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NAVAL
POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
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THESIS
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited
THE DHIMMI NARRATIVE: A COMPARISON BETWEEN THE HISTORICAL
AND THE ACTUAL IN THE CONTEXT OF CHRISTIAN-MUSLIM RELATIONS
IN MODERN EGYPT
by
Gianstefano C. Martin
December 2009
Thesis Advisor: Mohammed Hafez Thesis Co-Advisor: Abbas Kadhim
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4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE The Dhimmi Narrative: A Comparison Between the Historical and the Actual in the Context of Christian-Muslim Relations in Modern Egypt
6. AUTHOR(S) Gianstefano Martin
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13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words) Religious texts, narratives, and history often provide the template by which religious leaders and their communities of faith frame actual events in modern times. In 2007, while conducting interviews in Egypt with leading figures from the Muslim and Christian communities, the author noted frequent comparisons, both favorable and unfavorable, between the dhimmi experience lived by Christians as separate millets in the past to describe the present conditions of the sizeable Christian minority living in Egypt today. This thesis investigates to what extent the parallels and analogies between the past and the present are valid and illuminating, and to what extent they are actually confounding, conflating, and obfuscating what is really going on. After identifying the hallmarks of the historical system by which the dominant Muslim authority managed its religious minorities in terms of spirit, ethos and practice, there follows a comparison of the main characteristics of the historical experience based on chronicles of Christians living as citizens in the modern Egyptian state. The thesis argues that although the origins of some current practices can be validated in some particulars, the dhimmi narrative as analogy is largely essentialism, and a rhetorical device, largely because it lacks the systemic, discriminatory intentionality and application exemplified by the millet system. As a way of understanding historical connections between the present and the past it has limited and circumscribed utility. Deployed as narrative or analogy by which to make meaning out of the present, it reinforces stereotypes, confounds attempts at conflict resolution, and infuses the future with an unwarranted sense of pre-ordained path determinacy. It leaves much to be desired as a useful analogy, but is useful in terms of developing taxonomy of attitudes and positions regarding the place of Christians in today’s Egyptian state.
15. NUMBER OF PAGES
125
14. SUBJECT TERMS Dhimmi, ahl al dhimma, Copts, Egypt, religious minorities, Islam, millet, Pact of Umar
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Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited
THE DHIMMI NARRATIVE A COMPARISON BETWEEN THE HISTORICAL AND THE ACTUAL
IN THE CONTEXT OF CHRISTIAN–MUSLIM RELATIONS IN EGYPT TODAY
Gianstefano C. Martin Chaplain, Major, United States Army
B.A., The University of Michigan, 1980 Master of Public Health, The City University of New York, 1987
Master of Divinity, The University of the South, 1993 Master of Religious Studies (Islam), The University of Virginia, 2007
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
MASTER OF ARTS IN SECURITY STUDIES (MIDDLE EAST, SOUTH ASIA, SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA)
from the
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
December 2009
Author: Gianstefano C. Martin
Approved by: Mohammed Hafez Thesis Advisor
Abbas Kadhim Co-Advisor
Harold A. Trinkunas, PhD Chairman, Department of National Security Affairs
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ABSTRACT
Religious texts, narratives, and history often provide the template by which
religious leaders and their communities of faith frame actual events in modern times. In
2007, while conducting interviews in Egypt with leading figures from the Muslim and
Christian communities, the author noted frequent comparisons, both favorable and
unfavorable, between the dhimmi experience lived by Christians as separate millets in
the past to describe the present conditions of the sizeable Christian minority living in
Egypt today. This thesis investigates to what extent the parallels and analogies between
the past and the present are valid and illuminating, and to what extent they are actually
confounding, conflating, and obfuscating what is really going on. After identifying the
hallmarks of the historical system by which the dominant Muslim authority managed its
religious minorities in terms of spirit, ethos and practice, there follows a comparison of
the main characteristics of the historical experience based on chronicles of Christians
living as citizens in the modern Egyptian state. The thesis argues that although the origins
of some current practices can be validated in some particulars, the dhimmi narrative as
analogy is largely essentialism, and a rhetorical device, largely because it lacks the
systemic, discriminatory intentionality and application exemplified by the millet system.
As a way of understanding historical connections between the present and the past, it has
limited and circumscribed utility. Deployed as narrative or analogy by which to make
meaning out of the present, it reinforces stereotypes, confounds attempts at conflict
resolution, and infuses the future with an unwarranted sense of pre-ordained path
determinacy. It leaves much to be desired as a useful analogy, but is useful in terms of
developing taxonomy of attitudes and positions regarding the place of Christians in
today’s Egyptian state.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................1 A. PURPOSE.........................................................................................................1 B. IMPORTANCE................................................................................................3 C. LITERATURE REVIEW ...............................................................................4 D. METHODOLOGY ........................................................................................13
II. THE HISTORICAL DHIMMI EXPERIENCE ......................................................17 A. THE ETHOS ..................................................................................................17 B. SCRIPTURAL GUIDANCE: NON-MUSLIMS .........................................17 C. EARLY RULINGS ........................................................................................19 D. RELIGION AND THE STATE....................................................................21 E. LEGAL STATUS OF CITIZENS ................................................................25 F. GOVERNMENT/MILITARY SERVICE ...................................................29 G. TAXATION....................................................................................................31 H. CHURCH BUILDING AND REPAIR.........................................................33 I. RELIGIOUS PRACTICES...........................................................................34 J. COMMUNAL REPRESENTATION...........................................................35 K. CONVERSIONS AND APOSTASY ............................................................36 L. SUMMARY ....................................................................................................38
III. THE CHRISTIAN EXPERIENCE IN EGYPT TODAY ......................................41 A. DEMOGRAPHICS........................................................................................41 B. REFERENCES TO THE DHIMMI ANALOGY........................................42 C. CONTEMPORARY DISCOURSE OF GRIEVANCE ..............................47 D. RELIGION AND THE STATE....................................................................50 E. THE LEGAL STATUS OF CITIZENS.......................................................55 F. GOVERNMENT AND MILITARY SERVICE..........................................65 G. TAXATION....................................................................................................67 H. CHURCH BUILDING AND REPAIR.........................................................67 I. RELIGIOUS PRACTICES...........................................................................71 J. COMMUNAL REPRESENTATION...........................................................72 K. CONVERSION AND APOSTASY ..............................................................77 L. SUMMARY ....................................................................................................82
IV. COMPARISON..........................................................................................................83 A. INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................83 B. POINT-BY-POINT COMPARISON ...........................................................84
1. Religion’s Relationship to the State..................................................84 2. Legal Status of Citizens .....................................................................84 3. Government/Military Service ...........................................................85 4. Taxation ..............................................................................................85 5. Church Building and Repair.............................................................86 6. Religious Practices .............................................................................86
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7. Communal Representation ...............................................................87 8. Conversions and Apostasy ................................................................88
C. CHRISTIANS IN THE EGYPTIAN STATE: A TAXONOMY ...............89 1. The Muslim Modernists ....................................................................89 2. The Muslim Brotherhood and Moderates .......................................90 3. Pluralist Traditionalist Islamists ......................................................91 4. Militant Islamists ...............................................................................91 5. The Nationalist/Multi-Confessional Vision......................................93 6. The Post-Islamist Culturalists ..........................................................93 7. The Nationalist/Secularist Vision .....................................................95
V. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS .........................................................................97 A. INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................97 B. AS HISTORIC DESCRIPTION...................................................................98 C. AS DESCRIPTION OF RELIGIO-POLITICAL REALITY ...................99
1. Continuities.......................................................................................100 2. Discontinuities ..................................................................................100
D. AS ANALOGY IN SOCIAL MOBILIZATION .......................................101 E. AS A MODEL FOR FUTURE RELIGIO-POLITICAL
RELATIONSHIPS.......................................................................................103
LIST OF REFERENCES....................................................................................................107
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST .......................................................................................113
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I would like to thank Dr. Abbas Kadhim and Dr Mohammed Hafez for their help
in writing this thesis. Without their support, encouragement, guidance, foresight, and
sensitivity to the issues it would not have been possible for me to maintain my focus, to
conceptualize and to articulate my findings in a systematic way. I greatly appreciated
their deepest enthusiasm for the topic, and endless patience with some of my cross-
disciplinary meanderings and reminding me about the relevance of what I was attempting
to national security policies and strategies.
I would also be remiss if I did not acknowledge that I am deeply indebted to the
Right Reverend Mouneer Anis, the Anglican Primate of Egypt and Presiding Bishop of
the Middle East and his staff, who provided me with a number of introductions to leading
figures in the Muslim and Christian communities throughout greater Egypt.
Finally, I would like to thank my family, especially my wife, Diana, who stayed
behind when I went to Egypt and to my little son, Giacomino, who I hope will live in a
world where religion does what it is supposed to do, that is, brings people closer to God
and each other. I could not have completed this work without them.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. PURPOSE
For four months in 2007, I had the privilege of conducting research on Christian-
Muslim relations in Egypt. In my conversations with a variety of religious leaders, I was
struck by how frequently they made reference to the dhimmi experience and the historic
religio-juridical system by which the Muslim majority managed relations with non-
Muslim members of their societies. It was clear they were drawing parallels between this
historical experience and current interactions between Christians and Muslims living in
modern Egypt.
The term dhimmi or ahl al dhimma, like many historical references, comes laden
with multiple meanings and connotations, depending on the interlocutor and the
audience. Because of the frequency of the reference to the dhimmi history and because it
was deployed by both Muslims and Christians, and not just in a pejorative way, but also
in a positive way, I came to formulate the hypothesis that this might not just be a simple
rhetorical device or hyperbole. Hence, in this thesis, I have evaluated the extent to which
it is valid to deploy this historical and religio-juridical term to describe current Christian-
Muslim interactions in Egypt. I attempt to get behind the rhetoric and determine the
extent to which such an analogy is sustainable by facts, and the extent to which it is not.
If grounded in fact, then one would expect to see a significant degree of correlation
between past and present, i.e., historical continuity. From the outset, this study envisioned
the following possible outcomes:
1. A high degree of continuity between the past and the present, thus validating the use of the analogy.
2. An insignificant degree of continuity and, correspondingly, a high degree of discontinuity between the past and the present, indicating that such a comparison is spurious.
3. Varying degrees of both continuity and discontinuity are present between past and present.
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4. Differential treatment, as applied to non-Muslims in the past, indeed exists today, but the conditions and practices are so different from those found in the historical record that the application of the dhimmi label today in this context is inaccurate.
I will argue that the treatment of non-Muslims in the past as dhimmi was far from
being a uniform and universal expression of Muslim-Christian relations in all contexts. In
order to avoid deploying what, in effect, is an essentialism, one must exercise great care
in characterizing all apparent discrimination as analogous with the historical record, and
thus, refrain from generalizations based on a few specifics. I will argue that while, in fact,
there exists a high degree of correlation between certain specific historical moments and
specific practices, and certain aspects of these practices, and this is still far different from
the intentional, systemic and institutionalized approach to governing non-Muslim
minorities as represented by the millet system. One can justify the claim that individual
discriminatory practices have historical roots in the dhimmi experience, but one cannot
say that this is tantamount to “dhimmitude,” just as it would be inaccurate to assert that
slavery still existed in the United States based on discriminatory practices that persisted
in segregated areas of the U.S. nearly a century following the emancipation proclamation.
The cognitive, political, and historical power of the term is undeniably potent and thus
tempting to deploy. While it is correct to recognize the legacy of individual practices that
carry an historic weight, one should not confuse the footprints, with the feet.
The historic dhimmi experience was an intentionally institutionalized system,
expressed in ways normative and regulatory, religiously sanctioned and officially
implemented. It regulated or delegated for regulation the public life of the minority
religious community. I, thus, posit that in Egypt today, though largely discriminatory and
usually (though not always) disadvantageous to the Christian population, current
practices should be considered fragments of historical residue to which the term dhimmi
or ahl al dhimma should not be applied. Though it leaves much to be desired as a useful
analogy, is useful to understand how it is deployed and by whom and for what purposes.
The deployment of the narrative provides insight into how various sectors in Egyptian
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society understand the past, how they relate in the present and how they envision the
future. It is thus useful in developing taxonomy of positions regarding the place of
Christians in today’s Egyptian state.
B. IMPORTANCE
Christian-Muslim relations in Egypt merit study for many reasons. First, Egypt
has the longest continuous, documented history of Christian and Muslim relations.
Moreover, to be able to study Christian-Muslim relations in modern times, one must be
able to find actual situations where sizeable and well-defined Christian and Muslim
communities consciously interact with each other, not just as individuals, or through their
religious leaders, but corporately, communally, and on multiple levels to include the
economic, educational, the artistic, the cultural, and the political. Egypt, perhaps unlike
other places on the globe, provides an opportunity to study both historic, as well as
significantly sizeable populations that interact according to modern and well as ancient
lines, and respond to political issues still today based on constructed notions of sectarian
identity. Finally, the fact that there is not a clear-cut separation of religion and
governance also means Egypt is even more of a living laboratory for studying the
political aspects of how non-Muslim religious minorities govern their common life
together.
Religious history, especially in the Egypt, provides a rich repository, a veritable
goldmine of schemata with which to frame reality. Moreover, religious history is no
ordinary history, but contains the potency of divine sanction. It has the power to confer a
sense of the sacred, of the numinous, of the divinely ordained and anointed order, derived
from immutable, transcendent truths. As such systems and causes that seem to be
grounded on their principles and leaders that invoke their divine power or quote from
their sacred scriptures have infinitely greater power than if they were to use secular
analogies and parallels. Religious leaders and their communities draw on this history and
attribute meaning to events based on shared memory and an internally validated system
of making meaning—a system of “coding.” It is not just how words are used, but also the
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authority and the gravitas of the interlocutor who deploys the narrative that reveals much
about how they and their community (audience) construct the past, present, and future.
Kees Hulsman, sociologist and co-founder of the Center for Arab-West
Understanding (CAWU), told Daily News Egypt (Misr al –Yaum) that in the same way
that Muslims are becoming more assertive in America, Copts are becoming more
assertive in Egypt and that this puts a strain on Muslim-Christian ties around the world.
Hulsman added that “whatever happens in Egypt between Muslim and Christians, will
have an effect in the West because these are not domestic issues; they have effects
outside of their borders.”1 I believe that Hulsman is correct. Because historical references
abound in the contemporary discourse of Christian-Muslim relations, I assert that in the
case of modern Egypt, the parallels drawn to the dhimmi experience, whether true or
false, are not simply diagnostic, but play important roles in terms of justification and
policy advocacy. I am convinced that studying and questioning the terms of discourse
and the ways that Christians and Muslim go about understanding their shared past, and
more importantly, construct and imagine their present and future is essential to generating
light, where sometimes all that has existed is a great deal of heat.
C. LITERATURE REVIEW
According to Hastings, “language, ethnicity, nationalism, and religion are four
distinct and determinative elements within world history.”2 They are core concepts for
every human and they help guide individual and group motivations while determining
how these entities will react to certain situations. All four are closely linked to each other,
as Hastings argues, and in examining the nature of modern Christian-Muslim relations in
Egypt, they are difficult to separate one from the other. However, to Hastings’ list, I
would also add another element: history itself. History operates, at least in the case of this
thesis, as both stage and actor. In every encounter that I witnessed between Christians and
1 Ruqqaya Izzidien, “Analysis: Drawing parallels between Copts in Egypt and Muslims in the West,”
Daily News-Egypt, August 14, 2009, http://thedailynewsegypt.com/article.aspx?ArticleID=23841 (accessed September 11, 2009).
2 Adrian Hastings, The Construction of Nationhood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997): 1.
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Muslims, history cast its shadows or beamed its spotlights, and in every scene, history
made its appearance and recited its lines. In culling through the primary and secondary
sources, I found much had been written about Christian-Muslim relations in Egypt from
both Muslim and Christian viewpoints As this study is a comparison of the present to the
past, the review of the literature became like a large, extended, fractious family reviewing
generations of scrapbooks, where one aunt exclaims, “Look how the baby is smiling; he
is the spitting image of your father!” —to which her son-in-law retorts, “I don’t think he
looks much like anyone in our family; I think he’s all yours!”
Historical accounts written by Egyptians and Christians, as well as secular
sources, from the classical to the modern periods, documented quite well how the
dominant Muslim society managed its non-Muslim minorities during specific periods
and/or how Christians and other non-Muslims survived or coexisted under Muslim rule.
Yet, there seems to be a gap in the literature where little has been done to
comprehensively compare treatment of Christians in modern Egypt to the treatment of
Christians as dhimmis under the historical millet system. I did, however, find numerous
incidental claims about the analogy based on one or two parameters, such as church
repair, conversion, or citizenship. Some tended to support the analogy’s validity, finding
evidence of “dhimmitude” in many of the negative aspects of modern Egyptian society.
Others vehemently denied any evidence of continued historically based discrimination,
and if anything pointed to what they saw as the more favorable aspects. They saw the
historical experience in a positive light and felt it still suitable as a model by which to
govern inter-religious relations. A few championed or denounced singular practices,
advocating in the name of universal citizenship that these residual aspects of the millet
legacy should be abolished. Most interestingly, the various attitudes cut across sectarian
lines, indicating that Muslims and Christians were not of one mind. Somewhat
surprisingly, there were Muslims who denounced the past and the present practices as
violations of human rights. Likewise, there were Christians who viewed the past system
(or at least certain aspects of it) with nostalgia, recalling only the protections and
privileges, and rejecting any attempt to categorize Copts as historical minorities or
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insinuate that they were other than full citizens. As Nielsen points out, the system as a
model for inter-religious relations still has its fans, not just detractors:
With regard to non-Muslim minorities, there are some scholars and activists who advocate the traditional practice of tolerating ahl al-kitab, Christians and Jews, as protected communities with specific rights, privileges, and duties. These scholars view such protection and toleration as a favour towards communities that are in essence subjugated. Contemporary proponents of this tradition rightly point out that this Treatment was far better than that which religious minorities generally experienced in Europe until the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.3
The more people I interviewed and the more I read, the more blurred the lines
became. Just when I thought I understood the various motives behind the convergences
and the cleavages an even more nuanced position would appear.
I will cite some of the more recent scholarly voices as a way of demonstrating the
variety and range of positions to be found in contemporary secondary sources. Because
the number of sources who are simply documenting a particular historical moment are so
numerous, I will restrict myself to those authors, who in terms of the treatment of non-
Muslim religious minorities have not only attempted to chronicle and illuminate
particular historical periods, but have also attempted to compare the different historical
records as well.
Bruce Masters characterizes the way in which modern Egypt, in dealing with its
Christian minority stands at a cross roads between the present and its Ottoman past.
Egypt, for him presents a living laboratory by which to examine the ways in which
authorities manage interaction among religious groups across cultures. He identifies the
very palpable tension in a society “both ruled by a pragmatic government and organized
around a dominant, public, religious identity—the Islamic.”4 For Masters, modern Egypt
is a study in contrasts and historical convergences, and is like looking at a double-
3 Jorgen Nielsen, “Contemporary Discussions On Religious Minorities in Muslim Countries,” Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations 14, no. 3, Carfax Publishing (July 2003): 338.
4 Bruce Masters, Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Arab World: The Roots of Sectarianism, Cambridge Studies in Islamic Civilization (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2001): 39.
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exposed photograph where one observes “the uneasy coexistence between a pluralistic
social environment and a demand for religious unity in both times [Ottoman and
modern].”5
Hugh Goddard, renowned modern scholar of the Crusades and Islam, in his book,
A History of Christian-Muslim Relations in many ways frames the larger question that
this thesis, in considering patterns of continuity and discontinuity, seeks to address.
Goddard, in taking note of the Copts in Egypt as one of the “ancient, once-dominant
Christian minorities” asks if the now dominant Muslim community will persist in its
classical and medieval view of Christians as dhimmis who “should be brought low” or
will they “move away from the classical concept of the Christian as dhimmi” and towards
the “fuller equality and participation envisaged by the Constitution of Medina.”6 Note
that Goddard does not claim that full equality can be obtained, only “fuller.” Goddard
holds a generally positive view of the Muslim world’s capability to deal with democracy
and pluralism and is openly critical of authors like Bat Ye’or, who, make frequent
negative references to the historic dhimmi experiences, having coined the neologism
“dhimmitude” to describe the life of Christians under Abbasid and Ottoman rule.
Goddard insists that such authors are unduly harsh and wrong to judge medieval Islam by
the standards of the UN Declaration of Human Rights.7 Bat Ye’or is the pseudonym of a
Jewish author who in The Decline of Eastern Christianity under Islam: from Jihad to
Dhimmitude, suggests that minorities are beginning to confront Islamic leaders and to ask
questions regarding their history and future. She claims that radical Islamist movements
are nothing new, but represent something coded into the DNA of Islam, which compels
Muslims to conquer and through jihad to impose of “dhimmitude.”8 She believes that
the “approach of the Egyptian government to tackle Islamic extremists will not succeed
5 Masters, Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Arab World, 39.
6 Hugh Goddard, A History of Christian-Muslim Relations (Chicago, New Amsterdam Books, 2000): 188.
7 Ibid., 68.
8 Bat Ye’or, The Decline of Eastern Christianity under Islam: from Jihad to Dhimmitude (Madison, NJ: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1996): 220.
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without. . . “a complete recasting of mentalities, the desacralization of the historical jihad
and an unbiased examination of Islamic imperialism.”9 While her negative, and
sometimes hostile characterizations of Islam have been challenged by Goddard and
others, there are those who feel the term “dhimmitude” to be a perfectly accurate mode of
description for the historic conditions of most non-Muslims.
Prominent contemporary Christian scholars and observers of Christian-Muslim
relations such as Sydney Griffith, and Richard John Neuhaus, editor of the American
Catholic magazine First Things are both Catholic who are critics of both modern
Islamism and find the evidence for dhimmitude compelling: Griffith writes:
The very mention of the legal disabilities that theoretically applied to Christians living within the Islamic polity forcefully reminds one of the sorrows of Dhimmitude, which Islamic law and practice imposed on the Jews and Christians, was a costly witness, and at times it entailed real martyrdom. While Christian martyrologies in Syriac, Coptic, Arabic and even Greek and Latin from the early Islamic period are not numerous, there are nonetheless some very important ones, which help the modern reader gain a better understanding of the sometimes precarious position of Christians in early Islamic society.10
Griffith and Neuhaus, like the French theologian, Jacques Ellul, who is a
Protestant, defend her neologism of dhimmitude as an accurate description of Islamic
political and cultural hegemony and as indeed being analogous to current times. The
latter, in reviewing her books applauds Ye’or scholarship as a counter to the “Islamophile
histories” currently the trend and he emphasizes his conviction that from the beginning to
the present, “Bat Ye’or persuasively demonstrates…Islam’s spectacular spread was brought
about by brutal military conquest, rapine, spoliation, and slavery, joined to a regime of
“dhimmitude” that was based on deep contempt for the subject infidels, including the Peoples of
the Book.”11
9 Bat Ye’or, The Decline of Eastern Christianity, 218–220.
10 Sydney Griffith, The Church in the Shadow of the Mosque: Christians and Muslims in the World of Islam, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008): 146.
11 Richard John Neuhaus, “The Approaching Century of Religion,” First Things, October 1997 http://www.firstthings.com/article/2008/09/the-approaching-century-of-religion-12 (accessed August 12, 2009).
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While it may be easy to classify characterizations like Bat Ye’or’s “dhimmitude”
as biased and highly agendized, it is much more difficult to dismiss the writing of S.S.
Hassan, a female, Muslim, Egyptian scholar with access to Pope Shenouda and the
Coptic hierarchy, as well as the Mubarak regime. In Hassan, we find a powerful,
authentically Egyptian voice who chronicles in great detail the vicissitudes of Egypt’s
Christian community in modern times. In her book, Christians versus Muslims in Modern
Egypt: A century-long struggle for equality, this author describes the Islamization process
under Sadat with the accompanying wave of popular anti-secular preachers, who
intimated that secular ideology was a Coptic program intended to divide the country and
obstruct the revival of true Islam. Using the historic reference to the dhimmi experience,
she forecast the contours of the future if the state failed to remain secular:
In the Islamic nation, the Christian minority would have the status of second-class citizens: dhimmis, or protected people, and if Islamic Law (sharia) were applied to the Christians not only in general areas, but in family law as well, as the Islamic militants advocate, it would most probably entail the fragmentation of the Christian family units and their eventual assimilations in the Islamic community.12
Hassan’s comments above indicate that the dhimmi theme is not only retrieved to
describe present conditions, it is also deployed in a prophetic manner to forecast and
frame the future. Other Egyptian secular Muslims also find aspects of the dhimmi legacy
alive in the here and now. According to Saad’Eddine Ibrahim, the noted Muslim
Egyptian professor of sociology and long-time critic of the Mubarak regime, there is
good reason to believe that in spirit and, indeed, in some specific cases, the treatment of
Christians according to a historical model of tutelage and domination persists. He decries
the fact that until 2005, the Humayonic which required a presidential permit for the
building or repair of churches was still on the books as “the remnants of an Ottoman law”
and “deeply entrenched religious discrimination in Egypt.” 13 However, while lamenting
the persistence the historical legacy, Ibrahim stops short of claiming that in modern Egypt 12 S. S. Hasan, Christians versus Muslims in Modern Egypt: The Century-Long Struggle for Coptic Equality (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003):106.
