Why do states act the way they act in

international system: A foundation for

International Relations Theory in the

epoch of Realisation.

Abstract

International relations of contemporary world are primarily understood and analysed through

neorealist or neoliberalist presumptions. Waltz presumes the structure has a certain effect on

how a state acts the way it acts in international system. Nye and Keohane presume due to

complex interdependence states act certain ways.

I argue against those two premises. I argue that in this historical epoch that we are entering,

the Realisation, needs of the state as the basis for understanding and analysing relations

among states. Neither the structure nor the complex interdependence explains why a state acts

the way it acts within the system. Neither do concepts like state of nature, survival, national

interests, balance of power, or security explain the states’ behaviours.

As a case study, I apply the finding to the interests of the United States of its main trading

partners in the American continent, and across the Atlantic and the Pacific Oceans. The trade

volumes, which the United States carries with those states, is taken granted as a reliable

measure to value needs of the United States to go out and do businesses. I compare these

trade volumes of the US with the trade volumes that it carries with the economies of littoral

Indian Ocean. Further narrowing down the case study, I apply this foundation, needs, to

analyse the US-Sri Lanka relations. I explain why the United States is unable to restrain

China in the country. The finding will also explain why the United States is unable to

restraint China elsewhere too.

Why the state acts the way it acts comes down to the fact that the state has certain needs. How

the state acts within international system renders upon how much of that needs are, or are not,

being fulfilled within its own territory and resource endowment. It is a natural development.

Author: A.S. Amarasinghe Vidanage

Holder of a master degree in International Security and Law from

University Southern Denmark, and a honorary bachelor degree in

International politics from University of East London.

LinkedIn ID: dk.linkedin.com/pub/anuradha-sampath/45/4b4/9a7/

Date Published: 08 Nov 2014

Contents

Chapter 1 ............................................................................................................................................ 5

Introduction ........................................................................................................................................ 5

The structure of this writing ........................................................................................................... 7

Chapter 2 ............................................................................................................................................ 8

Historical development of international relations theories ............................................................... 8

Realism and Liberalism ................................................................................................................... 9

Niccolò Machiavelli ......................................................................................................................... 9

Thomas Hobbes ............................................................................................................................ 10

John Locke ..................................................................................................................................... 11

Kenneth Waltz ............................................................................................................................... 11

Nye Joseph and Robert Keohane .................................................................................................. 12

The Epochs: a reflection on the historical developments of IR theories ......................................... 14

The Realisation .............................................................................................................................. 17

Survival .......................................................................................................................................... 18

Needs ............................................................................................................................................ 19

Chapter 4 .......................................................................................................................................... 21

How a state ought to think ............................................................................................................... 21

Chapter 5 .......................................................................................................................................... 25

Case Study - Interests of the United States ................................................................................. 25

Main trading partners of the United States. ................................................................................. 26

Main trading partners of the United States in Indian Ocean. ....................................................... 27

Chapter 6 .......................................................................................................................................... 28

Needs theory is tested ...................................................................................................................... 28

Interests of the United States in Sri Lanka .................................................................................... 29

Theory in different cases............................................................................................................... 33

Contemporary armed conflicts ..................................................................................................... 34

Chapter 8 .......................................................................................................................................... 38

Needs as the founding principle and as an analytical tool of IR ....................................................... 38

Chapter 9 .......................................................................................................................................... 41

Conclusion ......................................................................................................................................... 41

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Why do states act the way they act in

international system: A foundation for

International Relations Theory in the

epoch of Realisation.

Chapter 1 Introduction

Needs of the state reasons why it acts. The ratio of needs of the state and natural

endowment of its resource to provide for that needs shall determine the extent to

which it has to act, or do not have act, among other states. In this historical epoch

that we are entering, the Realisation, neither the structure nor the complex

interdependence explains why a state acts the way it acts. In the epoch of realisation

the states are to realise their truer capabilities reflecting their needs and natural

resource endowment.

Kenneth Waltz writes something works as a constraint on the agents (units/states) or is

imposed between them and the outcomes their actions contribute to – the structure. (1979.

p.39) Nye Joseph and Robert Keohane assert in the politics of interdependence, domestic and

transnational as well as governmental interest are involved – complex interdependence.

(1977. p.7) Furthermore, Nye and Keohane believe that many of the failures of American

foreign policy [this could be any state] have their roots in the limitations of realist

assumptions. (1977. p. xvi) Waltz, Nye and Keohane assert those theoretical frameworks are

useable as analytical tools to analyse international relations as well.

I asked following questions myself. Are the Chinese actions being restrained by the structure?

Or, one could asks, as Henry Kissinger adamant about it, why the actions of United States in

South China Sea are limited? Is that because the structure restricts the US’ action? Does the

complex interdependence reason how - rather why - a state acts? Are we to believe that if the

state is giving up the realistic presumption about other states, that state unleashes endless

potential towards interdependence?

In this article, I answer no to all the above questions.

Instead, I argue, it is the genuine needs of the state reasons way the state acts outwards in

international system. The state could not fulfil all the domestic needs of it itself within its

own resource endowment. States with smaller populations and relatively little resource

endowments could not set precedents in international system. In this article, I argue for needs

as basis to understand and analyse the state’s actions and international relations. A theory

based on needs could easily be devised as an analytical tool as well.

I argue, a normal state, even at the time of war, ought to act out in international system

according to its natural capabilities that reflected within its domestic needs and its resource

endowment. Survival is a relative term. The states’ actions ought to reflect its needs. Up until

recently these conditions, which this realisation is made possible, was not clear.

I call this epoch the Realisation. There is a makeable shift in this historical epoch that we are

entering today. It contrasts from the post-modernity. In terms of international relations,

conditions which favour the Chinese model of governance, makes this shift. The ideas of

unrestrained individual liberties and liberal democracy will officially become the things of

the past. Everything is legitimised by people like you and me, global multitude. We are

realising the time and space that we are living in, its limits and constraints.

Before this epoch ends, each state will have realised their natural capabilities. States could

measure their needs and resource endowment to provide for those needs. States will have

gone out fulfilling their needs that could not be fulfilled within their own territories. At the

same time, those states, which have been maintaining inflated appetites for centuries, not

reflecting the natural needs of their populations, will finally have deflated accordingly. For an

example a country like India is yet to define itself reflecting its natural needs upon its given

capacities to meet those needs. A country like the United States has to deflate accordingly

too. A country like Russia, it seems, is yet to be redefined too. The largest country on the

Planet Earth reaching its landmass from west to east but only accommodating 142 million of

population – it is less than half of the US population and even Bangladesh hosts more

population than Russia – even with its unfavourable rough terrain, is troublesome.

The concepts like survival, balance of power, power, and security are yet to be seen used with

their truer meanings at the end of this epoch. So will be the relevance of concepts like

interdependence, and cooperation.

In his Priorities for 21st Century Defense, the President Obama clearly outlines the US’

intention to contain China in South China Sea. Could the United States perpetually stop

China gaining more than itself in international system? Why does the United States have not

much to do with India for example? India hosts the second largest population on the Planet

after China? Obama defines the US-India relations as one of the defining partnerships of the

21st century. Could the United States intentionally, for geostrategic reasons, increase

complex interdependence with India to the extent that it can contain China? Some reflections

would be drawn at the end of this writing.

The structure of this writing

I briefly outline the evolution of IR theories from medieval time to neo-neo theories and ask

what is enabling this shift from human nature, survival, structure, or cooperation to needs

based theoretical framework. Only the historical settings of the writings of Niccolò

Machiavelli, Thomas Hobbes and John Locke will be drawn into this end. Waltz and Nye and

Keohane deserve the most attention here. In terms of theories, I outline only the main

theoretical frameworks of Waltz, and Nye and Keohane. Enough justice could not be done to

any of them within a short article like this.

The writing will outline definitions of the realisation, needs and survival. What it means by

territory and resource endowment will also be defined.

Once the theoretical framework and definitions are outlined the interests of the United States

are brought in the writing as the case study. Main trading partners of the US are compared

against the trade volumes it carries with major littoral economies in the India Ocean.

Acknowledging the increasing engagement of China in Sri Lanka, the case is further

narrowed down to the US-Sri Lanka relations to reflect what the United States could do, and

could not do, even in a small country like Sri Lanka due to its shrinking capabilities. Few

broad remarks are made on how the theory could be applied in other cases.

The relevance of needs framework would be reflected broadly bringing China into the

discussion. Some remarks are made on contemporary armed conflicts. The armed conflicts

that are taking place within the pen-stroked-borders by distant powers. I question the

relevance of those armed conflicts as anything to do with international theories. The

conclusion will be followed.

Chapter 2 Historical development of international relations theories

Kenneth Waltz has just passed away last year. But he has left us with a radically different

theory to understand and analyse international relations from his realist predecessors. He

deserves immense gratitude from all of us for his effort. So does the theory of Nye and

Keohane.

The evolution of their way of thinking reflected the certain conditions in the historical epoch

in which they lived in. There is nothing surprising about the inescapable reality that the time

and space place upon the evolution of our thinking. For example there has to be a reason why

Hans Morgenthau places human nature at the centre of his theory immediate aftermath of the

WW II.1

The scope of thinking could definitely have limitations. One who observes the wider

geostrategic changers around and how much of them have affected, or not affected, those

great thinkers, rare windows will be opened to observe the historical constraints that those

thinkers may have had in their times and spaces. It is however not to disregard the timeless

wisdom of natural principles.

