Neoliberalism and Development in Cameroon

Neoliberalism and Structural adjustment programs in Cameroon :

Privatizations from agricultural to electricity sectors.

Soraya Fouda

Carleton University

Department of Political Science

April 12th ,2012.

Abstract

Decades of neo-liberal policies in Cameroon have negatively affected the economic and social

development goals set at the independence in 1960. The article is an attempt to explain how

Structural adjustment Programs’ privatization policies in the country have damaged major

sector of the economy such as agriculture or power energy; but also major social sectors. The

article will focus on privatizations of agriculture and electricity, with an analysis of the effects

those privatizations have on the developmental agenda.

Key words : Structural adjustment programs, economic development, social development,

privatization, corruption.

2

Under president Truman, the world started to see development as an escape to

underdeveloped world. If one country was underdeveloped, it was the duty of developed

countries to help them. The world become split in two; developed versus underdeveloped.

In 1980’s the neo-‐liberal approach of the market became the obvious solution to bring

those countries out of poverty; and like many others ‘underdeveloped’ nations, Cameroon

did not escape its applications. The Bretton Woods institutions’, the World Bank and IMF

implemented the Washington consensus with Structural adjustment Programs; neo-‐liberal

policy agenda of reforms poor countries should apply to growth their economy. From its

implementation in 1987 in Cameroon until today, neo-liberal policies of the Washington

consensus have been a failure. What are the consequences of such failure to the economy

and the population? This is the question this article will attempt to answer.

Two of the mains sectors that undertook reforms are going to be discussed to understand

the dynamic of the second Structural adjustment Program implementation in Cameroon

and its developmental policy. The first one was the liberalization of the economy and the

main economic sectors that are agriculture and oil; but the focus on this paper will solely

based on agriculture. The second one is poverty alleviation and growth promotion by

strengthening the supply and quality of essentials social services such as education, health

etc. through the liberalization of those sectors, Finally, the privatization and reforms of the

energy sector with a specific focus on electricity ( IMF report 7 ) .

3

The developmental state has two components; one is ideological and the other one is

structural. In terms of ideology, the developmental state’s primary mission is to ensure

economic development, usually through high rates of accumulation and industrialization

(Mkandawire 2). The state has the ideology that it has to economically develop the nation.

The Cameroonian state did it after the independence; the new government had the ideology

to develop the state and create high rates of accumulation. At the structural level, state

structure is at the chore of this aspect of developmental state. It means that the state

emphasizes the capacity to implement those economic policies effectively. The capacity of

the state to implement those policies depends on various institutional, technical,

administrative and political factors (Mkandawire 2). The state should be a strong state in

order to succeed into implementing those policies.

It is important to understand in the developmental state theory the factors that have

accounted for success can also be the same reason for economic failure. This is what

happened in Cameroon, where its performances until the mid-‐ 1980’s would have qualified

it as a developmental state until the economic crisis of 1985-‐86 when it became an anti-‐

developmental state. Another important point to understand with the developmental state

is the idea of nationalism. The inducted nation has for a goal to “catch up” with more

advanced economies (Mkandawire 3 ); that was the idea behind the whole nationalist

movement in Africa after Independence. In the case of Cameroon, nationalism also brought

nationalization of all major economic sectors.

To follow the idea of developmental state both ideologically and structurally, after the

independence, the Cameroonian state performed very well economically from 1961 to

1985, with agriculture supporting the economy. The country’s economy was well managed

and had one of the highest per capita incomes in sub-‐Saharan Africa (Amin 6). The main

4

objective of the development policies of the state was a 5 years plan to integrate politically

and economically all regions and to improve the standard of living of the population

(Amin 12). Policy makers were focused on doubling the per capita incomes and reduce the

social and economic inequalities. During that time, there was an increase in the government

revenue as well as in salaries. The government adopted a welfare-‐state/interventionist

approach to its policies and extensively intervenes in the economy; the prices of goods and

services were regulated, as well as public industries and agricultural inputs were

subsidized (Amin 13). The creations of many public enterprises underline the dynamic of

protectionism in the country. Nevertheless, in the mid 1980’s, after more than two decades

of rapid economic growth, the economy collapsed. This was partly because a fall in world

prices for its main export commodities and poor domestic management ( Amin 7) .

