Republic Act No. 9522 March 10, 2009AN ACT TO AMEND CERTAIN PROVISIONS OFREPUBLIC ACT NO. 3046, AS AMENDED BYREPUBLIC ACT NO. 5446, TO DEFINE THE ARCHIPELAGIC BASELINE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND FOR OTHER PURPOSESBe it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled::Section 1.Section 1 of Republic Act No. 3046, entitled "An Act to Define the Baselines of the Territorial Sea of the Philippines", as amended by Section 1 of Republic Act No. 5446, is hereby amended to read as follows:Section 1. The baselines of the Philippines archipelago are hereby defined and described specifically as follows:Basepoint NumberStation NameLocationWorld Geodetic System of 1984(WGS 84) CoordinatesDistance to next basepoint (M)

Latitude (N)Longitude (E)

1PAB-01Amianan Is.21657.73"1215727.71"70.08

2PAB-02Balintang Is.195738.19"122946.32"99.17

3PAB-04Bigan Pt.181835.30"1222019.07"71.83

4PAB-05ADitolong Pt.17716.30"1223128.34"1.05

5PAB-05BDitolong Pt.17614.79"1223143.84"0.39

6PAB-05Ditolong Pt.17551.31"1223142.66"3.29

7PAB-06Spires Is.17236.91"122313.28"9.74

8PAB-06BDigollorin Pt.165918.03"1222756.61"3.51

9PAB-06CDigollorin Rk.164956.11"1222650.78"2.40

10PAB-07Divimisa Pt.164738.86"122264.40"30.94

11PAB-08Dinoban Pt.161844.33"1221406.69"116.26

12PAB-10ATinaga Is.142954.43"1225751.15"80.29

13PAB-11Horodaba Rk.146.29.91"1241659.21"0.54

14PAB-12Matulin Rk.146.10.40"1241726.28"96.04

15PAB-13Atalaya Pt.12416.37"125353.71"6.79

16PAB-13ABacan Is.123618.41"125850.19"5.52

17PAB-14Finch Rk.1232.33.62"1251259.70"0.80

18PAB-14ACube Rk.1231.57.45"1251332.37"4.90

19PAB-14DNW Manjud Pt.122836.42"1251712.32"1.30

20PAB-15SE Manjud Pt.122737.51"125185.23"7.09

21PAB-16AS Sorz Cay122141.64"125237.41"5.68

22PAB-16BPanablihon121727.17"125270.12"5.21

23PAB-16CAlugon121321.95"1253019.47"1.94

24PAB-16DN Bunga Pt.121148.16"1253130.88"0.54

25PAB-17E Bunga Pt.121120.67"1253148.29"5.71

26PAB-18ASE Tobabao Is.1267.00"1253411.94"83.94

27PAB-19CSuluan Is.104516.70"125588.78"56.28

28PAB-19DN Tuason Pt.94959.58"126106.39"57.44

29PAB-20AArangasa Is.85316.62"1262048.81"40.69

30PAB-21BSanco Pt.81311.53"1262853.25"30.80

31PAB-22Bagoso Is74245.02"1263429.08"12.95

32PAB-22CLanguyan72949.47"1263559.24"0.54

33PAB-23Languyan72916.93"1263559.50"0.76

34PAB-23BLanguyan72830.97"1263557.30"1.2

35PAB-23CN Baculin Pt.72729.42"1263551.31"10.12

36PAB-24Pusan Pt.71719.80"1263618.26"1.14

37PAB-24AS Pusan Pt.71614.43"1263557.20"63.28

38PAB-25BCape San Agustin61714.73"1261214.40"1.28

39PAB-25Cape San Agustin6168.35"1261135.06"67.65

40PAB-26SE Sarangani Is.52334.20"1252842.11"0.43

41PAB-27Pangil Bato Pt.52321.80"1252819.59"3.44

42PAB-28Tapundo Pt.62155.66"1262511.21"3.31

43PAB-29W Calia Pt.52158.48"1252152.03"0.87

44PAB-30Manamil Is.5222.91"1252059.73"1.79

45PAB-31Marampog Pt.52320.18"1251944.29"78.42

46PAB-32Pola Pt.698.44"1241542.81"122.88

47PAB-33AKantuan Is62647.22"12213.34.50"29.44

48PAB-34ATongguil Is.6233.77"1215636.20"2.38

49PAB-35Tongquil Is618.51"1215441.45"1.72

50PAB-35ATongquil Is.6017.88"1216311.17"85.94

51PAB-38AKirapusan Is512.8.70"1204138.14"55.24

52PAB-39Manuk Manka Is.44739.24"1195158.08"43.44

53PAB-40Frances Reef42453.84"1191450.710.61

54PAB-40AFrances Reef4253.83"1191415.15"15.48

55PAB-41ABajapa Reef436"9.01"119322.75"6.88

56PAB-42APaguan Is.44252.07"119144.04"8.40

57PAB-43Alice Reef44555.25"119315.19"2.28

58PAB-44Alice Reef4475.36"119512.94"18.60

59PAB-45Omapoy Rk.45510.45"119221.3023.37

60PAB-46Bukut Lapis Pt.5223.73"1194418.14"44.20

61PAB-47Pearl Bank54635.15"1193951.77"75.17

62PAB-48Bagnan Is.6558.41"1182657.30"8.54

63PAB-48ATaganak Is6414.08"1181833.33"13.46

64PAB-49Great Bakkungaan Is.6114.65"118654.15"3.97

