NAVAL POSTGRADUATE
SCHOOL
MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA
MBA PROFESSIONAL REPORT
INNOVATIVE DEFENSE ACQUISITION CONCEPT DEPLOYER
EQUIPMENT BUNDLE (DEB)
June 2017
By: Frederic Albesa Isaac J. Ortman Stephen F. Kirouac
Advisors: Robert F. Mortlock
Douglas E. Brinkley Amilcar Menichini
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13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)
The military spends resources ensuring individual warfighter equipment is technologically advanced and operationally effective/suitable. Certain types of warfighter equipment, specifically durable goods, have long service lives; therefore, services cannot afford to replace all warfighter equipment when advances in capability or weight reduction are achieved. However, like pre-positioned stocks of heavy combat equipment, having stocks of modern warfighter equipment in a non-contingent environment ready for early deployers ensures readiness and buys time for industrial base ramp-up.
The Deployer Equipment Bundle (DEB) concept would outfit early deploying brigade combat teams (BCTs) to the next major contingency with the most modern, lifesaving equipment available, providing sufficient buffer stock to enable the industrial base to ramp up to full capacity. This concept procures organizational clothing and individual protective equipment (OCIE) and personal protective equipment (PPE) for immediate capability needs and includes flame-resistant (FR) uniforms. The DEB concept increases flexibility while reducing operational risks to the Army. We found that an effective implementation of a DEB concept should leverage the best practices of the Army Rapid Field Initiative (RFI) operations, Army Pre-positioned Stocks (APS) operations, and United States Marine Corps Individual Clothing and Combat Equipment (ICCE) operations. In addition, our research identified the barriers and challenges to the acceptance of the DEB concept: aversion to change, ignorance to new concepts, Army culture, and trust. 14. SUBJECT TERMS deployer equipment bundle, soldier protection system, prepositioning equipment, organizational clothing, critical combat equipment, readiness, rapid fielding initiative, lifesaving equipment, personal protective equipment, fire-retardant uniforms, barrier to acceptance
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Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.
INNOVATIVE DEFENSE ACQUISITION CONCEPT DEPLOYER EQUIPMENT BUNDLE (DEB)
Frederic Albesa, Lieutenant Commander, United States Navy Isaac J. Ortman, Lieutenant Commander, United States Navy
Stephen F. Kirouac, Captain, United States Army
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
MASTER OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION
from the
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL June 2017
Approved by: Robert F. Mortlock, Ph.D., lead advisor Douglas E. Brinkley, Ph.D., support advisor Amilcar Menichini, Ph.D., support advisor Rene G. Rendon, Ph.D. John T. Dillard, Ph.D. Academic Associates Graduate School of Business and Public Policy
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INNOVATIVE DEFENSE ACQUISITION CONCEPT DEPLOYER EQUIPMENT BUNDLE (DEB)
ABSTRACT
The military spends resources ensuring individual warfighter equipment is
technologically advanced and operationally effective/suitable. Certain types of warfighter
equipment, specifically durable goods, have long service lives; therefore, services cannot
afford to replace all warfighter equipment when advances in capability or weight
reduction are achieved. However, like pre-positioned stocks of heavy combat equipment,
having stocks of modern warfighter equipment in a non-contingent environment ready for
early deployers ensures readiness and buys time for industrial base ramp-up.
The Deployer Equipment Bundle (DEB) concept would outfit early deploying
brigade combat teams (BCTs) to the next major contingency with the most modern,
lifesaving equipment available, providing sufficient buffer stock to enable the industrial
base to ramp up to full capacity. This concept procures organizational clothing and
individual protective equipment (OCIE) and personal protective equipment (PPE) for
immediate capability needs and includes flame-resistant (FR) uniforms. The DEB
concept increases flexibility while reducing operational risks to the Army. We found that
an effective implementation of a DEB concept should leverage the best practices of the
Army Rapid Field Initiative (RFI) operations, Army Pre-positioned Stocks (APS)
operations, and United States Marine Corps Individual Clothing and Combat Equipment
(ICCE) operations. In addition, our research identified the barriers and challenges to the
acceptance of the DEB concept: aversion to change, ignorance to new concepts, Army
culture, and trust.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION..................................................................................................1 A. BACKGROUND ........................................................................................1 B. PURPOSE ...................................................................................................3 C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS .......................................................................3 D. METHODOLOGY ....................................................................................3 E. ASSUMPTIONS .........................................................................................4 F. REPORT ORGANIZATION ....................................................................4
II. BACKGROUND ....................................................................................................7 A. ORGANIZATIONAL CLOTHING AND INDIVIDUAL
EQUIPMENT ...........................................................................................13 1. Service Regulations ......................................................................13 2. Operations ....................................................................................17
B. RAPID FIELDING INITIATIVE ..........................................................30
III. LITERATURE REVIEW ...................................................................................35 A. UNITED STATES ARMY PRE-POSITIONED STOCK (APS).........35 B. DEPLOYER EQUIPMENT BUNDLE CONCEPT .............................42
1. Purpose..........................................................................................42 2. Summary .......................................................................................42 3. Background ..................................................................................44 4. How Deployer Equipment Bundle Concept Works ..................45 5. Deployer Equipment Bundle Set Composition .........................46 6. Sustainment ..................................................................................48 7. Application to the Global Response Force (GRF) ....................48 8. Path Forward ...............................................................................50 9. Summary .......................................................................................50
IV. DATA ANALYSIS ...............................................................................................51 A. DOTMLPF – DEPLOYER EQUIPMENT BUNDLE ..........................51
1. Rapid Fielding Initiative (RFI) ...................................................53 2. Army Pre-positioned Stocks (APS) ............................................54 3. United States Marine Corps Individual Clothing and
Combat Equipment (USMC ICCE) ...........................................56 4. Organizational Clothing Individual Equipment .......................57
B. DEPLOYER EQUIPMENT BUNDLE SWOT ANALYSIS ................59 1. Strengths .......................................................................................60
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2. Weaknesses ...................................................................................61 3. Opportunities................................................................................62 4. Threats ..........................................................................................63
C. COMPARATIVE QUANTITATIVE ANALYSES ..............................64
V. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND FUTURE RESEARCH........................71 A. SUMMARY ..............................................................................................71 B. CONCLUSIONS ......................................................................................74 C. FUTURE RESEARCH AREAS .............................................................75
LIST OF REFERENCES ................................................................................................77
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST ...................................................................................83
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LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1. Potential Operational Risk with Equipping Immediate Deployers Source: Project Manager Soldier Protection and Individual Equipment (PM SPIE) (2013). .....................................................................2
Figure 2. Modular Tactical Vests. Source: Modular Tactical Vest (n.d.). ..................9
Figure 3. List of United States Marine Corps Individual Combat Equipment. Source: United States Marine Corps (n.d.). .................................................9
Figure 4. U.S. Army Individual Clothing. Source: Central Issue Facility Torii Station (n.d.)...............................................................................................11
Figure 5. U.S. Army Organizational Clothing. Source: Central Issue Facility Torii Station (n.d.)......................................................................................12
Figure 6. Computation for 1,500 Personnel over a Three-Month Period. Adapted from DOA (2005, p. 1). ...............................................................16
Figure 7. Marine Corps Logistics Command Structure. Source: Marine Corps Logistics Command (2016)........................................................................18
Figure 8. Logistics Services Management Centers around the Globe. Source: Janczak (2014). ..........................................................................................19
Figure 9. Consolidated Storage Program Concept. Source: DON USMC (2011). ........................................................................................................20
Figure 10. Individual Combat Clothing and Equipment Examples. Source: DON USMC (2011). ..................................................................................20
Figure 11. Consolidated Storage Point Locations. Source: DON USMC (2011). ......22
Figure 12. Inventory Levels of Supply. Source: DON USMC (2014). .......................23
Figure 13. The Requisition Process. Source: DON USMC (2014). ............................24
Figure 14. Desert Camouflage Pattern ........................................................................26
Figure 15. Woodland Camouflage Pattern ..................................................................26
Figure 16. OCIE Management Process. Source: OCIE CMO (2016a). ......................28
Figure 17. OCIE Funding Distribution Process. Source: OCIE CMO (2016a). .........29
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Figure 18. Number of Soldiers Issued RFI by Fiscal Year. Source: Hoffman (2016). ........................................................................................................31
Figure 19. Army Pre-positioned Stock. Source: Association of the USA (2008). ......36
Figure 20. APS Program Organization. Source: DOA (2015c, Figure 2-1). ..............38
Figure 21. Comparative Sensitivity Analysis of Unweighted Evaluation Factors ......67
Figure 22. Comparative Sensitivity Analysis of Weighted Evaluation Factors ..........68
Figure 23. Alternate Comparative Sensitivity Analysis of Weighted Evaluation Factors ........................................................................................................69
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LIST OF TABLES
Table 1. List of United States Marine Corps Individual Clothing Issue. Source: DON USMC (2016). .......................................................................8
Table 2. List of USMC Combat Equipment. Source: United States Marine Corps (n.d.). ...............................................................................................10
Table 3. RFI for One Soldier in FY14. Source: Mortlock & Super (2014). ............32
Table 4. Examples of TAT and NAP Items. Source: DOA (2015c, Table 1-1). .....37
Table 5. MPF & MCCP-N Equipment and Supplies (1 of 2). Source: USMC (2009). ........................................................................................................40
Table 6. MPF & MCCP-N Equipment and Supplies (2 of 2). Source: USMC (2009). ........................................................................................................41
Table 7. BCT Set with Transitional plus Arid/Desert Uniforms and Temperate Weather Mount Combat Boots. Source: PM SPIE (2013). .....46
Table 8. BCT Set with Transitional plus Woodland/Jungle Uniforms. Source: PM SPIE (2013). ........................................................................................47
Table 9. BCT Set with Transitional Uniforms. Source: PM SPIE (2013). ..............47
Table 10. DEB Sustainment Costs (Supplemental Funding after DEB Fielding). Source: PM SPIE (2013). ..........................................................48
Table 11. GRF Projected Annual Costs Based upon an 18-Month Fielding Cycle. Source: PM SPIE (2013). ...............................................................49
Table 12. DOTmLPF Matrix Summary .....................................................................52
Table 13. SWOT Matrix for DEB Analysis ...............................................................60
Table 14. Evaluation Factors, Definitions, and Performance. Source: Richards et al. (2013, p. 14). .....................................................................................65
Table 15. Evaluation Factor Weights and Assessment ..............................................66
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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
ABS Automated Battle Book System AMC Army Materiel Command AMCS Army Military Clothing Stores AO Acquisition Objective APS Army Pre-positioned Stocks AR Army Regulation ARCIC Army Capabilities Integration Center ASA (ALT) Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics, &
Technology) ASC Army Sustainment Command AVC Asset Visibility Capability BCT Brigade Combat Team CBA Cost Benefit Analysis CBRNE Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and Enhanced
Conventional Weapons CCE Critical Combat Equipment CIF Central Issuing Facility CL II Organizational Clothing and Individual Equipment Class VII Vehicles and major end items CMO Central Management Office CONOPS Concept of Operations CONUS Continental United States COSCOM Corps Support Command COTS Commercial-off-the-shelf CPR Capabilities Portfolio Review CSA Chief of Staff of the Army CSP Consolidated Storage Program CTA Command Table of Allowance
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DAMO-CI Department of the Army Military Operations–Capabilities Integration, Prioritization, and Analysis Division
DEB Deployer Equipment Bundle DEMIL Defense Demilitarization DLA Defense Logistics Agency DOA Department of the Army DOD Department of Defense DOTmLPF Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and
Education, Personnel, Facilities EE PEG Equipping Program Evaluation Group FR Fire Retardant FR ACU Flame Retardant Army Combat Uniform G-3/5/7 Army Operations G-4 Army Logistics G-8 Army Procurement & Resources (USA, Deputy Chief of Staff) GRF Global Response Force, 82nd Airborne HQDA Headquarters, Department of the Army ICE Individual Combat Equipment ICCE Individual Critical Combat Equipment IIF Individual Issue Facility IOTV Improved Outer Tactical Vest LSMC Logistics Service Management Center LSS Lean Six Sigma MAGTF Marine Air Ground Task Force MARCOM Marine Corps Command MARCORLOGCOM Marine Corps Logistics Command MCO Marine Corps Order MCoE Maneuver Center of Excellence
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MFP Master Fielding Plan MPF Maritime Prepositioning Force MSC Military Sealift Command NALMEB Norway Air-Landed Marine Expeditionary Brigade NAP Non-Authorized for Pre-Positioning OCIE Organizational Clothing and Individual Equipment OCO Overseas Contingency Operation OCP Operational Camouflage Pattern OMA Operations and Maintenance Army OPR Office of Primary Responsibility PEO Program Executive Office PM SPIE Program Manager Soldier Protection and Individual Equipment PO Procurement Order POM Program Objective Memorandum PPE Personal Protective Equipment RFI Rapid Fielding Initiative SDDC Surface Deployment Distribution Command SOP Standard Operating Procedure SPS Soldier Protection System SSA Supply Support Activity SWOT Strength, Weakness, Opportunity, & Threat TAACOM Theater Army Area Command TACOM Tank and Automotive Command TAT Materiel to Accompany Troop TAV Total Asset Visibility TLCM Total Life-Cycle Management
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UFR Unfunded Requirement UIF Unit Issue Facility USA United States Army USMC United States Marine Corps USN United States Navy USTRANSCOM US Transportation Command VCSA Vice Chief of Staff of the Army
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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
To my advisor, Dr. Robert Mortlock, you have my deepest appreciation for your
full support and guidance during this thesis process. To Dr. Douglas Brinkley and Dr.