One of the main exported commodities was agriculture with cocoa and coffee as well as

bananas and rubber. As a solution to the crisis, the government decided to become more

involved in the economy. The state concentrated on expanding more the public sector and

the government became more and more interventionist in transportations, general services

such as electricity and water were nationalized ( Amin 7 ).The state gained more control of

industries such as their dominant economical sector agriculture . Agriculture accounted for

almost 34% of the GDP and employed 80% of the labor forces and providing 85%of export

from 1961 to 1985 (Amin 5). Considering the data at that time and the expansion of the

agricultural sector and discovery of oil, the government encouraging private sector capital

investment to invest, the country had all the pre-‐conditions for an economic take off

(Rostow 6); Indeed, the “prices drop” in the main agricultural goods by almost 60%

(Awung & Atanga 2) Cameroon was exporting was a major issue for the economy.

5

After 1985, the economy became stagnant; Food production grew while the export crop

production declined. With its main economic sector affected and declining, the state began

to be in a very sensitive economical situation; hence by 1986, the government started

internal adjustment, including measures in the areas of prices policies and institutions.

They launched an austerity program in 1987; the World Bank and the Cameroonian state

started to considered Structural adjustment programs as a way to recreate growth and re-‐

launched the economy through neo-‐liberalism.

Neo-‐liberalism is rooted in the notion that there is only one body of economic theory

with universally applicable concept. Neoliberals believe private producers consumers are

pre-‐supposed to be utility and profit “maximizers” who respond rationally to correct

market signal. They assert market will produce rationale behaviors that efficiently reflect

market signals based on the principles of scarcity and choices. Neo-‐ liberals find important

to consider the historical background but their theorical construct also examine

government and states, as they exist in practice with all their various imperfections

highlighted (Brohman 7) .Neo –liberalism theory agenda is based on principles of free

markets, economic liberalization and open market; it is one of the reason they are looking

closely to states and governments’ flaws.

The Neo-‐ liberalist development agenda started in the early 1980’s with the Bretton Woods

agreement alongside the Reagan-‐ Thatcher era. Bretton Woods’s institutions and the

Washington consensus with powerful organizations such as the World Bank and the IMF

decided on an agenda to promote liberalism in third world countries. IMF has different

programs they implemented in developing countries to stimulate growth (Hutchful 10); but

it was really through Structural adjustment Programs that the IMF and the World Bank

6

introduced neo-‐liberalism to Africa. Underdeveloped nations, in the face of the economic

crisis of the mid 1980’s started to turn to the IMF and World Bank to lend money to create

again a cycle of growth in their economy. The argument of the Washington consensus and

the economic powers behind Bretton Woods’s institutions was that a “laissez-‐faire”

capitalism was necessary for a broader political and social freedom (Broham 17). Hence,

IMF and the World Bank started economic programs in Africa; one of the IMF main

objectives was to incorporated trade policies, public sector reforms, deregulation, external

liberalization, emergence of monetary government, and rollback of the state to Africans

countries (Hutchful 7). But, those lenders did not allocate the money without conditionality;

starting 1981, borrowers countries were required to implement adjustment policies with

certain conditions.

With all the neo-‐liberals reforms in the continent and the economic crisis, the

Cameroonian state decided with the IMF in 1989 to implement Structural Adjustments

Programs (SAPs) with 150 millions dollars loan from the IMF (Awung & Atanga 17).

Conditions to the SAPs were reforms involving the preparation and implementation of

poverty reduction, the maintenance of a stable macro-‐economic environment, the set up of

mechanisms to ensure efficient and transparent use of interim debt reliefs and

strengthening public expenditures and management (Awung & Atanga 19) .The issue of

poverty alleviation started to become of the World Bank’s preoccupation in the 1990’s;

hence it became one of the conditions of the bank to lend money. The bank strategy in

fighting poverty relied heavily on redistribution of public expenditures, rather than new

founding (Hutchful 16).

In 2000’s, Cameroon reached the position of Highly indebted poor country initiative and

benefits from interim debt reliefs from its creditors previously accumulated through loans

7

from the IMF and the World Bank in the first phase of SAPs implemented from 1989-‐1999.

Following the release of its debt credit, the IMF implemented a second structural

adjustment program plan (SAPs II). The main goals to their medium-‐term adjustment

program was to strengthen macroeconomics stability, to bring economy into a sustainable

development path and to bring improve social conditions of population and reduce poverty

(IMF report 3). Another mandatory condition in the second SAPs was the total privatization

of para-‐statals organizations; that means the state would have to lose more control of some

important sector of the economy (e.g. agriculture) (Awung & Atanga 19).