Idealists generally assume that states inertly seek cooperation - or at least have potential to do

so. For them nature is cooperative for mutual interests. The father of the liberal political

theory, John Locke claims that in the state of nature everyone is equal. Realists, such as

Thomas Hobbes, generally presume human nature is wicked. These premises had set

precedents how we understand and analyse states’ actions for centuries. Classical liberals and

realists alike have been argued that what is at stake in relations among states is either survival

or peaceful coexistence.

When the question is put as what is the interest of a state, each contemporary theorist tend to

jump their guns and tries to form arguments with core definitions like human nature, power,

balance of power, cooperation, and security. Sadly, even those who try to define the concept

of national interest systematically, someone like Martha Finnemore, have ended up

entertaining trendy concepts like international social structures evidently showing the

difficulties of thinking fresh in any given historical context.

What conditions have made the concepts like human nature, and cooperation appealing

historically to observe the actions of states? Let us outline the historical contexts in which

those classical thinkers thought and wrote.

1 The WW II is referred to the Western War II. The WW I = The Western War I. Why that is explained in 7th footnote.

Realism and Liberalism

When Niccolò Machiavelli, Thomas Hobbes, and John Locke were thinking, wars were all

around them. A part of the world, of what we now call the west, was going through

unprecedented changers due to an historical coincident occurred – the discovery of New

World. The chances of expanding their territories seemed to have had no end at sight for

some of the western monarchies. With these expansions the capabilities of so called nation-

states were constantly at shift.

Nothing seemed to have stopped the nature of their Monarchies. Machiavelli and Hobbes

were mainly reflecting on physical wars around favouring their rulers. Locke was doing the

same thing, favouring his monarch, but was reflecting on inner and outside religious wars in

his time to form his peaceful argument. How much the young Jewish Morgenthau may have

reflected on the nature of Adolf Hitler; wonder yourselves for a second now. He himself was

born in Germany in 1904, and lived there until he immigrated to the US in 1937. It is hard to

imagine that he had any chance of reflecting on international relations without contemplating

the raw power and human nature of Nazi leader.

Even if there was no more room left for endless territorial expansions at the aftermath of the

WW II, the overly accumulated capabilities of the United States had left the observers of

states relations with an image that its power - soft and hard – is endless. That was until when

China emerged as a main actor in international relations recently.

Those misgivings, rather the historical constraints of their thinking, whether it is idealist or

realist, are evident even in the writings of these original thinkers.

Niccolò Machiavelli

It is very significant where Machiavelli was born. He

came from Florence in Italy. The west did not mean

much at the time in 1513 when he was writing The

Prince.

The Italians were the ones having Renaissance, not the

Prussians or the English. Remember, his writing came a

century prior to the Westphalia Treaty in 1648.

In my mind his thought had been impaired by following

historical constraints.

It has been while since the reconsolidation of Ottoman

power disconnected western traders, mainly traders of Venice, having access to eastern trade

through, the Silk Road. Prior the Mongolians had offered a secure passage to these traders.

Picture source: Bio - biography.com

Thus, it was a busy time to find a way around to Far East to maintain the demand for those

lucrative products such as spice and silk. A Portuguese explorer, Bartolomeu Dias, had just

reached the Cape of Good Hope in South Africa in 1448 for the first time. It is about forty

years later in 1492 Christopher Columbus landed on the New World by a coincident. The

Christian theologians of the era, whom were closer to Spanish Monarch, had initially refuted

the Columbus’ journey because they believed the earth was flat.

The Prince had nothing to do with these distant realities. He was merely trying to regain the

office he lost from Giuliano de' Medici, the co-ruler of Florence, favouring him. None of

those broader changers seems to have had any lasting effect on him or on his writing.

Contradicting the traditional belief that the ruler does not have to be virtues to be a legitimate

ruler was the message delivered in The Prince. Does this hypothesis have any pretext today in

terms of international relations? The appeal of this hypothesis to understand how the

President Obama or the President Putin or the Chinese Primer Xi Jinping manages their

states’ relations with other states is more or less irrelevant today. It is a different question to

ask to what extent this hypothesis is relevant within the domestic political structures in this

writing.

Thomas Hobbes

What had Hobbes have in his mind when he wrote phrases

like a perpetual and restless desire of power after power that

ceases only in death, and such a war as is of every man

against every man in 1651? He was living in self-exiled in

France while he was writing Leviathan. He feared for his

own life because he suspected that his favouritism to

absolute sovereign in the English Civil War bring him

death. It seems he felt safer in France where the Thirty

Years of War waging was just coming to an end. It was war

everywhere, all around him. A social contract, one which

the monarch has absolute control, was seems to be the

solution for him to eradicate this perpetual war, which is

conditioned by human nature.

Some of his works concerned the slavery at the time, allowing us to observe that the scope of

thinking is being stretched with historical encounters.

Picture source: Wikipedia

John Locke

John Locke, a Scottish natural law philosopher, who was born in

1632, replying to Sir Robert Filmer, an English political figure

who defended the divine right of English King, wrote following

words in 1689; lack of a common judge, with authority, puts all

persons in a state of nature and again, Men living according to

reason, without a common superior on earth, to judge between

them, is properly the state of nature.

He was favouring King William III and wife, the protestant Mary

II, to gain the reign in England. The Bill of Right, which was

ratified in 1688 with some influence of Locke’s writing, had

paved the way to bar the Catholic members sitting in the UK

Parliament, and had guaranteed the Monarch for a protestant until

last year, 2013.

Kenneth Waltz

All of them, Waltz, Nye and Keohane, were born in the

United States. They should all have sensed the immediate

triumphalism of the US at the aftermath of the WW II, and

somewhat distant devastations across the Atlantic and the

Pacific Oceans. As Waltz was born in 1924, he should have

seen the most. Amid seventies their ideas are evolving. They

were in the middle of the Cold War; but had witnessed the

détente. The world was a bipolar world. They all have seen

the Korean War and Vietnam War, which were results of the

Cold War. When the writings of their first editions were

printed, the USSR was still a supper power in its old form.

Post-war institutions like the UN, WTO, IMF and the World

Bank were out in action.

The Waltz’s ‘Theory of International Politics’ was first printed in 1979.

His process of thinking to form a systemic theory was primarily shaped by initial questions

like - Should it [a state] spend more or less on defense?; Should it make nuclear weapons or

not?; Should it stand fast and fight or retreat and seek peace? (p.19) Answering those

questions himself, he wrote, something works as a constraint on the agents or is imposed

between them and the outcomes their actions contribute to. That is the structure. For that

reason, for him, an international relations theory could not be formulated as a mere

reductionist theory alone.

Picture source: Udaimonia -udaimoniaonline.com

Picture source: Wikipedia

His shift from classical realism to neorealism lies right there where he looked for a structure.

His understanding of the system is composed of a structure and of interacting units. (p.79) He

writes structure is defined in terms of the primary political units of an era, be they city states,

empires or nations. (p. 91) Of changers in the distribution of capabilities across units changes

the structure of the system. (p.97) That is changes of the system. (p.101) According to that

expectations of units change as well. (p.97) In the structure there are few poles (states/units)

with great power, and their rank depends on how they score on all of the following items: size

of population and territory, resource endowment, economic capability, military strength,

political stability and competence. (p.131)

Waltz draws a clear line at what place the structure starts affecting the units, and what place

the units start affecting the structure. The capacities of greatest poles affect the units.

Answering his initial questions one could understand it as that those units with fewer

capabilities have to adopt accordingly to the structural constrains. The units start affecting

the structure when unites have to concert to find answers to global issues like Poverty,

Population, Pollution and Proliferation, his 5 P’s. (p.210)

A simple understanding of these jargons is like follow. Since it was the bipolar system at

observation, the United States and the USSR were the great poles. All the other unites have to

act accordingly because those two poles have great power shaping the structure. That is the

system. The changers in the distribution in capabilities of these great poles may affect the

system as a whole could be understood bringing China in to the system as a great pole, and

how the expectations of units change accordingly to the structural change.

Nye Joseph and Robert Keohane

The first edition of Power & Interdependence of Nye

and Keohane was printed in 1977.

Firstly, it has to be said, that the theory of complex

interdependence is not a theory that could be applied to

analyse national policies without modifications. It is a

theory analysing the world system. They themselves

assert that. (p.191) The analytical scope is further

narrowed when they stipulate the appropriateness of the

theory to industrialised and pluralist countries. (p.23)

In there may also lay the reason for obsolete theory of

theirs to analyse the today’s world system.

Their writing was primarily evolved answering

following two questions; what are the major features of

world politics when interdependence, particularly economic interdependence, is extensive?;

and how and why do international regimes change? (p.5)

Picture source: Wikipedia

Nye and Keohane formulated the concept of complex

interdependence as a base to understand and analyse

international relations. Contrasting from realists, they

believe; actors other than states participate directly in

world politics; a clear hierarchy of issues does not exist;

and force is an ineffective instrument of policy. (p.20)

However, when they write sometimes, realist

assumptions will be accurate, or largely accurate, but

frequently complex interdependence will provide a

better portrayal of reality the theory incorporates both

ends of the spectrum. (p.20)

They point out, placing the writing in a particular

historical context, détente showed the signs towards

interdependence, and the realists’ assumption of national

security is fading away as analytical framework. (p.5-6)

The areas like climate change and financial market showed ideal type of interdependence to

them.

