses in increasing numbers and
penetrating even the most remote areas. The press, who’s themes gravitated almost
exclusively around politics, became increasingly a leader and a barometer of public
opinion. Other cultural institutions, such as libraries, theaters and cultural associations
offered to many the prospect of understanding the intricacies of the political machinery.
More and more of the public became available for political mobilization.
The result was an increase in citizens who were ready and able to take part in the
political process, but were unable to do so because of the unique nature of the Dualist
construct. The outcome of this was the increase of frustration with the social and
political system, which did not allow for reform in concert with the social modifications.
Since the system, owing to its fragility on ethnic grounds, did not allot for smooth or
rapid changes, the public opinion and civil society started to search for radical solutions
out of the undesirable situation with which they were confronted. The support f or
liberalism, especially in urban areas, interestingly, did not decline, but remained at the
same levels. It is precisely the level of contestation, also mostly occurring at the urban
13 Ibidem., p. 425
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level, that gained considerable clout. Those contesting the establishme nt on the grounds
of social inequity claimed that their solutions would provide an answer to the nationality
question as well ( sometimes vice versa). The two entered into a sort of symbiotic
relationship, each feeding of the other’s themes, ending up in a n a common platform of
those socially and ethnically disenfranchised by the system.
The political crisis of liberalism in Hungary
The concept of the crisis of liberalism, so often uttered and utilized, is chiefly
associated with late 19 th and turn-of-the century Austria. It was for this social -political
and intellectual context that Carl Schorske put forward this idea. However, this
phenomena was not particular alone to the Austrian half of the Monarchy. It had direct
synchronicity with a similar course of events in Transleithania, and, as the historian Peter
F. Sugar suggest, preceded and may have even kick started the political paradigm shift in
the other half of the Monarchy 14.
The reasons for this shift in political language and tactic can be t raced back to the
structure of the polity laid down in 1867, and strengthened in 1875. The Dualist
14 Peter F. Sugar, An Underrated Event: The Hungarian Consitutional Crisis of 1905 -1906, p. 281-282
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agreement itself gave birth to the ideology of the political class, instead of it being based
solely on social and other realities 15. Relating oneself towards the Ausgleich, whether
positive or negative, was to be the directive for the partition of the Hungarian political
class16. The Liberal (Szabadelvu) Party, which supported the Compromise, being favored
by the emperor, fashioned for itself a political and el ectoral system that ensured its
comfortable dominance. Inside the legislature, a highly efficient voting machinery,
composed of liberal deputies, dubbed “ the Mameluks” ( because of their dependency on
the party chief), was set up by the leading liberal pol itical figure of the period, Tisza
Kalman. Due to electoral gerrymandering and the fact that parliamentary debates yielded
as the usual outcome the confirmation of the government policy, the opposition was
blockaded. The main opposition party, the so -called Independence (Fuggetlensegi) or
’48-ers, was founded in the same year, 1875, as the liberals. From the outset their
political objectives were frustrated time and again by the political framework of Dualist
Hungary. Alongside a host of other small parties , as well as the groupings of the various
nationalities, they rarely had their voices heard or their plans come to fruition. The
electoral procedures and the party politics created by Deak and perfected by Tisza
Kalman seemed to be airtight for much of the second half of the 19 th century17.
Dualist Hungary began to exhibit symptoms of ailment as early as the Banffy
government’s tenure in power. Around 1897, a new phenomenon appeared on the
political stage: parliamentary obstruction. The political practice a nd vocabulary had also
taken a turn towards a new-found aggression. The catalyst for the apparition of this type
15 C.A. Macartney, The History of the Habsburg Empire , pp. 687-68916 Laszlo Peter, The Dualist Character of the 1867 Settlement , in Gyorgy Ranki, Hungarian History- WorldHistory, p. 12017 Kozari Monika, A Dualista Rendszer, pp. 134-143
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of new contestation of the established order was the Quota and the Customs Union. This
was, according to the Ausgleich, to be renewed every ten years18. The parliamentary
opposition started to make use of this new tool of obstructing the proceedings of
legislature, seeing it as the only avenue of defense against the central authority. The tactic
in itself signifies a radicalization of thought. Con jugated with an unprecedented increase
of the Independents representation in Parliament after the 1895 elections, it was to be a
herald of things to come. Another important factor, highly significant in the area of
symbolic capital, was the death of the he ro of Hungarian nationalism, Kossuth Lajos, in
Italy. With much pomp and pathos, his remains were brought to Hungary, a host of
mortuary ceremonies were dedicated to him, resulting in a sort of sepulchral cult, that
stirred up nationalist feeling like neve r before. The emperor refused to acknowledge the
event, and also robbed the Liberal party of much needed electoral assets, by forbidding
the officials of the country ( ministers, senior civil servants and so forth) to take part in
the ceremonial proceedings19. This only served to further weaken the already feeble and
manifestly artificial liberal dominance over internal matters.
Accompanying his father’s cortege was Ferenc Kossuth, also allowed back into
the country after sustained campaigning by the 48 -er fold. The opportunity provided by
the ceremonies surrounding the death of the cult figure of the Hungarian revolution, and
the return of his son was masterfully exploited by the Independist opposition in their own
favor. He joined the party as its nomina l leader in the fall of the same year. To many of
the Hungarian electors, it must have seemed as the spirit of 1848 was beginning to be
rekindled.
18 Poloskei Ferenc, A magyar parlamentarizmus a szazadfordulon , pp. 70-7619 Peter F. Sugar, An Underrated Event: The Hungarian Consitutional Crisis of 1905 -1906, p. 284
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The Liberal Party was beginning to show signs of evident internal weakness after
the retirement of Kalman Tisza. It soon became obvious for the higher party echelon that
the position of leader was up for grabs, and they started vying for it. This, in turn, lead to
instability and lack of efficient support for the governmental policy in the latter part of
the party’s existence. The party voting and propaganda machinery started to function
erroneously, and cracks, visible to the public, appeared in the party authority. Moreover,
men such as Albert Apponyi, who had their endeavors at leadership frustrated by the
strong-hand tactics of Banffy and later, Istvan Tisza, broke away from the party, with a
significant amount of followers. They would go on to form the conservative wing of the
Coalition government, continuously gravitating between ’67 -er and ’48-er attitudes and
discourses.
The stage was thus set for the beginning of what was appropriately dubbed by
Hungarian historiography “the years of obstruction”. The parliamentary opposition, by
way of loud diversions or other devices, unleashed a fierce campaign of im peding the
proceedings of the legislative body. The result was that important acts, that had to be
voted by parliament, such as budgets, not to mention the above -mentioned Quota
agreements and army recruiting bills, could not be passed. The country found i tself after
1898 effectively in an ex lex situation. The forceful tactics of the Banffy government did
not yield any positive results. The opposition profited from the fall of the Badeni
administration in the Austrian half, and the fact that the negotiatio ns for the 1897,
effectively concluded, were not ratified by the Reichsrat. The Independists declared the
pact as to be null and void, and the customs union between the two halves of the
Monarchy dissolved. All that Banffy could do, as one of his last acts , was force through
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parliament an extension of the 1887 agreement for one more year, before he was ousted
from office.
The term in office of Szell Kalman was accompanied by high hopes for peace,
and he soon became known by the epithet “the great leveler” or the “peacemaker”20, due
to his conciliatory strategy. His tactic to revitalize the deadlocked politic machinery was
to initiate negotiations with the leading members of the opposition, and offer various
concessions, in exchange for passing the needed le gislation. Another successful move by
him was to bring Apponyi’s group back into the fold. He was temporarily pacified by
appointment to the chair of the Lower House of the Hungarian parliament. But this
temporary success did not count for much, since some months earlier, another significant
group of dissidents appeared, and ostentatiously broke with the party on the ground of the
wrangling over the Quota. This faction, of 32 deputies, led by count Andrassy Gyula Jr.,
began to bolster the bulwark of the opp osition from 1899 onwards.
Under the leadership of Szell, the liberals gained victory and an increase of seats
in parliament after the elections of 1901. However, as the Hungarian historian Istvan
Dolmanyos points out, the increase was rather artificial ( even under the factitious
conditions of the dualist electoral system), and can be attributed mostly to the former
National Party electorate of Albert Apponyi 21. This fact, conjugated with the uneasy
partnership with Apponyi’s group, resulted in Szell’s ad ministration lying on quite shaky
foundations. In fact, his political support actually decreased rather than multiplying, as
the results of the elections seemed to have indicated.
20 Poloskei Ferenc, op.cit. , p. 10021 Dolmanyos Istvan, A magyar parlamenti ellenzek tortenetebol ( 1901 -1904 ), p. 129-130
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The term in office of Szell brought many promising and necessary reforms i n the
social, agricultural and financial areas; out of these the agricultural minister, Daranyi
Ignac’s achievements were the most significant. A consummate technocrat, he engineered
a series of reforms that greatly contributed to the modernization of the country’s
backward agricultural system. However, in the eyes of the public opinion and civil
society, there was no room for acknowledging these feats. The political imaginary of
Hungary was still gripped by the ominous constitutional question. In this area as well,
Szell’s mandate debuted with a measure of success. He managed to squeeze out of the
Austrian government a more favorable Tariff and Trade agreement in 1902. But for the
opposition, which was going through the final phases of radicalization of pol itical
language and thought, it was too little too late. The strong obstruction they unleashed in
parliament blocked the ratification of this agreement, and it never was never put into
practice22.
Another important factor that undermined Szell’s authority at the head of the state
and the party was the emergence of an alternative political leader, representing an
alternate path to quell protest: Istvan Tisza and his forceful method. His refusal to debate
on the terms of the opposition, and his resolve to br eak obstruction by any means
necessary or available23 alienated many ( such as Andrassy Jr.’s faction), and widened the
gap between government and opposition.
The very fact that Szell attempted a reconciliation and gravitated back and forth
between concessions to Hungarian nationalism and to the Compromise, brought about his
downfall. The attempt to uphold the Dualist framework, while stretching it to its very
22 Sugar, op. cit., p. 28623 Gabor Vermes, Istvan Tisza, in Body Pal (ed.), Hungarian Statesmen of Destiny 1860 -1960, p. 83 andPoloskei Ferenc, Tisza Istvan, p . 84
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limits via skilful legislative trickery and half -measures that satisfied no-one, was a
temporary solution at best. The final blows to Szell’s administration were given by the
heated debate that broke out around the army question in 1902 -03. Linked to the previous
financial conundrum, the recruiting and army budget contributions, army instruction
language and soforth, were brought to the fore. The opposition, owing to its nationalist
lineage, demanded nothing more than the extension of the rights of the Honved army
(then a sort of national guard) to the extent that it would result in a separate Hungaria n
army of its own. Among other demands was the introduction of Hungarian as the
language of instruction and drills in the Hungarian contigents of the army, the stationing
of Hungarian troops on home soil, and the insignia used, which were deemed to be “un -
Hungarian”. While Szell attempted to wrangle some halfway solution out of the central
authority, the opposition again, by the means of obstruction, succeeded in having the new
limited military bill to be non-ratified. Hungary was again in an effective ex l ex situation,
and Szell resigned. His successor, the former ban of Croatia, count Karoly Khuen -
Hedervary, had little more success in resolving any of the contested matters. The emperor
dealt him and the 67’-er camp a hard blow by the notorious Chlopy decla ration of 1903,
in which he reinforced his unequivocal dominance over military affairs. The liberal party
now was a shadow of its former dominant self, and was open to no other avenue of
political tactic and language than Istvan Tisza’s forte solution.
His first term in office was to be marked by unprecedented measures taken
against the opposition. His proposed bill for new internal norms of orderly conduct in the
Lower House was met by the fiercest obstruction of the period; the votes were passed by
his supporters waving handkerchiefs instead of the usual method. The bill passed under
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the ill-boding name of lex Daniel ( after the nominal author of the proposal for the law)
and allowed for deputies to be forcefully pacified or even removed from the chamber s, if
necessary. All of this resulted in little more than a Pyrrhic victory, since it deepened the
chasm between the few defenders of the Ausgleich and its contesters. After a three week
recess, at the reopening of parliamentary proceedings, a new event pu t its mark on
Hungarian political life. It was the entry of violence into the field of politics. The
opposition entered the chambers of the Lower House on December 13, 1904 and
physically destroyed much of the interior of the house, as retribution for what they
perceived as the manifestly unlawful act from three weeks prior. This event did much to
discredit the value of the parliament and indeed, the political class in the public eye of the
time, but this will be addressed later. The direct result of Tisza’ s actions was an internal
consolidation achieved by the most forcible methods. The other, more important side of
this coin was represented by an unprecedented internal weakening of the Liberal Party, to
the point of its passing into non -existence. As stated above, Andrassy Jr. had already left
the party and Apponyi had reconstituted his National party by this time. A host of other
small parties joined the ’48 -ers camp, such as the Ugron-Party or Nandor Zichy’s
Catholic People’s Party and last but not least, the nationalities, hoping for more rights for
their respective electors. All that Tisza’s hard -line strategy achieved was the
strengthening of the rank of the opposition, which associated into what became known as
the “Coalition”. The final nail in the co ffin of the Liberal Party was the call for elections
in early 1905, in which the newly-formed Coalition obtained a resounding victory. The
Independence Party carried the day, obtaining a staggering 166 mandates, over a lowly
159 of the once all-encompassing Liberals. Other members of the Coalition, with the
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support of nationalities parties, such as the newly -reformed Romanian National Party (8
mandates) and the Slovak People’s Party ( 2 representatives), brought the number of the
pro-change camp up to 241. The Liberal Party was subsequently dissolved and Tisza took
a step back from politics, for a period at least.
The new parliamentary dominance could not be translated into a government and
a policy, as far as the emperor was concerned. In Franz Joseph’s eyes, this would have
been tantamount to the dissolution of the Dualist framework he had so long protected.
But it also provided a novel opportunity for him; it brought forward the possibility of
doing away with the constant annoyance of the Hungarian pol itical class, and direct
interaction with his subjects through a centralist reign. After the appointment of baron
Geza Fejervary ( a staunch loyalist) as prime minister, he toyed for a while with the idea
of introducing universal suffrage into the Hungari an half of the Monarchy, a thought he
let transpire through the discourse of his Hungarian Minister of the Interior, Jozsef
Kristoffy. But this course of action would have meant a complete jump into the darkness,
and an experiment in governance that the he ad of the imperial household was not yet
prepared to make, and was not convinced would yield favorable results. Instead, he used
this threat quite efficiently in his discourse in order to tame the resistance of the
Coalition, and coerce it into a compromis e that would leave the Dualist superstructure
intact. The promise of universal vote goaded the opposition into submission, and brought
the aureola of a populist kingship back onto the person of the emperor, for a period.
The moment Kossuth Ferenc concede d to accept the demands of the emperor, and
form a Coalition government that left in place the Ausgleich system, the days of the
Coalition were numbered. Parliamentary elections were decreed for the spring of 1906,
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which the Coalition won hands down. The C oalition formed a government under the
guise of Sandor Wekerle, dropping all claims that were deemed taboo by the emperor.
The very act undermined everything that the Independence and the other parties had been
upholding. They were forced into the confines of the very structure they had been
denouncing for years on end as unjust and illegitimate. The leaders of the opposition now
found themselves in power, having to pursue a conciliatory and moderate policy. Having
been swept into office on the basis of a w ave of nationalistic and chauvinistic slogans,
they had to make a significant discursive shift. The target of the Dualist framework had
become unavailable, and had to be replaced by an equally significant thopos in the public
discourse. Their answer was to target the nationalities with new pieces of restrictive
legislation ( such as the ill -famed Apponyi Law for education) and to impede their
participation to the political system, to which they had gained access in unprecedented
numbers. The masses were also accorded larger and larger sections of the political
discourse, that started aiming at them as the desired target and recognized them as
sources of legitimation. This signified their entry in the field of politics, but as an unruly
actor to whom concessions had to be made in order to keep it in check at all times.