With the guidance of IMF and World Bank, Cameroon engaged itself in a neo-‐liberalist

development policy for 20 years, with recommendation to privatize diverse economic and

social sectors such as education but also privatize energy such as water and electricity

companies SNEC ( societe nationale des eaux du Cameroun) and SONEL ( Societe nationale

d’electricité). (African Development Bank Report on Cameroon 9).

Public-‐enterprise reform and private-‐sector development have been designed in the

offices of the Bretton Woods institutions. Like other structural adjustment measures, they

have been accepted by virtually all bilateral donors and presented to African governments

as the only way forward to development and economic growth (Konings 6) . Privatizations

take their roots in the theorical stream of the liberalism founded by Adam smith. The

central idea is that even imperfect, the market is preferable to the drifts of the public action

that hinders the game of individual interests.

Privatizations in Cameroon began in the late 1980’s under the pressure of International

multilaterals institutions. It has continued since at a slow and erratic pace. Since the first

SAPs in 1989, Cameroon has undertaken a vast program of privatizations and restructuring

8

of state owned corporations and public-‐private enterprises. In 1995, the government to

made a decision to accelerate the privatization program and to extend its scope, by

including main public utilities such as water, electricity, and telecommunication etc.

(Ndzomo and Nzongang 2).

Recognizing that its power sector needed to be modernize, the state power company

SONEL, the sole generator and distributor of power needed to be privatized as the World

Bank advised the government to do. In the late 1990’s, only 452 000 connections existed,

leaving most of the people in the country without electricity (International Finance

Corporation 2); hence as a response, the government adopted a power sector reforms with

the 1998 electricity sector Law, that set ground work for privatization of SONEL

(International Finance Corporation 2). It is important to underline that even though there

was a demand for more electricity from people, the privatization of the company itself was

more to comply to the commitments imposed by the World Bank with SAPs (Pineau 4). The

objectives of the privatization of the electricity sector were standard goal of liberalization/

privatization programs of the Bretton Woods’ institutions; indeed, the only assessment of

SONEL made by the World Bank were very general and assert issues such as day to day

management, lack of transparency, lack competition and weak ministerial oversight and

high costs (Pineau 4) . Between 1998 and 2000, the government set new electricity policy

framework to develop private involvement and competition under the supervision of

ARSEL, the supervisatory regulation agency. One law and three decrees set the legal

framework of electricity sector in Cameroon (Ministry of Economy and Finance of

Cameroon para 3).

Five large international companies initially expressed interest in SONEL;The State owned

EDF from France, Hydro-‐ Quebec from Canada, the American corporation AES , South

9

African ESCOM and Spanish state owned ESPENOSA (Pineau 6). In order to increase

attractiveness of the deal to investors, the government guaranteed 50 % of the purchase

price against risks and other potential issues (IFC 2). The transaction structure allowed

56% of SONEL capital to be acquired by the successful bidder to a transparent process. The

successful bidder would be granted 20 years concession for the distribution, consumption

and generation of electricity throughout the country; it would also have exclusive right to

distribute and sell electricity to low volt consumers for 20 years and to medium and high

volt consumers for the first 5 years. The reciprocal debt between SONEL and the

government would be eliminated and some of SONEL outstanding debts would be

transferred to the government (IFC 2). In November 2000, AES was the only bidder and

acquire SONEL for 61 millions (Pineau 12). No further information is available on the

transaction and contract signed between the government and AES, which is highly

problematic as there is a clear lack of transparency (Pineau 7).

AES also has the goal to build more dams to allow a greater generation of power throughout

the country, especially after the drought of 2001 to 2003. Hence, they started a project with

the co-‐financing of the World Bank in the region of Limbé. The dam was supposed to be

built in 10 months for the beginning of the rainy seasons, but major delays occurred, as with

all of their other projects (Pineau 14).To summarize the objectives of the privatization of

SONEL by the government and the World Bank were to use the private sector investment

and benefit from its expertise, to improve service quality, to supply electricity at a

competitive price, to involve the national private sector to SONEL capital, to fight the lack of

transparency and competitiveness and the state interference to the day to day

management.

10

The power sector was not the only one to be liberalized and privatized; the agricultural

sector restructuration was also one of the main aims of the World Bank with SAPs.