Picture source: Ohio Wesleyan University - http://news.owu.edu

Chapter 3 The Epochs:

a reflection on the historical developments of IR theories

At the beginning of 16th century, about five hundred years ago, the world has to be a rather

mysterious place. That is even for en enlightening western mind. The constraint that time and

space played upon our thinking is a constant one. A physical example of that is that even in

the last quarter of the 18th century the King Gorge III of England was still commissioning

voyages to find new lands to claim under his name. What else could a modernist thinker has

seen about the state affaires beyond the raw power of Monarchies and their unrestrained

desire for expansion? Even at the aftermath of the WW II, human nature had a great appeal to

explain states’ relations. Only today we could observe some of the historical constraints that

Waltz, Nye and Keohane, once lived through.

Realistic needs of the state is the last this they had in their mind. The development of

capabilities among main actors in international relations had not reflected the natural needs of

their local populations within the constraints of their resource endowments.

It is very clear for us now that in those historical epochs where those classical thinkers lived

the Planet Earth was yet to be explored and reclaimed. In that sense we are doing rather

injustice to those enlightenment thinkers brining them into to understand contemporary

international relations. They had no such sense of the world. It is that you and I have this

sense of world today due to increasing circulations of information within a fraction of the

time. The ill of applying the writings of Machiavelli, Hobbes, and Locke to form theories of

international relations came about due to lack of understanding of their historical periods and

of those interpreters.

Human nature driven understanding of international relations was again at present at the

aftermath of the WW II. The writing of Morgenthau reflected the bitter truth of Hitler’s

expansionist attitude, and of his desire for spreading Aryan race. Those who argues today for

the re-emergence of Morgenthau’s theory, someone like Michael Charles Williams, has to be

very careful of not misinterpreting the actions of people like the Russian President as

something that driven off by his human nature. He is a product certain historical realities in

international system. He has been left with no other ways to secure interests of the state than

acting to bar the irrational expansionist attitudes of Europe in Crimea.

Let us reflect on the contemporary international theorists, Waltz, and Nye and Keohane.

It is puzzling to me that none of those thinkers derived their theories looking at the territory

of the state and the population it accommodates within its territory to find the reasons why

their state acts the way it acts. Like a child and a grown up man has same needs but in

different volumes, a smaller state differs from a bigger state in terms of the volume of its

needs. Some conditions bared them seen that their country had been developing its

capabilities for so long, and an historical coincidence had favoured that. To have an

undistorted view of the epoch that we are entering today what we have to know is what made

possible the development of capabilities of their state to the extent it did not reflect the

natural needs of the state.

The United States seems had the rigour and capabilities to make the whole world a free world

and a democratic one, or to bring the whole world under its knees if it wanted to. This is the

historical condition played on Waltz, and Nye and Keohane. The writings of Francis

Fukuyama, the End of History and the Last Man, is an innocent reflection of this epoch. Even

at the very last days of the last century the liberal values were seemed just about to take over

the whole world.

Waltz writes changers in the distribution of capabilities across units changes the structure of

the system. How could China, as a great pole, since it did not wage a war to expand its

capabilities, change its capabilities? What has to be understood is that what made the United

States to have greater capabilities than what it naturally deserves was based on a historical

coincidence – it is explained under the Realisation. In normal conditions, the capabilities are

extracted from natural resources. No eternal slavery or expansion is possible. The capabilities

of the state do not change that often. War is a way to expand the pool of resource endowment.

Technologies help it too. On the basis that each nation on this Planet has access to those

technologies, the nature given resource endowments of states, hence the capabilities derived

from them, has to be more or less fixed.

Those who were the victim of last epoch, generally speaking the post-modernity, have to be

the last of those generations which would not be able to pay attention to where their feet are

prior to observing international issues. Look at the ground you standing up, the size of the

population you belongs in, or you wish to belong to, and the resources you have around to

facilitate needs of people around you. Then find out how, and to what extent, your state ought

to act within international system.

Neither the structure nor the complex interdependence matters to the state. Neither liberal

democracy nor communist ideologies, whether it is mix of Chinese and Russians, matter

when it comes to provide for people within the state. Do you think that keeping 1.35 billion

people somewhat content is an easy task in the age of realisation? What has to be done has to

be done no matter what. That is why China is unstoppable – not because any ideologies it

follows. The states with larger populations, according to their resources endowments, shall be

going out looking to fulfil their natural needs no matter what. That is to me a legitimate cause

of action for states.

It is neither the structure nor the interdependence that reason a state to act the way it acts.

Waltz writes the greatest act of creation since the Adam and Eve is Richard Nixon’s

conferring superpower status on China in 1971. (p.130) He writes, China has more than 800

million people; Japan has a strong economy; Western Europe has the population and the

resources and lacks only political existence. (p. 130). A lot has changed since then. China is

the second largest economy in the world. It will soon surpass the United States economically

and militarily as well. Prior to consolidating military might, Germany has reasserted its

traditional power in West as an economic powerhouse. Japan has given up its post-war stance

as a pacific nation, and has taken up arms to defend its national interests.

Even if Waltz has clearly recognised, under the capacities of units that the size of population

and territory, resource endowment, economic capability, military strength, political stability

and competence are to determine the capabilities of the state, for some reasons, countries like

India, China had gone missing from affecting his theory.

Even at the outset I was in doubt about the theoretical framework of Nye and Keohane. The

analysis of the theory in rather abstract cases such as ocean and money, and the United States

relations with Canada and Australia have nothing appealing to small nations, therefore bring

no any resourceful analysis to understand the theory out from industrialised and liberal states.

They themselves have asserted that. Since they assert it is a liberal and pluralistic world

system they have in mind, the theory has to be obsolete to analyse today’s world.

In addition to that, in the preface to their first edition, Nye and Keohane write we believed

that many of the failures of American foreign policy in these areas had their roots in the

limitations of realist assumptions. For the liberals the mistake the realists do is a rather

theoretical one as well as analytical. Nye and Keohane have gone to a great extent to

accommodate nuances in the international regime. But the very moment they believe in that

the realist’s core enforces restrictions upon the state on its actions they are explicit about the

state’s endless will for complex interdependence otherwise.

Nye and Keohane are mistaken in their core belief. If they are right, it implies that illiberal

economies are destined to have thinner – their own word – interdependence than to those

liberal thicker interdependence lines. That is not valid anymore. For example, according to

them, China could not be more interdependent, or to say have a thick line, in their theory.

A clear definition of the present epoch, the realisation is needed prior to proceeding further

with this writing. What I mean by needs has to be clearly outlined also against the concept of

survival.

The Realisation

The conditions of Realization appear at the end of post-modernity.

The following definition is sufficient, within international relations of states, to understand

what conditions the Realisation.

The capacity of the Planet Earth is more or less understood. Today, the four corners of the

world have been clearly drawn. It works as a constraint - a constraint which plays a role in

almost everyone’s mind regardless one lives in Congo in Africa or in North America. Alone

knowing the four corner of the world, it is also significant that the main actors, which already

play a greater role in international relations today, and those who will play increasing role in

near future - such as Turkey, Iran, Germany, China, India, Brazil and South Africa and so on

– have no significant boarder disputes. Their natural resource endowments will not be

changed before the end of Realisation. Therefore, the capabilities of top dozens of countries

are more or less fixed.

In my understanding the issues of Senkaku Islands and the border disputes of India and China

will have been faded away as the time passes. Even if the disputes will lead to armed

conflicts, they would be in rather insignificant scale in comparison to the WW II experience.

Whether they will lead to significant war(s) is another matter – had those issues being left for

regional actors to solve themselves, such as to Japan and China and India and China, they are

more likely to ceded away with less significance.

One of the other significant facts in the epoch, especially contrasting it from the post-

modernity, is that the liberalists’ dream of individual freedom is realized unattainable.2 As

China is becoming the dominant economic power it is to set the example for the desired

government for the rest of the states and transnational organizations. Like the United States

did aftermath of the WW II.

The economic dominance, which west once had opposing communist ideologies, has to have

a name. The liberal democratic, it was labeled. Rhetoric of it played the biggest role keeping

people flocking into the idea. The chosen attitude of United States seemed had unleashed

potential to empower entire global multitude.3 The un-fencing human nature has, and still

does, found real comfort in the idea. The legitimacy of the global multitude was therefore

easily came-by for post-war institutions such as United Nations, WTO and IMF. Those

western democracies and barrages of intergovernmental organizations seemed to have the

rigor to change the whole world for good. But they suffered the lack of political will and

aspirations among those political leaders to do so. They were mere appendages of needs of

those handful states. The exploitation of developing world continued. Reality fell far too

short to the rhetoric of theirs.

2 The limited globe seems to have an affect limiting human rights at some level too. 3 Read Empire and Multitude of Machel Hard and Antonio Negri

While being a victim to those cumbersome old mechanisms, which roots belonged in the

colonial past, the United States reluctantly maintained the peace and security. Corruptions

and exploitation were the lubricant of this system.4 When the Chinese companies meet old

rotten structures we are to see the changers on ground - we have already seen some in across

Africa. Inevitable changers will also soon appear at the top levels in places like UN.

The Realisation is to say the capacity of the earth is realised. The capabilities of top dozen

states are not to change until the end of Realisation. The fact that human nature has to be

constrained is realised. I believe that not only at the top administrative levels across states but

also in ground among the global multitude consensus are developing that rhetoric of

liberalism is just a conjuring tool. So it goes the liberal democracies are the last places to

bring these effective changers to their constitutions and across their institutions. The demise

of the concept liberal democracy is guaranteed. The rise of more effective administrative

system is setting up the precedent in the epoch of Realisation.

In the desired type of administrative system - whether it is multiparty system or single party

system, whether the candidates are elected or chosen - the decisions, which concern the state

as whole, are made according to the principles. The Standing Committee of Chinese

Politburo and the principles of democratic centralism seem to be the ideal type of

administrative body and the principle that the state ought to adhere to.