Consequences and the backdrop of the Constitutional Crisis
The first and foremost consequence of the crisis of political liberalism that started
in the late 19th century and ended with Is tvan Tisza’s second mandate as prime minister
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(in 1910-1918), and the disappearance of it, was the loss of credibility of Parliament, and
further on, the political class. From the late 1880’s on, there is a gradual, but noticeable
decrease of civility in the political etiquette in the parliament, that coincides with the loss
of control of the Liberal Party over the institution itself. There are numerous cases of
aggressive accusations launched by some representative toward another, involving
personal immorality or cases of corruption 24. Most of these were gratuitous and had no
other scope than to discredit an opponent that could not be subdued through rational
argumentation. Violence entered into political life through another avenue, as most of
these disputes ended up in duel, a practice that the authorities were powerless to prevent.
More and more, radical solutions were favored over legal ones and aggression seemed to
gain a role as a legitimate course of action. This all led up to the crescendo symbolized by
the tactic of obstructing the legislature, that became after 1897 an almost day -to-day
occurrence. The deadlocked parliament offered a tragicomic spectacle to the public
opinion, peppered with numerous ridiculous scenes. The legitimacy of representative
government in the existent conditions soon became to be questioned by a number of
political commentators, and members of the intelligentsia, such as Ady Endre, Oszkar
Jaszi and others. A significant part of the intellectual class turned against the
establishment after the turn of the century. The entire institution offered a chaotic image,
culminating with the symbolic act of physical destruction of the interior of the Lower
House by the opposition representatives in 1904. Among them there were numerous
notable former liberals, such as Banffy Dezso; afterwards, they proudly posed for
pictures among the remains of the damaged furniture. The epilogue of this course of
events was the forceful ejection of unruly deputies by police at the order of Tisza in
24 Andras Gero, Az elsopro kisebbseg , pp. 213-215
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191225. The events had come full circle, and the mask of civility, rationality and
legitimacy fell away. This, combined with the fact that ever since the age of Kalman
Tisza, there emerged fewer and fewer political personalities worth mentionable for their
skill and rhetoric prowess, resulted in further perceived illegitimacy of the present
political order. The institution of parliament became synonymous with a giant voting
machine that served no other end than enacting the will of the few party leaders. The lack
of an equitable electoral system also chipped away at the image of the legislature. All
roads seemed to be leading to the same destination: doing away with this form of
representation in favor of forte, or mass solutions, or perhaps a combination of the t wo.
The loss of the crowd
Another important effect of the crisis was the emergence and growing support for
an alternate political class. These were various groups that demanded radical measures to
reform the political system ( and social measures as well), among them the most
important being universal suffrage (this is the motif that is common in all their
discourses). In the radical discourse, this took on the role of a panacea that would heal all
the ailments of the dualist framework. Out of the political parties that campaigned for it
25 Andras Gero, Modern Hungarian Society in the Making. The unfinished experience , p. 163
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the most important were the Socialists, the left wing of the Independence Party (at times),
peasant parties such as Achim’s, radical groups of the intelligentsia ( Jaszi) and the
nationalities groups. They had the unmitigated support of the crowds behind them, but
had access to little or no official political representation. But this also was a quite
heterogeneous coalition of momentary vested interests. However, the mass support they
mustered influenced those in power to also make a shift in their discourse and political
vocabulary, in order to divert some attention away from them. Because most of this
crowd was perceived to be nationalized, radicalization of this discourse was the preferred
option.
The American historian Alice Freifeld launches the concept of the loss of the
crowds to characterize this process. The urban masses are the principal agent in this
progression, taking on more and more the role of a legitimate participant on the political
scene. As early as the late 1890’s, the urban crowd began to make its voice heard,
participating in demonstrations and marches that supported universal suffrage and social
reform. Mayday manifestations became a yearly occurrence in Budapest and other major
cities26. The opposition itself sparked off this evolution, by actively asking the masses to
promote “national resistance” during the Fejervary government. But it was an element it
could not control after 1906, and sought to repress. Violence and street clashes after
strikes and manifestations happened more and more often as it soon became obvious that
the Kossuthites did not want to enact the sweeping reform plans that were expected from
them. The “chastened crowd 27” of the old establishment eroded so much a few years aft er
the gaining of power by the Coalition that it could only call upon students and a few other
26 Alice Freifeld, Nationalism and the Crowd in Liberal Hungary 1848 -1914, p. 260-26127 Ibidem, p. 161
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petty bourgeois elements for support 28. Simultaneously, public celebrations of
nationalism, such as March 15, or the opportunity brought about with the reburial o f the
remains of the historical hero Rakoczi, became more and more important. Their social
role was to express unity and integrate the crowd seamlessly into the body of the nation.
In the nationalities camp, a similar “turning towards the masses” can be pe rceived. For
example, the newly-reformed Romanian National Party’s strategy was to actively
campaign among its own ethnic constituencies, in order to “civically educate” them.
Mass rallies became usual practice. Cultural activism also accompanied political
propaganda in an effort to gain some measure of autonomy from the official discourse.
The challenge answered: remodeled nationalism
There is a pregnant, noticeable evolution of discourse and ideology from the latter
years of the nineteenth centur y, leading all the way up to the Constitutional crisis of
1905-1906. During this period Hungarian nationalist polity radicalized its discourse and
political practice and also became more and more populist. This was all done in a bid to
control the above-mentioned amorphous, looming element represented by the masses.
28 Ibidem, p. 297
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Fervent nationalism characterized the public debate, and themes such as the
Common Law question, education, military and financial problems to be settled between
Austria and Hungary were the ones that dominated. These motifs towered over all others
and lead to the crisis described above. Many of them preexisted the 1905 -06 events, and
were products of the ideological paradigm of 1867. It was only natural for them to gain
preeminence in the turn of the century years, as the grip of the liberal elite on the rains of
power loosened significantly. The real paradigm shift occurred after the seizure of power
by the Coalition ( although there were indicative symptoms even before), by the means of
a compromise with the emperor. Since the political language that most of the groups that
formed the Coalition operated with was that of activist nationalism, they could scarcely
afford a reversion toward a more moderate discourse. The heterogeneity of the coale sced
oppositional forces and the emergence of alternate parties, that started preaching with
more and more vigor the virtues of mass politics, asked for a reorientation of nationalist
devoutness. It was within these boundaries that nationalist rhetoric had to be reinterpreted
towards a new common goal. The new formula that the ruling elite stumbled upon,
partially in order to divert attention from its own bungling and nascent social -political
demands, was the reemphasis of the nationality question. It was a t this point that the
nationality problem really entered into the public debate. In the past, it had always taken
a back seat in front of the all -encompassing Public Law debate, and was treated more or
less with deference. What also helped this along was t he entry of the representatives of
the nationalities ( in parliament, they formed the so -called “Nationalities Club”), with a
significant enough amount of deputies so as to be vocal. They had, in the beginning, high
hopes from the new order of things to ac t in accordance with its staunch legalist discourse
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and consequently enforce the application of the 1868 Nationalities Law to the letter. For
example, the seconding motion on count Banffy’s speech that denounced the appointment
of the Fejervary government and the prorogation of parliament in 1905 was made by a
Romanian National Party representative, Aurel Novacu. Banffy’s address reads:
“The legal state is the aim, but with this question we can only concern ourselves
when we have already assured the natio nal state…Hungary’s interests demand its
erection on the most extreme chauvinistic lines. 29”
In other words, the national agenda has preeminence in front of the upholding of the law.
The entry of the nationalities representatives and their sudden ( at l east that is how
they seemed to be to the governance) claims to their share of equal rights lead them to be
perceived by the ruling Coalition as agitators and deemed untrustworthy. On many
occasions during parliamentary debates, they were qualified as “dis loyal to the Hungarian
state” and a threat to the integrity of it. The dominant perception was that with their new -
found activist methods, they spread distrust of Hungary, and its government among
otherwise peaceful citizens, in order to undermine its auth ority. Therefore, new pieces of
legislation started propping up in order to prevent the further spread of this agitation, and
curtail the success of it in the future. It was the government’s outspoken wish to forge a
new, trustworthy, and more importantly, Magyar, citizens’ class. Ergo, institutions had to
be Magyarized and to Magyarize. I have identified two examples of laws that were meant
to accomplish this desiderate, and adequately characterize the political agenda. The first
is the already-mentioned Lex Apponyi for public education. Without going into its fine
details, its provision for the salaries of the teachers, and introduction of Magyar as a
29 R. W. Seton-Watson, A History of the Roumanians , p. 419
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compulsory subject that required educational staff that had proved its mastery of the
language, went against cultural autonomy. The law stipulated:
“dealing with the cooperation of supervisory school authorities with activities
hostile to the state and giving the highest educational authorities the means - in the
case of these anti-state activities- to root out the evils that are extremely
widespread.30”
This meant that the state arrogated itself the right of interference in education at all levels.
Those conspicuously targeted were the educational facilities of various religious and
nationality groups, in particular.
The other law was the Lex Kossuth, championed by the leader of the
Independence Party. Its most important provision was the obligatory mastery of
Hungarian by the railway employees and auxiliary staff on the whole of the territory of
Hungary, including Croatia. This served to further alienate the already wavering Croatian
support for the Nagodba.
“Only an individual who is a Hungarian citizen and has mastered the Hungarian
language can be employed by a public power -driven railroad company operating
in the lands of the Hungarian Holy Crown. On the territory of Croatia -Slavonia
those employees who during their service on the railroad come in contact either
with the passengers or the local population must also be familiar with the Croatia n
language.31”
At the influence of neo-conservative intellectual streams of thought, such as those
of Rez Mihaly, Zsolt Beothy and Gusztav Beksics, Hungarian political intelligentsia
30 Hanak, The nationalitatenfrage… apud. Peter F. Sugar, op. cit., p. 30031 Peter Hanak (ed.), Magyarorszag tortenete, vol. 7, tom. II., p. 641
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started to perceive and treat the other nationalities as dangerous. The above quoted pieces
of legislature were nothing more than an attempt at their suppression. Also, they saw the
whole political process of nationalization as a competition between ethnic groups, that
Hungarians had to win by all means. This attitude filtered down to some nationalities’
thinkers as well, the most prominent being Aurel C. Popovici. The radicalization of
discursive practice resulted in a widening chasm between the two political elites and later
on, in the practical impossibility of reconciliatio n.
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Chapter Two
Hungary’s fin-de-siecle intellectual background andatmosphere
Oszkar Jaszi and the Huszadik Szazad group.
The leftist response to the nationality problem
As a result and congruent to the factors and events describ ed in the first chapter, a
new phenomena began manifesting itself in Hungary after the turn of the century. This
was the transfiguration of intellectual life and trends. New currents of ideas began to
emerge, incipiently most unbeknown to the establishment . Theirs was a novel response to
the perceived crisis in which Hungarian society and political life found itself after 1900.
The solutions offered ( as we will see) were radical to the measure that the problems
themselves were regarded as being at the same level. The receptiveness of the urban
public opinion to novel and revolutionary answers assured the growing support for this
and others such groupings. Jaszi’s most important feat is the mediatory role, which he
fulfilled with more or less success, betwee n nationality, social-democratic, and leftist
Independist circles. This was achieved through grouping them around a few common
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discursive themes and ideological elements on occasions such as campaigns for universal
suffrage and so forth. The new parties an d political formations of the sort began, after the
1908-09 apparent failure of the Coalition government, to quickly format themselves as an
alternative power structure to that of the establishment. A second Coalition was formed
that, although never formal ly paraphed, started to attack the establishment on a common
platform of contestation. It was held together with loose strings, the most important of
which was Jaszi and his Civic Radicals. It operated on a principle of vested interests, and
sought more or less the same immediate goal: a democratized Hungary, based on mass
political participation. However, this also meant that the seeds of dissent were sown. The
heterogeneity of this second coadunation of oppositional forces was to manifest itself in
1918, with disastrous after-effects for the fabric of the Monarchy.
From the Sociological Society to the Civic Radical Party
The Sociological Society ( Tarsadalomtudomanyi Tarsasag) began as a platform
designed to bring together scientifically -minded, but also ( less visibly), socially militant
youth. The intellectual roots of those that went on to form the Society and the Huszadik
Szazad review came from the Budapest University’s Faculty of Law. Here, the newly -
emerging theories of and about society and it s functioning, and nascent sciences, most
important of which was sociology, began to find a niche. Instrumental in the development
of the new generation of Hungarian intellectual radicalism and sociology were two men:
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Gyula Pikler and Agost Pulszky 32. The two were a part of the Law department at the
university, and frequently lectured on themes such as philosophy of law, state and
society. Their exposes encapsulated novel theories on society, such as Herbert Spencer’s,
and also the idea that society, like na ture, functioned according to strict laws 33. This was,
of course, a manifestation of the European influence of positivism. But their students
took these ideas even further, developing an original synthesis of conjecture and new
scientific methods, with which they aimed to cure the ailments of Hungarian society and
state.
The small groupings of reformist youths began to form debate circles and to
organize themselves in semi-official clusters under different names more and more
intensely after the turn of the century. The new logical step for them was to gain a voice
for themselves inside the Hungarian scientific and public debate by means of a press
organ. The Huszadik Szazad periodical fulfilled two exigencies: the need to publicize the
opinions of the group, but also to crystallize it further. It also provided a forum for the
exchange of ideas regarding societal mutations and the possibility of scientific remedy.
From the outset, two different currents of ideas began making their voices heard from
within the framework of the publication. The liberal -reformist-moderate trend was
championed by Gusztav Gratz, while the radical -leftist one was represented by Oszkar
Jaszi34. The first edition facilitated the first conflict, relating to the placement in the body
or on the cover of the journal of a ( mildly) congratulatory letter by Herbert Spencer.
Jaszi was to have his way, symbolically for the future of this dispute, and the letter was to
headline the first issue of the new periodical. But the fact that divergin g systems of ideas
32 Litvan, Oscar Jaszi, p. 633 Attila Pok, The Social Function , p. 26734 Pok, The Social Function… , p. 270-271
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existed within the Huszadik Szazad editorial board did not lead to a divorce between them
until late in the life of the journal. This was due to the flexibility of it, and, more
importantly, to the lack of dogmatism which characterized i ts members ( especially
Jaszi). It was indeed an unconfined forum for the exchange of ideas. The other factor was
that, although having a definite core of theory and belief -system, the faction’s ideas were
in continuous flux, both influencing and being inf luenced by other parallel streams of
thought. They continuously engaged in debates, both direct and indirect, with currents of
ideas such as the new nationalism of the Independence Party, the dogmatic Marxism of
social-democrats, populist-authoritarian tendencies of the Court, the new conservatism of
the men sponsored by Tisza Istvan, and others.
The narrative concerning the life of the review and the formation of the different
political and civic organizations through which the group manifested itself is of little
concern to this thesis. The formation of the Sociological Society, the Huszadik Szazad in
1900, and the Civic Radical Party in 1912, as well as the different groupings spawned by
these, such as the Martinovics-lodge and the Galileo circle are the few significant events
worth mentioning. Instead, a treatment of the salient elements of Jaszi’s and the group’s
ideology and intellectual contribution to the fin -de-siecle Hungarian milieu is more
compelling.