65PAB-50Libiman Is.61339.90"118352.09"5.53

66PAB-51Sibaung Is.61743.99"11805.44"41.60

67PAB-52Muligi Is.65214.53"1182340.49"75.06

68PAB-53South Mangsee Is.73026.05"1171833.75"26.00

69PAB-54Balabac Is.74830.69"1165939.18"6.08

70PAB-54ABalabac Great Reef75127.17"1165417.19"1.18

71PAB-54BBalabac Great Reef75219.86"1165328.73"2.27

72PAB-55Balabac Great Reef75436.35"1165316.64"5.42

73PAB-60Ada Reef820.26"1165410.04"10.85

74PAB.61Secam Is.81118.36"1165951.87"30.88

75PAB-62Latua Pt.88756.37"1171551.23"7.91

76PAB-63SW Tatub Pt.84417.40"1172039.37"11.89

77PAB-63AW Sicud Pt.85332.20"1172815.78"13.20

78PAB-64Tarumpitao Pt.92.57.47"1173738.88"81.12

79PAB.64BDry Is.95922.54"1183653.61"82.76

80PAB-65CSinangcolan Pt.111319.82"1191517.74"74.65

81PAB-67Pinnacle Rk.121935.22"1195056.0093.88

82PAB-68Cabra Is135324.45"12015.86"115.69

83PAB-71Hermana Mayor Is.154843.61"1194656.09"9.30

84PAB-72Tambobo Pt.155761.67"1194455.32"12.06

85PAB-72BRena Pt.16957.90"11945.15.76"0.25

86PAB-73Rena Pt.161012.42"1194511.95"6.43

87PAB-74Rocky Ledge161634.46"1194619.50"0.65

88PAB-74APiedra Pt.163712.70"1194628.62"1.30

89PAB-75Piedra Pt.161829.49"1194644.94"1.04

90PAB-75CPiedra Pt.161928.20"119477.69"0.63

91PAB-75DPiedra Pt.16204.38"1194720.48"80.60

92PAB-76Dile Pt.173424.94"1202033.36"6.86

93PAB-77Pinget Is.174117.56"120212.20"14.15

94PAB-78Baboc Is.17554.13"1202440.56"35.40

95PAB-79Cape Bojeador182932.42"1203342.41"1.77

96PAB-79BBobon183052.88"1203455.35"58.23

97PAB-80Calagangan Pt.191014.78"1211252.64"98.07

98PAB-82Itbayat Is.204315.74"1214657.80"25.63

99PAB-83Amianan Is21717.47"1215643.85"0.08

100PAB-84Amianan Is.21718.41"1215648.79"0.25

101PAB-85Amianan Is.21712.04"121573.65"0.44

Section 2.The baseline in the following areas over which the Philippines likewise exercises sovereignty and jurisdiction shall be determined as "Regime of Islands" under the Republic of the Philippines consistent with Article 121 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS):a) The Kalayaan Island Group as constituted under Presidential Decree No. 1596; andb) Bajo de Masinloc, also known as Scarborough Shoal.Section 3.This Act affirms that the Republic of the Philippines has dominion, sovereignty and jurisdiction over all portions of the national territory as defined in the Constitution and by provisions of applicable laws including, without limitation,Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991, as amended.Section 4.This Act, together with the geographic coordinates and the chart and maps indicating the aforesaid baselines, shall be deposited and registered with the Secretary General of the United Nations.Section 5.The National Mapping and Resource Information Authority (NAMRIA) shall forthwith produce and publish charts and maps of the appropriate scale clearly representing the delineation of basepoints and baselines as set forth in this Act.Section 6.The amount necessary to carry out the provisions of this Act shall be provided in a supplemental budyet or included in the General Appropriations Act of the year of its enactment into law.Section 7.If any portion or provision of this Act is declared unconstitutional or invalid the other portions or provisions hereof which are not affected thereby shall continue to be in full force and effect.Section 8.The provisions of Republic Act No. 3046, as amended by Republic Act No. 5446, and all other laws, decrees, executive orders, rules and issuances inconsistent with this Act are hereby amended or modified accordingly.Section 9.This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days following its publication in theOfficial Gazetteor in any two (2) newspaper of general circulation.

