Neoliberalism, Corporatism and Small Business Political Activism in Contemporary Mexico

7/30/2019 Neoliberalism, Corporatism and Small Business Political Activism in Contemporary Mexico

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Neoliberalism, Corporatism, and Small Business Political Activism in Contemporary MexicoAuthor(s): Kenneth C. ShadlenReviewed work(s):Source: Latin American Research Review, Vol. 35, No. 2 (2000), pp. 73-106Published by: The Latin American Studies AssociationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2692135 .

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NEOLIBERALISM, CORPORATISM, ANDSMALL BUSINESS POLITICAL ACTIVISM INCONTEMPORARY MEXICO*Kenneth. ShadlenBrownUniversity

Abstract:n the 980s nd 1990s, eoliberalismnd changingolicy-makingregimesresentedocial ctors hroughoutatinAmerica ith ew hallengesand pportunities.his rticlenalyzeshe oliticaltrategiesevelopedy woorganizationsepresentingmallmanufacturersn Mexico or espondingotheseweepingconomicndpoliticalhanges,mphasizinghe rganizationalbases fpoliticalctivism.trategiesre ssessedccordingoorganizations'publicxpressionf upportor roppositiono conomicolicies,he xtentowhichrganizationsork ithinxistingrrangementsornterestepresenta-tion,ndthe oliticallliances ade y mall usinessrganizationsndtheirleaders. ne trategynMexico ntailedcquiescingoradicalconomicolicychanges,eployingignificantesourcesopreserveset f orporatistnstitu-tions hat egulatedusinessssociation,nd upportinghe overnmentn-cumbents.nothertrategyntailedoicingersistentublicriticismfneo-liberalism,pearheadingnationalampaigngainstusinessorporatism,ndsupportinghe enter-Leftpposition.nalysisf hesetrategiesemonstratesthe mportantffectsf nstitutionalegaciesuring eriodsf egimehange.The erseverancef orporatistnstitutionsanmaketdifficultorweak ctorsto hed ldmodesf ctivism,otwithstandingchangedrray fmaterialndpoliticalncentives.Inthe 980s nd 1990s, ountrieshroughoutatinAmericadoptedneoliberal odels f conomic evelopmenthat eaturedxtensiveradeliberalization,eregulationfforeignnvestment,rivatizationf tate n-terprises,nd fiscal rthodoxy.nmany ountries,eoliberalismasbeenaccompanied ynew formsf nteractionetween lite conomic ctorsand the tate.'Thesemajor hangesneconomic olicy nd thenature f

*1wishto thank he LARR editors s well as five nonymousreviewers longwithJeffreyAndersonand Eduardo Silva for heir xtensive nd constructive valuationsof this rticle.Thanks are also extended to RuthBerins Collier and David Collier for he nsightful om-ments hat heyhave provided at variousstagesof thisproject.1. For an overview of neoliberalreforms hroughout he region, ee Varas 1995). For casestudies thatemphasize the changingroleofbig business, see Bartell nd Payne (1995) andDurand and Silva (1998).LatinAmericanesearcheview olume 5 number ? 2000 73


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Latin mericanesearcheviewpolicymaking avedisruptedong-standingatternsf tate-societalela-tions ndpromptedocial ctors o developnew forms frepresentationand political articipationSmithnd Korzeniewicz997).Thechanges f he 980s nd 1990shavepresentedarticularlyif-ficult hallengeso smallbusinesses. heir rientationoward eoliberalreformsistinguisheshem romarge irms,he ypical ocus f nalysesofbusiness nd politics. maller irms enerallyave minimalccesstocreditnd technologynd operaten essproductnd marketnformationthanarger irms. wners ndmanagersf mall usinessesftenack m-portant rofessionalkills ndtheresourceso train nd retrainheir m-ployees. hus mall ndustrialistsypicallyavemore ifficultydjustingto nternationalompetitionnd aremore hreatenedy directoreignn-vestment.2naddition,he liminationfmany tate ubsidiesnd the e-ductionsngovernmenturchaseshathave tended o accompanyradeandinvestmentiberalizations part f arger nti-inflationaryrogramsdampenmass purchasing ower nthedomesticmarket.n short,mallfirms avemore ifficultyakingdvantagef he otentialromise fneo-liberalism,uch s export pportunities,ndthey acegreaterbstaclesnovercominghe hallenges osedby ncreasedompetitionnthedomesticmarket.