In the beginning, Jaszi and the group form ed around the review advocated a
staunch adherence to science and a total non -involvement in politics. This anti -political
viewpoint was espoused in a concordant manner by all of the contributors to the journal.
The reasons behind this decision were twofol d: one the one hand, the political scene was
seen as the appanage of a socially backward, unprogressive caste, and a stage that did not
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take into account scientific-rational views. The second cause was expressed best by
Szabo Ervin, who in an article in 19 06, put forward the idea that any attempt at
application by a political body of an abstract meta -theory will result in the inevitable
corruption of it. The editorial board of the Huszadik Szazad and its columnists thus set
forth to break new ground in soci al science. Their activity gravitated around the
investigation of the laws which governed the functioning of society, dedicating special
attention to Hungarian and Austrian societies, and their internal mechanism,
particularities. To realize this aim, the ir research tackled a variety of subjects, contingent
to that of sociology. For example, Jaszi, Bodog Somlo and Ervin Szabo all published
works on historical materialism. Foreign articles on ground rent theory by Henry George,
on the contemporary ideologic al trends in the labor movement, and the sociology of
aesthetics ( Allen Grant, Guyau, Ernst Grosse) 35 were all included in the editions of the
journal between 1900 and 1905. All of these fields were linked to that of sociology by
deriving their roots from the laws of social mobility.
The political isolationism professed by the circle did not last long. As early as
1903, Bodog Somlo lectured at the Sociological Society “On the Theory of Social
Development and a Few of Its Practical Applications”; in the co urse of this expose, Jaszi
put forward his views, regarding:
“the exposition and propagation of new ideas in the fullest possible manner to be
the most useful for society as a whole, but I regard the freedom of political
agitation to be the best guarantee of development36”.
35 Pok Attila, The social function of sociology in fin -de-siecle Budapest, in Gyorgy Ranki (ed.), Hungaryand European Civilization , p. 26936 Gyorgy Litvan, ,A Twentieth-Century Prophet: Oszkar Jaszi 1875-1957, p. 27
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Jaszi soon came under fire from many of his supporters who did not view the field of
science and that of politics to be irreconcilable, but to be congruent. The apolitical stance
was derived in the beginning from a sense of a lack of a lternative in politics. In 1904-05,
with the outset of the political crisis, and the Fejervary government, an opportunity
became available. Upon his return from Paris, Jaszi organized his followers in a moderate
support for this new administration. The the n-Minister of the Interior, Jozsef Kristoffy,
began championing the cause of the introduction of extended, perhaps, universal suffrage.
He also actively sought out and cultivated relationships with leftist circles such as Jaszi’s
and the Social-Democrats. In response, the Sociological Society inspired the creation of
the League for Universal Secret Suffrage ( Altalanos Titkos Valasztoi Jog Ligaja). It still
advocated a supra-politic attitude, appealing publicly to all citizens, irrespective of
political adherence, to join the League. Among the public signatories of the appeal, and
members of the organization were the poet Ady Endre, and Oszkar Jaszi 37. The latter
soon pulled out of the project, as it was too closely associated with the schemes of the
Fejervary government. Not long after, the League disintegrated, not being able to
successfully convey its ideas to a Hungarian public opinion which was outraged at the
foreign and treacherous character of the administration. The organization’s first political
project was thus unsuccessful. But its main discursive thopos was kept, and actively
propagated throughout the 1905 -1918 period: universal suffrage. This type of radical
electoral measure was set in place as the main objective of the group. It was seen as the
main reform that would insure smooth political transition and the easing of the social and
ethnic tensions existent in the country. Universal suffrage was the stepping -stone towards
a free, legalist, rational, democratic, mass Hungary.
37 Richard E. Allen, Oscar Jaszi and Radicalism in Hungary 1900-1919, p. 110-111
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Another of the Sociological Society’s important and influential moves was to set
up a number of seminars to educate young intellectuals and members of the working class
in the new doctrines and sciences, such as sociology. The Free School of Social Sciences
was founded in 1906-07, and the contributors to the Huszadik Szazad journal and the
scholars of the Sociological Society all contributed with lectures on various scientific and
political subjects. This was a novel approach to politics, ushering in the method of direct
activism and propagation of new ideology among the electorate, and of alternative
political education. The Free School and the cultural associations of the nationalities,
such as the Romanian ASTRA mutually influenced each other’s methodology.
By 1905-1906, Jaszi’s theories and Weltanschauung began to enter into their final
phase, that of being mature enough to withstand political activity. The main works of his
scientific oeuvre were to still lie ahead, but his intellectual prowess and influence were
already great. His greatest addition to the political debate was most probably the ability
with which he forged together apparently disparate themes. Social, political and national
problems found a common solution in Jaszi’s project:
“ the interests of Hungarian, Slovak, German, and Romanian proletariat are the
same…and they have no interests in conflict with the sovereignty of the
Hungarian state or the historical leadership role of the Magyar element…Only
through a socialist policy can the Magyar element d efend its existence vis-à-vis
the nationalist agitators38”
In his two letters to Ervin Szabo in 1904, he continues, stating:
38 Allen, p. 178
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“ there is no more anti-socialist thought than the desire to break -up already
evolved national units into their components. Accor dingly, the Hungarian state’s
survival s in the interest of socialism 39”.
Here, his arguments seem to be inspired by austro -marxist influence. The nationality
problem also fits smoothly into the proposed plan:
“The nationality policy of the Social -Democratic Party must be based on the
enforcement of the Nationality Act of 1868….administrative, judicial, and
economic policy which will meet the most vital interests of the nationalities ( I’m
speaking always of the proletariat) in their own language. 40“
“the Magyars…must assimilate in fraternal fashion through [ their superior]
economic and cultural strength….this assimilation would only be in the benefit of
the nationality millions41”
By means of injection of the social question into the core of the national one, Jaszi hoped
to successfully defuse it. His plan suffices many ends: consolidation and maintenance of
the Hungarian state, its national coherence, rights to the disenfranchised, whether they be
discriminated against on ethnic or social basis. This framework also assured, at least on a
theoretical level, the smooth integration of nationalities into the body of the dominant
nation, via voluntary means. By offering a political understanding of the nation and
citizenship, versus the predominantly e thnic understanding of it, Jaszi was able to
successfully reconcile the diverging forces of contestation towards the established order.
Jaszi’s understanding of the nation developed via a multitude of different and
diverging opinions, out of which a rema rkably original synthesis resulted. As we have
39 Ibidem., p. 17840 Ibidem., p. 17941 Ibidem., p. 179
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already seen, his immediate answer to the demands voiced by the leaders of the
nationalities was inspired by very traditional sources, namely Jozsef Eotvos and his
oeuvre. He understood the nation as being com posed of good citizens, forged through an
unwritten social contract between the state and them. In a lecture entitled “The
Nationality Question and Hungary’s Future” given at a meeting of the Galileo circle in
1911 he put forth his ideas on the emergence o f nations and the nationality question.
“ do not view the [nationality question] as is fashionable in Hungary today, as the
machinations of a few agitators and enthusiasts. The nationality question is a
universal historic movement, appearing wherever c ertain economic, historical and
psychological conditions of social development appear. 42”
Jaszi viewed the emergence of nations as a natural, and necessary step in societal
development, and alongside it, the nationality question as a congenital symptom. Th e
only way through which society could surpass this stage was to harness the innate energy
of nationalism, which had to be institutionalized. The nationalities were to melt into the
greater body of the nations, in one way or another, because of the unalter able laws of
social and economic development. His thinking seems to be highly influenced by a
hybrid Marxian-Spencerian theory of organic social evolution. But he did not see this
unavoidable evolution as necessarily favorable to the current ruling nations , and
Hungarians. As he announces in his most well -known work, The Development of Nations
and of the Nationality Question, only through the strict application and extension of the
1868 Nationality Law could the Hungarian state assure its continued rule. Go od schools,
good administration, a benign cultural policy, and an equitable justice system, all in the
native languages of the nationalities, could secure their allegiance to Hungary. Otherwise,
42 Ibidem., p. 183
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they would fall prey to their own nationalist intelligentsia, those small clusters made up
of reactionary classes, that steered them toward national conflict. As early as 1907, he
publicizes this point of view, while reviewing a book of Emil Babes, a Romanian
National Party leader. He praised his and his party’s new ly adopted legalist standpoint.
He also began actively cultivating relationships and corresponded with various
nationality politicians and activists 43. The plan was to convince them to coalesce with the
left and the radical Hungarian groups, and join the st ruggle for the achievement of a
Hungarian Rechstaat, a democracy which would yield to most of their demands.
Although he was greatly influenced by Marxism and especially by the Austrian
stream of it, his innate nationalism made him enter into a conflict with their proposed
solutions. Also, he had a hard time espousing the inherent centralism of the Viennese
project with his own desire to maintain the fabric of the Hungarian state. The plan of Karl
Renner and Otto Bauer, promoting nationality belonging at the level of the individual,
was castigated by Jaszi as being “in this day and age….more or less utopian”. The
criticism went against the integrative tendency of the austro -marxist scheme and the fact
that its imposition would be tantamount to a toppling -over of statehood. Jaszi also firmly
declared that he negated any kind of “constitutional -territorial policy, in fact my whole
conception is directed against it”. His feeble collaboration with the Left Independists of
Justh and Karolyi depended on this. In stead, he preferred an attempt to coagulate the
forces of the Hungarian opposition and the nationalities around the idea of universal
suffrage, the only universal political remedy for the country’s remedy.
43 Kemény, Gábor G., Iratok a nemzetiségi kérdés történetéhez Magyarorszá gon a dualizmus korában,Budapest, Tankönyvkiadó, 1966-1985, vol.3, p. 623
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The problem with Jaszi’s scheme was precisely th at he was not in a position to
offer anything. The only thing he managed to do for the advancement of the nationality
problem, “the Archimedean point of Hungarian democracy”, as he called it, was to
promote a stream of thought that favored compromise betwe en the nationalities and the
establishment. This was to be mirrored in the attempted negotiations between government
lead by Tisza Istvan and the Romanian National Party in 1912 -13. The rather late formal
entry of Jaszi and his collaborators into politics also robbed the moderate wing of the
nationalities of a viable partner, resulting in growing distrust of the Hungarian political
class. The formation of the Civic Radical Party in 1912 came at a time when RNP leaders
Maniu, Goldis and Vlad were attempting to strike a deal with Tisza and failing. They thus
fell back into a position of faltering and bided their time until more radical solutions
could be implemented. The plea of Jaszi for a renewed community of interests was to
eventually languish because of t his misdoubt, and its attempted implementation in 1918
was to fall on deaf ears.
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New Hungarian Radical Nationalism and Conservatism.
Ethnic understandings of the nation
Hungarian nationalism, at the intellectual and conceptual level, also s uffered a
significant mutation around the turn of the 19 th century. Influenced by new streams of
thought, coming from the scientific and aesthetic realms, it would offer a new, alternative
concept of the nation. This novel understanding of the nation would begin operating with
powerful ethnic stereotypes, as well as seeing the nations as separate, irreconcilable units.
It would shore up its position with a flurry of pseudo -scientific and historical arguments,
designed to act as a bulwark against any possibl e contestation. Its significance lies in
proposing a fresh ethnic apprehension of the nation, an alternative to the consecrated
liberal one. It favored a discourse on race and racial struggle, instead of constitutionalism,
historicism and legalism, promoted by the 1867 generation.
In order to correctly characterize this group of intellectuals, and owing to the
dimensional limitations of this thesis, I will sketch their broad ideological outlines and
their contribution to the nationality question via a bri ef archaeology of their intellectual
sources. For this purpose, I have identified three main exponents of this current of
thought, due to their significance and popularity in the period. They are Beksics Gusztav,
Rez Mihaly and Rakosi Jeno. All were highly influential publicists of the era, and
advisers of the strong man of Hungarian politics, Tisza Istvan.
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Beksics Gusztav was a Hungarian publicist, journalist and legal expert. From the
mid 1880’s onward he became well known for his nationalist rhetoric i n his articles,
writing for all the main Hungarian newspapers of the period. From 1884, he managed to
get himself elected to the Lower House of the Hungarian parliament, owing to his pro -
governmental standpoint. He was well -known for his works on constitu tional history, in
which he glorified the value of the Hungarian doctrine of the Holy Crown and that of the
rights of the Hungarian nation ( and consequently of Dualism, its greatest achievement),
to be above even of British value - and institutional system 44. For him, and his peers,
Hungarian cultural and institutional supremacy was equal to none, and a given.
This idea was to become the base for his later works that dealt with races and
racial strife Central and Eastern Europe. This shift in his discursiv e strategy and the
sudden displacement of his argumentative focal point, from constitutional to nationality
problems, was typical for the 180 degree turn that Hungarian politics would make in just
a few years. What is interesting and quite representative a s well is that this conversion
was made in just a matter of two years ( the Dualismus tortenete appeared in 1893, and
his next work, A Roman Kerdes es a Fajok Harcza, was published in 1895) 45. The
Hungarian Coalition government went from an anti -1867 reformist position in 1905 to a
repressive Magyarization policy in 1907, mirroring the same displacement. Dualism was
to be upheld utilizing a new ideological toolkit.
His ideas transpire best in his book entitled A Roman Kerdes es a Fajok Harcza
Europaban es Magyarorszagon ( The Romanian Question and the Fighting of Races in
44 Gusztav Beksics, A dualismus tortenete, kozjogi ertelme es nemzeti torekveseink , Budapest, Athenaeum,189345 he had tackled the topic before, in 1883, in a less influential work, entitled Magyarosodas esMagyarositas , but went back to publish works on constitutional matters
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Europe and Hungary). In this magnum opus, Beksics pioneers a new idea on social
organization and mechanism. He puts forward a new understanding of history, in which
the prime agency belongs to races. The mechanism through which history evolves is
racial struggle. At this point, it is important to pinpoint what Beksics understood through
the concept of race. For him, it was a set of characteristics, customs and traits that were
common to all peoples; it is closest to our contemporary definition of an ethnic group.
Races were distinguished through these stereotypical features, and each member of a race
was naturally compelled to fight for their sustainment. These “races” ( fajok ) were
therefore engaged in a dialectic struggle for survival, out of which only the stronger races
would emerge as victorious. This teleological construct reflects a combination of
intellectual influences, containing elements of Darwinism ( the natural struggle of spec ies
and the survival of the fittest), Malthusianism ( population growth, the resulting penury
of material resources and the competition to control them), Spencerianism ( the organic
evolution of society), and also of the thought of early racial theorists a s Gumplowicz.
Ironically, through this endeavor to establish concrete law for the functioning of society
and history, Beksics seems to have the same goal and come from the same school of
thought as his adversaries of the time, Oszkar Jaszi and the radicals . They both utilized
science as a way to market their ideology, and had a dialectic explanation for the
evolution of society. The initial positivist and liberal provenance was to lead them
towards separate, fully antagonistic political positions, that of l eftist democracy and neo-
conservatism. This is somewhat similar to the Austrian case, where the liberal clubs were
the birthing place of both Renner and Bauer’s austro -marxism and Lueger’s Christian
socialism46.
46 Schorske, Fin-de-siecle Vienna, p. 119-120
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Gusztav Beksics identified four main forces that he thought maintained the
identity and continuity of a race. They are religion, the national idea, culture and capital.
