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Naval Operations in the South Channel of Corcyra 435-433 B. C.Author(s): N. G. L. HammondSource: The Journal of Hellenic Studies, Vol. 65 (1945), pp. 26-37Published by: Society for the Promotion of Hellenic StudiesStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/626337Accessed: 07-12-2015 20:00 UTC
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NAVAL
OPERATIONS
IN
THE SOUTH
CHANNEL
OF CORCYRA
435-433
B.C.
[PLATES
I-III]
SUCH
attention as the battle of
Sybota
has received
has resulted rather
in criticism
of
Thucydides
than
in
clarification
of the
battle;
yet,
as the
greatest
naval battle between
Greek
and Greek before the
Peloponnesian
War,
it
is of some
interest to the naval historian.
My
attempt
to
reconstruct
the battle
is based on the belief
that
Thucydides'
account is
accurate,
though
cursory
in
some
respects,
and contains
enough
topographical
clues for
my purpose.
In
interpreting
these clues I
have drawn
upon
the results
of
travels in
Epirus,
which I
hope
to
publish
elsewhere;
the
relevant data
are adduced
here in brief.
The
paper
falls into
two
parts,
a
topographical
introduction and the
study
of
Thucydides'
narrative.'
I.
TOPOGRAPHY
OF
THE
SOUTH
CHANNEL
The South
Channel
of
Corfu is
contained
between the
almost
parallel
coasts
of
Corfu and
Epirus.
The Corfu
coast
between
Cape
Lefkimo
and
Cape
Bianco
is
low-lying
with
sandy
beach and
shallow water
inshore;
but
south of
St.
Theodoro
Point
sunken
rocks
make
approach
dangerous, especially
off
Cape
Bianco,
where
the Bianco
Shoal
stretches
both
south
and
east
into
the
Channel.
Thus in
modern
times
the
only
area
suitable
for
beaching
is
between
Cape
Lefkimo
and St.
Theodoro
Point.
There is
no evidence
of
any
general
change
since
antiquity
in
the
coastline
or
sea-level;
2
and
as this
coast
is
sheltered
from
.heavy
seas
the
extent
of
the Bianco
Shoal and
the
sunken rocks
is
likely
to
have
been
more
or less
constant.
The
stretch
of
coast between
Cape
Lefkimo and St.
Theodoro Point
is
alluvial and
may
there-
fore have encroached
slightly
on the sea since
antiquity.
The
Cape
Leukimme of
Thucydides
should
be
identified
with
Cape
Lefkimo;
apart
from
the
persistence
of
the
ancient
name,
it
alone
affords
the
beaching
facilities
required
for a
naval
base.3
The
Epirus
coast
between
Hieronisi
and
the
mouth of
the
Paramythia
stream
is
mainly
precipitous
with
deep
water
inshore;
there is no
reason to
suppose
that
there
has been
any
change
since
antiquity.
The
best
anchorage
in
the
Channel
is
Port
Mourzo,
where
Leake
lay
in
a
Russian
brig
of war in
May,
18o6;
sheltered
by
the
Sivota
islands
and with
shallow
water
inshore,
it
is
probably
suitable for
beaching
(the
Mediterranean
ilot is
silent on this
point
and I
have not
visited
the
port).
To
the
south there
are two
bays
with
shelving,
sandy
beaches,
Arilla
Bay
and
that at the
mouth of
the
Paramythia
stream,
and
between
them
a
small
bight,
Stavrolimeno;
the two
bays,
which I
have
visited,
are
suitable
for
beaching.
The
silt
deposited
by the Paramythia stream may have diminished the anchorage at its mouth, but only to a
small
extent
since
ancient
times.
This
group
of
anchorages,
being
exposed
to the
west,
is
secondary
to
Port
Mourzo.
Within
the
Channel
the
Sivota
group
of
islands marks
the
narrowest
part
of the
Channel;
between
the
two main
islands
there
is an
anchorage
which
may
be
entered
only
from
the
north,
a reef
barring
the
southern
entry.
The
islands
are
rocky
and
covered
with
thick
scrub.
With
the
possible
exception
of
the
Sivota
islands,
there
is
water
close
to the
above
anchorages.
The
identification
of
the
ancient
Sybota
islands
with
the Sivota
group
is
certain;
and
'mainland
Sybota'
should
be
identified
with Port
1
am
indebted to
Professor
Adcock
for
his
help
and
criticism.
2
J.
Partsch,
Die
Insel
Korfu,
Petermanns
Mitteilungen
Erganzungsband, xix. (1887), p. 39
and
43, with geo-
logical
map.
3
This
accords with
Strabo
vii.
7, 5, who,
describing
the
coast
from
north
to
south,
mentions
Buthrotum
and then
the
Sybota
islands
Kcrr&
-r6
4ov
&KpOV
ris
KopKVpaias
rilv
AEvKi~IPAt
KEIrEvat;
sailing
south
one
sights
Cape
Lefkimo
and not
Cape
Bianco.
The
latter
should be
identified
with Ptolemy's Cape Amphipagos, cf. Leake, Travels
in
North Greece
(1835)
I
94,
rather
than
Gomme,
Historical
Commentary
on
Thucydides
(i945)
183
n.
I,
who
places
it on the
west
coast of
Corcyra.
26
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3/16
NAVAL
OPERATIONS
IN
THE
SOUTH CHANNEL
OF CORCYRA
27
Mourzo,
being
immediately adjacent
to
the
islands
and also
affording
the best
anchorage
in
the Channel.4
On
the
southern
approaches
to the
Channel the
Paxos
group
has
good
anchorage
at
Port
Gayo.
Three
miles
off
the
port
the
Madonna Shoal
is
dangerous,
being
sometimes
dry
but usually submerged. According to the MediterraneanPilot III 131
'
preference
should
be
given
to the
passage
eastward
of the Madonna Shoal
and in a
sailing
ship
the
mainland
should
be
kept
aboard
particularly
towards
sunset,
as
at
night
the wind is almost certain to
be
off
the
land;
the current
also sets
to the northward
along
this coast.'
The
Epirus
coast
south
of
Paramythia
stream
falls
away
towards
the
east,
running
almost
due east between
Parga
and
Agios
Ioannes,
and
then resumes
its
general
S.S.E.
direction. Between
Paramythia
stream
and
Parga
the
coast
is
precipitous
and
forbidding, rising
like a wall as one sails close
inshore.
In
this
stretch
there
is no salient
promontory;
Cape
Varlam
appears
on the
Admiralty
chart,
for which
Leake
gives
a
variant
name
Formajo,
and
Cape Trophale
is added
by
the
Greek
Staff
map.
Yet
in
itself
this
stretch
of coast
is a salient feature
in
entering
the
South
Channel;
here the
mainland
closes
in to form the
Channel,
and
the
high
point
499
m. between the
two
capes
affords
a landfall
to the
voyager
from the south.
It is also
dangerous
for small
vessels,
being
exposed
to
rough
seas
from
the west
through
the
gap
between
Paxos and Corfu
and
to
the
dangerous
north wind
of
the
Corfu Channel.
The
anchorages
of
Parga,
Agios
Ioannes
and
Splantza
lie off the
main
route to the
Channel
(cf.
Plate
I
and
IIIa).
Of these
Parga
is
the
best,
although open
to the south
except
for
a small beach
in
the north-west
corner;
Splantza,
also
known
as
Phanari,
is difficult
of
egress
against
a west
wind;
Agios
Ioannes,
remote
in
its
angle
of
the
coast,
affords safe
anchorage
in
stormy
weather,
but the
coast
is
rocky
and
steep-
to.