13 Sa’ad Eddine Ibrahim, “Christians Oppressed,” Wall Street Journal (Eastern Edition) New York, November 18, 2005, A.16.
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Christians live officially as dhimmis. Ibrahim, for many years director of the Ibn
Khaldun Center in Cairo, feels that while the Egyptian constitution holds all members of
the three heavenly religions to be equal citizens, in reality, Christians are effectively not
equal. To Ibrahim and other secularists they suffer the plight of the minority at the hand
of the majority. He and his center advocate for them to be legally classified as minorities
and, by law, to receive certain protections in the name of ensuring minority rights.
Ironically, his position has been opposed by many Christians, most prominently the
Coptic leader, Pope Shenouda, who like many Copts, but also liberal Muslims, feels that
this is a reduction of Copts once more to de jure dhimmi status—something very
negative. The pope states that “we are not a minority in Egypt. We don’t like to consider
ourselves a minority and do not like others to call us a minority.”14 Ibrahim, on the other
hand, feels that despite the constitutional affirmation that Copts are full citizens, they live
as unprotected and subjugated minorities. According to his version, the Pope Shenouda
rejects the categorization because it smacks of a return to official dhimmi status and the
Mubarak government rejects the classification because it would be an embarrassing
admission; that the government has failed to develop a truly egalitarian society.
Not all Copts agree with their pope either. Shawky Karas, President of the
American Coptic Society insists that as long as the Egyptian state privileges Islam as the
official religion and the constitution maintains the shari’ah as the main source of the civil
code then discrimination and conflict is inevitable. Christians will always be second-class
citizens because in his view, the “injunctions of the Qur’an constitute no less than a
comprehensive blueprint for society.”15 Karas suggests that the desire to make Christians
dhimmis under Islamic rule remains. He believes that President Mubarak, while paying
lip service to equality for all, has been continuing the same policy of religious oppression
and discrimination against Egypt’s Christians as Sadat did, but without sanctioning or
encouraging physical attacks.
14 Pope Shenouda, Human Rights Watch, 1994, 37, in Paul Sedra, “Class Cleavages and Ethnic Conflict: Coptic Christian Communities in Modern Ethnic Conflict,” Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations 10, no. 2 (1999): 219.
15 Shawky Karas, The Copts since the Arab Invasions: Strangers in their own Land (Jersey City, N.J: American Coptic Association, 1985): 93.
11
Egypt’s officially sanctioned and government sponsored Islamic institutions are
synched. Al Azhar and Pope Shenouda, sing a similar song. Ali Gomaa, the Grand
Mufti of Egypt and a modernist prefers to focus on the spirit of the law and dismiss
abuses as incidental and aberrant manifestations that reflect an imperfect level of
education among the general population. The Grand Mufti, while recognizing there is
widespread discrimination, asserts that the Egyptian constitution and the shari’ah, too are
both completely compatible with the values of democracy and the French Enlightenment.
He adamantly denies that such abuse and practices are a function of the system (Lesa ka
nazzam). 16
It is also important to understand how Pope Shenouda’s claims of full Coptic
equality have been in some ways undermined by the Western media and scholars who
cannot help but see the Christian community as victims of Islamist oppression and
characterize their situation as anything but that of full citizens. Western scholars of
Egyptian Islamism note the resentment that radical Islamists feel towards Copts to whom
the “secular” government has given at least on paper equal citizenship, something which
they believe the shari’ah forbids. For example, Gilles Kepel, the noted French journalist
and author of numerous books on radical Islam writes that “for the Islamist movement, to
assault the Copts is to assault the state.”17 While crediting the government with
attempting at least in public to uphold constitution, in his Muslim Extremism in Egypt,
Kepel identifies the gap between the actual versus the ideal. Like many skeptical
Westerners, Kepel here has identified true center of gravity in terms of inter-religious
relations, an inconvenient truth for the some Copts.
There are other modernist Muslims, however, who are not secularists but Post-
Islamists. They see the way forwards is to get back to the pristine times of the early
Muslim community. While denouncing discriminatory practices, they feel that secularism
16 Ali Gomaa in G. Martin “An Interview with Ali Gomaa, Grand Mufti of Egypt,” The Army Chaplaincy: Professional Bulletin of the Unit Ministry Team, Ft Jackson, S.C (Winter-Spring: 2009): 54–57.
17 Gilles Kepel, Muslim Extremists in Egypt: The Prophet and the Pharaoh, trans. J. Rothschild (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1993): 240.
12
has been tried and found wanting. The radical Islamist solution that deploys the classical
juridical formula to subjugate non-Muslims is even more repugnant to Muqtader Khan. A
former fellow at the Brookings Institute and director of International Studies at Adrian
College in Michigan, Khan asserts that in a true Islamic state “communities with different
religious orientations enjoy religious autonomy which essentially is wider in scope that
the modern idea of religious freedom.” Claiming that “the principles of equality,
consensual governance and pluralism are enmeshed in the “Compact of Medina” these
values can actually be “an excellent model for developing modern Islamic
democracies.”18 For them, a truly Islamic state with a “modified” dhimmi based on the
original Quranic ideal would be best.
Admittedly, folks like Khan are somewhat removed from the reality of Egypt, and
one could easily critique his views as presenting the ideal and not the real. Yet, his view
is not unique. Most interesting in this regard is the nuanced and highly controversial
position of Rafiq Habib, a Coptic Evangelical, the son of a former bishop and one of the
founders of Egypt’s Islamic Party, Hizb al Wasat al Islami. The Wasat or the “middle
party” also seeks a third, post-Islamist way of co-existence, and broke off from the
Muslim Brotherhood in 1996, who they saw as unrealistically and un-Islamically clinging
to worn-out road maps for international and inter-religious relations, such as Dar al Harb
and Dar al Islam. The fundamental point that makes Wasat post-Islamist for our
purposes, is that instead of defining Islam as a religion, it defines it as a culture, or
civilization, which is inclusive of minorities. Thinking of Islam as a culture is similar to
how certain people in the West refer to the West as “Judeo-Christian,” while still leaving
room for Muslims, Hindus, Buddhists, and others to practice freely therein. Thus, Habib,
the chief ideologue of the party for many years, envisions an Islamic culture which
belongs to Christians as well as Muslims. In Habib’s thought, to be a dhimmi is to be an
essential Christian minority member of an Islamic culture and society. Habib believes the
18 Muqtader Khan, “Prospects for Muslim Democracy: The Role of U.S. Policy,” Middle East Policy X, no. 3 (Fall 2003): 86.
13
Shari`ah can be viewed as a tool to facilitate modernity, if interpreted properly by
democratically elected religious officials, not state-appointed ones as those currently
ruling from al-Azhar.
Randall Henderson, a Christian, though secular scholar is cautious in approaching
the easy labeling of discrimination as tantamount to “dhimmitude.” Moreover, he
reminds the reader the not all aspects of the dhimmi experience were negative and that in
many ways the past system had many advantageous over the present one. In many ways,
his scholarship strengthens the post-Islamist solution and that of the Wasatiyya, including
Rafiq Habib’s. Henderson, in suggesting that it would be inaccurate to characterize the
historic dhimmi experience as a negative one, claims it would be wrong to use the term
dhimmi as a synonym for present forms of injustice against Christians. He points out that
certain advantages for Christians existed in the historical contexts that, in fact, do not
exist in Egypt today. Henderson warns:
…while it is tempting to conclude that this system worked against them, Copts and Jews [they] often took their family litigation to Islamic courts which were open to all religious groups during the Ottoman period. There they could achieve a divorce or litigate other problems that Church court would not have permitted. This was particularly beneficial to non-Muslim women who were locked in unwanted marriages.19
In conclusion, the literature is rich enough to allow a comparison between the two
historical moments, and to determine if any pattern can be discerned by comparing
multiple common practices and policies. It also reflects many more nuanced positions
than I expected to find and thus lends itself to analysis on a variety of levels.
D. METHODOLOGY
I should note that I intend this to be a “thick,” descriptive and comparative study,
rather than an analytical undertaking with clearly labeled dependent and independent
variables. I will identify the main characteristics, policies, ethos and norms of the
historical dhimmi experience in Egypt and compare them to current state of affairs among
19 Randall Henderson, “The Egyptian Coptic Christians: The Conflict Between Identity and Equality,” Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations, 16, no. 2, Routledge (April 2005): 157.
14
Coptic Christians living in Modern Egypt to see it the analogy is valid. The comparative
case-study methodology lends itself well to the study of similar phenomenon across time,
and is one of the basic techniques used to establish general empirical propositions and
discover empirical relationships among variables. As Stretton posits, “comparison is
strongest as a choosing and provoking, not a proving, device; a system for questioning,
not answering.” Generalizations drawn from a comparative case study, even one of few
cases, can perhaps assist with further theory development when tested within a wider
sample.20 Thus, I intend to engage in a certain amount of comparative historical analysis
in which I will place the statements and actions of contemporary religious leaders about
current political and social issues in modern-day Egypt in historical perspective. I also
hope that once such a descriptive study is complete that certain hypotheses could be
formulated about correlations, if not causality, with possible indicators of inter-religious
strife or harmony. This study then would lay the groundwork for a future, more analytical
study with even some quantitative aspects.
My first task, as demonstrated above was to conduct a review and establish the
contours of the discourse. How is the dhimmi narrative being retrieved? By whom and for
what purposes? What are the political and religious positions and do they follow sectarian
cleavages?
In Chapter II, “Key Characteristics of the Historical Dhimmi Experience,” I turn
first to the Qur’an and the ahadith and then survey a variety of historical accounts from
the Pact of Umar up to the firmans of the Ottoman Millet system. While careful not to
essentialize and create the appearance of a universal application of norms to non-Muslims
in all places at all times, I believe I have been able to eliminate situational idiosyncrasies,
localized manifestations and particulars, and to distill from the record those aspects of the
dhimmi experience which transcend any cultural context or historical moment and instead
are universals. I go back as far as the time of Mohammed and move forward to the end of
the Sadat era. Thus, the historical dhimmi experience against which I compare the case of
20 H. Stratton in Arendt Lipjhart,” The Comparable-Cases Strategy in Comparative Research,” Comparative Political Studies 8/2 (July 1975): 160.
15
Copts in modern Egypt is focused on eight normative social and political categories.
These are the general areas wherein Christians, according to classical Islamic
jurisprudence and custom, as religious minorities, traditionally received different
treatment from Muslims:
a. Religion’s Constitutional relationship to the state
b. Legal Status of Citizens
c. Government/Military Service
d. Taxation
e. Church building and repair
f. Religious Practices
g. Communal representation
h. Conversions and Apostasy
Once having identified and defined the overarching norms that characterize the
historical dhimmi experience, taking into account geographic and temporal variations, I
take actual statements about Christian-Muslim relations made by contemporary religious
leaders and place them and analyze them in their cultural and historical context. These
comments come from interviews that I conducted while in Egypt during the summer of
2007. As a priest of the Anglican Communion, I was able to avail myself of relationships
and contacts that are the fruit of pre-existing ecumenical agreements between my church
and Muslim leaders. Thanks to the ecumenical accords that existed between my church
leaders (particularly the Archbishop of Canterbury) and the Grand Imam of al-Azhar, I
was able to interview many influential and key members from both the Muslim and
Christian communities most of whom here will remain anonymous with the exception of
Dr Ali-Gomaa, the Grand Mufti of all Egypt. In addition to the aforementioned official
contacts, I also spoke “off-line” to a variety of clergy and religious leaders, local
journalists, politicians, and diplomats at the U.S. Embassy in Cairo, and other secular
subject matter experts who also provided valuable insights. Some interviews were
conducted in English, others in Arabic depending on the level of fluency and preference
of the person being interviewed. I also monitored the local press, and perused the
16
archives of the Al-Ahram Center for Strategic and Political Affairs. The comments will
serve as a springboard into the historical, and if necessary, the theological issues, context,
and backdrop against which they can be better understood.
After summarizing my findings, I move on to Chapter III where I compare the
historical record with contemporary relations, beginning with the rise to power in 1981 of
President Hosni Mubarak, following the assassination of President Anwar Sadat. A
summary of the findings concludes the chapter.
In Chapter IV, I engage in a point-by-point comparison of each of the above-
mentioned categories. I analyze the dhimmi experience, historical and modern, and report
my findings in terms of continuity or discontinuity with the past, noting specific
practices, traceable or not to the historical experiences. I note similarities and
dissimilarities and with the historical record, attempting to distinguish simple unrelated
sectarianism and discrimination, from that rooted in patterns of historical behavior. I
employ reports from human rights groups, the U.S. State Department, and Egyptian
historians and sociologists. I provide an interpretation of the findings and a
contextualization of the findings in the political life of modern Egypt. In this chapter, I
explain those who have the most to gain from continuing to perpetuate the dhimmi
narrative and conditions, and those who have the most to lose if it were to be challenged,
questioned, circumscribed or even abandoned. I also offer possible explanations and
relate them to theories of human behavior and cognitive theory where possible.
In my conclusions, I analyze how the dhimmi analogy is deployed, what it means
to those who deploy it, and how it currently shapes modern sectarian relations, and
develop taxonomy of positions.
17
II. THE HISTORICAL DHIMMI EXPERIENCE
A. THE ETHOS
Any attempt to analyze the historical record and distill from it the key aspects of
the dhimmi experience is fraught with challenges simply because of the variations in
time, culture, and location. Has there been a universal dhimmi experience? I think that
questions such as this that inveigh one into binary thinking are most unhelpful here. I
have steered away from looking for specific rules and regulations but rather aspects of
social differentiation that indicate an ethos, a pattern, and a set of norms. Thus, I prefer to
wrestle with a more nuanced question in mind: to what extent can one identify common
themes, stances, attitudes, and policies that could reflect the presence of a set of
universally accepted norms for governing relations between Muslims and non-Muslims in
a Muslim society? Since my intent is to eventually compare the historical dhimmi
experience with the actual one, I am intentionally casting a wide net. I do so with the
conviction that, because specific cases and regulations vary in the details and contexts,
the only legitimate way to determine the validity of the dhimmi analogy, is to examine
primarily the norms, and only secondarily the specific rules, and only to the extent that
the specific can suggest something universal and general. The documentation regarding
the practices commonly applied to non-Muslims is extensive, and far beyond the scope of
this paper to catalogue and classify all of them. Nevertheless, in surveying the record, it is
possible to identify several key and influential policies that were formulated, and that laid
the foundation for a comprehensive tradition that allowed local adaptation and
modification. I will move through the categories outlined in the first chapter and then
conclude with a summary of my findings as a way of establishing a baseline for
comparison.
B. SCRIPTURAL GUIDANCE: NON-MUSLIMS
Even before Muhammad’s death in the year 632 CE, interactions between the
growing Muslim community and the local ‘People of the Book’ who were living in the
environs of the new city-state of Medina, had reached a point where Qur’anic verses were
18
needed to dictate a principle to establish norms that addressed the relationship between
the Muslims, the Jews, and Christians. The occasions for the revelations (asbab al
nuzuul) suggest that these Quranic directives came down in response to conflict and jihad
between the Muslims and their fellow citizens of Medina. Within the Qur’an there is
usually clear distinction made between polytheists (Mushrikoon) and People of the Book,
with much greater respect shown to the latter and for our purposes, then we will only
look at specific references to ahl al kitab or ahl al dhimma, careful not to conflate them
with other categories of non-Muslims. Nevertheless, the specific Quranic references to
the ahl al-dhimma establish early on their inferior status in society, primarily for their
seeming recalcitrance shown to the Quranic message and the new prophet. Their beliefs
moreover are errant and misguided. Thus, we see that in the nascent period of Islamic
history, while still under the prophet, the precedents for the management (toleration,
subjugation and protection) of Jews and Christians, as the ahl al-kitab, first became
formulated. The Quranic text tells the Muslims:
Fight those among the ‘People of the Book’ who do not believe in Allah and the Last Day, who do not forbid what Allah and His Messenger have forbidden and do not profess the true religion, till they pay the poll-tax out of hand and submissively. The Jews say Ezra is the Son of God, while the Christians say the Messiah is the son of God. Such are their assertions, by which they imitate the infidels of old. God confound them! How perverse they are! (Q:IX:29-30)
While some interpreters say that the verses above were largely addressing non-
Muslims outside Medina, there are other early references to questions concerning the
status of monotheistic non-Muslims who lived within the Medinan Islamic community as
well. These, too, appeared during the life of Mohammed, especially once he and the
community moved to Medina where Muhammad offered a settlement, known as the
“Constitution of Medina,” which allowed other Jews and some non-Muslims in the area
to retain their own law and religion. The first use of the term “dhimma,” referring to
security for protected peoples, appeared in this agreement. Regarding the meaning of the
term itself, there is even some variation in shade of meaning. Some prefer to find the
meaning in the verbal root of the Arabic word, which basically means “to affix blame” or
19
“to find fault.” However, others have suggested that dhimma means, rather benignly, “to
be under the care of” or to be “protected” i.e., under the protection and responsibility of
the Islamic government. In classical Islamic times the dhimmi populations were to be
governed through the offices of their own leaders who were then held responsible for
both the taxes and the good behavior of those under their care.
C. EARLY RULINGS
Based on the early conception of dhimma, Christians and Jews received the right
to worship and retain their own religious customs in exchange for the jizya, a head tax,
which marked the ahl al-dhimma. There seems to be multiple reasons for this tax. One
motive, as articulated in the Quran was that of humiliation for failing to accept the
prophet’s revelation, and one might infer as a way of applying social pressure to
encourage conversion. Another reason, cited by some is that later on it became a charge
levied in lieu of the obligation to perform military service. Be that as it may, if the ahl al
dhimma refused to pay the jizya he was considered by all jurists to have not kept his end
of the agreement, which automatically restored to the umma its initial rights of war—to
kill and to dispossess the dhimmi, or to expel them, because they dared to revert to their
status of being an unsubjected infidel. Courbage and Fargues write:
Before launching an attack he (Muhammed) would offer them three choices—conversion, payment of a tribute, or to fight by the sword. If they did not choose conversion, a treaty was concluded, either instead of battle or after it, which established the conditions of surrender for the Christians and Jews—the only non-Muslims allowed retaining their religion at this time. The terms of these treaties were similar and imposed on the dhimmi, the people ‘protected’ by Islam, certain obligations. 21
Moving in the early life of the community in the first centuries after the death of
Mohammed, we find that, despite some evolving differences in the four schools of
Islamic Sunni jurisprudence, there appears near unanimity in matters concerning the
dhimmis. We read of them extensively in Abu Yusuf (731-98), a follower of Abu Hanifa
21 Youssef Courbage and Philippe Fargues, Christians and Jews under Islam (London: Tauris Publishers, 1995):2.
20
(d. 767), who was the founder of the Hanafi school of jurisprudence. He explained his
views at length in a treatise written for the caliph Harun al-Rashid (786-809). In his book
on the kharaj (land tax), Abu Yusuf declared that the governor should not exempt any
Jew, Christian, or other dhimmis from the jizya: “and no one can obtain a partial
reduction. It is illegal for one to be exempted and another not, for their lives and
belongings are spared only because of payment of the poll tax.” 22
Here we see how the classical view developed by the qadi and madhahabs holds
that the tax is to be considered the price to be paid by the “People of the Boo”’ for the
“covenant of protection” (adh-dhimmah) which the Islamic government provides for
them. There evolved the notion of the dhimmi as a community towards which Muslims
had a special responsibility- as one does towards one’s dependents. However, many
would say, this was not always so benign and certainly not without a note of
condescension, subjugation, and sometimes mistreatment.
From these origins, a much more tightly regulated structure for the ahl al-dhimma
would develop under the Abbasid caliphs as the shari’ah expanded into a comprehensive
system of law for Muslims as the empire expanded and incorporated large numbers of
non-Muslims and many Christians.23 In these later Islamic times, jurists created a
statutory principle, using scriptures to support a social policy that discriminated between
Muslims and the “People of the Book.” In recent times, some modern Islamic scholars
have come to insist that these classical jurists, like Abu Yusuf cited above, in their
eagerness to oblige the caliph and support the program of conquest, illegitimately
expanded and twisted scriptures to facilitate subjugation of the non-Muslim community.
Moreover, they decry the way that this legacy has reverberated across the centuries, and
still today is retrieved and reworked by militants. Abdul Aziz Sachedina observes the
following:
22 Abu Yusuf Ya’koub, Le Livre de l’Impot Foncier (Kitab el-Kharad) Translated from Arabic by E. Fagnan (Paris, 1920):189.
23 C. E. Bosworth “The ‘Protected Peoples’ (Christians and Jews) in Medieval Egypt and Syria,” Bulletin of the John Rylands University Library of Manchester (Manchester:1979): 11–36, 41.
21
. .. the political situation of Muslim societies had far-reaching consequences for the ways in which the Qur’anic teachings about pluralism were sometimes ignored in order to gain control over conquered peoples. The active employment by contemporary militant Muslim leaders of the violent precedents that were set at those dark moments of Muslim history points to the tension that exists between the qur’anic principles of justice and fair treatment of non-Muslims and the demands of maintaining the political vision of an ever-expanding dar al Islam. 24
By the year 732, just one hundred years after the death of Muhammad, Muslim
military forces had consolidated their control over a large stretch of territory outside of
Arabia which thereafter would become the heartland of what some now call the
“Islamicate” societies.25 This expanse of territory, embracing major portions of the
Roman and Persian empires of Late Antiquity, included numerous Christians. It is
important to note that perhaps 50 percent of the world’s confessing Christians from the
mid-seventh to the end of the eleventh centuries found themselves living under Muslim
rule.26
D. RELIGION AND THE STATE
Having briefly outlined the earliest and foundational norms and experiences that
over the centuries influenced Muslim-Christian relations, I will not begin to look at
those areas that I have identified as being representative of the larger, systemic
dhimmi experience. The first I will address is the relationship between religion and the
state.
Once Mohammed and his community arrived in Medina, Islam became political
and the fledgling state took on a religious identity. However, the religion expanded to
embrace a political agenda as well. The earliest notion that Islam is both a religion and a
state i.e., din-w-dawla can be traced back to this time. After Mohammed’s death in 632
24 Abdul Aziz Sachedina, “The Qur’an and other Religions,” in The Cambridge Companion to the Qur’an, McAuliffe, Jane (ed) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006):296.
25 Marshall Hodgson, The Venture of Islam, vol. I-III (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1974). Hodgson coins a term that he hopes describes the political system and a culture that encompassed great ethnic, linguistic and religious diversity.
26 Ibid.
22
CE, in the Sunni model, the scholarly class—the Ulema-wielded power, particularly
legal-juridical and religious power over the caliph, or amir al-mu’miniin. This caliph
wielded the sword and was the representative of the temporal authority. Without going
into a long description of the various ways in which the ulema and the amir al mu’miniin
co-operated and the spheres in which they operated, suffice it to say that there was a
kind of mediation between culture and religion and the needs of the state.
In the Islamic polity, unlike foundational Christianity or the modern secularism to
which it gave birth, religion is not divorced from the public agenda, leaving adherents of
competing doctrines free to pursue their beliefs engenders an inherent tension between
religious communities that has to be resolved through state regulation. Contrary to the
pluralistic spirit of the Qur’an, Muslim jurists encouraged a state-sponsored
institutionalization of the inferiority of non-Muslims, including the monotheist ahl al-
dhimma, as necessary for the well-being of the Muslim public order. Operationally, too,
because in the Islamic polity, religion is not divorced from the public agenda, the need
for public order has to be balanced and resolved through state regulation. Historically, in
the name of order, this included the state regulating religious expression and practice.
Muslim jurists encouraged a state-sponsored institutionalization of the inferiority of non-
Muslims, including the monotheist ahl al-dhimma as necessary for the well-being of the
Muslim public order. For these classical legal scholars, unbelievers had been offered
Islam and rejected it. Therefore, it followed that their inferiority was not imposed, but
freely chosen. Rulings related to non-Muslims were thus formulated in the context of
Muslim states in control of defining its relation with those ruled by them. The rulings in
large measure, reflect politico-social situational aspects of interpersonal relations in
juridical decisions, rather than the theological underpinnings of interfaith relations in the
Islamic creed. The Islamic tradition evolved into an instrument for the simple furthering
of the Muslim political and social agenda for power. i.e., the Muslim state’s hegemonic
control over other groups and nations. This pattern persisted, not just as an artifact of
medieval Muslim conquest, but as a system that continued through to Ottoman time until
the Tanzimaat reforms.
23
….the position of Islam at the emergence of the Ottomans and its institutionalization at the height of empire made it so that religion was adapted to the needs of the state, and contributed to the segmented integration of groups into the state. In their construction of the imperial realm Ottomans separated and differentiated between religion as institution and religion as a system of beliefs. 27
The policy with the most far-reaching effects was the Past or Covenant of Umar.