This rticle illcontrasthepoliticaltrategiesn response o neo-liberalismftwo organizationsepresentingmall ndustrialistsnMex-ico.3 The strategiesnder nalysis an be consideredlongthree imen-sions:organizations'ublicexpressionfsupport oror opposition oeconomic olicies; he xtent owhich rganizationsorkwithinxistingarrangementsornterestepresentations opposed oworkingutside reven eekingodismantlehem;nd the oliticallliances ormedy mallbusiness rganizationsnd theireaders. hese wocompetingtrategiesare abeledhere ccommodationistnd dissident.

Themain epresentativesf mall ndustrynMexico ought o ac-commodateo the hangingnvironment.hile his esponse ccasionedsomepublic riticism,hen xpressedautiouslynd nsafeforums,c-commodationharacteristicallyastoleratednd even ndorsed eoliber-alism.Accommodationistseekto preserve nd work within xisting2. For mportanttatementsn theeffects fdifferentialccess tocredit nd technology,eeEvans (1979),Maxfield 1990),and Berry 1993). Fordiscussions ofthe mpediments o ad-justment acedby smallproducers nMexico, ee RufzDuran and Kagami (1993),RuizDuranand Schadtler1992),Alarc6n 1994), ndCONCAMIN (1991).Fora contrastingiew that x-pectsMexican smallfirms o demonstrate lexibility,ee Rubio (1988).3. Mexican business establishments ave been classifiedby theSecretariade Comercio yFomento ndustrial s "micro" with 1 to 15 employees, "small" with 16 to 100 employees,"medium"with 101 to 250employees, nd "large"with morethan 250 employees SECOFI1991). use small o refer o micro, mall,and medium-sizedbusinesses those with250 em-ployeesor fewer).

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SMALL BUSINESS POLITICAL ACTIVISM IN MEXICOarrangementsor tate-businessnteractionnd touse themoextracten-efits rom he tate,ven s theprincipalhannels or nterestrticulationbecome ominatedyorganizationsepresentingargernd more nterna-tionalized irms. ccommodationistsemain upportivef he ong-rulingPartido evolucionarionstitucionalPRI). n sum, yrefrainingrommo-bilizing ppositionothreateningconomic olicy hanges, ttemptingopreserve ld tiesto state fficialsnd old patternsf state-societalela-tions, nd loyallyupportinghe ncumbentRI,the ccommodationistshave ought o nfluenceolicytthemarginsndthereby inimizehe f-fectsfneoliberalism.Inthe 980s nd1990s, he rganizationost learlydentifiedithaccommodationas been theCamaraNacionalde la Industria e Trans-formacionCANACINTRA),whichhasmonopolized fficialepresenta-tion f mallndustryothe tate.4ANACINTRA'sccommodationiste-sponse llowed heMexican overnmento mplementxtensiveconomicreforms ith nly epid ppositionrommall usinesses.Asecondgroup f ndustrialistsespondedo the hallengesf he1980s nd 1990s ycriticizingtronglyhe ontentfneoliberalconomicpolicy ndtheexclusive ature f economic olicymaking. hesedissi-dents eject eoliberalism,ndtheyssail nd seek odismantle hat heyregard s undemocraticnstitutionsorrepresentingusiness nterests.Withminimalccess opolicymaking,hedissidents aveoptedfor ewmodes fpoliticalmobilizationy ollaboratingith ongovernmentalr-ganizationsnd anti-neoliberalocialmovementsnd supportingnop-position olitical arty ftheCenter-Left,hePartido e la RevolucionDemocraticaPRD).Formost f he ast wenty ears,his roup frebel mall ndustri-alists emained tthefringefMexican olitics. ut nrecent ears, hebroadeningftheir asewithin he mallbusiness ommunitys wellasthe lliances hey aveformed ith arious onbusinessctors avecon-tributedobroadermulticlassppositionothePRI andtheneoliberal e-velopment odel.Toexplain hese wo responses,ccommodationistnd dissident,this rticle illfocus nthematerialndorganizationalasesof mall usi-nesspoliticalctivism.naddition odifficultconomichallenges,mallfirms lso face setofpoliticalhallengeshat urtheristinguishhemfromigbusiness. mall ndustrialistsrdinarilyack heresourceso de-fendheirnterestsndividually.hey re ess ikelyo havedirect ontactswith olicymakers,ndtheirndividualnvestmentecisions avemini-mal mpact nthe conomys a whole. mallfirmsonsequentlyavea