Parga
and
Splantza
are suitable for
beaching
triremes,
but
Agios
loannes is
not;
all
three have facilities
for
watering.5
On
the
Epirus
coast the
only large
site lies
just
south
of
the
Paramythia
stream.
The
acropolis,
which is
half-an-hour's distance
from
the
bay,
is defended
by
a
strong
ring-wall
enclosing
some
130o,ooo
square
metres;
a
single
long
wall extends
down the
slope
towards
the
bay,
and this
slope
is covered with
many
ancient
building
remains;
beside the
bay
there are
remains of
an
ashlar
tower
and a
polygonal
wall,
and the
modern
chapel
of
Agia
Maria rests
on
ancient foundations.
By
analogy
with
other sites
in
Epirus
I
consider
this
site,
named
Vemokastro
on
the
Greek
Staff
map,
to
have
been
a
major
town
in Hellenistic
times;
and
doubtless it controlled the
bays
of
Arilla and
the
Paramythia
stream
(cf.
Plate
IIIb).
On
the cliff
at the southern side
of the
bay
of
Splantza
there
are
the
remains of a small
fort,
some
150
m.
long
by
40
m.
wide,
and
an
-abundance
of coarse
pottery
sherds;
this
fort
evidently
controlled the
port
of
Splantza
in Hellenistic
times,
but
it
numbered
few inhabitants.
The
swamps,
which
cut
off
Splantza
from the
hinterland,
must have contributed
then
as
now
to its
lack of
importance. Agios Ioannes
possesses
neither ancient nor
modern
remains;
at
Parga
some
antiquities
of the Roman
period
have
been
found,
and the remains
of
an
ancient
quay
in the north-west corner of the bay probably belong to that period. While Port Mourzo has
no
ancient
remains,
there is a Hellenistic
acropolis
in
the hills behind
near
Koutsi;
smaller
in
extent than
that
of
Vemokastro,
it
represents
a
small
town,
which
would be
served
on
the
coast
by
Port Mourzo.
The
distribution
of
Hellenistic
sites shows Vemokastro
playing
the
r6le
of the
modern
Parga;
that is to
say,
Vemokastro
was
the
main coastal
town and
port
on
the
routes
between
Preveza and
Corfu,
and also served the
rich
hinterland of the Acheron
valley.
The reason
in
Hellenistic times for
preferring
Vemokastro to
Parga,
which
has
held
undisputed
sway
since
Roman
times,
cannot
be found in the nature of its
territory
or
in
overland
routes;
both
possess
fertile land and
olive
groves,
and there is little to choose between the
routes
from
them
into the
4
Thuc.
I.
50,
3,
og-rt
8
Tr
Xipora tris
OEEWrpcoTri8o
Apv
'pip.os; 52,
I;
and 54, I,
iv
"ro s
'v
-T
1TrEipct)
Vup36ro1s.
Later authors
mention
only
the
islands
Sybota,
under
which the
anchorages
both
west
and
east
of St.
Nicolas
Isle
may
have been
comprised.
When
Leake
lay
at
Port
Mourzo,
it was uninhabited.
Thuc.
III.
76:
Alcidas anchored at mainland Sybota; he was then free
to
choose the
best
anchorage
in the
Channel.
5
Insets of
these harbours
will be
found
in
Admiralty
Chart
206
(1912).
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4/16
28
N. G.
L. HAMMOND
hinterland
plains.
The
reason must be
sought
in
considerations
of coastal trade. If such
trade
looks
south
towards
Preveza
(near
the
site
of Roman
Nicopolis)
then
Parga
is the natural
port
for
this
part
of
Epirus;
if
it
looks north
towards
Corcyra,
Vemokastro
and Mourzo are
the
natural
ports,
and
they
have the
great
advantage
over
Parga
that
they
lie north
of the
dangerous
coast
on
either
side of
Cape
Varlam.
In
regard
to
the
main trade route from Greece to
Italy,
Vemokastro
lies on
that
route,
whereas
Parga
lies off
it;
but Hellenistic
Epirus
would be
con-
cerned
more
with local trade
routes than the
main trade route. If Vemokastro had
this
importance
in
Hellenistic
times,
it
may
be
assumed
to
have
been
preferred
to
Parga
in the
fifth
century
B.c.,
when
Corcyra's
supremacy
in
trade
led
her to
dispute
the naval
supremacy
of
the
north-west route.
At
that time
Vemokastro
deserved
the
description
given
in
1819
to
Parga-
'the
Ear
and
Eye
of Corfu'
6;
Plate
IIa
and b
give
the views from Vemokastro and
Plate
IIIa
shows the
coast
from
Splantza
to
Cape Trophale.
In
describing
the
topography
of the
operations
of
435
to
433
B.c.,
Thucydides
could
draw
upon
the evidence
of
eye-witnesses
of the
operations
and
upon
the
general
knowledge
of mariners
who
used
the
north-west route
to the
Adriatic,
Italy
and
Sicily,
the latter
being
summarised
in
the nautical
handbooks
or
Periegeseis
of
the
time;
in either case the
description
was
given
from the
viewpoint
of the
sailor.
In
434
B.C.,
the
Corinthians established
posts
for
naval
and land
forces,
Trri
AK-rTq
Kcid
TrEpirT
XEiJptov Trs eEOwrrpcoTirG0,
n order
to
protect
Leucas
and other
friendly
states
from
raids
by
the
Corcyraean
squadrons;
the
Corcyraeans
encamped
'
opposite'
with
naval
and land
forces
at
Cape
Leukimme
(I.
3o, 3-4).7
The
post
at Actium could
check raids on
Ambracia
Anactorion
and
Leucas
or
further
south;
that
at
Cheimerion
opposite Cape
Leukimme must
have been
intended to
report
Corcyraean
move-
ments
through
the
Channel and
to harass
Corcyraean
raiders either
sailing
thence
or
returning.
The
stretch
of
coast'
opposite
'
Corcyra
is
that
between Hieronisi
and
Cape
Varlam,
for
further
south
one
loses
sight
of
Corcyra;
-rT
XEIpipov
riqS
OEaTrpC0orios
hould
then
be
found
on
this
stretch of
coast,
and
it should be
noted
that
Thucydides' phrase
suggests
an
area
rather
than
a
place
such
as Actium.
In
433
B.C. the
Corinthian fleet
sailing
from Leucas
made
land
on the mainland
'opposite' Corcyra
and
came to anchor at Cheimerion in
Thesprotis
8;
here too
Cheimerion
must
be
placed
north
of
Cape
Varlam
and,
since
the
Corcyraeans
occupy
the
Sybota
islands,
south
of
Port
Mourzo.
At
this
point Thucydides
introduces
a
digression:
E"rl
-T
Axi'rv, Kcii -rr6AIT5
rrEp
iTroO
KEiTral Tro60ahdxAU&q
V
rTi 'EAcxTaTribi
fs
EaTrpcoTi'O
'E)prl"
~iria
6i
~rcap' Mc-riv
'AXEPouciVa
iliv
iES
e6?aacaav*
"
6E
ri
S
?Espcp-oriboS 'AXipcov
roTrcqaps ov EapdAAElMt
E
cravIvTv,
xc'
oJ
KCi T-TiV
TrCAV4dicV
EXE1"
aEE
KCi
dU
ai
T00 raorc~6o,
6picoV
sV
EEoTrpco'risba
KCi
KE-rpivIv,
Cv
EVTb
)
l
QKpc QV(XEi
T6
XEiptIov. oi p~v
i0v
Kopivio TrT
i0TrrEfpoU
EVTaJOaC
6pli30vCTai
TE
KCi
CrTp(T6TrEovTOriaV-VTo.