Agriculture is part of a livelihood strategy to safeguard family food security, health and

education. Agriculture is definitively the main economic sector in the country, but for rural

dwellers also, it is the backbone of their livelihood. Men engage in cash-‐crop production

while women take concern with food crop production (Fonchingong 3). The SAPs measures

in agriculture was aimed to encourage the production of cash crop production for exports

and to generate more for foreign exchange and render the country better able to service its

debts payment (Fonchingong 3). Crops growing in the country include banana, coffee,

cacao, plantains etc. In order to achieve these goals, the government and the World Bank

decided to further liberalize the agricultural sector. The strategy was to improve the sector

competitiveness and enhance productivity with a view to strengthening growth, increase

farmers incomes and hence subsequently reduce poverty (IMF 5).

The government also intended to improve basics infrastructures to the rural area as well as

the quality of social services deliver to them. In order to improve the competitiveness and

production of the sector so it could reach growth, the program provided for the publication

of an agricultural policy statement (ADB report on Cameroon 21). The new agricultural

policy of the government was based on modernization of the sector institutional

framework, the improvement of incentives framework and the reinforcement of actions

aimed at improving the competitiveness of export and quality of goods, especially in the

cacao and coffee sub-‐sectors (IMF 7). To achieve these goals, the state decided to continue

the decentralization of public administration and develop a strong partnership between the

government and local communities. The program started in 1989/1990 and continues in

1999/2000 until now (IMF 5).

11

Structural adjustment programs in agriculture include both privatization and liberalization;

the food crop development authority and the Market food board which had control of cacao

and coffee, were both liquidated along with others developmental agencies in the process of

liberalizing the agricultural sector (Bamou and Masters 7). The goals were also to grow new

crops and implement a variety of new agricultural techniques. In order to achieve that, the

public agricultural education system was virtually abandoned because of its degrading

facilities and weak staffs , to private educational institutions that were better equipped with

human and financial resources (Bamou and Masters 9). Liberalization and privatization of

the sector also meant liquidation of the public agricultural bank; the aim was to allow the

emergence of private financial intermediaries institutions.

The agricultural reforms engaged in the early 2000 have and still on-‐going require a total

withdrawal of the government in the activities.

Tackling poverty was one of the prominent goals of the World Bank and they expected to

do so through privatization and agricultural reforms as aforementioned.

Twelve years after the implementation of SAPs II, the assessment of the policies imposed by

the World Bank on Cameroonian economy are mixed; if some positive outcomes did

occurred, the majority of the goals aimed at the three objectives aforementioned failed to

produce any kind of economic and social growth.

It is understood that privatization is effective if the first private contractor assure all the

functions and activities of the enterprise not explicitly defined by the state and secondly, if

the first contractor take in charge financial costs linked to the modernization and

development of the enterprise but also, if the case arise the recorded financial losses.

(Ndzomo and Ndzongang 8). Based on those two principles, privatization of AES-‐SONEL

12

was a success, but in term of the developmental agenda behind it, the consequences of this

neo-‐liberal policy were disastrous. Indeed, since the privatization of SONEL, electricity

issues in the country have been worse than what in was 13 years ago. Power cuts persist,

and there is a long way to go before people can stay with lights on all the time. In 2003,

following three years of drought, there was no water left in the dams, causing the turbines

to stop, leading to black outs in most of the country lasting for several days. Since 2001,

those events are recurring and on-‐going; people find themselves without water and

electricity for days while the bills keep on growing. Electricity bills were up by 10% in the

five years preceding the privatization of SONEL (IRIN para 3).

In order to provide long-‐term power supplies, AES is trying to raise 100 millions dollars to

build more dams as well as gases power thermals stations (IRIN para 10). Even though the

numbers of connections have increase by nearly 50% (IFC 2), most of the goals achieve in

2001 are still not achieve, 12 years later. First, AES-‐SONEL has failed to supply electricity at

a competitive prices, no competition take place and prices increases at a schedule basis

(Pineau 17). Households’ consumers were hoping at the time to have better electricity

services at affordable prices. In terms of the consumers’ goods and services the World Bank

wanted to install by privatizing electricity, it is an enormous failure. Secondly, the

government realizes that AES will not resolve the long-‐term issues of electricity in the

country as they failed in 12 years to build more than one dam (Pineau 15). Finally, only two

objectives of the government was partly successful; it was to use private investment and

benefit from its expertise and its removal from day to day management as it only has 44%

of the shares (AFD report 17). If the government partially succeeds in that area, they and

the World Bank failed in all of the other goals as no private national sector investors get in

the deal with IMF, there is still lack of transparency (a law was passed to protect the lack of

13

transparency in accounting (Pineau 17) ) . In conclusion, privatization of electricity in

Cameroon brought higher consumers costs and poorer services.; if it failed to have positives

changes, it has reinforced patterns of patron-‐clients relations ( Konings 7) .