There are several others, congruent to these four, such as women or the power of
urbanization, but these four are always existent and determinant in the competition of
races. Out of the four, the most important element is culture. Beksics concludes, through
a historic and aesthetic investigation, that the Hungarian race is in possession of the
greatest amount of culture in the region , and is logically, the dominant race. Other races,
such as the Romanians, are to be absorbed into the body of the Hungarian race, through
what is a wholly natural process 47. Magyarization was the tool to accomplish this
cultural assimilation of the Romani an brood. The Romanian race itself is characterized in
a surprisingly overtly positive way, as having a host of redeeming qualities, versus other
inferior races, such as Slavs. However valiant the efforts of the Romanians though, they
are to be assimilated to the Magyars, because of the superior power -position in which the
latter find themselves.
Another of the quintessential qualities which assure the vitality of a race,
according to Beksics, is its ability to assimilate. Strong races, he argues with the aid of a
historical overview, have always been those who absorbed weaker ones, and incorporated
their best abilities. The Romans, Beksics argues, was such a race, which through
adaptability and assimilatory tactics, forged an empire of unparalleled size a nd strength.
It was only at the time when their doctrine stiffened and they lost the all -important
quality of assimilation that they lost the whole of their accumulation and became a
footnote in the annals of history 48. The Hungarian race has this power of assimilation as
47 Beksics, A Roman Kerdes, p. 45; p. 13248 Beksics, A Roman Kerdes…, p. 127-128
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well, the author argues, exhibited via its mixed origin, but maintained and transmitted
throughout the generations its vigor and set of abilities. Interestingly, this argumentation,
owing to the same intellectual sources, and of similar rhe toric lineage, was to be turned
on its head by a Romanian political thinker, Aurel C. Popovici, who argued that the
mixing of races in Hungary would lead to an eventual corruption and weakening of them.
Another emblematic thinker for the new ethnicist na tionalist current was Rez
Mihaly. He also had a background of journalism and similarly to Beksics, was educated
as a legal expert. His conceptual framework is mostly in the same line as the latter’s, with
the sole exception that Rez was perhaps more radica l. This author, in works such as A
Magyar Fajpolitika and A Magyar Uralma es a kor szelleme , took the racial discourse
even further, advocating a more radical social Darwinist standpoint. As he claimed, “the
nation itself is a biological race, a participan t in the perpetual struggle for life” 49. This
racial definition of the nation, bordering on the side of biology, carried within it the
congenital conclusion that racial conflict was inevitable. Indeed, Rez proclaimed that
“past nations should die to make ro om for the newcomers; we know this is the perpetual
law of progress”. The conflict was not to be forceful or to be conducted through violent
means. Rez trusted Hungarian racial supremacy to the fullest, as did the laws of racial
progression that would ensure the assimilation of lesser races. Forcing the laws of
evolution would have been tantamount to rushing the inevitable 50. He denounced
movements such as the Social -Democratic to be anti-Hungarian and opposed to social
progress. Instead, he proposed a plan of Hungarian self-preservation, centered around the
endowment of the gentry with political power. A number of nationalist measures in the
49 Turda, The idea of National Superiority , p. 133-13450 Ibidem., p. 135-136
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field of politics, alongside the favoring and protective policy toward the Hungarian
gentry and upper middle class wer e to assure a degree of autarchy and oil the machinery
of internal assimilation. Magyarization was also hailed to be a legitimate, and seemingly
the only valid course of action available. Believing that the Hungarian racial situation and
the Magyar’s status as a race was not yet a stable enough platform for a leadership role in
the region, Rez supported the Ausgleich. He also abhorred any federalization plans of the
Monarchy and other measures of subversion, such as the introduction of universal
suffrage. Through this opinion, he reflected the official standpoint of the establishment,
and of Istvan Tisza, who’s circle of advisers he belonged to.
Jeno Rakosi was made famous by his frequent use in his articles of the slogan “a
Hungary of 30 million Magyars”. In this short phrase lies his most important contribution
to the ethnic-nationalist camp’s discourse. Echoing the ideology of Beksics and Rez, he
was a highly-read and popular publicist, who frequently engaged in debates with the
leftist contesters. Interestingly, he began as a supporter of the Independence Party, and its
right-wing, and publicly opposed the Compromise. But soon he also would shift his
attention away from the debate around the Public Law. He championed the idea of an
integrative Hungarian nation, on a holy mission to civilize the lesser peoples of the east.
Magyars were to transmit the knowledge and value -system of the West by any means,
Magyarization being the most important one 51. In 1899, he writes:
“the unending conflicts around the co nstitutional question must be avoided; they
achieve nothing more than to consume the vital energies of the nation…instead,
our goal must be the realization of a Hungary of 30 million Magyars…in an
instant all of our troubles would be solved…all of Easte rn Europe would be
51 Turda, The idea of National…, p. 139 -140
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ours…this goal can be attained only through relentless work…each Hungarian
should therefore become a staunch Magyar chauvinist…on the flag of each
Hungarian, be him a politician or not, should be inscribed the goal of a Hungary
of thirty million…”52.
Rakosi argued that his goal could be achieved through cultural and linguistic conversion
of the various nationalities living on the territory of Hungary. He became a supporter of a
conservative statecraft solution to fuel the internal impe rialist drive of the Magyar people,
in its bid to become a significant regional power.
The significance of the thinkers described above in the field of politics is twofold.
First of all, they had a sizeable amount of influence on the politicians of the p eriod,
especially of Tisza Istvan’s National Party of Work. They supplied the newly -reformed
pro-Compromise conservative camp with an ideological backbone and a discursive
strategy. The core of this strategy was, as I have already stated, to divert attenti on away
from the Constitutional question and, more importantly, the social and electoral matters,
and substitute them with the nationality problem. The rhetoric argued for a period of
internal consolidation, achieved through conservative means. Secondly, b y pushing a
novel apprehension of the nation, they broke with the intellectual traditions of Hungarian
liberalism ( while the politicians sponsoring them broke with liberal political practices).
These discursive strategies ( and their political application ) resulted in a growing distrust
of the nationality elite in the Hungarian polity, and would lead in a breakdown of
communication between these two parties.
52 Gratz, Gusztáv, A dualizmus kora, Budapest, Magyar Szemle Társaság, 1934, vol. 2. , p. 5-6
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The Great Austria movement and Aurel C. Popovici
In the turn-of-the century intellectual debate, as we have already seen, supra -
national and national schemes confronted each other, in an attempt to impose their
respective projects as the sole cure for the ailments of Austro -Hungarian society. Into
this classic right-left controversy, a third, a lternative political option injected itself,
attracting many supporters. It was this plan for the overhauling of the Monarchy which
was most typical for the Austro -Hungarian political tradition. Its special character was
made up of a combination of element s taken from regional patriotism, Kaisertreue,
leftist-populism ( the possibility of the introduction of universal suffrage), catholic
conservatism and flavored with novel elements, such as ethnic nationalism. It
successfully espoused the nationality and s ocial problems and demands, steering their
energies toward a centralist solution.
The most discussed and analyzed embodiment of this new centralist political
avenue is the Great Austria movement. Generally, its ideology and activity are associated
with the Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his political ambitions. However, upon further
examination, one can discover that the whole of the dynastic institution experimented
with new centralist options after 1903. Franz Joseph, for example, was the driving force
behind the Fejervary administration in Hungary, which attempted ( more or less
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truthfully) to introduce universal suffrage and disseminated propaganda concerning this
matter. In Cisleithania, he formed an almost manifest alliance with the Austrian left, and
introduced universal suffrage in 1907 in an assay to circumvent the existing political
machinery.
Concrete plans for the looming institutional and perhaps, administrative
reorganization of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy are few and far between. The
Archduke purposely kept close a variety of politicians from different pedigrees. In his
camarilla there were nationality politicians, such as Aurel C. Popovici and Milan Hodza,
german neo-conservatives ( Karl Lueger), and traditional loyalists ( Alexander Brosc h).
This ideological fluidity was intended to fuse together this heterogeneous amalgam. In
fact, among the few common points that the group had was its stalwart opposition against
the Dualism and the “disproportionate” influence of Magyars and the desire f or a strong,
centralized authorithy-figure. The only clear-cut, instrumentalized project of imperial
reform in existence was that of Aurel C. Popovici. He is considered by many historians
therefore to having been the closest as there ever was ( although fr om their
correspondence, it is clear that Franz Ferdinand disagreed with several of his points) to an
ideologue of the Great Austria camp 53.
Popovici’s importance is twofold. Primarily, as stated above, he offered a
potential plan for the future revamping of the imperial superstructure. Secondly, he
offered his Romanian constituency ( and to other nations as well) a fresh apprehension of
the nation, one that imbued the idea of dynasticism with modern ideas of ethnicity. He
was the lynchpin which held toget her the disenfranchised nationalities and the Crown. It
53 Kann, The Multinational Empire , vol.2., p. 197-198
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is through this conceptual binom his intellectual contribution is best understood and
integrated in the larger scape of the turn -of-century debate.
In order to understand better the motivation lying behind his proposed plan, one
must begin with a short overview of the latter. Popovici’s idea of the nation was based
upon the respective nation’s ethnic character. In this respect, he can be included ( with
some reserves) in the same school of thought as the above-described Hungarian
intellectuals of neo-conservative lineage. His intellectual influences are a mosaic
comprised of different notions of such scholars and political thinkers. Among these were
Ludwig Gumplowicz, Houston Stewart Chamberlain ( of both he makes lengthy and lofty
quotations in his works), and Joseph -Arthur de Gobineau; he made use of their ideas on
ethnicity and race. Popovici also borrowed concepts to back up his argumentation from
Edmund Burke, and Herbert Spencer, and from german and English utilitarianism. He
was also under the sway of the Vienna circle of neo -conservative politicians and their
greatest representative, Karl Lueger, especially after his forced exile. From 1893 to 1908
he lived in Vienna and took a stake in the ongo ing debates concerning the future of the
empire, siding with the conservatives. But he was far from being a conservative himself.
Coming from a liberal background, he developed a sophisticated modernist critique of
modernity of sorts. He combined the emerg ing, yet murky idea of race with a contestation
against the liberal order, developing a future project of traditionalist social organization
and ethnic differentiation. In his later life, he was an avid contributor to the populist -
nationalist Romanian journal “Samanatorul” ( “The Sower”), lead by the nationalist
historian Nicolae Iorga. In his second most important theoretical work, Nationalism sau
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Democratie ( Nationalism or Democracy), published in 1910, he advocates an elitist
notion of the societal edif ice54.
Popovici made frequent use of “race” as the provider of the basis for the nation.
He himself defines race as “nationality”, a loose grouping of such attributes as a common
background of language, culture and heritage, but also, most significantly, a strong sense
of belonging to a community. “Romanianness” was the self -conscious result of the
cultivation of this national feeling, which resulted in the appearance ( and maintenance)
of the Romanian nation. This integral definition of the nation brought together in one
community all those who shared the same ethnic conscience. It was obligatory to
translate this sentiment into political reality, in order to assure the continuity of those who
spawned it55.
All races, for this Romanian political thinker, h ad a particular set of
distinguishable features which set them apart from others. The stereotypical ethinc
repertoire which he operated with produced radical affirmations. For example, on
numerous occasions in his oeuvre, he declares that Hungarians are “a ll the same” or are
“animated by the same spirit”, while alluding to their ambiguous relationship with Jewry.
The differences of race were a product of nature itself in Popovici’s opinion, and resulted
in each ethnic group having rights and indeed, a nece ssity for a well-defined habitat. The
struggle for these was also an organic competition, and the very force that pushed
forward the evolution of society. Races were locked in a continuous fight for survival.
Here, he mirrors the ideas of Gumplowicz ( the synegetic nature of race) , Spencer
54 Turda, Aurel C. Popovici’s nationalism and its political representation , p. 54-5555 Ibidem., p. 58-59
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(organic evolution ) and Knox ( the superiority of race) 56, but also of other
contemporary thinkers, such as Gusztav Beksics, with who’s work he repeatedly engaged
into polemics. But where he swerves off the thought of Beksics is the question of race
dynamics. Where Beksics extols the value of combination and the ability to assimilate of
a race as its greatest asset, Popovici considers the mixture of ethnicities to be the key to
their downfall. The preservation of race and its qualities through autarchy is the
cornerstone of Popovici’s thought. This is an element appropriated from Gobineau, and
tailored to fit the logic of his argument ( his concept of racial degeneration is dynamic, as
opposed to Gobineau’s irreversibl e atrophy). The hybridized nature of the Hungarian race
therefore would lead to its inevitable downfall, especially after its latest incorporation of
a large number of Jews.
This ethnic underpinning of society, in Popovici’s Weltanschauung, would be
transposed into concrete form in his magnum opus, Die Vereinigten Staaten von Gross -
Osterreich ( The United States of Great Austria ), appeared in 1906. He put forth a plan
which linked together federalist and centralist tendencies, all the while jealously
safeguarding his beloved concept of ethnic separatism. Although at first appearance, the
project seemed to belong to a by-gone era, it was not rooted in traditional politics.
Popovici, as did his whole generation, broke with the idea of the historically -based
federalist makeup of the Habsburg Monarchy. The reinstatement of the pre -1867
Transylvania would not have resulted in an ameliorated state for Romanians. Hungarians
dominated even before that, and the lesson was not lost on them. What was needed
instead, Popovici claimed, in the spirit of equity, was an ethnically -based reconfiguration
of the imperial crown lands. Accordingly, he developed a federal structure, composed of
56 Turda, The idea…, pp.144-148
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15 provinces, each circumscribed to a more or less well defined ethnic dominance. Th ese
were:
1. German Austria. Composed out of the alpine regions of inner Austria, the
Burgenland, German southwestern Bohemia, and southern Bohemia
2. German Bohemia. The north-western part of Bohemia, alongside the region of
Tratenau
3. German Moravia (Silezia). Approximately all of german Silezia with parts of
German Bohemia and Moravia
4. Bohemia. All of the remaining Czech region of Bohemia, Moravia and Silezia
5. Western Galicia. The polish-inhabited part
6. Eastern Galicia. The Ruthenian part of the region, wi th the Ruthenian parts of
Hungary and Bucovina
7. Transylvania with all the Romanian -inhabited regions of Hungary and Bucovina
8. Croatia with Dalmatia , Croatian Istria, and Fiume
9. Kraina. It would encompass all the Slovene lands
10. Slovakia
11. Voivodina. The Serbian-inhabited part of Southern Hungary
12. Hungary proper
13. Szekler Land
14. Tirol
15. Triest. With Italian Gorz and Italian Istria” 57
57 Aurel C. Popovici, Stat si Natiune. Statele Unite ale Austriei Mari, transl. C. Schirfinet, Bucuresti,Albatros, 1997, pp. 279-280
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This construct would be governed by a federal government, which would exercise total
power in matters relating to civil and criminal legisla tion, foreign policy, customs and
currency, health, and justice. The legislature’s lower house was to be elected on the basis
of universal male suffrage ( ideas of mass politics began to seep somewhat into
Popovici’s scheme as well). The upper house would bring together the elites of the
nations of the Empire, appointed upon a quota basis, and corporatism 58. Besides
Popovici’s scheme being socially orthodox, he allowed very little space to maneuver to
all nationalities, including his own. Solving the nationa lity conflict seemed to hold the
candle to all other issues, as far as the Romanian politician was concerned. But even in
this matter, his plan was not ideologically uniform. His Romanian nationalism lead him
to conceive a maximalist plan for autonomous Tr ansylvania, including many ethnically
mixed regions. He also seems to have favored German domination in some regions, and
in some respect, over the whole empire. German would have become the Reichssprache
and Vienna the capital. He also exhibited a fairly unambiguous contempt for Slavs, and
considered them a danger because of their vulnerability to Russian Pan -Slav propaganda.