(I.
46,
4-5).
This
passage
shows that there
was
a
Cape
Cheimerion between the
mouths
of
the rivers
Thyamis
and
Acheron,
and
also a
harbour
of
the same name
which was inhabited.9 The
identification of
Cape
Cheimerion with
Cape
Varlam admits of little doubt; the description of its position between the two river-mouths is
clearly
that of the
mariner,
who
changes
course
at
Cape
Varlam
where the Corfu Channel is
lost
to
sight
and Port
Splantza
comes into
view;
the fact that it
is some
seven miles closer to
the
mouth
of
the
Thyamis
is
immaterial,
as
Thucydides
is
not
giving precise
measurements.
Moreover this
identification
explains
the
landfall
of the Corinthian
fleet
(I. 46, 3),
which
would be
guided
to
the coast
opposite Corcyra
by
the
high point 499
m.
above
Cape
Varlam.
The
port
Cheimerion
should be close
to the
Cape
Cheimerion and
'
opposite
Corcyra,'
that is
6
C.
P.
de
Bosset,
Proceedings
n
Parga
(1819),
46.
S'AvTEcTrpaTO-TE8EjovTSo
'i
Kai
ol
KEpKUpalot
iri
riT
AEuKhI
vaXi
rE
KC
i
TTE3C].
ITTrTEOV
8
OOjUITEpO1
1&k
i
Solt,
&?O&
-r6
Opos-ro
"OT
d&VTKCtE36CIEVO1
XEtpvo srl
86
&VEXcp1pToav Tr'
OiKoU
?K&rTEpOl.
In both
cases
the
meaning
of
dv-rt-
appears
to be
'opposite.' in the geographical sense. In the bay west of
Cape
Lefkimo
there
is
excellent
anchorage,
according
to
the
Mediterranean
Pilot.
8
'E-rEti T8 -poCaEPtaV "-T Kc"r&
apKupotv rvTEripc &T-r
AEUK65O0 ThrOVTE~,6pli3OVTaI
iS
XEt~ptov
T~is
OE(arnpCS8O yi5
(I. 46, 3).
9 Jowett
translates
gaort
bU
t'iv
'Cheimerion
is
a
harbour' and
adds
a
footnote
'or
"
here
there
is a
har-
bour
"
';
I
prefer
the former
translation,
which
is
supported
by the analogous sentence at 50, 3, ga-frt
rd
X0Pora
ris
OeE-rpOTrip0oS
hlv
ipfiPos.
I
assume it
was
inhabited
from
Thucydides'
silence,
since
in
the
case
of
mainland
Sybota
he
states it to
be
uninhabited.
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5/16
NAVAL OPERATIONS IN THE SOUTH
CHANNEL
OF CORCYRA
29
north
of
Cape
Varlam;
the two
possibilities
are
the
bay
of the
Paramythia
stream
and
Arilla
Bay.
As
the former
lies
closer
to
Cape
Cheimerion
and
served
the
Hellenistic town
at
Vemo-
kastro,
we
may
identify
Port
Cheimerion with the
bay
of
the
Paramythia
stream.
The
digression
of
Thucydides
contains
much information which
is irrelevant to his
purpose,
the locating of Cheimerion, and the style resembles that of Ionian geographers. Pearsonhas
suggested
that
in
this
passage
Thucydides
was
drawing
upon
some
Periegesis perhaps
even
Hecataeus
';
he has
seen
the
same influence
in
Thucydides'
other
descriptions
of
Epirus
and
Acarnania.o1 Some
support
may
be
lent to Pearson's
suggestion
by
comparing
I.
46, 4
with
Strabo
VII.
7,
5,
Esloi
E
vris5E
s
-r
X
poarca, iS
i
v
'HTTEipouKpV aITrXoCa?Il,KTa-rad
To
Ecov
&Kpov
T-rl
KopKupcias
-'v
AEvKippwav
KEip[EVa.
Kcd
&AAat
E'
Ev
Trc T
apaT\rCp vT1r0i5ES
E0iv OlK
lC(1
pvlprl.
EiTEl-rrCM
pac
Ep~MpoV
K
D
FUK0'SAlv
Eis 6v
IPp&?OEl
6
'AXEPcpv
To-rap6dcs,PCEwv
KTi'S
'AXEpouacis
p
S
KCI
EX6Epsvos
XEious
ToT-ra~po's,
OTE
KCi
\JUKdCivEtv
Tbv
K6h'rrOV"
PEi 5i
KcI
0
Ol6c(ptiS
1n'tlCiOV.
UiTrpKEITa
8E
TOUTOU p~Ev
TOJ
K66nrrov
KiXupos, ri
Trp6T-rpov
Equpac,
r6ALs
OEcrTrpcTrov,
ooKa KcrQ
BoupcorT6v
oviKrl.
YIylS iA Tr
KiXopouv
ohiXv0ov
BouX~Tlov
.......
KcQilKE1
OT-rv l
cpcr'
TXp'
"ro
K6TroU.
lET
65 FUVK'vAlIVa ~(PEi EUiC1io &AhoiAlVEaVS.Leake
11
pointed out that Strabo appears
to
echo
Thucydides
in
the reference
to
the
Acheron
river,
Ephyre,
and the
Thyamis
river;
this
echo
is
at first
sight
striking,
because
the relevance
of
including
the
Thyamis
in
each
case
is not
obvious. But
there is a
reason
in
one case.
Thucydides
locates
Cheimerion
between
the
Thyamis
and Acheron
rivers,
two
better-knownlandmarkson
this
coast;
the
mention
of
the
Thyamis
is
essential
to
his
argument.
Strabo adds
nothing
to his
explanation
of the
Glykys
Limen
by
introducing
the
Thyamis;
he
has
already
mentioned
Buthrotum
n
its
proper
place
between
Poseidion
and
Sybota,
and described
Buthrotum as the
seat of a
Roman
colony.
It
therefore
seems
likely
that Strabo found in
the source which he
used for
the
Glykys
Limen
a
reference to
the
Thyamis,
Ephyre
and
Phoinike
near
Buthrotum,
and
includedit here
despite
his
earlier
mention
of
Buthrotum. Was
Strabo
drawing
here on
Thucydides
or
on
a
source
common
to
Thucydides
? It
is
a
priori
mprobable
that
Strabo
would use
Thucydides
when
he
could draw
on
Periegeseis;
and
in
this
case he would find
nothing in Thucydides
about
the
Glykys
Limen.
There
is
thus
good
reason to believe that
Thucydides
and
Strabo
were
drawing
on
the same
Periegesis,
probably
that of
Hecataeus,
which was
more
detailed for
this
part
of
Epirus
than
either of
the
citations made
by
the two
authors.
If
my
deduction
is
correct,
the
Periegesis
ncluded the
Thyamis
mouth,
the
Sybota islands,
some islets
Ev
T~
Tapdtr\cp
(which
Strabo
did not
care to
describe),12
Cape
Cheimerion and
Glykys
Limen
at the
Acheron
mouth.