The central point of this sort of administrative system is that the decisions are based on

principles. The principles happen to be based on true needs of the state, and have taken into

account where the state is, and where it wants to be in medium and long term future,

reflecting its realistic capabilities. The principles are not to be manipulated by the temporary

demands of its citizens. These demands will be addressed not compromising the principles.

However, the system as a whole will only survive delivering the fruits gained by adhering to

those principles, among its citizens fairly. Since, the global multitude is increasingly

becoming aware of the worldly and stately constraints, this sort of administrative system does

not have to be enforced upon them.

Below the definition of needs is outlined against survival. Only having a clear idea of what I

refer to as needs once could understand the argument.

Survival

What the traditional realists place at the centre of state’s reason of action is survival. Even the

hesitant Waltz writes following;

‘In any self-help system, units worry about their survival, and the worry conditions

their behavior.’ (p. 105)

Survival of the state is the bare minimum of its existence. The state possesses following

qualifications, a permanent population, a defined territory, a government and the capacity to

4 Read Making Globalization Works of Joseph Stiglitz

enter into relations with other states.5 A threat to any of those qualifications renders the state

taking legitimate actions to survive. War is justified under those circumstances.

Michael Walzer argues that at the extreme emergency the British bombing of German cities

were justified for a period of time. I would argue that the recent annexation of Crimea by

Russia is also justified under the same pretext of survival since the Russia’s largest naval port

in South is based in Sevastopol. For Russia the access to the Southern part of the globe is

only secured through Black See, and Sevastopol secures that. That shows even the concept of

survival is open for contextual interpretations.

Remind you the issue of Palestinian state. Some argue it does not have any of those

qualifications, except may be a permanent population. But it does not mean however that the

nature of illegality, which Israel exists as a state, bars the Palestinians acquiring state status.

In fact it is the illegality of Israel state confers the status of state to Palestine. It is none of

those above qualifications. Our consensus, the global multitude, of persistence endurance of

its people grants the legitimacy.

Needs

Needs are the needs of the state that the government in power has to address. The Indian

population of 1.23 billion people has needs. The US population of 318 million has legitimate

needs. So does the 1.35 billion people in China. Each government ought to provide for those

needs in order to be a legitimate government within historical settings.

It seems, the main difference between survival and needs is that needs are set in historical

settings. People decide what their needs are within the given historicity, historical context.

In that sense needs surpasses survival.

Needs could justify legitimate course of war. At the time when the legitimate concerns of the

population is not fulfilled within its own territory, and the resources are unable to acquire in

peaceful manner from international community, a certain state authority may have the right to

wage a legitimate war to acquire those resources. In the sense war is never over, far from it.

In fact the real meaning of concepts likes survival, national security, and balance of power

and so on, yet to be seen in full swing with their truer meanings. The condition of all states

realising their full capabilities makes the latter possible. It is most likely that we will

convince an epoch like that at the end of the Realisation.

Needs are material and spiritual in nature. There is no political, historical or cultural barrier to

realizing these needs. If needs are not being addressed by the relevant authorities domestic

political upheaval is guaranteed. Most importantly when a certain state is not addressing its

needs, which is set in historical settings, it provides a vacuum out there in the international

system which other nations could exploit. The best example of this sort is the puzzling

decision made by the Chinese statesmen not to explore further after those historical journeys

5 Art 1 - Montevideo Convention

made by Zheng He to Africa at the first quarter on fifteen century. It seems to me India just

has to be competence enough to see how much of its needs could be addressed within

international system. The eventual peril of the nation is guaranteed if it fails to deliver those

needs.

Chapter 4 How a state ought to think

The limits of neorealism and neoliberalism were outlined above. The historical epoch that we

are living in, the Realisation, was outlined, and explained why and how it differs from the

post-modernity, the epoch that those neo writers were born into and lived. It is explained that

the capabilities of states are not constantly in flask, given the fact that states have fairer

access to technologies. Nor structures - despite the fact that the main poles of those structures

may have been developing their capabilities unfairly for centuries, and may wish to maintain

them as they are - could constrain the other states for eternity from achieving what they

deserve, their truer needs. It was a result of a historical coincidence that have been conjuring

the minds of great thinkers to theories the states relations as many things. I pointed out, with

the actors like China and India are set to be significant players in international relations they

make us realise that why states ought to act is reasoned by the fact that states have needs

according to their populations. Given the fact that what each state has inherited from the

Mother Nature, its endowment of resource, is varies the state ought to go out beyond its

territory for looking to fulfill its natural needs that it could not fulfill within its own resource

endowment. This is why a normal state acts. I have made this argument above. Below I

elaborate it further.

Clear definitions of state and territory are required to proceed further. A clear definition of

resource endowment could be an advantage as well.

State within international legal terms;

‘the state as a person of international law should possess the following qualifications:

(a) a permanent population; (b) a defined territory; (c) government; and (d) capacity

to enter into relations with the other states.’ (Art 1 - Montevideo Convention).

Territory within international legal terms;

‘(a) The sovereignty of a coastal State extends, beyond its land territory and internal

waters and, in the case of an archipelagic State, its archipelagic waters, to an adjacent

belt of sea, described as the territorial sea. (b) This sovereignty extends to the air

space over the territorial sea as well as to its bed and subsoil. (c) The sovereignty over

the territorial sea is exercised subject to this Convention and to other rules of

international law. (Art 2 - United Nations conventions on the Law of Sea)

Resources endowment shall encompass following. It means how much of resources a certain

state could endow within its territory, and its human capacity. It includes the territory of the

state, and human capacity of the state. A larger territory does not necessary mean more

resources, and vice versa – ex Russia. A smaller population dose not necessary means a

smaller pool of human capacity, and vice versa – ex Denmark. What could be extracted from

the same resource pool within different states may differ according to the access of

technologies each state has. The capacity of an average individual could also be differed

according to the level of education an individual exposes. The constraints that the former and

the latter enforce upon a state in achieving its full capacity are temporary factors, I assert.

Ideally the resource to provide for needs of the state is to be born out of its own territory. Will

the spiritual existence of the population be healthier, if all needs are secured within its own

territory, is an unnecessary theoretical burden. The matter of the fact is that no nation on this

Planet is capable of providing for all of its needs within its own territory.

There two states meet. Each state wants to secure its needs from the other.

This is the natural encounter of states. That encounter does not have to be a material one.

Third parties, INGOs, NGOs and multinational companies may also play a role within the

legal frameworks bestow upon them - regardless whether those frameworks are loose, a lot of

loopholes or strict – by the states. This is the natural encounter of two states. It could be

many.

Needs is the reason why the state acts in international hemisphere. The state could not bother

to think if there is a structure out there or not. It is a mere necessity. If the structure

constrained the state’s actions for a decade, or for a century, that would be a temporary

passage of the state. We have already discussed that there was a hiccup in the middle of last

millennia that this natural reasons of why states act was distracted up until the post-

modernity.

Naturally speaking then, when the larger the population is, and the limited the resource

endowment to provide for that population within its own territory, that state shall naturally

have to go out seeking cooperation among states or acquire things by force. In that sense,

China (1.35 billion), India (1.23 billion), the United States (319 million) and Indonesia (253

million) and so on, have the largest pool of natural needs. Since an accurate calculation is yet

to be done to find out of what amount of resource an each individual may need to provide for

his or her wellbeing within his life span use the common sense approach for the time being.

Then it becomes obvious that the historical developments of past five hundred years have

made things pretty unnatural. It started with a coincidence – landing in the New World. 6

Maintained it with subtle and brutal powers hence. Accumulated wealth and power made new

thinking and technological advancements possible. Needs is the last thing those statesmen

6 Does luck describes this event than coincidence? I do not know. It seems, it will, if Columbus intended to find anything. But he wanted to find India, not something else. See, if he found India that could have been lucky because it was not even certain that at the time he will return back. When you go to a job interview, you expect to get the job. Some level of luck will involve getting the job. Here you met your intended employer, and you become lucky. But what if you ended up in a wrong interview room and you still get a job, a job better than what you intended. I would not say that a luck. That is a mere coincidence.

had in mind. The conjuring ideologies like liberalism largely kept the system afloat for last

century. Evidently showing the hypocrisy behind the concept, the disparity has been

increasing among the people in liberal states. The US power house, where the ideologies and

the raw power emanated from, has been struck at the heart of Manhattan. Now the United

States is a super power that has to think about flexing its muscles accordingly to its needs.

The vacuum which once was there increasingly is being filled by the actions of developing

nations. In that sense the countries like China and India with their large populations and

relatively larger resource endowments have the potential for economic and military

capabilities that the US will never able to have. These two countries alone together will close

any vacuum out there and even could go well beyond extracting what they need by other

means. The larger populations offer them the relative advantage to do so.

The bottom line is that that the natural resource endowment of the state does not grow just

because it wishes it to grow. The technology, which may try to be efficient all the time, may

do so. But whether it would be able to increase its efficiency in higher phase than the growth

rate of global population, and still would that be capable at all to carter everyone with the

resource needed to have their creative spaces to unleash their true potential is doubtable.

The aspiration of a statesman has to match the natural capacities that the state has been

bestowed upon him. The aspiration of President Obama is restricted by the size of his

population and the resource endowment of the state. Just because a grand theory presupposes

the other is evil, and, therefore you have to check and balance your power all the time against

other states, does not make the state’s natural capabilities grow. Just because some analysts

invite the President Obama to restrain the Chinese engagements in Africa or in the India

Ocean or in the South China Sea it does not mean that he could afford do that. The arguments

such as that the second strike nuclear capabilities of some states keep other states growth at

bay is an old myth. China was not. And India will not.