MAGALLONA v. ERMITA, G.R. 187167, August 16, 2011Facts:In 1961, Congress passed R.A. 3046 demarcating the maritime baselines of the Philippines as an Archepelagic State pursuant to UNCLOS I of 9158, codifying the sovereignty of State parties over their territorial sea. Then in 1968, it was amended by R.A. 5446, correcting some errors in R.A. 3046 reserving the drawing of baselines around Sabah.In 2009, it was again amended by R.A. 9522, to be compliant with the UNCLOS III of 1984. The requirements complied with are: to shorten one baseline, to optimize the location of some basepoints and classify KIG and Scarborough Shoal as regime of islands.Petitioner now assails the constitutionality of the law for three main reasons:1. it reduces the Philippine maritime territory under Article 1;2. it opens the countrys waters to innocent and sea lanes passages hence undermining our sovereignty and security; and3. treating KIG and Scarborough as regime of islands would weaken our claim over those territories.Issue: Whether R.A. 9522 is constitutional?Ruling:1. UNCLOS III has nothing to do with acquisition or loss of territory. it is just a codified norm that regulates conduct of States. On the other hand, RA 9522 is a baseline law to mark out basepoints along coasts, serving as geographic starting points to measure. it merely notices the international community of the scope of our maritime space.2. If passages is the issue, domestically, the legislature can enact legislation designating routes within the archipelagic waters to regulate innocent and sea lanes passages. but in the absence of such, international law norms operate.the fact that for archipelagic states, their waters are subject to both passages does not place them in lesser footing vis a vis continental coastal states. Moreover, RIOP is a customary international law, no modern state can invoke its sovereignty to forbid such passage.3. On the KIG issue, RA 9522 merely followed the basepoints mapped by RA 3046 and in fact, it increased the Phils. total maritime space. Moreover, the itself commits the Phils. continues claim of sovereignty and jurisdiction over KIG.If not, it would be a breach to 2 provisions of the UNCLOS III:Art. 47 (3): drawing of basepoints shall not depart to any appreciable extent from the general configuration of the archipelago.Art 47 (2): the length of baselines shall not exceed 100 mm.KIG and SS are far from our baselines, if we draw to include them, well breach the rules: that it should follow the natural configuration of the archipelago.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaTHIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 158290 October 23, 2006HILARION M. HENARES, JR., VICTOR C. AGUSTIN, ALFREDO L. HENARES, DANIEL L. HENARES, ENRIQUE BELO HENARES, and CRISTINA BELO HENARES,petitioners,vs.LAND TRANSPORTATION FRANCHISING AND REGULATORY BOARD and DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS,respondents.QUISUMBING,J.:

FACTS: The petitioners challenged the Supreme Court to issue a writ of mandamus to LTFRB and DOTC to require the public utility vehicles (PUVs) to use the compressed natural gas (CNG) as an alternative fuel instead of gasoline and diesel. The petitioners cite the different statistics and studies from renowned institutions that show the bane of air pollution and related environmental hazards. The petitioners alleged that the particulate matters (PM) have caused detrimental effects on health, productivity and the overall quality of life. This PM constitutes complex mixture of dust, dirt, smoke and liquid droplets composed of harmful elements which are emitted into the air from engine combustions. Studies from the Philippine Environment Monitor in 2002 shows that over 2,000 die prematurely, 9,000 people suffer from chronic bronchitis and 51 million cases of respiratory symptoms in Metro Manila alone. The petitioners proposed the use of CNG to counter the effects. CNG is known to be the cleanest fossil fuel and 90 percent less CO emissions and cuts hydrocarbon emission by half. The petitioners assert their right to clean air as stipulated in Sec. 4 of R. A. 8749 known as Philippine Clean Air Act of 1999 and Sec. 16 Article II of the 1987 Philippine Constitution. The Solicitor General, in his comments for LTFRB and DOTC, said that nothing in the Philippine Clean Air Act prohibits the use of gasoline and diesel by motor vehicle owners, and more sadly, the said act does not include CNG as an alternative fuel. Further, the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) is the agency tasked to set the emission standards for fuel use and tasked to develop an action plan.ISSUE: 1. Whether the petitioners have the personality to bring the petition to the Supreme Court.2. Should mandamus be issued against LTFRB and DOTC to compel PUVs to use CNG as alternative fuel.HELD:Yes, the petitioners have the personality to bring the petition to the Supreme Court as in the case of Oposa vs Factoran. Sec. 16 of Article II of the 1987 Philippine Constitution bestows on the people the right to breathe clean air in a healthy environment. The implementation of this policy is articulated in Sec. 4 of R.A. 8749. As in the decision of the Court in Oposa case, the case is an inter-generational responsibility and for inter-generational justice. The petition focuses on the legal right of the petitioners for their right to clean air. The issue concerned is not only important to the petitioners but also of public concern.On the other issue, mandamus cannot be issued to LTFRB and DOTC because it not within the mandate of the agencies to impose the use of CNG. Their mandate is to oversee that motor vehicles prepare an action plan and implement the emission standards for motor vehicles. The DENR is the agency tasked to set the emission standards, and that the legislature should first provide the specific statutory remedy to the complex problems bared by the petitioners before any judicial recourse by mandamus is taken.DECISION: The petition for the issuance of a writ of mandamus is dismissed for lack of merit.

Oposa vs. Factoran Case Digest (G.R. No. 101083, July 30, 1993)FACTS:The plaintiffs in this case are all minors duly represented and joined by their parents. The first complaint was filed as a taxpayer's class suit at the Branch 66 (Makati, Metro Manila), of the Regional Trial Court, National capital Judicial Region against defendant (respondent) Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Reasources (DENR). Plaintiffs alleged that they are entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is the country's virgin tropical forests. They further asseverate that they represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn and asserted that continued deforestation have caused a distortion and disturbance of the ecological balance and have resulted in a host of environmental tragedies.

Plaintiffs prayed that judgement be rendered ordering the respondent, his agents, representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to cancel all existing Timber License Agreement (TLA) in the country and to cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new TLAs.

Defendant, on the other hand, filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint had no cause of action against him and that it raises a political question.

The RTC Judge sustained the motion to dismiss, further ruling that granting of the relief prayed for would result in the impairment of contracts which is prohibited by the Constitution.

Plaintiffs (petitioners) thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari and asked the court to rescind and set aside the dismissal order on the ground that the respondent RTC Judge gravely abused his discretion in dismissing the action.

ISSUES:

(1) Whether or not the plaintiffs have a cause of action.(2) Whether or not the complaint raises a political issue.(3) Whether or not the original prayer of the plaintiffs result in the impairment of contracts.