Amilcar Menichini, thank you for providing your expertise and insight. To my thesis
partners, I will never forget room 262.
This MBA professional report is dedicated to my favorite shipmate and wife,
Amphay, and our children, Milo and Valentin. Thank you for all your love, support, and
patience during these past 18 months.
—Fred Albesa
In life, events experienced shape who we are, and who we are to become. I once
remember being asked, “What do you want to accomplish by the time you are 40?” My
response, “earn an MBA.” Although two years late, it looks as though I will finally
accomplish that goal.
Here at the Naval Postgraduate School, the friends made and the knowledge
gained will forever leave a mark on my life. I firmly believe nothing in life ever worth
doing comes easy, and earning my master’s in business administration was without a
doubt one the most challenging yet rewarding task I have experienced thus far in my
military career. I would like to acknowledge that, if not for the support of my wife,
Madelene, and son, Yadin, success at this endeavor may not have been possible. I love
you both immensely.
—Stephen F. Kirouac
I dedicate this project to the First Deployers. As the “tip of the spear,” this work is
for them. Thank you to Dr. Douglas Brinkley, Dr. Robert Mortlock, and Dr. Amilcar
Menichini for the outstanding support and academic insights. Lastly, thank you to my
wife, Anne, and our three children, Eleanore, Lillian, and Samuel. I love you for all time.
—Isaac J. Ortman
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I. INTRODUCTION
On December 8, 2004, while attending a town hall meeting with Soldiers at Camp
Buehring, Kuwait, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld was asked a question
regarding the lack of up-armor on military vehicles. He responded, “As you know, you
go to war with the Army you have. They’re not the Army you might want or wish to have
at a later time” (Kristol, 2004, Introduction). Rumsfeld’s statement prompted senior
leaders to look inward and determine what steps were required to rectify Army materiel
capability gaps such as up-armor and antiquated critical combat equipment (CCE).
The United States Army (USA) spends a substantial amount of resources ensuring
that individual warfighting equipment is technologically advanced and rigorously tested
for combat effectiveness and suitability. Warfighter critical combat equipment has an
extended life cycle, meaning it lasts a long time. The managerial decisions regarding
procurement, issuing, and sustainment create long-lasting retained effects on readiness.
The Army cannot afford to replace all warfighter equipment when advances in capability
or weight reduction are achieved. As with pre-positioned stock of heavy combat
equipment, providing stocks of modern warfighter equipment Class II (CLII), ready for
issue to early deployers will save money, ensure readiness, and buy time for a ramp-up of
the industrial base to provide for follow-on forces. This is all in keeping with General
Mark A. Milley’s number one priority: “READINESS!” (Milley, 2015, p. 1).
A. BACKGROUND
The Maneuver Center of Excellence (MCoE) recognized the need for an agile
deployment equipping process that will keep the industrial base active to ensure that
rapidly deploying troops receive the required combat equipment. The MCoE
recommends that headquarters, department of the Army (HQDA G3/5/7), endorse the
Deployer Equipment Bundle (DEB) concept in order to allow Program Executive Office
(PEO) Soldier to procure and manage the necessary items (Sando, 2012). Edgewood
Chemical Biological Center conducted a cost benefit analysis (CBA) in 2013 in support
of this project. The DEB concept maintains a warm industrial base and significantly
2
reduces operational risk associated with either a surge or sustaining base (see Figure 1).
The DEB concept is not currently adopted by necessary stakeholders.
As displayed in Figure 1, under a warm industrial base designated with a blue
line, the DEB concept is capable of fielding 15 brigade combat teams (BCT)s sooner than
a surge or sustainment base fielding within the first two months due to proactive storage
aspect. Under a surge industrial base, designated with a red line, with fire retardant (FR)
uniforms in production, it would take an additional five months after declaration for
industry to ramp-up production and 12 months before they were capable of fielding a
total of 15 BCTs. Under a cold industrial base, designated with a yellow line, without FR
uniforms in production, it would take an additional eight months after declaration for
industry to commence production and 15 months before they were capable of fielding a
total of 15 BCTs. As demonstrated in the shaded area of Figure 1, operational risk is
significantly mitigated with a DEB concept, allowing faster fielding and a faster
industrial base ramp-up.
Figure 1. Potential Operational Risk with Equipping Immediate Deployers Source: Project Manager Soldier Protection and Individual Equipment
(PM SPIE) (2013).
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B. PURPOSE
This project examines the challenges and barriers to acceptance for the United
States Army implementing a DEB concept for organizational clothing and individual
CCE. The DEB concept would be funded in a non-contingency environment with
Operations and Maintenance Army (OMA) base funding. The DEB concept is analyzed
for strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats to identify advantages and
disadvantages. Class II (CLII) materiel legacy operations for procurement, storage, and
issuing from supply is analyzed. Army pre-positioned stock (APS) concept for Class VII
(CLVII) is comparatively analyzed for parallel processes. Additionally, this research
examines the United States United States Marine Corps (USMC) for comparison of how
they operate their pre-positioned class II materiel equivalencies.
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
To identify DEB challenges and barriers to acceptance, our research examines the
following questions:
Primary Question: What are the challenges and barriers to acceptance for the
USA to adopt and implement the DEB concept for organizational clothing Class II
materiel?
Secondary Questions:
1. What is the Army’s legacy operation for the procurement, storage and issuing of organizational clothing and individual equipment (OCIE)? What is the Army’s desired CCE readiness level?
2. Using comparative analysis, what is the USMC organizational clothing equivalencies operation? Why does the Army pre-position heavy equipment and not FR Army Combat Uniform (ACU) and CCE items?
3. What are the advantages and disadvantages of the DEB concept? How does the DEB affect Commercial Industry’s ability to ramp-up to full-rate production?
D. METHODOLOGY
This project reviewed a substantial amount of literature, to include applicable
concept plans, memorandums, cost benefit analyses, organizational charts, standard
operating procedures, and official government reports related to the DEB concept, pre-
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positioned stock, and CLII materiel/equivalencies. Data was analyzed through a
comparative analysis of strength, weakness, opportunity, and threats (SWOT) as a way of
identifying DEB challenges and barriers to acceptance.
E. ASSUMPTIONS
This document makes a number of assumptions when analyzing and comparing a
DEB state to a status quo alternative. These assumptions are made to assist us in our
research and analyses. The assumptions made are
• In a non-wartime environment, PEO Soldier operates rapid fielding initiative (RFI) as a low-intensity operation dependent on fiscal resources directly proportional to the number of outside continental United States (OCONUS) mission-deployed Soldiers.
• 15 BCTs is a reasonable number of planned first deployers in the event of one or more simultaneous major contingencies.
• Fielded Soldier OCIE must be replaced at an annual 10% degradation due to wear and tear.
F. REPORT ORGANIZATION
This report is organized into five separate chapters with supporting data, Figures
as required.
Chapter I introduces the DEB concept topic and provides a summary of purpose
and methodologies. This chapter identifies the secondary research questions used to gain
answers and ultimately address the primary research question: What are the challenges
and barriers to acceptance for the USA to adopt and implement the DEB concept for
organizational clothing Class II materiel? The chapter concludes with an outline of the
thesis.
Chapter II provides the background information about Organizational Clothing
and Individual Equipment (OCIE). Specific areas of interest include current regulations
governing OCIE activity, a summary of OCIE operations, and the Rapid Fielding
Initiative (RFI) for contingency operations. OCIE is explored across the USA and the
USMC as applicable. The purpose of this chapter is to capture a snapshot of status quo
operations.
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Chapter III provides a literature review of the documents defining Army pre-
positioned stock and the DEB concept in order to provide a context for later analysis.
Chapter IV presents an analysis of the DEB concept. DEB is analyzed using the
Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel,
Facilities, and Policy (DOTmLPF-P) template. Additionally, DEB is analyzed through
the lens of a SWOT analysis. Next, we perform quantitative analysis to subjectively
differentiate between a DEB and non-DEB state of operation. This chapter concludes
with a sensitivity analysis of how evaluation criteria could be weighted differently to
support a different outcome.
Chapter V concludes the project with a summary of conclusions based on
analyses from earlier chapters. Conclusions are tied to the content in the previous
chapters and inferences from analyses. Ideas and opportunities not reviewed in this
project are provided as future research areas. Chapter V ends with our closing
conclusions and recommendations.
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II. BACKGROUND
This chapter provides insight on the regulation requirements for both the U.S.
Army’s organizational clothing and individual equipment (OCIE) and the USMC’s
individual clothing and combat equipment (ICCE) operations. Additionally, this chapter
provides a preliminary comparative analysis of the USMC ICCE operations to the U.S.
Army’s central issuing facility (CIF) and RFI operations in an attempt to highlight
differences that may be leveraged and discussed in Chapter IV.
The USMC designates Individual Clothing and Combat Equipment as two
separate entities of which both are issued to a Marine upon initial entry into service and is
required to be maintained throughout the entirety of a Marine’s service. Individual
clothing articles consist of items such as a Marine’s blouse, trousers, belt, boots and other
items (see Table 1). Combat equipment, typically issued for the duration of a Marine’s
tour on a particular duty station, consists of combat equipment such as helmets, modular
tactical vests (see Figure 2), the family of load bearing equipment (see Figure 3), and
other similar items (see Table 2).
9
Figure 2. Modular Tactical Vests. Source: Modular Tactical Vest (n.d.).
Figure 3. List of United States Marine Corps Individual Combat Equipment. Source: United States Marine Corps (n.d.).
10
Table 2. List of USMC Combat Equipment. Source: United States Marine Corps (n.d.).
For the U.S. Army, organizational clothing and equipment is worn in both combat
and training environments. Like the USMC, the U.S. Army has two types of Soldier
equipment: individual and organizational. Individual equipment, issued to Soldiers upon
their entry into the U.S. Army, consists of basic items required for a Soldier to conduct
daily business. These items include, dress blues, duffel bag, combat boots, patrol cap,
operational camouflage pattern (OCP) Army combat uniform (non-FR), and a myriad of
other items (see Figure 4 for examples of individual clothing). Organizational clothing
items are issued on a loan basis via installation central issuing facilities to Soldiers while
assigned to their respective home station installations. These organizational items
include, laundry bags, improved outer tactical vest [IOTV], elbow/knee pads, hydration
system, rucksack, load carrier vests, assault pack, combat helmet, and other equipment
(see Figure 5).
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Figure 5. U.S. Army Organizational Clothing. Source: Central Issue Facility Torii Station (n.d.).
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A. ORGANIZATIONAL CLOTHING AND INDIVIDUAL EQUIPMENT
Whether in a garrison, training, or combat environment, the armed forces deems
organizational clothing and individual equipment as CCE and personal protective
equipment (PPE).
1. Service Regulations
Service regulations are documents defined in explicit detail, the guidance and
policies of which service members are required to follow.
a. United States Marine Corps
The USMC uses only one logistical strategy for ICCE operations regardless of the
operational environment that exists. That guidance is specified in USMC Corps Order
(MCO) 4400.201 (DON USMC, 2016). Additionally, the USMC guidance for long-term
ICCE storage is specified in MCO 4400.196A (DON USMC, 2015).
MCO 4400.201-V13, Individual Clothing, Flags, personal Effects, “and the
Consolidated Storage Program, [provides] guidance for the administration and
management of individual clothing, flags, personal effects, and [storage]”(DON USMC,
2016, p. 1-2) Additionally, it provides “guidance for the governing, construct, roles and
responsibilities, and integration across the USMC for the management of the CSP
[which] consists of the individual issue and unit issues facilities” (DON USMC, 2016, pp.
1-14, 9-2). MCO 4400.201-V13 provides USMC commanders the specifics of Marine
clothing allowances; ICE (Individual Combat Equipment) record keeping; sources of
supply, retention, recovery, and replacement of individual clothing; and guidance to the
consolidated storage point on “the centralized inventory management of [infantry combat
equipment]” (DON USMC, 2016, p. 1-8).
MCO 4400.196A, the intent of this order is to “provide broad guidance and
responsibilities for centralized management of ICCE, and operation and management of
[IIFs and UIFs]” (DON USMC, 2015, p.1). Additionally, the order is promotes
operational management and equipment readiness of CSPs through asset management,
14
equipment accountability, and optimization of inventory. Additionally, it provides
guidance on methods of decreasing total support costs for life cycle management of CSP
inventory.
MCO 4400.150 provides guidance and policy to ensure standardization of
consumer-level supply operations regardless of the environment. This policy ensures that
“processes and procedures are in compliance with Department of Defense (DOD)
regulations for supply and financial management” (DON USMC, 2014, p. 4). MCO
4400.150 concentrates and governs supply operations at the unit level of inventory.
b. United States Army Regulations
OCIE class II operations are managed within three separate levels of Army
logistics: strategic, operational, and tactical. Each level navigates a myriad of Army
regulations that crisscross a wide logistical OCIE framework. All levels tie one regulation
to another regulation at a separate, yet vital, level of the OCIE framework.
Majors Weestrand and Gilbert (2015) state, “Theater level sustainment operations
aims at providing effective warfighter support with greater efficiency linking the strategic
industrial base to tactical formations, specifically by optimizing theater level OCIE
inventory and processes” (Weestrand & Gilbert, 2015, p. 16). For example, through
implementation of a Lean Six Sigma (LSS) strategy, the 21st Theater Sustainment
Command, synchronizing with the LSS project team members, reallocated excess OCIE
inventory worth over $14 Million to “six different installations” (Weestrand & Gilbert,
2015, p. 19). According to Weestrand and Gilbert, “The redistribution of [theater level]
OCIE stocks offset future requirements at these installations, saving the United States
Army future dollars spent” (Weestrand & Gilbert, 2015, p. 19).