According to A. S. Tritton, the scholar who has done to this day the most in-depth work
on this agreement is that the Pact of Umar is a collection of norms dealing with
management of the Non-Muslim minorities attribute to Umar of which there were several
and some of whom were caliphs. According to Tritton, “the conclusion forced on one is
that no one knew what the covenant of Umar was; and that any collection of peace terms
might be glorified with his name.” 28 However, for the most part the stipulations came
originally from the treaties concluded between the Muslims and the cities and garrisons
that the Muslim armies conquered in the seventh century in the time of the second
caliph, ‘Umar I (634-644); hence the name of the compilation of these and later
stipulations.
Some claim that the Pact was also named for caliph Umar ibn Abd al- Aziz’s
(717-720). His program, for the most part, was aimed at promoting the equality of all
Muslims, be they Arab conquerors or new converts to Islam,29 yet, socially speaking, it
had a significant impact Christians living under the caliphs’ rule. The Pact or Covenant
of Umar drew visible, and well-articulated, public distinctions between Muslims and
non-Muslims in terms of power, access, prestige, and privilege. Historically, after the
conquest and the consolidation of Islamic rule in the conquered territories, this pact
gradually came into being to govern and enforce the laws that mandated a low social
profile for Christians, Jews and others who paid the tax According to the pact, protected
peoples—i.e., Jews and Christians—acquired the privilege to worship, to own property,
27 Karen Barkey, “Islam and Toleration: Studying the Ottoman Imperial Model,” International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society, Springer Science 19 (May 2007): 9.
28 A.S. Tritton, The Caliphs and their Non-Muslim Subjects: A Critical Study of the Covenant of Umar (London: Oxford University Press, 1930): 12.
29 Ibid., 15–18.
24
and to pursue their occupations in return for acknowledging the authority of the Muslim
government, swearing loyalty to the Muslim state, and paying the jizya as well as any
other financial assessments. In addition, the pact prohibited Christians and Jews from
marrying Muslim women and making any public religious display, such as exhibiting
imagery, ringing bells, making processions, issuing proclamations, and undertaking new
construction or repairs on synagogues or churches. Jews and Christians could not
proselytize, teach the Qur’an, nor prevent family members from converting to Islam.
Dhimmis could not imitate Muslims in appearance, bury their dead in Muslim cemeteries,
build homes that overlooked those of Muslims, own slaves previously owned by
Muslims, hold political office, ride horses or camels, testify against a Muslim in a
criminal legal case, sell alcohol, pork, or carrion to Muslims. In addition, Jews and
Christians in some places were to identify themselves by wearing a girdle over external
clothing, shaving the front of their head (males), and using distinctive headgear, saddles,
and mounts.30
One can certainly argue that considering the times, the degree of respect and
toleration afforded non-Muslims as religious minorities in Muslim lands was much
greater than that afforded non-Christians in Christian lands. Even though the legal
disabilities which governed these dhimmis required subservience, they received certain
guarantees and protections not so available to others in the Christian West. Yet, while
specifics have varied, there seems little doubt that in view of the stipulations of the Pact
of Umar, the dhimmi populations of Christians in the Islamic world were what we would
now call today second-class citizens, and as a consequence, over the course of time, the
number of bishoprics, churches, monasteries and schools gradually decreased, as a result
of a privileged position and priority given to official establishment of Islam. Syria,
Palestine and Egypt, i.e., areas where the largest populations of the speakers of Arabic
lived31 at the end of the ninth century, were still largely Christian; however, under
Muslim rule these populations gradually decreased. Some would say they converted,
30 Op Cit, Masters: 21 Many Western scholars believe that the more stringent stipulations were added during the Abbasid caliphate, which took a harsher line against religious dissent.
31 Op Cit, Griffith: 11.
25
others would say they succumbed. It is clear, however, that in many respects, the slow
erosion of Christian numbers had to do with motives other than purely spiritual or
religious appeal. To a large extent, it had to do the practical advantages of the new
religious identity that brought with it greater social status, upward mobility, and financial
rewards. These were positive incentives, yet negative incentives. The negatives and
positives i.e., the application of the carrot or the stick varied according to time and place.
For instance, after the time of the Crusades and the Mongol invasions of the thirteenth
century, anti-Christian policies became more pronounced under the influence of rigorous
and strict constructionists of the Covenant of Umar, like Ibn Taymiyya (1263–1328)32.
As negative incentives and sanctions were imposed, Christians began to decline
precipitously in numbers in the Islamic world. Later, under the Ottomans and the
implementation of the semi-autonomous millet system Christians lived with many more
freedoms, independence and power—positive developments, which, as we shall see, are
even today looked upon with some nostalgia.
E. LEGAL STATUS OF CITIZENS
The aforementioned Pact of Umar provided the dhimmi with a conditional
indulgence to worship, to own property, and to pursue their occupations. In return, they
were required to acknowledge the authority of the Muslim government, and swore
loyalty to the Muslim state. This still did not confer upon them the status of citizens.
Indeed, the concept of citizen itself was not a category that existed. There were only
Muslims and non-Muslims. Among the non-Muslims there were several categories, the
most socially respected and socially useful were the dhimmis. According to Abdel Aziz
Sachedina, “that the shar’iah has never developed the concept of citizenship,”33at least
not in way that Western Europe did. Judges upheld the spirit of the Pact of Umar, if not
always the letter, and often intervened in the affairs of the ta’ifa (sect) when they
deemed it necessary to keep order and to protect the Islamic identity of society.
32 Paul Heck, “Jihad Revisited,” The Journal of Religious Ethics 32, 2004): 122.
33 Abdel Sachedina, in The Force of Faith: Part I: The Impact of Religion on Military Operations, The Defense Language Institute, Foreign Language Center, (Monterey, CA, 2010).
26
Christians and Jews possessed no inherent rights, could not give testimony against a
Muslim in criminal cases, and were required to demonstrate their subservience in a
variety of ways.
It was during the Ottoman times, however, after the millet system came into being
that a kind of citizenship developed wherein Christians and Jews were granted rights and
privileges as long as they stayed within their circumscribed areas or milla. Bruce
Masters’s study of the Ottoman Arab provinces has drawn attention to the paradoxical
character of religious privilege and political subordination for Jews and Christians. The
ahl al-dhimma acquired a measure of autonomy to form their distinct communities that
ran parallel to the dominant Muslim one. This communal organization prefigured the
more strictly controlled millet system of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.34
While functioning within the parameters of this semi-autonomous and in some
ways imagined sphere, the dhimmi achieved a kind of limited, indeed, legally mandated
millet citizenship. If a Christian or Jew committed a crime against a member of another
community, the law of the injured party applied. However, any dispute involving a
Muslim fell under their shari’ah−based law. However, the courts during Ottoman times
practiced a kind of de-facto recognition of their dhimmi subjects, if not treating them as
full citizens. Court records indicate that there were numerous cases throughout the
Ottoman Empire of Jews and Christians who brought their cases to shari’ah courts thus
expressing confidence that they would mete out justice, which they usually did. 35
Nevertheless, this did not imply equality: the Ottomans retained the same highly
condescending attitude toward the ahl al-dhimma as their Arab predecessors. According
to Columbia University’s Karen Barkey, the hallmarks of the Ottoman millet system’s
attitude towards its religious minorities is that they were to be “separate, unequal and
protected”36 This approach to interfaith relations solidified a hierarchy of privilege that
allowed Christians and Jews to maintain their religious identity, yet clearly demonstrated
34 Op Cit., Masters: 31–33, 61–64.
35 William Montgomery Watt, Muslim-Christian Encounters (New York: Routledge, 1991): 61.
36 Op Cit, Barkey: 16.
27
the subordination of the ahl al-dhimma to Muslims in an Islamic culture. Hence, as I
mentioned, they were more subjects than citizens.
During the Ottoman eighteenth century, vassal states and their political elites
began to contest the Sublime Porte’s authority. Competition, military and commercial
with European powers intensified eventually leading to the reform of existing institutions.
In retrospect, we have come to understand that through a series of agreements and
concessions to the British, French, and Russians in particular, the Ottoman Empire lost a
measure of its sovereignty, and the millet leaders, such as the Greek and Coptic Orthodox
patriarchs lost a measure of their ability to control the members of their flocks.
The definition of who was a citizen was universalized by the Tanzimaat reforms.
The sultan was valiantly trying to update and hold his empire together with a series of
reforms that granted full Ottoman citizenship to all regardless of creed. Paradoxically, as
“Ottomanness” became the new criteria for universal citizenship, we see a rise in real
sectarianism, perhaps best epitomized by the mutasariffya administrative areas on Mount
Lebanon.37 In 1856, Sultan Abd al-Majid (r. 1839–1861) issued the Hatt-i Humayun
decree, conceding in principle the equality before the law of all the subjects of the
Ottoman Empire regardless of religion It is true that in their thrust, the Tanzimaat reforms
( both the Gulhane Rescript and Hatt i-Humayun) broadened and extended the Ottoman
identity and dismantled much of the basis for the old millet identities, however, because
they were linked to the Ottoman sultan’s “Capitulations” and thus to European and
Christian powers, they strengthened the relationship between the empire’s religious
minorities and its foreign patron states. This conferred upon the newly emerging non-
Muslim Ottomans a taint of “foreignness” and disloyalty even. The Russians presented
themselves as formal protectors of Eastern Orthodox groups, the French of Roman
Catholics, and the British of Jews and other groups. An Ottoman official in his memoirs
wrote:
37 Ussama Makdisi, The Culture of Sectarianism: Community, History and Violence in Nineteenth-century Lebanon (Berkeley, CA, 2000, University of California Press) Makdisi’s thesis is that Europeans encouraged non-Muslim minorities to construct sectarian identities, which they then mobilized.
28
Foreign Powers ... take up, some of them, the cause of those eastern Christians who are under Ottoman rule, alleging they are acting in the name of ‘humanity.’ Their real motive, however, is that they may use them as a point d’appui for their political schemes and designs. . . each native Christian community entertains, nowadays more or less without disguise, sentiments of animosity towards the Osmanlis, and even sympathizes with the enemies of the Turkish empire in times of international trouble or war. 38
As the Ottoman millet system of citizenship began to degrade, the identification
of the religious creed with ethnic nationality was slipping. However, in Egypt, the ability
of the sultans to effect policy was questionable already by the mid-eighteenth century. By
the nineteenth century, things evolved towards even greater autonomy courtesy of
Mohammed Ali Pasha. The Copts’ position began to improve under the stability and
tolerance of his dynasty. 39 H. B. Christophoros, a representative of the Greek Consulate,
and a member of the Hellenic College teaching staff said the following:
Mohammed Ali demonstrated his protection of the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate and its flock (rayih) throughout the whole period of the revolution, both during the time of Ierotheos I and afterwards. On the one hand he did not cease to provide much material and moral protection to the Greek Orthodox people; and on the other hand, upholding the privileges of the Patriarch in matters relating to the management of the internal affairs of the Church. This was manifest both in his personal relations with the Church and in his favourable interpretation of the Firmans which were given by the Sultans after the election of the Patriarchs in recognition of them.”40
As a result of the Crimean War (1853-56), the Copts saw the dawn of their
emancipation. Their main mark of inferiority, the jizya tax, was lifted in 1855, and in the
same year, they were allowed to join the army. In 1866, the Copts served in the inaugural
session of the Consultative Council, establishing a process of Coptic integration into the 38 Mehmet Beyri Halit, Istanbul, in Andrew Wheatcroft, The Ottomans (London: Viking Press, 1993): 164.
39 Barbara Carter, The Copts in Egyptian Politics: 1918-1952 (Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, 1986): 9.
40 Tillyrides Makarios (Orthodox Archbishop of Kenya) “Mohammed Ali and Hellenism in Egypt and His Request to Translate the Life of Alexander the Great into Turkish” in Adventures in the Unseen Nairobi, Kenya, 2007 http://www.orthodoxresearchinstitute.org/articles/misc/makarios (accessed September 23, 2009).
29
Egyptian political system. Ensured of their political rights, and freed from all social
restraints, the Copts flourished. This Coptic civil revival was accompanied by a religious
awakening, triggered by their enlightened Patriarch, Cyril IV (1854-1861), and it had the
effect of raising their moral and educational standards, and a kindling re-discovery of
their distinct identity.
More illuminating was the Copts’ effort to reformulate the country’s communal guidelines and eliminate or minimize the role of religion in Egypt, as it was emerging from its Ottoman past. The most obvious option for a new community was one based on territorial nationalism—”Egyptianness”—as distinct from a pan-Islamic or regional identity of any kind. Egyptian nationalism was born on the eve of World War I and became popular in the country during the struggle against foreign domination; Christian leaders were among its chief advocates and ideologues, as it was both consonant with the Coptic historical legacy and politically beneficial.41
Copts now were employed in financial and accounting positions and were
appointed rulers in a number of local governates. Copts had rights of land ownership and
a large financial and commercial bourgeoisie developed. A lay council, the Majlis al-
Milli was created in 1874 to represent the Coptic community. Religious freedom and
equality in employment were guaranteed in principle, though de-facto discrimination was
still present.
F. GOVERNMENT/MILITARY SERVICE
While many Christians and Jews reached positions of notable authority in the
courts of the various caliphs and sultans, the real power of the state remained firmly in
Muslim hands. Where Christians advanced en masse in the Islamic state began under the
under the Ottoman Sultan, Murad II, wherein young Christian boys were recruited from
among the conquered peoples of the Balkans to serve the state. It was considered a
system of human taxation and lasted from the fifteenth century until the nineteenth
century. These boys, however, though originally from Christian homes were raised as
41 Ami Ayedor, “Egypt’s Coptic Pandora’s Box,” in Ofria Bengio and Gabriel Ben-Dor, (eds) Minorities and the State in the Arab World (Boulder, CO, Lynne Dienner Publishing, 1990): 55.
30
Muslims. Known in Turkish as devshirme, it was much debated by Muslim scholars of
the time and many considered it to be contradictory to shari’ah. According to dissenting
ulema, the shari’ah gave clear instructions to the Muslim ruler to protect and take care of
all Christian subjects. These clerics noted that the shari`ah permitted enslavement only in
Dar al-Harb, not Dar al-Islam, where Muslims ruled. However, the needs of the empire,
as well as tribal traditions, apparently caused the rulers to find this practice irresistible.
From the fifteenth until the seventeenth century, between 200,000 and 300,000 boys were
conscripted into the devshirme.
Already in operation at the end of the fourteenth century, it continued to evolve through the fifteenth] In the sixteenth century, when a levy was to be made the sultan’s ferman first appointed a commissioner and a janissary officer for each district. Under the supervision of the local qadi and sipahi, at each village the commission summoned all male children between the ages of eight and twenty, and their fathers, choosing those children who appeared to be fit. The levee included only the children of Christian villages engaged in agriculture, excluding urban children and any only child. The commission recorded each child’s name and description in a register and sent the boys in groups of a hundred to a hundred and fifty to the age of the Janissaries in Istanbul. 42
A tragedy for many, but some scholars note that for many later Ottoman Christian
families, being the “slave” of the sultan was considered to be an honor by some, and
these janissaries filled the most prestigious positions in society.
Very often, becoming the sultan’s slave was the fastest way out of poverty for young boys in the countryside. There are some reports of Christian families glad for the opportunity to let their sons be selected through devishirme and be able to advance. 43
Yet others, also modern scholars, contest the degree to which Christians
viewed the conscription and conversion of their boys in such a benevolent light:44
42 Hakan Y. Erdem, Slavery in the Ottoman Empire and its Demise, 1800–1900 ( London, Palgrave MacMillan Publishing, 1996): 1–2.
43 Op Cit, Hodgson: 102.
44 Speros Vryonis, Jr., “Seljuk Gulams and Ottoman Devshirmes,” Der Islam 41 (1965): 245–247.
31
…in discussing the devshirme we are dealing with the large numbers of Christians who, in spite of the material advantages offered by conversion to Islam, chose to remain members of a religious society which was denied first class citizenship. Therefore the proposition advanced by some historians, that the Christians welcomed the devshirme as it opened up wonderful opportunities for their children, is inconsistent with the fact that these Christians had not chosen to become Muslims in the first instance but had remained Christians…there is abundant testimony to the very active dislike with which they viewed the taking of their children.
G. TAXATION
According to the Pact of Umar, protected peoples—i.e., Jews and Christians—in
exchange for the privilege to worship, to own property, and to pursue their occupations
had to acknowledge the authority of the Muslim government, swearing loyalty to the
Muslim state, and paying the jizya as well as any other financial assessments.
Interestingly, the change from Byzantine to Arab rule was welcomed by many among
the dhimmis who found the new yoke far lighter than the old, both in taxation and in other
matters. Some even among the Christians of Syria and Egypt preferred the rule of Islam
to that of Byzantines.
Taxation from the perspective of dhimmis who came under the Muslim rule was
“a concrete continuation of the taxes paid to earlier regimes”45 and from the point of view
of the Muslim conqueror, was a material proof of the dhimmis subjection. The
importance of dhimmis as a source of revenue for the Muslim community is illuminated
in a letter ascribed to Umar I and cited by Abu Yusuf: “if we take dhimmis and share
them out, what will be left for the Muslims who come after us? By God, Muslims would
not find a man to talk to and profit from his labors.”46
In the first century following the Muslim conquest of Egypt, we see the effects
of taxation upon the Coptic majority. Large-scale conversions occurred that were closely
linked to the disproportionate economic hardship inflicted upon the Christians. According
to Goddard, “oppressive taxation led to a whole series of revolts in different regions of
45 Claude Cahen, “Jizya,” in Encyclopedia of Islam, Bearman, Bianquis, Bosworth, van Donzel, and Heinrichs (eds) (Leiden: E. J. Brill Publishers 1960–2005).
46 Bernard Lewis, The Jews of Islam (Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1984): 62.
32
Egypt between 725/107 and these were crushed by the local governors and, in the end,
the caliph al-Ma’mun himself, who visited the province in 832/217.”47While modern
commentators wonder, how, given the level of intentionality and “jihad” by economic
means that the Coptic community was able to resist at all, it is important to note that
taxation alone did not cause mass conversions- it was a combination of taxation and
military aggression. Ira Lapidus commented that:
Coptic resistance by force of arms was broken. The despair which followed these crushing defeats seems finally to have set in train the movement of mass conversions to Islam... We may say that the defeat of the rebellion broke the backbone of mass Coptic allegiance to Christianity.48
Later, other heavily Christian areas, particularly in the Ottoman lands
experienced a similar pattern of conversions. However, for those that remained Christian
or Jewish the Ottomans came to develop the millets wherein the ahl al dhimma lived
within a semi-autonomous community which actually acquired a great deal of power.
They set their own laws and collected and distributed their own taxes. However, dhimmis
still had to carry a receipt certifying their payment of jizya at all times or be subject to
imprisonment. According to Norman Stillman, the “jizya and kharaj were a crushing
burden for the non-Muslim peasantry who eked out a bare living in a subsistence
economy.” 49 A number of scholars have concluded that, ultimately, the additional
taxation was a critical factor that drove many dhimmis to accept Islam.50However, others,
such as Bernard Lewis argues that while dhimmis had to pay higher taxes, they did not
have to pay zakat and Lewis notes that “there are varying opinions among scholars as to
how much of an additional burden the jizya actually was.” 51
47 Op Cit, Goddard., 71.
48 I. M. Lapidus, in Hugh Goddard; Ibid., 71.
49 N. Stillman, The Jews of Arab Lands: A History and Source Book (Philadelphia, Jewish Publication Society of America, 1979): 28.
50 Op Cit, Lewis, 17, 18, 94.
51 Ibid., 14–15.
33
H. CHURCH BUILDING AND REPAIR
The regulations about church building and repair, once enshrined in the Pact of
Umar, prove durable over time. These rules prevented Christians and Jews from
undertaking new construction or repairs on synagogues or churches in many locations,
stipulating that dhimmis not “build a church, convent, hermitage or cell, nor repair those
that are dilapidated,” 52 Sometimes, dhimmis managed to expand churches and
synagogues and even build new ones, albeit at the price of bribing local officials in order
to get permissions. When non-Muslim houses of worship were built in cities founded
after the Islamic conquests, Muslim jurists usually justified such evasions of the Islamic
law by claiming that those churches and synagogues had existed in the earlier
settlements. Later, depending on the locale, the permission for dhimmis to retain their
places of worship and build new ones depended upon the circumstances in which the land
fell under the Muslim rule. The policy varied based on local relations and the degree of
tolerance of the ruler and the usefulness of the Christians to the ruler.
From a modern sociological standpoint, the ease and ability given to the
Christians to restore their religious buildings, can be interpreted as a measure of the
degree of religious freedom accorded to the ahl al-kitab by a Muslim state. For example,
in observance of this prohibition, Abbasid caliphs, al-Mutawakkil, al-Mahdi and Harun
al-Rashid ordered the destruction of all churches and synagogues built after the Islamic
conquest and prohibited their rebuilding. Yet, an historian of the Shi’a Fatimids at the
Ismaili Center of London narrates that “al Mu’izz has been credited with granting
permission for the restoration of the church of al-Mu’allaka at Fustat. Interestingly, this
action of the imam-caliph aroused some opposition, particularly from a Sunni cleric, who
vowed to die rather than allow the church to be repaired.”53 Could this mean that the
Shi’a had a more tolerant way of managing relations with the ahl al dhimma? Before we
move to the conclusion, we should also consider that in the eleventh century, the Fatimid
52 Op Cit, Tritton, 6.
53 Shainool Jiwa, “Religious Pluralism in Egypt: The Ahl al-Kitab in Early Fatimid Times,” The Institute of Ismaili Studies, 2001, http://www.iis.ac.uk/view_article.asp?ContentID=104038, 9 (accessed November 2, 2009).
34
(Shi’a) caliph al-Hakim oversaw over the demolition of all churches and synagogues in
Egypt, Syria and Palestine, including the Church of the Holy Sepulcher in Jerusalem.
Although, al-Hakim subsequently allowed the rebuilding of the destroyed buildings, his
actions contributed to the launching of the first Crusade.
I. RELIGIOUS PRACTICES
According to the Pact of Umar, Jews and Christians could not proselytize, teach
the Qur’an, prevent family members from converting to Islam, imitate Muslims in
appearance, bury their dead in Muslim cemeteries, build homes that overlooked those of
Muslims, own slaves previously owned by Muslims, hold political office, ride horses or
camels, testify against a Muslim in a criminal legal case, sell alcohol, pork, or carrion to
Muslims. The Pact of Umar prohibited Christians and Jews from marrying Muslim
women. In addition, Jews and Christians were to identify themselves by wearing a girdle
over external clothing, shaving the front of their head (males), and using distinctive
headgear, saddles, and mounts and making any public religious display, such as
exhibiting imagery, ringing bells, making processions, and issuing religious
proclamations.
In practice these measures, which seem draconian, were often impractical and had
to be loosened. In Egypt, particularly under the Shi’a Fatimids, we hear that in 977, the
second year of al ‘Aziz’s reign, a decree was issued which prohibited the Christians from
participating in the rituals of Epiphany and hour years he forbade the Christians from
celebrating the festival of the Cross-measure seemingly to fall completely in line with the
Pact of Umar. However, these prohibitions were not a permanent ban on the celebration
of religious festivals by the Christians. In fact, “the very next year they were granted
permission to celebrate the Festival of the Cross again.” 54 These policies were
implemented to uphold public mores and address episodic moral laxity.
A combination of religious privilege and political subordination characterized the
relationship between minority communities and their Ottoman overlords. Bruce Masters
54 Jiwa, “Religious Pluralism in Egypt.”
35
has argued that even though Muslims and non-Muslims interacted with one another
extensively, Jewish and Christian communities were disconnected from public
“consciousness,” and “existed outside the boundaries of the social community.” 55
Authorities enforced the principle that non-Muslim religious expression could not
impinge upon the Muslim public sphere in any way. Christians and Jews were not to
disturb Muslim sensibilities with the sights, sounds, and smells of rival faiths. Prohibition
of public preaching, symbolism, processions, construction of new sacred spaces, and
propagation of the faith outside the family banished Jewish and Christian communities
from the public realm and placed them on the periphery of Ottoman society. Laws
governing relations between Islam, Christianity, and Judaism assumed that the ahl al-
dhimma ought not under any circumstances to disturb Muslims’ peace of mind. Officials
took special notice of non-Muslims when they intruded upon the Islamic public order. 56
Regardless of time or place, in terms of religious practices, it was in the public
domain where the Muslim concern for public order brought to bear the force of local
edicts developed on the basis of the overarching legal and moral touchstone of maslaha
mursala i.e., public good/welfare. Christians were largely left to their own devices to
perform their devotions as they pleased in private or in the confines of the sanctuary of
the church.