Thusly, he carved up many new provinces to favor Germans, Italians or his fellow
Romanians rather then Slavs. These double standards did not bring him much popularity
among nationality politicians. The other problem in which Popovici did not fully live up
to his own standards was assimilation. His views are somewhat duplicitous when small
enclaves of nationalities in his newly -crafted counties are concerned. Theoretically, he
sketches for them a certain amount of rights and protection, mainly in the cultural and
educational field. Each of the Crown Lands would, in this respect, draft a Law similar to
58 R. A. Kann, The Multinational Empire , vol .2., p. 202
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that of Eotvos’ 1868 one59. But, in many places in his United States of Great Austria and
other works, he openly admitted that the fate of these small units is to be swallowed up
by the larger ones, as a natural process. By this statement, he temporarily circumvents his
own advocacy of the Gobineau-inspired degeneration theory. The assimilatory tactics so
abhorred in Magyar hands, seemed acceptable, once the tables had been turned.
Despite its shortcomings, the plan gained a significant amount of notoriety, and
remained until the last days o f the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, one of the most
important schemes for its renovation. It held the upper hand in many circles over projects
such as Renner’s or Jaszi’s because of its safe social platform and ease of conception.
Because of this, it seemed to many, for a long period, to be the only feasible project, and
the most certain to be implemented, under some form or another by the heir presumptive,
Franz Ferdinand.
The intellectual streams presented in this chapter were the most significant novel
apprehensions and contributions to a problem which they themselves brought to the
foreground of Hungarian, and indeed Austro -Hungarian discourse: the nationality
problem. Pushed profusely by the Hungarian and intellectual elite ( alongside its own
ethnicizing nationalism), in order to eschew social and constitutional matters, it became
in a short while the dominant thopos of the Hungarian political debate. Along with it
came the estrangement of the already jaded nationalities living on the territory of
Hungary. They began perceiving themselves as being in a competition for their very
existence, one that they could not hope to win if they resorted to traditional tactics. As a
consequence, in political activity and discourse, they became more and more militant a nd
open to radical solutions. The Dualist framework became infused in their imaginary with
59 Popovici, Stat si Natiune, p. 258 and infra.
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a symbolism of oppression. All those who promised quick deliverance were heeded to. In
the following chapter, I will document how a movement of a disenfranchised nat ionality,
the Romanians, went through a gradual ideological and discursive transformation, toward
a final divorce with Dualism.
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Chapter three
The Romanian National Party 1903 -1914
Postmemorandism: towards a new ideology
Before one can embark on the journey of illustrating the ideology, discursive and
political practice of the Romanian National Party in its last, activist phase, the roots have
to be traced. It is vital for the understanding of the motivation lying behind the new
political tactics to have an accurate picture of the prehistory of activism among
Transylvanian Romanians. I will therefore concentrate on isolating the few salient factors
and moments that contributed toward the reconfiguration of the Transylvanian p olitical
outlook.
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The most important external factors and influences have already been roughly
sketched ( as much as the confines of this thesis allow) in the first two chapters. It is
within the shifting Hungarian political life and discourse that the RN P also undertook a
decisive renovation of its own ideological underpinnings. In this respect, the Romanian
party’s activity is highly contextual, having its own well -defined niche inside the
Hungarian political spectrum. If carefully analyzed, its evolutio n parallels the major
internal mutations of Cisleithania, the watershed moments being also reflected in RNP
party life. It was precisely this aspect that Romanian historiography overlooked, in most
cases, consciously. Historians wanted to obscure dangerous aspects of party strategy from
the point of view of the nationalist vulgata. In-fighting among party factions was
downplayed, as an unimportant aspect of the continuous fight against Hungarian
oppression. I hypothesize that it is exactly this aspect that is most important, since it links
the RNP into a greater context, leading to a better understanding of its history and
contribution to the social debate inside the Monarchy.
Methodologically, my analysis will rely upon the method of Rogers Brubaker. H e
makes use of a triadic nexus of interwoven relationships between the “nationalizing
nationalism” of the states, the defensive nationalism of the minorities within them, and
the transborder nationalism of the kin states, in order to explain the activity o f the
minority political groupings 60. In this case, the “nationalizing nationalism” is represented
by the Hungarian state and its cultural and educational policy. The minority concerned,
is, obviously, the Romanians of Transylvania ( among others). The acti vity of the kin
state is embodied most clearly by the activity of the Cultural League For the Unity of All
60 Rogers Brubaker, Nationalism reframed. Nationhood and the national qu estion in the New Europe ,Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996, p. 4 -5
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Romanians. It is the complex interplay between these three major categories of factors
that determine the evolution and progression of Romanian polit ical discourse at the turn
of the 19th century.
As this chapter of the thesis aims to be a microcosm, reflecting the matters
already treated in the first two parts, I will begin again by underlining some of the social
substratum. The latter part of the 1 9th century meant, for Transylvania, as it did for
Hungary, a fast-paced social and economic advancement. Without going into details, as
these problems are not of special concern to the topic of this thesis, it is important that
this development was concen trated regionally in a few geographic centers, and
concretized through urbanization. The most significant industrializing effort was
projected onto the Banat region of Transylvania, an important mining and commercial
node. It is therefore not surprising, t hat the new political elite of the RNP was composed
mostly of men from this region. Here, an entirely new echelon of values dominated,
opposed to the traditional line upheld by Transylvania proper. A young, economically
self-sufficient and socially emancipated class of Romanian petty bourgeois politicians felt
that the old ways did not serve the best interests of the nation. The new generation
developed around such financial establishments as the Victoria bank in Arad or the
Ardeleana bank in Orastie, the second and third richest after the Albina of Sibiu61. They
themselves, dealing with Hungarian politicians and businessmen successfully on a daily
basis, felt that the system could be reformed from within. All that was lacking was
political will.
There are two major milestones in the chain of events that lead toward the
ideological dislocation of passivism. The first is the establishment of the journal
61 Liviu Maior, Miscarea nationala romana din Transilvania 190 -1914, Cluj, Dacia, 1986, p.51, p. 59
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“Tribuna” ( “The Tribune”) in Sibiu/Nagyszeben in 1884. With this new press organ, the
fledgling Romanian urban intelligentsia began conveying their ideas to a larger audience.
The newspaper’s tone, however, differed significantly from the traditional thematic
pushed by established Romanian publications, such as the Gazeta Transilvaniei ( The
Transylvanian Gazette). In its inaugural number, it declared “the necessity of establishing
a modus vivendi for all the nationalities living on the territory of Hungary” 62. It also set
forth to reinterpret the immediate value of the passive standpoint, urging the leadership of
the RNP to engage in more than declarations of principle and small cultural undertaking.
It set in perspective the option of future revision of the value -system of political
passivity; in this sense, the influence of the kin state, Romania was decisive. The Tribuna
mirrored the cultural, political and aesthetic revolution that was taking place in Romania
at the time at the hands of Titu Maiorescu and the Junimea generation. Also, the
contribution of Ioan Slavici, the aesthete returning from Romania, was decisive. With the
help of the Liga Culturala pentru Unitatea Romanilor ( The Cultural League for the
Unity of all Romanians), bankrolled from Bucharest, he successfully gathered around him
a number of Romanian nationalist youth, who were not members of th e RNP.
Dynamism, a turn toward autochthonous tradition and the Romanian constituency,
instead of an aping of Czech and Hungarian tactics, seen as bankrupting political will,
were proposed.
The change of the topicality and volume of political discourse u rged the RNP
leadership and dr. Ratiu, its president, in particular, toward some sort of action. This was
to be crystallized through the so -called “Memorandum-movement” of 1891-1892. The
party elite embarked on a year -long propaganda campaign in press and through other
62 Tribuna, Ioan Slavici (ed.), Sibiu, 1884, nr.1., p. 1
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channels, in order to promote the text of a memorandum concerning the demands of the
Romanians, that was to be submitted to the emperor Franz Joseph. It declaimed the
cultural and electoral practices of Hungarian dualism, appealing to the hig hest authority
for a revision of the entire framework. In this way, the RNP leadership sought to
elegantly bypass its own wow of passivity and circumvent the Hungarian legal
framework, at the same time. Beyond the mere details of this undertaking, its sign ificance
lies in a few symbolic results. On the one hand, it was the last great project of traditional
politics of appealing to the imperial centre, and it ended in failure ( the emperor denied
them an audience). This was the symbolic breaking -point between the Romanian elite
and Franz Joseph, and dashed hopes of imperial intervention. The myth of the “good
emperor”, was, for all thoughts and purposes, effectively dead from 1893 on. On the
other hand, it was the first political operation that made use of a completely new tactical
and discursive toolkit. The vigorous press campaign, the numerous speeches, the
unprecedented state of political mobilization ( the delegation which went to Vienna in
1892 had a number of peasant leaders in its composition, for exam ple), all heralded a
future permutation of party politics. The ensuing press trials and political conflict kept a
large part of the Romanian citizenry in a continuous state of political mobilization. The
RNP-lead Nationality Congress of 1895, in Budapest, also ending without concrete
results, was the last nail in the coffin of passivism.
The post-memorandist political lexicon was, from 1895 onward, replete with new
themes. The topicality revolved mainly around the necessity for pragmatic politics, and
the validity of the maintenance of political idleness. The subsequent debate between
disciples of Ratiu and those gathered around the defunct “Tribuna” was a reproduction of
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the inter-party dialectic of Romania proper. Both factions found backing from D.A.
Sturdza’s Romanian Liberal Party ( Tribunists) and the Conservatives ( Ratiu and the
Popovici camp). The two sides soon engaged in a bitter ideological conflict. The first
episode of this rivalry was represented by the wrangling over the control of the
“Tribuna”. Ioan Ratiu and the editor of the Tribuna, Russu -Sirianu faced off, while the
Romanian exiles, Eugen Brote ( Tribunist) and Aurel C. Popovici, provided external
support. The old guard was to come out on top, after Sturdza withdrew his formal
backing after 1895 ( the Liberals had seized power in Romania, and had to back away
from the open support of the national movement, in virtue of Romania’s diplomatic pact
with Austria-Hungary)63. The “Tribuna” editorial board was to be taken over by Ratiu’s
faithful after a shrewd maneuver that took away the support of the publishing house from
Brote’s men.
This victory, however, proved out to be only a Pyrrhic one, in the long run. The
ex-Tribunists, with the help of Brote and less outwardly, the Bucharest Liber als,
reformed their lines. They founded a new weekly, mirroring the name of the old, called
“Tribuna Poporului” (“The People’s Tribune”). The name was chosen in order to take
legitimacy away from the opposing side, and show the popular roots of the movemen t.
Quite significantly, the newspaper was based in Arad, at the core of the most socially -
mobile Romanian geographical area. Soon, the conciliatory tactics toward the Hungarian
authorities of Brote and company came under heavy fire from Aurel C. Popovici. He
denounced Brote as “ a traitor”, divulging the details “ of a plan to organize the
Romanian constituency into a Hungarian governmental party”, and accused him of
63 Lucian Boia, Contributii privind criza Partidului National Roman si trecerea de la pasivism la activism(1893-1905) in Studii de Istorie, tom 24, nr.5., Bucharest, 1971, p. 967
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“playing the interests of the Romanian minority in Hungary onto the hands of the
Romanian Liberal Party64”.
The faction lead by Russu-Sirianu, Eugen Brote and the archbishop Vasile
Mangra developed a program in response to Popovici’s allegations. This was to mark
their wholesale abandonment of passivity, and the beginning of the attempt to coag ulate
all the forces of the party around them. The first step of this plan was the forsaking of the
tactics of political isolation. The second, to formulate a fresh political credo, with a de -
emphasis of the 1 and 9 articles of the 1881 RNP program ( the r epudiation of Dualism
and the claim to Transylvania’s autonomy). The third would be engagement in political
life and laying to rest the Romanian -Hungarian conflict. Other points, such as the smooth
cooperation with other nationalities living on the territo ry of Hungary, and possible
coadjutation with the Hungarian opposition, were also high up on the list 65. This set of
principles, brimming both of pragmatism but also of militant, integral nationalism, began
to shift the balance of power from Sibiu to Arad. Most regional groups ( like Mocioni and
Vincentiu Babes’) made unenthusiastic declarations of principle in favor of the party
elders, since the prestige of dr. Ratiu was still overwhelming. But the vitality of these was
decreased and the Tribuna Poporului soon gained the upper hand. It spawned a number
of satellite publications and political groupings, such as those gathered around the Revista
Orastiei or the later Libertatea. A number of political figures, who would later on
become of consequence to the RN P, such as Aurel Vlad, Ioan Mihu or Alexandru Vaida -
Voievod, emerged from these activist partisan circles.
64 Tribuna, XIII, 1896, 25-29th of February and 8-12th of March issues65 Brote to Roman Ciorogariu, 1902.5.11. , apud. Boia, Contributii privind criza Partidului NationalRoman si trecerea de la pasivism la activism , p. 972
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The discourse of the activist camp is quite conspicuous right from the outset. The
headline of the first edition of the newspaper reads “ Actiune!” ( “Action!”). The article
declaims the lack of activity, the decay of political life among Romanians, and shifts the
blame for the party disunity squarely on the Sibiu men 66. Brote also publishes a proposal
in 7 points, entitled “Puncte de orientare” ( “Poi nts of Reference”) in which he
underlines the changes happening in Hungarian political life. He states the opportunity
that is presented to the Romanian fold to broker a significant improvement of their
status67. Between the years 1898-1899 a number of attempts of reconciliation, such as the
Mangra-initiated party gathering at Cluj or the petition of Iuliu Maniu and Aurel Vlad,
met with the stubborn resistance of Ratiu and his shrinking cluster of stalwarts.
The elections of 1901 for the RNP meant another step towards the scrapping of
traditional politics. The new obvious crisis of Hungarian political life and the opportunity
for reform were by then hard to ignore. Still, Ratiu managed to squeeze a declaration of
abstinence from the party assembly, in the p rogram of 190168. It solemnly declared “not
to have our fate fall pray to the enemy, to be debated or negated, and to adhere to the
values of our nation and our past achievements 69”. This however, was to be the last
utterance of political autarchy. In the sa me year, Brote makes an open plea for activism,
publishing an article entitled “ Puncte noua de orientare” ( “New Points of Reference”).
He declares:
“Let us admit that the policy of passivity has not managed to attain any of the
goals proposed, desired and expected…the current of thought created from 1894
66 Actiune! in Tribuna Poporului, I, 1897, nr.8.67 Puncte de orientare in Tribuna Poporului, I, 1897, nr. 1968 The electoral appeal of the RNP committee for the 1901 elections, 1901. sept. 5., in Kemeny G. Gabor,Iratok a nemzetisegi kerdeshez, Budapest, Tankonyvkiado, 1964, vol .3., p. 175 ( subsequently INK)69 INK, vol.3., p. 177
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onwards in the midst of the Romanian leadership for the abandonment of the
politics of passivity only grows…Our organization was founded on the basis of
the spreading of the ideas of the Memorandum. T his idea ( goal) was also realized
and the leadership of our national political life did not know what other goal to
give to an already waiting and disciplined army. First, the army waited, then it fell
into disorganization, because it lacked a politica l idea70”
A year later, he declared:
“There is only one choice remaining that will guide us to the desired goal: the
Constitutional fight. We do not delude ourselves, and realize that this will be a
hard-fought and bitter struggle, but not one that canno t be won. With a well-
developed and disciplined political organization, the Romanians can send a
considerable number of deputies into the Hungarian Chamber. 71”
The Tribuna Poporului group also began to play the card of public opinion and vox populi
in order to get the better of the RNP chiefs. It published articles with opinions of peasants
that proclaimed:
“we have had enough of passivity and want that you, leaders of the towns, come among
us and together with the people let us try another political co urse, because passivity is
getting us nowhere72”.