(1) Strategic Level Regulations
AR 710-2, Policy for Supply Operations below the National Level (DOA, 2008b),
provides guidance during both “peace and war for the supply management and operations
of Corps Support Command (COSCOM), Theater Army Area Command (TAACOM),
and other [Materiel Management Centers (MMCs)] above division and below division,
15
[specifically stating, the process requirements for managing equipment stored at] direct,
general, or installation Supply Support Activities for issue to a customer (SSAs)” (DOA,
2008b, pp. 1, 13). Additionally, AR 710-2 instructs the deputy chief of staff army
logistics (G4) to establish an Army supply policy, evaluate requests for additional
procedural publication, deviation from existing procedural publication, review and
approve implementation of existing procedural publications (DOA, 2008b).
AR 740-1, Logistics: Storage and Supply Activity Operations, provides guidance
for the management of materiel storage and supply operations. Specifically it instructs the
Deputy chief of staff G4 and subordinate commands to develop and submit concepts and
long range plans for future worldwide storage and maintenance of Army Pre-positioned
stocks (described in greater detail in Chapter IV), equipment storage space requirements,
justification for new facilities storage requirements, quality control (QC), and the reliable
management of supplies and equipment in support of the Army’s supply distribution
system (DOA, 2008c). Lastly, AR 740-1 provides guidance for the identification, control,
and utilization of shelf-life OCIE items (DOA, 2008c).
(2) Operational Level Regulations
Section II, Chapter 10 of the Common Table of Allowances (CTA) 50–900
authorizes a central issuing facility’s to requisition, distribute, care for, replace, account
for, secure, stock, mark, inspect, inventory, recover, and dispose of OCIE. (Fort Carson
Logistics Readiness Center, 2016). There is a central issuing facility located on nearly all
Army installations.
Common Table of Allowances 50-900, Clothing and Individual Equipment,
provides guidance for the issuance of OCIE in specific climate zones, mission
requirements, and military occupational specialties. CTA 50-900 states that in
conjunction with CTA 8-100 and 50-970, “it is the only department of the Army (DOA)
authorization document [used] for individual and organizational clothing and equipment.”
(DOA, 2008a, p. 1). CTA 50-970 additionally provides an authorization document for
OCIE according to the provisions of Army Regulation 71-32 and 700-84 (DOA,
2008a, p. 1).
16
AR 71-32 governs that CTA 50-970, Expendable/Durable Items (except medical,
ammunition, repair parts, and heraldic items), provide policies and guidance for a
“flexible basis of issue, which may be used to acquire selected items of
expendable/durable equipment and provides guidance for determining initial issue and
stockage levels of expendable/durable items required to accomplish their mission” (DOA,
2005, p. 1). As an example, the computation in Figure 6 reflects the quantity required for
a force of 1,500 personnel for a three-month period using a basis of issue 1 per 100
individuals per month.
1500 Number of personnel x 3 Number of months
4500 Total personnel months / 100 Personnel factor 45 x .1 Quantity Factor 4.5 Items required for stockage level
Figure 6. Computation for 1,500 Personnel over a Three-Month Period. Adapted from DOA (2005, p. 1).
Army Regulation 71-32, Force Development and Documentation provides guidance to
the Deputy chief of staff G4 and army procurement and resources deputy chief of staff
(G8) on the development “and documentation of [Army force structure programs, force
accounting], personnel and equipment requirements and authorizations, [and associated
force management activities]” (DOA, 2013b, p. 1). The force management system is the
information technology system for all basis of issue plans required for the planning and
programing of acquisition requirements. By identifying and documenting both personnel
and equipment requirements, basis of issue plans are developed for new or improved
items of equipment and materiel development (DOA, 2008a).
Army Regulation 700-84, Issue and Sale of Personal Clothing provides guidance
for the “issue and sale of personal clothing” (DOA, 2014b, p. 5). Specifically, it directs
the deputy chief of staff G4 and the Army Materiel Command to make periodic
17
inspections to the Army Military Clothing Store to ensure compliance with established
policies and procedures. Lastly, Army Regulation 700-84 directs unit commanders to
ensure that only a Soldiers OCIE listed in the CTA 50-900 are inventoried and inspected
and then subsequently entered on their personal clothing records (DOA, 2014b).
Forces Command Regulation 700-2, FORSCOM Standing Logistics Instructions
delineates the logistical policies, movement planning methods, support responsibilities,
pre-mobilization/deployment stockage and storage of CTA items of deployable units
within the U.S. Army Forces Command. Additionally, Forces Command Regulation 700-
2 dictates when “contingency plan implementation requires [the] use of Army Pre-
positioned stocks for materiel sustainment support” (DOA, 1999, p. 5).
PM SPIE standard operating procedure outlines policies for operations conducted
to support PM SPIE, the Logistics Management Directorate, the Fielding and New
Equipment Training Operations, Materiel Readiness Operations. The PM SPIE standard
operating procedure (SOP) provides guidance to stakeholders on the proper fielding of
Class II and protective clothing and individual equipment (DOA, 2015b).
(3) Tactical Level Regulations
Army Regulation 735-5, Property Accountability, provides guidance for the
accounting of U.S. Army property outlining and standardizing requirements and
procedures. Specifically, Army Regulation 735-5 establishes “guidelines for maintaining
the command supply discipline program, addressing supervisory and/or managerial
responsibilities within the supply system” (DOA, 2013c, p. 1). Furthermore, Army
Regulation 735-5 provides brigade, battalion, and company commander’s oversight
management designating that commanders at all levels comply with policies set forth
within the regulation (DOA, 2013c).
2. Operations
To understand Army OCIE operations and whether the DEB concept is accepted,
a comparative analysis between the USMC and Army is presented in Chapter IV.
18
Currently, the USMC is the only organization (non-Army) that closely resembles the
Army’s mission requirements and equipment types.
a. USMC Individual Clothing and Combat Equipment (ICCE) Operations
Within the headquarters element, there are four separate line organizations, each
handling a separate form of logistics for the USMC. The line organization that
specifically manages ICE, is the Logistics Services Management Center (LSMC) see
Figure 7. The LSMC states they are tasked to “monitor critical USMC ground equipment
supply chain activities; plans, manages, executes, and integrates supply chain
improvements; and manage multiple critical logistics programs to ensure effective and
efficient support to the warfighter” (USMC, 2014, p. 3). Under LSMC there are
strategically located centrally managed logistics and sustainment support centers see
Figure 8. Nested under those strategically located support centers are the Consolidated
Storage Program offices which manage individual and unit combat equipment.
Figure 7. Marine Corps Logistics Command Structure. Source: Marine Corps Logistics Command (2016).
19
Figure 8. Logistics Services Management Centers around the Globe. Source: Janczak (2014).
In 2011, Consolidated Storage Program offices (central issuing facilities, and the
consolidated storage facility) transitioned to individual issue facilities and unit issue
facilities under the Consolidated Storage Program concept, illustrated in Figure 9 (DON
USMC, 2011). Both individual issue facilities and unit issue facilities are tasked “to
manage the issue, recovery, storage, and sustainment of [ICCE inventory such as]
infantry combat equipment; chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and [enhanced
conventional weapons (CBRNE) equipment; and] special training allowance pool
(STAP) equipment, to individual Marines, [unit commanders], and higher/adjacent
[commands]” (DON USMC, 2011, para. 16). See Figure 10 for ICCE equipment
examples.
20
Figure 9. Consolidated Storage Program Concept. Source: DON USMC (2011).
Figure 10. Individual Combat Clothing and Equipment Examples. Source: DON USMC (2011).
21
The “Consolidated Storage Program [utilizes the] Asset Visibility Capability
(AVC) [program] to individually track and account for all serialized items [and the] shelf
life of perishable [CBRNE inventory across the network] of Consolidated Storage
Program [locations] ((DON USMC, 2011, p. 46). The USMC considers the AVC
program to be “the single most critical tool [that the USMC can utilize to] ensure
Warfighters have what they need when they need it” (DON USMC, 2011, p. 43).
Additionally, the USMC requires that the AVC program provide the total life cycle
management (TLCM) data when “making [future] critical fielding and replenishment
decisions” (DON USMC, 2011, p. 43). The USMC does not feel that the Consolidated
Storage Program could “function without a robust and capable AVC” (DON USMC,
2011, p. 43).
The Consolidated Storage Program classifies inventory into two categories:
expendable and consumable (DON USMC, 2015). Any ICCE inventory deemed non-
expendable is an accountable item when issued to Marine Corps command (MARCOM)
unit. Due to the extensive nature of that requirement, the USMC states “there is a need
for a centralized inventory control system, to include centralized computation of
requirements, procurement, initial issue provisioning distribution, and accountability of
all assets owned by the USMC” (DON USMC, 2014, p. 1-15). Non-expendable items are
non-consumable inventory that is recoverable to the USMC. For a better understanding of
ICCE consumable goods, any form of individual clothing that would touch the skin of a
Marine (e.g., undergarments), that is deemed expendable, and therefore a consumable
good (DON USMC, 2014).
As displayed in Figure 11, there are 52 strategically placed CSP facilities across
21 worldwide geographic locations. Between 2011 and 2014, CSP locations repaired and
replaced ICCE inventory valued at more than $114 million dollars for redistribution
(USMC, 2015). In fiscal year (FY) 2014, the CSP processed 14.9 million pieces of
equipment for 518,901 worldwide customers (USMC, 2015). Marine Corps Logistics
Command (MARCORLOGCOM) states that “the CSP adds value [to the logistical
supply process] by rapidly providing necessary equipment to the operating force in
support of worldwide mission requirements” (USMC, 2015, p. 40).
22
Figure 11. Consolidated Storage Point Locations. Source: DON USMC (2011).
MARCORLOGCOM regulations do not require ICCE inventory to be serially
managed. Therefore, CSPs “are required to maintain gain/loss transactions [ensuring
100% property accountability] at all times. [Any and all unserviceable items discovered]
shall be disposed of directly through the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) in accordance
with Department of Defense [(DOD) 4140.1-R], Supply Chain Materiel Management
Procedures:” Operational Requirements; DOD 4160.28, Vol. 3—Defense
Demilitarization (DEMIL): Procedural Guidance Defense DEMIL: Procedural Guidance
(DON USMC, 2014, 2-27). For example, DOD 4160.28 states that “uniform clothing
stores and military exchange service stores shall not be allowed to sell DEMIL required”
CCE and PPE (DOD, 2011, p. 57).
23
Figure 12 illustrates the two key elements to the USMC supply system: wholesale
inventory level (general materiel support) and the retail inventory level (direct unit
support).
Figure 12. Inventory Levels of Supply. Source: DON USMC (2014).
The wholesale inventory level consists of a Marine Corps Inventory Control Point
tasked with providing materiel management and inventory control for ground weapons
systems and equipment. The Inventory Control Point is a central supply point for the
USMC supply system and has explicit knowledge and control of worldwide Marine
Corps inventory. Under the Inventory Control Point is the Remote Storage Activity
(which is beyond the scope of this thesis) and the Direct Support Stock Control (United
States Marine Corps Financial Management School, 2010).
Retail inventory is considered the lowest level of the USMC’s supply system and
is further segregated into two separate categories: intermediate inventory and consumer
inventory. Consumer inventory is considered a unit level supply activity, primarily
responsible for the distribution of equipment internal to Marine Corps units, specifically
ICE and FR uniforms. As stated in MCO 4400.150, “consumer-level inventory can exist
at any level whether strategic, operational, or tactical” (DON USMC, 2014, p. 1-2).
When ICE and FR uniforms are requisitioned by a unit from their installation CSPs or
unit issue facility (UIFs) for an upcoming deployment, consumer level supply operations
ensure that the correct quantities of ICE and FR uniforms requisitioned are at the right
place at the right time (DON USMC, 2014). Should an installation UIF not have the
requisite quantity of equipment necessary to field units designated for deployment, those
UIFs will reach back to the logistics services management centers for additional
24
quantities of ICE and FR uniforms. UIFs only house enough ICE and FR uniforms to
support designated deploying units on their respective installations (DON USMC, 2014).
ICE (FR uniforms) require central inventory control at the CSP level due to the
nonexpendable nature, monetary value, requirement for training, and sensitivity of this
materiel.
Intermediate inventory is managed at the direct support stockage control level and
acts as the go between for consumer and wholesale inventory in support of an area of
operation or a specified organization (DON USMC, 2014). The purpose of intermediate
inventory is to place cash sale ICCE materiel, cleaning supplies, petroleum type items,
and repair parts for basic maintenance strategically located around the world as a method
of reducing logistical response times for any unit requests for ICE materiel. The materiel
located within the direct support stockage supply lines is not the same materiel type
located within the CSP/IIF’s. For an effective unit requisition of direct support stockage
materiel to take place, the process requires four actions as shown in Figure 13.
Figure 13. The Requisition Process. Source: DON USMC (2014).