4. Smallmanufacturingirms renotexclusivelymembers fCANACINTRA, nordoes itsmembership onsist ntirelyf smallfirms,utthechamberhistorically as served as theof-ficial epresentativef small ndustryn Mexico.75


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LatinAmerican esearch eviewgreatereedfor ormalrganizationodefendheirnterests,et ollectiveactions more ifficultor hem.5

The greatermportancefformalrganizationombined ithessabilityoovercomehe mpedimentso collectivectionyield ignificantimplicationsor mallfirms' trategiesfpolitical ctivism.mallbusi-nessesmay emoreffectedy"corporatist"tatenstitutionshat egulateinterestrganizationnd interestepresentation.6orsmallfirms,tateconcessions eliveredhroughorporatistrameworks,uchas compul-sorymembership,anbe essentialngredientsor urmountingmpedi-mentsoorganization.7uch oncessions,owever,angeneraterganiza-tional ependence,ndvulnerabilityo theremoval f suchconcessionscan encouragerganizationsepresentingmallfirms omodifyheir e-sponses oeconomic olicy hanges. rganizationalependencesthuskey onditionnderlyingstrategyf ccommodation.Two additional rganizationalspects fsmallbusiness ctivismmerit ttention.irst,hedifficultrocesses fbuilding rganizationsndcultivatingndmaintaininginks o policy-makingnstitutionsayen-courage ontinuitynpoliticaltrategyndthusdiscouragehedevelop-ment nd exploitationfnew alternativehannels.econd, o the xtentthat oncessions ainedbyaccommodationccruedisproportionatelyothe eadershipf given rganization,strategyf upportinghe tatenexchangeoruch oncessionss ikelyogenerateacklashrommemberswho arereceivingewer f hebenefits.ailedprotest,owever,an havetheperverseffectf xacerbatingependencendsubsequentlyeinforc-ing he rganizationalonditionsnderlyingccommodation.This rticleonsistsffour ections. hefirstocuses nhow stateinstitutionshaped atternsf mall usinessrganizationndpoliticalc-tivism romhe1940s hroughhe1970s. hisperiodwitnessed he mer-gence fCANACINTRA, business rganizationhathas played n im-portantolenMexican olitics.he econd ectionnalyzeshe hallengesof he1980s nd1990s,when mall ndustrialistsecame ivided ver heappropriateesponseo neoliberalism,nd llustratesowthe orporatistframeworkhwartedmallbusiness issidents'ffortso establish moreautonomousormfrepresentation.he third ectionxamineshedissi-dents' esponseo their rganizationalefeat,nd thefourthectionna-

5.MichaelShafer as also emphasizedthat ollective ction smoredifficultor mallfirms(1994, haps. 1-2).On thegenericdifficultiesf collective ction, ee Olson (1965).For analy-ses that ontrasthedistinct rocessesof organizationnvolved n businessassociations ndlabor unions, ee Offe nd Wiesenthal 1980),Traxler 1993),and Van Waarden 1991).6. For a discussionof the conceptofcorporatismnthe study ofLatin Americanpolitics,see Collier 1995).See also Schmitter1974),Williamson1989), nd Collier ndCollier 1979).7. In this mportantense, then, mallfirmswould appear to have more ncommon withworkers nd peasantsthanwithbig business.

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SMALL BUSINESS POLITICAL ACTIVISM IN MEXICOlyzeshow he nti-corporatistampaign pened venues or he issidentstoestablishieswith ther ocietalmovements.BACKGROUND: CORPORATISM, SMALL. INDUSTRY, AND CANACINTRA