RULING:

First Issue: Cause of Action.

Respondents aver that the petitioners failed to allege in their complaint a specific legal right violated by the respondent Secretary for which any relief is provided by law. The Court did not agree with this. The complaint focuses on one fundamental legal right -- the right to a balanced and healthful ecology which is incorporated in Section 16 Article II of the Constitution. The said right carries with it the duty to refrain from impairing the environment and implies, among many other things, the judicious management and conservation of the country's forests. Section 4 of E.O. 192 expressly mandates the DENR to be the primary government agency responsible for the governing and supervising the exploration, utilization, development and conservation of the country's natural resources. The policy declaration of E.O. 192 is also substantially re-stated in Title XIV Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987. Both E.O. 192 and Administrative Code of 1987 have set the objectives which will serve as the bases for policy formation, and have defined the powers and functions of the DENR. Thus, right of the petitioners (and all those they represent) to a balanced and healthful ecology is as clear as DENR's duty to protect and advance the said right.

A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the correlative duty or obligation to respect or protect or respect the same gives rise to a cause of action. Petitioners maintain that the granting of the TLA, which they claim was done with grave abuse of discretion, violated their right to a balance and healthful ecology. Hence, the full protection thereof requires that no further TLAs should be renewed or granted.

After careful examination of the petitioners' complaint, the Court finds it to be adequate enough to show, prima facie, the claimed violation of their rights.

Second Issue: Political Issue.

Second paragraph, Section 1 of Article VIII of the constitution provides for the expanded jurisdiction vested upon the Supreme Court. It allows the Court to rule upon even on the wisdom of the decision of the Executive and Legislature and to declare their acts as invalid for lack or excess of jurisdiction because it is tainted with grave abuse of discretion.

Third Issue: Violation of the non-impairment clause.

The Court held that the Timber License Agreement is an instrument by which the state regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. It is not a contract within the purview of the due process clause thus, the non-impairment clause cannot be invoked. It can be validly withdraw whenever dictated by public interest or public welfare as in this case. The granting of license does not create irrevocable rights, neither is it property or property rights.

Moreover, the constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of obligations of contract is limit by the exercise by the police power of the State, in the interest of public health, safety, moral and general welfare. In short, the non-impairment clause must yield to the police power of the State.

The instant petition, being impressed with merit, is hereby GRANTED and the RTC decision is SET ASIDE.

Cruz vs DENR, G.R. No. 135385, December 6, 2000Isagani Cruz v. Dept. of Energy and Natural Resources,G.R. No. 135385, December 6, 2000

FACTS: Cruz, a noted constitutionalist, assailed the validity of the RA 8371 or the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act on the ground that the law amount to an unlawful deprivation of the States ownership over lands of the public domain as well as minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution. The IPRA law basically enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples over ancestral domains which may include natural resources. Cruz et al content that, by providing for an all-encompassing definition of ancestral domains and ancestral lands which might even include private lands found within said areas, Sections 3(a) and 3(b) of said law violate the rights of private landowners.

ISSUE: Whether or not the IPRA law is unconstitutional.

HELD: The SC deliberated upon the matter. After deliberation they voted and reached a 7-7 vote. They deliberated again and the same result transpired. Since there was no majority vote, Cruzs petition was dismissed and the IPRA law was sustained. Hence, ancestral domains may include natural resources somehow against the regalian doctrine.

LA BUGAL BLAAN TRIBAL ASSOCIATION INC vs RAMOS Case Digest

LA BUGAL BLAAN TRIBAL ASSOCIATION INC., et. al. v. VICTOR O. RAMOS, Secretary Department of Environment and Natural Resources; HORACIO RAMOS, Director, Mines and Geosciences Bureau (MGB-DENR); RUBEN TORRES, Executive Secretary; and WMC (PHILIPPINES) INC.G.R. No. 127882, 27 January 2004, En Banc (Carpio-Morales, J.)The constitutional provision allowing the President to enter into FTAA is a exception to the rule that participation in the nations natural resources is reserved exclusively to Filipinos. Provision must be construed strictly against their enjoyment by non-Filipinos.FACTS:RA 7942 (The Philippine Mining Act) took effect on April 9, 1995. Before the effectivity of RA 7942, or on March 30, 1995, the President signed a Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA) with WMCP, a corporation organized under Philippine laws, covering close to 100,000 hectares of land in South Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Davao del Sur and North Cotabato. On August 15, 1995, the Environment Secretary Victor Ramos issued DENR Administrative Order 95-23, which was later repealed by DENR Administrative Order 96-40, adopted on December 20, 1996.