J. COMMUNAL REPRESENTATION
The aforementioned discussion of subject and citizens of semi- autonomous
sectarian communities leads naturally into the issue of community representation. Again,
the Ottoman system offers the most well-developed example of religious leaders who
fulfilled a dual role- that of spiritual and political leaders. Jews and Christians obtained
the right to select their own leaders and resolve their own disputes. In the absence of what
we understand as public services, each religious community became responsible for
55 Op Cit, Masters, 16–17.
56 Speros Vryonis, “The Experience of Christians under Seljuk and Ottoman Domination, Eleventh to Sixteenth Century,” in Conversion and Continuity: Indigenous Christian Communities in Islamic lands, Eighth to Eighteenth Centuries, Michael Gervers and Ramzi Jibran Bikhazi, (eds) (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, Toronto, 1990): 114–119.
36
creating, maintaining, and financing its own schools, charitable agencies, and clerical
bureaucracies. These rights and responsibilities formed the basis of an informal
understanding in the early modern period and that would later become formalized (and
more detailed) in the millet system of the nineteenth century. The millet system accorded
religious communities a large measure of self-regulation in exchange for loyalty to the
Ottoman state.
Indeed, the millet system of Ottoman Islamic law has been called a “pre-modern
model of a religiously pluralistic society.”57 The millets had the right to choose their
own religious leaders (patriarchs for Christians, exilarchs and geonim for Jews) but only
as subject to the approval of the Muslim authorities, who sometimes blocked candidates
or took the side of the party that offered the larger bribe. The head of millet was most
often a religious hierarch such as the Greek Orthodox Patriarch of Constantinople, who
reported directly to the Ottoman Sultan. The millet leader held office at the discretion of
the government, but was elected by the community and was a recognized intermediary
between the two, combining in his own person the headship of a voluntary rayah (lit:
flock) and the status of an Ottoman official. The special function thus assigned to the
patriarchates conferred upon the millets, as an institution, an ecclesiastical-political
character. This meant that in the Middle East, a church i.e., an ecclesial body evolved into
the most visible and public aspect of a nationality and the authority of the patriarchates,
extend to the control of schools, and even to the administration of certain branches of
civil law.
K. CONVERSIONS AND APOSTASY
Modern scholarship, particularly much of that which has been generated by
Muslim scholars residing and working in Western academia, suggests that early in the life
of the ummah, Muslim jurists illegitimately interpreted holy texts and manipulated
hermeneutical-juridical tools to allow the state to institutionalize the inferior treatment of
57 Abdulaziz Sachedina, “Freedom of Religion and the Question of Apostasy in Islam,” in Islamic Learning, Information Arm of the Organization for Islamic Learning. http://www.islamiclearning.org/ (accessed October 6, 2009) based on Abdulaziz Sachedina, Islamic Roots of Democratic Pluralism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001): 96–101.
37
non-Muslims. For the militant, and those extreme in their politics as well as their piety, it
was easy to espouse a commonly held belief that “true” Islam meant “intolerance toward
individual conscience.” 58While they were not unaware that the Qur’an, in its teaching,
favored free choice of religion, the drive to obtain a secure and orderly society was also
an important part of the Qur’anic ethos and one which the caliph and his jurists privileged
in terms of social ethics. Thus, we see that a harsh treatment of apostates develop,
generally based on a reading through the prism of the traditions as narrated in the
Medinan period. Muslims who turned away from Islam were seen as not just rejecting it
theologically, but also politically. Apostasy, then, was regarded as a form of treason at
the very worst or insubordination and a threat to public order at very best. As Sachedina
notes, in this historical context, the ulema’s attempt to balance the freedom of the
individual conscience and concern for the public order was unsuccessful: the jurists
opted largely for ruling that meted out a harsh punishment for apostates, justified
because it was no longer a mere matter of belief; it was an act of sedition:
As long as apostasy remains a private matter and does not disrupt the society at large, there is no particular punishment in the Qur’an. However, when it violates sanctity and impinges on the rights of Muslims to practice their belief, then it is treated as a physical aggression towards the faith. At that point it is no mere apostasy; it is, rather, treated as an act of sedition that causes discord and threatens the unity of Islamic community. 59
Hugh Goddard in his book A History of Christian –Muslim Relations notes that
there were never conversions en masse from by Muslim to Christianity, as there was by
Christians to Islam. While the door for those who wanted to convert to Islam was open
while for those who wanted to leave Islam remained firmly shut. When conversions
occurred they were done in very low-profile way. However, there were a few public
conversion of prominent Muslim during the imperial period. Sheik Salih, an Indian alim,
converted in 1825 became an Anglican priest, and Muhammed Mansur, a cleric of al-
58 Abdul Aziz Sachedina, “Freedom of Conscience and Religion in the Qur’an,” in Human Rights and the Conflict of Cultures: Western and Islamic Perspectives on Religious Liberty, with David Little and John Kelsay (eds) (Columbia, S.C.: Univ. of South Carolina Press, 1988): 53–90.
59 Ibid.
38
Azhar, publicly embraced Christianity in 1919.60 Much ado was made of such
conversions by the English and the evangelical press of the time. Given the political
circumstances and the imperial presence of Great Britain, it is understandable how much
safer and advantageous a conversion to Christianity was at that particular time in that
situation. However, in most places and times, for the common Muslim to convert to
Christianity meant near social suicide. While there are cases of Muslims, converting to
Christianity, most of these who did so, did so clandestinely. Even in the absence of
formal punishment, rejection, censure, sanction and social stigmatization were all forms
of social pressure brought by the Muslim community, if not the Muslim authorities upon
those who opted out of the ummah.
L. SUMMARY
Obviously, even this cursory attempt at identifying the more salient aspects of the
historical record indicates that the treatment of non-Muslims was universally not the
same at all times and in all places. Certain norms, because they surfaced with regularity
and were intentionally and systemically sustained, albeit with some variation, allows me
to assert that along these general lines differential treatment was the norm. Within each of
these categories, specific practices and application of norms varied, however. The
contours of the discourse and the overarching ethos remain clear as they express
continuity with the greater Islamic legal tradition, less in terms of ibadat (worship) and
more in the area of mu’amalat (practices or social actions). For the purposes of historical
comparison then, I identify elements that reflect not just the letter of the law that
regulated the dhimmi communities, but also the spirit. As Bernard Weiss observes in his
book, The Spirit of Islamic Law “ if the law was in some measure more an ideal than a
social reality, then it was a solidly institutionalized ideal firmly woven into the fabric of
Muslim thought. But it was not just an ideal; it was in a very large measure a social
reality.”61
60 Op Cit, Goddard, 135.
61 Bernard Weiss, The Spirit of Islamic Law (Atlanta, The University of George Press, 2006): 187–188.
39
In summary, the areas of social and legal reality that historically characterize the
contours of the dhimmi experience, and with which I will make my comparison are:
religion’s constitutional relationship to the state, the legal status of citizen
government/military service, taxation, church building and repair, regulation of religious
practices, communal representation, and freedom of religion, particularly the right to
convert away from Islam. As Weiss, notes all of these elements fall within at least one of
the four main, enduring areas of consideration, wherein to this day according to shari’ah,
the public authority can intrude upon the lives of individuals for “the collection of taxes,
the regulation of the behaviour of people in public places, and the recruitment of persons
to bear arms, and the maintenance of public worship.”62
62 Weiss, The Spirit of Islamic Law, 185.
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III. THE CHRISTIAN EXPERIENCE IN EGYPT TODAY
A. DEMOGRAPHICS
The Christian community of Egypt numbers close to 12 percent of the population
and, with its own auto-cephalous orthodox church, has a long history of engagement with
the Islamic world, dating from the seventh century. They are proportionately most
numerous in Upper Egypt. Most Copts are working class peasants and laborers, although
there is a Coptic business upper class and a middle class of urban professionals and small
landowners. Copts are present in most institutions of the state, and there are Coptic
members of all registered political parties. Other Christian communities include the
Armenian Apostolic, Catholic (Armenian, Chaldean, Greek, Melkite, Roman, and Syrian
Catholic), Maronite, and Orthodox (Greek and Syrian) churches, which range in size
from several thousand to hundreds of thousands.
An evangelical Protestant community, established in the middle of the nineteenth
century, includes 16 Protestant denominations (Presbyterian, Episcopal (Anglican),
Baptist, Brethren, Open Brethren, Revival of Holiness (Nahdat al-Qadaasa), Faith (Al-
Eyman), Church of God, Christian Model Church (Al-Mithaal Al-Masihi), Apostolic,
Grace Pentecostal, Apostolic Grace, Church of Christ, Gospel Missionary (and the
Message Church of Holland (Ar-Risaala)). There are also followers of the Seventh-Day
Adventist Church, which was granted legal status in the 1960s. There are 800 to 1200
Jehovah’s Witnesses and small numbers of Mormons, but the government does not
recognize either group.63
The Muslim population of Egypt is roughly 88 percent of the total and is
overwhelmingly Sunni. In terms of the Islamic world, Egypt has produced great scholars
and leaders and is the site of al-Azhar, the oldest and most prominent Sunni legal and
religious institution in the Islamic world. Due to Egypt’s history as a center of gravity in
the Muslim world and because in many ways it stands at a crossroads between East and
63 United States Department of State, 2008 Report on International Religious Freedom – Egypt,
September 19, 2008: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/48d5cbebc.html (accessed August 18, 2009).
42
West, President Barack Obama chose Cairo as the location for his recent address to the
Muslim world. Thus, Egypt currently affords the opportunity to study a moment in time
in which contemporary Christian and Muslim leaders and their communities are engaging
each other, not in a vacuum, but in a milieu in which significant political and social
currents swirl about them.
B. REFERENCES TO THE DHIMMI ANALOGY
On a steamy Cairo morning in the summer of 2007, I stood in front of typical
nineteenth century villa tucked into the side streets of the fashionable neighborhood of
Zamalek, an island in the middle of the Nile. I waited patiently while the houseboy
fumbled with his heaving iron keys and opened the gate. He led me down a garden
footpath and into a cool and spacious room with vaulted ceilings: the antechamber of the
offices a leading Catholic prelate. A large picture of Pope Benedict XIV hung on the
wall. In that way, it was not much different from any other embassy, where a smiling
portrait of the head of state is prominently displayed. A few minutes later, I was ushered
into the prelate’s offices. This senior clergyman, with piercing blue eyes and a gentle,
even wistful demeanor, asked me several questions about my studies and my research.
After chasing a cup of thick, Arabic coffee with a glass of cold water and lemon juice, he
proceeded to respond to my questions about the general state of Christian-Muslim
relations in Egypt. I was given to understand that he saw relations between the
communities in a state of general decline. The monsignor provided me with many
valuable insights into the various issues that affected relations between Christians and
Muslims, not just in Egypt, but worldwide, and also not just among the elites, but also on
the street. Soon, we began to get into the meat of the matter and the main area of my
research, the effect of increased Islamization in upon relations between the Muslim
majority and the Christian, largely Coptic Orthodox minority.
I found a general perception among Christian and Muslim Egyptians, as well as
foreigners who have lived here or visit here regularly, that Egyptian society over the
course of the last twenty years has been undergoing a slow process of Islamization.
However, their definitions of Islamization were not always clear to me, nor were the
43
metrics that they applied to come to this conclusion. Some simply based their opinion on
the increased number of women donning the headscarf and the niqab, or measured
Islamization by attendance at Friday prayer, or an increase in Islamic bookstores, or the
number of building permits issued for new mosque construction. Others insisted that
Islamization had much less to do with religiosity and much more to do with the degree to
which Islam had penetrated the social, educational, economic, military, and political
structures previously considered to be secular. Others, still unsatisfied with such a
definition, insisted that one had to distinguish between different degrees and types of
Islamization. They posited that some phenomena related to this apparent Islamization
were authentic and natural consequences of living in a Muslim-majority society and thus,
were fairly benign. They considered that other manifestations that embraced ideologies
and practices that were oppressive, discriminatory, and intolerant as more dangerous and
worthy or rejection.
Eventually such discussions revolved around the inclusion or continued exclusion
in the political process of the most prominent and well established of the Islamist groups,
i.e., the Muslim Brotherhood. The, participation of candidates affiliated with the Muslim
Brotherhood in the summer 2007 Majlis al Shura Parliamentary elections, and the arrest
of several of its members stimulated discussion in the press, on the street, and also among
the Christian and Muslim elites. Yet, aside from recognizing its effectiveness as a
movement of the opposition, it seemed difficult for Egyptians, even those sympathetic to
the Islamist cause, to articulate the most precise and up-to-date position of the Muslim
Brotherhood. This perhaps was due in part to the fact that the group and its leadership
have evolved over the years, but few could explain the Brotherhood’s position in matters
related to co-existence with non-Muslims, such as full implementation of shari’ah, (a
cornerstone of MB ideology) conversion from Islam, citizenship, the jizya tax, or church
building and restoration. In discussing the Muslim Brotherhood’s longstanding desire to
see a full application of shari’ah, the monsignor expressed a sanguine concern for the
impact this would have on Egypt’s sizeable Christian population:
44
The return to dhimmi status would be a possibility. Nevertheless, there are different discourses inside the MB. ‘We are all one,’ say some… and some say “this Egypt is for all.” Some say the Christians should not be considered as a minority. It is similar to the Coptic discourse rejecting the minority status, but in regard to Islam being the solution, the government is throwing people in jail for saying this.64
I recall walking away from the interview, grateful for the many profound insights
that the monsignor had provided. In all that we had discussed, what struck me the most
were his multiple references, such as the one cited above, to the past dhimmi experience
of the Christians community. It was not so much the simple reference to a historical fact
as it was with the way he seemed to deploy it to frame his concerns about the future of
Christian-Muslim relations. I found that this way of retrieving the past, to create an
analogy to the present and the future was to repeat itself over and over again, both in the
press and in conversation. Copts, especially by means of the international media, and
blogosphere drew attention to current levels of violence and discrimination against their
fellows. The Christians perceived aspects of the Egyptian constitution itself as expressing
the ethos and spirit, if not the name of “dhimmitude.”
Apart from the scores of violent attacks against them over the past 35 years, they have been forced into a de-facto dhimmi status. In fact, the infamous Second Article of the Constitution provides the legal basis to discriminate against and marginalize the Copts in their own homeland. 65
Moreover, this particular historical parallel, first articulated by the good
monsignor, had traction. Indeed, comparisons to the dhimmi experience, sometimes
accompanied by citations from the Qur’an and the hadith, injunctions from the Pact of
Umar or firmans from Ottoman period, were drawn and seemed a standard part of many
of my interlocutor’s rhetorical repertoires, so much so that it seemed to be taken for
granted that the past conditions were completely comparable to the present ones.
64 G. Martin, unpublished personal interview with senior Roman Catholic clergyman, Cairo, May 29, 2007.
65 Adel Guindy, “The Islamization of Egypt,” Middle East Review of International Affairs 10, no. 3, Article 7/10, September 2006).
45
Ali Gomaa, the Grand Mufti of Egypt whom I interviewed, waved off complaints
that Christians were being discriminated against and asserted that the current conditions
for Christians were much improved and that they had many more rights than ever before.
He nevertheless, cited as his benchmark, the treatment of Christians during the Ottoman
period when they were considered dhimmis. The Grand Mufti dismissed the violence and
discrimination against Christians as episodic and not systemic, echoing the government’s
stance that Christians long ago acquired full citizenship.
…in terms of Shari’ah law being the law of the land, Christians need to reflect upon their experience here. What has been their position? They did not complain when under the Ottomans there was the Shari’ah. Afterwards, under the Ottomans they complained about the millet laws dealing with dhimmis and these laws were eliminated. We said “what don’t you like” and they told us and we said, “fine, you want freedom from this? Then you are free” 66
However, there are other Muslim voices, official ones, too, that do not share the
Grand Mufti’s perspective of equanimity. The official website of the Supreme Council
for Islamic Affairs, an official body of the “Ministry of Awqaf,” (The Ministry of
Endowment and Islamic Affairs) posted an article entitled “Islam versus Ahl al-Kitab:
Past and Present.” The author, Dr. Maryam Jameelah, attempts to answer the question
“how can we be certain that Islam is the only infallible Truth?” The article concludes by
emphatically stating:
Peaceful relations and mutual respect among us can only be achieved through strength. We must cease indulging in apologetics and present the Islamic message to the world honestly and forthrightly. Before we can hope to succeed with Tabligh (proselytizing) on a large scale, we must first convert the nominal Muslims into true believers. We must establish a full-blooded Islamic state where the world will witness our precepts translated into action. Finally, we must crush the conspiracies of Zionism, free-masonry, Orientalism and foreign missions both with the pen and with the sword. We cannot afford peace and reconciliation with the Ahl al Kitab until we can humble them and gain the upper hand. 67
66 Op Cit, Ali Gomaa, in G. Martin.
67 Maryam Jameelah, “Islam versus Ahl al-Kitab: Past and Present,” Supreme Council of Islamic Affairs, Arab Republic of Egypt, http://www.islamic-council.com/non-muslims_u/Chapter3.asp. (accessed October 20, 2009).
46
Yet, even within this same organization there shades of opinion. I was able to
interview an even more senior spokesman from the very same Supreme Council for
Islamic Affairs, who sought to harmonize relations between Muslims and Christians,
claiming that equanimity is within the true spirit and teachings of Islam. This official
spokesman (a former Muslim Brother) seemed to me most disinclined to “humble” the
dhimmi. Rather, with regards to treatment of non-Muslims, he argued for retrieval and
application of the true spirit of the Qur’an—a spirit, according to him was illegitimately
bent and twisted by the early jurists to facilitate domination of conquered peoples.
For me there is no contradiction, but the way you apply the law and the sort of application are two different things. It has to do with the education of Muslims on how to deal with non-Muslims. If you apply correctly and honestly the Qur’an, they are protected and have same rights. The Qur’an is educational. So it comes down to a problem of culture. Toleration is found in texts of all monotheistic traditions. 68
The man who introduced me to the senior spokesman of the Supreme Council for
Islamic Affairs, is one of the senior-most Anglican leaders in the Middle East and Egypt.
In giving voice to the inchoate distrust and fears of his flock, he, too, deployed the dhimmi
analogy as a way of characterizing his imagined vision of the future—a future, he was
convinced, was to be one of oppression if the Islamists were to come to power:
If the Muslim Brotherhood came to power or any Islamists, we would immediately become dhimmis. If Muslims would like to affirm the citizenship rights of minorities, then they should put aside religion, and the Muslim Brotherhood will never put aside religion. They cannot put aside religion. 69
Before one dismisses this senior Christian clergyman’s fears as unfounded, one
should contemplate the following statement of a prominent and widely read Shaykh
Ahmed al-Mahalawi, who is popular with the Islamists. One can infer from Shaykh al-
Mahalawi’s comments that he is quite familiar with the scriptural justification for
humbling the ahl al-dhimma.
68 G. Martin, unpublished personal interview with senior spokesman of the Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs, Cairo, May 25, 2007.
69 G. Martin, unpublished personal interview with senior Anglican leader, Cairo, August 22, 2007.
47
Before this Friday sermon, an official of the Religious Endowments Ministry came and gave me a paper containing instructions to preach on Islamic tolerance towards dhimmis. I protested against such dictates but I readily tackled the subject. Verily Islam is, and has always been, tolerant with regard to dhimmis, yet on the condition that they know their place.”70
Depending on whom I was interviewing, the comparison, regardless of whether or
not one sees it as valid or spurious, was sometimes viewed in a favorable light in and
other times in a negative light. Whether they were holding up the treatment of Christians
as dhimmi as an example, par excellence of Muslim toleration, or decrying it as obsolete
in the light of modern ideas of citizenship and human rights, I found it noteworthy that
the Qur’anic concept of dhimmi status provided many with the cognitive template, the
model, and the standard by which they measured contemporary Christian-Muslim
relations. Moreover, I sensed that there was a general consensus that, given perception of
intensity and speed with which Islamization was proceeding, people believed that history
could someday be repeated. Some welcomed that day, and some feared it.
C. CONTEMPORARY DISCOURSE OF GRIEVANCE
During the liberal period of the early twentieth century and the fight for Egyptian
sovereignty form the British, the topic of minority rights and treatment of the Egyptian
Christian minority appeared to be studied as a relic, and a curiosity, of an artifact of a
now obsolete system. In 1907, the Copts demonstrated a great faith in the national effort
by joining the pro-Islamic al-Watani movement to call for the removal of the British
occupation. However, party leadership and party goals changed to promote strict Islamic
policies, causing prominent Copts to leave al-Watani party leadership. Many moderate
Muslims and Christians formed the al-Ummah movement in order to promote national
unity. The Party succeeded in defining the Egyptian identity as separate from the
Ottoman identity. Despite this, Coptic-Muslim relations continued to suffer under the
combined strain of British rule and pro-Islamic Khedival policies. In 1911, a Coptic
conference was organized under the leadership of the Bishop of Asyout in reaction to the
70 Ahmad al-Mahalawi, al-Fitna at-Ta’ifiya fi Misr (Cairo, 2006), in James Jankowski and Israel
Gershoni, (eds) Rethinking Nationalism in the Middle East (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997): 226.
48
assassination of Boutros Ghali, the Prime Minister and a Coptic Christian. At the
conference, public demands were made for Coptic rights, and immediately, an Islamic
sectarian response developed. Undeterred by this Islamist tilt, in the three decades
following the end of the First World War—often referred to as the Arab liberal age—
Christians worked side by side, under the revolutionary egalitarianism promoted by Sa’ad
Zaghloul.
A political party was born of this movement, known as the Wafd party. It ‘stressed the unity and equality of all Egyptians, Muslims, or Christians, and several Copts played important roles in the party, alongside Muslims, in trying to obtain independence for Egypt after the war’71
Christians and Muslims struggled together against the British occupation and did,
in fact, secure rights of citizenship that came close, but did not equal that of their Muslim
counterparts. In 1920, the British resorted to the old tactics of divide and conquer by
appointing a Copt as Prime Minister. The British tried to separate Copts and Muslims,
attempting to isolate Copts from the nationalist movement by inciting sectarian strife. In a
show of unity over 2,000 Copts met at the Greater Marcossia church to protest the British
machinations. One Copt even attempted to assassinate the Copt nominated for Prime
Minister, Yousef Wahbeh. The outcry against the British attempt to pit Christian against
Muslim backfired to the extent that most Copts strove even harder to demonstrate their
commitment to national unity, even at the expense of their own possible promotion in
government. With this nationalist mindset, the Copts went on to baffle the British even
further by opposing the British proposal to include a provision for religious minorities in
the 1923 constitution.
The two communities began protesting together and brandished banners with the Islamic crescent and the Christian cross inter-twined. Likewise, Muslim shaykhs and Coptic priests were not afraid to share pulpits, both proclaiming to their congregations that they held a common link both spiritual and essentially Egyptian72
71 P. Doorn-Harder, Contemporary Coptic Nuns (Columbia, S.C., University of South Carolina Press, 1995): 21.
72 Op Cit. Hasan, 36.
49
Copts also sided with Arabs in the conflict with Israel in the 1940s, but when
Arabs demonstrated violently against Jewish settlement in Palestine, Copts, still unable to
convince the Muslim majority of their loyalty to the national unity of the Egyptian state,
fell victim to political abuse and physical assault. Still, Copts were appointed governors,
ministers of foreign affairs, even prime ministers. During that period, the close affinity
between the crescent and the cross reflected the popular motto: ‘Religion is the province
of Allah and the homeland is for all.’ All in all, despite some significant low points, the
period from the 1919 revolution through the fall of King Farouk has been considered the
pinnacle of Coptic integration, with two Coptic prime ministers during this period and
widespread political participation of Coptic MPs, a Copts at high levels in a variety of
government posts and in the media.
Not long after WWII, things shifted. As the late French Protestant Professor
Jacques Ellul put it, “that which was related to Islam and the Muslim world was believed
to belong to a past that, if not dead, was certainly no more alive than medieval
Christianity… And then, suddenly, since 1950, everything changed completely.”73 After
Gamal Abdel Nasser’s 1952 coup, Copts were gradually largely excluded from the top
echelons of political and administrative bodies. The revolution in 1952 brought in
nationalization and agricultural reform. While middle and lower class Copts benefited, as
did their Muslim counterparts, the Coptic elite lost 75 per cent of their property through
nationalization; Until that moment, the Christians had dominated a major share of the
economy. Nasser also issued two decrees that had implications for Copts: one enforcing
religion as a basic subject in the curricula rather than complementary to it, and a second
decree which put entrance into al-Azhar University off limits to non-Muslim students.
Also, Nasser abolished political parties with significant Coptic membership, like the
Wafd Party. He seized Coptic Church endowments in 1957 and limited landholding by
any Copt to 200 acres. This began a serious deterioration in the status of Copts and
provoked the first wave of twentieth century emigration of Copts.
73 Jacques Ellul, in preface to Ye’or, Bat, Les Chretiens d’Orient Entre Jihad et Dhimmitude: VIIe-
XXe siecle (Paris, La Cerf, Paris, 1991): 3.