ThecornerstonefMexican usiness orporatismasbeen he 941Ley de las Camarasde Comercio de las de IndustriastheChambersLaw). It requiredllMexican irms o oinofficialusiness rganizations("camaras") hatwouldbe regulated ythe tate. his aw had differentialeffectshroughouthebusiness ommunity. hileorganizationsepre-sentingarge irmsenerallyemainedutonomous rom he tate,he r-ganizationndarticulationf mallndustrialists'nterestsontinuedobesubject o state onstraints.heseconstraintsn turn roduced ivisionswithin he mallbusiness ommunityhat ignificantlyffected exicanpolitical conomyn the1980s nd1990s. ounderstandhese ivisions,this ection illprovide ackgroundnthe ssociative atternsfMexicanbusiness, ith special ocus n the ffectf heChambers aw on thepo-liticalrajectoryf he rganizationepresentingmall ndustry.The1941Chambers aw madea statutoryistinctionetweenn-dustrynd commercewithervices onsidered dimensionf ommerce)andrequiredndustrialistso oin ndustrialhambers.n sectorswheresuchorganizationsidnot xist,ndustrialistsere orequest ermissionfromhe tate oform ewchambers. t he ame ime,he tateponsoredthe reation fCANACINTRA.When t wasestablishedn1941, ANA-CINTRAwasdesignateds a mixed-activityatchall hamberor ew ndemerging anufacturingectorshatacked hambersf heir wn. twasnotdesignateds a chamberormall ndustrialistser e.Thepatternf nterestrganizationhat ollowedhe1941Cham-bersLaw transformedANACINTRA ntothede facto epresentativeof small nddomestic-orientedexican ndustrialists.heorganizationunderwentapidgrowth hroughouthepostwar ra, s thousandsf n-dustrialistsnunorganizedectors ecameegally bligatedo oin ndpaydues to the hamber. oundedwith 3membersn1941, ANACINTRAhad6,700membersy 1945,ome9,000membersy1950,bout 1,500 y1960,nd close o30,000 y1970.Whiletwasgrowing, owever,ANA-CINTRA lso ostmembersonew ndustrialhambershatwere ffiliateddirectly ith heConfederacione Camaras ndustrialesCONCAMIN).Theconfederation'sembershiponsistedffive hambersf ndustryn1941including ANACINTRA),nd tgrew o24chambersy1944,35 y1950,nd43by1960.Thispatternffragmentation-fromANACINTRA nto ector-specific hambers-wasmostpronouncedn thesectors ominated ylargerirms. hree easons anbe adducedforhis rend.irst,argerirms

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LatinAmerican esearch eviewhavean easier ime vercominghebarrierso collectivection hat ypi-callympede he ormationforganizations.econd,argerMexican irmsand ocal subsidiariesfforeignirms erebetter reparedo satisfyhelegal requirementsor stablishingew chambers,nd theyweremorelikely o have adequatecontacts nd resourceso swaytheappropriatestate fficialsesponsibleor uthorizinghe creationf newchambers.Third,s CANACINTRA ame o representmallfirms,arger irms ithdistinctnterestsndneedsfor ifferentervices anted heirwnorgani-zations.8 hesefactors einforcedach other: igfirmseavingCANA-CINTRA urnedhechambernto herepresentativef smallfirms,ndCANACINTRA's ocations the epresentativef mall irms eightenedbigfirms' esire o eave.ThecreationfnewchambersnCONCAMIN ncreasedhemater-ialandorganizationalependencefCANACINTRA nthe tate. ecausethe ectorseaving ANACINTRAendedogeneratehe astestrowthnthemost ynamicreas f he conomy,ANACINTRA ame orepresentfirmsrom weakeregmentfMexicanapital. his utcomeedto sym-metrynCANACINTRA'smaterialelationshipith he taten that tsmembersameto depend nthe tate or rade rotection,ubsidies,ndgovernmenturchasesarmore han he tate epended n these mallerfirms'ontributionso economicctivity. exicanmanufacturingirms fallsizesbenefitedromtate oncessionsuringhis eriod,nd asa result,virtuallyll Mexicannd transnationalapital ame odepend n the tateinthismaterialense Reynolds 970;Vernon 963).Larger irms,ow-ever,with heir reaterssets nd contributionso economicctivityndemployment,njoyed degree f everagehat maller irmsacked. husthe ypicalstructuralependence"f he tate ncapitalwas diminishedwith irmsepresentedyCANACINTRA.9 hesedifferencesrew s theMexican conomy ecame ncreasinglynternationalizedn thedecadesfollowingWorldWar I,and thegapwidenedbetweenargefinancial-industrialonglomeratesnd small ndependent anufacturingirms.10CANACINTRAlsobecame ncreasinglyependentnthe tate ororganizationalupportnthat ragmentationade tharder ohold he r-ganizationogether.apitalistsngeneralrestymiedessbytypicalm-pedimentso collectivection ecause nasymmetricalistributionfre-sourceswithinhe ollectivityncreaseshe ikelihoodhatargerirms illbe able to beartheburdens forganizationuildingVanWaarden 991).