It was not long before these new discursive blueprints yielded the expected results. The
supporters of the official RNP party line were few and far between. The passivist line was
ebbing away. The Tribuna Poporului men scored victory after victory. First, in 1902,
after the passing away of Iosif Goldis, the activists lobbied for Vasile Mangra to fill the
70 Tribuna Poporului, V, 1901, 20 th of October71 Tribuna Poporului, VI, 1902, 8 th of January72 Tribuna Poporului, V, 1901, 29 th of September
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vacant bishop’s seat. They succeeded, drawing considerable clerical support. The death
of Ioan Ratiu in the same year removed the last bulwark of political passivity, and left the
road open for the activism. The “Tribuna” of Sibiu ceased to appear in April 1903. The
Tribuna Poporului changed its name to “Tribuna” in the spring of 1904. The cercle was
complete.
The catalyst for the adoption of activism was the formal declaration in favor of
this strategy by the Arad organization and the subsequent candidature of Aurel Vlad. He
ran in 1903, without the approval of the party hierarchy, for the vacated deputy man date
in the Dobra/Hajdudobra county. Using the new methods of rallying and propaganda, he
achieved an unexpected success. This was a great coup for the Tribunists, and was fully
exploited in the columns of the journal. It was a symbolic victory, which show ed that
electoral gerrymandering and the inequity of the Hungarian voting system could be
transcended. Activism quickly swept away the last remnants of resistance. The Tribuna
Poporului declared : “the victory at Dobra leads us to hope that in the upcomin g general
elections we will succeed in sending to Parliament at least 10 or 15 deputies 73”. The lines
were ironically prophetic, since the RNP would succeed in gaining a number of 16
mandates in the 1906 elections. The Arad politicians then pushed for a nat ional
conference of the RNP, confident in the fact that their point of view would carry the day.
The conference was to be held in Sibiu on the 10 th of January 1905, and sealed the
triumph of the new party line. This was the watershed moment, marking the en try of the
Romanian elite into Hungarian political life. The ideological changes, reflected through a
new political vocabulary and the use of a fresh discourse concerning the nation, were
manifold. The party had turned toward its electorate more directly, attempting to employ
73 Tribuna Poporului, VII, 1903, nr. 96, 28 th of May
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up-to-date methods of political mobilization. The practice of mass rallies, for example,
was pioneered in the 1903-1904 years in the Dobra and Nadlac/ Nagylak electoral
campaigns. The RNP attempted to draw legitimacy from popular suppo rt, and was thusly
pushed in the direction of becoming a mass party. The example of the socialist movement
and other leftist agrarian movements from fin -de-siecle Hungary was obviously quite
influential. Moreover, the RNP began to show careful interest tow ard cooperating with
these and other opposition movements of Hungary, the exchange of opinions leaving the
mark on their discourse as well. In the following subchapters, I will analyze the topicality
of the Romanian nationalist discourse in the period of a ctivism, alongside the
transplantation of it into practice on the field of politics.
The period of participation (1905 -1910)
The era of activity officially debuted in the beginning of the year 1905. The RNP
members called for a general conference o f the party to be held at Sibiu, the traditional
capital of Romanian polity. The venue was symbolic for the passing of the torch from the
men of central Transylvania to those coming from the Partium and Banat. Only 97
circumscriptions actually managed to s end a delegate to the party gathering, opposed to
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the near 300 that participated in the last congress, in 1893, before the Hyeronimy -ban74.
This goes to show the measure of disorganization and chaos the intestine struggle
produced. Nonetheless, the adoption of the new party line passed overwhelmingly with
79 votes to 12, and 6 abstentions. A new party president was elected in the person of
Gheorghe Pop de Basesti. In view of the upcoming elections, an Electoral Committee
was set up, consisting mostly of youn g activists: Vasile Lucaciu, Teodor Mihali, Ioan
Suciu, Aurel Vlad, Iuliu Maniu and others. The new party program 75 preferred to shelve
the first and ninth articles of its 1881 correspondent, and instead tackled a variety of
political, and increasingly, soc ial and cultural demands. The second article underlined the
party’s adherence to the famed 1903 Chlopy declaration of Franz Joseph, and called for
an united army, in which every regiment would make use of its own language of
instruction and command. This w ould prove out to be a significant matter in the party
schedule, since it was one of the breaking points with the Coalition government.
Subsequent articles asked for a full application of the 1868 Nationalities Law of Jozsef
Eotvos. A new desiderate was in troduced, in the form of a demand for universal, secret
suffrage and a reorganization of the electoral circumscriptions. Also, for the first time, the
social sphere gained inclusion into the agenda. A reform of the taxes on land, according
to property size and more importantly, a sweeping land reform were proposed, through
which peasant would be bestowed property from the estates of the authorities. Increased
healthcare and the provision of measures of social security for urban workers were also
listed among the goals to be attained. The party therefore, was clearly under the
intellectual convergence of political nationalism and populism, in linking the social and
74 the Minister of the Interior of the Banffy -era, Karoly Hyeronimy, had outlawed the party in 1895,because of its activity during the Memorandum movement75 Tribuna, IX, nr. 3., 3rd of January 1905
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the national questions. Similarly, identical solutions to settle both problems were
suggested: land reform, universal, secret suffrage, an overhaul of the political and
institutional system, the strict application of the 1868 Nationalities Act. The points of
view of the Hungarian left and the nationalities began to converge on several points.
Before proceeding to illustrate and analyze the RNP in the 1905 -1910
parliamentary session, one important episode has to be taken into account. This was the
beginning of preliminary discussion between the RNP militants and count Istvan Tisza,
during his first term as prime minister. In 1903, he began to maneuver toward the
nationalities, by a series of speeches announcing that “the winning of the trust and respect
of our non-Hungarian language citizenship is one of the most worthy national causes and
is a question of lively importance both for this category of non -Hungarians and for
ourselves as well”76. Tisza was following the politics of pragmatism that would make him
famous in latter years, and employed a clever “carrot and stick” policy toward his
opponents. The parliamentary obstruction he sought to break through force, and the
nationalities he set out to appease. Of course, he did not mean to give rights to all
nationalities. The Romanians were the privileged choice, due to their numerical size and
highly effective political organization. The men chosen to broker the talks were the
bishop Vasile Mangra and more importantly, the prominent banker and up -and-coming
politician from the Orastie activist cell, Ioan Mihu. His boldness in 1902, when breaking
the party code, he denounced points 1 and 9 of the 1881 program as anachronic, and his
proclivity toward compromise got him noticed by Tisza. Once he took office on the 3 rd of
November 1903, the Hungarian prime minister began initiating talks through unofficial
76 Zoltan Szasz, A Roman kerdes Tisza Istvan elso kormanyanak politikajaban ( 1904) in TortenelmiSzemle, 1968, XI, nr. 3, p. 257
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channels. The Tribuna Poporului hailed the declarations of the head of the cabinet as the
signs of a new era and proclaimed “we acknowledge without reservation the existence of
a Hungarian state that respects our rights as citizens…because the existence of a strong
central European Habsburg state is more insurance for the future of our nation than any
dreams of Dacia Traiana could ever hold 77”. On the other hand, the only parliamentary
representative of the Romanians at that time, Aurel Vlad, declaired that he could not give
Tisza’s intentions his vote of confidence, since “neither Tisza’s past , his character or his
program promised any solution to the problem”. Nonetheless, it seemed that a
compromise would soon ensue. These hopes from the Romanian side were soon dashed,
as it became obvious that Tisza was playing a double -handed game, enticing both
opposition and nationalities to give up some of their liberty and join the Liberal Party.
The parliamentary instability, the violent reaction toward the strong -arm tactics of Tisza
in the Chamber, would see his government fall and the attempt at rapprochement
flounder. Still, the channels of communication between the two camps remained
established and would go on to be the foundation for the revival of the talks aft er 1910.
The Liberal Party came up short in the 1905 elections ( and soon dissolved), but
the Coalition and the nationality parties recorded their first big success. The RNP
managed to send 8 delegates to the Lower House of the Hungarian parliament, its b iggest
success to date in the post -1867 era. The anti-Viennese stance of the Independence Party
convinced the emperor of the necessity and opening for an alternative political choice,
and the legislature was soon prorogued. The RNP, through the voice of it s
representatives, wavered between the throne and the newly -attained political
representation. Aurel Novac openly protested against the suspension of parliamentary
77 Tribuna Poporului, 1903, 10th of November
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proceedings. An overall tone of neutrality was proclaimed, but it soon it became obvious
that the question cut right across the party line. In the campaign of passive resistance
trumpeted by the Coalition to hinder the activity of the Fejervary -cabinet, 9 out of the 20
Romanian-dominated circumscriptions made the choice to obstruct 78. The party showed
considerable skepticism towards the efforts of the “League For Universal Suffrage” as
well, although it was clearly influenced by its ideas and propaganda techniques.
The electoral campaign for the 1906 elections saw the RNP employ a new
ideological toolkit. For the first time, it set out to organize major rallies and go into rural
areas in order to drum up support for its cause. A good example for this campaigning
amongst the crowd was the gathering of 10 thousand Romanian electors, many of them
peasants in Lugoj, in late 1905. Also present was the Romanian nationalist historian and
politician Nicolae Iorga, whop urged men such as Valeriu Braniste ( editor of the
Drapelul) to rally in favor of the 1905 points. The last pockets of resistance were thus ly
liquidated and the RNP was on its way to becoming an integral mass party.
The 1906 elections, the first to be held in an atmosphere of relative freedom,
brought with them the biggest success of the nationality parties to date. The Hungarian
minorities managed to elect 26 delegates to the Lower House, out of which 14 were
Romanians. Immediately, they were invited by opposition leader, Ferenc Kossuth, to join
the ranks of the “national opposition”. The RNP, through the voice of one of its deputies,
Teodor Mihali, refused. This, cumulated with the neutral attitude exhibited by the
nationalities during the Fejervary administration, was the starting point for the mistrust
projected against them. Soon, appellatives such as “traitors”, “agitators”, and “rebel
78 Stelian Mandrut, Miscarea Nationala si Activitatea Parlamentara a Deputatilor Partidului NationalRoman 1905-1910,Oradea, Fundatia Culturala “Trei Crisuri”, 1995, p. 86
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rousers” became commonplace among the Coalition deputies when referring to the
Nationality Club. The two sides soon found themselves locked in a brutal rhetorical
showdown, centered around citizen’s civil, political, economic rights and responsibilities.
These clusters of dispute culminated with incidents, such as the forced eviction of
Romanian deputy Alexandru Vaida -Voievod from the Chamber by his Hungarian
colleagues, after a particularly fiery speech.
In this period, the rhetorical scheme of the RNP w as aggregated around a few
major themes. The first and foremost characteristic of their discourse was legalism and
the correct and equitable application of the existing framework of jurisprudence. In his
opening speech to the Lower House, RNP deputy Alexan dru Vaida-Voievod made a plea
for the observing of the provisions of the 1868 Eotvos Law. His interpellation reads:
“our political line is decided by the internal political line of Hungary. If this
internal policy goes against the rights of the public a nd citizenry, then we will be
forced to combat the politics of the government, and we will do this… we will
serve any political right that helps with the emancipation of our electorate…but
we cannot be accused of treason and the upholding of Germany’s Drang Nach
Osten policy…79”
The RNP therefore presented itself as an element of normality in a political and legal
framework gone wrong. On many occasions, in parliamentary speeches and press articles,
they underlined the fact that they are fighting against a political system that does not even
abide by its own rules. The RNP, as the flagship of the Nationality’s Club in the
parliament, situated itself on a platform of popular and law -abiding organization, locked
79 Alexandru Vaida-Voievod and Milan Hodza’s interpellation and response to count Batthyany Tivadar’sspeech on the Croatian question , 1906. Nov. 23 rd , in INK, p. 7-8
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in an almost dichotomical struggle against a tyrannical adversary. This strategy was not
something new, not even for the Hungarian public opinion, since it had just been avidly
used by the Hungarian opposition forces that went on to form the Coalition government.
The RNP now turned this discourse on its head, placing itself on the vacated seat of the
contester. Moreover, as Alexandru Vaida -Voievod in one of his speeches pointed out:
“the public opinion of the country itself asked for a revision of the electoral
system, and the demand had been so str ong because the heads of the present
government, the leaders of the Coalition incited it. It still vividly remains in our
memories how the sons of the Coalition, under the Tisza - and Fejervary-days,
toured the country, denouncing the unconstitutional na ture of the state…80”
This brings us to the second most important thopos in the ideological apparatus of the
RNP in the phase of activism. The metonymy of “constitutionalism” was also used in
frequent association with that of electoral reform. This quickly transmuted into an
advocacy of the introduction of universal suffrage. Vaida -Voievod continued, stating:
“(after being accused by Kallay Lipot of demagogy) …There is a type of
demagogy, honored House, that is saint. Do not misinterpret my words…when
Apponyi toured the country to agitate for this idea, he brought it to the lowest
categories of the population…can the work of the government be so monumental
that it cannot devise a law similar to that in the other part of the Monarchy took
only a month and a half to draw up?...instead, the House wastes its time with the
80 the interpellation of Vaida-Voievod and the response of prime -minister Sandor Wekerle concerning theBill for the introduction of “universal, secret, equal and county -wide voting rights” , 1906 Nov. 10 th , inINK, p. 13
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Law for the Millimeter, and God only knows what else…all the while, the ideas
of universal freedom have captured the hearts and minds of millions… 81”
The new populist direction was begin ning to make considerable headway and the party
soon looked toward other potential partners, beyond the traditional other nationality
collaborators. In 1907, a new journal, entitled “Lupta” ( “The Struggle”), was launched,
in order to further propagate the ideas of the party. In its inaugural issue, it declared that
“the Romanian people had never risen against the Hungarian people in its history, since it
had been subject to the same feudal Hungarian oppression 82”. As early as 1903, Vasile
Goldis was quoted in a Hungarian paper, saying he saw “no danger from socialism from
the point of view of Romanian interests 83” and “was in favor of an alliance with the
social-democrats for the introduction of universal suffrage 84”. The appearance of a
Romanian section within the Social-Democratic Party prompted the RNP leadership to
infuse its discourse with even more demands for social and economic reform, in order to
maintain the cohesion of its urban electorate. The Romanian section constituted the
lynchpin which brought together the two camps. Points 1,4 and 6 of the Socialist agenda
contained a clear RNP influence in asking for suffrage reform. The two parties soon
began collaborating in a number of common rallies for universal suffrage 85. In
parliamentary addresses, on the 10th July 1906, Iuliu Maniu declared the social -
democratic program’s article referring to citizen’s rights as virtuous and set in perspective
a possible future cooperation on its basis. This motion was also supported by Coriolan
Brediceanu’s talk; Vasile Goldis then underlined the common elements between workers’
81 Ibidem., p.13-1482 Lupta, I, nr. 1., 1st of Januray 190783 Tribuna Poporului, 1903,VII, 7th of May84 Tribuna Poporului, 1903,VII, 7th of May85 Stelian Mandrut, op.cit., p. 123
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and peasant movements, while Vasile Lucaciu accused the government of a policy of
oppression against both workers and nationality peasants, in the Banat region 86. The
League for Universal Suffrage was formed in cartel with the socialists, and many
common rallies and talks in the Romanian counties that supported the alliance with the
socialists became commonplace after 1907.