50
Under Sadat, social frustrations mounted in the 1970s with the rise of Islamic
radical movements, strikes and protests, Sadat courted the Islamists as a foil to counter
the left. Like the British, Sadat, too, politicized religion to gain allies and revived or at
best acquiesced to Islamist animosity towards the Copt. Islamic groups became
increasingly organized and violent. In 1972 Coptic churches, houses and shops were
burnt as Copts reacted to the increasingly discriminatory laws.
Sadat, in currying favor with the Muslim Brotherhood, and to pacify militant
Islamists had parliament amend the constitution whereby the shari’ah became the basic
source of legislation. This amendment remains on the books until this day, and I will
discuss at greater length below under “religion’s constitutional relationship to the state.”
Confrontations escalated in 1978 and 1979 and culminated in 1980 with Sadat accusing
Pope Shenouda III of involvement in a plot to undermine state security. The Pope was
placed under house arrest and exiled to a desert monastery, while 125 Coptic activists
were arrested. Coptic associations were banned and all Coptic publishing concerns were
closed down. By signing the peace treaty with Israel, Sadat succeeded in infuriating many
of radical Muslims he had so earnestly courted. In 1981, he was gunned down by Islamist
militants. Under Mubarak, the Pope, who had been kept muzzled for four years was freed
to circulate in 1985. But as economic recession deepened, violence against Copts flared
up and has continued to do so sporadically, and in many cases, unpredictably up to the
present day. Below we will now describe element-by-element, the present Christian
condition based on the same hallmarks of the historical dhimmi experience identified in
chapter three.
D. RELIGION AND THE STATE
As mentioned above, in the early part of the twentieth century, Egypt
experimented with a more secular government that allowed near equal access to power by
both Muslims and Copts, yet the relationship never could be considered a full separation
of Mosque and State. The government grants legal status to only the three “heavenly
religions,” i.e., Islam, Christianity, and Judaism and, as we will see in the subsequent
section, this constitution recognition of these three faiths has an impact of the personal
51
status of individual citizens. Constitutionally, a useful way of understanding the
relationship of religion to the Egyptian state is to study the role played by Al-Azhar. Al-
Azhar provides a mirror that reflects the tension and the degree of cooperation between
the state and the religious establishment. Traditionally, the head of al-Azhar held a
position of legitimacy in the eyes of the people. He was seen as a de-facto, not just de-
jure leader. Therefore, what the head of al-Azhar decreed was usually accepted without
questioning by many Muslims. There was no need for the state to place its imprimatur on
al-Azhar. Indeed, it was more often the state that needed and looked for religious
endorsement.
As early as 1812, the state intervened to ensure it got the rulings it needed by
appointing the Shaykh al-Azhar, and from 1895 to 1896 the aforementioned Abduh,
representing the government, secured government salaries from al-Azhar clerics. By
1911, 62 percent of al-Azhar’s budget came from the government and reached 96 percent
by 1959. The final fusion of the state and the ulema occurred when Nasser further
nationalized al-Azhar in 1961. For some being co-opted by the state meant a loss in the
ulema’s autonomy and explained its lack of prophetic voice, especially whenever it
seemed to produce rulings that tended to support unpopular government positions.
Nasser transformed al-Azhar into the Academy of Islamic Research, and this academy,
along with the positions of the mufti of Egypt, the minister of awqaf (religious
properties), and the Supreme Council of Islamic Affairs, since then have assisted the state
with important issues of religious expression, and social control. Thus, since Nasser’s
time, all positions at al-Azhar are filled by state appointees. When, in 1996, Hosni
Mubarak appointed Muhammad Sayyid Tantawi (b. 1928) as the Grand Imam, many
protested his selection as a political choice, as he is a leading member of the religious
faction of the National Democratic Party that rules Egypt under Mubarak.
While most modern day Egyptian Christians cannot remember a time when the
government and the official Islamic establishment were not in charge of all matters
dealing with religions in the society, they have regarded the established mosque-state
relationship between the government and al-Azhar as infinitely preferable to any Islamist
52
arrangements. In reality, the measure which appears to cause greater distress is the
constitutional Status of Islamic Law, which, as of 1971, was returned to a place of
prominence and later in 1980 officially amended by referendum by President Sadat. As a
concession to Islamist sentiment, Sadat amended the constitution to establish Islamic law
as the principal source of legislation in Egypt. Article Two of the Constitution since then
reads in full: “Islam is the religion of the State and Arabic its official language. Islamic
jurisprudence is the principal source of legislation.” Thus, in terms of international
agreements or human rights charters, there is inserted a correlated reference to Article
Two, found in many pieces of international legislation, treaty or multilateral agreement to
which Egypt is a party states that, although “Egypt is willing to comply with the content
of said (article, agreement, accord)” it is with the proviso that “such compliance does not
run counter to the Islamic shari’ah”74. Though Article Two is clear about Islam being the
main source, (meaning there are no other civil or religious sources), the Egyptian legal
system is actually still a hybrid. It is based on Islamic law together with civil law
originating from nineteenth century French civil codes, but in terms of the legal traditions
of other religious faiths, Islam remains constitutionally the sole source.
Thus, like the constitutions of most nations, and even many Muslim nations, the
Egyptian Constitution is the unique product of Egyptian history. In its structure, spirit and
content it attempts to weave together into a coherent document, different legal and moral
traditions. While it seems to have been successful to a remarkable extent in harmonizing
and universalizing commonalities and reconciling differences, points of friction exist.
Muslim legal minds, however, now tend to see the problems as largely solved, and very
few accommodations or concessions are necessary. The Grand Mufti believes that with
minor modifications, the ethical principles found therein are both uniquely Egyptian and
represents core values that are both religious and profoundly democratic:
A careful, point-by-point comparison was made with Shari’ah law, not fiqh, but Shari’ah law, which is different. Here we speak of the Maqassid of the Sharia (the overall objectives of the Shari’ah ethical system) and I
74The Emory Law School, “Islamic Family Law,” Legal History: http://www.law.emory.edu/ifl/legal/egypt.htm (accessed November 7, 2009).
53
say that no one should be surprised that it was found that most of the French Civil Code was perfectly acceptable and could be related to its counterpart in the Shari’ah. I have written twelve articles on this subject. Likewise, vice-versa, when the Shari’ah was compared to French Civil Code it was found acceptable with Western notions of democracy. Thus, I am in agreement with those who say that the liberal, democratic position is compatible with the shari’ah. The Egyptian constitution in making the Shari’ah the main source is embracing its universalities. (Kulliyaat) Twelve Islamic countries found themselves to be in agreement on this, i.e., that Egyptian Civil Law is recognizably based on usul al fiqh, i.e., Shari’ah, but again, not the direct application of fiqh…In general, then, our Egyptian civil code is not an explicitly Muslim law.75
When Sadat amended the constitution to please the Islamist, Pope Shenouda was
vociferously opposed. His approach changed following his years under house arrest and
now the Coptic Orthodox position has moved from one of opposition during the 1980’s to
one of cooperation. Outside observers of the interfaith scene and not familiar with politics
of it all, find it interesting that the Coptic Orthodox Church, which historically, has had
the longest relationship with Islamic authority, the most conflicts, and arguably has lost
the most members from conversion to Islam, now seems to feel quite at easy with the
current formulation of the constitution. This, however, is contingent upon the semi-
secularists in the Mubarak regime keeping the Islamists in check and generally positive
attitude emanating from al Azhar. Bishop Youannes states:
The civil constitution that grants equal citizenship rights for all Egyptians is the real product of the dialogue of life in Egypt. Furthermore, dialogue of life has always been the safeguard for security of the Egyptian society in the moment of sectarian strife. 76
Still, other Christians push for constitutional reform. In doing so, they walk a fine
line, risking the ire of both Al-Azhar and the government ministry of religion. They
continue to identify contradictions in the constitution as the source of problems. They
find it difficult to harmonize the idea that the shari’ah is the main source of law (article
75 Op Cit Ali Gomaa, in G. Martin.
76 H.G. Bishop Youannes, “Coptic Christians and Muslims – Cooperation on Community Concerns in Egypt” in Evangelischer Entwicklungsdienst, Bonn, 2007, 9 http://www.eed.de/de/de.sub/de.sub.32/de.sub.info/de.info.262/index.html (accessed August 3, 2007).
54
two) with all citizens being equal (article forty). I spoke to a senior leader if the small yet
well-organized, vocal and well-funded Coptic Evangelical Association of Egypt, who
communicated his dissatisfaction and insisted that there is room for improvement:
This is an absolute contradiction [in the constitution]. How do you have equality if you exclude me as a Christian in article two and then include me in article forty? How can we say there can be any equality? The problem is that here we are very selective when we deal with articles. When there are difficulties between Christians and Muslims, then we see how often the powers cite article two, meaning Islam is the law of the land and we are second class citizens. In times of tolerance, we see judges and politicians invoke article forty, where we are the fullest of citizens. I think we need some amendments to the constitution – mainly the second article. I am not for eliminating the second article because we should accept the feelings of the majority who are Muslims. But if the second article says that Islam should be the main source, then I think it should be changed and not be limited to Islamic law only, because this is a kind of discrimination. The second article should include all religious laws as sources. Some judges have dealt with Christians as second class citizens using this article.77
Others from the Christian community have similar concerns which extent beyond
the immediate particulars of Egyptian and the idiosyncrasies of Egyptian constitutional
law. The Roman Catholic Church, for example, has a history of encounters with Islam
that extends both in time and in space, and has a perspective beyond the local and
national level. What happens in Egypt is important for its own sake, but also for how it
can affect Christian communities throughout the Islamic world. The Catholic Church sees
the constitutional and human rights of Christians in Egypt as bell-weather for Christian-
Muslim relations worldwide, as unlike the Coptic Church, it represents the needs of
Palestinian, Lebanese, Syrian, Iraqi, and Pakistani Christians. In some of these places,
Christian communities are smaller than in Egypt, and in many they have even fewer
rights. Thus, the protections that Christians have in Egypt are looked upon by the
Catholic Church as important gains- and gains that need to be protected or improved
upon in the scope of global Christian Muslim relations.
77 Op Cit, Martin, G. August 8, 2007.
55
My senior Roman Catholic prelate stressed the importance of constitutional
reforms that avoid either extreme, either the ultra-secular or the extreme Islamist:
This issue [of reform] came up with the amendments to the Egyptian Constitution and a number of voices said it should be revised. There could have been a greater discussion of the constitution at the time of the proposed amendments. The Shari’ah law, as a number of Muslims would say, is a human construct and has developed over many centuries starting with al-Shafi, who wanted to bring unity to the madhabs. But the Christians have been, and will continue to be, very uncomfortable with this and it is not the idea that Christians would have as their idea of a country in which they are full citizens. There is a difference between the idea of being full citizens and the provisions of Shari’ah law that go against this equality. This implementation of Shari’ah might throw the situation back to the Ottoman system and mean a return to the millets. This could be okay for matters of personal status, but not legal status. Is there any court that is superior to a Shari’ah court where you can appeal? Right now, there isn’t.78
E. THE LEGAL STATUS OF CITIZENS
In Egypt, matters which generally speaking, in the West would be considered
family law (marriage, divorce, alimony, child custody, and burial) are regulated based on
one’s religion, but not all religions. Consonant with past Ottoman practice, the principle
of separate personal courts and/or laws for every recognized religious community and
reserved seats in the parliament persists. The application of family law is based on an
individual’s religious beliefs. In the practice of family law, Muslim families are subject to
the Personal Status Law, which draws on shari’ah Christian families, regardless of
denomination, are subject to Canon Law of the Coptic Orthodox Church, and Jewish
families are subject Orthodox Halakhic law. In cases of family law, disputes involving a
marriage between a Christian woman and a Muslim man, the courts apply the Personal
Status Law. Inheritance laws for all citizens are based on the Government’s interpretation
of shari’ah. Muslim female heirs receive half the amount of a male heir’s inheritance.
Christian widows of Muslims have no automatic inheritance rights but may be provided
for in testamentary documents. Under shari’ah, converts from Islam lose all rights of
78 Op Cit, Martin, G. August 8, 2007.
56
inheritance. However, because the Government offers no legal means for converts from
Islam to Christianity to amend their civil records to reflect their new religious status, the
converts’ loss of inheritance rights may not be indicated on civil documents.79
Christians demonstrated concern about the overall legal imbalances in family law,
but also about this lack of bi-directional religious freedom. Most I spoke to want to see
the constitution modified to allow a level playing field and am worried about the loss of
members to both conversion, as well as immigration. For instance, in terms of inheritance
under shari’ah, converts from Islam lose all rights of inheritance. As just mentioned,
because the Government offers no legal means for converts from Islam to Christianity to
amend their civil records to reflect their new religious status, the converts’ loss of
inheritance rights may not be indicated on civil documents. My senior Coptic Evangelical
interlocutor expressed his views as follows:
I think we need to establish an environment of religious freedom, but in our Egyptian context it is difficult to convert to Christianity, and very easy to convert to Islam. This is due to the constitution… The majority who convert to Islam, I believe, is for the reasons related to divorce because they can’t divorce in the eyes of the Church, so they convert to Islam which permits, divorce, especially for the men. Or they convert for economic reasons, for greater economic opportunity. Rarely do people move because of ideological reasons. However, I am working hard to re-discuss divorce because there are situations where we as a church need to help solve this. We should take some initiatives as a church to help solve the problems of divorce among Christians and then the number that convert to Islam will drop greatly.80
In short, the sense of Christian marginalization dates back the first Islamic
conquest, and though there was a moment when Copts felt fuller in the early half of the
twentieth century, the default position in the collective consciousness has been one of
marginality. Yet, many moderate Muslim leaders such as the senior spokesman of the
Supreme Council on Islamic Affairs cited above, and Ali Gomaa, the Grand Mufti,
asserted that the Qur’an was an excellent foundation upon which to build a society since
it held within its pages the basis for an egalitarian state- even for non-Muslims. They 79 Op Cit, United States Department of State, 2008.
80 Op Cit,. in G Martin, August 8, 2007.
57
claim that most problems of discrimination experienced by the Christian community have
historically been isolated, disconnected incidents caused by individuals acting
independently, or in some cases, caused faulty interpretation and implementation. The
Grand Mufti explained his understanding of the problem and challenged Christians to
closely examine the source of their discontent:
In terms of Shari’ah law being the law of the land, Christians need to reflect upon their experience here. What has been their position? They did not complain when under the Ottomans there was the Shari’ah. After the Ottomans, they complained about the millet laws dealing with dhimmis and these laws were eliminated. We asked, ‘what don’t you like?’ And they told us and we said, ‘fine, you want freedom from this? Then you are free.’ The new constitution made them free from all millet laws and millet councils. If properly understood and applied, the Shari’ah is fully compatible with modern notions of human rights and democracy 81
I found, however, that many of the Christians who complained about legalized
discrimination saw the problems as systemic, and traced the fundamental inequities
enshrined in the system, itself, to the earlier historic model and what they saw as current
contradictions in the Egyptian constitution. For them, because Article Two declares that
“Islam is the Religion of the State,” there is then no way that “all citizens are equal
before the law.” For these critics, the law itself invited discrimination. This
discrimination they described was often subtle, yet legal, reducing them to de-facto
minorities, without minority rights or any government oversight into alleged abuses or
discriminatory practices. Any time they would charge discrimination, the government,
the officially sponsored state mouthpieces of both the Islamic and Christian communities
would attempt to silence them, pointing out that article forty of the constitution gave
them full citizenship.
While the Muslim majority and the Copts themselves frequently remind each
other that they are full citizens under the constitution, to many, the assertion rings hollow.
81 Op Cit Ali Gomaa in G. Martin, 56.
58
The U.S. State Department found in its 2006 Report on Religious Freedom that the
government generally upheld constitutional protections; however, they went on to note
the following:
…discrimination against non-Muslims exists. There are no Christians serving as presidents or deans of public universities, and they are rarely nominated by the Government to run in elections as National Democratic Party (NDP) candidates. For the first time in more than thirty years, a Copt was appointed one of the country’s twenty-six governors, in Qena. As of June 30, there were six Christians (five appointed, one elected) in the 454-seat People’s Assembly; six Christians (all appointed) in the 264-seat Shura Council; and two Christians in the 32-member cabinet. Christians, who represented between 8 and 15 percent of the population, held less than 2 percent of the seats in the People’s Assembly and Shura Council. 82
As it stands now, Christians perceive that the government and Muslim authorities
tend not to identify any pattern of harassment but instead, respond to each incident as a
unique occurrence. When I spoke to a diplomat from the political and economic section
at the U.S. Embassy in Cairo, she confirmed the impression that the Christians but
particularly the Copts seem to flail about in this regard. This diplomat stated:
The Coptic Community is more frustrated now than in the past. There is not just a lack of progress in achieving economic wellbeing or justice. There are real concerns of conversion, assimilation, immigration and contention with the government. No one here who has any sense can look at this situation from a critical perspective and say they have equal rights.83
In addition to reporting general figures, trends and statistics, the 2006 U.S. State
Department’s Report on Religious Freedom in Egypt cites specific cases, which have
since entered into the popular and collective perception and consciousness of the Coptic
and Christian communities.
Government practices discriminated against Christians in hiring for the public sector, staff appointments to public universities, payment of
82 Op Cit. United State Department of State, 2008, 7.
83 G. Martin, unpublished interview with diplomat from the political and economic section of U.S. Embassy, Cairo, July 15, 2007.
59
Muslim imams through public funds and barring Christians from study at Al-Azhar University (a publicly funded institution). There are few Christians in the upper ranks of the security services and armed forces. In general public university training programs for Arabic language teachers bar non-Muslims because the curriculum involves the study of the Qur’an. In fall 2005 Christian student Christine Zaher successfully completed the requirements for a master’s degree in Arabic from the Suez Canal University in Port Said and secured a teaching position at the same university. Prior to her graduation, there had been no reports of Christian graduates in Arabic language since 2001; she was the first Copt appointed to a university level Arabic language teaching position in several decades. 84
When it comes to discussing discrimination, understanding the perception on the
street is essential. It is important to know how stories are spun, who spins them, how
facts are selected, distorted, omitted and transmitted, and thus, how rumors get started.
This helps us understand how communities develop a discourse of grievance. This is not
intended to diminish the validity of stark facts on the ground as cited above. It is
necessary to see how such facts are framed and massaged into an identity and a
consciousness of a victimized minority. This, then, can become the preferred prism
through which all actions of the “other” are viewed. Often, the rumors, personal
anecdotes, and media reports serve to confirm and reinforce the worst. A prominent
Danish pastor working with a Danish government funded program in Cairo is familiar
with process by which many incidents become grist for such a mill:
In the community circulate the “grand narratives” which are stories of oppression and atrocities that go around, but it difficult to actually find the individuals who are the supposed victims. I think that these are stories that get exaggerated in the story telling. … There are many such stories is circulating. Then what happens is that these stories often go abroad and get blown up. These narratives of grievance return back to Egypt after the Copt lobby gets a hold of them. It is a narrative of grievance, which is a two-edged sword. 85
84 G. Martin, unpublished interview with diplomat from the political and economic section of U.S. Embassy, Cairo, July 15, 2007.
85 G. Martin, unpublished personal interview with Danish Pastor, June 7, 2007.
60
Most Christian leaders note that even a pattern of discrimination does not
necessarily translate into persecution. Nevertheless, the majority cited situations where
cases of discrimination went unaddressed by authorities. Indeed, the Christian leadership
in general finds that the lack-luster response to some of these cases is just as troubling as
the offenses themselves. As stated earlier, Muslim leaders, generally perceive issues of
discrimination as random of acts of misguided or even corrupt individuals, who need to
be better supervised. My senior spokesman at the Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs
implied that the Christian discourse of under-representation was a misperception, stating
that a disproportionate number of Christians are found among the well-off and the elite,
and observing that, “there is the typical sociological relationship between the privileged
minority and underprivileged majority, and some Muslims would actually say that the
Christians are a “qualitative majority.”86
For most Muslims with whom I spoke, equality was the norm and discrimination
the exception. When apparent inequities were pointed out, many Muslims identified the
self-limiting attitude and non-participation of the Christians as a self-defeating,
unpatriotic myth promulgated by the media in the West. Though these Muslims
frequently acknowledged the domination of the Muslims in the political and
administrative life of the country, they were adamant that it should not be viewed as the
result of discriminatory practices, but simply as a reflection of a demographic reality. As
the Grand Mufti asserted:
Here, in Egypt, we must avoid speaking of majority and minority, since we grew up together as children, went to school together and our families are neighbors. We do business together and are all Egyptians…I perceive that the problems were political, not religious. It is important to speak about supposed (italics to indicate his emphasis) discrimination. While I acknowledge that this exists, I cannot say we should blame the system because it is not a problem with the Egyptian system. It is really a reflection of the demographic reality here in Egypt. It is important to differentiate between matters of racism and simple matters of demographics. In examining legislation we always have to ask if it leads to greater competition (between religious groups) or to cooperation. We
86 Op Cit. G. Martin, May 25, 2007.
61
have no member of parliament who is a Christian, not even one who is running. Why? I say that it is for the same reason that the US has never had a black President, and has had only one Roman Catholic. 87
Moreover, the Christian leaders find that the discrimination is frequently so subtle
that Muslims, who are used to being in the majority, fail to appreciate how excluded the
minority can feel. My senior evangelical spokesman cites particular areas of concern:
In theory, in Egypt, according to the constitution there is no persecution as found in the laws as they are written…. However, in all fairness, I must say that there is discrimination based on individuals who are influenced by extremists, or they, themselves, are extremists and they practice discrimination rather than persecution…. I would also like to see laws against people who practice discrimination, and so I would like to see laws that protect and monitor acts of bias or injustice based on religion. …Equality needs to be more than theory, it needs “legs on the ground” so people can see it and live it. Not much happens now to someone who discriminates against Christians. I would like to see Christians also get rid of the article of faith that says we can blame everything on being persecuted; we have to stop just repeating this. We need to integrate into the social life and get into all sectors and not self-exclude ourselves. 88
Most reports indicate that Christians have little representation in the political
affairs of the country. Often those few who serve in the government are appointed, not
elected. Fed by an apathy born of marginalization and “self- imposed ghettoization,” the
Christians seem to identify the issues, but are without much of a plan or method as to
how to organize and leverage the government. There does not seem to be much desire or
capacity to gain the support of government authorities to promote administrative changes
and to react to discrimination in a systematic way. Most concur that it has been an uphill
battle trying to get the authorities to recognize the pervasiveness of the problem of
discrimination, and to implement policies to correct the abuses or ensure the Christians
are provided for as “protected” minorities. Opinions differ on the degree to which the
problem is fundamentally a problem of the legal substance, or legal application, with
most Muslim religious authorities, unlike secularist Muslims, defending the use of
87 Op Cit, Ali Gomaa in G. Martin.
88 Op Cit. G. Martin, August 8, 2007.
62
shari’ah as the main source of civil law. They do not attribute problems experienced by
the Christian communities to inconsistencies or inequities deriving from the constitution.
Instead, they tend to lay the blame for injustices on the imperfect interpretation and
application of the shari’ah, but not with shari’ah, itself. The high-ranking spokesperson
for the Supreme Council on Islamic Affairs, a very urbane, Western-educated Muslim,
asserts that equality for all is possible under the shari’ah:
For me there is no contradiction between Shari’ah and the Civil Code. However, the content of the law and its application are two different things. This, again, has to do with education of Muslims on how to deal with non-Muslims, and the influence of a very political press. If you apply correctly and honestly the Qur’an, non-Muslims are protected and have the same rights. The Qur’an is educational in this regard, so it comes down to a problem of culture. There are attitudes of rejection which come from the non-Muslims, But Pope Shenouda understands. He is not a puppet of the government, and Article Two of the constitution (making Islam the religion of the land and the Shari’ah the main source of the law) does not bother him because he knows the Qur’an. The danger is a political one, because the bad attitudes come from popular, cheap, low, culture. There is toleration in texts of all monotheistic traditions. 89
Not all Christians necessarily disagree with his assessment. There are those
leaders who believe that in substance, the Egyptian Constitution embodies a balance of
Christian and Muslim values and offers adequate, unbiased protection to both groups. For
instance, during one of the most violent of times in which Copts were experiencing near
daily assaults from Islamists, Pope Shenouda deflected criticism that the Copts were
being persecuted
Violence, Shenuda claimed, indiscriminately targeted both Muslims and Copts, which showed that its leaders were far removed from the true faith of Islam, as even the ulama conceded. Reiterating its traditional assertion of loyalty to the state, the Coptic Church rejected criticism emanating from the United States regarding the alleged persecution of Copts in Egypt90
89 Op Cit. in G. Martin, May 25, 2007.
90John H. Watson, Among the Copts (Brighton, Sussex:2000) in Meir Hatina, “In search of Coptic Authenticity,” Middle Eastern Studies 42, no. 1 (January 2006): 51.
