Navy in JIAMD Programs – The Way AheadSea-Based Terminal Working Group Update to NDIA

RDML Brad HicksDeputy Surface Warfare for Combat Systems/Weapons (N76F)

April 7, 2005

2

Sea Power 21 Missile Defense Operations

Sea StrikeSea StrikeFORCEnet

Sea BasingSea Basing

Sea ShieldSea Shield

Missile defense is a key capability in executing

Sea Power 21 and the National Strategy

Missile defense is a key capability in executing

Sea Power 21 and the National Strategy

Maintaining the Joint Sea Base sanctuary is the Navy’s highest operational level missile defense priority

Provide regional defense for allies and expeditionary forces where land based missile defenses are denied, as well as critical air and seaports

Active missile defenses augmented by advances in ISR and INFO OPS (IO) provide high leverage offensive defensive integration in missile defense

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

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The Challenge

• Analysis defines clear capability gap– 2012 MCO-3 (POM 06)

– 2020 MCO-1 & MCO-2 (PR07)

• COCOM Priority

• A potential Navy contribution to a joint BMD solution

Defense of the Joint Sea Base, APODs, and SPODs from SRBM & MRBM

Defense of the Joint Sea Base, APODs, and SPODs from SRBM & MRBM

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The Joint Missile Defense Vision

Reduction in threat TBMs

D-DAY D+1 D+2 D+3 D+4 D+5

Navy

Army USMC

AF

EngagementEngagement

InformationOperations

InformationOperations

TimeCriticalStrike

TimeCriticalStrike

To address…

Number of threat TBMs

IO Assessment

% TBMs reduced

Assess R

isk

Assess R

isk

Assess R

isk

TCS Assessment

% TBMs reduced

Offensive IOTCS for TELsMissile engagement

Tier 2 Missile Engagement

SBT PAC-3

% TBMs reduced

Assess R

isk

Tier 1 Missile Engagement

SM-3 ABL THAAD

% TBMs reducedSea Based Terminal Defense Sea Based Terminal Defense

Contributes to Layered DefenseContributes to Layered Defense

Sea Based Terminal Defense Sea Based Terminal Defense Contributes to Layered DefenseContributes to Layered Defense

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Two Tier Sea Based Defense

BMDS

Exo-atmosphere

Endo-atmosphere

Layered Defense requires Midcourse and Terminal Engagement CapabilityDepth of fire needed to achieve desired Pn / Pra

SRBM / depressed trajectories may not allow engagement by exo-atmospheric systems

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SBT Assessment History

• FY03 SBT Study• Near term focus• SM-2 Block IV mod test

• POM 06 BUR• Netted TAMD assessment• Included assessment of SBT missile options

• PR07 Navy SBT way ahead effort • TF Missile Defense issue

• 14 Dec Navy-MDA BOD SBT Brief• Significant MDA interest

Result was joint Navy-MDA sponsorship of SBT BMD Assessment

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SBT Assessment Charter

• Examine a range of options for SBT systems development

• Consider ongoing MDA and service programs that could be leveraged for SBT

• Address need to ensure Joint Assured Access and Defense of Joint Sea Base

• Assess combat systems options / requirements

• Present options and assessment to MDA and Navy leadership

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Sea-Based Terminal BMD Assessment

Working Group Organization

Assessment Leads

Kevin Apel

CAPT(s) Bill McQuilkin

Threat Assessment

Steve Peduto

Capabilities-Gaps Analysis

Gary Schnurrpusch

Systems Architecture

Jerry Rogers

Options

CDR Gary May

Technical Leads

Mickey Skamangas

Bill Tropf

SBT Working GroupMDA (DT, AB, TR, SE, PI, BC) OPNAV (N76, N70, N81, N2)

PEO IWS (1.0, 2.0, 3.0, 6.0 7.0) PEO Ships JHU-APLNSWC-DDSEA 017

DIA MSIC SPAJ8 JTAMDOUSA USAF STRATCOM AMRDEC

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Sea-Based Terminal BMD Assessment

Analysis Team Approach

• Threat Assessment:– Define threat space – Characterize operational threat environment

• Capabilities-Gaps Analysis:– Quantify operational capabilities & gaps given

the BMDS program of record– Assess operational contribution of SBT options

• System Architecture:– Characterize Block 2010 BMDS baseline – Develop and characterize SBT options

• Options:– Characterize cost, schedule, and risk

of selected options

Performanceassessment of SBT options

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Sea-Based Terminal BMD Assessment

Option Assessment Criteria (U)

Sea-Based Terminal BMD options are assessed on ability to provide robust defense of the Sea Base and forces ashore.

• Development status

• Technical maturity and risk

• Conceptual Modifications

• Cost

• Schedule

• Engage targets

• Adequate fire power

• Defend assets or area (footprint)

• Maintain battle space

• Produce effective kill

• Ability to fill the gap

• Availability of assets

• Mission commonality

• Adequate number of engagements

• Complexity of BMC2, communications

• Risk to assets

ProgramPerformanceOperational

Assessment Criteria

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PLATFORMSCG / DDGDDXLarge ShipCVW TACAIR

SBT CapabilityFunctional Building Blocks

SENSORSModified SPY-1Modified DDX DBRPATRIOT RadarTHAAD RadarAircraft Organic RadarAircraft IRSTS

WEAPONSSM-6 ModSBMSEMSEMarinized THAADTHAAD

C2BMAegis BMD w/ SBT ModsOA Aegis w/ SBT ModsDDX w/ SBT ModsPATRIOT ECSTHAAD C2BMAirborne Organic C2BMAirborne Integrated C2BM

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SBT Option Candidate "ESG"s

Aegis/DDX with SM-6 Aegis/DDX with SBMSEAegis/DDX with Marinized THAAD

Large Ship Embarked PAC-3 Large Ship Embarked THAADLarge Ship PAC / THAAD Engage

on SPY Radar

TACAIR with MSE Engaging on own or Aegis Radar

Surface Combatant Options

TACAIR Options

Embarked System Options

BMDSBMDSBMDS

BMDSBMDSBMDS

BMDS

ECS

BMDS

ECS

BMDSBMDS

ECS

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Sea-Based Terminal BMD Assessment

Status / Group Schedule

Activity January February March April May June

TOR

Kick-off Meeting

Threat Assessment

Capability - Gap Analysis

System Architecture

Options

Overall Assessment & Recommendations

Major

In-Process Reviews

Final Report

Refinements

Refinements

Refinements

2/2

1/19

2/28 3/28

EXCOMM EXCOMM / BoD EXCOMM BoD