25
The requisitioning process is initiated with a submitted unit request to the supply
resource manager due to potential unit capability gaps. The next step in the process is for
the resource manager to validate user requirements and capability gaps, then notify the
supply officer. The supply officer then reviews the request and determines if there is a
valid need for the item requested. Should the command and supply officer approve the
request, the request is then pushed through the supply resource manager to generate a
commitment for request, order, and funding transaction code of the item in need. Upon
request validation of the item, the request is forwarded for fulfillment. Once the requested
item is received, the resource manager directs it for issue. It is important to note that
requisitions are a vital necessity for all MARCOM units and are maintained until
disbursement at the consumer supply level (DON USMC, 2014).
b. Army Organizational and Individual Equipment (OCIE) Operations
Prior to September 11, 2001, incoming Soldiers newly arrived on installation
were required to in-process at installation central issuing facilities and receive specified
OCIE in accordance with CTA 50-900. CTA 50-900 specified that central issuing
facilities were required to prioritize issuance of older model OCIE first (DOA, 2008a).
That requirement often resulted in Soldiers being issued antiquated equipment of varying
pattern. For example, Soldiers scheduled to deploy to Iraq prior to the invasion, were
issued desert camouflage patterned uniforms as shown in Figure 14, and woodland
camouflage patterned flack vests and Joint Service Lightweight Integrated Suit
Technology, as shown in Figure 15. Quite often, due to limited supply, the desert
camouflage uniforms issued to Soldiers were previously worn and already in a direct
exchange serviceable state. When equipment is in a direct exchange state of
serviceability, it is considered no longer suitable for use.
26
Photo taken of author CPT Kirouac’s uniform
Figure 14. Desert Camouflage Pattern
Photo taken of author CPT Kirouac’s uniform
Figure 15. Woodland Camouflage Pattern
Donald Rumsfeld’s statement, “You go to war with the Army you have” (Kristol,
2004, Introduction) did not sit well with Democrats in Congress. During a congressional
meeting, Connecticut Senator Christopher Dodd stated, “This [equipment condition] has
been an ongoing question since the very outbreak of the conflict in Iraq. It’s as old as the
conflict, going back when we learned that the Humvees that were going over there were
not adequately armored” (Public Broadcasting Station, 2004).
As a result of the Rumsfeld incident, all forms of logistical procurement and
management required modernization enhancements (readiness) to the overall OCIE
27
process. The OCIE modernization process (circa 2004–2006) required the Army to
prepare three documents, the Supply Request Package, the modernization plan, and the
Master Fielding Plan (MFP). The first document, the Supply Request Package, sent
technical data to the Defense Logistics Agency wholesale. The second document, the
modernization plan, delineated the implementation of new OCIE and the phasing out of
older antiquated OCIE. The third document, the MFP, supported the central fielding and
funding of designated units for deployment on the upcoming patch chart. For
understanding, a patch chart is nothing more than a list of units slated for an upcoming
deployment. The Army used the Supply Request Package, Master Fielding Plan, and
modernization plan as templates for coordinating budget, fielding, and modernization of
designated items needed for priority elements during a prescribed timeframe
(traditionally three years). After production of the designated OCIE items was complete,
priority units received the required equipment, in addition to CIF facilities, and war
reserve stocks, as needed.
OCIE equipment designated for replacement was required to be issued to
exhaustion. However, it was issued to units not designated for upcoming deployment. By
exhausting current supplies, this allowed residual stocks to diminish, eliminating any
future need of disposal.
In 2006, Army vice chief of staff, General Richard A. Cody, commissioned the
formation of an Integrated Process Team with the intent of determining the most optimal
way of managing OCIE for the foreseeable future. As a result, General Cody
commissioned the central management office with the mission of “providing total asset
visibility of OCIE with the intent of improving inventory management while enhancing
Army Total Life Cycle Systems Management” (Organizational Clothing and Individual
Equipment Central Management Office [OCIE CMO], 2016b, para. 2). The Central
Management Office’s vision was to “manage the Soldier as a system and to optimize
OCIE sustainment policies and processes under the Army Force Generation model as part
of the PEO Soldier’s OCIE life cycle management strategy” (OCIE CMO, 2016a, vision).
The OCIE Central Management Office (OCIE CMO) works as a subordinate to
the U.S. Army Tank-Automotive and Armament Command and collaborates with the
28
Army G4 Integrated Logistics Support Center and PEO Soldier, as shown in Figures 16
and 17 (OCIE CMO, 2016a, para. 2).
Figure 16. OCIE Management Process. Source: OCIE CMO (2016a).
29
Figure 17. OCIE Funding Distribution Process. Source: OCIE CMO (2016a).
The Army central point of contact would now become the OCIE CMO, which
worked closely with PEO Soldier and DLA. The OCIE CMO was tasked with
synchronizing sustainment activities for all OCIE items and providing disposition
instructions for lateral transfer of any and all excess OCIE with the goal of maintaining
total asset visibility (TAV; OCIE CMO, 2016a, para. 3).
The scope of the CMO is limited to asset management and sustainment of OCIE
assets across the Army. The OCIE life cycle management approach is managed in
accordance with AR 70–1, Army Acquisition Policy. Headquarters, Department of the
Army (HQDA) G8 tasked PEO Soldier with the responsibility of equipping the Army and
recommending the scope of initial fielding necessary. Initial fielding quantities are
“determined based on [G-8] guidance, urgency, operational needs, industrial capacity and
available funding” (Department of Defense Inspector General (DODIG), 2007, p. 21).
30
Once quantities and timelines are established, the program manager (PM) identifies and
coordinates with the appropriate agencies to achieve the most effective means for
procuring, fielding, sustaining and training of the item. CMO provides asset visibility,
usage data, readiness data and other information to facilitate PM planning.
The Life Cycle Management Command is the Army’s central point for data
gathering and analyses. Its mission is to ensure that the phase-in plan for newly
introduced OCIE include up-front funding, a residual inventory reduction plans,
sustainment strategy, and life-cycle cost estimates for the new OCIE items (OCIE CMO,
2016a, para. 4).
As OCIE pertains to army military clothing stores (AMCS), Soldiers use the
AMCS to replace lost OCIE as a method of avoiding the statement of charges process.
Nevertheless, the Army chooses not to stock high quantity levels of OCIE items in the
AMCS due to excessive management and inventory costs.
Per DLA guidance, the AMCS does not stock high dollar items in stores (e.g.,
sleeping bags, rucksacks, body armor, etc.). Funding to maintain higher valued items in
the AMCS would require additional funding to the Army stock fund and an Unfunded
Requirement (UFR) for base dollars to support that initiative. This increased funding
requirement prompted the introduction of the Rapid Fielding Initiative.
B. RAPID FIELDING INITIATIVE
In 2002, first deployers to Operation Iraqi Freedom reported individual equipment
shortages where “[the] current budget did not allow Soldiers and units to have needed
equipment available when they deployed, and the timeline for receiving the equipment
was too long” (Whaley & Stewart, 2014, p. 538). In response to identified deficiencies
and Soldier feedback, the vice chief of staff of the Army directed PEO Soldier to create a
process to quickly distribute “mission-essential clothing and equipment” (DODIG, 2007,
p. 1). The rapid fielding initiative was direct compliance to vice chief’s order. RFI is a
process that the Army uses to distribute and equip OCIE materiel at the Soldier level
(Carier, 2007). RFI “expedites acquiring and fielding up-to-date off-the-shelf clothing,
individual equipment, tentage, organizational tool kits, hand tools, administrative
31
supplies, and equipment CLII to support Soldiers” (DODIG, 2007, p. 1). RFI also
specifically includes FR uniforms, the new standard for deploying Soldiers.
RFI originally provided 49 items to 119,000 Soldiers deploying in support of both
Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom in 2004 (Goerger, Crino,
McCarthy, & Griffin, 2007, p. 4). Later, RFI expanded to include limited initial issue
items required for specific camouflage-patterned CCE and eventually became the
standard process for issuing to deploying Soldiers (Goerger et al., 2007, p. 4). RFI has
continuously operated, since its beginning in fiscal year 2004 (see Figure 18), using
emergency supplemental funding (DODIG, 2007). Once Overseas Contingency
Operation (OCO) funding discontinues, RFI becomes an unfunded process. Presently,
RFI equips approximately 60,000 Soldiers per year (Hoffman, 2016).
Figure 18. Number of Soldiers Issued RFI by Fiscal Year. Source: Hoffman (2016).
RFI uses both existing programs of record for clothing, individual equipment, and
commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) purchases to outfit Soldiers with the equipment they
need for the warfight (Whaley & Stewart, 2014, p. 538). PM SPIE briefed to industry that
the list of RFI materiel is “updated, validated and resourced annually” (Hoffman, 2016,
slide 37). Annual additions, deletions, and other changes keep the RFI list current.
Table 3 provides a list of FY14 approved RFI on-hand storage materiel requirements in
order to successfully field one Soldier the proper sizes on clothing and equipment.
32
Table 3. RFI for One Soldier in FY14. Source: Mortlock & Super (2014).
RFI FOR ONE SOLDIER
Item
No of Sizes/
Variants Item
No of Sizes/
Variants
A2CU COAT (OCP) 15 GHILLIE HAT 1
A2CU TROUSERS (OCP) 15 GHILLIE SUIT ACCESSORY KIT, FR, OCP 1
A2CU, FG Cotton Undershirt -o 8 GLOVES-WINTER 5
ACU FR (OCP) , Coat 37 Helmet Cover (OCP) 3
ACU FR (OCP) , Trousers 36 Holster, Pistol (OCP) 1
Army Combat Shirt (ACS) (OCP) 7 ICVC (OCP) 15
Army Fuel Handlers Coveralls (TAN) 6 IMPROVED FIRST AID KIT (OCP) 1
Army Patrol Cap (OCP) 14 Improved Helmet Retention System 2
Army Sun Hat (OCP) 14 Infrared, IR Strobe – Small 1
Bandage, Gauze Combat 1 IOTV, GEN II, Complete (OCP) 11
Battery, Non-Chargeable 1 IR Flags 1
Bladder, Hydration System (100oz New) 1 Knee & Elbow Protection System (OCP) 1
BOOTS, Aviation/CVC Hot Weather Boots (FR) 112 Light Weight Performance Hood 1
BOOTS, HWMCB Bates EO3612 - (HOT Weather) 106 MOLLE, Rucksack, Medium (OCP) 1 BOOTS, MC Belleville 950 - (Temperature Weather) 106 MOLLE, Grenadier Set (OCP) 1
BRACKET, LEVER (NOD) 1 MOLLE, Medic Set (OCP) 1
Brassiere 5 MOLLE, Pistolman Set (OCP) 1
COAT, GHILLIE SUIT BASE LAYER, FR, OCP 10 MOLLE, Saw Gunner Set (OCP) 1
Disinfecting Kit 1 NAPE Pad (OCP) 2
Ear Plugs, Combat 3 PANTS, ARMY COMBAT, Guard, Piolet (Removable) 1
ECWCS BOTTOM KIT (OCP) 15 PANTS, ARMY COMBAT, Without KneePAD+Piolet 18
ECWCS TOP KIT (OCP) 15 PROTECTIVE OUTER GARMENT (POG) 6
EYEWEAR KIT, One size fits all 1 PROTECTIVE UNDER GARMENT (PUG) 6
FR ACU Patch Kit (OCP) - Soldier Issue 1 Rank, Patch (OCP) 22
FREE BOTTOM KIT (OCP) 18 Rank, Pin-On 22
FREE SOCKS (4 PK) 5 Rifleman Set (w/TAP) (OCP) 1
FREE TOP KIT (OCP) 18 Strap, Eyewear, Retention 1
FREE, Gloves (OCP) 2 Strap, Involuntary, Restraint 1
FREE, Rigger Belt (OCP) 6 TCAPS 2
GEN 3 Combat Gloves 6 Tool, Rescue 1
33
Once purchased, the clothing and equipment items are staged at various
warehouses and staging facilities with a central storage facility located in Lansing, MI
(Mortlock & Super, 2014). The Army Campaign Plan determines deployment numbers
and is used to create a master fielding schedule (Goerger et al., 2007, p. 5). RFI uses the
master fielding schedule to order finished goods, based on anticipated needs, which are
then sent to various warehouses (Goerger et al., 2007, p. 5). Inventory is received,
packaged and shipped-off to requirement fielding sites as forecasted, where it is
individually issued (Carier, 2007). Some CLII equipment, like boots, are sent to the
fielding sites at greater than 100% requirements to account for sizing requirements of the
individual Soldier (Carier, 2007). The RFI concept uses a predictive tariff factoring
model to estimate sizing requirements and quantities of the fielding site Soldier recipients
(Goerger et al., 2007, p. 29).
Excess organizational clothing materiel is returned to the Lansing, MI, warehouse
where they are “checked for quality and re-shelved to support future fielding exercises”
(Goerger et al., 2007, p. 24). In the event of a shortage, additional materiel is sent from
the warehouse to fill the requirement (Carier, 2007). According to the Rapid Fielding
Initiative Business Case Analysis, if the warehouse is out of stock, the required class II
equipment is ordered and “shipped directly to the unit at a later date,” which can
sometimes be after the Soldiers have deployed (Goerger et al., 2007, p. 6). Additionally,
as evidenced at Bagram Airfield, Afghanistan, in-theater RFI warehouses “provide initial
issue and theater-specific items” (Barkley, 2011, para. 2). The Rapid Fielding Initiative
Business Case Analysis from June 2007 states, RFI’s primary objective is “to field 100%
of Soldiers deploying to theater with 100% of their RFI items 30 days prior to conducting
their mission readiness exercise” (Goerger et al., 2007, p. 8). From beginning to end, RFI
takes the following steps:
1. Utilize RFI Equipment List – Approved by HQDA G-3/5/7
2. Review Master Fielding Schedule
3. Conduct Strategic Planning
4. Bring-in refurbished OCIE and procure new OCIE, and ship to warehouse
34
5. Warehouse packages and ships equipment to fielding sites
6. Equipment is fielded
7. Retrieve and Order additional equipment as needed, and send it to the Unit (Mortlock & Super, 2014, slide 3)
35
III. LITERATURE REVIEW
A. UNITED STATES ARMY PRE-POSITIONED STOCK (APS)
The USA and USMC both preposition materiel around the globe to streamline and
coordinate logistics requirements with effectiveness and efficiency in response to either a
military conflict or to support any humanitarian assistance needs. The main goal is to
“deliver the [right materiel] at the right place and at the right time” as well as reduce the
logistical timeline for delivery of heavy equipment to the warfighter in theater (United
States Joint Forces Command, 2006, p. 2). In contrast to OCIE doctrine which states that
OCIE is carried as to accompany troops (TAT). With more expeditionary deployments,
the deterrence strategy relies more and more on power projection rapidity (DOA, 2015c).