Cape
Cheimerionwas
thus
a
landmarkbetween
Sybota
and
Glykys
Limen,
and
may
be
identified
without
reference to the naval
operations
of
435-
433
B.c.
as
Cape
Varlam,
at which
point Sybota
is
unsighted
and
Glykys
Limen
comes into
view.l3
The
Periegesis
lso
described
the
hinterland where
lay
the
famous
Acherusian
Lake
and
Ephyre.
It is
probable
that
Strabo
keeps
closer
to
the
Periegesis
n
describing
Ephyre
as
inland of the bay into which the Acheron flows
dGrrpKElTr
c
TOthO'erOU
Iv
aOK6hprOu
KiXvpos,
41
Trp6rTapovEqupa,
rdatS
OsEcatlrporcv)
han
Thucydides,
who
describes t as
inland
of
the
port
Cheimerion
(o'rrn
~
Alilv,
KcI
Tr621
rr5
p
cQ6TOO
KEiT
T
Tr6
08A&cc
~
5
Av
"r
'EAtaldrrn5tT)
?EowrpcorTios
Egiaprl).
Both
descriptions
are
correct
in
the
sense that
the Acheron
valley
plain,
beside
which
Ephyre
probably
lay,
was
served
by
the
ports
on
the
coast,
whether
Cheimerion,
Glykys
Limen
or
in
moderntimes
Parga.
It is
possible
that the
same
Periegesis
s the source of
another
reference to
Cheimerion;
Stephanus
s.v.
Ee~iptov cxKpa
GEorprrpoTicsrcT
evOvTbv
eriEptel'-s.
The
existence
of an
ethnic
10
CQ
xxxiii.
(I939)
52,
and
Early
Ionian
Historians
(1939)
50.
11
NG
iii
7
n.
I.
12
Islets
between
Sybota
and
Cape
Cheimerion
are
Megalo
and Mikro
Mourtemeno,
Peramos and Katsonisi.
13
For
this
stretch
of
coast two
other
names
are handed
down.
Scylax
gives
the
corrupt
EAEA
or
the harbour
at
the
mouth of
the
Acheron.
Today
it is
named
Phanari
after the
name of
the
region
and
Splantza
after
the
village
of
twenty
hovels;
in
antiquity
it
may
equally
have had
two
names,
Glykys
Limen and that of
Scylax,
the
latter
being
associated either with
the
fort
on the south side or with the
swamps
which
cut the harbour
off
from
the
interior.
Ptolemy
III.
14, 5
and
Plutarch
Antony
62
give
Torone
or
Toryne,
which
is
generally
identified with
Parga
and
came
into
use
in
the Roman
period.
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30
N. G. L. HAMMOND
in
reference
to the
Cape
rather than to the harbour or town
(the
latter
probably
dating
from
Hellenistic
times), implies
that there was an area called
Cheimerion,
of which the inhabitants
were
named
Cheimerieis;
there are
analogies
in the Kestrine and Elaiatis areas which Thu-
cydides
mentions,
and we have
already
seen some
reason in Thuc.
I.
30, 3
for
believing
Chei-
merion to be the name of an area. The name would best apply to the coast and hinterland
between
Agios
Ioannes
and
Sybota,
which
juts
out as the eastern bastion
of the Corfu Channel
in
the
eyes
of
a
mariner
from the
south;
and the
meaning
of the name'
stormy'
well
fits
this
dangerous
and
rocky
coast.
The
last mention
of Cheimerion is in Pausanias VIII.
7,
2,
yAIUK0S 05r0p
EK
8c
Xa'carls
8iHov
io-riv
ivTraJc
-rE
dvitvt
v
-r
'ApyoMibt Kci
v
TI"
OEoT-rpcoTri8l
crx
-r
XEIPptov
KcaOOJP[EVov.
Pausanias'
source
is
not
known;
the freshet was
discovered
in
1847
in
the
bay
of
Agios
Ioannes.14
To a modern
geographer
Pausanias'
description
of its
position
'off
Chei-
merion so-called'
has
a
vagueness
which
his
qualification
KaAhooJEVOV
eems
to
confess;
but
it should
be
remembered that
Pausanias could not
describe
a
position
with
the
precision
of
modern
geographers.
Rather,
his
qualification
is added
because
he is
referring
to
a
little-
known canton
in
Thesprotis
in
Epirus.
Prior
to
the
discovery
of the freshet
at
Agios
Ioannes,
Leake had
identified
the
cape
and
harbour
of Cheimerion
with
Cape
Varlam
and Arilla
Bay.
But after
its
discovery
Bursian,
followed
by
Gomme,
used
the
evidence
of
Pausanias
to
identify
the
harbour
of
Cheimerion
with
Agios
Ioannes;
Bursian
and
Gomme were then
compelled
to
align
the
evidence
of
Thucydides
and Strabo
with
this
identification.15
There
are,
however,
cogent
reasons
for
refuting
their
view. The
phrase
of Pausanias is not
capable
of
such
precise
application.
If
it
were,
we should
have to
find
near to
Agios
Ioannes
a
Cape
Cheimerion
which
forms
a
notable
landmark between
Sybota
and the Acheron
mouth. Bursian
suggests
the
spur
on
the
south side
of the
bay;
but this is neither a
cape
nor a
landmark,
and
the
bay
with
its
environs
lies
off the sea-route between
Sybota
and the
Acheron
or
Sybota
and
the
south. It
is therefore
hardly
possible
to
make
the evidence of
Strabo
comply
with
this
identification.
When we come to
Thucydides,
the difficulties are still
greater.
To define the
bay
of
Agios
Ioannes
as between
the mouths
of the
Thyamis
and
Acheron
is
little short of
nonsense. Nor
is
it
suitable
as a
naval and land base
in
434
and
433
B.C.;
the
coast
is
rock-bound,
so
that
beaching
of triremes is
impossible,
and the
immediate hinterland
is
barren.16
And
the
operations
of
435
to
433
B.C.
give
further
reason for
rejecting
Bursian's
and
Gomme's identi-
fication.
II.
THE
NARRATIVE OF
THUCYDIDES
Of the
importance
of
the Battle
of
Sybota Thucydides
leaves
us
in
no
doubt;
his
account
is
detailed
and
graphic.
In
accordance
with
his
statement
of
method
a
few
chapters
earlier
(I.
22),
we
may
assume his sources to have been
the
best
available
eye-witnesses;
he
could
consult the Athenian
participants
after the battle of
Sybota,
and it is
probable
that
either
before
the
Peloponnesian
War
or
during
his
exile he
could
consult
Corinthian
eye-witnesses
for
the battles of Leukimme and
Sybota.
Nor
can
we
exclude the
possibility
of
his
hearing
some account from the
Corcyraeans.
His narrative
was
probably composed
early,
in
my
view before
41I5
B.c. at
the
latest.17
We have
thus
every
reason
to
expect
a clear and
trust-
worthy
account.
The
dispute
over
Epidamnus
involved at first
only
Corcyra
and
Corinth with her
colonies
Ambracia and
Leucas;
the
expedition
sent overland
by
Corinth
occupied Epidamnus,
but
was blockaded
by
the
Corcyraean navy
and
Corcyra's
Illyrian
allies.
Thus,
open
war
became
likely
between
Corcyra
and
Corinth,
a war in
which
not
only Epidamnus
was at stake
but the
14
JGS.
xviii
139
f.
15
Leake, NG. III 6; Bursian,
Geographie
Griech.
(1862)
I
28;
Gomme,
op.
cit.
180.