The argument also goes against the neoliberals. Just because the idea of complex

interdependence makes the world secure or peaceful or nicer, it does not mean the state has

the capacity to push itself beyond its needs of its population.

Let us ask few simple questions now which will in return pave the path towards case studies.

The population of the world today is about 7.1 billion. Could the Planet Earth provide for that

population? As I stated earlier, I discard the belief that the ability of constant and gradual

progress of technological capacities to provide for increasing world population. The

efficiency of technology may increase; but whether it may do so surpassing the population

grown rate, and will it matches the increasing aspiration of world population to share the

planet somewhat equally is always uncertain. There is also a belief that the population growth

rate is to be settled sooner or later, and subsequently it will start to decrease. Even the future

of state relations envisioned with those rather uncertain premises, the capacity of the Earth

will remain the same. Each and every single individual on this Planet deserves the creative

spaces to unleash their true potential.

Then the question could be narrowed down to ask if each and every individual on this planet

to be contented with their historical needs, and to what amount of resource has to be allocated

for each citizen to so. To what extent an each state could provide for itself within its own

endowment for that individual needs would not be hard to calculate. Then we will have some

numbers that we could also use to device which states are most likely to go out to fill up their

needs and what states are going to stay relatively closer to their geographical boundaries to

content needs of their populations. The natural developments of thin and thick lines of

interdependence are to determine that way.

How does the United States go about acting to provide for its local needs?

Chapter 5 Case Study - Interests of the United States

The United States is the third largest nation on this Planet. Its population is 318 million. That

is the fourth largest population on planet. But its economy is the largest in the world, about

$16 trillion in 2013. Picture that now within the total trade volume of whole world last year,

$87 trillion.

Needs of this 318 million people have long been contented. I take the liberty to say that. We

all know that, with a common sense approach - since we do not still have an accurate number

that how much of resource an each individual in this Planet needs to content his or her

material and spiritual needs fairly - the average GDP per capita of $58,000 of an US citizen

may go well beyond the point. The issues of unfair wealth distribution and other domestic

issues are outside of the scope of this writing.

The point of the matter here is how the United States goes about securing its needs in

international system. How does the United States go about doing its business? I bring the

trade volume of the United States to answer that question.

This epistemology will enable us to reach the desired ontology. This method will also offer us

an analytical tool to analyse any state relations. For further subtle analysis the export volume

and import volume could be separated in the epistemology. The volume of investment

between two countries could also help to bring further subtle understanding of relations. Here

in this article, I only take the duel trade volume of the United States as a measurement to

analyse how it is tied up to the rest of the world and to what degree. For the time being this is

an adequate epistemological tool.

The argument that the wealthy capitalists have already gone far beyond the traditional

boarders of nation-states with their investments in multinational companies, hence the trade

volume of a state is a misunderstanding method has no ground. The companies, regardless

how elusive their trades are, conduct within the legal frameworks of the states.

Below I outline the United States’ main trading partners in the world. I also outline the trade

volumes of significant economies among littoral economies in Indian Ocean to the United

States to understand how the United States is going out fulfilling its natural needs.

The answer to the latter question, how does the US do it business, shall offer us an entry point

to understand why the United States acts the way its acts within international system. I do not

believe that the United States acts in international system irrationally – not any more.

Main trading partners of the United States.

Remind yourselves the total GDP of the United States is about $16 trillion.

Its immediate neighbours Canada and Mexico are the first and the second largest trading

partners of it. According to 2012 data, the US-Canada trade volume amounted to $707

billion. And the US-Mexico trade volume amounted to $536 billion.

The United States meets its next largest trading partners across the Pacific and the Atlantic

Oceans. Now find a map of the globe, and place the US right middle of it, and then observe

those immediate neighbours and neighbours across two Oceans. You are looking at the main

blood veins of the United States.

The US economy is tied up to about 27 counties across the Atlantic Ocean in EU, the US

eastward trade, with an estimated $1.06 trillion of trade volume in goods and private services

in 2013.

The US economy is tied up following economies across the Pacific Ocean, the US westward

trade, in following manner - China, $579 billion; Japan estimated $290 billion; Korea, $129

billion; Singapore, $68 billion; Taiwan, $64 billion; Malaysia, $42 billion; Thailand, $41

billion; Indonesia, $29 billion; Vietnam, $29.7 billion; and Philippines, $24 billion.

The Middle East is an

exception. The US economy is

tied up to Middle East with a

trade volume of about $300

billion in total. That number is

an intelligent guess after

consulting few official

resources which I have already

referenced with other sources.

This number includes countries

like Iraq, Libya and the US-

MENA Trade members.

It is believed that this

unconventional trade relation is

to be radically changed in coming years due to US domestic Fracking. Scaling down the US

military operations in the region and its persistent hesitation to use the hardcore power, and

less oftern used hardcore power, is an evident of this changing US needs in the region.

Now, let us play some close attention to some of the main littoral trade economies of US in

the Indian Ocean.

Picture resource: Anthony Cohen - http://pbrnews.com

Main trading partners of the United States in Indian Ocean.

Main trading partners of the United States in Indian Ocean is as follow. The numbers are in

billion, or otherwise mentioned. The numbers represent two way trade relations. Numbers are

from year 2013.

India is currently the US’ 11th largest goods trading partner with $63.7 in total goods

trade.

Australia is currently the US’ 26th largest goods trading partner with $35.3 in total

goods trade.

South Africa is currently the US’ 38th largest goods trading partner with $15.8 in total

goods trade.

Bangladesh is currently the US’ 58th largest goods trading partner with $6.1 in total

goods trade.

Pakistan is currently the US’ 62nd largest goods trading partner with $5.3 in total

goods trade.

Sri Lanka is currently the US’ 72nd largest goods trading partner with $2.8 in total

goods trade.

Oman is currently the US’ 73rd largest goods trading partner with $2.5 in total goods

trade.

Kenya is currently the US’ 96th largest goods trading partner with $1.1 in total goods

trade.

Tanzania is currently the US’ 124th largest goods trading partner with $491 million in

total goods trade.

Burma is currently our 154th largest goods trading partner with $176 million in total

good trade.

Nepal is currently the US’ 164th largest goods trading partner with $110 million in

total goods trade.

Draw immediate inferences from the above set of the trade volumes. India is the outstanding

trading partner of US in the region. Australia is the second. The Burma’s trade relation with

US is one of the most insignificant. Sri Lanka stands as 72nd largest trading economy of US.

Chapter 6 Needs theory is tested

A theoretical framework was outlined above to analyse international relations. The argument

was made it is the real and natural needs of the state that reasons why the state has to act in

international hemisphere. In this chapter, firstly, I explain the constraints posed to the existing

neo-neo theoretical frameworks of understanding states relations. Secondly, needs theory is

applied to the US-Sri Lanka relations. Some broad framework is outlined to explain how

needs of the United State could be analysed its relations to its regional trading partners. A

section is included arguing that a serious international relations theory does not have to

explain why armed conflicts are taking place in places like Middle East today.

The structure determines how states interact in international system. That is the Waltz’s

hypothesis. He also seems to admit, with some hesitations, survival of the state renders how

state acts in international system. According to complex interdependence the trade relations

have no restrains at all, Nye and Keohane profess. Most intriguingly, they believe if the state

is to get rid of realist belief, then the state is capable of unleashing endless potential to

cooperate with other states.

What sort of structural constraint bars the US-Sri Lanka relations? Does survival have

anything to do at all on how and why the United States acts the way it acts towards Sri

Lanka?

Are there no any constraints for the United States to trade with Sri Lanka in complex

interdependence? Or will the United States and Sri Lanka unleash endless potential towards

cooperation because they do not believe in the realist presumption of survival?

Bringing China into the spectrum to answer these questions brings new realisations. It does

not however mean that the needs base assessment on two state relations, or more, is

impossible to analyse without bringing third parties to the context. If one still obedient to the

Waltz’s idea of changes in capabilities among great poles one ought to understand current

changes as follow. The capabilities have been changed within the system, now China, as a

pole, has great capabilities, and according to that the expectations among nations are also to

be changed. Here the observer misses the point I made about the historical hiccup.

Some input was made regarding China under the section of the Realisation. Further

necessary input will be brought alone as the writing progresses. It is a well known fact that

China is, and has been, investing heavily in these littoral economies for last decade or so.

Let us observe the US-Sri Lanka relations within these developments.

Interests of the United States in Sri Lanka

Sri Lanka is the 72nd largest good trading partner of the United States with a $2.8 billion trade

volume in 2013. The trade volume alone does not do the justice to paint a complex picture of

relations between the United States and Sri Lanka. The rest - the geography, regional politics,

and recent cultural and political developments and so on – helps to build the complex picture.

The point is here, however, that at the end that none of those things matter but the trade based

on needs. Without the input of rest it is nearly impossible to draw connections and build up

an argument.

For the United States, even after realising that there remains some issues in Sri Lanka if

attended could bring significant changes to regional politics it is unable to do so. That is due

to the constraints it is enforced upon by its natural needs and resource endowment.