The party not only made strides to reduce the gap toward the left, it al so adopted a
number of ideological traits from the kin state. The influence, both direct and ideological -
discursive, of the National Liberal Party of Romania, upon the fledgling activist dogma,
was considerable. A good amount of the National -Liberal paraphernalia was imported
and made use of in the struggle against the Sibiu old guard. The premier issue of the
Tribuna Poporului, for example, read: “Only through ourselves can we succeed”. This
diatribe, of course, was the age-old slogan of the Romanian Liberals. It was soon adopted
as official party motto, heralding the prestige of Bratianu Jr.’s party among the PNR fold.
The proclivity toward a compromise with the left was also a trait taken from the Regat 87,
not forgetting it swallowed up its autochthonous s ocialist movement in the late 1890’s.
The organization on a local level, into clubs, or at the centre in a party divided into press,
economic, social, cultural and so forth departments also mimicked the liberal division.
The subsidies that the cultural organization “ASTRA” and the party itself received via the
Bucharest-based “Cultural League” were also an instrument of control in the hand of
Bratianu, Stere and company. The frequent student protest organized by the same
institution in favor of some or othe r of the RNP’s demands also served greatly to help the
Romanian common imagined community perceive itself as a whole.
86 Ibidem., p. 12387 i.e. Regat=Romanian Kingdom
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An important milestone of the relationship between the Hungarian authorities and
the nationality parties was recorded in 1907. The Coali tion Government, following along
the line of an overly nationalistic rhetoric, felt it needed to Magyarize and to Magyarize
quickly. The instrument to achieve this goal, and put to rest the vilified minorities and
silence their claims was to be the famed L ex Apponyi. This law, focusing on the pay of
teachers, sparked a lively debate in the parliament and the press, and went on to be one of
the causes of discord between the Coalition and the Nationalities Club. The law’s flagrant
anti-minority stance gave a chance to the RNP deputies to showcase their skills as
advocates of the cultural liberties of the disenfranchised. It was an opportunity for the
party to present themselves in a dual role. On the one hand, they presented themselves as
victims of inequity and lawlessness, while the flipside of the coin was their righteous
fight against an overbearing establishment. This second part, was played out quite
successfully, and brought the party much of the mass support it yearned for. Vasile
Goldis’ speech as a reaction to the proposed bill was:
“(after an expose showing that the very idea that stands behind the Bill
contradicted the 1868 Law and the spirit of Deak, Eotvos and Andrassy Sr.)…this
Bill…does not fulfill the requirements of popular education. It chi ps away at the
autonomy of religious schooling, and eliminates it altogether in many
circumstances; it contradicts the very principle of popular education -believe me-
even politically it will not attain the goal proposed for it, that is to bring togethe r
the peoples of the Monarchy. Instead, it sows the seeds of severance, because it
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pits against one another the interests of the state and those of the Church…for all
the reasons stated above, I cannot accept this proposed Bill 88”
The parliamentary grouping of the nationalities, spearheaded by the RNP delegates,
prepared a motion to suppress the Bill, stating:
“owing to the fact that the Bill contradicts much of the basic laws of the country
and circumvents their very spirit, upon the successful passin g of the law through
the legislature, to authorize the Minister for Education and Culture to prepare
another, replacement Bill, that would underline the remaining provisions of the
laws still not broken by the Apponyi Bill 89”
To this was added an interpellation of RNP speaker, Stefan Cicio Pop, in which he stated
that the Romanians wanted only to live by the “ neminem laedere, suum cuique tribuere,
honeste vivere principle90”, but was hindered in its attempt to do just this by the
Hungarian nationalist educational policy “that robs us of the very right to educate our
youth91”. After this and bitter daily wrangling over censorship and particular cases of
minority rights infringement by government officials, the RNP began to gradually turn
away from the Coalition and in on itself. It hoped that a future change of administration
would result in a turn for the better, and concentrated its efforts to rekindling of cultural
and political rights in its hinterland. The failure of the Wekerle government to carry
through the expected electoral reform also lead to the Coalition to be perceived as
88 Vasile Goldis’ reaction and counter -proposal to the Bill for Education, 1907 April 5 th, in INK, vol. 5., p.14889 Alexandru Vaida-Voievod and his nationality collegues bill proposal, 1907 April 8 th, in INK, vol. 5., p.149
90 Stefan Cicio Pop’s reaction in the debate concerning the Apponyi Bill , 1907 April 9 th, in INK, vol. 5., p.15091 Ibidem., p.151
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duplicitous and untrustworthy agent. It certainly was not fit for the role of a level -headed
talking partner that the activist politicians yearned for. Both the upholders of the
Hungarian Ancien Regime and the opposition that took their place had compromised
themselves in the eyes of the Romanian elite. What was left was the search for radical
solutions, possibly outside the parliamentary framework.
Alexandru Vaida-Voievod’s activity at the chancellery of the Archduke Franz
Ferdinand was such an alternate option. The trust in an imperial strong hand solution, that
would finally enfranchise and emancipate the Romanian constituency, had still some
support among the RNP electorate. I t was animated by the remains of the loyalist feeling,
that had characterized Romanian proto -nationalism92, and still had some pull in the early
twentieth century. The initiator of the talks between the RNP representatives and the
camarilla of the Archduke was Aurel C. Popovici. Upon completion of his magnum opus,
The United States of Great Austria , he felt a need to bring it to the attention of both the
representatives of the nationalities and the heir presumptive, as the targets his ideological
product was geared toward. He called upon Teodor Mihali and Alexandru Vaida -Voievod
to travel to Vienna and mitigate the transmission of his book to the chancellery of the heir
to the imperial throne. The group soon established a lively relationship with future
Austrian prime minister, the baron Beck, a close associate of Franz Ferdinand. The
inaugural meeting was held in Beck’s residence, who asked the politicians present to aid
the relationship between the archduke and the nationalities. The medium chosen by him
was regular reports on party and Hungarian political activity. The three representatives
treated the matter with a fair amount of skepticism, and Vaida declared: “Considering the
fact that, at the moment, my nation is in no immediate threat…I decline the audi ence with
92 Sorin Mitu, Geneza identitatii nationale…, p. 8 and passim.
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your Imperial Highness…and reserve my right to ask for audience at the time when the
Hungarian government would get ready to deal the Romanians a death blow 93”. The book
was remitted to Franz Ferdinand, who expressed sentiments of encouragement, a lthough
not agreeing with all of Popovici’s opinions. Though at this point, the rest of the
Romanian politicians broke contact with the Belvedere circle, Vaida stayed on, and
agreed to submit regular reports to the military chancellery. The reasons behind this
decision were the Romanian politician’s strong loyalist sentiment, and the conviction that
the favorable solution would come from Vienna ( he himself was educated in the
Austrian capital).
The publication of Popovici’s work facilitated a strong campa ign for the
spreading of its ideas. Vaida also took part in this undertaking, publishing a number of
commentaries in the columns of his journal, the “ Lupta”. At this time (1906-1907) he
also engaged in a number of parliamentary allocutions, in which he ma de public his pro-
dynastic stance. He declared: “the belief of the Romanians toward the throne is
traditional” and “tell his Majesty that we have always been loyal subjects…and tell him
to remember us not only when making speeches like that at Chlopy…but a lso when
dealing out rights and freedoms in this country 94”. In the 5th of February 1907, Vaida
makes a fiery speech in the Lower House, commenting on the Lex Apponyi, and the
danger of the introduction of Hungarian in the army as an official language of co mmand.
He publicly asked the emperor not to sanction the laws on education, threatening his
93 Liviu Maior, Alexandru Vaida-Voievod intre Belvedere si Versail les (insemnari, memorii, scrisori),Bucuresti, Editura Sincron, 1993, p. 9994 Tribuna, XII, nr.245
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party would not vote in the military budget 95. This show of force and vigor prompted the
archduke to call upon Vaida, through his chief of staff, Karl Brosch. Vaida was granted
an audience, at the end of which he enthusiastically declared: “this is what Joseph the II
must have been like96”. He then embarked on a furious campaign to popularize the person
of the archduke among his fellow Romanians. The headlines of the “ Lupta” read: “Franz
Ferdinand! A name, a symbol. The symbol of the future, the symbol of hope, for all the
nations of the Habsburg Monarchy. Especially for us Romanians, for whom the present
holds no reward for the acrimonies of the past; we, are advised t o hope the best from the
future and with great attention do we set our eyes upon our grand old emperor, and upon
our future monarch”. Systematic and periodical articles are published, having as subject
the person of the heir to the throne, his participatio n to military maneuvers, his ideas on
state reform ( “ The Rebirth of Austria 97”, “The Archduke and the Coalition 98”), his
proclaimed sympathy for the cause of the Romanians ( “The Archduke Franz Ferdinand
among the Romanians. Remembrances 99”) and so forth. The thopos of the heir
presumptive as a continuator, indeed, a second Joseph II, was profusely utilized. Vaida -
Voivevod also brokered the entry of Slovak politician and fellow colleague in the
Nationalities’ Club, into the Belvedere circle. This was done in accordance with the idea
of establishing a direct contact between the emperor and his subjects. Also, the idea of a
state of readiness on the side of the nationalities in case of the impeding succession to the
throne of Ferdinand, was pushed. Vaida also s ent Miron Cristea and Augustin Bunea,
95 Liviu Maior, Alexandru Vaida-Voievod intre Belvedere si Versailles (insemnari, memorii, scrisori),Bucuresti, Editura Sincron, 1993, p. 55
96 Maior, Alexandru Vaida-Voievod intre Belvedere si Versailles (insemnari, memorii, scrisori), Bucuresti,Editura Sincron, 1993, p. 5697 Lupta, nr. 113, 190898 Lupta, nr. 54, 190799 Lupta, nr. 56, 1907
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members of the Greek Catholic clergy, to meet with the archduke, in order to “have men
ready for when the time comes”. Another important moment was the visit of the archduke
to Romania ( 1909), in the organization of w hich Vaida took a large share. He published
an article entitled “The heir commeth” in which he declared: “A decisive individual on
the throne of the Habsburg- this meets with our sympathy. This is undoubtedly a great
change and we have had enough of all th e “fortwurstelen” and an imagined generosity,
which was really translated into our sacrificing 100”. The infusion of traditional politics
with novel motifs, such as the yearning for a forte solution is clear. Vaida also saw the
imperial solution as the sole v iable one because of his obsession with the Russian and
Pan-Slavic danger that threatened Romanians on both sides of the Carpathians. This
apparently is an element originating from Hungarian political theorists, such as Beksics
or Rez.
But Vaida’s stream of thought never managed to become mainstream, even within
the confines of his own party. He was practically its only major representative, although
the leadership fueled his attempts in Vienna. This was done by Maniu, Pop de Basesti,
Goldis and the others in order to have “a foot in each boat”, of sorts. In the unlikely case
that Franz Ferdinand would really decide to embark on a pro -nationality course of action,
the RNP wanted to have a man close. Otherwise, the party never gave its full vote of
confidence neither to the archduke or his chancellery. The reasons were manifold. The
erosion in the trust toward the dynasty has already been treated. To this, the ambiguous
and duplicitous behavior of the heir presumptive, was added. For example, cases such as
that in 1908-1909, when after the fall of the Wekerle government, Vaida, Hodza and the
others tried to persuade the archduke of the necessity of the forcible introduction of
100 Lupta, III, nr. 80, 6 th of May 1909
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universal suffrage, and he wavered in support, did not help his case much. Also, th e lack
of an openly declared set of aims or a concrete plan for the future, was reproached. The
fact that the archduke rarely preferred to grant a direct audience to the nationality
politicians, and conducted his talks through third parties, in secrecy, of fered little
guarantee for the future, as far as RNP officials were concerned. The assassination of
Franz Ferdinand in 1914 finally eliminated this high centralist option from the schedule
of the RNP.
In the 1905-1914 period, the Romanian National Party, besides its political
activity, undertook a new approach to politics, and concentrated a considerable amount of
effort and resources on extra -parliamentary tactics. These were the publishing of an
increased number of press material, engaging in various cul tural activities, and the
attempt to secure financial autonomy for the Romanian minority. They, alongside the
participation at the high political tier, were hailed as being equally important. The new
tactics were declared to be necessary in order to create and maintain a state of constant
and growing political awareness and mobilization, which would be the key to
emancipation in all areas. The spread of “political education” was also important, as it
was seen as a way to raise the level of “political and na tional consciousness”. The RNP,
therefore, wanted to create for itself a growing, vocal and stable electoral basis, that
would ensure its subsistence in the future. The economic institutions, such as banks,
increased in number and efficiency in this perio d, to the traditional Albina of Sibiu others
such as Victoria and Ardealeana were added. Their internal departmentalization and
organization were modeled on the highly successful Raiffeisen Creditanstalt. The new
banks were geared toward offering credit to the smallholders, thereby nationalizing their
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efforts. They themselves were usually under the patronage of the leading figures of the
RNP, the likes of Ioan Mihu or Aurel Vlad. The association between the political and the
economic-social effort was therefore obvious to all. The economic struggle was
politicized. Cultural institutions also grew in number, under the aegis of the party or the
Tribuna, and always under the auspices of the Cultural League, which contributed
material and resources. An increasin g number of cultural and scientific products of the
Regat traveled to Transylvania via the mediation of the League -RNP tandem, reaching a
growing audience.
The party itself wanted to appeal to a broad electorate, and aimed to be
recognized by all social strata as their legitimate leaders. As extensive platform it had
socially, it was proportionally narrow ethnically. The RNP aimed to be a party of
Romanians, and Romanians alone. Gone were the days of Mocsary’s election from a
nationality district. The ideas of ethnic autarchy and separation of Beksics and others
made a clear impact upon the political conception of Romanian leaders as well. The party
press organ declared in 1905: “we want all Romanians to join, from badica ( Sirs) to
opinca ( the wearers of boots i.e. peasants)…in other words, a completely democratic
organization101”. The most important social category, because of its size, for the RNP,
was, however, the peasantry. As a virtually uneducated social class, it had to be outfitted
with a basic national-political toolkit, in order to survive assimilation. In this respect,
party activists and leaders were sent out to “connect with the people” in various electoral
tours and mass rallies. The peasantry was regarded as the backbone of the movement, the
repository of ancient traditions, but at the same time, to be still too politically immature
to stand by itself. It could easily fall prey to the demagogy of some Hungarian peasant
101 Tribuna, XII, nr.29, 1908 and XII, nr. 31, 1908
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party or the Magyarizing tactics of the government itself. It therefore nee ded the guidance
of the urban categories, the bourgeoisie. This division of classes was less important for
the national ideologues of the Transylvanian Romanians, as ethnic belonging transcended
all. This ethnicist background was to be the basis of the con testation which grew up
within the party ranks, after 1908. It would serve to push the party’s discourse toward a
further radicalization, in an effort to maintain cohesion.
Conflict and rapprochement.
Octavian Goga versus Tisza Isvan
In 1907, a new element appeared among the of Transylvanian publicists. The
journal “Tara Noastra” ( “Our Land”) was the spearhead of a new generation of
politically-minded aesthetes. Its leaders proclaimed they were continuing the tradition of
men such as Ioan Slavici, that mixed literary and political activities, all in accordance
with the national project. The most prominent representatives of this new stream of
thought were Octavian Taslauanu, Ilarie Chendi and Octavian Goga. They began their
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careers in virtual anonymity, but quickly gained adherence, especially among youth and
student groups in Vienna and Budapest. They owed their success to their virulently
nationalistic and autochtonist rhetoric. They espoused criticism of the Dualist nexus with
a denunciation of the valor of activism and parliamentarism. Their instruments were the
political journal “Tara Noastra”, and the influential literary review, the “ Luceafarul”
(“North Star”).