Positioning materiel at the right place improves time significantly and supports
the mission as long as the materiel is what is needed. Based on the concept of forward
projection of power, prepositioning materiel is the fastest way to respond to an emergent
conflict. The APS concept is deployed in five different locations, as shown in Figure 19.
36
Figure 19. Army Pre-positioned Stock. Source: Association of the USA (2008).
Per ATP 3-35.1, APS encompasses pre-positioned “unit sets of equipment,
operational project stocks, Army War Reserve Sustainment [stocks], and War Reserve
Stocks for Allies” (DOA, 2015a, p. 2). Army Sustainment Command (ASC) manages
this equipment however, the materiel is under the responsibility of the Army Materiel
Command (AMC) and Military Sealift Command (MSC) (DOA, 2015a).
The current operational temp overseas and the sequester create issues for APS.
ASC has met difficulties rebuilding stocks afloat and modernizing equipment to meet the
current demands of the warfighters facing constant changes during conflicts. APS
personnel face constant pressure from degrading readiness. The association of the USA
stated, “It is not just the age and condition of APS equipment and cumbersome systems at
issue. The salient issue is whether APS possesses the right equipment in sufficient
number, properly sited and well-maintained” (Association of the USA, 2008, p. 5).
37
The Automated Battle Book System (ABS) displays what is available at each APS
location. Under APS Concept of Operations (CONOPS), it is important to note the
concepts of materiel not authorized for pre-positioning (NAP) and to-accompany-troops
(TAT) items. NAP and TAT are materiel required to be brought to theater from the home
station (e.g., expensive radio communication items). Troops deploying into theater must
carry their personal OCIE due to its “cost, availability, sensitivity or unsuitability for
storage” and is comparable to the NAP concept (DOA, 2015a, p. 1-4). Examples of TAT
and NAP items are listed in Table 4.
Table 4. Examples of TAT and NAP Items. Source: DOA (2015c, Table 1-1).
APS is managed by both Army, the Office of the Surgeon General (OTSG), and
the support of DLA (see Figure 20).
38
Figure 20. APS Program Organization. Source: DOA (2015c, Figure 2-1).
APS operation functions are comprised of five stages: Planning, Deployment,
Employment, Redeployment and Regeneration. When contingencies emerged overseas,
the key enabling steps for APS are as follows:
1. Strategic lift: Troops and personal materiel is transported to the aerial port of debarkation (APOD).
2. APOD Troops and personal materiel are consolidated as close as possible near the theater of operations.
3. Seaport of debarkation (SPOD): Pre-positioning ships are deliver class VII materiel near the theater of operations.
4. Staging Base: Troops are setting up bases in theater
5. Surface Transportation Infrastructure and Movement Control: Routes and schedules are put in place to allow materiel and additional troops to be transported to forward staging bases.
6. Security: Base are safe and secure within theater
7. Logistics Support: Constant and reliable logistics is provided through warfighters and enablers.
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The USMC can also tap into APS to support any contingencies assigned overseas.
In addition, they are deployed in Norway with the Norway Air-Landed Marine
Expeditionary Brigade (NALMEB) and at sea with the maritime prepositioning force
(MPF). These two programs support the Marine Air Ground Task Forces (MAGTFs) and
additional forward deployed units. The purpose of these three programs (APS,
NALMEB, and MPF) are to support a rapid deployment of forces and to support the
United States National Defense Strategy.
As mentioned in the Prepositioning Program Handbook, “Operations Desert
Shield/Desert Storm (Southwest Asia), Restore Hope (Somalia), and Iraqi Freedom have
all benefited from the support of both programs above. Time and strategic lift were
conveniently located and immediately available to Combatant Commanders” (USMC,
2009, p. i). Of note, all materiel pre-positioned under APS cognizance does not contain
CCE or PPE (see Table 5 and 6).
42
Surface Deployment Distribution Command (SDDC), AMC, and MSC under
United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) support the movement and
staging of forward materiel. APS, AMC, and MSC are often called the strategic mobility
triad.
B. DEPLOYER EQUIPMENT BUNDLE CONCEPT
1. Purpose
The DEB concept includes two primary categories of Soldier OCIE: fire retardant
uniforms and upgraded personal protective equipment (PPE) like Soldier Protection
System (SPS), which includes a helmet, ballistics vest, hard armor plates, protective
eyewear, and integral sensor system. (PM SPIE, 2013).
2. Summary
Per the Army Equipping Guidance 2013 through 2016, Annex B—Terms of
Reference, the DEB is an equipping concept in draft form designed to ensure that the
latest operational flame retardant (FR) uniforms, clothing and individual equipment are
immediately available to field to deploying Soldiers, meeting the capability that PEO
Soldier’s RFI using Overseas Contingency Operation funds currently provides
(DOA, 2013a).
This concept would support a current lack of planning in OCIE and Personal
Protective Equipment (PPE) requirements at low cost in case of a sudden major conflict
and deployment of troops up to 15 brigades (PM SPIE, 2013). In the DEB cost benefit
analysis dated December 5, 2013, Edgewood Chemical Biological Center studied and
reviewed the DEB concept in full detail. It operates similarly to RFI, but is funded from
the base budget in a non-contingent environment. The goal is to ensure that the latest
OCIE is ready to immediately field to deploying Soldiers. It provides decreased
operational risks and lessens the chance that the Army (or any other branches of the U.S.
Armed Forces) will have to pay a high-price for an unplanned and massive rush orders to
equip an entire force with the most advanced equipment available and still maintain an
43
inventory in case of further emergent needs when faced with a sudden major conflict (PM
SPIE, 2013).
Currently, the Armed Forces Exchange website lists the Army OCP blouse and
trouser (non-FR) total cost per set at $95.51 (Armed Forces Exchange, n.d.). According
to PM SPIE in Table 10, the FR ACU blouse and trouser total cost per set is $175; an
increase of 83% over standard OCP uniforms. Due to high price differentials, the Army
does not issue FR ACUs prior to a deployment and only issues to deploying warfighters.
The DEB concept supports deploying forces in camouflage uniforms, along with OCIE
and Personal Protective Equipment (PPE; PM SPIE, 2013).
A goal of the DEB concept is to provide time for the industrial base to ramp up
and launch the production of additional items for follow-on deployers and future
sustainment (PM SPIE, 2013). Edgewood Chemical Biological Center’s cost benefit
analysis, dated December 5, 2013, shows concern for major conflicts from the RFI OCO
funded environment. It could take up to 12 to 15 months to equip and field 15 brigades
and their support team.
The DEB concept recommends that the Army maintain and manage the DEB
inventory and provide a loop system to make sure the equipment stored is the best the
Warfighter can get (PM SPIE, 2013). Like the RFI system, the DEB stock is modernized
as new equipment comes on line and older equipment is issued to the troops in
continental United States (CONUS) in accordance with HDQA G-3/5/7 priorities (PM
SPIE, 2013). Upon termination of contingency operations, surplus RFI is responsible for
replenishment of updated DEB inventory (PM SPIE, 2013). DEB could also support the
Global Reaction Force with FR uniforms and modern PPE (PM SPIE, 2013).
The DEB concept received the endorsement of Maneuver Center of Excellence
(MCoE; Sando, 2012) and Army Capabilities Integration Center (ARCIC). A detailed
storage and sustainment plan is the natural following step for this idea. A solid cost
benefit analysis regarding storage solutions was developed in 2013 (Richards et
al., 2013).
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3. Background
PEO Soldier manages the rapid fielding initiative, a similar concept to DEB.
However, RFI exists in a well-funded Oversea Contingency Operations environment and
hot industrial base (PM SPIE, 2013).
With a potential cessation of hostilities and RFI funding coming to an end, it is
prudent to develop a process to equip first deploying brigades for future deployments
post OCO funding (PM SPIE, 2013). One of the key points of the DEB concept is about
FR uniforms (PM SPIE, 2013). For instance, infantry personnel in CONUS are not
equipped with FR garments and in the case of a sudden deployment requirement, FR
uniforms are not issued until well after departure from home duty station. The DEB
process would mind the FR gap and provide specific FR uniforms and PPE (PM
SPIE, 2013).
HQDA guidance is in full alignment with this concept (PM SPIE, 2013). The
DEB concept follows the FY13 Defense Planning Guidance for regional deployment and
aligns with the FY12 Soldier Modernization Strategy and the FY15 Army Equipment
Modernization Strategy.
The Army Strategic Planning Guidance 2014 is in the same alignment as it states,
“The ready capabilities of American military forces allow the United States to respond
quickly around the world, providing a presence that advances U.S. national security and
contributes to global peace and stability” (DOA, 2014a, p. 1).
The document continues, “If these fiscal constraints remain, resulting in an
undersized and less ready Army, it leaves the Congress, future administrations, and the
Nation with severely reduced options for military action to prevent, deter or win conflict”
(PM SPIE, 2013b, p. 1 ).
To rapidly field the most up-to-date equipment for a future conflict within a non-
contingent environment, including deep budget cuts and possibilities of a dormant and
cold industrial base, the Army along with PEO Soldier must acquire, stock, and manage a
45
large and dormant stock of OCIE materiel in support of deployers and enablers (PM
SPIE, 2013). The DEB concept intends to answer the future unexpected demand to
support this capability (PM SPIE, 2013).
4. How Deployer Equipment Bundle Concept Works
Under the DEB concept, the Army would assign an office of primary
responsibility (OPR) to procure, stock, upgrade, and issue DEB OCIE materiel as
required (PM SPIE, 2013).
a. Procurement and Stockage
The OPR would work with responsible Army staff agencies to ensure base
funding for the DEB concept is included in future Army program objective memorandum
(POM) submissions. The DEB concept is funded with Equipping Program Evaluation
Group (EE PEG) Operations and Maintenance Army (OMA) funding. DEB will use the
RFI storage concept (PM SPIE, 2013). Systems like container inserts, tactical lockers,
rack systems, contingency rack systems, or content specific solutions will significantly
reduce the concerns about the flexibility and speed required to respond to a contingency
and outfit 15 brigades (PM SPIE, 2013). In 2013, Edgewood Chemical Biological Center
developed a cost benefit analysis to address advantages and inconveniences to central
storage versus regional storage (Richards et al., 2013).
b. Upgrading
The DEB concept will supply the most up-to-date OCIE materiel available.
Annually, the OPR will receive an army approved; revised list of Organizational Clothing
Individual Equipment (OCIE) items in accordance with G-3/5/7 priorities and submits
follow-on requirements to DLA Troop Support office in support of continuous upgrades
for materiel in storage (PM SPIE, 2013).
c. Issuance and Outfitting
In support of immediate contingency operations, first deployers and enablers are
outfitted with the most technically advanced equipment inventoried in the DEB
46
warehouse under the supervision of the assigned DEB OPR (PM SPIE, 2013). Congress
will then activate OCO funding, which will allow replenishment of DEB materiel for
future conflicts (PM SPIE, 2013). RFI is then re-activated or ramped-up if necessary and
take the relay of the DEB concept in an OCO funding environment (PM SPIE, 2013).
5. Deployer Equipment Bundle Set Composition
The DEB concept provides FR uniforms and PPE accessories on the annually
reviewed list, similar to the current RFI list. Outfitting up to 15 brigades or 4,700
warfighters and enablers is the goal and can used as a planning factor (PM SPIE, 2013).
Therefore, an effective clothing size tariff ensures all Soldiers are issued properly sized
items to their body composition (PM SPIE, 2013).
As shown in Tables 7, 8, and 9, the draft DEB concept plan dated February 20,
2013, delineates a prescribed list of required items.
Table 7. BCT Set with Transitional plus Arid/Desert Uniforms and Temperate Weather Mount Combat Boots. Source: PM SPIE (2013).
47
Table 8. BCT Set with Transitional plus Woodland/Jungle Uniforms. Source: PM SPIE (2013).
Table 9. BCT Set with Transitional Uniforms. Source: PM SPIE (2013).
48
6. Sustainment
In accordance with the DEB concept plan, theater CIFs would manage and sustain
first deployers through a direct exchange operation until CONUS manufactures ramped
up to required production levels (PM SPIE, 2013). Planning Figures to support this
program are based upon historical data of annual replacement percentages of 20% for
uniform items, 10% for PPE (PM SPIE, 2013).
Initial estimates for the cost to support DEB activity is at $7.3 million annually
(PM SPIE, 2013; see Table 10). Additionally, the plan states OCO funding is re-activated
upon declared contingency in support of the RFI initiative to replenish DEB warehouse
stocks in support of follow-on crisis.