63
My high-ranking Anglican clergyperson, who enjoys extraordinarily good
relations with Al-Azhar, expresses views similar to those espoused by the senior
spokesman for the Supreme Council of Islamic Affairs. He, too, attributes the problems
to incidents of misinterpretation and misapplication, as well as to a particular resistance
to secularism. He states:
The Shari’ah is popular as a symbol. The government is afraid to call itself secular because the understanding of the term here is atheist and godless. What they think in terms of the word ‘secular” is not what you think. Even the intellectual Muslim interprets it to mean irreligious. They don’t see secularism as a simple separation of mosque and state. Of course, this is a contradiction but it depends on how people behave. The problem is not in the Shari’ah, but in the interpretation of the Shari’ah. What interpretation shall be applied? In terms of conversion and apostasy some say that people who convert should be killed after three days if they don’t repent. Another view is that they should be given a grace period until the end of their lives and God will then judge. We, as Christians have no problem with Shari’ah, but with its interpretation and implementation. 91
This leads me to discuss one of the most hotly debated, and most variegated
issues regarding the legal status of religions minorities to emerge anywhere in the
Muslim world in the last 25 years. A heated debate over whether or not Copts are in fact,
minorities, and should be recognized as such, first began when Sa’ad iddine Ibrahim and
the Ibn Khaldoun Center sponsored a conference on the topic back in 1994. This
conference apparently hit a raw nerve, reflecting the tension both within the Coptic
community and the larger Egyptian society. This controversy burns hot still today and I
argue that at its heart, this debate is whether the dhimmi narrative should or should not be
an accepted as an “orienting” narrative to govern the non-Muslim minority. There are
cleavages that do not run along sectarian lines here, making one less sure about the
motives of those who retrieve and deploy of the dhimmi metaphor and analogy in
reference to this debate on minority rights. At first glance, one might assume that all
Christians would insist on being considered full citizens. At first glance, one might think
that the Islamist elements would prefer to see Christians relegated to the status of
91 Op Cit, in G. Martin, August 22, 2007.
64
“dhimmitude” in the classical sense. Yet, in effect, there are both Christians and Muslim
who take issue with the notion of Copts as full citizens of a modern, secular Egyptian
state. There are both Christians and Muslims who state that Christians should be
considered protected minorities, not always, however for the same reasons. A senior
Anglican clergyman considered a reality that should be acknowledged, at the same time
noting that minority status should not mean a diminished form of citizenship:
The dialogue we have now is about how we can best deal with misconceptions and generalizations. We speak about the Muslim minorities in West and minorities in Egypt. Some Copts don’t like being considered a minority but this is like putting our head in the sand. But this is the fact and many conflicts are because of the rights of the minorities are not respected. 92
Some see that the full citizenship of the Copts as a necessary myth to ensure
social cohesion and national unity. Others, Christians and Muslims, regard it as a
transparent lie, and a farce, pointing to facts that don’t support the reality. What is
interesting is that whether one sees notions of equal citizenship as valid or invalid, or
whether one argues for the recognition of a Coptic minority nation or not, it comes
down to a debate between whether one wants to approach the situation from a normative
or a realist position. The situation becomes even more complex when one comes to
appreciate the conflicting motivations held by those who support the same positions.
And here is the crux of the matter, and perhaps the main question that emerges as a result
of writing this thesis: would the recognition and classification of the Coptic/Christian
community as a “minority” community, constitute, as is feared by some and
recommended by others, a return to the dhimmi experience? In my conclusion, I will
provide taxonomy of the various positions vis-à-vis a modernist dhimmi narrative and the
possible nuanced political positions that such usage can indicate.
92 Op Cit in G. Martin, August 22, 2009.
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F. GOVERNMENT AND MILITARY SERVICE
Because Christians are constitutionally equal citizens there are theoretically no
bars to entrance into government service or anything that legally could prevent them from
rising in the ranks. Nothing like the devishirme system of the Ottomans exists, nor has
existed for centuries. At the same time, there are no special programs, conscriptions or
“tracks” or official ‘minority preference/quota or “affirmative action” type programs to
speak of. According to the United Nations High Commission for Refugees, yearly report,
“Copts are present in most institutions of the state, and there are Coptic members of all
registered political parties.” However, the report also indicates “Copts continue to face
state discrimination in such areas as university admissions, public spending, [and]
military promotions.”93
Coptic diaspora groups have collected documentation and repeatedly called
attention to Muslim army officers have been subjected Christian draftees to persecution
and extreme torture leading sometimes to their death, as a way to force them to convert to
Islam.94
Today Copts are disproportionately represented among the ranks of prosperous
city dwellers. Urban Copts tended to favor careers in commerce and the professions,
whereas the livelihoods of rural Copts were virtually indistinguishable from their Muslim
counterparts. Urban Copts are stratified into groups of long-time residents and groups of
recent migrants from the countryside. The latter group, often impoverished, falls outside
the traditional urban Coptic community and some can be found among the zabaliin, the
traditional garbage collectors and recyclers. The former group included many university
professors, lawyers, doctors, a few prominent public officials, and a substantial middle
echelon of factory workers and service sector employees. However, only in 2007 was a
Coptic woman allowed to teach Arabic at one of the government run Universities (Ain
93 UNHCR, “World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples – Egypt,” http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/ June 2008 (accessed October 22, 2009).
94 Mary Abdelmassih, “Forced Islamization of Christian Conscripts in the Egyptian Army,” Copts United, October 14, 2009, http://www.coptsunited.com/Details.php?I=21&A=183 (accessed November 1, 2009)
66
Shams), challenging the Muslim monopoly. Until then, it has generally been accepted
that to truly know Arabic one had to be a Muslim. This is also the pattern in other areas
of government service; Copts are generally underrepresented.
For some years, President Mubarak to compensate for the lack of duly elected
Christian representation. Usually, because so few Copts manage to get elected, he has had
to appoint them. In 1990, following a series of attacks against Copts and churches in
Upper Egypt, Mubarak “in an attempt to appease Copts, gave five of the ten
presidentially appointed seats in Egypt’s Parliament to Copts.”95 According to the same
source in Feb 23, 1993 a Reuters article quoted Copts complaining of the government
showing preferential treatment in terms of awarding scholarships and promoting and
selecting qualified personnel for upper government jobs; Moreover, they substantiated
that there was significant “discrimination and segregation by teachers and school
officials of Coptic students and the removal of all reference to Copts and Christianity
from many school curriculums.”96 I will conclude this segment with an excerpt from the
U.S. State Department’s 2009 Report of Human Rights for Egypt:
There are no Christians serving as presidents or deans of the country’s 17 public universities. On April 12, 2009, the weekly newspaper Watani reported that of nearly 700 president, dean, or vice dean positions in the country’s public university system, only one position is filled by a Christian. The Government rarely nominates Copts to run in elections as National Democratic Party (NDP) candidates. Christians, who represent between 8 and 12 percent of the population, hold fewer than 2 percent of the seats in the People’s Assembly and Shura Council. In November 2008, Al Youm Al Saba, an Internet news service, reported that the number of Copts accepted in the National Police Academy for the year 2008-2009 was 24 out of 1,600. As of June 30, 2008, there were six Christians (five appointed, one elected) in the 454-seat People’s Assembly; six Christians (all appointed) in the 264-seat Shura Council; two in the 32-member cabinet; and one governor of the country’s 28 was Christian. There are
95 UNHCR, Minorities at Risk Project, Chronology for Copts in Egypt, 2004, http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/469f38841c.html (accessed October 3, 2009).
96 Op Cit, U.S. Department of State, 2008.
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few Christians in the upper ranks of the security services and armed forces. Public funds compensate Muslim imams but not Christian clergy.97
G. TAXATION
In Egypt, the jizya was abolished by the Napoleonic regime that briefly ruled in
Egypt and later in 1855 by Said Pasha, after the Gulhane Rescript of 1839 and before the
Hatt I Humayun in 1856. Taxation is now universal according to the constitution for all
members of the “three heavenly religions,” and no differentiation is made based upon
one’s religious affiliation. Taxes collected by the state are levied on all citizens. While
egalitarian in the matter of collection, one could make a case that the expenditure of tax
monies is less so. According to the U.S. State Department, “the Government appoints and
pays the salaries of the imams who lead prayers in mosques and monitors their sermons
but does not contribute to the funding of Christian churches.”98 The same can be said for
state funds spend on religious programming: tax monies are spent liberally on shows that
convey an Islamic message and content while none of the state funds is spent on
Christian programming. The fact that the government collects taxes from Christians but
“bars them from studying at Al-Azhar University, a publicly funded institution with
approximately half a million students” could also be framed as a matter of an uneven and
discriminatory expenditure of taxes.
H. CHURCH BUILDING AND REPAIR
The contemporary interpretation of the 1856 Ottoman Hamayouni decree,
partially still in force, had until 2005, required non-Muslims to obtain a presidential
decree to build new churches and synagogues. In addition, MOI regulations, issued in
1934 under the Al-Ezabi decree, specified a set of ten conditions that the Government
had to consider before a presidential decree for construction of a new non-Muslim place
of worship could be issued. According to Sa’ad’Eddine Ibrahim, noted Egyptian
97 Op Cit, U.S. Department of State, 2008.
98 Ibid.
68
professor of sociology and long-time critic of the Mubarak regime, mentioned earlier in
the paper for championing the classification of Copts as minorities:
.. nothing is as symbolic as the persistence of the Humayonic Decree, which requires no less than a presidential permit for the building, renovation — or even the minor repair — of churches. Of course, no such restrictions exist on the building of mosques. This decree, the remnants of an Ottoman law and the most oppressive of any discriminatory law, is expressly intended to restrict the ability of Copts to practice their faith. .. there can be no genuine hope for true democracy, civil liberties or the abatement of deeply entrenched religious discrimination in Egypt as long as the Humayonic Decree stands in flagrant violation of the constitution and human rights...99
The conditions included the requirement that the distance between a church and a
mosque not be less than 100 meters (340 feet) and that approval of the neighboring
Muslim community be obtained before a permit to build a new church may be issued. In
1997, the Coptic publicist Milad Hanna complained that “we live in a fundamentalist
country, like Iran or Saudi Arabia,” and he asserted that “they [Copts] should be able to
exercise their right to build and repair their churches.”100
One of the most bitter complaints Christians now aired vocally (and an obvious priority for Shenuda) concerned discrimination in building houses of prayer. The law relating to the construction of churches was based on the Ottoman hatt-i humayun (noble rescript) of 1856, which guaranteed equality between Muslims and non-Muslims in the empire but also required government licensing to erect a church. A 1934 Egyptian government decree further specified ten restricting conditions for the construction of churches, including a minimum distance between churches and between a church and the nearest mosque, as well as the absence of objection on the part of Muslim neighbors. Getting a license to build a new church became an increasingly tedious matter, with the government never too enthusiastic to grant it. 101
99 Op Cit, Ibrahim, A.16.
100 Hanna Milad N’am Aqbat lakin Misriyyun (Cairo: Maktabat Madbuli, 1980) in Hatina, Meir “In Search of Coptic Authenticity: A Coptic Perception,” Middle Eastern Studies 42, no. 1, January 2006): 50.
101 Op Cit., Ayedor, 57.
69
In December 2005, in a move to decentralize and “power down” to lower
echelons, President Mubarak declared that it was no longer necessary that churches
obtain presidential authorization to repair and rebuild. This authority has now been
granted to the provincial governors, in theory streamlining the process. However,
according to the 2006 U.S. State Department’s Report on Religious Freedom in Egypt,
churches still have encountered difficulty in obtaining permits. For example, there are
complaints that local officials, acting arbitrarily, delay ordinary repairs such as painting
of walls and plumbing by incorrectly classifying them as “reconstruction” projects. This
misclassification means that formal permits must be sought instead of a simple
notification.
Some churches have complained that local security officials have blocked church repairs or improvements even when a permit has been issued. Others suggest unequal enforcement of the regulations pertaining to church and mosque projects. 102
Nevertheless, the State Department’s report shows that by most accounts things
have improved. Figures published by the Egyptian Government’s Official Gazette,
indicate that sixty-three Presidential decrees were issued from June 30, 2005, through
July 1, 2006, for church-related construction, whereas only twelve permits were issued
during the previous period.103 Perceptions, though, are slow to change among the
Christian population. Echoing the sentiment that “ one warm day, doesn’t make a
summer,” a prominent clergyman in the Coptic Evangelical community, like many other
Christian leaders, says that more can be done in this regard, since it is still quite difficult
to obtain permission to build new churches, not just repair the old ones.
There is still a harsh law on the books against Church building and when Muslims discover that Christians are building a church, maybe without waiting for permission, or even with permission, then there are fights as it happened in Giza and Alexandria. These occasions happen constantly. The law makes it difficult for Christians to build new churches. This is a heavy
102Op Cit, United States Department of State, 2008.
103 Ibid.
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matter. I see what happens and so I conclude which church can get built, and I see that we need to have this law modified. 104
Because the churches are such obvious, visible signs and symbols of the Christian
presence, it is not unusual that they are frequently the target or the setting for sectarian
clashes. Alexandria, Giza, and Luxor, during 2005 and 2006, witnessed significant strife.
According to the U.S. State Department:
In the October (2005) incident, a young Muslim man, enraged by reports that some Christians had staged a play critical of Islam, attacked several Christians outside a church. Subsequent riots left three Muslims dead and resulted in significant damage to Copt (Egyptian Christian) private properties and some damage to churches.105
The same report states that on January 18, 2006 there were serious sectarian
clashes in the settlement of Udayssat, near Luxor wherein Christians were found to be
conducting an Epiphany service in a building that had periodically served as an
unlicensed church since 1971. The repeated use of an unauthorized building provoked
Muslims to act:
Several hundred Muslim residents of the area surrounded the building, vandalized the property, and attempted to set it ablaze. In the ensuing melee, approximately a dozen persons, both Christian and Muslim, were injured, along with several policemen. On January 20 assailants killed a forty-seven-year-old Christian farmer, Kamal Shaker Megalaa, as he returned from his fields. The Luxor district attorney ordered the arrest and investigation of several Muslims from Udayssat on suspicion of involvement in his murder. 106
Two and a half years after promulgation of Decree 291/2005, church and lay
leaders complained that the permit process remains susceptible to delay by local officials.
They charged that some local authorities refused to process applications without certain
“supporting documents” that were virtually impossible to obtain (e.g., a presidential
decree authorizing the existence of a church that had been established during the
104 Op Cit, Martin, G. August 8, 2009.
105 Op Cit., United States Department of State, 2008.
106 Ibid., 5.
71
country’s monarchical era). Others complain that some local authorities categorize
routine repairs and maintenance (e.g., painting of walls and plumbing repairs) as
expansion/reconstruction projects, thus requiring formal permits versus simple
notification. They also maintain that security forces blocked them from using permits that
had been issued, and at times denied them permits, for repairs to church buildings and the
supply of water and electricity to existing church facilities. Such incidents often
depended on the attitude of local security officials and the governorate leadership toward
the church and on their personal relationships with representatives of the churches. As a
result, congregations have experienced lengthy delays—years in many cases—while
waiting for new building permits.
In 2008, the U.S. State Dept reported that “local authorities have closed down
unlicensed places of worship. As a result of restrictions, some communities use private
buildings and apartments for religious services or build without permits.”107
I. RELIGIOUS PRACTICES
Today in Egypt, there are no tangible similarities between the restrictions and
sanctions placed on the ahl al dhimma such as those found in the Pact of Umar or under
the Ottoman millet system. However, we must consider that practices have evolved. A
broadcast or a website today is what a religious procession was in the days of the
Ottomans. Public practices of religion have changed and the new media has replaced the
main streets and plazas. The local media, including state television and newspapers,
gives prominence to Islamic programming, while Christian television programs are aired
weekly on state-owned Nile Cultural TV. In 2002, Pope Shenouda protested:
All we want is equal relations between the two parts of the [Arab] nation, because often the Christians do not find reasonable space in which to function… No one accepts the American preacher’s [Jerry Falwell] attack on Islam in a loathsome manner. Yet I cannot even count the articles,
107 Op Cit, United States Department of State, 2008: 5.
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books, and publications attacking Christians in Egypt, and we let these things pass, so as not to start big problems, or even small ones. 108
On August 11, 2009, the United States Commission on International Religious
Freedom (USCIRF) released a letter sent to American President Barack Obama,
petitioning him to address the difficulties that religious minorities face in Egypt. In the
letter, which was sent ahead of President Hosni Mubarak’s visit to the United States,
USCIRF also asked Obama to promote freedom of speech in Egypt for both the religious
minorities and the Muslim majority in Egypt.
J. COMMUNAL REPRESENTATION
Religious and political leaders in many parts of the non-western world have had
to deal with resurgent traditionalists, and religio-political identities, at the same time
operating alongside, if not often within, the secular paradigm. With the strictly secular
model appearing on the wane, we are seeing both continuity and discontinuity with the
past as Muslim and Christian leaders, no longer confining themselves to strictly spiritual
matters, are reasserting their traditional temporal roles. By word and deed, they are
forming the ethos and shaping the political milieu in which Christians and Muslims have
historically interacted. Regarding some issues, this means returning to earlier times when
religious leaders were de facto representatives of their communities. It has meant a break
with some aspects of secularism, as well as attempts to retrieve the more distant past, its
confessionalism, and its millet system, but for some it has meant blazing new paths.
In terms of Christian inter-communal relations, I found that between the Coptic
Orthodox and other Christians there exists a degree of rivalry. There appears to be a
desire among the significantly larger Coptic Orthodox Church to maintain its primacy,
which translates at times into an exclusive claim to speak for all Egyptian Christians. The
other Christian groups accept this and, indeed, appreciate the sacrifices that the Coptic
108 Pope Shenouda in al-hayaat, October 20, 2002, in MEMRI (Middle East Media Research Institute) Inquiry and Analysis, no 110, November 12, 2002. http://www.memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Page=archives&Area=ia&ID=IA11002 (accessed on October 12, 2009).
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Orthodox Church has made over the centuries, granting it a certain primum inter pares
status. However, the smaller, but very well-organized and well-funded Coptic
Evangelical Church feels that the Coptic Orthodox resent their presence at the table of
interfaith dialogue. A high-ranking Coptic Evangelical pastor and community organizer,
and a member of the Egyptian Council of Protestant Churches lamented that “it is
difficult to be a minority within a minority,” and declared that the relationship with the
Coptic Orthodox is so difficult that he “has given up on ecumenism.”109
Muslim leadership has also found it difficult at times to identify who exactly
speaks for Christianity. The Grand Mufti, Ali Gomaa cited, as an example of Christian
discord, the inability of the Christian leaders to come to an agreement about what
recommendation they should make to the government about its divorce laws. Muslim
authorities tended to see this as an example of internal Christian discord. The Grand
Mufti expressed frustration at the Christian leadership’s lack of cohesiveness and ability
to clearly articulate their recommendations led to Muslim perplexity and exasperation.
Under Pope Shenouda’s pontificate these relations have enjoyed moments of
alienation and confrontation, as well as rapprochement, cooperation and solidarity. In
light of the scarce and limited presence of Christians in political life, Pope Shenouda, as
the leader of the largest Christian community in Egypt, has often been the main
representative of Christian concerns. He has communicated to the Egyptian government
and to the world these concerns, championing the cause of Copts, but often all Egyptian
Christians. When I asked a senior Coptic Evangelical leader about relations with the
Coptic leadership and probed him regarding his feelings on degree of cooperation
between Coptic Evangelicals and Coptic Orthodox Church, he made the following
comments:
We have good relations, sometimes, but the relationship has had turbulence and now we look to a post Pope Shenouda period. This is a very complicated issue. When you are a minority of a minority, like us, you have it tough. Ecumenism is not working well it the Middle East. I must be blunt. It is painful. The relations with the Coptic Orthodox Church
109 Op Cit in G. Martin, July 11, 2007.
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go back and forth in a way that is not healthy…They want to benefit from the money from the West which comes mostly from Protestant churches. They don’t see us as a church, but as a people who want us to proselytize and to convert Coptic Orthodox to Protestantism. 110
The Grand Mufti of Al-Azhar, in explaining the history of relations with the
Coptic Church, offered a historical perspective on Pope Shenouda’s pontificate, alluding
to Shenouda’s reticence in embracing egalitarian reforms. The Grand Mufti’s subtle,
historical reference below could indicate that the Mufti senses that the Pope preferred the
older, Ottoman-style form of millet rayih representation, where the power was more
consolidated in the hands of the local patriarch.
It sometimes seems to me that only Pope Shenouda has been dissatisfied with this [the Egyptian Constitution] and would like to see a return to the millet council. I personally saw a dramatic change in the approach of Pope Shenouda. He had a lot of problems under Sadat and was in prison. Sadat wanted to have a Muslim committee oversee the affairs of the church, which, of course, Shenouda fought. The question emerged and still lingers for us: Is he a political or religious leader? Clearly, “he has an agenda.” [exact words here, spoken in English] He is ambitious. But I think that the times changed, more than Shenouda has changed the times. 111
Copts, themselves, are somewhat unsettled at the prospect of a transition, given
that Pope Shenouda ascended to his position in 1971. There is some obvious jockeying
going on. Although Egypt has a very ambiguous church-state/ mosque-state
arrangement, there has been an unusual attempt to apply the civil code to religious
matters. Labib Halim, the Vice President of the State Council, “has proposed a new
regulation granting all Copts the right to elect their pope. The present rules bar Copt
laymen to take part in this process, rendering the electoral system unconstitutional.”112
According current canons, only the Holy Synod and members of the Coptic Religious
Endowments Authority have the right to vote for a new Pope.
110 Op Cit in G. Martin, July 11, 2007.
111 Op Cit, Ali Gomaa, in G. Martin.
112 Ahmed Kamel, “Speculation on Succession,” The Egyptian Gazette (Cairo, July 11, 2007): 2.
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According to Bishop Youannes of the Coptic Orthodox Church representation of
one’s community now falls under the modern rubric of “Dialogue of Life” which he sees
“is a way of life and coexisting in the Egyptian society where Copts and Muslims live as
neighbors, striving and working together in response to their day-today common
problems and challenges.”113 He considers this to include “the Christian and Muslim
religious leaders such as Pope Shenouda III and the Shaykh of Al-Azhar, as well as the
other bishops and shaykhs in official conferences and festivals frequently with the aim of
enhancing the relations at the institutional level.”114 Bishop Youannes states that its
purpose in the optimal situation is “where community members, both Christians and
Muslims, get together and cooperate in a genuine way in the development process;
discussing their community concerns and problems, advocating for their rights and
making the best use of their local resources.” 115
Yet for the Christian community it still appears at times that the issue of control
over what, whom, when and where discussions will take place is a major factor. One of
the primary criteria for being able to represent one’s community was legitimacy. Muslim
authorities expressed some frustration with the Christian community in this arena. Al
Azhar wants there to be one representative as in the days of the Christian millet.
However, today in Egypt that is unlikely given there are now denominations and the
Christian churches cannot sort out who should be their legitimate spokesperson and
articulate their own position on family issues, particularly divorce. This apparent lack of
coherence reflects poorly upon the state of the Church, but also confounds religious
authorities such as those at Al-Azhar who hope to facilitate such matters. As the Grand
Mufti states:
I will give you an example regarding divorce wherein the state let the Christians make their own recommendations to the state. They came to the Government after having agreed on nine points to present the government legislature, but then at the last moment they fell into arguing with each
113 Op Cit, Bishop Youannes.
114 Ibid.
115 Ibid.
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other and so I say that the problems in the Christian community have more to do with their internal sectarian politics than with the Shari’ah or Islam.116
While the acceptance of this multiplicity of viewpoints, and the recognition of
several legitimate spokespersons ensures that the fullest possible picture of Christian
concerns gets represented, this same range and diversity of positions is not as well-
represented on the Muslim side, largely due to the authority and the ability of Al-Azhar
(and thus the government) to control the message and the terms of discourse. Despite the
best efforts of the official interlocutors to recognize each other as the legitimate
representatives of the Muslim communities, internally, they often found themselves
challenged by voices within their own communities. Unlike, Ottoman times, when it was
very clear that the official ulema and none others spoke for Islam, today in Egypt Al
Azhar has some competitors. These dissonant voices were often referred to as “deviant,”
“extremist” or “unorthodox.” A high-ranking spokesperson of the Government’s
Supreme Council on Islamic Affairs has actually repudiated the ulema’s monopoly and
control over who could represent the Muslim umma. He, himself, as a layman and as an
ex-member of the Muslim Brotherhood, has continued to carefully cultivate relationships
with a variety of factions for many years.
I reject the professionalization of religion, for example, control by the ulama and the idea that no one else has any right to speak. At the same time, there is a big role for the ulama. They must be al ulama al istanaar ‘ones that give the light,’ and must not let fanatics dominate discourse. They run the risk of becoming the silent majority, because the media pays attention to the fanatics. 117
The Grand Mufti, Ali Gomaa, was keen on asserting the role for Al Azhar as
primum inter pares. “Al-Azhar speaks for Islam”118 he asserted, and recently has been
calling for an international Muslim panel of jurists (fuqaha) to limit who can legitimately
issue fatwas
116 Op Cit, Ali Gomaa, in G. Martin.
117 Ibid.
118 Ibid.
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One of the problems faced by religious communities today is the issue of authority. In both Islam and other religions we are witnessing a phenomenon in which lay people without a sound foundation in religious learning have attempted to set themselves up as religious authorities, even though they lack the scholarly qualifications for making valid interpretations of religious law and morality. It is this eccentric and rebellious attitude towards religion that opens the way for extremist interpretations of Islam that have no basis in reality.119
Indeed, Christian leaders, for the most part, tended to prefer Al-Azhar as the
official voice and most expressed hope that Al-Azhar’s teachings would prevail. Most
said that the best thing for non-Muslim minorities was for Al-Azhar to recover its
authoritative role among the world’s Muslim community.