16
A
caique skipper
with
whom
I
sailed described the
harbour as
adequate
in a
storm
(&v
EX1
&aV'yKrl aao-rdCEl
Alud&vt).Walking
from
Splantza
to
Parga
I
found no
people
near
Agios
Ioannes,
except
one
shepherd
a
mile
inland
where a small
dell afforded
grazing.
17
CQ.
xxxiv.
(i94o)
146
f.
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NAVAL OPERATIONS
IN THE SOUTH CHANNEL
OF CORCYRA
31
naval
supremacy
of the north-west
route to the
Adriatic and
South
Italy;
for Corinth
could
not
relieve
Epidamnus
without
challenging
the
Corcyraean
fleet
of
12o
triremes
(I. 25, 4).
In
preparing
her
forces
Corinth
secured
the aid
of
Megara,
Pale in
Cephalonia, Epidaurus,
Hermione,
Troezen, Elis,
Thebes
and
Phleius,
in
addition
to
the
original
participants,
Am-
bracia and Leucas; Corcyraean envoys, accompanied by envoys from Sparta and Sicyon,
failed
to
persuade
Corinth to use arbitration
rather
than
force.
In
435
B.c.
the allied
fleet
of
seventy-five
sail,
to
which
Corinth
contributed
thirty,
sent
an
envoy
ahead
to declare war
on
Corcyra,
and
assembled
at
Actium;
there
they
were met
by
a
Corcyraean
envoy
with
the
demand not to sail
against
Corcyra,
which
they
refused. The
Corcyraeans
meanwhile
manned
a
fleet of
eighty
sail
(a
squadron
of
forty
being engaged
in
the
blockade
of
Epidamnus),
and
putting
to
sea defeated
the
Corinthian
fleet
decisively.
The
trophy
was set
up
at
Cape
Leu-
kimme;
this
suggests
that the battle was
fought
within
sight
of
Leukimme
and
probably
in
the
South
Channel,
which
Corcyra
could
claim
to be her
home waters. The
Corcyraeans
executed
all
their
prisoners, except
the
Corinthians;
on
the
day
of
the
naval
battle
Epidamnus
fell,
releasing
the
Corcyraean
squadron
of
forty
ships.
Exploiting
its
supremacy
the
Corcyraean
fleet
ravaged
the
territory
of
Leucas
and
Cyllene
in
Elis; Corinth,
unable
to
challenge Corcyra's
fleet,
endeavoured
in
summer
434
B.c.18
to
check the
Corcyraean
raiders
by
establishing posts
of
naval
and
military
forces
on the mainland
coast. The
post
at Actium
safeguarded
the
Ambraciote Gulf and Leucas
town,
and
constituted
a
threat
to
Corcyraean
raiders
sailing
to
the south
of
Leucas.
The
other
post
was
established in
the canton of Cheimerion
in
Thes-
protis,
opposite
Corcyra; Thucydides
does
not
give
the
exact location
of the
post,
but two sites
may
be
suggested-either
the
natural
fortress,
on
which
the Hellenistic site known
as Vemo-
kastro
was later
built,
with
the
adjacent
bay
as
anchorage
for
the naval
force,
or the hill of
Arpitza,
344
m.,
with the
Bay
of
Arilla as
anchorage.19
This
post
in
any
case
overlooked
the
South
Channel
and
could
report by
beacon
signal
the movement of
Corcyraean
ships;
it
could also
harass
any
small
Corcyraean
squadrons
leaving
or
returning
to
the
Channel. The
Corcyraeans
encamped
with
naval and
military
forces at
Cape
Leukimme
opposite
the
Corin-
thian
post;
as the
northern
part
of the
Cape
is
swampy,
I
have
placed
the
camp
as on the
map.
Neither side
attacked the
other
and
in
the
winter both
withdrew
(I. 30)
;
the
tactics of
Corinth
had succeeded.
In
433
B.c.
both
Corcyra
and
Corinth
sent
envoys
to
Athens;
the result was
a
defensive
alliance between Athens
and
Corcyra.
Shortly
afterwards an Athenian
squadron
of
ten
ships
sailed for
Corcyra
with
precise
orders
to
engage
the Corinthians
only
if
they
intended
to land
on
Corcyraean territory
or
possessions.20
Neither the
size nor the
orders
of
the
Athenian
squadron
can
have
pleased Corcyra. For
these orders
meant that
the
Athenians would not
necessarily
contest
the
entry
of
the
Corinthian
fleet
into
Corcyraean
waters,
but was liable to
go
into action
only
when intention
to
land
on
Corcyraean
soil was
proved;
if the
Corcyraeans
waited
upon
the Athenians to
act,
there
was
nothing
to
prevent
a Corinthian fleet from
passing
the narrows of the South Channel and
gaining
the wider waters
opposite
Corcyra
town,
where
their
presence
might
precipitate
a
revolution
or
lead
to
a
naval
engagement
under conditions
favourable to Corinth.
Since
the battle of Leukimme
the
Corinthians had been
building
and
equipping
a
large
fleet,
for
which
they
hired
additional
rowers from
the
Peloponnese
and
elsewhere
(I.
31,
i).
In
late
August
or
early September
433
B.c21
the armada of
I50
ships
set out for
Corcyra;
the
Corinthian
squadrons
totalled
ninety
ships,
and the
remaining squadrons
were
supplied
by
18
The
chronology
of
Gomme,
op.
cit.
197,
is
followed
throughout.
19
Supplies
could be
provided
by
the area
of
Arpitza
(a
village
of
6oo
families)
and
the
hinterland
plain
of
Mar-
gariti;
as
the
post lay
at
the
mouth
of
the South
Channel,communication
by
sea with Actium was not
endangered
by
the
Corcyraeans.
The two
posts
may
have
been linked
for
signalling
by
beacons,
as
in
427
B.c.
when
Alcidas
lay
at mainland
Sybota
and
was
warned
of
an
Athenian fleet
sailing
from
Leucas
(III. 80, 2).
so
I.
45,
,
rri
Kipuvpav
...
.
&
.
is
-Ov
KEVOV
TiT
XcpflV,
cf.
53,
4 may
refer to the
territory
on the mainland which
Corcyra
held
(III.
85,
2);
the
vagueness
of the
phrase,
which
is
probably quoted
from
the
original order, may
be
intended to cover
Epidamnus
also.
21
The
evidence
for
the
month
is in
IG
I
2
295
=
GHI.
55,
cf. Gomme
loc.
cit.
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32
N.
G. L.
HAMMOND
Elis,
Megara,
Leucas,
Ambracia
and
Anactorion;
the allied
squadrons
were
each
under
separate
command.
Sailing
from
Leucas
they
made land
on the mainland
opposite
Corcyra
and came to anchor
at
Cheimerion
in
Thesprotis,
where
they
formed
an
encampment;
they
were
joined
here
by
a
large
force
of
barbarians
who had come
up
to
help
them,
the
mainlanders
of these parts being friendly to Corinth. The Corcyraeanson learning of their approachhad
manned
I
I
o
ships
and
camped
on
one
of
Sybota
islands,
the
Athenian
squadron accompanying
them;
the
Corcyraean
land
force,
accompanied
by
Iooo
Zacynthian
hoplites,
took
up position
on
Cape
Leukimme
(I.
46-47).
The
direct course from Leucas to
Port
Cheimerion,
keeping
east
of
the
Madonna
Shoal,
is
forty-seven
miles
which
is
slightly
more
than
the modern
estimate of
a
trireme's
normal
range
in one
day
on
a calm
sea.22
The
arrival of the barbarian land
force
at the
rendezvous
was
presumably arranged
n
advance
by
Ambracia;
the
rich hinterland
could
provide supplies
for
the
force,
there
were
beaching
and
watering
facilities
for
the
fleet,
and the
position
over-
looked the South Channel and
the coast
of
Corcyra.