8. On thisthird oint, ee Brandenburg1958).9. Forstatementsf the state'sdependenceon capital, ee Lindblom 1977,1982),Offe ndWiesenthal 1980), and Przeworskiand Wallerstein 1982). The materialdependence ofCANACINTRA's membersduring hisperiodhas been highlighted yMosk (1950),Vernon(1963),and Elizondo (1992).10. See Jacobs nd Mattar 1985) for nalysis of the changingpositionof small firmsn theMexicanmanufacturingector.78


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SMALL BUSINESS POLITICAL ACTIVISM IN MEXICOButwith ANACINTRA, hile he hamber'smembershipasgrowing,itwas also osing he arge irmshatmight ave implifiednd facilitatedorganization.he creationfnew chamberslsohurt ANACINTRA e-cause eachnewchamber apturedhedues of llfirmsn ts ector-notjustthehandfulfbigfirms hat etitionedor new chamber.ANA-CINTRAhereforepposed ctivelyhe reationfnew ndustrialhambers.AlthoughheChambers aw required tate uthorizationor hecreation fnewchambers,hevagueness fthe aw left tate fficialsx-traordinaryiscretion,hich hen ranslatednto ubstantialontrol verCANACINTRA.Accordingo theChambers aw, the Secretaria e laEconomiawas to determine hen new chamberould be created ndwhich irmshouldoinwhich hambers.11ut he awdid not pecifyherequisitesor stablishingeparatendustrialhambers,ordid it definethe riteriaywhichhe tatewoulddetermine hethergroup fmanu-facturershouldform heir wn chamberr remainmembersf CANA-CINTRA.Also, achchamber'snternaltatutesad to conformo there-quirementsfthe aw andbeapproved ythegovernment,s would nystatutoryhanges.As secessionistroups etitionedor uthorizationfneworganizations,ANACINTRA bjected,ndthe tate ecame hepri-mary rbitratorf hese onflicts.ecause eparatehambersouldnotbecreated ithoutovernmentuthorizationnd the aw wasvague s tothecriteriaor reatingewchambers,he ontinuedxistencendviabilityfCANACINTRAame odepend argelyn the tate's iscretion.Thus n thedecadesfollowinghe1941Chambers aw,CANA-CINTRA ame o depend n the tate rganizationallyntwomajorways.First,ANACINTRA epended ncompulsory embershipoguaranteethe rganizationnexpandingase ofdues-paying embers.econd ndmore ritical,tdepended n the tate's ulingsgainst reatingewcham-bers, speciallynsectors ithmany mallfirms,osaveCANACINTRAfromufferingassive emorrhagingfmembers.Thefact hat heChambers aw gavetheMexican tate he ools odetermineANACINTRA's ate ncouragedhambereadershipo makesmall ndustrynimportantllyof he tate. hestrategyf ccommoda-tionwas developed n this arlier eriod.CANACINTRA eadily up-ported he state n a widerangeof economic nd politicalssues.Thechamberupported olicies hatgenerallyenefitedtsmembers,uchas thetradeprotectionnd consumptionubsidies hatbolsteredocaldemand.At the ametime, owever,hechamber efrainedromtrongcriticismsfpolicies hatwere ess favorableo smallfirms,uchas in-creased oreignnvestmentnthemanufacturingector nd tax nd creditpolicies hat acilitatedhe mergencef argemultisectoralonglomerates.

11.Jurisdictionas transferredn the1960sto theSecretaria e IndustriayComercio SIC),and intheearly1980s to the Secretaria e ComercioyFomento ndustrial SECOFI).79


