8/10/2019 Negation and the Law of Contradiction in Indian Thought.pdf

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NEGATION AND THE

LAW

OF

CONTRADICTION

IN

INDIAN

THOUGHT:

A

COMPARATIVE

STUDY

By

J. F.

STAAL

N

the

fourth

chapter

of

book

'

of

the

Metaphysica

Aristotle deals with

the

principle

of

contradiction. This law

is

formulated

as follows:

'it

is

impossible

or

anything

at

the same

time to be

and not to be '.' Let us

imagine,

says

Aristotle,

that

somebody

wished to

oppose

this

view. Our

opponent

cannot

hold

a

view which

contradicts he law

of

contradiction

without

assuming

the

validity

of

this law

itself: for

otherwise he

is not even

denying

what we

are saying. The only alternative for him, then, will be to say nothing. But

this is

absurd:

'for

such a

man,

as

such,

is

from

the start

no better

than

a

vegetable

'.2

We

are

often told

that Indian

philosophers

do

not

accept

the law

of con-

tradiction. This

may

well be

one

of

the

causes of the

neglect

of

Indian

thought

by

Western

philosophers:

for

nobody

desires

to

study

a

body

of

propositions

when

he

is

at

the same time told

that

their contradictories

may

hold

as well.

Is

it

perhaps

a

new-and

according

to

some

superior-kind

of

logic

to

which

we

are

invited to

accustom

ourselves?

Many may

not feel the

need

for

what

would amount to a radicalconversion. Nevertheless such a requirement eems

implied

in

statements like

the

following,

where

a

Western

scholar

speaks

about

principles

such

as the

law

of

contradiction:

'But

the

Eastern

mind

is

con-

vinced

that,

taking

together

all the

circumstances n which we need

our

thinking

to

give

us

adequate guidance,

t

would be fatal

to allow ourselves

o

be

enslaved

by

these

principles

.3

After

stating

this the

author

goes

on to

quote

a Buddhist

principle

which

indeed

contradicts the law

of contradiction.6

The

question

arises

whether 'the

Eastern

mind' has

in its

entirety

thrown

the

law of

contradiction

overboard.

The aim of the presentstudy is to see how Indian thinkerstreat contradic-

tions

and what

explicit

rules are

given

for the treatment

of contradictions. If

1

Met.,

r

4,

1006

a

3-4.

Other statements of this law have been

formalized

by

I. M.

Bocheniski,

Ancient

formal

logic,

Amsterdam,

1951, 38-40;

cf. also

J.

L.

Ackrill, Mind,

LxU,

1953,

110-12.

2

ibid.,

14-15;

cf.

translation of

W. D.

Ross, Oxford,

1908.

3

E. A.

Burtt,

'What can

Western

philosophy

learn from India ?

',

Philosophy

East

and

West, v,

1955-6,

202.

4

The

principle

called

catuscko.ti.

ee

P.

T.

Raju,

'The

principle

of

four-cornered

negation

in

Indian

philosophy',

Review

of

Metaphysics,

vII,

1954, 694-713;

T. R.

V.

Murti,

The

central

philosophyof Buddhism,London, 1955, 129-31, 146-8. The earliest occurrenceperhaps in the

Pali

canon is

Majjhima-nikdya,

autta

63

(transl.

H.

C.

Warren,

Buddhism

in

translations,

Cambridge,

Mass.,

1946,

117-22).

For a

formalization

see:

H.

Nakamura,

'Buddhist

logic

expounded

by

means of

symbolic logic',

Journal

of

Indian

and Buddhist

Studies, vII, 1958,

384-5. The same

formalization

n an

earlier

Japanese

version

(in Indogaku

Bukky3galku

kenkyfi,

III,

1954,

223-31)

was criticized

by

R. H.

Robinson,

'

Some

logical aspects

of

Niglrjuna's

system

',

Philosophy

East

and

West,

vi,

1957,

302.

The

validity

of this criticism

may

be

questioned.

8/10/2019 Negation and the Law of Contradiction in Indian Thought.pdf

2/20

NEGATION

AND THE LAW

OF

CONTRADICTION

1N

INDIAN

THOUGHT

53

Indian

philosophers

are either unaware of contradiction

or

deny

the

validity

of

the

principle

of

contradiction,

he

structure

of Indian

logic

would

seem to be

so

fundamentally

different from

the

structure

of Western

logic,

that the

possi-

bility

of mutual

understanding

may

become

questionable.