The
camp
was
probably
beside the
beach
for the
convenience of the
fleet,
for there
was no
danger
of attack
by
land.
The
Cor-
cyraean
fleet at
the
Sybota
islands
could
lie
in
the
anchorage
between the
two
main
islands
and,
if
necessary,
in
the
anchorage
of
Port
Mourzo;
encamping
on
one of
the
islands the
Corcyraeans
could
ferry
supplies
from
Cape
Leukimme
and
water,
if
there was
none on
the
islands,
from
Cape
Leukimme or from the
uninhabited
Port
Mourzo.
In
this
position
the
Corcyraean
fleet
enjoyed
two
advantages:
the
only
all-weather
anchorage
in
the
South
Channel
and
a
base for
patrolling
the
narrowest
part
of the
Channel,
between
the
Sybota
outer
island
and
the Bianco
Shoal;
in
these,
the
only
narrow
waters between
the Corinthian fleet
and
Corcyra
town,
the
Corcyraean
fleet
could
hope
to
force
an
engagement.
The
Athenian
squadron
accompanied
the
Corcyraeans;
but
its
orders
did
not
authorise action
in
defence
of
Corcyraean
waters.
In
quality,
the
newly
built
Corinthian
triremes
were the best in
the
allied
fleet,
and
in
general
the
ninety
Corinthian
ships
were
probably superior
to
those
of
their
allies.23
The
Corcyraean
fleet of
12o
ships
in
435
B.c.
had
included some
old vessels which
were
streng-
thened for the battle of Leukimme
(I.
29, 3);
on this occasion
Corcyra
posted
at
Sybota
i
Io
ships.
As
the
proportion
of
slave to
free
among
the
prisoners
taken
by
Corinth
was
8oo
to
250
(I.
55,
1),
the
Corcyraean
rowers
were
predominantly,
if
not
entirely,
slaves and
were
likely
to be
inferior
in
skill
to
the
enemy
rowers.
For
naval
manoeuvre
the
Corcyraean
fleet
may
thus be
judged
weaker
than
the
Corinthian
allied
fleet;
but at this
period
battle tactics
were
based on
the use of
marines for
boarding
rather than
on
manoeuvre
for
ramming.
The
Athenian
squadron
was
in
a
class
by
itself both in
seamanship
and
in
battle
tactics;
but it
was
doubtful if it
would
go
into
action.
'When
their
preparations
were
complete,
the
Corinthians with
three
days'
provisions
put
out to
sea
ready
for action
from
Cheimerion
by
night,
and
at
dawn as
they
were
sailing
they
sighted
the
Corcyraean
fleet
not
only
out at
sea but
sailing
towards them.
When
they
per-
ceived each other, they formedorder of battle facing one another. The Athenian ships lay on
the
right
wing
of
the
Corcyraeans,
whose
main
line
was
held
by
three
squadrons.
Of the
Corinthians the
right wing
was held
by
the
ships
of
Megara
and
Ambracia,
and
in
the
centre
lay
the
individual
squadrons
of the
other
allies;
the left
wing
was held
by
the
Corinthians
themselves,
with
their best
sailers
facing
the
Athenians
and the
Corcyraean
right.
When
the
signals
were
raised
on
each
side,
theyjoined
battle and
fought,
both
sides
having
on
their
decks
many
heavy
infantry
and
many
archers
and
javelin
men,
since
at this
time
they
were still
equipped
rather
clumsily
in
the archaic
manner. The
battle was
fought
with
more
obstinacy
than
tactics,
its
general
nature
being
more akin to
battle on
land.
For
whenever
they
charged
22
Gomme,
op.
cit.
20,
following
K6ster;
under
sail
a
trireme
could
cover
up
to
ninety
miles.
Miles are
here
and
below to be understood as sea miles. The direct course
was
probably
that
usually
taken;
in
427
B.c.
Alcidas
followed the
coast from
mainland
Sybota
to the
isthmus
of
Leucas,
in
order to
avoid the
Athenian
fleet
which
would
take the
direct
route
(III.
81,
I).
23
To man
her
fleet
Corinth
also
hired
rowers
who
could
be trained into
good
crews;
for her Sicilian
expedition
Athens
raised
rowers from
her
empire
to
man the
fleet
which is so
highly praised
by Thucydides.
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NAVAL
OPERATIONS IN THE SOUTH CHANNEL OF CORCYRA
33
one
another
they
did not
easily
disengage,
owing
to the multitude and crush of
vessels;
also,
their
hopes
of
victory lay
rather in the
heavy infantry
on their
decks,
who stood firm and
fought,
the
ships
being
stationary.
The manoeuvre of
breaking
the line was not
used,
but
they fought
with
more
spirit
and
vigour
than science.
Everywhere
tumult
reigned
and the battle was
confused;
in
the
course
of it the Athenian
ships,
coming
up
wherever the
Corcyraeans
were
being pressed,
caused alarm to the
enemy,
but did not
engage,
the
generals being
deterred
by
their
instructionsfrom Athens. The
right
wing
of the Corinthians
especially
was in
difficulty;
for the
Corcyraeans
with
twenty
ships
routed
them,
and
pursuing
the scattered
ships
to the
mainland
sailed
up
to their
camp,
where,
disembarking, they
fired the deserted tents and
plundered
the
stores. In this
part
then the Corinthians
and their allies were worsted and the
Corcyraeans
were in the
ascendant;
but where the Corinthians themselves
were,
on the
left,
they
were far
superior,
for of their inferiornumbers the
Corcyraeans
had the
twenty
ships
absent
on
pursuit.
The
Athenians,
seeing
the
Corcyraeans
hard
pressed, began
now to
give support
more
unequivocally;
at first
indeed
they
refrained from
ramming
any
opponent,
but
when
the
rout
was
becoming
complete
and the Corinthianswere
pressing
on,
then indeed
everyone
went
into
action without
any
further
distinction,
the
exigencies
of the situation
being
such
that
hostilitiesoccurred between Corinthand Athens.' (I.
48-49).
The fleets
at Cheimerion and
Sybota lay
six and a half miles
part,
and
during daylight
each could
be
kept
under observation
by
the
other
(cf.
Plate
IIb).
The
Corinthians
pre-
sumably
sailed at
night
in order to
escape
observation;
and their
object
may
have been to
exploit
the fact that the
Corcyraean
fleet was nine
miles distant from
the
Corcyraean
and force.
For,
if
the
Corinthian fleet could
gain position
to
the
westward
of
Sybota,
it
would
cut off
the
Corcyraean
fleet
from
the
Corcyraean
land
force;
and,
if
the Corinthian land force
moved
up
to
occupy
the
coast
east
of
Sybota,
the Corinthians could attack the
enemy
fleet under
favourable
conditions.
Either
before
or after
attacking
the
enemy
fleet
the
Corinthians could
sail on
Corcyra
town,
which
they
would
reach
more
rapidly
than the
Corcyraean
land force
marching
overland
from
Cape Leukimme.24
This
possibility may
have caused the Corinthian
fleet to take on board provisions or threedays. If this was the Corinthianplan, the fleet would
sail for the western
part
of the
Channel
in
order to
escape
observation from
Sybota;
their
probable
course
is
indicated
on
the
map.