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LatinAmerican esearch eviewCANACINTRAlsowent utof tswaytosupport he tate nan arrayfissues hat ook n special ignificancenMexico's ostrevolutionarynvi-ronment.or example,CANACINTRA ctively efended overnmentproclamationsupportingheCubanRevolutionnd oinedwith he tateandofficialaborunionsncelebratinghenegotiatedurchasefforeignelectricalompanies s Mexico'smost ignificantevolutionarychieve-ment ince he1938oil expropriationAlcazar1970, 3; Puga 1984, 99;andWionczek964,85-90).ANACINTRAwas not ntirelyupportivefthe tate n all ssues, ut ts eaders enerallyefrainedromtrong riti-cisms fpolicy,ndtheir ew riticismsendedobedirectedowardrrorsofomission atherhan ommission.hat s,the hamber ouldartfullyintegrateolicy dvocacynto elebrationsf he tate's therwiserevo-lutionarychievements."12n sum,CANACINTRA xchanged oliticalsupportor othmaterialndorganizationalrotection.13Throughouthepostwar ra,CANACINTRA's ccommodationiststrategyemaineddivisivessue mong mall ndustrialists,ith ensionbetweenhe ro-governmenteadershipndthosewho dvocatedmore rit-icalpositionsnd resentedhe hamber'sacrificef utonomy.he eadersdefendedheir ctions y pointingotheresults:membershipas grow-ing,14ndCANACINTRAwas affordedccess o policymakers. lthoughCANACINTRA id notdrive conomicolicy,fficialtatus rovidedhechambereadership ith reliableet f ontacts ith tate olicymakers.15THE CHALLENGES OF THE 1980S AND 1990S: SMALL INDUSTRY DIVIDED

Small ndustrialistsavefaced neweconomic ndpoliticalnvi-ronmentince he arly 980s,when conomicrisis nd ntense ressurefromhe nternationalinancialommunitybliged heMexican overn-ment oopen he conomy.16conomiciberalizationegan nthewakeofthe1982debtcrisis nd continued hroughouthedecade Lustig 992).

12. For examples, ee CANACINTRA (1952,1961a,1961b) and Lavin (1960).13.This nterpretationoincides withMiddlebrook's 1995) nterpretationf therootsof asimilar lliance between the postrevolutionary exican state and organized labor. n bothcases, thetight elationship eveloped not ust as an imposition f the statebut as a functionofa weak sector'sstrategy o seekpolitical lliances.14. CANACINTRA became the largestsingle industrialchamber n Mexico, withovereighty housandmembersby the1980s.15. Analystshave disagreedoverthe extent fCANACINTRA's influence ver policy.Anissue that has drawn substantial ttentionhas been Mexico's flirtation ith entering heGATT n1979-1980,which CANACINTRA opposed. Story1982)citedCANACINTRA's op-position oexplain n partthe decision not to oinGATT. Mares (1985), ncontrast,ttributedthe decisionto changesin Mexico's oil reserves, rguingthatCANACINTRA's oppositionwas most notable after residentJos6L6pez Portillo nd other tate officials evealedtheirreservationsbout GATTmembershipnd indicated hatMexicowould most ikelynot oin.16. In addition to thereferencesited,my analysis n this ection s based on extensive n-80