Table 10. DEB Sustainment Costs (Supplemental Funding after DEB Fielding). Source: PM SPIE (2013).
7. Application to the Global Response Force (GRF)
The primary mission of the Fort Bragg Global Response Force (GRF) is to deploy
17 hours no notice and extract American civilians from war zones. Additionally, GRF
provides support to allies facing natural disasters (PM SPIE, 2013). For instance, a GRF
brigade deployed to Haiti in 2010 following the earthquake disaster (PM SPIE, 2013).
With the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) threat, GRF is required to be ready at a
ready state at a moment’s notice (PM SPIE, 2013). Therefore, the DEB concept is
directly applicable to GRF operations (PM SPIE, 2013). The DEB concept plan states
that a GRF would benefit from the DEB, having immediate access to up-to-date
equipment. The Army would support deploying Soldiers through either RFI or DEB,
49
whether OCO funding was available or not (PM SPIE, 2013). Additionally, sustainment
must be accounted for to better forecast program lifecycle costs (PM SPIE, 2013).
In addition, every 18 months the next GRF unit must be equipped with the most
advanced materiel available within the DEB inventory (PM SPIE, 2013). Continuous
replenishment of the DEB storage location will have to be considered with additional
support funding (PM SPIE, 2013).
Initial PM SPIE estimates for the costs to support GRF are around $50 million per
an 18-month period (see Table 11). A GRF element is 3,865 warfighters, which is
slightly smaller than standard brigade-size element of 4,700 warfighters (PM
SPIE, 2013).
Table 11. GRF Projected Annual Costs Based upon an 18-Month Fielding Cycle. Source: PM SPIE (2013).
50
**Note: Table 11 identifies that GRF projects annual costs based on an 18 month fielding
cycle. This includes, an expanded DEB list beyond just FR ACUs and PPE.
8. Path Forward
Upon DEB concept approval, ASA (ALT) will assign an office of primary
responsibility (OPR) to design a precise DEB storage solution and fielding process (PM
SPIE, 2013). Then, the HQDA G-3/5/7, DOA Military Operations-Capability Integration
Division (DAMO-CI) will provide a solution to equip units like GRF when operating in
non-combat exercises (PM SPIE, 2013).
9. Summary
The DEB is a Soldier readiness deployment concept that is capable of supporting
early deploying brigade combat teams (BCT) outside an OCO funding environment and
mending the gap between the current existing RFI program and an environment absent of
contingency. According to PM SPIE:
The DEB concept will outfit 15 BCTs and enablers of first deployers to the next major contingency with the most modern, lifesaving equipment available, providing sufficient buffer stock to enable the industrial base to ramp up to full capacity. This concept procures OCIE/PPE for immediate capability needs and will include FR uniforms, along with OCIE. The DEB concept increases flexibility while reducing operational risks and costs to the Army. This concept allows for continuous technology refreshment of stocks in storage and, once activated for fielding, seamlessly integrates with and facilitates transition to the RFI List as supplemental funding becomes available. (PM SPIE, 2013, p. 11)
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IV. DATA ANALYSIS
A. DOTMLPF – DEPLOYER EQUIPMENT BUNDLE
Chapter IV conveys the research and data analysis process. In the first section of
chapter IV, we use the DOTmLPF matrix (see Table 12) to qualitatively compare the
Deployer Equipment Bundle concept to the Rapid Fielding Initiative, the Army
Preposition Stock activity, the United States Marine Corps Individual Clothing & Combat
Equipment sustainment activity, and the United States Army Organizational Clothing &
Individual Equipment sustainment activity. The intent of the comparative analysis is to
derive the similarities and differences between the chosen processes to further identify
DEB’s internalities and externalities. Additionally, we evaluated the comparative analysis
above and injected those conclusions into a strength, weakness, opportunities, and threats
DEB assessment. Next, we conducted a quantitative analysis of two separate conditions,
the Army with the DEB concept and a legacy low-level RFI status quo. To do this, we
define criteria variable capability gaps (DOTmLPF, 2005). When referencing the DEB,
we are currently in a low-intensity and/or non-contingent environment with a warm
industry base.
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Table 12. DOTmLPF Matrix Summary
RFI
(Rapid Field Initiative)
APS (Army Pre-Positioned
Stocks)
USMC ICCE (United States Marine Corps –
Individual Clothing and Combat Equipment)
OCIE (Organizational Clothing Individual
Equipment)
DEB (Deployer Equipment Bundle)
D Doctrine
Responsibility to provide organizational clothing and critical combat equipment to deploying Soldiers. No doctrine available.
Step-by-Step regulative structure for training, exercise, contingencies and retrograde operations.
New concept, like DEB. Issuance of materiel to troops in support of contingency operations. Troops train with same materiel issued during contingency.
Well regulated. Note that specific materiel stored in specific CIF facilities (i.e., cold weather equipment)
DEB stores a specified number of BCTs worth of FR ACUs and SPS components (helmet, vest, plates, eyewear & sensors). RFI stores materiel to support deployment schedules.
O Organization
PEO Soldier managed vertical integration.
Well-structured organization located in CONUS and OCONUS under AMC, TRANSCOM, SDDC, MSC
Like DEB concept, ICCE uses narrow organization hierarchy (3 levels)
Life cycle management organization, which operates in steady state capacity. Uses narrow organization hierarchy (3 levels).
No organization currently managing DEB. Shallow chain of command (Acquisition organization – 4 levels). Contingency operations only.
T Training
Training for new items occurs at the facilitating event.
All training requirements well described under doctrine. Regular training exercises are conducted.
Training requirements are still being refined. No additional training required.
No training provided to deployers on how to use the materiel issued. Long-term training provided to warehouse personnel.
Long-term storage training required. Troops will not train with materiel issued. Same as RFI.
m materiel
Small quantity of materiel stored, but same items as DEB.
APS and DEB have the same purpose in supporting readiness with large materiel quantities issued during contingency.
Like DEB, FR-ACU only issued during contingencies. All the remaining and required OCIE is issued during training. Materiel issued covers multiple pattern.
Materiel not serially tracked and uses algorithm to determine inventory levels. FR-ACU uniforms are not issued. CIF facilities manage the materiel, not OCIE LCMC. OCIE owns the facility.
Annual scheduling dictates DEB materiel issuance during a contingency. Troops don’t train with gear issued.
L Leadership
PEO Soldier tasked in 2002 with mission set.
High level of internal and external communication required. The life cycle community supports the program.
Recognize developing stage of the Consolidated Storage Program. Like DEB, the life cycle management community supports the new concept.
Robust program with many lessons learned. DEB is a new program.
Director of Capabilities Development and integration on behalf of the deputy chief of staff and G-3/5/7 task ASA (ALT to assign an OPR).
P Personnel
Same personnel as RFI managing DEB in a non-contingency environment. Mix of civilian and military personnel.
Additional qualified personnel required during surge. Mix of civilian and military personnel.
Like DEB uses a mix of civilian and military personnel.
Like DEB, uses a mix of civilian and military personnel.
Additional personnel required during surge capacity requirements. Mix of civilian and military personnel.
F Facilities
Operates out of Lansing, MI warehouse and multiple fielding sites.
Requires additional fielding facilities when contingency starts. Globally positioned.
Uses multiple facilities. Decentralized organization. No additional warehouse required. Centrally located.
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1. Rapid Fielding Initiative (RFI)
This section compares and contrasts the Rapid Fielding Initiative to the Deployer
Equipment Bundle concept.
Under the doctrine aspect of DOTmLPF, our analysis determines that RFI is
tasked to procure, store and ultimately field organizational clothing and critical combat
equipment to deploying Soldiers. DEB doctrine takes over the RFI process to procure and
store inventory to desired levels as a means of achieving readiness. Our analysis
determines when comparing the two concepts, the significant doctrinal difference is in
the storage concept. DEB stores a specific number of BCT’s quantity of materiel and the
RFI stores variable quantities of equipment relative to the projected deployment schedule.
A similarity between the two concepts is the quality of materiel and item types. For RFI
and the DEB, both contain CCE deemed to be the exact same and are determined during
annual review procedures.
Under the organization aspect of DOTmLPF, our analysis determines that PEO
Soldier is tasked to manage RFI operations. At this time, there is no specific organization
managing the DEB as it is still in concept state.
Under the training aspect of DOTmLPF our analysis determines that for RFI,
training occurs internal to the organization. At this time there are no official internal
training processes prescribed for the DEB. However, for both the RFI and DEB
processes, during fielding events, should there exist a new piece of equipment unfamiliar
to the warfighter, on the spot training would take place allowing users to understand the
intricacies of that equipment. Additionally, there is an assumption that both processes
would implement train the trainer classes with end users on unfamiliar equipment in
question.
Under the materiel aspect of DOTmLPF, our analysis determines that when
comparing the two concepts, there is no significant materiel differences between RFI and
DEB operations. A noteworthy similarity between the two programs is the CCE
equipment types chosen.
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Under the leadership aspect of DOTmLPF, our analysis determines that in 2002
the Chief of Staff of the Army tasked PEO Soldier with the RFI mission set
(Carrier, 2007). Additionally, in 2012, the Director of Capabilities Development and
Integration on behalf of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3/5/7 tasked PEO Soldier with
managing the DEB concept (Sando, 2012).
Under the personnel aspect of DOTmLPF, our analysis determines that personnel
requirements are identical for both concepts for day-to-day operations. However, the
DEB concept operates under surge capacity conditions. This condition necessitates the
requirement for additional personnel to manage due to rapid fielding surge capacity
requirements.
Under the facilities aspect of DOTmLPF, our analysis determines that at this time,
there is no specific facility housing the DEB as it is still in concept state. However, as
mentioned in the leadership paragraph, both processes are designated to operate out of the
Lansing, Michigan facility or similar existing Army warehouses.
2. Army Pre-positioned Stocks (APS)
Under the doctrine aspect of DOTmLPF, our analysis determines that an
exhaustive step-by-step regulative structure governs APS operations in comparison to the
DEB, which has no doctrine in its present form.
Under the organization aspect of DOTmLPF, our analysis determines that APS is
comprehensively structured with an expansive depth and range to its organization. Army
Materiel Command chain-of-command activities include Sustainment Command,
Strategy Logistics Activity (when deployed), four support brigades and six Army support
battalions. Horizontally, supporting activities include United States Transportation
Command, Surface Deployment Distribution Command, and Military Sealift Command.
In contrast, the DEB concept has a relatively shallow construct with three chain-of-
command levels; HQDA G-4, PEO Soldier, and PM SPIE.
Under the training aspect of DOTmLPF our analysis determines that a single
over-arching regulation dictates all training requirements for APS operations. The
55
training is regularly reviewed using constant process improvement. No overarching
formal training requirement exists for the DEB program, however, if adopted, official
training is institutionalized and planned ahead of time.
Under the materiel aspect of DOTmLPF, our analysis determines that both APS
and DEB have the same purpose, to deliver pro-active readiness. Additionally, when a
sudden contingency occurs, both programs house and deliver large fixed quantities of
materiel to the Warfighter fielding sites. Furthermore, one major difference, the root of
our thesis, organizational clothing (CL II) is not a component of Army pre-positioned
stocks.
Under the leadership aspect of DOTmLPF, our analysis determines that a major
requirement, for both APS and DEB, are to have an effective high level of internal and
external communication. The major difference lies in the doctrinal relevance of either
community which shapes leadership behavior. APS leadership works within the life cycle
management community, whereby DEB leadership works within the acquisition
community.
Under the personnel aspect of DOTmLPF, our analysis determines that in support
of contingency operations, both the APS and DEB utilize qualified personnel. In the
event of a contingency and fielding requirement of DEB assets, additional qualified
personnel are required to perform mission support.
Under the facilities aspect of DOTmLPF, our analysis determines that APS and
DEB both possess facilities with a square footage capacity necessary to perform their
primary functions. Additionally, when contingency is declared, both the APS
prepositioning ships and the DEB staging warehouse require additional fielding sites.
However, a significant difference between APS and DEB is the number of facilities and
locations. APS is globally positioned in nine locations. In contrast, DEB materiel is
staged in the Lansing, MI warehouse current facilities, but it is still to be determined.
Furthermore, APS land-based sights do not require additional facilities to conduct
operations whereby the DEB staging warehouse does. Both facilities are subject to the
“act of God,” however, APS facilities carry additional vulnerability to antagonist activity.
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3. United States Marine Corps Individual Clothing and Combat Equipment (USMC ICCE)
Under the doctrine aspect of DOTmLPF, our analysis determines that the Marines
issue what the Army considers initial issue clothing through the Individual Issue
Facilities (IIF) and organizational clothing through Unit Issue Facilities (UIF). One
similarity between ICCE and the DEB is the relative newness of each operational
concept. In 2011, the USMC created the CSP program and nested the IIFs and UIFs
underneath. The DEB program is still in a conceptual state, therefore doctrine is not yet
concrete. Another similarity between ICCE and DEB is the issuance of supplemental gear
for a contingent operation. For the Marines, an example is fire-retardant clothing.
However, for the Army, DEB issue is FR ACUs and SPS component items. A significant
difference between the USMC and DEB is that the USMC issues CCE to a Marine who
trains on and deploys with that specific CCE. PM SPIE fields DEB equip only after a
contingency is declared with the possibility that the Soldier may not be trained on the
CCE received from the DEB fielding. Under the DEB concept, there is a potential
requirement for units to update SOPs and reflect changes as Soldiers deploy with materiel
configurations different from what they train on. However, this is only a minor issue.