However,
dawn
found the
Corcyraean
fleet not
only
at
sea but
heading
towards the Corinthian
fleet,
and at no
great
distance
apart
as the fleets
deployed
on
sighting
one another. We
may
suppose
that
the
Corcyraeans
had
either antici-
pated
or been informed
of
the Corinthian
move;
they
would
then sail
for
the narrows
of the
Channel,
which
they
could
best hold.
The
probable
course
and
battle-position
of each
fleet
is
shown on the
map,
action
I.
The-distance
covered
by
the
leading
ships
before
deploying
was
eight
miles
from Cheimerion
and four
miles from
the
Sybota
anchorage.
In
navigating
their
night
course
from
Cheimerion
the
Corinthians
may
be
assumed
to
have
put
their best
sailers
ahead,
and on
deploying
these
formed
the left
wing;
for if the
Corinthianscould
gain
a
victory on this wing, they might yet cut off the Corcyraeans rom their land base at Leukimme.
It was
equally
vital
for the
Corcyraeans
to
safeguard
their
right
wing. They
therefore
placed
there
the
Athenian
squadron
as an
outlier,
highly
manoeuvrable
and
much
feared
by
the
enemy;
moreover the
Ath'enians
were defended
by
their
diplomatic
status,
for
it was
unlikely
that the Corinthians would take
the
initiative
in
attacking
them.
Being
faced
by superior
numbers
the
Corcyraeans
could
either observe the same
interval
between
ships
as the
enemy,
in which
case their
wings
would
be
enveloped,
or extend
their line
by
thinning
out the centre
and
keeping
the
wings strong;
the
course of the
battle
suggests
that
they
adopted
the latter
alternative.25
24
It
may
be assumed that the
Corinthians knew
of
the
land
base at
Leukimme
either from
information or
by
observation from
Cheimerion
(cf.
Plate
IIa
and
b).
25
In the map I have put the Corinthian line at three
miles
in
length.
The
nature
of
the battle
indicates
that
both
sides formed a
single
line for
boarding
tactics
(the
Athenians
alone
acting
as a
mobile
reserve);
for
I50
ships
a
line
of
three miles
allows
forty
yards per ship.
Taking
the
dimensions
of
the
trireme
at
IIo
feet
long
and
fifty
feet
wide from
oar-tip
to
oar-tip,
the
interval
of
clear water
between ship and ship
sailing
ahead would be
twenty-four
yards
and between
ship
and
ship turning
broadside for
boarding
would be
four
yards.
As
boarding
tactics
only
were
employed
in this
battle,
this
seems
to be
a
reasonable
JHS.-VOL.
LXV.
D
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10/16
34
N. G.
L.
HAMMOND
The
Corcyraean victory
over
the
enemy
right
wing
occurred
early
in the
battle,
for
Thucydides
comments
on
the
absence
of the
pursuing
squadron
when
the main
Corcyraean
force
was
being
hard
pressed.
As the direct
course
from their
left
wing
to
Cheimerion
was
according
to
my
reconstruction
eight
miles,
we
must
allow
some one
and
a
half
hoursfor
these
ships
to reach
the camp at Cheimerion. The time being shortlyafterdawn, theywereprobably
not visible
to the main Corinthian
fleet when
they
were
halfway
to
Cheimerion,
sailing
into
the
rising
sun with
a
high
and shadowed
coast
as
a
background.
Meanwhile
the
Corinthians
on
the
left
half
of the line
26
were
defeating
their
opponents;
the
outlying
Athenian
squadron
manoeuvred
freely
to
help
the
Corcyraean
right,
and
finally
went into
action
to cover the
rout
of their
allies,
who would
naturally
make
for the land
base at Leukimme.
The extent
of
the
Corcyraean
defeat
appears
later
in the narrative
(I.
54,
2)
;
of the
ninety
ships
remaining
when
the
squadron
was
pursuing
to
Cheimerion,
some
seventy
were
put
out of
action,
so that
of
the
Corcyraean
centre
and
right
wing
only
some
twenty
ships
reached
Leukimme,
escorted
by
the
intact Athenian
squadron
of
ten."2
'
After the rout the Corinthians
did
not
take
in
tow
the
hulls of
the
ships
they
had
sunk,28
but turned to the men
whom as
they
sailed
among
the
wrecks
they
slew rather
than
took
prisoner,
even in
ignorance
killing
their
own
friends,
for
they
had
not
perceived
the
defeat
of
those
on the
right
wing.
As there were
many
vessels
on both
sides
and
they
extended over
a
large
area of
sea,
once
they
were
engaged
with
one
another
it was
difficult
to
distinguish
who
were
vanquishing
or
being
vanquished;
for in
number
of
ships
this
was the
greatest
battle
to
date
between Greek and
Greek. When
the
Corinthians had
pursued
the
Corcyraeans
to
the
land,
they
turned
to
the wrecks
and their
own
dead,
and
recovering
most of
them
conveyed
them
to
Sybota
whither the land force
of
the
barbarians
had
come
up
to
aid
them;
Sybota
is an
uninhabited harbour of
Thesprotis.
Thereafter
they
mustered
anew and
sailed
against
the
Corcyraeans. They,
together
with the
Athenian
squadron,
sailed
out
against
them
with
the
ships
that were
fit
for
action
and
as
many
as
were
left
to
them,
for
they
feared
an
attempt
to
land
on
their
territory.
It
was
already
late
and
the
Paean
had been
sung
for
sailing
in
to close
quarters,
when the Corinthians
suddenly
began
to back water
having
escried
twenty
Athenian
ships sailing
towards
them;
these
ships
had
been
sent
out
subsequently by
the
Athenians
to
reinforce the
squadron
of
ten,
for
they
feared-as did
happen-that
the
Corcyraeans
might
be
defeated and
their ten
ships
prove
too
few to
protect
them.
The
Corinthians
then,
seeing
these
estimate;
even
so two
ships
turning
broadside
simul-
taneously
would
require
skilful
handling,
for it
was
import-
ant
to
save
one's own oars
and timbers and to
damage
the
enemy's.
During
the
Peloponnesian
War
the
tactics
of
breaking
the
line and
ramming required
a
closer
order
in
the line
for
defence;
thus
one
cannot
apply
to
Sybota
deductions
drawn,
for
instance,
from
the
battle
of
Arginusae.
On
the
Corcyraean
side the
Athenian
squadron
might
occupy
more sea
room,
in
order
to
keep
its
freedom of
manoeuvre; even so the Corcyraean ships would be spaced
more
widely
than the
Corinthian,
probably
between
forty-
five
and
fifty yards
per
vessel on
the
average.
Thucydides
I.
50,
2,
7TONN65v
&p
VE6yV
0aCSv
&po-rEpcov
al
rri
7rroXO'
rFs
ea?,Xaas
lS
TEXOUa&Sv,
suggests
that
the
line
was
unusually
long.
Cf.
Rodgers
Greekand
Roman
Naval
Warfare
(I937)
47
and
187
(Arginusae),
and
Koster,
Antike
Seewesen
(1923)
137
f.
26
I.
49,
6
I
,8
oaEroi
aav
ol
Kopivetot,
Tri
TC
EOC.)covvpP,
rrohO
iKCov;
the Corinthians
presumably
held with
their
ninety
ships
the left
centre
as
well
as
the
left
wing.
At
48,
4
the
order
of
battle
is
given
from
right
to
left
by
national
squadrons
and
I
take it
that
the
twenty-one
ships
of
Elis
Leucas
and Anactorion
occupied
the
right
centre
or
part
of
it.