Petitioners prayed that RA 7942, its implementing rules, and the FTAA between the government and WMCP be declared unconstitutional on ground that they allow fully foreign owned corporations like WMCP to exploit, explore and develop Philippine mineral resources in contravention of Article XII Section 2 paragraphs 2 and 4 of the Charter.In January 2001, WMC - a publicly listed Australian mining and exploration company - sold its whole stake in WMCP to Sagittarius Mines, 60% of which is owned by Filipinos while 40% of which is owned by Indophil Resources, an Australian company. DENR approved the transfer and registration of the FTAA in Sagittarius name but Lepanto Consolidated assailed the same. The latter case is still pending before the Court of Appeals.EO 279, issued by former President Aquino on July 25, 1987, authorizes the DENR to accept, consider and evaluate proposals from foreign owned corporations or foreign investors for contracts or agreements involving wither technical or financial assistance for large scale exploration, development and utilization of minerals which upon appropriate recommendation of the (DENR) Secretary, the President may execute with the foreign proponent. WMCP likewise contended that the annulment of the FTAA would violate a treaty between the Philippines and Australia which provides for the protection of Australian investments.ISSUES:1. Whether or not the Philippine Mining Act is unconstitutional for allowing fully foreign-owned corporations to exploit the Philippine mineral resources.2. Whether or not the FTAA between the government and WMCP is a service contract that permits fully foreign owned companies to exploit the Philippine mineral resources.HELD:

First Issue: RA 7942 is UnconstitutionalRA 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 is unconstitutional for permitting fully foreign owned corporations to exploit the Philippine natural resources.Article XII Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution retained the Regalian Doctrine which states that All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State. The same section also states that, the exploration and development and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the State.Conspicuously absent in Section 2 is the provision in the 1935 and 1973 Constitution authorizing the State to grant licenses, concessions, or leases for the exploration, exploitation, development, or utilization of natural resources. By such omission, the utilization of inalienable lands of the public domain through license, concession or lease is no longer allowed under the 1987 Constitution.Under the concession system, the concessionaire makes a direct equity investment for the purpose of exploiting a particular natural resource within a given area. The concession amounts to complete control by the concessionaire over the countrys natural resource, for it is given exclusive and plenary rights to exploit a particular resource at the point of extraction.The 1987 Constitution, moreover, has deleted the phrase management or other forms of assistance in the 1973 Charter. The present Constitution now allows only technical and financial assistance. The management and the operation of the mining activities by foreign contractors, the primary feature of the service contracts was precisely the evil the drafters of the 1987 Constitution sought to avoid.The constitutional provision allowing the President to enter into FTAAs is an exception to the rule that participation in the nations natural resources is reserved exclusively to Filipinos. Accordingly, such provision must be construed strictly against their enjoyment by non-Filipinos. Therefore, RA 7942 is invalid insofar as the said act authorizes service contracts. Although the statute employs the phrase financial and technical agreements in accordance with the 1987 Constitution, its pertinent provisions actually treat these agreements as service contracts that grant beneficial ownership to foreign contractors contrary to the fundamental law.The underlying assumption in the provisions of the law is that the foreign contractor manages the mineral resources just like the foreign contractor in a service contract. By allowing foreign contractors to manage or operate all the aspects of the mining operation, RA 7942 has, in effect, conveyed beneficial ownership over the nations mineral resources to these contractors, leaving the State with nothing but bare title thereto.The same provisions, whether by design or inadvertence, permit a circumvention of the constitutionally ordained 60-40% capitalization requirement for corporations or associations engaged in the exploitation, development and utilization of Philippine natural resources.When parts of a statute are so mutually dependent and connected as conditions, considerations, inducements or compensations for each other as to warrant a belief that the legislature intended them as a whole, then if some parts are unconstitutional, all provisions that are thus dependent, conditional or connected, must fail with them.Under Article XII Section 2 of the 1987 Charter, foreign owned corporations are limited only to merely technical or financial assistance to the State for large scale exploration, development and utilization of minerals, petroleum and other mineral oils.

Second Issue:RP Government-WMCP FTAA is a Service ContractThe FTAA between he WMCP and the Philippine government is likewise unconstitutional since the agreement itself is a service contract.Section 1.3 of the FTAA grants WMCP a fully foreign owned corporation, the exclusive right to explore, exploit, utilize and dispose of all minerals and by-products that may be produced from the contract area. Section 1.2 of the same agreement provides that EMCP shall provide all financing, technology, management, and personnel necessary for the Mining Operations.These contractual stipulations and related provisions in the FTAA taken together, grant WMCP beneficial ownership over natural resources that properly belong to the State and are intended for the benefit of its citizens. These stipulations are abhorrent to the 1987 Constitution. They are precisely the vices that the fundamental law seeks to avoid, the evils that it aims to suppress. Consequently, the contract from which they spring must be struck down.

Miners Association of the Philippines v. Factoran, Case DigestG.R. No. 98332 January 16, 1995

Facts :

Former President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order Nos 211 and 279 in the exercise of her legislative powers. EO No. 211 prescribes the interim procedures in the processing and approval of applications for the exploration, development and utilization of minerals pursuant to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. EO No. 279 authorizes the DENR Secretary to negotiate and conclude joint-venture, co-production, or production- sharing agreements for the exploration, development, and utilization of mineral resources.

The issuance and the impeding implementation by the DENR of Administrative Order Nos. 57 which declares that all existing mining leases or agreements which were granted after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitutionshall be converted into production-sharing agreements within one (1) year from the effectivity of these guidelines. and Administrative Order No. 82 which provides that a failure to submit Letter of Intent and Mineral Production-Sharing Agreement within 2 years from the effectivity of the Department Administrative Order No. 57 shall cause the abandonment of the mining, quarry, and sand and gravel claims, after their respective effectivity dates compelled the Miners Association of the Philippines, Inc., an organization composed of mining prospectors and claim owners and claim holders, to file the instant petition assailing their validity and constitutionality before this Court.Issue :Are the two Department Administrative Orders valid?Ruling :Yes. Petitioner's insistence on the application of Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, as the governing law on the acceptance and approval of declarations of location and all other kinds of applications for the exploration, development, and utilization of mineral resources pursuant to Executive Order No. 211, is erroneous. Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, pertains to the old system of exploration, development and utilization of natural resources through "license, concession or lease" which, however, has been disallowed by Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. By virtue of the said constitutional mandate and its implementing law, Executive Order No. 279 which superseded Executive Order No. 211, the provisions dealing on "license, concession or lease" of mineral resources under Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, and other existing mining laws are deemed repealed and, therefore, ceased to operate as the governing law. In other words, in all other areas of administration and management of mineral lands, the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, and other existing mining laws, still govern. Section 7 of Executive Order No. 279 provides, thus:Sec. 7. All provisions of Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, other existing mining laws, and their implementing rules and regulations, or parts thereof, which are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Executive Order, shall continue in force and effect.