In the right middle of the Indian Ocean it is the US’ antipodal point. That is where Sri Lanka

is located. Because of that the geography becomes crucial to understand the US-Sri Lanka

relations. Reflecting this geographical reality the border of the western US Pacific Command,

68 E, lies right through the western cost of Sri Lanka.

The US has to circumnavigate half of the globe to meet Sri Lanka. The longitude of 79 E of

Colombo, capital of Sri Lanka, is one of the remotest places to US. Therefore, regardless

where you start flying from in the US, about 14,000 km of flying has to be done to Colombo.

The US statesmen are now increasingly paying greater attention to the geostrategic position

of Sri Lanka; that is after three decades of armed conflict concluded in 2009 by the Rajapaksa

Government. John Kerry is one of those first to realise the geostrategic significance of Sri

Lanka to US.

This attention is given not only because there is no armed conflict in the country, but the

geostrategic position of Sri Lanka in the Indian Ocean alone is a significant one. Sri Lanka

provides an easy access to littoral countries in the India Ocean. The half of the world

maritime trade is already taking place through the Sri Lankan water. For example the US

Pacific Command shall have realised that an establishment of naval port in Sri Lanka gets rid

of the logistical burden that Diego Garcia, a US Naval Support Facility, has in the Indian

Ocean.

The maritime flow in the India Ocean is to increase exponentially in coming decades. The

littoral economies of India Ocean are tied up to emerging economies like China, India and to

Australia. They have great potential increasing their trade volumes in coming decades and

century. This region is rich with natural resources too. Plus the oil supply line from the

Middle East to this region and towards Japan is uninterrupted. Sri Lanka is in the right middle

of all these changers.

Historically speaking, since the WW II, the US had very little encounters with Sri Lanka. On

the other hand, for Sri Lanka, the United States has been the main market for its rudimentary

export products. In return, the United States is maintaining a large budget deficit in Sri

Lanka. The last year alone it was about $2.1 billon.

In the Kerry’s report, it mentions that the United States has instead focused on political

reforms and humanitarian concerns of the country. (p.13) It points out that the United States

has not paid attention to the trade potential between two countries and geopolitical

significance of having Sri Lanka as a close friend to the US. The report writes following;

‘Along with our legitimate humanitarian and political concerns, U.S. policymakers

have tended to underestimate Sri Lanka’s geostrategic importance for American

interests.’

Meanwhile China is, and has been, investing heavily in the country’s infrastructures. As to

prove that this relationship is growing stronger on 16 September 2014 the Chinese Premier Xi

Jinping visited Sri Lanka.

He commenced the Colombo Port City Project, a brand-new city and a port from reclaimed

land from the sea. This investment, which amounts to $1.4 billion, is the largest foreign

investment in Sri Lankan history. Magam Ruhunupura Mahinda Rajapaksa, another harbour

project in Hambanthota is also been built with the Chinese investments. With its funding a

build a brand-new airport, Mattala Rajapaksa International Airport, was also completed. The

country’s biggest electricity generator, 900-megawatt coal power plant in Norocholai, was

launched by Xi and Rajapaksa together. The funding, of cause, came from China. It seems Sri

Lanka is set to fly.

In the front of US-Sri Lanka relations, on 23 of September, the President Obama met with the

President Rajapaksa, while he was heading the Sri Lankan delegation for UN General

Assembly, in New York. On 24, Hilary Clinton had invited Rajapaksa seeking support for her

brand new Elephant Initiative. On 26, the President Rajapaksa sat down with a special

business delegation in New York, which included companies like Boeing, Citigroup and

Exxon Mobil. These US companies have shown interests entering into the Sri Lankan market.

There is nothing new in this sort of meetings at the outset. But there is something new in

these developments.

What is new here is that the US statesmen seems to show changing hearts towards Sri Lanka.

The US statesmen have consumed five years, since the end of war, to contemplate on the

relation of Sri Lanka. In fact, the last March 2014, the United States took a contradictory

initiative against the Rajapaksa regime hosting a resolution at the United Nations Human

Right Council (UNHRC), which in return set a historical precedent under its mandate.

On the top of that Sri Lanka is being drawn in to US regional politics, the Pivot to Asia, by

Japan and India. In that sense, Sri Lanka is also tied up to the concept - the US principle

national security shift to South China Sea area to preserve 21st century US leadership in the

world. The United States has initiated a Trilateral Relations with India and Japan toward that.

The increased US military engagement in Darwin in Australia goes towards that as well. Sri

Lanka is closely linked to Australia too.

Thing is that Sri Lanka has very delicate relations with these regional actors. For example

President Rajapaksa defines the Sri Lanka-India relations as India is our relation and all

others are our friends. That says everything about Sri Lanka as a small island - fifty times

smaller to be exact with - in the India Ocean. Since 1952 Japan and Sri Lanka has a special

relation. J.R. Jayawardane, then Finance Minister later the Second President of Sri Lanka,

delivered a speech disclaiming war reparations at San Francisco Peace Conference that year.

The gravity of his speech to Japan has left his name in the memories of average Japanese

citizens’ minds that lasts until today. On the top of this traditional relations Japan is putting

extra efforts to be seen as a good friend of Sri Lanka because it wants Sri Lanka to secure its

crucial oil supply from the Middle East in Sri Lankan water. That goes towards containing

growing Chinese influence in Sri Lanka as well. Because of these reasons Japan signed a

maritime agreement with Sri Lanka on 07 September. Sri Lanka is a good friend of Tony

Abort’s Australian government as well. Since Prime Minister Abort opposes people

smuggling religiously he needs Sri Lanka in the Indian to secure that interests.

Ideally, the United States would not want to unsettle any of these relations of Sri Lanka.

The whole point to take away from these evolving regional dynamics around Sri Lanka and

recent developments between the United States and Sri Lanka is - even thou Sri Lanka is a

small and geographically distanced nation - that Sri Lanka could potentially play a greater

role with the United States to secure US interests in the region. The appropriate question

looms that could the United States do anything great at all in Sri Lanka? According to the

neorealists and the neoliberals the United States ought to act in Sri Lanka.

Could the United States perpetually keep the Chinese influence at bay in Sri Lanka investing

in the country to surpass the Chinese investments? That would go alone the line of neoliberal

assumption. On the other hand, neorealists in the United States, at worst case, could look into

pressing the charges against Rajapaksa regime to indict him and his brother for those alleged

crimes, which is alleged to have been committed in the last phase of the armed conflict.

In a different note, it is interesting to see those interests of neo-neo converge at some point

there. Recall one of the idealists’ premise of a crime, even the alleged, shall be investigated

and perpetrators shall to be brought to justice. Same time there is this interdependency

principle they promote. What is; how is it; and who is deciding the priorities - it is you to

think? The realists want, no matter what, the best to be done to preserve the interests of the

state. The realists tend to be more pragmatic in this way.

So what would it be? Concluding the case study, I would argue as follow.

In fact the US interests in Sri Lanka is insignificant compare to its interests among its main

trading partners. It means, according to new hypotheses, the United States is fulfilling very

little from Sri Lanka towards its needs.

Will the United States invest in a new harbour project in Sri Lanka, or in an airport, or a

power plant? I doubt that. The United States’ needs are being long contented from

surrounding economies. The United States is unable to stretch its resource endowment

towards Sri Lanka, even if it wanted to, to gain the crucial relative upper hand against China.

It does not make any sense for the US to do so either. As some analysts argue that US ought

to secure its interests in Sri Lanka with economic investments is not based on the analysis of

the United States needs in Sri Lanka. It could not build airports or harbours in Sri Lanka. It is

simple and strait forward as that. It does not however mean that those US companies

gradually going to build up a niche trade relations with the country.

Nye and Keohane have taken grated that if the realist presumption is given up by the US

statesmen that would unleash potential towards perpetual interdependence. Does this mean

the United States could not survive without depending on Sri Lanka? Just because the US

statesmen have beautiful, peaceful and changed hearts towards a state it does not mean every

relationship is equally significant to the United States. It is needs of the state that matters, not

the beauty, peace or hatred in international relations. Those analysts, who have inflated ideas

of interdependence, are not capable of reflecting on a particular relationship within the real

needs of the state.

Even if we consider for a moment, the converging interests of the neo-neo in Sri Lanka, in

terms of US interests, pursuing the criminal charges against the Sri Lankan regime, the

United States do not possess the unilateral power to enforce its will in the epoch of

Realisation. Russia and China restrict any of Security Council resolutions brought against the

Rajapaksa regime. In the previous epoch, just after the Second World War or even after the

immediate collapse of Soviet Union, the United States may have pursued this path

unilaterally. At the beginning Realization the United States has been restrained by its

resource endowment. It could no longer afford to go beyond its natural needs like it was

doing before.

No structures could constrain other states forever when the other states are driven by genuine

concerns of theirs, needs. Nature given resource endowment of the state does not change in

long haul even if the state may wish to maximise the capabilities with best available

technologies. In the long run even the legitimacy for such state actions, attempts to reach its

maximum capabilities, is also granted by the international consensus among its multitude.

The constraints, which the structure could be put upon on a state, are temporary. That is due

to the fact that that sort of structure is not made out by poles reflecting their truer needs

within their own resource endowments. The post-modern structure had some ills. It does not

matter the size of the state, each and every single state has genuine rights to fulfil their needs.

It goes without saying that no state has endless resource endowments for unrealistic realist or

liberal agendas.

Theory in different cases

Some would argue that the US-Sri Lanka relations may be the last place a systemic

international relations theory could be applied, and any fruitful analysis could be drawn to

generalise the theory. For some critics the distance between countries and the size of the

countries may also seems to be problematic. For those reasons I briefly outline the theory in

different cases, in the US-India relations and US immediate trading partners.