Under the organization aspect of DOTmLPF, our analysis determines that the
USMC and DEB both use a narrow hierarchy organization. ICCE uses 4-levels: Marine
Corps Logistics Command Group, the Logistics Service Management Center, the
Consolidated Storage Program, individual issue facilities and the Unit Issuing UIF. In
contrast, the DEB concept uses 3-levels; HQDA G-4, PEO Soldier, and PM SPIE.
Summarily, at the lowest level for the USMC, CCE is sent to multiple individually
managed IIF/UIF organizations.
Under the training aspect of DOTmLPF our analysis determines that due to the
newness of both programs, training requirements are still being refined. However, the
difference between the ICCE program and DEB concept is the training required for long-
term inventory management. ICCE personnel receive life-cycle management training to
include long-term storage and care requirements. DEB personnel are acquisitions
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management trained, and due to their high stock turn rate of CCE equipment, may not
have a long-term storage training.
Under the materiel aspect of DOTmLPF, our analysis determines that USMC
ICCE and DEB materiel to be similar in type and pattern. Another similarity between
ICCE and the DEB is that neither outfitting concept tracks CCE through individual serial
numbers. There are two significant differences. First, in a contingent environment, a
Marine only receives FR ACU, but the DEB Soldier receives everything all at once.
Second, a Marine receives two-types of authorized uniforms.
Under the leadership aspect of DOTmLPF, our analysis determines both
leadership communities are dedicated to their programs. Due to the relative infancy of
ICCE operations, USMC leadership is operating in a learning and improvement stage.
According to the Marine Corps Logistics Command’s Logistics Solutions for the
Warfighter, leadership is “currently developing the Consolidated Storage Program (CSP)
requirement” (Marine Corps Logistics Command, 2017, para. 1) Similarly, DEB
leadership experiences change management with the integration of increased and long-
term storage requirements.
Under the personnel aspect of DOTmLPF, our analysis determines that both ICCE
and DEB operations utilize a mix of uniformed service members and civilians. The
USMC operates steady-state at all times with a fixed number of personnel. In contrast,
the DEB requires additional personnel to conduct surge fielding requirements.
Under the facilities aspect of DOTmLPF, our analysis determines that the USMC
ICCE and DEB programs utilize centrally managed facilities. A significant difference
between the two programs is that USMC ICCE utilizes multiple IIF and UIF locations to
stage and field CCE. In contrast to ICCE, the DEB utilizes a singular staging warehouse
and external facilities to conduct fielding operations.
4. Organizational Clothing Individual Equipment
Under the doctrine aspect of DOTmLPF, our analysis determines that both the
OCIE CMO life cycle management program and the DEB concept are similar in the fact
that both contain CCE that is not serially tracked. Significant differences between the two
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programs are, OCIE CMO life cycle management program utilizes regulations to
determine what OCIE (cold weather equipment) types are housed within specific CIF’s.
The DEB contains cold weather equipment under the auspice that it has the potential of
being utilized in cold weather environments. An additional variance between the two
programs is that the OCIE CMO life cycle management operates CIF’s that work in a
steady state capacity issuing CCE to Soldiers, in comparison to the DEB, which operates
and issues CCE to Soldiers only on a contingent surge capacity. Lastly, OCIE LCMC
manages CCE utilizing a peak issue methodology algorithm to determine when and how
much inventory to replenish (Fan & Loredo, 2013). In comparison to the DEB, which
orders CCE annually, that order is in direct relation to the forecasted deployers for the
upcoming fiscal year.
Under the organization aspect of DOTmLPF, our analysis determines that both
programs run in completely different aspects. OCIE CMO operates its CIF’s within the
life cycle management community, whereas the DEB operates within the acquisitions
community. The hierarchy for OCIE management is the U.S. Army TACOM LCMC
(Tank and Automotive Command Life Cycle Management Community), the Central
Management Office, and the individual Central Issuing Facilities. In contrast, the DEB
concept command structure is 3 levels; HQDA G-4, PEO Soldier, and PM SPIE.
Under the training aspect of DOTmLPF, our analysis determines that training for
both OCIE management and the DEB are internal to their respective programs. However,
a slight difference between the two programs is that OCIE training after issuance of new
equipment to the warfighter is not provided. In contrast, DEB provides initial training on
new equipment immediately upon issue to the warfighter. An additional difference
between the two programs is that the OCIE CIF personnel receive life-cycle management
training to include long-term storage and care requirements. DEB personnel are
acquisitions management trained, and due to their high stock turn rate of CCE equipment,
may not have a long-term storage training.
Under the materiel aspect of DOTmLPF, our analysis determines that a similarity
between the two programs is that neither the OCIE LCMC process nor the DEB process
track CCE via individual serialized numbering. Additionally, both programs refurbish
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and recirculate serviceable CCE turned back into their respective programs as a measure
of cost savings. There are two significant variances between the two programs. First, the
OCIE LCMC does not issue FR ACU uniforms to Soldiers, whereas RFI does. Second,
OCIE LCMC owns OCIE CCE. However, installation-owned CIF’s and its personnel
house and manage this equipment. In contrast, DEB is owned and managed entirely
through PEO Soldier. However, a minute similarity between the DEB and OCIE are that
the DEB, like OCIE, are both issued within installation-owned facilities.
Under the leadership aspect of DOTmLPF, our analysis determines there is little
similarity between the two programs except Army leaders command both organizations.
In 2006, the OCIE LCMC implemented its current program. Over the past eleven years,
OCIE LCMC has had the opportunity to conduct process refinement through lessons
learned. In contrast, the DEB concept, if enacted, is an entirely new program from which
leaders have only their past experiences from other programs which to draw lessons
learned.
Under the personnel aspect of DOTmLPF, our analysis determines that both
OCIE CMO and DEB operations utilize a mix of uniformed service members and
civilians. The OCIE CMO operates steady-state at all times with a fixed number of
dedicated civilian personnel and only one military member. In contrast, the DEB requires
additional personnel to conduct surge fielding requirements.
Under the facilities aspect of DOTmLPF, our analysis determines that the OCIE
CMO and DEB utilize appropriate sizing facilities to conduct operations. A significant
difference between the two programs is that the OCIE CMO utilizes decentralized
facilities. For example, there are CIF’s on every major Army installation. In contrast to
the OCIE CMO, the DEB utilizes a singular staging warehouse and external facility sites
to conduct fielding operations.
B. DEPLOYER EQUIPMENT BUNDLE SWOT ANALYSIS
From the DOTmLPF analysis, we identified a number of strengths, weaknesses,
opportunities and threats assigned to DEB see Table 13. The intent of this section is to
flush out criteria necessary to conduct a quantitative analysis.
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Table 13. SWOT Matrix for DEB Analysis
STRENGTHS WEAKNESSES
- Annual Validation
- Non-Contingency Readiness
- Reduced Learning Curves
- Centrally Located Optimal CCE
- Component Servicing Capability
- Singular Management
- Forward Staging
- Training
OPPORTUNITIES THREATS
- Leverage Lessons Learned
- Executive Priorities
- Configuration Scalability
- Hub and Spoke Logistics
- Incremental Force Modernization
- Managerial Oversight
- Funding and Appropriation
- Changing Executive Priorities
- RFI Continuation
- Modernization
1. Strengths
Annual Validation: Through annual review, CCE currently in the DEB program
is validated for warfighter needs. If the materiel is no longer required for DEB warehouse
storage, the materiel is removed from the Lansing, MI warehouse and fielded to end-
users as required. If validated for inclusion in the DEB, materiel is compared against the
commercial industry off the shelf items to ensure the best available equipment is
procured and included in the DEB. Additionally, materiel in the RDT&E process is
reviewed for maturity and potential inclusion in the DEB (Richards et al., 2013, p. 59).
Non-contingency Readiness: The ultimate goal of DEB when a large-scale
contingency is declared, is to create readiness in a non-contingent environment through
acquisition and staging the best CCE available for a specific number of BCTs.
Additionally, DEB ensures a warm industrial base, reducing ramp-up time for acquisition
and fielding activities. DEB also uses fiscal resources to bridge the gap between base-line
and war-time fielding requirements. As a planning factor, Richards et al. state for
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example, “Contingency scenarios dictate up to 15 BCT’s having DEB capability and
deploying within 60-days (11 in 30 days, and an additional (4) in 60 days) after notice to
execute” (Richards et al., 2013, p. 59).
Reduced Learning Curves: The seamless transition from status quo RFI to DEB
operations would rapidly reduce the learning curve for existing employees. The
similarities between the programs create an inherent strength due to the ease of
implementation and executability. The primary change environment from RFI to DEB is
the source of funding.
Centrally Located Optimal CCE: All CCE requirements and fire retardant
uniforms are centrally staged in one single location for efficiency. Installation CIF’s in
close proximity to the Soldier only have non-FR ACUs, which may not be the necessary
materiel for deployment, which disqualifies the advantage of a CIF’s proximity on base.
Component Servicing Capability: CIF’s only provide service to their
Installation’s Commands. The DEB services all Army components: active, guard, and
reserves, regardless to location or component. Therefore, the deployer expeditiously
receives everything they need and are fully-equipped for the mission.
Singular Management: A logistical drawback to status quo OCIE operations is
that installation owned CIF’s manage CMO LCMC owned equipment. One single
organization owns and manages DEB OCIE. This single ownership streamlines
administrative and operational requirements.
2. Weaknesses
Forward Staging: To be effective, the DEB requires significant resources to
conduct staging and fielding operations. The DEB operates exclusively from a CONUS
logistical footprint. Soldiers must receive all CCE and PPE prior to deploying otherwise,
Soldiers deploy to a potentially immature logistical battlespace with the CCE and PPE
the currently possess.
Training: On occasion, Soldiers have not previously trained on CCE and PPE
received during fielding events. This new equipment poses an operational risk to
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Soldiers due to the injection of unfamiliar items that are not customized or configured to
the units SOPs. Albeit a weakness, it has minimal impact. Unit SOPs are living
breathing documents. Once the equipment is received, units have the ability to adjust
existing SOPs and briefly familiarize their Soldiers with the DEB equipment prior to
entering a battlespace.
3. Opportunities
Leverage Lessons Learned: When tasked and funded, the Acquisition
Community will seamlessly incorporate DEB concept procedures into baseline RFI
functions performed. Since 2003, PEO Soldier has fielded CCE to over one million
Soldiers (Richards et al., 2013, p.3). There is an immense opportunity to leverage lessons
learned from legacy RFI operations when establishing guidelines to DEB standard
operating procedures. Additionally, PM SPIE has the opportunity to gain knowledge and
leverage lessons learned from the Life-Cycle Management community. For example,
CMO/OCIE and ICCE operations all have a high volume long-term storage aspect.
Reviewing lessons learned, DEB stakeholders may capitalize on improved efficiencies in
storage, inventory and fielding operations. .
Executive Priorities: In February 2017, President Trump submitted a National
Security Presidential Memorandum (NSPM-1), which states, “the Secretary shall assess
readiness conditions...modernization…and…improve readiness conditions” (DOA,
2016, p. 1). Additionally, CSA General Milley’s states on 1 September 2015:
We must ensure the Army remains ready as the world’s premier combat force. Readiness for ground combat is-and will remain the Army’s #1 priority. We will always be ready to fight today, and we will always prepare to fight tomorrow. Our most valued asset, indeed, the nation’s most valued asset, are our Soldiers and our solemn commitment must always be to never send them into harm’s way untrained, poorly led, undermanned, or with less than the best equipment we can provide. Readiness is #1, and there is no other #1. (Milley, 2015, para. 4)
Both statements are from the highest levels of executive authority and clearly show that
readiness is currently a priority. If for no other reason other than the aforementioned,
there exists an enormous opportunity for DEB implementation.
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Configuration Scalability: If quantity of equipment becomes an issue, the
amount of CCE stored for DEB readiness is scalable to senior leadership requirements. If
the office of the United States Army chief of staff (G8) feels the quantity of equipment
exceeds funding capacity desired, there exists an opportunity to scale down the DEB
inventory to supportable levels.
Hub and Spoke Logistics: DEB centrally stages CCE in a single location and
distributes to necessary deployer fielding locations as required. The warehouse in
Lansing, MI, may not be the optimal location for hub and spoke logistics due to its
location. To minimize transit times, reducing the distance between the warehouse hub
and fielding site spokes is vital. Through relocation of the distribution warehouse hub, an
opportunity to reduce the lag time to fielding events would exist.
Incremental Force Modernization: As DEB modernizes CCE components for
staging, phased-out equipment may be removed from the warehouse and fielded to
operational Army units. Life cycle command planners can then create a phased-out
fielding schedule, based on individual unit requirements, once the DEB is implemented.
This provides an opportunity for the incremental modernization of a unit’s legacy items.
4. Threats
Managerial Oversight: Managerial Oversight is a concern. Highlighting the
appropriate community to manage the DEB is vital. In the planned format, PEO Soldier,
an Acquisition community organization, is tasked to perform DEB operations. The
concern is that the Life Cycle community manages long-term storage and non-contingent
OCIE fielding processes. The Life Cycle Community may be concerned that another
community is performing their function. This could easily be perceived as an inability of
the Life Cycle Command to do their job. Higher Army Leadership may not like other
Agencies assuming their duties and responsibilities. Community stovepipe mentalities to
maintain legacy programs under current doctrine is a threat.
Funding and Appropriation: Administration priorities and the willingness to
fund programs have a direct relationship. Programs live and die through executive
support or the lack thereof. The readiness DEB buys may become less desirable to
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another Administration’s priorities. Therefore, a priority today may not be a priority for
tomorrow.