If, on the otherhand,

the

principle

of contradiction

s

either

applied

mplicitly

or laid down

explicitly,

this

may

be

variously interpreted

there

may

be historical

connexions

between

India and the

West which account for

certain

influences;

there

may

be

a

connexionbetween the

logical

law and the

structure

of

Indo-European,

manifest

in

both

Greek

and

Sanskrit;

there

may

be

a

general linguistic background

o

the law of

contradiction;

or

finally,

the law

may

be a universal

logical

law-

whatever that

may

mean. A

discussion

of the

question,

whether

Indian

philosophers

are to be considered

vegetables, may

therefore

constitute

a

chapter

of comparativelogic.

The

Sanskrit

term

which seems to

correspond

most

closely

to the

Western

term

contradiction

s

derived from a

root sidh-

meaning

'

to

keep away

'.

The

noun sedha derived from

this root denotes

'keeping away

',

and the nouns

nisedha

and

pratisedha

have a

similar

meaning,

which

can be sometimesfurther

specified

as

'prohibition,

negation'.

The

latter term leads to

the

formation

of

the

noun

vipratisedha

meaning

'

mutual

prohibition

or

'

contradiction .

An

early

technical

or

semi-technical use of the

term

vipratisedha

occurs in

Apastamba's

Srauta-sitra

(between

400

and

200

B.c.),

where

during

the

offering

the Vedas are assigned to the various sacrificers n the following manner1:

'The

hotr

sacrifices with the

1Rgveda;

the

ud~it.r

with

the

Samaveda;

the

adhvaryu

with

the

Yajurveda

;

the

brahman

with

all.

When it is

expressly

said,

or in

case of contradiction

(vipratisedha),

another

(priest)

may

sacrifice

.

Instead

of

vipratisedhdt

he

partly parallel

text

of

Hirainyakesin's

rauta-siitra

has

asa.mbhav9t

'if it is

impossible

. Both

passages

refer to cases where a

priest

is

unable

to

sacrifice

in

accordancewith what is

prescribed

or

him on

account of one

rule

or one

established

practice,

because he

is

already

engaged

on

account of

another

rule

or other

rules.2

The last

sAtra,

herefore,

ormulates

a principle which holds in cases of mutual contradiction between two rules

applicable

to the same

situation.

It is a

rule for

the

manipulation

of other

rules,

a

paribhas

'

meta-rule

',

and it is

accordingly

placed

in

the

last

part

of

the

Apastamba-irauta-sAtra,

hich consists of

the

yaj3Fa-paribhasI-sietrdni

'

meta-rules

regarding

the

sacrifice . The

term

vipratisedha

s a

term

which

applies

to

the contradictions between

formulated

rules,

and not

for

instance

between

entities.

It

is

characteristic

or

Indian

thought

that at an

early

stage

of

development

the

distinction between

language

and

meta-language

was

made.

This

is con-

nected with the fact that the subject-matter or variouskinds of investigations

1

AIasta

mba-a-rausa-t~ra,

24.1.16-20.

s

W.

Caland

n

his

translation

ad

loc.

specifies

this

by

the

following example:

'Z.

B.

muse ein

anderer

als

der

Adhvaryu,

da

dieser

beschiftigt

ist,

das

Opfertier

osbinden'.

VOL.

xxv.

PART

1.

5

8/10/2019 Negation and the Law of Contradiction in Indian Thought.pdf

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54

J.

F.

STAAL

was

a

large

body

of

linguistic

material,

the

Vedic

texts

which

were

considered

transcendent

and revealed

(iruti).

The sitra

literature

on the

one

hand

embodies

Vedic passagesand continues to prescribe ormsof activity in a Vedic fashion,

and on

the

other

hand

interprets

Vedic

passages.

This

literature

thereforedoes

not

only

deal with ritual

activity,

but deals

also

with

statements

regarding

ritual

activity.

In the

first

respect

it

constitutes

a

language

dealing

with

the

ritual as

object

material,

in

the second

respect

it

constitutes

a

meta-language

dealing

with the

language

which deals

with the

ritual.

The

paribhds

rules,

more

specifically,

were

explicit

meta-linguistic

rules for

the

manipulation

of

Vedic

passages.

With the

development

of

grammar

here

is

a

shift in

two

respects.

On

the

one

hand the object material s new : it is neitherthe ritual,nor Vedicpassages

dealing

with the

ritual,

but

it

is

the

spoken

language

(bhd.s)

and,

to a limited

extent,

the

Vedic

language

(chandas).1

On

the

other

hand it is not

Vedic

passages,

but

the

rules

of

grammar

hemselves

which are the

subject

of a meta-

linguistic investigation.

The same

term,

paribhtad,

applies

to

rules

of this

meta-

language.

The

importance

of

these meta-rules ncreases when

the rules of

the

grammar

of

Pan~ini

re

accepted

as authoritative.