27
Gomme,
op
cit.
194,
and
others
have
doubted the
accuracy
of
the
figure seventy.
Thucydides'
narrative
suggests
that
the
Corcyraean
losses were
very high; he
mentions
the
great
superiority
of
the
Corinthians
(49,
6)
the
Corcyraeans'
effort to
muster
ships
in
offering
battle
in the
evening
(50o, 4),
the
withdrawal
of
the
Corinthians who
feared
the
second
Athenian
squadron
numbered more than
twenty
(51,
I),
and
the considerations
which
dissuaded
the
Corinthians
from
accepting
battle
on the next
day (52,
2).
This establishes
a
presumption
that
Thucydides
did
give
a
high
figure
for the
Corcyraean
losses,
and,
if
we
accept
his
figure
thirty
for the
Corinthian
losses,
seventy
for
the
Corcyraean
losses need
not be
suspected;
as
the
Corinthians
killed survivors
in the
water
(50,
I),
the
1050
prisoners
taken
by
them
(55,
I)
lend some
support
to
the
figure seventy.
If we allow
that the
figure
seventy
was
written
by Thucy-
dides and is not a MS error, is there any probability that he
was correct
?
He
qualifies
the
numbers of
losses with
-rEpi
and
patwora,
but the
general
trustworthiness
of
his
account
suggests
that these
numbers
should
be
respected.
In the
Peloponnesian
War losses
in naval
engagements
were
not so
high
in
proportion
to the
size
of
the
fleet
as
those of
Corcyra
at
Sybota;
but
in the
naval
victory
over
Aegina
c.
458
B.c.
the
Aeginetan
losses were
seventy
ships
(I.
io5,
2)
whereas
their fleet
was
probably
smaller
than that
of
Corcyra
(I. 50,
2. Thuc.
notes
Sybota
was the
greatest
battle
to
date
between
Greek
and
Greek).
It seems
likely
that
the
archaic
tactics
employed
at
Sybota
caused
higher
loss
in
ships
than
the
manoeuvring
and
ramming
of
the
Peloponnesian
War;
all
ships
engaged,
the
fighting
was
bitter,
and
after
charging
one
another
disengagement
was
difficult
(49, 3).
Thus
withdrawal
was less
easy
than
it
later
became.
28 &S
KTaOrabaElav,
Sunk
in
the
sense
of
waterlogged;
when a ship was carried by boarding, it was presumably
holed to
put
it out of
action.
The
towing
in
of
waterlogged
hulls must
have
been
a
slow
process,
which
helps
to
explain
the interval
between
the
dawn
engagement
and
the
action
which
broke
off
in the
evening.
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http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp7/25/2019 Naval Operations in the South Channel of Corcyra 435-433 b.c.
11/16
NAVAL
OPERATIONS IN THE SOUTH
CHANNEL OF
CORCYRA
35
ships
first
and
suspecting
them
to be from Athens but in
larger
numbers
than
they
saw,
began
to withdraw.
They
were
not seen
by
the
Corcyraeans,
for in
their
case
they
were
sailing
up
from an
unseen
quarter,
and the
Corcyraeans
were
surprised
at
the
Corinthians
backing
water,
until some saw and cried that there were
ships
there
sailing
up.
Then
they
also
began
to with-
draw; for it was alreadygetting dark, and the Corinthiansturning away brokeoff the action.
So
they
parted
from one
another,
and the battle ended
at
nightfall.
The
Corcyraeans
were
in
camp
at Leukimme
when these
twenty ships
from
Athens,
commanded
by
Glaukon son
of
Leagros
and
Andokides son
of
Leogoras,
bore down
through
the
corpses
and
wreckage
and
sailed
up
to
the
camp
not
long
after
they
were
sighted.
The
Corcyraeans,
for
it was
night,
feared
they
were
enemy
vessels,
and
then knew
them;
and
they
came
to
anchor'
(I.
50-51).
In
killing
the men in the water Corinth
and her allies
were
revenging
the
execution
of
prisoners
by
the
Corcyraeans
n
435
B.c.
Thucydides
accounts
for
the
failure
of
the
Corinthians
to
perceive
their
defeat on
the
right
wing,
but he tells
us
nothing
more
of
the
twenty
victorious
Corcyraean
ships.
As the
Corcyraeans
were
prepared
to
fight
again
in
the
evening,
these
ships
must have
regained
the
base at Leukimme. So
long
as
they
hugged
the
coast,
they
could
move
up
the
Channel
without
being
observedfrom
the scene of the
main
action; it thereforeseems
likely
that,
while the Corinthians
killed
the
survivors,
pursued
the
Corcyraeans
to land
and
were
collecting
their dead and the
wrecks,
the
twenty
ships
passed
north of
Sybota
on
the
east
side of the Channel and then raced across to Leukimme.
For the
pursuit
to
Cheimerion,
the
pillaging
of
the
camp
and the
voyage
to the
latitude
of
the
Sybota
isles,
we
may
allow
some
three
hours
29;
during
that time the Corinthians could
well
have
been
engaged
on
their
opera-
tions
in
the
westward
part
of the Channel.
The barbarian land
force
was
not
at
Cheimerion
an
hour or two after
dawn,
when the
Corcyraeans
pillaged
the
empty
camp;
it
must
have
been
already
on the
way
to
mainland
Sybota
(Port
Mourzo),
and
the
synchronisation
of
its
departure
with
that of the
fleet
must
have been
part
of the
Corinthian
plan
of
action. The
pursuit by
the
Corinthiansof the
Corcyraeans
to
the land
'
was
clearly
to
Corcyraean
territory,
and
in
this
case to
the
coast
near Leukimme
where the
land force
of
the
Corcyraeans
could
cover
them
from
further
attack.
When
assembled
at
mainland
Sybota,
the
Corinthian
fleet
had lost
thirty ships;
of
the
120
left
a
number would be
in
need
of
repair,
which
was
impossible
in
a
deserted
place
(52,
2),
and the losses
in
oars
and
crews
could
probably
not be
replaced
(if
the
Corinthians
had
brought
a
supply
of
oars,
they
would have
been
fired
at
Cheimerion
by
the
Corcyraeans).
It
seems
improbable
that when
they
offered
battle
in
the
evening
they
mustered as
many
as 120
ships.
The
Corcyraeans
probably
had
spare
oars
and
timber at
their
Leukimme
base
and
could also fill
gaps
in
their
crews from the
land
force;
the
forty
ships
which
had survived the battle
were
probably
thus
an
effective
force.
The
phrase
6aorl
aav
?otrrai
(50,
4),
if
not
pleonastic,
must refer to
ships
reserved at
Leukimme
30;
as
the official
strength
of
the
Corcyraean
fleet was
MIo
and
of
these I
10
were
engaged
in
the
morning,
the
reserved
ships
may
have numbered
ten
vessels
too old
and
slow
for
manoeuvre.
Even if
we
put
the
Corcyraean
total
including
the Athenian
squadron
at
sixty
ships
and the
Corinthian
total
at
less than
I20
ships,
the Corinthians
still far
outnumbered
the
Corcyraeans;
therefore
the
Corcyraeans
would not venture farfrom
the cover
of the
land
force. The
probable
position
of
the
fleets
for
action
2
is
shown on the
map.
In
this
position
the
Corinthians
would
see the
second Athenian
squadron
rounding
Cape
Bianco,
before
it was
visible
to
the