In the sector of agriculture, the results were not very different. Agricultural reforms in

Cameroon have created a tremendous amount of economical tensions within the

population. Those tensions can be felt between urban and rural population but also in

gender relations. After the economic adjustment, there is now hardly dividing line between

men and women in farming. The clear division of labor between men who were

concentration on cash crops and women on food crops has now changed (Fonchingong 3).

This is the result of the economic pressures brought with the SAPs; so now everybody

works on land to ensure survival for them and their family. Moreover, the transfer of

technologies that was supposed to happen with the liberalization of agriculture hardly

occurred; indeed, in rural areas small farmers, most women and men work the land with

basic agricultural tools. Hence, in rural areas women and men are involved in income

generating activities outside their home; they have to leave rural areas to sell their crops in

neighboring urban areas, if there is one. The issue is, because people in urban areas

incomes have declined, farmers can only sell their crops at low-‐prices in the markets. So,

there are no economical benefits from them, as they have to pay their own transportation to

the city and sell their crops for less. This is affecting women more than men, as they have to

take a better role to provide a livelihood for their family (Fongchingong 4) ; it is a failure for

the social aspect of the development agenda the World Bank, as women are economically

and socially under high volume of pressure, sometimes requiring their children to drop out

of school to help them work in the land or sell crops.

14

The agriculture liberalization has also affected farmers in a macro level. Before

liberalization, there was the Food Crop market authority and the National Produce

Marketing Board, which had control of cocoa and coffee. Their liquidation improved

average incentives, but for many products and regions of the country, there were very few

traders available; So, for the farmers, marketing costs actually rose. The deterioration of

local marketing conditions inhibited farmers’ productions, which in turn limited the

entrances into private settings to serve these markets (Bamou and Masters 7).

The private educational agricultural institution created some improvements’, but it only

covered a limited range of skills and it served only certain regions of the country (Bamou

and Masters 8). Moreover, with the privatization of the educational system, schools to skill

trained farmers became expensive and most of the family cannot really afford to send their

children or their spouse to have a proper agricultural skills train; especially local farmers

who operates on a micro-‐level scale.

Another big goal of the World Bank in this project was to build roads to connect rural and

urban areas within the countries, but to also build roads connecting to other countries, so

that agriculture could benefit from sub-‐regional competitiveness by allowing farmers to sell

their crops to neighboring countries (IMF report 6). Unfortunately, because neighboring

countries are dependent on Cameroonian crops such as plantain, farmers sell them at very

high prices, often leading to the raise of prices of those crops within Cameroonian markets.

For example, the price of a regime of plantains in 2005 was 2500 CFA (5 dollars) , now in

2012, it is close to 7500 CFA (16 dollars). The sub-‐regional competitiveness is a good policy

as farmers can easily sell their crops outside of the country to neighbors, but it is also

detrimental to Cameroonians as more and more local farmers can cross the border to sell

15

their crops in Gabon or Equatorial Guinea, neglecting Cameroonian consumers who do not

have enough economical mean to pay the regime of plantains at 7500 CFA.

The reality of the agricultural sector in Cameroon right now is that government has

abandoned farmers, as they do not have any kind of economic or social structure to dwell

on such as banks to procure loans or educational system to help them enhanced their skills.

Moreover, the liberalization of agriculture has created a form of food crisis within the

country as prices for necessity means such as plantains, rice, chicken etc. are way to high for

the consumers. Cameroon is the breadbasket of central Africa but yet, its own people are no

longer able to afford to eat well at a reasonable price, in the name of a neo-‐liberal policy

that did not take into account that neo-‐liberalism is a zero-‐sum game.