K. CONVERSION AND APOSTASY
For the most part, the situation in terms of conversion both from and away from
Islam corresponds to the historic pattern with however, so further elaboration in terms of
Egypt’s participation in several international human rights agreements. I will summarize
the state of the law below in term of the areas apostasy and conversion as applied to
marriage, inheritance, religious affinity and how the perpetuation of discriminatory
practices are reconciled with international conventions.
There are multiple reasons and situations wherein a person would convert or have
to convert from being a non-Muslim to a Muslim. These are fully contemplated in the
law. I will discuss some areas where conversion, is, by law, obligatory and wherein the
law prescribes administrative steps pursuant to the conversion of non-Muslims to Islam.
Many of these involve marriage and the status of children born to a non-Muslim mother
and Muslim father. Under Egypt’s understanding of shari’ah, non-Muslim males must
convert to Islam to marry Muslim women, but non-Muslim women need not convert to
marry Muslim men. Muslim women are prohibited from marrying Christian men.
According to the shari’ah as interpreted by the Government, a non-Muslim wife
who converts to Islam must divorce her “apostate,” non-Muslim husband. After the
119 Ali Gomaa, “Building Bridges of Understanding.” Speech delivered at the Cambridge Interfaith Programme (Cambridge, England, June 4, 2007).
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wife’s conversion, local security authorities ask the non-Muslim husband if he is willing
to convert to Islam; if he chooses not to, divorce proceedings begin immediately. The
minor children of converts to Islam, and in some cases adult children, will automatically
become classified as Muslims in the eyes of the Government irrespective of the religion
of the other spouse. This practice is in accordance with the Government’s interpretation
of shari’ah, which dictates “no jurisdiction of a non-Muslim over a Muslim.”120
In disputes involving a marriage between a Christian woman and a Muslim man,
the courts apply shari’ah as well.121 Under the shari’ah, converts from Islam lose all
rights of inheritance, but this is difficult to ascertain when push comes to shove because
no legal record of such a conversion is ever made. What is important to note is that the
interpretation is consonant with the historical one and permits Muslims something it does
not permit Christians.
In terms of the far touchier issue, conversion away from Islam, we can say that
religious conversion to Christianity or away from Islam for any reason remains a difficult
issue. In January 2008, the Cairo Administrative Court, a court of first access, ruled that
freedom to convert does not extend to Muslim citizens.122 As is historically the pattern,
the government does not recognize conversions of individuals originally Muslim to
Christianity or other religions. Because of this, those who do convert often prefer to do so
in private. There is considerable fear of harassment from the authorities and Islamist
organizations. On the other hand, conversions by Christians to Islam get significant
positive publicity in the media. The weekly religion page of the prominent daily Al-
Ahram often reports on conversions to Islam and claims that converts improved their
lives and found peace and moral stability.
Copts were alarmed by the mounting pressure from Islamic religious circles to impose Islamic law on all Egyptians. One such Islamic initiative,
120 United State Department of State, “International Religious Freedom Report 2006 – Egypt,”
Released by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, 9. http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2006 (accessed July 9, 2007).
121 Ibid.
122 U.S. State Department, State Department Report on Human Rights, Egypt, 2009, http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2006/78851.htm (accessed November 3, 2009).
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publicly considered in the mid-1970s, was the “apostasy law” (qanun al-ridda ) that sought to apply the shari’a-prescribed death penalty to apostates, including Christians who had converted to Islam temporarily (a common practice among Copts, for certain practical reasons). Another demand, put forth toward the end of the decade, was for the shari’a to be proclaimed “the main source of legislation” in Egypt. The government dropped the apostasy law following a Coptic uproar, but then succumbed to Muslim pressures and adopted the latter demand, changing the constitution accordingly in May 1980. Such readiness by the state to introduce discriminatory religious measures—whether yielding to radical Islamic pressures or due to its own pro-Islamic prejudice—was highly worrisome to the Copts. “That a single Muslim should embrace Christianity is an unbearable scandal and an assault on the public order,” Mirit Butrous-Ghali, a leading Copt thinker, charged bitterly, “while it is permissible, acceptable and desirable for hundreds of Copts to convert to Islam. [The state] makes things easy for [such converts to Islam], providing them with benefits and gifts, and joyful celebrations and parades are organized for them in the streets,” he noted. 123
Where there has been some slippage in the traditional stance towards conversion
and apostasy is in the Egyptian state’s finessing of the issue when it comes to arena of
international human rights; something that the historical model did not contemplate. It
seems to make the Egyptians uneasy. The 1990 Cairo Declaration of Human Rights in
Islam, adopted by a foreign ministers meeting of the Organization of the Islamic
Conference, avoids the question of religious freedom and religious minorities
altogether.124
As we have noted, the freedom of religion is mentioned in the Egyptian
constitution as well as in numerous instruments of international law to which Egypt is
party. Nevertheless, with respect to the international human right of freedom of religion,
Egypt’s position must be seen within the wider framework of the Muslim world. Most
Muslim states maintain that Muslims are not allowed to abrogate their faith. This view
was not yet vigorously defended by the few independent Muslim states during the
discussions of the (non-binding) Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) of
1948, which stipulates in Article 18: 123 Op Cit, Ayedor, 58.
124 Elizabeth Ann Mayer, Islam and Human Rights (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1999): 203–8.
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Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance.
Egypt ratified in 1982 the binding International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR) of 1966, which allowed the “freedom to change his belief,” but was
amended to say “freedom to have or adopt a religion or belief of one’s choice.”125
Although this still appears to give a person the freedom to change his or her religion,
Egypt is of the opinion that this provision does not violate the rules of shari’ah. The court
interpreted the “freedom of belief” as a guarantee to practice one’s belief unhindered,
with the following qualifications:
The first of these two [i.e., the freedom of belief] is unrestricted, while the second [i.e., the practice of this belief] may be restricted by means of its [internal] order to affirm some of its highest interests, and in particular on the grounds of preserving public policy and moral values [al-nizam al-’amm wa al’adab] and to the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. 126
It is the concept of public policy (Maslaha) that may help to solve the riddle of
the apparent contradiction of Egyptian jurisprudence disallowing apostasy, on the one
hand, while upholding the freedom of religion on the other. This means that the Egyptian
courts hold that since Islam protects the freedom of the constitution should grant each
individual the right to freely embrace whichever religion he believes without constraint.
However, the courted expressed the caveat that this freedom does not restrict the
application of the Islamic shari’ah to only those who embrace Islam. It is asserted that
since the State’s religion is Islam, then when a person embraces Islam, he must then
submit a law that does not condone renunciation of one’s official identity as Muslim.
Hence, the shari’ah is reflected in Egyptian law and constitutions and permits freedom of
opinion, but within the limits of public policy, which prohibits the misuse of this right.
No individual has the right to call for what contradicts the public policy or moral values
125 Maurits Berger, “Apostasy and public policy in contemporary Egypt: An evaluation of recent cases from Egypt’s highest courts,” Human Rights Quarterly 25, no. 3, Baltimore (August 2003): 722.
126 Ibid.
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(al-nizam al’amm aw al-’adab), or use his opinion to harm the (Islamic) fundamentals
upon which the society is built, interpreted to include reviling sacred things, or
expressing contempt towards Islam or any other heavenly religion Such transgressions,
to include apostasy, according to both the Supreme Constitutional Court, as well as the
ICCPR, are considered to be outside the scope of unrestricted freedoms. This ruling then,
upheld the historical continuity between the present and the past: to depart from Islam has
traditionally and juridically meant to revolt against it and this is what no Islamic law or
state tolerates. Thus, while the courts’ position on the (Islamic) interpretation of apostasy
itself has undergone no change in Egypt, the political developments in the 1990s had
serious repercussions. Until the 1990s, apostasy was mostly a clear situation of
conversion, that is, an intentional act by a Muslim to convert to another religion. Usually,
these converts had been Christians before becoming Muslim, and their conversions often
were documented or otherwise easy to prove. 127
A lower court ruling interpreted the Constitution’s guarantee of religious freedom
as inapplicable to Muslim citizens who wish to convert to another religion. This ruling is
under appeal. However, most recent reports indicate that this is the norm and will
continue to be so. According to the 2009 U.S. State Dept Report on Human Rights in
Egypt:
For the second consecutive year, a court—while calling for legislative reform to achieve effective protection for freedom of religion and to confront the manipulation of religion—ruled against a convert from Islam to Christianity who had appealed for official recognition of his conversion on the basis of constitutional guarantees of freedom of religion.128
Only in July of 1997 did separate court rulings provided for 13 Christian-born
converts to Islam to obtain identity documents indicating their conversion back to
Christianity. However, the courts included requirements effectively identifying the
Christian converts potentially exposing them, if implemented, to risk of significant
discrimination by both governmental and societal agents. Furthermore, governmental
127 Berger, “Apostasy and public policy in contemporary Egypt,” 722.
128 Op Cit. U.S. Dept of State, 2009.
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authorities detained some converts from Islam to Christianity, some religious freedom
advocates, and some Christian children of parents who converted to Islam.
L. SUMMARY
It should be clear to the reader that a significant amount of documented evidence
that suggests that a pattern of discrimination based on religion exists in multiple areas of
public life in Egyptian society. Nearly all of the large functional areas identified as being
characteristic of the historic dhimmi experience were found to manifest aspects of
differential treatment. The extent to which these modern discriminatory practices are
Islamic, intentional, and consonant and continuous with the historical record will be the
subject of my next chapter wherein I compare the practices of the modern with the
historic and attempt to produce a taxonomy of political positions.
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IV. COMPARISON
A. INTRODUCTION
In this section I intend to briefly compare the historical record and the modern
experience to see to what extent there are continuities and/or discontinuities. I will go
down the list and point—by point compare the major areas i.e., the fundamental
functional aspects that characterize the ethos of the system by which the dominant
Muslim class administered and managed non-Muslims. As stated earlier, my objective is
to determine the validity of the dhimmi analogy in the context of contemporary Egypt. It
strikes me that at this point it would be useful, therefore, to remind the reader with a
working definition what the dhimmi experience-system consisted of, again making
allowances for localisms, adaptations and mutation across time and space.
First, and foremost the treatment of ahl al dhimma was based on divine revelation
i.e., Quranic principles. Second, it was operationalized juridically by a class of
theologian-scholars who provided rulers with a divinely sanctioned, yet adaptable method
of dealing with the “People of the Book” who lived in their domains, yet still, in theory,
claiming to derive from divine revelation. Third, the system of differentiated customs,
laws, usages, practices though claiming to be derivative of the divine revelation, were in
fact, at times more consonant and some times less consonant with this authority. Fourth,
the complex systems that eventually came into being were part of an intentional and
state-sponsored program with clearly articulated codices and administrative apparatus
that yielded fairly consistent policies. These policies produced a steady and stable state of
affairs. They formed, bound, constrained, permitted, and circumscribed social
interactions, public behavior and inter-religious transactions for significant and
recognizable periods.
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B. POINT-BY-POINT COMPARISON
1. Religion’s Relationship to the State
With regards to the relationship of Islam to the state, the historical record
indicates that Islam, from the time of the first Islamic conquest of Egypt was the official
religion and the laws were based upon the shari’ah. Comparing this to the modern
experience, we see that during the early period of the twentieth century, a distance
between mosque and state began to appear. However, when President Sadat amended the
constitution in 1980 to state that the shar’iah was the main source of the civil code, Egypt
then officially ceased to have a separation of mosque and state.
2. Legal Status of Citizens
The brief period of secularity during the early decades of the twentieth century
allowed the Christian community to attain a modicum of equality. However, with the
advent of the free officers, Coptic gains in the area of civil rights began to recede and
once Anwar Sadat amended article two of the constitution to read that the shari’ah was
to be the main source of the civil code, Coptic hopes for a more egalitarian society faded
even further. If it were not for article forty of the constitution which upholds the full
citizenship of all members of the three heavenly religions, conditions would resemble the
historic two-tiered system. Later we will discuss the multiple interpretations of what
application the contending voices say that the application of shari’ah does or should
mean. For now suffice it to say that the data indicates that the Egyptian legal system, in
terms of dealing with non-Muslim minorities, specifically ahl al dhimma, has generally
tended to retrieve and replicate rulings that reflect the classical applications of fiqh,
aspects the historic millet management of religious minorities, and not the ethos of
pluralism as recognized in quranic revelations. Although Nasser, under the rubric of
affirming Copts equal status as full citizens, abolished separate courts, that is was
advantageous to the Christian community is a matter of debate:
Following Nasser’s abolition of Muslim and Christian religious courts, Copts suffered from legal discrimination, when, in cases involving
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Muslims and Copts, they now had to appear before Shari’ah trained Muslim judges seconded to the new civil courts. (Coptic religious judges were retired).129
3. Government/Military Service
I could find no parallels between the historic levy of young Christian troops, such
as intentionally and systematically practiced by the Ottomans according to the custom of
devishirme, not could I find that today in Egypt there is any government program that
privileges or discriminates, selects or bars anyone’s access to civil service at any level
based on religion. That a degree of favoritism is shown to Muslims is probable, given the
statistics and the reports. This, however, is a reflection of communal prejudices, biases
and while certainly represent an injustice, lack the criteria of intentionality and state-
sponsorship that characterized the historic dhimmi experience.
4. Taxation
Here, again, I found no continuity between the historic model of tax collection
that involved the poll tax (jizya) and the land tax (kharaj) and the current system of
revenue collection. All citizens in modern Egypt have for some time been taxed according
to a system which is essentially blind to one’s religious affiliation. However, as mentioned
in the discussion of taxation in the previous chapter, the distribution and expenditure of
public funds appears to indicate the presence of a religiously oriented bias. Presumably
state-sponsorship of Islamic institutions, such as al-Azhar, Islamic broadcasting,
construction and upkeep of mosques and payment of Muslim clergy entails the
expenditure of taxes collected from all citizens, including Christians. Because Christians
are barred from attending institutions which their taxes help support, and because their
churches, clergy and religious programs receive no similar government subsidies, this
suggests the presence of discrimination based on religious identity and a state preference
for Islam over Christianity. While I do not find this situation to be analogous with historic
experience i.e., a differentiated form of taxation imposed upon and collected from the ahl
129 David Zeidan, “The Copts: Equal, Protected, or Persecuted: The Impact of Islamization on Muslim-Christian Relations in Modern Egypt,” Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations 10, no 1, 1999): 58.
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al dhimma in its specifics, I do find that there it does fit the criteria of reflecting an
intentional, systematic and state-sponsored policy of religiously biased revenue
expenditure.
5. Church Building and Repair
Church building and repair is an area wherein, until very recently, we could
actually perceive a legal genealogy that demonstrated that modern laws regulating the
repair and rebuilding of churches descended from historic rulings grounded in the
classical juridical tradition that typified the dhimmi experience. Until very recently, I
believe that most reports would support the claim that Muslims, often with the assistance
of the state, were able to build and repair mosques without having to go through any of
the bureaucratic procedures, such as securing multiple permissions that Christians have
had to learn to negotiate. The classical rulings that prevented obstructed and tightly
regulated the repair and building of churches that date back to the Hatt-i-Humayon and
go back even to the Pact of Umar, no longer seem to inform the policies of the Mubarak
government in 2007 lifted the need for Christians to obtain a presidential decree. While
incidents persist in which individual Muslims attack and destroy churches, this
phenomenon now becomes a matter of social tension and inter-communal conflict rather
than a matter of systematic, intentional, state-sponsored policy. Questions of police
enforcement and protection, however, now become the focus as to whether or not the
break with the past is real of merely pro-forma.
6. Religious Practices
As already alluded to above, in today’s Egypt there are really no codified
discriminators such as those found in the Pact of Umar or as practiced during the
Ottoman period. Certain considerations about the timing of religious processions and the
ringing of church bells persist however. The attempts by the authorities to regulate these
practices now however are done so in order to avoid inciting conflict. Thus, security
concerns or public order are not the reasons for controlling these practices, not to enforce
a religious decree. As in the case of other aspects of the historical experience, a social
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residue lingers and is expressed in the daily frictions between the two communities. For
example, following the inauguration of a legally build church in the upper Egypt in
February of 2002, Muslims reacted violently to the ringing of church bells. This attack
produced a violent Christian counter-attack
Security forces told Reuters that after a Muslim mob pelted the church with rocks, Coptic Christians responded by firing shotguns at their attackers. Muslims were apparently upset by the ringing of the church’s bells, despite the local authorities having been told beforehand about the form the inauguration ceremonies would take.130
Copts charge that frequently the Egyptian government particularly the security
forces and lower-level provincial authorities are complicit by not intervening more
vigorously when extremist elements commit such acts. The government and the
spokespersons of official Islam however, roundly denounce such acts and characterize
them as isolated incidents committed by a small minority of fanatics. Again, here we
must discern the difference between institutionalized oppression and independent
Muslims who deploy as social forces acting on historic grievances or act on perceived
loss of power or social position, grounded in a particular religious construct. What is not
clear is the degree to which charges of official complicity are actually investigated.
7. Communal Representation
There is really no evidence to support the notion that Egypt maintains a millet
system wherein appointed leaders govern semi-autonomous religious communities in
temporal matters. However, due to an underrepresentation of duly elected Christian
members of parliament, there is a certain level of advocacy conducted by religious
leaders on behalf of the Christian communities. The only area which one might suggest is
similar to the millet system is in the area of the family courts. The family courts are still
separate and based on religious identity and thus, the Coptic Orthodox Church wields
significant power to shape legislation in this particular sphere. Pope Shenouda, though
130 Reuters, quoted in “Christians and Muslims clash as church bells ring for the first time” U.S. Copts Association, February 18, 2002. http://www.copts.com/english/?p=329#more-329 (accessed on October 31, 2009).
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not possessing de-jure political office, nevertheless has a great deal of de-facto political
power. This falls now into the realm of tradition, and warrants a discussion about the
actual centers of political gravity, however, as a system, there is little actual resemblance
to the historic rule of patriarchs under the millet system, wherein they were state
functionaries who had the ability to collect taxes and govern.
8. Conversions and Apostasy
Reports suggest that for the most part, there is significant continuity between the
juridical structures that historically governed conversion away from Islam and the
modern Egyptian legal system. However, punishments are much different now and less
severe. Moreover, there is evidence that increased international pressure upon the
government and al-Azhar as well has resulted in more moderate rulings and the
overturning of more traditional rulings. Recent precedents worth citing are the adult
Copts who were able to reclaim their Christian identity years after their parents converted
to Islam, and a certain reluctance and lack of vigor on the part of authorities to prosecute
individual Muslims who converted to Christianity. However, in general there is still
sufficient grounds to claim institutional, intentional state-sponsored policy grounded in
the traditional interpretation of shari’ah and application of fiqh to suggest continuity
between the past and the present. The legal rubric under which apostasy is now
considered should be noted and are now punished according in terms of their rights under
personal status laws. According to this nuanced theory as articulated by those such as
Tariq al-Bishri (b. 1933) a historian, a retired judge, and former head of Egypt’s state
council, an apostate would still have his legal rights as a citizen, but should be socially
punished for upsetting the public order. According to Scott, Al- Bishri states that “social
punishments for apostasy are because it constitutes an act against society and against
Islam,’ not dissimilar from the punishments that the Coptic community seeks imposes
upon its own apostates.131
131 Tariq Al-Bishri, in Rachel Scott “Context Citizens in Modern Islamic Thought,” Islam and Christian–Muslim Relations 18, no. 1, January 2007): 13.
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C. CHRISTIANS IN THE EGYPTIAN STATE: A TAXONOMY
After determining degrees of actual continuity and discontinuity between the
historical dhimmi experience and the actual one, it is also important to consider the
deployment in the present of the past in political terms, because in fact, that is the level
on which it is most frequently the historic dhimmi experience is called into service. Thus,
given the level nuance in terms of how the dhimmi narrative gets deployed and who
deploys it, I have concluded that one of the most helpful notions might be to create some
kind of taxonomy whereby one can classify the positions and the interlocutors.
1. The Muslim Modernists
At one end of the Muslim continuum are those who advocate a relatively
pluralistic and egalitarian vision for Islamic Egypt and desire a recovery of what they
claim to be the original quranic ethos. When they use the term dhimmi itself it is usually
used in the original quranic sense of the “scriptuaries,” not with any desire to see a return
to the millet system. These more moderate thinkers envision an Islamic Egyptian territory
that has a place for non-Muslims. For these thinkers, the fabric of Islamic Egypt need not
be uniform; it can be interwoven with a dhimmi presence without destroying the Islamic
nature of the territory. This vision also has its roots in the later idea developed by jurists
such as al-Shaybani in the Siyaar of dar al-sulh (land of treaty), which allowed for truce
lines between Muslim and non-Muslim areas, even within dar al-Islam. In the moderate
vision, dhimmi communities are very much a part of the traditional landscape of Islamic
Egypt. For the moderates, then, Egypt would have a place for the dhimmi Copts, certainly
as full citizens. However, the exact nature of this citizenship, as Sachedina noted earlier
is somewhat foreign to the shari’ah and still and thus is a matter for considerable debate.
Some moderates argue for full citizenship and rights for Christians and Jews in the
Islamic state. Other moderates see a more restricted participation for ahl al-kitaab. Ali
Gomaa, the Grand Mufti is one who fits into this camp and, at his harmonizing best,
abandons the classical polemics of Christian-Muslim dialogue, as witnessed interactions
between the churches and al-Azhar seem to have departed from following the traditional
polemics and argumentation, yet are still using classical forms to frame the issues, but
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eschews official attempts to convert. Despite his contention that in modern Egyptian
state, the old paradigms of the Ottoman millet system and pre-Ottoman rule are long
gone, there are clear traces that persist particularly in the way the traditional ulema
counseled the Sultan on the management of religious minorities.
2. The Muslim Brotherhood and Moderates
The Muslim Brotherhood Al-ikhwan al-muslimun (the Muslim Brothers) is
perhaps the most important example of a moderated and moderating group in Egypt.
Though not so moderate in the past, it has recently been working through quasi-legal
channels and by peaceful measures. Al-ikhwan advocates a less urgent approach to
Islamic revolution and a relatively more conciliatory relationship with Coptic Christians,
reference the Supreme Guide, Mehdi Akif’s rejection of the dhimmi analogy in an
interview with Egypt’s leading independent newspaper, Misr al-Yaum. When asked about
the status of Copts as dhimmis, Akif responded, “the matter of dhimmis is finished. Do
we take jizyah [a tax] from you? The Muslim Brotherhood considers you citizens with
the same rights and duties as the rest of us. Are you not our partners in the homeland in
everything?”132 Such Islamists appear for the moment to support full rights and
citizenship for Copts in a future Islamic state, but it is difficult to see just how true and
total equality would be realized in an Egypt under the MB version of shari’ah. While
liberal, Wasattiyya Christians are fully on board, the majority of Copts take a jaundiced
view of MB declarations such as “the [MB] organization’s vision rests on the concept
of citizenship and equal rights for all, stressing that it wants to restore the caliphate in the
spiritual realm, and not the political one.”133 The MB/ moderate Islamist view of the
place of the Copts is ambiguous, and in the view of Copts, perhaps intentionally so.
132 Mahdi Akif “Egypt’s MB Chief on Al-Qa’ida’s ‘Deviant’ Thought, Copts, Iraq, Clash With
Regime” Cairo Al-Misri Al-Yawm in Arabic, November 24, 2007. http://www.almasry-alyoum.com/ (accessed October 3, 2009).
133 Issander al Imrani, “The Emergence of a Coptic Question in Egypt,” Ikhwanweb: The Muslim Brotherhood’s Official English Web site, http://www.ikhwanweb.com/article.php?id=4326. (accessed November 13, 2009) Liberal-minded Brothers such as Abd al-Mun`im Abu al-Futouh even advocated for Copts to build their churches without impediment yet skeptics charge that this is a ploy to for the MB to gain permission to build their own mosques.
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Moreover, the wide-spectrum of “moderate” Islamist vision of Egypt is difficult to
characterize as being uniform, stable, or consistent over time, hence a certain wariness
and diffidence on their part.
3. Pluralist Traditionalist Islamists
Yusuf al-Qaradawi, an al- Azhar trained cleric living in exile in the Gulf is
popular on the Egyptian street. His CDs and cassettes are found in any Egyptian souk and
are standard listening among many Islamists. Though hardly a moderate in his approach
to Western culture and the state of Israel, Qaradawi advocates for a pluralistic and
tolerant position towards ahl al dhimma, and clearly sees the past millet system as the
model of the future. Thus, Qaradawi does not advocate total equality for non-Muslims; he
argues they should be subject to the jizya tax, and they must severely restrict any public
display of Christian faith.