Well -settled is the rule, however, that regardless of the reservation clause, mining leases or agreements granted by the State, such as those granted pursuant to Executive Order No. 211 referred to this petition, are subject to alterations through a reasonable exercise of the police power of the State.Accordingly, the State, in the exercise of its police power in this regard, may not be precluded by the constitutional restriction on non-impairment of contract from altering, modifying and amending the mining leases or agreements granted under Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, pursuant to Executive Order No. 211. Police Power, being co-extensive with the necessities of the case and the demands of public interest; extends to all the vital public needs. The passage of Executive Order No. 279 which superseded Executive Order No. 211 provided legal basis for the DENR Secretary to carry into effect the mandate of Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

HON. HEHERSON T. ALVAREZ v. PICOP RESOURCES, INC.G.R. No. 162243, December 3, 2009Chico-Nazario, J.:Doctrine: A timber license is not a contract within the purview of the non-impairment clause.

Facts:PICOP filed with the DENR an application to have its Timber License Agreement (TLA) No. 43converted into an IFMA.PICOP filed before the (RTC) City a Petition for Mandamusagainst then DENR Sec Alvarez for unlawfully refusing and/or neglecting to sign and execute the IFMA contract of PICOP even as thelatter has complied with all the legal requirements for the automatic conversion of TLA No. 43, asamended, into an IFMA.The cause of action of PICOP Resources, Inc. (PICOP) in its Petition for Mandamus with the trialcourt is clear: the government is bound by contract, a 1969 Document signed by then PresidentFerdinand Marcos, to enter into an Integrated Forest Management Agreement (IFMA) with PICOP.Issue:Whether the 1969 Document is a contract recognized under the non-impairment clause by which thegovernment may be bound (for the issuance of the IFMA)Held:NO. Our definitive ruling in Oposa v. Factoran that a timber license is not a contract within the purviewof the non-impairment clause is edifying. We declared: Needless to say, all licenses may thus berevoked or rescinded by executive action. It is not a contract, property or a property right protected bythe due process clause of the Constitution. Since timber licenses are not contracts, the non-impairment clause, which reads: "SEC. 10. No lawimpairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed." cannot be invoked.The Presidential Warranty cannot, in any manner, be construed as a contractual undertaking assuringPICOP of exclusive possession and enjoyment of its concession areas. Such an interpretation wouldresult in the complete abdication by the State in favor of PICOP of the sovereign power to control andsupervise the exploration, development and utilization of the natural resources in the area.

Republic v. Pagadian City Timber]

License agreements arenot contracts within the purview of the due process and thenon-impairment of contracts clauses enshrined in theConstitution.A timber license is not a contract withinthe purview of the dueprocess clause it is only a license or a privilege, which can bevalidly withdrawnwhenever dictated by public interest or publicwelfare.

Republic v. PagadianFacts:

The Republic of the Philippines, through the DENR, executed an Industrial Forest Management Agreement (IFMA), with Pagadian City Timber, for the former to develop, utilize, and manage a specified forest area covering 1,999.14 hectares located in Barangays Langapod, Cogonan, and Datagan, Municipality of Labangan, Zamboanga del Sur, for the production of timber and other forest products subject to a production-sharing scheme.The Pagadiansrequired Comprehensive Development and Management Plan (CDMP) wasapproved by the DENR. But, the Subanen Tribe complained that respondents failed to implement the CDMP,disrespected their rights as indigenous people and employed armed men. This prompted DENR to issue anorder creating a regional team to evaluate and assess the IFMA. The DENR requested for a representative of Pagadian to appear before them, upon compliance with which, a conference was held between the parties andthey found inventoried various equipment, seedlings, infrastructures, etc. and found that the area coveredwas beyond that stipulated in the IFMA. An evaluation team was dispatched to the area concerned forinspection and assessment, in the presence of the IFMA holder, representatives, laborers and other personnelon the area. In the conduct of the same, the team found that the mango seedlings are not satisfactory and theyhad failed to develop the area. Finally, the team conducted an exit conference with the CENR Officer, and theIFMA holder where the tentative and general findings of the evaluation and assessment was laid-out andpresented to the body. On the basis of their findings, the team required Pagadian to explain why they failed tocomply with the CDMP. But, because of the influx of more complaints from the locals, DENR issued notice of cancellation to Pagadian because of their failure to comply with the agreement. This was objected to byrespondent and appeal was made to the Office of the President. The order of cancellation was affirmed by theOP, but was reversed by the CA.

Issues:

W/N the IFMA is a privilege granted by the State, which may be revoked without violating the non-impairment clause.