The United States is adamant about the common values of the largest democratic nation on

Planet, India. But the United States is unable to address any of the India’s main concerns – its

over population, and its restricted access to natural resources. The rest of the issues of the

country derive from those two main problems.

Addressed the India Parliament in 2010 the President Obama has asserted that the US-India

relations is as one of the defining partnerships of the 21st century. That hints at the intention

of Obama to draw India into the game of containing China in India Ocean, and in South

China Sea and so on. Pointing at the dilemma that the United States faces in this US-India

relationship Hilary Clinton, the Secretary of State at the time, summed up the increasing US

engagement in India as a strategic bet – this issue is with a great gravity; intends to address in

detail in a separate writing.

Coming back to the line of thought we are developing in this article, I ask, could the United

States restrain India from developing into a super power. The realists will stress US has to be

concerned. Or could the United States be cooperative with India in this so-called complex

interdependence. Simple answer is the United States is unable to do any of those things in

those grand scales that some professes it to do.

Meanwhile, Xi Jinping, after visiting Sri Lanka, strait went to the birthday celebration of the

India Prime Minister Narendra Modi in his home town in Ahmedabad in Gujarat, and

announced more than $20 billion in investments in developing India’s road sector. Both

signed about 12 more agreements, one including on the usage of the outer space in peaceful

manner. Ask yourselves now if it makes any sense for the United States to follow the suite.

The extent to which the United States’ ability to stretch that far, either cooperatively or

otherwise, is restrained. Why is it restrained; it is restrained because the United States do not

have the luxury of that resource endowment, and it would not make any sense for the US tax

players to follow any of those extremes.

Neither the complex interdependence nor the structure means much to this US-India

relationship. The India just has to realise its true potential as a great nation in international

system, and achieve maximum capabilities within its resource endowment, and go elsewhere

fetching them to fulfil the rest. Before the end of Realisation, I assume, India could have done

so.

The relations of United States with its immediate neighbours in the continent, and across the

two Oceans, countries like Canada, Mexico, Germany, the United Kingdom, Japan and Korea

and so on, require nuance analysis. I am not in a position to attend to any of those relations in

such details within the given time scale. Following remarks would however be useful for

such analysis.

The relations of US with these trading partners are driven by mutual needs of theirs. The

relations of United States with its immediate neighbours are significant to it. That goes

without saying that those relations are significant to those countries at the other end of them

as well.

Since the WW II, the United States has been developing extensive economic relations in this

region. Until few years ago, some of these economies, including the US one, seemed

unstoppable with their innovative financial derivatives. They had found a way to develop for

eternity on paper. Those things are becoming things in the past. They had nothing to do with

the natural needs of local populations and the states’ natural resource endowments. Since the

finance crisis in 2007 some of these countries are developing in rather slower phases, and

others are not developing at all or deflating. These countries are increasingly faced with

higher unemployment rates and higher welfare costs.

These unsettling processes will only be settled when each country will find their natural

needs and resource endowments ratio. The countries that are most likely to bring troubles for

themselves, and therefore for the region as whole, are the ones those who are trying to

maintain former grandeurs. They are the once those who most likely to involve in money

laundering for rich and accommodate those richer classes within their borders. It is not hard

to imagine that these types of countries will increasingly become ideal targets to all sorts of

extremists. Those countries which try to delay the process of deflating their economies to

reflect true needs bases relations with other states, by use of numerous conjuring

mechanisms, will be the hardest hit, and pose great dangers to whole region.

These economies are great case studies to analyse for their truer needs, and for how much of

their needs could be contented within those naturally bestowed resource endowments of

theirs.

Contemporary armed conflicts

The prevailing armed conflicts within the border lines that were not drawn by the local power

structures and with the involvement of local people are what I have in mind - mainly in the

Middle East. It may be the centuries old former colonial masters that had drawn those lines or

they were drawn by the post WW II idea of self-determination. What they have in common is

the absence of local power structures merged within, horizontal and vertical. The

development of those local power structures has been distracted by distant power structures

elsewhere.

With pessimism or optimism, both the liberals and the realists, and the analysts and policy

advocates alike tend to observe these conflicts to understand how international relations

works.

I assert that since these landmasses do not fit the concepts of nation-states due to lack of

home grown local power structures the conflicts unfolding within them could not be subject

interests of international relations. A theory of international relations ought to observe nation-

states. Therefore, those conflicts which are bubbling across the world today could hardly be

observed within a proper theoretical framework. For sure, the conflict analysts and policy

advisors have busy time explaining these phenomenons to their respective employers and

governments.

Could a theory based on needs explain these conflicts? Simple answer is no. It will not. It

does not have to be. The change in capabilities of the United States has created a power

vacuum in these areas. The lack of its interests in this region due to domestic fracking and its

shrinking economic leverage to act as it did before have created this power vacuum. Plus, the

best thing the Washington and rest of the power brokers did for this region, in recent years, is

the miscalculations they did of the gravity of taking away regional stabilising figures like

Muammar Gaddafi. It is the grievances of local populations, which have been betrayed by

global and local power structures, to correct those historical misgiving drive these conflicts.

The cadres of those armed groups do not try to conquer the world. They are trying to get rid

of decades old miserable and inconsistent local power structures, which were favoured by

Washington, London, and Paris.

What those power brokers do not realise is that sooner the those boarders are redrawn by

local power structures with local people involved is the better. Thing is that their eroding

interests still find it difficult to do so. But in terms of understanding international relations

accurately these conflicts are just mere distractions. I believe Beijing sees them that way.

Who wants to live within the borders that you, or your ancestors, were not part of making?

Nobody. Blood has to be shed to create nation-states. Greater the suffering endured harder to

brake them later. These are the untold rule of the game of nation building.

Since the WW II, the United States, either directly or indirectly, has been the major player in

maintaining peace and security in the world. The Charter of the United Nations stipulates

volumes for that. For a second, remind yourself that maintaining is inherently a conservative

project. Not only the United States but states like Russia, Britain, France, and China have

been engaging in this maintaining business. While some engaged in it a lot, some did not.

China had no colonial ambitions as such. Therefore, it has been careful to engage, within and

outside the system, only to the extent it wants to secure territories that once belonged to it.

That is why none-intervention is the mantra of Chinese statesmen. This point is rather

significant to understand. This is the reason why I assert that a theory of international

relations does not have to explain the prevailing armed conflicts within its parameters. If

Beijing has nothing to do with them, these conflicts could not be setting parameters for an

international relations theory.

Washington, being a big time victim to the oil supply from Middle East, reluctantly

maintained the structures that had been put in place by former colonial powers. Or timely

those local structures had to be twisted accordingly. The annual reminders of the United

States urging reforms in those places in Middle East, even in places like Saudi Arabia, goes

long way to prove that US was a rather hesitant player dealing with those old power

structures.

Meanwhile, the people on the ground, within those strait line borders, which were drawn by

stokes of a pen, in places like Iraq, Syria, Mali, Libya, and elsewhere, have been waiting so

long expecting conjuring concepts like regime change, liberal democracy, human rights, and

free markets will uplift their lives for good. That is despite the fact that no local structures

were in place to do so. Those dreams never realised.

Now the United States is fracking within its own boarders it could afford to go home. The

United States seems to have reached it economic capacities. The ambition and aspiration are

relative terms that reflect the capabilities of the state. Mainly, a combination of these two

factors is increasingly forcing it to loosen up the fists of it on the ground in distant lands, and

its engagements in global governance. The prevailing armed conflicts shall be analysed in

this context. For example, the further the analyst distances himself from this broader context

to analyse a particular conflict his analysis tend to become more abstract and irrelevant.

It is not to say that these sorts of analysis and policy oriented understandings do not serve a

purpose. These sorts of analysis offer access to temporary remedies that are increasingly

difficult to implement due to shrinking resource pools across those capitals. Drones may keep

them going for while. These short of analysis however hinder the changing dynamics in

broader geopolitical sense.

For example an analyst who analyses the Islamic State (ISIL/ISIS) today asserts that it is an

extremist terrorist organisation – extreme than al Qa’ida they say. He tries to identify the

leading individuals behind it, ideologies, regional connections, and how the operations are

financed and so on. This analysis in return shall offer a clear basis for targeted killings,

counter ideologies, and an access to a coherent counter strategy to fight back. However, none

of those things are materialised to the extent that those local grievances are to be eliminated.

The targeted killings create more extremism. A killing one without giving him a fairer chance

to fight back is not only proved to be cowardliness but also it does not settle the enemy to

accept the defeat. In a conventional war there is a clear victory and defeat. The looser admits

the defeat. He is a proud loser because he fought it. In a drone attack, before the drone attack

he was, and after the attack suddenly he is not. What does it leave in the mind of his fellow

cadres and family members? Probably hated, and more determination. It is not a way of

fighting a war. The defeat will never be accepted until the enemy is given a fairer chance to

lose it. We all know that we do not have a counter ideology as such anymore. If a strategy is

scrambled the regional players are absent. And someone somehow tunnels the funding for the

operations.

What is lacking behind in these sorts of analysis is the hope - the hope that the capacity local

people to shape and contribute to build their own nations, and the humility into their enduring

willingness to fight for their freedoms. If one enables to see these potentials in unlikely places

he will also enable to see the safest exit strategies for Washington, London and Paris. One

who observes things in this way may also see new dynamics in places like in Iraq - a majority

Sunni state right next to Shia Iran, and finally the Southern part of the Iraq getting its

business done – and in Libya.