Most importantly, he calls for a proscription on constructing new churches. Copts ‘should not display their symbols and crosses in Muslim territory and should not establish a church in a Muslim city where none existed before. This is an order since such a display is considered an affront to Islamic sentiment which may precipitate discord and disturbances.’134
This sensitivity to displays of Coptic faith in the midst of Islamic territory is
frequently seen among those who allow a place for Copts in Islamic Egypt. Given their
predilection of the millet model, there remain serious questions about the nature and
extent of that place, and the freedoms Copts would enjoy within it.
4. Militant Islamists
In Egypt, militant Islamists are in the distinct minority among advocates of
political Islam, however, their influence is disproportionate to their numbers and t during
the 80s and 90s they succeeded in seriously damaging Christian-Muslim relations. For
134 Yusaf Qaradawi, Ghayr al-muslimun fi al-mujtama al-islami (Beirut, 1983), in Mark Purcell, “Place of the Copts: Imagined Territory and Spatial Conflict in Egypt,” Ecumene (Vol. 8 No.4, 1998): 441.
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militants, Coptic churches, crosses, icons and people are out of place in Muslim Egypt.
They properly belong in dar al-harb, outside the bounds of dar al-Islam and outside the
bounds of Egypt
These militant Islamists counter the moderates and even traditionalist, pluralist
Islamists by arguing that pluralism goes against the idea of the Islamic state and therefore
the true Muslims state should refrain from seeing the People of the Book as dhimma, who
deserve protection. Extreme militants reject the dhimma “special” category for Christians
and Jews and argue that they should be considered unbelievers (kafirun). Because they
are kafirun, the Islamic state need not grant them special dhimmi status. Christians and
Jews should rightly be opposed and brought low, violently if necessary. According to
their permissive and heterodox use of ijtihad, these militants do away with the classical
categories of ahl al dhimma or ahl al-kitaab, and the world is divided into only two
categories: Muslims and non-believers. Moreover, according to the most radical, the
struggle against non-believers is elevated to the level of a personal duty for all Muslims.
The most aggressive militants define Christians and Jews as hostile to Islam by
definition, and intimate that they are in league with Western imperialism and are a kind
of ‘fifth column.” The militant discourse associates Christianity with Western
colonialism, and Judaism with Zionism, and plays up the theme of Muslims as historical
victims of these two forces. Because Protestants and Evangelicals trace their presence in
Egypt to the colonial past and to foreign missionaries the militant discourse is particularly
problematic and threatening. However, even in the so-called militant camp, there are
those like the prominent and well-publicized Muhammad Imara, a regular guest on
government TV shows who writes a weekly column in the government-owned al-Akhbar
newspaper. Imara argues that the Qur’an urges Muslims to fight non-Muslims only when
they are the aggressors and threaten Islam.135
135 My senior contact at the Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs explained how Imara’s book, Fitnat Al-Takfir Bayna Al-Shi’a Wal-Wahhabiyya Wal-Sufiyya (“The Civil Strife of Takfir Between Shi’ism, Wahhabism, and Sufism”), published in December 2006 had to be removed from the shelves because it was discovered that Imara accused Christians of heresy and noted that Islam permitted the killing of non-Muslims. Imara apologized and explained that he had only been quoting ancient sources permitting the killing of non-Muslims.
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5. The Nationalist/Multi-Confessional Vision
This multi-confessional nationalist idea enjoyed its greatest popularity after the
First World War and the national revolution of 1919, as mentioned before, when
Egyptian resistance to British colonial rule began to grow. The Wafd party, the standard
bearer for Egyptian nationalism and multi-confessionalism also had a purely secular tilt
as well. Many Copts became important players in the Wafd and helped found and direct
it ideologically through its most influential years.
According to this nationalist concept, Egypt is a both a melting pot and an
amalgam- what one might call a cultural and religious “pudding stone” that absorbed the
cultures and religions that came to dwell in it, creating a unique identity of Egyptianess,
but without the fusion and accompanying loss of identity of the individual components.
Hence there are accretions upon accretions of distinct Pharaonic, Greek, Coptic, Arabic
and Islamic peoples and cultures. This nationalist model, in contrast to the secular model
does not separate religions from the state but incorporates it into a system that in theory is
multi-confessional In this vision, the non-Islamic cultures are the foundational cultures
upon which, only later, does the Islamic heritage get added on. Hence, there is the
implied historic debit to Coptic culture, tradition and religion. In this view, it is as much
the Copts as the Muslims who flavor Egypt with its distinct identity. In the multi-
confessional nation of Egypt, Copts are full members of Egyptian Society, and never
dhimmi, since for them the term connotes second-class citizenship, not simply a minority.
Under this polity, they cannot be considered either “second-class” nor “out of place.”
The pluralistic nationalist view of Egypt is still an influential idea in Coptic and non-
Islamist thought. Pope Shenouda exhorts his Copts to support the nation-state’s view of
Egypt, with its official doctrine of pluralism and equality before the law, despite the
cognitive dissonance that arises from the often blatant discrimination they experience.
6. The Post-Islamist Culturalists
Like the Nationalist Multi-Confessionalists, some Christians have joined ranks
with progressive Islamists to develop a Post-Islamic vision. They have taken part in
constructing a national identity that validates the cultural and religious legacy of the past,
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as providing a multi-confessional state with however, a more positive interpretation of
the dhimmi experience. This imagined Post-Islamist Egyptian identity is to be constructed
by Copts, Muslims and other Egyptians. It is associated with the work of Ahmad Lutfi
al-Sayyid, Muhammad Husayn Haykal and most recently Rafiq Habib an evangelical
Christian and co-founder of the Wasat Party, among others. This school of thought
considers the population of the Nile region to be a single, separate territorial nation that
has no links to the great Islamic community.
These Christians like to point out that they share a long history with Muslims and
readily claim a common identity with them. Makram Ebeid, a Coptic nationalist leader in
the interwar years, liked to say that “Christianity is my religion, but Islam is my
culture.”136
Rafiq Habib, as an example of such a post-Islamist Christian asserts Islam has
provided the best political defense against Western cultural hegemony and keeping Egypt
independent. According to Habib, Egypt is the result of a common struggle for
independence and nation-building in which the Muslim majority and the non-Muslim
minority took part. In this way it differs sharply from the earlier caliphal, or Ottoman
Muslim state that was based on conquest. In this situation it is the duty of the Muslim
majority to concentrate on applying the principles established by God and the Prophet
(rather than stubbornly insisting on applying outdated and inappropriate rules. Thus,
Habib implicitly advocates, like the modernists, for an abandonment of the classical
model of “dhimmitude” and a return to the utopian, pluralistic quranic ideal of the ahl al
dhimma. This necessitates a movement in the relationship between Muslims and
Christians “from one of contract (aqd), to one of constitution (dustour) and from dhimma
to citizenship (muwatana)”137
Abu al-Magd, A Christian, who had caught this vision was moved by the
growing tension between the Egyptian regime and Islamic political extremism to issue a
136 Phillipe Fargues “Demographic Islamization: Non-Muslims in Muslim Countries,” SAIS Review XXI, no. 2 (Summer–Fall, 2001):113.
137 Jorgen Nielsen, “Contemporary Discussions on Religious Minorities in Muslim Countries,” Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations 14, no. 3 (July 2003): 330.
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declaration of principles in 1991. He responded in this declaration to the fear emanating
from the Christian community, largely the traditional Copts, that in reality, Muslims
would marginalize the Christians, given the overwhelming Muslim majority in the
population of Egypt. Yet al Magd, asserted that on the contrary, that a return to authentic
ahl al dhimma status would be “an historical expression of rights and duties
guaranteed.”138 Such Christian thinkers claim that the institutions most representative of
the classical experience of an oppressed ahl al dhimma are no longer present.
He [Abu Magd] reaffirms his belief… that it is possible to write a modern constitution which gives full religious freedom and civil rights to all, Muslim or not. Therefore, according to Abu al-Magd, the rights of non-Muslims in a modern Islamic state would be guaranteed in constitutional texts that have the highest legal standing and would be fully in consonance with the Shari’ah. 139
7. The Nationalist/Secularist Vision
Since the Nasser era, the political which most Copts are familiar with is one that
has attempted to achieve the secular separation of religion and governance as
operationalized in the West. While has not been a successful because it has largely never
been achieved, it remains for many Copts the option of choice. Not entirely confident of
their place in either the state’s or the Islamists’ imagination of Egypt, many continue to
lobby for secularism. As we know it, such a strategy is seen as a way to achieve
separation of religion and government, thereby eliminating the differences in questions of
citizenship and rights between Copts and Muslims. The approach does not eschew
religion, it only removes it from the public realm and makes it a private matter. Much of
this work draws heavily from the Pre-Nasser Wafd Party legacy, which is itself derived
from Western ideals. We should note that this position, is also championed by a
generation secular Muslims who, in defending the Copts are also defending themselves.
According to Sami Egyptian sociologist Sami Zubaida, spokesmen for this position, like
the aforementioned Sa’ad Eddine Ibrahim note that his secular liberal view embraces “a
138 Nielsen, “Contemporary Discussions on Religious Minorities in Muslim Countries.”
139 Ibid.
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campaign for human rights and democratic institutions, [which is] directed primarily at
the government and the law, but also increasingly against, the second, illiberal view of
the Islamists”140. Therefore, there has been significant common ground here between
Copts and Muslim secularists and modernists. Copts, especially those educated in Britain,
France and the United States, have been supportive of this. Yet they are also cognizant
of the fact that, according to Egypt’s constitutional formula, the state has failed to
disassociate itself from official religion. Moreover, the protections they once had as
dhimmi are gone. They are legally full citizens, a minority, often discriminated against for
their religious identities, yet there is significant opposition by both the Muslim elite and
Christian elite give them greater tutelage and protections. The grounds for this seem to
have to do with the unusual understanding in Egyptian society that classification of the
Christian community as a minority would somehow mean that a) they are not full-citizens
and b) would mean a return to second-class dhimmi status. This is puzzling to many
outside observers, particularly those familiar with secular Western models where full
citizenship is in no way diminished by minority status, which only provides additional
protections and programmatic over watch of the community’s civil rights. Thus, the
Egyptian understanding of the secular model is in some ways quite unique.
140 Sami Zubaida, “Islam, the State and Democracy: Contrasting Conceptions of Society in Egypt,”
Middle East Report, no. 179: Islam, The State and Democracy (November–December 1992): 3.
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V. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS
A. INTRODUCTION
My objective in conducting this research and writing this thesis has been to
evaluate the historical validity of the dhimmi analogy, and to analyze to what extent one
can claim a pattern of continuity between the present and certain elements which typify
the past. In doing so, my hope has been that a clearer idea of how, by whom, and for
what reasons the narrative is retrieved and constructed.
My intent has been to be as anti-septic as possible, and by that I mean I have
simply tried to examine the facts, not pass judgments, or provide ammunition to any
particular side. In drawing conclusions, I have been guided by two main sources of
inspiration. The first source has been Hugh Goddard, a dedicated and balanced scholar of
Christian-Muslim relations, whom I have cited numerous times in this paper. Particularly
with regards to the historical record, I take to heart Hugh Goddard’s admonition that the
past cannot be measured with the same yardstick that we use to measure the present, and
I try not to fall into the line of his fire as some modern Christian and Jewish authors have.
Goddard asserts that those who do so fail to recognize that “by medieval standards, the
Muslim treatment of Jews and Christians was relatively tolerant and liberal,” at the same
time he acknowledges that “by modern standards [they would be] still discriminatory to
some extent.”141 Thus, although this is a qualitative, not a quantitative study, I intend to
“line up the data points, graph the intersection,” and let the facts speak for themselves.
My second muse, whom I now call upon, is the anthropologist, Clifford Geertz. Though
Geertz wrote extensively a generation ago about his studies of Muslim communities,142 I
have, in a less obvious way, relied on his perspective and methodological bent. Although
Geertz seriously under estimated the resilience of Islam and most religions for that
matter, to respond to modernity, I have always appreciated how, in studying religion he
141 Op Cit, Goddard, 68.
142 Clifford Geertz, Islam Observed: Religious Development in Morocco and Indonesia (Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1971).
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directed one’s focus to the context as much, if not more, than the dogmas, doctrines and
texts. What he would call the “mediating conditions” that shape the religion, are those
which in the end prove to be more important than the doctrines that make up the content
of the religion. This has meant for me that, in the end, it is the practice of the community
that matters. The interpretation Muslims and Christians give to what is happening in their
everyday life of believers has more explanatory power than respective theological
construct. Because Geertz’s understanding of Islam, as experienced in two very different
societies (Morocco and Indonesia) brought out the diversity of Islam’s response to
accommodate the way different cultures decide right from wrong and create meaning.
Thus, I have opted for the perspective of Geertz, wherein the context is the air without
which the doctrines cannot breathe.
I still have many unanswered questions about the dhimmi narratives (as separate
from the dhimmi experiences) as it applies to the current Coptic situation, and the rights
and freedoms or religious minorities in a moderate Islamic state. For present purposes, I
can only conclude by identifying the multiple, critical roles the dhimmi narratives play on
multiple levels, in the multiple Christian and Muslim communities. The use of the term
dhimmi, or ahl al dhimma appears to be used in the following four ways in the current
context of Christian-Muslim relations in Egypt, as:
i. Historic description ii. Description of present religio-political reality
iii. Narrative, analogy, and symbol in the service of social mobilization iv. Model for future religio-political relationships
I will briefly summarize my analysis of the following ways the dhimmi theme is
deployed, and address my original hypotheses in terms of continuity between the past and
the present.
B. AS HISTORIC DESCRIPTION
The historic experience of religious minorities living under Islamic rule varied
across time and place. Rulings in their specifics were modified; however, certain
characteristics remained stable enough to demonstrate a desire by the Muslim state to
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secure social homeostasis wherein, in exchange for a certain modicum of religious
expression non-Muslim or ahl al dhimma were allowed concessions. The vast amount of
documentation is conclusive enough to establish that from these origins, a much more
tightly regulated structure for the ahl al-dhimma would develop under the Abbasid
caliphs, as the shari’ah expanded into a comprehensive system of law for Muslims. Islam
functioned as an institution of the state and its practitioners emerged only as state
officials. Much recent scholarship across Ottoman territories indicates that in most
circumstances, Muslims and non-Muslims interacted and intermingled relatively freely in
the neighborhood, in the marketplace, and at court, and that compared to the treatment of
non-Christians in Europe, religious minorities under Islamic rule fared much better.
C. AS DESCRIPTION OF RELIGIO-POLITICAL REALITY
Here is where I come to the crux of my thesis. Today, as in the past, Egypt is a
religiously pluralistic society ruled by a pragmatic government and organized around a
dominant public religious identity—Islamic. The uneasy coexistence between a
pluralistic social environment and a demand for religious unity in both times allows for
an examination into the ways in which authorities managed interaction among religious
groups across cultures. Studying the blend of similarities and differences, continuities and
discontinuities has provided an opportunity for comparisons that offer a broader
perspective, as well as the value or limitations of historical analogies as models for inter-
religious relations.
Varying degrees of both continuity and discontinuity are present between past and
present. The continuities are found in the larger normative ways that govern non-
Muslims but also in some specific ways. My findings suggest that there are more
differences in the specifics and while differential treatment, as applied to non-Muslims in
the past, indeed exists today, the conditions and practices are significantly different from
those found in the historical record.
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1. Continuities
a. It would seem then, that at least in theory, toleration as a political policy,
whether in Ottoman times or today’s pluralistic and globalizing Egypt, the formula that
governs non-Muslim minorities is grounded mostly on the ideal of religious harmony and
political dominance rather than on Enlightenment values. The Islamic teachings about
pluralism are those derived from the traditional classical period, which despite the
modernist vision and interpretation, are not egalitarian but rather, have historically sought
to minimize conflict in pluralistic societies by ensuring domination of the Muslim
majority by guaranteeing protection of select minority rights and privileges.
b. In drawing parallels between modern Egypt, and historic record
(Ottoman society in particular), patterns of official suppression and informal provision
for private worship reveal a fundamental similarity to the management of religious
difference through subordination and protection in modern day Egyptian society. Ruling
elites in both times have blended measures of accommodation and repression to manage
religious conflict. Rulers have governed in such a way that demonstrates their need to
keep minority community productive and but also the need to maintain the dominance of
the Sunni Islamic public order.
c. My findings indicate that while equality is the claim, the fact is that
“toleration” is more likely to be the reality for most Egyptian Christians. However, the
rationale of the discourse has changed. More precisely, the accommodation of religious
minorities in the context of modern Egypt seems no longer to be purely Islamic but to be
a hybrid strategies drawing from two separate springs: first, modern, secular attitudes
about human rights that come out of the European Enlightenment and second with
historic Islamically-grounded model of managing non-Muslim minorities.
2. Discontinuities
a. In terms of forced conscription government service or that which could be
similar to the devirshirme there are no parallels evident. Nor are there the poll or land
taxes that characterized the dhimmi experience.
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b. The historic dhimmi experience was characterized by the fact that it was
scripturally derived, religiously sanctioned, intentional, and systematic, state sponsored,
and was administered with some consistency by a well-trained bureaucracy by members
of both non-Muslim and Muslim communities. Moreover, it was concerned with public
actions and public behaviors. In this regard, I find that there are significant discontinuities
because many of the current discriminatory practices, deeply embedded in the social
fabric though they may be, and the historic record. This does not mean that there is not a
historic legacy and a significant residue. Yet fingerprints, at most can only point to a past
transgression, and are not sufficient to establish that Christians still live under a system of
“dhimmitude.”
c. Having said as much, I would like to caveat that statement with the
observation that the state does contribute to discriminatory injustices that have historic
roots, in the areas of uneven expenditure of tax monies, maintaining policies that impede
the building and repair of churches, and the promulgation of laws that permit and clearly
favor conversion by a non-Muslim to Islam, but not vice-versa. These practices do seem
to be continuous with the historic system of differentiated treatment between Christians
and Muslims, and bear enough resemblance to the historic record to cause the Christian
population to not unjustifiably draw comparisons with the past. While there is uneven
application and enforcement of these laws, one cannot dismiss them as aberrations,
because they are still on the books, and moreover derive much of their authoritativeness
to article two of the constitution that since President Sadat’s time reads the “ the shari’ah
is the main source of the civil code.”
D. AS ANALOGY IN SOCIAL MOBILIZATION
The dhimmi narrative functions largely as an essentialism, often as a rhetorical
device, largely, as just mentioned because it is undiscerning and conflates actions by
individuals with the systemic, discriminatory intentionality and application exemplified
by the millet system. As a way of understanding historical connections between the
present and the past it has limited and circumscribed utility. Deployed as narrative or
analogy by which to make meaning out of the present, it reinforces stereotypes,
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confounds attempts at conflict resolution, and infuses the future with an unwarranted
sense of pre-ordained path determinacy. According to Russell and Casebeer, narratives,
among other functions, in such situations provide “justice frames which serve to
mobilize discontent, justify the need for loyalty to the church and the group, reinforce
pre-existing identities of the self and the other, create necessary identities where none
exist, generate scripts of the past, present and future. They serve to interpret
environmental conditions and identify threats to survival and they also actively motivate
members and channel energies.”143:
The dhimmi narrative does for the Christians what most narratives do when
communities face a perceived or real existential threat. To Russell and Casebeers’
description of the ways that narratives function we can superimpose the schemata used by
Roof who would place the functions of narrative under his two types, i.e., the
“disorienting” and the “orienting.” 144 Both types run through the discourse of the Coptic
community. The “disorienting” theme draws upon stories of the dhimmi experience i.e.,
theme of displacement, loss of status, subjugation, discrimination, persecution and
perhaps most importantly marginality beginning with the Muslim conquest of Egypt. The
“orienting” narrative is constructed upon two main pillars, the strength of Coptic
monasticism as a bastion on cultural resistance and the suffering of the Coptic people,
particularly the blood of the Coptic martyrs. Clearly embedded in the dhimmi narrative,
as lived and understood by the Copts, is that by means of their collective suffering,
through persecution and even martyrdom and by keeping the faith, they will find
salvation. The “disorienting” narrative is today also constructed from fragments of
history, particularly fear of persecution at the hands of militant Islamists and the
accompanying weakening of the community that occurs when large numbers emigrate or
converted.
143 William Casebeer and James Russell, “Storytelling and Terrorism: Towards a Comprehensive Counter-Narrative Strategy,” Strategic Insights IV, no. 3, March 2005, http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/nps/casebeer_mar05.pdf (accessed October 6, 2009).
144 Wade Clark Roof, “Religion and Narrative: The 1992 RRA Presidential Address,” Review of Religious Research 34, no. 4, June 1993, University of California, Santa Barbara, 52.
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E. AS A MODEL FOR FUTURE RELIGIO-POLITICAL RELATIONSHIPS
Although there is a small, and possibly growing group of Christians, such as
Rafiq Habib who look beyond the present to a post-Islamist future, most members of the
Christian community whom I spoke with voiced grave concern when speaking in the
future tense. Much of their future anxiety surfaced when we discussed the perception of
increased political power of Islamists and attacks against them from militant Islamists. It
appeared to me that in response to their disadvantaged situation, Christians have
constructed both a future-oriented discourse of fatalistic resignation, or preparatory
resistance. Both responses come, in my view, from a kind of “anticipatory anxiety” that
itself has, however its roots in the past. Zeidan comments that “a main element in the
unsteady balance of Muslim–Coptic relations in this century has been the tendency of
unscrupulous politicians to manipulate the religious divide in an effort to strengthen their
own position.” 145
I listened to this anticipatory anxiety and accompanying anticipatory grievances,
which were frequently voiced in terms such as “if the Islamists were to come to power,
then we would be reduced once more to the state of dhimmitude.” It is clear that the
Islamization of Egyptian society, the growing power of Islamists, and the fear of
unknown—what the implementation of shari’ah could bring—creates a sense of
foreboding. And secular Muslims share this sense of foreboding as well. In my view,
because the Copts are the most vulnerable, the secular Muslim community watches them
intensively, the same way miners keep an eye on the canary. A “real fear among Christians
in Egypt” is attributed by the sociologist Sa’ad Eddiine Ibrahim146 to local Islamic
extremists, but also to the failure of the state to fully include the Copts in the mainstream of
public life. The Egyptian daily, al-Ahram, in response to MB and Islamist description
about Egypt as an Islamist state posted ominous warnings:
145 Roof, “Religion and Narrative,” 54.
146 Sa’ad Eddine Ibrahim, “Meditations on the Question of Minorities,” Ibn Khaldun Center, Cairo, 1992, in Phillipe Fargues, “Demographic Islamization: Non-Muslims in Muslim Countries” SAIS Review 21, no. 2 (Summer–Fall, 2001): 103–116.
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It is sufficient to read the reform initiative issued by the Muslim Brotherhood in the spring to realize how remote their thinking remains from the underlying principles of a modern democratic state. That document was a blatant call for the establishment of an Islamic state that would become the cornerstone of Islamist universalism. It would revive the hisba system, imposing strict moral guardianship, or policing, over women and over artistic and cultural expression. It would deprive Copts of full citizenship rights, and it would establish religion rather than a civil constitution as the basis for the relationship between the citizen and the state.147
The unchecked traditionalist and militant Islamist discourses that look backwards
cause the Christians to be alarmed and to believe that “oppression will be cast upon them
regardless of how non-violent it may appear.” 148 Islamist clerics like the popular and
vocal Shaykh Kishk, throughout the 1090s, accused the Copts of having been historically
involved in the Crusades, and of having formed pacts with Western powers and
Zionists.149
It appears that every mosque that gets build with public funds, and every church
that cannot be tells the Christians that they are a second-class citizen. Every attack
against Copts, every church burnt down, or not repaired, every threat and barrier to
conversion, or legal impediment to the recovery of Christian identity, every assertion of
the Islamic character of the Egyptian national identity, and claim by officials of the
superiority of the Islamic state makes claims of Christian-Muslim unity and equality
seem quite distant and hollow.
Barbara Tuchman notes in her book, Practicing History that there are three things
that make a good historian and they are the investigative, the didactic and the
narrative150. The scope and focus of this study has been to establish the degree of
historical continuity or discontinuity, and to understand the power and applicability of the
historical narrative to the present. Having gone through this exercise, it appears there is
147 Sameh Fawzi, “Brothers and Others,” al-Ahram Weekly, no.772, December 8–14, 2005). http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2005/772/op8.htm (accessed October 15, 229).
148 Op Cit, Henderson, 164.
149 Op Cit, Zeidan, 62.
150 Barbara Tuchman, Practicing History: Selected Essays (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1981).
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sufficient evidence to suggest that the dhimmi analogy/narrative/trope is so frequently
applied that a second study is indicated in order to explore the possibility that the
cognitive and psychological power and appeal of religious myths and narratives might be
at play, as much as actual history.
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