Held:Yes. The IFMA is a timber license, and as such, the non-impairment clause may not be invoked in thepresent case. Timber licenses, permits and license agreements are the principal instruments by which theState regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted.And it can hardly be gainsaid that they merely evidence a privilege granted by the State to qualified entities,and do not vest in the latter a permanent or irrevocable right to the particular concession area and the forest products therein. They may be validly amended, modified, replaced or rescinded by the Chief Executive whennational interests so require. Thus, they are not deemed contracts within the purview of the due process of law clause. Even assuming arguendo that an IFMA can be considered a contract or an agreement, we agreewith the Office of the Solicitor General that the alleged property rights that may have arisen from it are not absolute. All Filipino citizens are entitled, by right, to a balanced and healthful ecology as declared underSection 16,[29] Article II of the Constitution. This right carries with it the correlative duty to refrain fromimpairing the environment, particularly our diminishing forest resources. To uphold and protect this right isan express policy of the State.The DENR is the instrumentality of the State mandated to actualize this policy. It is "the primary government agency responsible for the conservation, management, development and properuse of the country's environment and natural resources, including those in reservation and watershed areas,and lands of the public domain, as well as the licensing and regulation of all natural resources as may beprovided for by law in order to ensure equitable sharing of the benefits derived therefrom for the welfare of the present and future generations of Filipinos." Thus, private rights must yield when they come in conflict with this public policy and common interest. They must give way to the police or regulatory power of theState, in this case through the DENR, to ensure that the terms and conditions of existing laws, rules andregulations, and the IFMA itself are strictly and faithfully complied with. The CA decision is reversed and set aside, and the decision of the Office of the President is reinstated.

Apex Mining Co., Inc. v. Southeast Mindanao Gold Mining Corp. (2006) Facts:The case involves the Diwalwal Gold Rush Area (Diwalwal), a rich tract of mineral landlocated inside the Agusan-Davao-Surigao Forest Reserve in Davao del Norte and Davao Oriental. Sincethe early 1980s, Diwalwal has been stormed by conflicts brought about by numerous mining claims over it.On March 10, 1986, Marcopper Mining Corporation (MMC) was granted an Exploration Permit(EP 133) by the Bureau of Mines and Geo-Sciences (BMG). A long battle ensued between Apex andMMC with the latter seeking the cancellation of the mining claims of Apex on the ground that suchmining claims were within a forest reservation (Agusan-Davao-Surigao Forest Reserve) and thus theacquisition on mining rights should have been through an application for a permit to prospect with theBFD and not through registration of a DOL with the BMG. When it reached the SC in 1991, the Courtruled against Apex holding that the area is a forest reserve and thus it should have applied for a permit to prospect with the BFD.On February 16 1994, MMC assigned all its rights to EP 133 to Southeast Mindanao GoldMining Corporation (SEM), a domestic corporation which is alleged to be a 100%-owned subsidiary of MMC. Subsequently, BMG registered SEMs Mineral Production Sharing Agreement (MPSA)application and the Deed of Assignment. Several oppositions were filed. The Panel of Arbitrators created by the DENR upheld the validity of EP 133.During the pendency of the case, DENR AO No. 2002-18 was issued declaring anemergency situation in the Diwalwal Gold Rush Area and ordering the stoppage of all miningoperations therein.Issues:1. W/N EP 133 and its subsequent transfer to SEM is valid.2. W/N the DENR Secretary has authority to issue DAO 66 declaring 729 hectares of the areascovered by the Agusan-Davao-Surigao Forest Reserve as non-forest lands and open to small-scale mining purposes.3. Who (among petitioners Apex and Balite) has priority right over Diwalwal?Held/Ratio:1. INVALID. One of the terms and conditions of EP 133 is: That this permit shall be for theexclusive use and benefit of the permittee or his duly authorized agents and shall be used for mineral exploration purposes only and for no other purpose. While it may be true that SEM is a100% subsidiary corporation of MMC, there is no showing that the former is the duly authorizedagent of the latter. As such, the assignment is null and void as it directly contravenes the term sand conditions of the grant of EP 133.a.The Deed of Assignment was a total abdication of MMCs rights over the permit.It is not amere grant of authority to SEM as agent. b. Reason for the stipulation.Exploration permits are strictly granted to entities or individuals possessing the resources and capability to undertake mining operations. Without such acondition, non-qualified entities or individuals could circumvent the strict requirementsunder the law by the simple expediency of acquiring the permit from the original permittee.c. Separate personality.The fact that SEM is a 100% subsidiary of MMC does notautomatically make it an agent of MMC. A corporation is an artificial being invested by lawwith a personality separate and distinct from persons composing it as well as from that of anyother legal entity to which it may be related. Absent any clear proof to the contrary, SEM is aseparate and distinct entity from MMC.d.Doctrine of piercing the corporate veil inapplicable.Only in cases where the corporatefiction was used as a shield for fraud, illegality or inequity may the veil be pierced andremoved. The doctrine of piercing the corporate veil cannot therefore be used as a vehicle tocommit prohibited acts. The assignment of the permit in favor of SEM is utilized tocircumvent the condition of nontransferability of the exploration permit. To allow SEM toavail itself of this doctrine and to approve the validity of the assignment is tantamount tosanctioning an illegal act which is what the doctrine precisely seeks to forestall.e. PD 463 requires approval of Secretary of DENR.Also, PD 463 (Mineral ResourcesDevelopment Decree), which is the governing law when the assignment was executed,explicitly requires that the transfer or assignment of mining rights, including the right toexplore a mining area, must be with the prior approval of the Secretary of DENR. Such is not present in this case.f. EP 133 expired by non-renewal.Although EP 133 was extended for 12 months until July 6,1994, MMC never renewed its permit prior and after its expiration.With the expiration of EP 133 on July 6, 1994, MMC lost any right to the Diwalwal Gold RushArea. SEM, on the other hand, has not acquired any right to the said area because the transfer of EP 133 in its favor is invalid. Hence, both MMC and SEM have not acquired any vested rightover the area covered by EP 133.2. NO. The DENR Secretary has no power to convert forest reserves into non-forest reserves. Such power is vested with the President. The DENR Secretary may only recommend to the Presidentwhich forest reservations are to be withdrawn from the coverage thereof. Thus, DAO No. 66 isnull and void for having been issued in excess of the DENR Secretarys authority.3. (Since its been held that neither MMC nor SEM has any right over Diwalwal, it is thusnecessary to make a Determination of the existing right of the remaining claimants, petitioners Apex and Balite, in the dispute.) The issue on who has priority right over Diwalwal is deemedovertaken by the issuance of Proclamation 297 and DAO No. 2002-18, both beingconstitutionally-sanctioned acts of the Executive Branch. Mining operations in the DiwalwalMineral Reservation are now, therefore, within the full control of the State through theexecutive branch.Pursuant to Sec. 5 of RA 7942, the State can either: (1) directly undertake the exploration, development and utilization of the area or (2) opt to award mining operations in the mineral reservation to private entities including petitioners Apex and Balite, if it wishes. The exercise of this prerogative lies with the Executive Department over which courts will not interfere.