The ideologies used are not the ends. They are only the means of cumbersome vehicle. We all

have been in this exact path few hundred years ago. None of those emerging nation-states in

places like Middle East or elsewhere are going to be super powers anyway. The sooner the

we have the local power structures emerge within those borders, may be with new nation-

states, is the better.

Chapter 8 Needs as the founding principle and as an analytical tool of IR

Increasing actions of China are to change how the international relations are understood and

analysed. Its actions have made us realised that larger countries with larger populations tend

to have large pool of needs to fulfil. Therefore, they have to be naturally active in

international system. The legitimacy for their actions is also granted by the international

multitude because it is the common sense development of the state.

Countries like India too are going to be significant players in coming decades. With these

changers how the international relations are understood and analysed have to be changed. The

emergence of countries China as a main actor in international system ought to refresh how we

understand international relations as a subject matter as well.

Needs of the state is the reason why the state acts in international sphere.

The absence of nations like China, with larger populations and bigger appetite, had distorted

the development of international relations as a subject matter since the modernity.

The whole concept of international is seemed to have been referred to describe regional

developments of west in last five hundred years or so. A definition of international could not

be outlined if the main players are not being spattered around the globe. The existence of

Japan and Korea within the established academia as actors of international politics does not

qualify it to refer to as international. Having the actors across the globe has to be one of the

minimal thresholds of the definition. If not, then, we are in the matters of regional relations,

and how that is affected around the globe. Think about then, a definition of international,

which includes actors like China and India, and the effect that their role could have in

international relations in coming decades and centuries.

Throughout history, where there are full of small and big coincidence, the development of

international relations as a theory and as an analytical sphere reflected the capabilities of

main actors in those particular historical settings, be they city states, empires or nations.

Since the end of Middle Ages the development of capabilities among western nations has not

been reflected the natural needs of their populations within. This unbalance development has

made countries like China and India absent from the international hemisphere for centuries.

That this vacuum that the absent of resistance reflecting natural needs of nations helped the

handful of nations to go beyond their natural needs, and had tricked the minds of great

thinkers to argue numerous things as the reasons why states act the way they act in

international hemisphere. The human nature was brought up as the reason why the state acts.

Due to the variations stances one could take upon the latter, it was able to argue that the state

is either peaceful or warmongering.

The concepts changed as the historical epochs changed. In other words, the vacuum, which

was there, was getting smaller and smaller as history passed by. The concepts like national

interests, power, and security replaced the old concepts as different epochs conjured different

things in great minds. In that sense the last batch of theories radically contrasted away from

those traditionalists. When someone like Waltz argues that it is the structure causes the state

to act in certain ways he differed radically from the old bunch. So did the Nye and Keohane

when it is argued that it is the complex interdependence that renders the way the state acts.

Today, you and I are entering into a new historical epoch, the Realisation. At the beginning

of this historical epoch China is to set the rule of the game. The ultimate demise of the liberal

democratic model is guaranteed before this epoch parishes. An administrative system that

mostly likely to cooperate attributes of the Chinese administrative system will replace the

latter as an effective and a legitimate mechanism within states and outside. This is an ongoing

transition. A lot could change even before the first ever truer World War shifts the power

from West to East decisively.7 This First World War will make the shift guaranteed. Even the

idea of unrestrained individual liberties – thou it never was - would be a thing of the past.

This increasing Chinese engagement - or the lack of engagement - in the international system

begs revision of the foundation of international relation theories. The world, in which people

share their thoughts instantly, where the limits of the globe are increasingly realised, it begs

for a realistic framework to understand and analyse states’ relations.

Each state has its needs. Needs are the needs of its population. Why the state acts is reasoned

by this natural needs. Could the state provide for its needs within its territories, and to what

extent, shall determine the extent to which actions of a certain state in international system.

Unlike the concept of survival the states’ needs are set in historical settings. The desire to

have the best could not be tainted by the fact that now the world is better known. What is

happening with the increasing actions of China with other states is that this historical

condition, the Realisation, makes us to realise the foundation of the state action in its real

sense. This Realisation constrains nothing. It does not mean that just because it is realised the

world is going to be more peaceful or less warmongering. It will depend on how the main

actors feel about of their true potential in future - at the end of Realisation, where the truer

needs are fulfilled and their truer capabilities are realised.

Therefore, an international relation theory based on needs does not assume war is obsolete.

War is alive and well for eternity.

7 The world wars could not have happened regionally. The containment of Germany, Italy and Japan could not constitute world wars. That is regardless that those armed conflicts were fought within their colonies elsewhere and needed materials were extracted from those distant colonies to fight those wars. The engagement of larger actors, which spattered around the globe, could only constitute a truer World War.

The war is alive and well does not mean that each armed conflicts are to be affecting the

subject matter of international relations theory. For example the armed conflicts in Middle

East and elsewhere could not affect the formulation of a theoretical framework to understand

international relations. The first reason is for that is that Beijing has nothing to do with those

armed conflicts. India got nothing to do with those conflict either. Those armed conflicts are

enabled by the loosening grip of old power structures in the region. None of those armed

conflicts could be subject interests of a serious international relations theory.

Before the epoch of Realisation ends, the main actors and the rest will have, more or less,

secured their natural needs accordingly. Wars, miseries, exploitations, and redrawing new

border lines will not be new in the epoch. There would be a time comes when the concepts

like balance of power will truly be contemplated in the system where the players like India,

China, and Brazil will have realised their capabilities fully. That is when one will truly

observe international relations in its truer sense.

The long term policy objectives of governments, intergovernmental, and transnational

organisations of varies sorts – politics and humanitarian alike – shall be reflected accordingly

to this changing dynamic in international relations, and needs shall be brought in as the

benchmark for setting missions and visions.

For example we have to observe needs of each state scientifically within their resource

endowments, and to what extent the each nation could provide for their natural needs. That

will also offer us an insight into to what extent the each nation has to go shopping outside of

its borders. An intergovernmental body such as United Nations is ideally suits for these tasks.

In terms of long term policy applications, those relatively larger states with limited resource

endowments, may find policies towards population control is appealing. These dynamics will

however not confer much change to the Security Council for example. Which countries hold

the status of Permanent Membership shall reflect the capabilities of states. Therefore, the

inclusion of India to a permanent member status shall be met soon. Having a nation from the

Middle East, and Brazil from South America as Permanent Members may reflect the

inclusion within and integrity of the Security Council in long run. It could also set long term

policy objectives towards to reflect needs of each state and their constraints. It would be a

stepping stone to realise the amount of resource needed for an each individual to realise truer

potential of him or hers offering them the creative spaces needed within their lifespan. The

appeal of long terms policies, such as population control, and global concerns such as

pollution, within states and outside, shall ideally stem from the Security Council.

Chapter 9 Conclusion

The activities of a state, outside of its borders, in an international system, are best understood

as reasoned by needs of the state. The population within the state has needs. They are set in

historical setting. Naturally to the extent to which the state cooperates, or not-cooperate, with

other states to provide for those needs determine the level of its activities in international

system. That is the argument I presented in this article.

The reason why the previous structures had posed certain restrictions on the development of

some states with larger pool of needs is understood as a coincidental development of

disproportionate capabilities among some units. The vacuum that the absence of nation-states

with larger pool of needs had created in international relations had conjured the minds of

great thinkers as well to argue numerous things as the reasons why states behave the way they

behave.

The actions of a nation like China are opening us a new passage, the Realisation, to

understand international relations with a down to earth interpretation. I argued that since we

are realising that a no nation-state – even the super power like United States – could act

beyond its natural resource endowment, the states with larger populations and relatively

larger resource endowments are to set the precedent in coming decades and centuries.

I pointed out that just because of the liberals are like to unleash endless cooperative potential

with other states in complex interdependence that does not lead states to be cooperative with

each other beyond their capabilities which reflected upon its resource endowment, and

domestic needs. The both the cooperation and the antagonism are limited by the natural

capabilities of the state.

Even in the war the terms like whatever means necessary to survive is a relative term.

The writing pointed out that the concepts like human rights, power, national interests, balance

of power, security, and so on, had certain appeal to analyse international relations in the past.

In the epoch that you and I live, the Realisation, needs shall be the founding principle

explaining international relations, and states behaviours.

Testing the needs theory I pointed out that the United States is unable to contain the Chinese

influence in Sri Lanka. The United States is unable to build harbours, and air ports in Sri

Lanka. Nor it could bring the Rajapaksha regime down using its real powers. The actions of

United States in India are also restrained. Needs of the United States are mainly being

fulfilled within the trade volume it carries with its immediate regional actors – Mexico,

Canada and few countries in the both sides of the Oceans. The United States is not a global

power anymore; it is supper power in that region. In that sense, it does not make any sense for

the US tax payers to increase its relations with India, be they for the sake of cooperation or

for realistic reasons, to the extent which that its needs are not reflected. Even if more subtle

analysis are needed to understand this needs based relations among its main trading partners,

analysis could be done. Careful analysis will most likely to show none of the United States’

relations with other states are based on anything else than needs. The United States may still

have some small leverage left at few places. But those leverages will all have soon deflated

accordingly reflecting its truer needs.

The prevailing armed conflicts within those borders of pen-stoked-strait-lines are not to be

the subject interests of a serious theory of international relations. If Beijing has nothing to do

with them that those armed conflicts got nothing to do with international relations – simple as

that.

China and India are larger states, respectively accommodating 1.23 billion and 1.35 billion

people. There is no way that a population of 318 million, the United States, could be a global

power that had the conditions favoured letter countries to realise their truer capabilities. As

you are just about to finish reading they are realising those capabilities. So, the children of

yours are going to live in a different world soon.