The main ideologue of the faction was the poet Octavian Goga. Coming from a
rural background, and educated in Budapest, he can be considered as a classic example of
the conceptual category advanced by Peter Hanak, “the culturally creative social
marginal102”. Goga’s self-perceived alienation toward everything cosmopolitan and
Hungarian permeates all through his literary activity. Opposed to the activist line, he
violently rejects this world, divinizing instead the simple value -system of the rural areas.
In fact, this is one of the main ideological locus of the new generation, that call ed itself
“Tinerii Oteliti” (“Steely Youth”). They professed a return to the ethnic and traditional
instead of a self-compromising attempt toward rapprochement with the degenerate
political centre. The intellectual influence of Romania, through the Samanat orist
(“Sower”) circle, lead by nationalist historian Nicolae Iorga, is clear in this respect, but
also the ethnicizing nature of fin -de-siecle Hungarian aesthetics. A need to maintain the
link with the peasantry, the lifeblood of the movement, was hailed as a life and death
matter103. The RNP leadership and its conciliatory policy was seen as “selling out” the
Romanian nation. The movement instead had to be transformed into a populist, true mass
movement, that would rescue the nation from the hands of peril.
102 Hanak, The Garden and the Workshop , p. 147-148103 “Tara Noastra”, I, nr.1, 1907
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The other important discursive element of Goga’s Steely Youth movement was
the intermingling of aesthetics and politics, to a level where they were undistinguishable.
A speech had to be at the same time, politically relevant and literarily palatable. Th e
Youth saw itself as the true leaders of the national movement, beyond its bourgeois,
urban parliamentary delegates. The leading role of the intelligentsia was extolled over
and over again in the columns of the “Tara Noastra”. The article of Goga in one i ssue of
the Luceafarul expressed an almost obvious contradiction between “men of law”, the past
leaders of the RNP, and “men of letters”, his compatriots. The former had only “morals at
a face value” as opposed to the latter who carried within them the bes t autochthonous
qualities of the nation. The activism of recent years was reevaluated, Goga concluding:
“not only the writers’ attributions are restricted, but even the notion of “politics”
is reduced to microscopic proportions. Instead of designating to this word the
manifestation of multiple forces that contribute to sustaining, strengthening, and
guiding people, ….many of our “good leaders” reduce politics…to this most
narrow area. They see in politics only the trifle harassment of our gigantic
relentlessness for the affirmation of the nation…they only see the isolated
blazes…forgetting all the bulk of the soldiers from the valley, those who want to
take part and could decide the fight…these people will not ever understand that in
the fight for national revival of an oppressed nation, cultural propaganda that
opens the words of writers [to the masses] is a decisive political act, more
important than the improvised words of Hungarian oratory…the man with the
leading role in our ‘politics’ will d espise from the depth of his soul the role of
literature, being entirely convinced that the talent of a writer weighs ten times less
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than the mouth of a good lawyer who in impeccable Hungarian could ruin the
policy of Tisza104” .
The group around the “Tara Noastra” aggressively lashed out against the established
leadership, publishing a series of articles with titles like “ A False Coriolan”, “What is the
Tribuna of our days?” or “ A man has died. Ioan Slavic i”. They diminished the valor of
the political activity in the Hungarian parliament in the 1905 -1910 period. This strategy
seemed to pay increasingly more dividends, especially after the frustration of the RNP in
the 1910 elections. The article of Taslauanu, “Two cultures. The culture of gentlemen and
the culture of peasants105” opposed the Romanian constituency and its political
representatives. The greatest coup of the Steely Youth was the seizure of the main party
press organ, the Tribuna, in 1911. This gave them a wide forum for their exegesis of their
ideology. One of the main themes was a fiery criticism of former activist politician,
Bishop Vasile Mangra, now turned Hungarian government deputy. This was in the
character of activism, Goga claimed. The attack of the aesthetes on the party apparatus
prompted the activists to react. An aggressive polemic ensued, in the pose -counter pose
article-series’ between the “Tribuna” and the “Lupta” ( later “Romanul”). Alexandru
Vaida-Voievod was the main debating partner of Goga, in his article “Tisza, Mangra and
the Tribune” slamming the youth formation for its political immaturity and lack of vision.
The divorce between the two sides was almost complete and highly visible, in spite of the
fact that Goga’s camp was never more than a fringe organization. The rappro chement
between the two was only realized only in late 1912, with the mediation of Bucharest,
through its representative Constantin Stere. The settlement, known under the designation
104 Octavian Goga, “Ce este Tribuna zilelor noastre?” , 1912 ( the translation belongs to Razvan Paraianu)105 Tara Noastra, nr. 24, 1911
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of the “Stere-Peace”, saw the Steely Youth return to the fold, and the “T ribuna” and
“Romanul” merge.
The conclusion of the debate was twofold. One the one hand, the moderate group
of RNP leaders saw their discourse altered, and pushed toward a further radicalization, in
the columns of the “Romanul”, in an effort to outbid th e opposition. More elements that
fused ethnic nationalism and social radicalism were introduced, gaining access to the
mainstream. Secondly, the symbolic value of Stere’s action was momentous: the
influence and arbitration of the kin state was the supreme authority. The Transylvanian
Romanian no longer looked toward Vienna or Budapest as providers of solutions to their
issues, but toward Bucharest. The weight carried by Bratianu’s opinions and political
options was paramount.
The final landmark that was t o seal the fate of Hungarian -Romanian
reconciliation was the second act of the negotiations between prime minister Istvan Tisza
and the leaders of the RNP. It underlined the incapability of finding common ground,
because of the refusal of the participants to yield or compromise. Upon the return of
Tisza to power, at the head of his National Party of Work, he immediately reactivated his
connections with Ioan Mihu. He favored a policy of appeasement and outlined a future
plan for the gaining of a measure of r ights for the Romanians to Mihu, in their first
meeting, in July the 23 rd in Budapest. Tisza’s main discursive thopos to convince the
Romanians of the necessity of a compromise was the “Slavic and Russian danger 106”. He
also praised the organization of their National Party, and expressed hope that at the
bottom of their hearts, the Romanians wanted to remain within the confines of Dualist
Hungary. Mihu, enthusiastic about the possibility of rapprochement, then contacted
106 Mihu, Spicuiri…, . 139
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Alexandru Vaida-Voievod and Iuliu Maniu , and conveyed Tisza’s proposal to them. Not
surprisingly, the Hungarian minister’s designs produced nothing more than careful
appreciation. The Romanian leaders viewed Tisza, already known for his strong -arming
of the Parliament, as a duplicitous negotiat ing party at best. Nonetheless, in early
September, the RNP committee decided to engage in talks with the leader of the
Hungarian cabinet. The text of a memorandum was drawn up, and presented in the
proceedings. It contained 23 points, at its core being de mands for a degree of political
autonomy ( the right to formally organize into a political party, rather than a
parliamentary club), the introduction of a sizeable suffrage reform, appointment of
Romanian officials in Romanian administrative areas, Church and educational
liberties107. It is easily ascertainable that this was a rather maximalist plan, mirroring the
fact the radicalization of political language the party was going through, and also the lack
of trust it had in the sincerity of the Hungarian auth orities. Tisza, after a preliminary
rebuff of most of the point exposed in the project, presented his point of view to the
Romanian delegation ( Mihali, Maniu, Vaida). The Romanians could have, in his
opinion, a degree of linguistic and cultural autonomy, in the exercise of justice, the field
of education and Church., but nothing more 108. This was the most his conservative
statecraft permitted. Though Mihu continued his work of persuasion, the meetings were
suspended for a period of two years. The parties wer e now at a standoff.
The final episode of the talks was consumed between January 1913 and February
1914. It was to proceed mostly along the lines of the first two attempts, with Maniu and
company presenting a maximalist plan, Tisza refusing to back down and Mihu playing
107 Hitchins, Mit si realitate…, p. 71-72108 Ibidem., p. 74
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the loosing role of mediator 109. Tisza proposed to the Romanian delegation a number of
reasonably satisfactory measures, such as educational autonomy and no further
intervention of the state into ecclesiastic matters. However, the fact that the talks took
place in an atmosphere of semi -secrecy prompted the RNP members to ask for a public
guarantee of the advanced plans 110. This they could not get, since Tisza was afraid of the
reaction from the right wing of the parliament, where the Catholic P eople’s Party and the
right fringe of the Independence Party were quite vocal. The RNP itself was between a
rock and a hard place, catching a considerable amount of flak from the up -and-coming
faction of the Steely Youth. The two camps were therefore put i n a situation where both
wanted to downsize some of their ideological capital, but could not do so, due to the
pressure of the extremes. To engage in possibly compromising negotiations with the
vilified “other” of both nationalist ideologies would have bee n tantamount to political
suicide. It would have robbed both the RNP and Tisza of important amounts of political
legitimacy, and this they could not allow. The negotiations were concluded in early 1914
without any concrete result, or a formal caesurae, to await a more favorable time. A time
that never came, because of the upheavals at the political level.
109 Mihu, Spicuiri…, p. 178110 Hitchins, Mit si realitate…., p. 78
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Conclusions
The Romanian National Party’s activity and ideology, transpiring through its
discourse, in the 1903-1914 period, is part of a greater pattern, observable all throughout
the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. It is a product of the changing political framework, that
opened up for a short period, in connection with the crisis of liberalism that engulfed the
Hungarian society. The established political order that was the maintainer of the Dualist
system, came under heavy fire from both the left and right of the political spectrum.
Traditional liberal nationalism stepped off the pedestal of the leading ideology of
Hungary, making room for new streams of thought, such as ethnic nationalism and civic
radicalism, that vied for supremacy. This was translated into political action with the
dissolution of the Liberal Party, that had become synonymous with the Compromise. This
political and discursive shift, with the sudden multiplication of political languages, gave
an opportunity to nationality parties for participation. It sparked an internal political
debate, between adepts of political passivity and activism; this process is easily
observable not only in the case of Romanians, but in that of Slovaks, Serbs and a host of
other minorities. An important contributor to this internal dispute was the Hungarian fin -
de-siecle intellectual scene, which provided a significant palette of political options and
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discursive tools to be reutilized in the RNP political lexicon. The ferment of the
intellectual background saw the ideologues of the Transylvanian Romanian nationalism
adopt concepts such as the ethnic underpinnings of the nation, and the understanding of
the inherent competition and separation between them. This was taken for granted,
adding to the breakdown of communication between centre and periphery.
As the thesis showed, there were three main internal political options available to
the RNP at the turn of the century. One was to hope change would come from the
emperor, in a form or other of federalism. This carried within it the inherent possibility of
forcible centralization, and bureaucratic -autocratic rule, an option less than palatable for
the middle-class political elite of the RNP. After 1914, and the assassination of the
Archduke Franz Ferdinand, this option was for all thoughts and purposes, dead. The
participatory avenue was another choice, before 1905 many Romanians being convinced
that some sort of compromise could be coerced out of the Hungarian establishment. The
change expected from the Coalition did not happen, and after 1907 -08 it was clear for the
majority of Romanian public opinion that both Tisza and Kossuth’s politicians did not
desire a favorable reconciliation with the nationalities. Instead, the staunch anti -
nationalities stance of the Coalition era, and the subsequent milder attempts by Tisza,
were perceived as being aimed at assimilation. The nationality question was in the
limelight of the political debate after 1906, and remained so until the last days of the
Monarchy. Initially introduced to reorient the attention of the nationalist energies toward
a new goal, it displaced the debate around the Compromise, and monopolized th e
political imaginary of Hungary. It was precisely this phenomena that was responsible for
the alienation of the nationalities. The Hungarian politicians turned their attention toward
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the minorities, and made their suppression their primary goal. This prod uced a high level
of distrust in government in general, and in Hungarian politics, in particular. The third
option open was the rallying to a radical leftist project, such as that offered by Jaszi at an
intellectual level, and by the Socialists and Left In dependists at the political tier. The
problem of the adherence to this generic “second Coalition” of opposition forces, which
had, nonetheless, many backers in the Romanian camp, was twofold. On the one hand, it
offered rights as a means toward integratio n, and also threatened the leaders of the
nationalities from a social perspective ( seeing them as “backward classes”). The other,
more pragmatic side of the coin was that this option only became politically viable at a
time when more attractive perspectiv es were available- late 1918.
The last, less conspicuous alternative was represented by a turn toward the kin
state. Romania and the Ionel Bratianu’s National Liberal Party progressively increased its
political influence over the RNP, formatting its ideo logy. Supplying it with a political and
cultural model, the kin state gradually “Romanianized” the Transylvanian elite. The
aesthetic and cultural models imported from the other side of the Carpathians also carried
a significant amount of weight. At the du al influence of both Hungarian and Romanian
nationalism and aesthetics, the RNP policy turned progressively toward a populist and
ethnicist rhetoric. The initial liberal ideology was displaced by one that favored mass
politics and the rejection of the Dual framework. In 1918, between adherence to a novel
democratic Hungarian system, that offered no trustable guarantees of social and national
rights, and a merge with Greater Romania, the RNP chose the latter. This was a symbolic
act of divorce with the estab lishment of Dualism, in favor of the full realization of the
precepts of the national project.
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The Romanian National Party, in the studied timeframe, can be considered a
typical example of the nationalities response to the political and discursive shift taking
place in the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy after 1900. Faced with the perceived choice of
being assimilated and to assimilate in the future, the intelligentsia of the nationalities
chose the latter. The failure to achieve an equitable rapprochement betw een the
nationalities and the political centers was one of the major factors contributing to the
decay of the framework enacted by Deak and Andrassy through the 1867 Compromise.
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Table of Contents
INTRODUCTION ................................ ................................ ................................ ..2
Chapter one ................................ ................................ ................................ ................................ ................. 10
The Political Crisis of Liberalism in Hungary ................................ ................................ ......................... 10
Factors of Crisis ................................ ................................ ................................ ................................ .......... 10
The political crisis of liberalism in Hungary ................................ ................................ ............................ 13
Consequences and the backdrop of the Constitutional Crisis ................................ ................................ 22
The loss of the crowd ................................ ................................ ................................ ................................ .. 24
The challenge answered: remodeled nationalism ................................ ................................ .................... 26
CHAPTER TWO ................................ ................................ ................................ .31
HUNGARY’S FIN-DE-SIECLE INTELLECTUAL BACKGROUND ANDATMOSPHERE................................ ................................ ................................ ...31
Oszkar Jaszi and the Huszadik Szazad group. ................................ ................................ ........................ 31
The leftist response to the nationality problem ................................ ................................ ........................ 31
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From the Sociological Society to the Civic Radical Party ................................ ................................ ....... 32
New Hungarian Radical Nationalism and Conservatism. ................................ ................................ ....... 42
Ethnic understandings of the nation ................................ ................................ ................................ ......... 42
The Great Austria movement and Aurel C. Popovici ................................ ................................ ............. 49
CHAPTER THREE ................................ ................................ ............................. 58
THE ROMANIAN NATIONAL PARTY 1903-1914 ................................ .............58
Postmemorandism: towards a new ideology ................................ ................................ ............................ 58
The period of participation (1905-1910) ................................ ................................ ................................ ... 68
Conflict and rapprochement................................. ................................ ................................ ..................... 85
Octavian Goga versus Tisza Isvan ................................ ................................ ................................ ........... 85
CONCLUSIONS ................................ ................................ ................................ .92
BIBLIOGRAPHY ................................ ................................ ................................ 96