Republic vs NaguiatNatural Resources and Environmental Laws

G.R. No. 134209; January 24, 2006

FACTS:Celestina Naguiat filed an application for registration of title to four parcels of land located in Panan, Botolan, Zambales. The applicant alleges that she is the owner of the said parcels of land having acquired them by purchase from its previous owners and their predecessors-in-interest who have been in possession thereof for more than thirty (30) years; and that to the best of her knowledge, said lots suffer no mortgage or encumbrance of whatever kind nor is there any person having any interest, legal or equitable, or in possession thereof. Petitioner Republic opposed on the ground that neither the applicant nor her predecessors-in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the lands in question since 12 June 1945 or prior thereto, considering the fact that she has not established that the lands in question have been declassified from forest or timber zone to alienable and disposable property.

ISSUE:Did the areas in question cease to have the status of forest or other inalienable lands of the public domain?

HELD:No, the said areas are still classified as forest land.The issue of whether or not respondent and her predecessors-in-interest have been in open, exclusive and continuous possession of the parcels of land in question is of little moment. For, unclassified land cannot be acquired by adverse occupation or possession; occupation thereof in the concept of owner, however long, cannot ripen into private ownership and be registered as title.A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such classification simply because loggers or settlers have stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land may actually be covered with grass or planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers. "Forest lands" do not have to be on mountains or in out of the way places. The classification is merely descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like.

CHEESMAN V. IACShort summary: American married to a Filipina. Filipina wife sold land and house on it, initially w/o protest from American husband, but later contesting it, raising that the sale was made w/o his knowledge and consent. Court held that since he is an alien who is prohibitted from owning land in RP, he cannot claim that he has a share in the conjugal property and thus, has no legal standing to void the sale.Facts:-Thomas Cheesman (American) and Criselda (Filipino) were married in 1970, got separated in 1981-Before they got separated, Criselda was able to purchase a land. Although aware of the sale and the fact that the property was only in the name of his wife, Thomas never objected to the said transaction-tax declarations where issued in the name of Criselda-Criselda exercised exclusive management over the property-In 1981 (ooohkaya), Criselda sold the property. Thomas now complains-Thomas filed for ANNULMENT OF THE SALE: Sale executed w/o his knowledge and consentDefense:Property was paraphernalThomas is American, disqualified to own or have any interest in real propertiesThe buyer was a buyer in GFTC1: sale VOID (for Thomas)-the buyer filed PETITION FOR RELIEF: there was fraud, mistake or excusable negligence, seriously impairing her right to present her case adequatelyGranted by TCSummary judgment:Property was Criselda's paraphernal propertyPresumption that all properties acquired during the marriage belongs exclusively to the conjugal partnership DOES NOT APPLY because Thomas, an American Citizen, is disqualified under Consti to acquire and own real propertiesWON Thomas can contest the validity of the Contract? NO3 factual matters affirmed by both TC and CA:(1) there was fraud, mistake or excusable negligence w/c seriously impaired the rights of the buyer(2) the property was bought by Criselda using the funds she had saved previous to the marriage(3) Criselda was the sole owner of the propertyArt XIV, Section 14, 1973 ConstitutionSave in cases of hereditary succession, no private land shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of public domain-Thomas had no capacity or personality to question the subsequent sale of the property by his wife on the theory that by doing so he is merely exercising the prerogative of a husband in respect of conjugal propertyThomas and Criselda have no conjugal property-or else Consti violated: not only would he have interest over the land, he would have a decisive vote as to its transfer or disposition as well-SC didn't discuss WON Thomas could recover from his wife if ever the funds used in buying the land was not Criselda's but their shared moneySince the buyer is a buyer in GF (she was led by Thomas to believe that the property was indeed Criselda's and not their conjugal property), she would be protected