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SMALL BUSINESS POLITICAL ACTIVISM IN MEXICOMexico nteredheGeneral greementnTariffsndTrade GATT)n1986and the ollowing ear nilaterallycceleratedhepaceof rade iberaliza-tion yeliminatingost uantitativemport estrictionsnd oweringhemaximumariffrom 00 o20 percent. y he arly 990s, mport arriershad beenreduced, oreignnvestmenteregulated, ost tate nterprisesprivatized,nd Mexicowas negotiatingheNorthAmerican reeTradeAgreementNAFTA)with heUnited tates nd Canada.Themajor hanges n economic olicywere ccompanied ytheemergencef new lliance etween he tatendbusiness,nwhich co-hesivegroup f technocraticolicymakers ollaboratedloselywith hetop strata ftheMexican usiness ommunity. ithin he tate, closelyknit roup fofficials ith xtensiveinks o the nternationalinancialcommunityame o control ey spects f conomic olicymakingMax-field 991; enteno ndMaxfield 992; enteno 994).nthe rivateector,thepeak representativesfthebusiness ommunityameunder he on-trol fthemost nternationalizedegmentfMexican apital,whichwasanxious o consolidateusiness upportor henewdevelopmenttrategy(Tirado nd Luna 1995; chneider 997;Garrido nd Puga 1990).Eachfeaturef henew lfiance iminishedANACINTRA'sapac-ity o affectolicymaking,s the ncreasinglyechnocraticature fpolicymakingndbigbusiness'smonopolyf hemain hannelsf nterestrticu-lationdevalued mall ndustry'sraditionaloints faccessto thestate.These endencies ere videntnthe womost mportantvents f hepe-riod nder tudy: series f ripartiteconomic acts hat erved s the rin-cipalmechanismf conomic olicymakingfter987,nd NAFTA.Bothfeaturedntenseollaborationetween he tatend elite rivate-sectorro-ponentsf heneoliberal odel. or xample, hen he conomicactswerebeing ormulated,usinesswas chieflyepresentedythepeak-level on-sejoCoordinadormpresarialCCE).17 imilarly,uringheNAFTA onsul-tations,usiness epresentationasmonopolized ytheCoordinadoraeterviewswith hemost prominentctors nvolved n the conflict,ncludingMireles,Moreno,three dvisers to CANACINTRA's presidents,Romo, and a numberof his closest support-ers in the 1986 CANACINTRA election.The analysis s also based on interviewswith ess-involved membersof CANACINTRA in the capital goods and metallurgy ections somepartial othe eadership, ome partial o the opposition).17. On the making ftheeconomicpacts, ee Kaufman, azdrasch, nd Heredia 1994).Foranalysis f hedilemma hat hepactspresented or ANACSTRA, see Shadlen 1997, hap.4).The ConsejoCoordinadorEmpresarial CCE) was founded n1975 to coordinate he ctivitiesofMexico's variousnational-level ectoral rganizations.Withinhisnetwork,heorganizationrepresentingndustrywas CONCAMIN (of which CANACINTRA is a member).The othermembers ncluded the Confederaci6n e Camaras Nacionales de Comercio CONCANACO,covering ommerce, ervices, nd tourism), he Consejo Nacional Agropecuario CNA, agri-culture), heAsociaci6n Mexicana de Casas de Bolsa (AMCB, finance), heAsociaci6n Mexi-cana de Institutos e Seguro (AMIS, insurance), nd two multisectoral rganizations, heConfederaci6n Patronal de la Republica Mexicana (COPARMEX) and the Consejo

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Latin mericanesearcheviewOrganismosmpresarialese ComercioxteriorCOECE), related rgani-zation reatedy heCCE torepresentusinessntrade ssues.18NeoliberalismndCANACINTRA

CANACINTRAeaders espondedo thechallengesresentedythe echnocraticnd exclusionaryntroductionfneoliberalolicies y n-tensifyingheaccommodationisttrategyevelopedoverthe previousforty ears. lthoughheywere ware f he hamber's aningnfluence,the eaders eared he onsequencesfpublic issent. hechamberackedthe ower o nfluenceolicy irectly,ndthe echnocraticnd elite olicy-makingrocessmeant hatven esidualccess opolicymakers as pred-icated n endorsingconomic olicy. husfrom he eaders'perspective,economicndpolitical eaknessmadeaccommodationhemost rudentstrategy.fter onsiderablenternalnalysis, ANACINTRA emainedcommittedoworking ithin he orporatistrameworknorderoextractasmany enefitss possible.Inthe eaders' iew, hemeritsfthis trategyeredemonstratedbythefirstmajor hallengef he1980s,he reationf hePrograma a-cionalde Fomentondustrial Comercio xteriorPRONAFICE).Whenthis rogram asbeingdeveloped, ANACINTRA ook dvantage f tsofficialtatus ndexploitedifts ithin he tate pparatus o become nactive articipantnthenegotiationsn 1983-1984.19ANACINTRAead-ers elebratedRONAFICE s a vindicationf he ccommodationisttrat-egy. acedwith olicymakersntentn iberalizingrade, ANACINTRAmanagedo way he utcome ndsecure he tate's ommitmentoa pro-gram fgradual ector-by-sectorariffeduction. more onfrontationalstrategy,heycontended,would have minimized heir ccess to thePRONAFICE onsultationsnd imitedheirnfluencen policymaking.20Mexicano de Hombresde Negocio (CMHN). The Asociaci6nde Banquera Mexicana (ABM),a foundingmember,was replaced after he 1982bank nationalizationby the AMCB, thestockbrokers'ssociation. Whenthe commercial anks were reprivatized n 1991-1992, heABM rejoined heCCE, giving hepeak organization ightmembers,nd theAMCB changedits name to theAsociaci6nMexicanade Instituciones ursatilesAMIB). For an overview ofthe CCE's structure,ee Luna and Tirado (1992). For an analysisof theCCE's public "ac-tions," ee Tirado and Luna (1995).18.As its name suggests,COECE integratedMexico's export-orientedusiness associa-tions ntoa singleorganization.Although thisad hoc coordinating rganizationremainedformallyubordinate othe CCE, stateofficials ransformedOECE into he most mportantMexican business organizationby granting t a de facto monopoly of representationnNAFTA. For more detailedanalysesof COECE, see Luna (1992),Puga (1993),Rubio (1992),and Thacker 1996).19. For analyses ofthe PRONAFICE negotiations,ee Rubio, Rodrfguez, nd Blum (1989)and Hobbs (1991).20. InterviewswithCANACINTRA officials.ee also Garza (1993,465).82