G8’s mission of managing finite fiscal resources on prioritized requirements and
willingness to spend is a threat tied directly to the DEB.
RFI Continuation: If Contingency operations persist, RFI continues at elevated
intensity. In this state, non-contingent readiness is made irrelevant. Therefore, the DEB
does not create readiness and is unnecessary.
C. COMPARATIVE QUANTITATIVE ANALYSES
In this section, we quantitatively compare two non-contingent states. The first
state is a condition of low-intensity RFI with the deployer equipment bundle, labeled
“DEB.” The second state, labeled “status quo,” reflects a low-intensity RFI, CIF fielding
operations, and no DEB. To do this, we first identify evaluation variable criteria for
assessment derived from elements of the SWOT assessment. Evaluation criteria are
chosen based on importance and their ability to discriminate one state against the other
(see Table 14).
Second, we create performance scores for the evaluation factors where (1)
represents the higher performance level and (2) represents the lower performance level
(see Table 15). It is important to note that for comparative analysis, lower scores are
more desirable.
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Table 14. Evaluation Factors, Definitions, and Performance. Source: Richards et al. (2013, p. 14).
When then applying performance scores to each evaluation factor for the DEB
and Status Quo, we determine that first deployer combat readiness receives a score of (1)
for the DEB and (2) for status quo. For cost & funding, we determine that the DEB state
receives a score of (1) and the status quo receives a score of (2). For industrial base, we
determine that the DEB state receives a score of (1) and the status quo receives a score of
(2). For management & executability, we determine that the status quo state receives a
score of one (1) and the DEB receives a score of (2). For aversion to change, we
determine that the status quo receives a score of (1) and the DEB receives a score of (2).
Third, we applied weighting to the observed evaluation factors with the intent of
highlighting the relative importance of first deployer combat readiness over the other
relevant factor criteria. The assigned weights are a subjective assessment of the author’s
perspectives (see Figure 21).
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Table 15. Evaluation Factor Weights and Assessment
Next, we sum the observed performance scores as a method of obtaining the raw
unweighted score for a baseline comparative analysis. The raw score formula is as such:
Factor (F)1 + F2 + F3 + F4 + F5 = Raw Score.
Finally, we multiply the observed performance scores against the relative weight
of importance for each evaluation factor to determine overall weighted score. The
weighted score formula is as such:
F1 ∗ Weight of Importance (WOI)1 + F2 ∗ WOI2 + F3 ∗ WOI3 + F4 ∗ WOI4 + F5
∗ WOI5 = Weighted Score
For a comparative sensitivity analysis, we conducted a raw score unweighted
baseline assessment to determine the unweighted score for each state based off the
metrics described in the raw score and weighted score formula. The sensitivity analysis
illustrates a score where DEB operations produces an unweighted score of (7) and the
status quo produces an unweighted score of (8). From an unweighted perspective, the
DEB scores the lower value of the two states on the sensitivity in analysis Figure 21.
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Figure 21. Comparative Sensitivity Analysis of Unweighted Evaluation Factors
Next, we applied the prescribed weighing critera referenced in Figure 22, to the
sensitivity analysis as a method of determining the effect of placing weights on the
overall score. The sensitivity analysis illustrates a score highlighting that DEB operations
produces a weighted score of (8) and the status quo produces a weighted score of (10).
From a weighted perspective, the DEB again scores the lower value of the two states on
the sensitivity analysis in Figure 22. We observe that once the weight of importance is
applied, the margin between the two states grows two points wider.
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Figure 22. Comparative Sensitivity Analysis of Weighted Evaluation Factors
Finaly, we adjust the weighing critera to the sensitivity analysis as a method of
determining what it would take to change the outcome of the sensitivity analysis so that
status quo reveives a lower more desirable value. In order to produce a lower value, we
change the first deployer combat readiness from a (1) to a (2). We then change both
management & executability and aversion to change from a one (1) to a (2). We
determine that both cost & funding and the industrial base would remain unchanged.
According to Richards et al. 2013 CBA, the DEB is cheaper than status quo. Therefore,
the weight of importance for cost & funding remains unchanged. Additionally, we
understand that the DEB provides a warmer industrial base than the status quo due to the
production requirements it places on commercial industry. Therefore, the weight of
importance for industrial base remains unchanged.
For status quo to receive a lower score than the DEB, the weights of management
& executability and aversion to change are increased to (2) and the relative weight of first
deployer combat readiness is reduced to (1). By changing the relative importance of the
weighting factors, the sensitivity analysis produces a score where DEB operations
receives a weighted score of (11) and the status quo receives a weighted score of (10).
From a weighted perspective, the status quo scores the lower value of the two states of
the sensitivity analysis in Figure 23.
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Figure 23. Alternate Comparative Sensitivity Analysis of Weighted Evaluation Factors
Until now, subjective observations have been applied; in Chapter V we will
interpret the differences from the analysis to draw conclusions to identify challenges and
barriers of acceptance to the DEB.
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V. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND FUTURE RESEARCH
A. SUMMARY
The DEB is a storage and outfitting concept and designed to provide First
Deployer readiness with the most up-to-date CCE upon declaration of the next major
contingency. DEB stores a specified number of BCTs of CCE in a non-contingent
environment. Furthermore, DEB allows the industrial base to ramp-up production in an
expedited manner which translates into sustained procurement and fielding readiness for
follow-on Force deployments. As the world exists currently, the only Army OMA-funded
baseline program that provides the most modern CCE for first deployers in a non-
contingent environment is the program that supports the GRF. The limitation with this
program is that it does not meet the capability gap to rapidly field more than one BCT.
The proactive readiness DEB has the ability to create remains unachieved. This project
set out to understand why. To answer the primary research question of identifying the
challenges and barriers to acceptance of the DEB, we researched OCIE, ICCE, APS and
RFI operations to gain insight from similar processes. We found the following challenges
and barriers to acceptance of the DEB:
• Ignorance to a new concept
• Aversion to change:
• Culture
• Trust
When new concepts are introduced into an organization, buy-in is necessary for
the concept to be received and accepted. When members of an organization do not
understand the principles of the new concept due to simple ignorance or the intricacies of
its structure, the willingness to accept the concept degrade.
Aversion to change is a naturally occurring behavior in humanity. This aversion
is magnified within type-A organizations whose policies and practices were refined and
established over generations. Often in those type-A organizations, the phrase “if it is not
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broken, do not fix it” is voiced. Change generates a certain amount of undesirable
friction and uncertainty.
Army culture is strong and diverse. The lifecycle management and acquisition
communities each have their own cultures and traditionally, are vastly different from one
another. The DEB requires a specific measure of readiness that may be not be
acknowledged by necessary stakeholders. DEB success requires comprehensive external
stakeholder support. The potential for a clash of cultures within external stakeholder
communities is high, especially when each stakeholder has differing priorities.
In horizontal networks, stakeholders operate with independent objectives
contributing to the same end goal. When separate communities have differing priorities,
those priorities often are not aligned with one another and clash. When readiness is the
priority, trusting independent stakeholders to behave in mutually supporting ways is
paramount to achieving that goal.
Then, we performed DOTmLPF, SWOT, quantitative and qualitative analyses to
determine if answers existed to the following secondary research questions:
1. What is the Army’s legacy operation for the procurement, storage and issuing of OCIE materiel? What is the Army’s desired CCE readiness level?
PEO Soldier has an acquisition objective (AO) or procurement objective (PO) for
each program. After the AO and/or PO is met, the program transfers from the
PM/Acquisition community to the Life Cycle Manager (or Sustainment command) to buy
more items and conduct life-cycle management operations, including storage and issuing
activities at/from the CIF.
To address the Army’s desired level of readiness, the 45th President of the United
States calls for improved readiness. The CSA of the Army’s number one priority is
readiness. Therefore, the desired level sought is relatively higher than present levels.
Implementing the DEB concept is one way the Army can improve readiness. The DEB
offers a proactive readiness capability to first deployers through its staging of large
quantities of FR uniforms (both ACUs and extreme cold weather clothing system
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[ECWCS]) and PPE items. This type of readiness does not presently exist beyond GRF
capabilities.
2. Using comparative analysis, what is the USMC organizational clothing equivalencies operation? Why does the Army pre-position heavy equipment and not FR ACU and CCE items?
Our research determines similarities and differences of the DEB concept to both
the USMC’s ICCE operation and the Army’s APS operation. The USMC utilizes a
centralized logistics management concept for ICCE operations. This construct of total
life-cycle management is nearly identical to the Army’s life-cycle management
operations. The USMC outfits the total force at time of initial issue (except FR uniforms).
If the Army designated a scalable amount of additional dedicated first deployer BCTs,
they could leverage a concept similar to the USMC fielding operations. To do this, DEB
would require programmed baseline budget funding, similar to the USMC. Per
ATP 3-35.1, Army Pre-Positioned Operations regulation, FR uniforms and CCE items are
not pre-positioned due to excessive cost, constrained availability, and a pilferable nature
(DOA, 2015, p. 1-4). APS Operations does not provide DEB the ability to leverage best
practices due to the dissimilarity of programs.
3. What are the advantages and disadvantages of the DEB concept? How does the DEB affect Commercial Industry’s ability to ramp-up to full-rate production?
The greatest advantage of the DEB concept is that it fills a capability gap for CCE
materiel readiness in a non-contingent environment. DEB keeps the industrial base warm,
significantly decreasing the amount of time required for the commercial industry to reach
full-capacity production upon declaration of a major contingency. The greatest
disadvantage of the DEB concept is that it is only needed for a non-contingent
environment. If, however, the United States fails to transition to a non-contingent state, a
sustained RFI operation will supersede a DEB concept requirement. If contingency
operations continue, OCO funding would continue to provide resources for the RFI to
procure, manage, and field FR uniforms and PPE materiel that the DEB would otherwise
stage. In a contingent OCO-funded operational environment, OMA baseline funding will
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not be used for DEB, thus deeming it irrelevant. Therefore, the willingness to pay for an
unneeded capability is not-existent.
To address DEB’s effect on Industry’s ability to ramp-up, we reviewed the rate at
which Industry is capable of reaching full-production capacity, a rate of 3 BCTs per
month, in both DEB and status quo environments. In a DEB state, Industry is capable of
ramping-up 90 days faster than in a status quo alternative. Our research determines that
the DEB concept is optimal when the commercial industry is not producing large
quantities of CCE materiel. Additionally, the DEB concept allows up to 21 BCTs the
ability to deploy with the most modern CCE within nine (9) months after declaration of
contingency, compared to 17 months in an environment without the DEB, FR uniforms
and a warm sustaining base (PM SPIE, 2013).
B. CONCLUSIONS
Based on the two evaluation factors where status quo outscores DEB operations,
we determine the DEB’s greatest challenges and barriers to acceptance to be aversion to
change, ignorance to new concept, culture, and trust. Human nature generally has an
aversion to change. Until change is understood and embraced, stakeholders will fail to
recognize the value of new information. Change in the Army requires shifting away from
legacy programs and embracing new paradigms of thought. The DEB concept is a
fundamental change in the way Army conducts OCIE management on a large scale.
Currently, the GRF brigade conducts a scaled down version of the DEB concept
displaying that the DEB concept already works on a smaller scale. Embracing large-scale
change adopted from small scale operations requires buy-in of new concepts, trust, time,
and program discipline. Additionally, the Army could use the USMC ICE concept for
operations as medium-sized DEB concept for storing and staging first deployer FR
uniforms and PPE.
Horizontal network relationship of key stakeholders all have varying cultures.
When different cultures converge, trust become an issue. Specifically relating to the
Army, stakeholders of separate communities have differing priorities, objectives and
definitions of how readiness is achieved. Significance to one community may be
75
insignificant to another. Until divergent thoughts from the various communities that
handle OCIE co-mingle, cultural and trust issues may persist.
Logistics is not an issue. Army already has the tangible capacity to seamlessly
integrate storage, monetary, and transportation requirements. The challenge of changing
hearts and minds is the crux of the issue. If stakeholder goals are aligned and mutually
endorsed to bring together disparate communities, DEB would create a unique
opportunity to provide readiness for the Army’s most important resource, the individual
warfighter.
C. FUTURE RESEARCH AREAS
Due to the scope and limitations of our research, we recommend the following
topic and sub-topics for future research and analysis. The life cycle management
community traditionally manages organizational clothing and individual equipment. We
feel that there is potential to eliminate stated challenges and barriers to acceptance
through placement of the DEB concept within the LCMC community. Specific areas of
interest should include: If the LCMC community managed the DEB, how would
readiness and life-cycle costs be affected? What are the tangible and intangible costs
associated with this change in management? Lastly, what insights are gleaned from
converting DEB operations ownership from the vertically integrated PEO Soldier
organization to a horizontal network of life cycle management organizations?
Additionally, we feel that there exists an opportunity to leverage the scalability of
the DEB inventory potentially reducing other challenges or barriers to acceptance due to
stakeholder sensitivity. Specific areas of interest should include: The DEB currently
specifies a quantity of support for a specified number of BCTs to support two regional
conflicts. Is that number of BCTs the optimal number or should it be a different quantity?
Specifically, what is the appropriate quantity of equipment necessary to support DEB
operations?
Lastly, the USMC currently issues required ICE to their warfighters immediately
upon arrival to individual installations and FR uniforms right before deployment. Specific
areas of interest should include: whether there exists an opportunity for the USMC to
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adopt a DEB concept or is the size of their force too small to warrant implementing such
a program?
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