In

dealing

with

linguistic problems

the

grammatical description

is

mainly

confinedto the

analysis

of words

(pada)

and

grammar

has

thereforebeen called

pada-mimd.msa

'investigation into words'. While it is sometimes rightly

stressed

that the Sanskrit

grammarians

neglected

or

paid

little

attention

to

syntax,

it is not

always

realized

hat

grammar

was

in

this

respect supplemented

by

the

vakya-mimu.msd

'investigation

into

sentences',

another name

for the

most orthodox

among

the

systems

of

philosophy,

more

generally

known as

Pfirva-mlmimss

Karma-mimi~ims,

or

merely

Mim~ins.2

Some

syntactical

principles

of

Mimims

will

occupy

us

here.

This

philosophical

system

is the

direct

successor to the

sitra

literature,

for

it

systematizes

the

interpretation

of Vedic sentences and evolves

general

canons of

interpretation.3

Also

here

general

rules

of

a

meta-linguistic nature, dealing

with

the

interpretation

of

Vedic

statements,

are

given.

Such meta-rules are often called

nydya.

These

rules are

further

used

and

developed

in

dharmaidstra.

The

term

nydya

is later

commonly

used to denote

logic

and the

system

of

logic.

We have

emphasized

elsewhere

that

the

early

use of the term

nydya

as

synonymous

with

paribhdsi

may

be

an

indication that elements

and laws of Indian

logic

can

be

traced

back

to

the

discussion

on

problems

of

language

and

meta-language

n

earlier

systems

and

especially

in

grammar.4

1 See especially P. Thieme, Pdttini and the Veda,Allahabad, 1935, 67 sq.; L. Renou, La

Durghatavrtti

de

Saranadeva,

I,

1

(introduction),

Paris, 1940,

7-8.

2

cf.

L.

Renou,

ttudes

vediques

et

pan.indennes,

vi

(Le

destin

du

V6da

dans

1'Inde),

Paris,

1960,

66.

3

Mim.msd

is

closest to the

paribh4ds

sections

of

the

si8tras.

See

D.

V.

Garge,

Citations

in

Sabara-bhdsya,

Poona, 1952,

50

sq.

4

J.

F.

Staal,

'The

theory

of

definition in Indian

logic

',

JAOS,

LXXXI, , 1961,

124.

8/10/2019 Negation and the Law of Contradiction in Indian Thought.pdf

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NEGATION

AND THE

LAW

OF CONTRADICTION

IN INDIAN THOUGHT

55

Problems of contradiction

are

dealt

with

in

this

meta-linguistic

context

in

grammar

as well

as

in

Mimdi.sa.1

P.nini

(c.

350

B.C.)

gives

the

following

meta-rule: 'in case of contradiction

(between

two

rules)

the later

(rule)

is to be applied

'.2

Here 'later rule' denotes a rule which occurs later in the

sequence

of rules in

Pinini's

grammar.3

Patanijali

(?

second

century

B.C.)

discusses this

s&tra

n the

Mahcbhdsya

and

pays

special

attention

to the term

vipratisedha.

After

giving

the

etymology

he

explains

it

by

itaretara-pratisedha

and

anyo'nya-pratisedha

mutual

prohibition'.

He

proceeds

to

quote

the

following

vdrttika dvau

prasatgadv

nydrthdv

kasmin

sa

vipratisedhah

if

two

rules

with

different

meaning apply

to one

(word)

this is

vipratisedha

.6

He adds

that this

application

should

be

possible

'

at the same time

'

(yugapad)

and

gives

the

following

example. According

to

Panini, 7.3.102,

long

d

is

substituted

for

final a of a nominal stem before terminationsbeginningwith y or bh.6 This

enables

us to

form

v.rksya

'to the

tree

',

v.rtykbhydm

'to both trees

',

and

apparently

*vrkfdbhyah

to

trees

',

from the nominal

stem

vrksa- 'tree'.

The

following

saUra,

7.3.103,

prescribes

the substitution

of

e

for this

a before

a

plural

termination

beginning

with

bh

or s. This accounts

for the

formation

of

v.rksesu

among

trees

'. But

as

-bhyah

is a

plural

termination,

the

second

siura

applies

also

to this

case

and

enables

us

to

form

vrksebhya4

to trees'.

The

two rules

form

in this

respect

a

vipratisedha

'contradiction'.

Then,

according

to

the

paribh4id,

as the

second

rule comes after

the

first,

the

second

prevailsand vrksebhya4s explainedwhile

*vrksd.bhyah

is not. We are perhaps

inclined

to

regard

he second

rule

as

an

exception (apavdda)

o the

first,

but

this

does also

produce

he

same

result

: for there

is

a

paribhs.d

which states

that the

exception

is

stronger

than

the

general

rule.7

The

above

discussion

can be formalized

along

the

following

lines.

Let the

siUras,

which

are

propositions,

be

ordered

as

they

are in

P.nini)

and be

denoted

by

~,

#2,

.

.

.

,

and

let

01