The conclusion of this paper is a clear critique of SAPs and the neo-‐liberalist theory

take through a post development theory. Indeed, post developmental theorists assert that

solution to be found in the ‘contextuality’ of development as a product of particular

historical processes. The context of development is constantly changing at a variety of

scales over times and among societies (Brohman 3). Structural Adjustment Programs have

proved to be ineffective both by their policies implementation and also in term of their

execution. There has been empirical evidence showing African governments may sign

document initiating a neo-‐liberal policy without intending to execute it (Konings 6).

Hence, even though donors are able to design and impose neo-‐liberal policies through

structural adjustment programs to African governments, they appear to have less control

over their actual implementation as in the case of Cameroon. Corruption and ethno-‐regional

tensions often fuel the lack of proper implementations of those policies. Moreover, in the

16

case of the privatization of SONEL and the other policies, it is clear that the World Bank and

the IMF did not take into consideration the current and evolving environment in which

Cameroon was. They simply implemented the “one –fit for all” policy they created.

The failure of the structural adjustment programs in Africa and in Cameroon, has compelled

the Bretton Woods institutions to recognize the positive role the state can play in the

process of development ( Mkandawire 4) .In the case of Cameroon, certain sectors did not

need to be totally liberalize, because of the social conditions at the time; but it was anyways,

leading to an economic distraught in the population. A situation in which, the government

will have tremendous amount of difficulty to reverse into something positive.

17

REFERENCES

-‐African Development Bank Group;Cameroon Structural adjustment programme II: Project performance evaluation report; Operations evaluation department; November 2002;p 9,21 .Print. -‐Amin,A; An examination of the sources of economic growth in Cameroon; African Economic Research Consortium, Nairobi; March 2002; p 5,6,7,12,13. Print. -‐Awung,W & Atanga,M; Economic crisis and multi-party in Cameroon; Cameroon Journal on Democracy and Human Rights , vol.5 No.1 , June 2011; p17,19;Print. -‐Bamou,E & Masters,W; Distortions to agricultural incentives in Cameroon; working paper;2007;p7,8,9.Print. -Brohman, J ;Universalism, Eurocentrism, and Ideological Bias in Development Studies:

From Modernisation to Neoliberalism, Third World Quarterly, 16, (1);1995;p3,7,17.Print -‐International Finance Corporation; Cameroon : Sonel; advisory service in Public-‐Private Partnerships; Washington DC; January 2012. P ,2. Web. http://www1.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/577489804a5b844a93e59f8969adcc27/SuccessStories_CameroonSONEL.pdf?MOD=AJPERES -‐ IMF; Cameroon,Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility Medium-Term Economic and Financial Policy Framework Paper (1999/2000–2001/02) ; http://www.imf.org/external/np/pfp/1999/cameroon/#VIIIA . Web. -‐Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN); Cameroon : Privatization provides no instant solution for electricity company;newspaper article, september 2003. Web http://www.irinnews.org/Report/45933/CAMEROON-‐Privatisation-‐provides-‐no-‐instant-‐solution-‐for-‐electricity-‐company -‐Fonchingong ,C;Structural adjustment, women and agriculture in Cameroon; Gender and development, vol 7, No3 , November 1999;p3,4. Print. -‐Hutchful,E;Adjustment in Africa and fifty years of the Bretton Woods: Change or consolidation?; Canadian Journal of development studies,XVI,3;1995;p7,16.Print. -‐Konings,P;Privatization and Ethno-Regional Protest in Cameroon;Africa Spectrum, vol.38 No.1,2003; P6,7 . Print. - Mkandawire, T;Thinking about Developmental States in Africa; Cambridge Journal of Economics 25(3), 2001; p2,3,4 .Print. -Ministere de l’economie et des finances du Cameroun;Privatization in Cameroon,fact

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sheet;Web http://www.fdi.net/documents/WorldBank/databases/plink/factsheets/cameroon.htm -Nzomo,J & Nzongang, J;THE PROCESS OF PRIVATIZATION OF PUBLIC AND PARA PUBLIC ENTERPRISES IN CAMEROON: AN ASSESSMENT;Journal of Sustainable Development in Africa ,Volume 9, No.4, 2007;p2,8. Print. -‐Pineau, P-‐O;Transparency in the Dark: An Assessment of the Cameroonian Electricity Sector Reform ; University of Victoria, Vancouver; August 2004; p 4,6,7,12,14,16. Print. -Rostow,W.W; The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non Communist Manifesto;Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960 ;p,6. Print.

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Neoliberalism and Development in Cameroon

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