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SMALL BUSINESS POLITICAL ACTIVISM IN MEXICOTheDissidents' esponse

WhileCANACINTRAeaders emainedommittedo theaccom-modationisttrategy,factionfdissidentsnthe rganizationdvocatedmore onfrontationaltrategynresponseo he hangingconomicndpo-litical nvironment.he dissidentmovementmerged rom he capitalgoodsandmetallurgyectors, hereproducersrequentlyamentedhelowqualityf nputs oming romtate-ownedteel ndenergyirmsndthehighcostofcredit.21or these ndustrialists,erely eactingo thestate'snitiativesas notenough. heymaintainedhat he ppropriatecourse or he hamber ouldbetopropose more ctivendustrialolicyin which conomic ecovery ouldbe basedon stimulationf domesticmanufacturing.uch strategyould nclude esistingradeiberalization,advocatingheprivatizationf ome tate nterpriseso mprovehe ual-ityofinputs,nd demandingmoreproductiveredit olicies. n 1982CANACINTRA istancedtself romhe usiness ommunity'seneralp-positionothenationalizationf he ommercialankingystem,xpectingthat henationalizationould mprovemall irms'ccess o credit.Whenthis bjective as notrealized nd credit ecameharder o obtainnstead,the issidentsecamencreasinglyissatisfiedith heireaders' trategy22WhereasANACINTRAeaders egardedccommodations the p-propriateesponseoweakness,hedissidentsiewed ccommodations afactor hatperpetuatedhechamber'sweakness. heycharged hat hechamber as failingorepresentembersdequatelyndassailed heead-ers'preoccupationith reservingANACINTRA's iche s interlocutor.Thedissidentselievedhat he hambers a whole nd ts eaders s indi-viduals adbecome oo losely lliedwith he tatendtoodependentn t.In their iew, hese elationshipserempedingANACINTRA romus-taining ppositiono thegovernment.hedissidentssserted hat ar rom

improvinghe epresentationalapacitynd nfluencef he hamber,s theleadership laimed, ANACINTRA's reoccupation ithorganizationalstatushad predisposedhe chamberoward assivity.23s a result,hechamber'sresences an actorn tate-businesselationsaddeteriorated.24Thedissidentsdvanced radicallyifferentvaluation f he ead-ership's trategyis-a-vishe tate. heyregarded RONAFICE s any-thing ut success.As soon as theprogramfgradual iberalizationas21. For analysisofsmallproducers n thesesectors, ee Villalobos 1989).22. For a discussionofthe mpactofthebank nationalization n the vailability fcredit nthe1980s, ee Maxfield 1990,153-62).23. This generic rait fcorporatisms also a commongrievanceof workerswithregard ounion leadershipworkingwithin orporatist tructures.24. See, for xample,La Jornada,8Dec. 1985, n which thedissidents amented, CANA-CINTRA has disappeared; it has lost ts presencenotonly amongindustrialistsutwiththedestiny f the country."

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Latin mericanesearcheviewannounced,heBancode Mexico ndthe ecretariaeHacienday CreditoPublico romisedna March 985 etterf ntentothenternationalon-etary und "a complete evision ftrade olicy" n order toreduce helevelofprotectionism."25hileCANACINTRAeaderswere elebratingthe PRONAFICE ictory,"rotection as argelytrippedrom hemetalandcapital oodssectors.26he dissidents egardeduch vents s proofof he hamber's ecay nd amplifiedheir allsfor verhaulinghe rga-nization's elationothestate.Thedissidents' riticismseightenedhetensions ithin he hamber.or xample, t onepoint, representativefthemetallurgyection dmonished hambereadersfornotrespondingmoreforcefullyo "cruciallymportanthanges nour government'sn-dustrial olicywhoseconsequences ill be veryharmfulorus." In re-sponse, ewascalledbefore he hamber's oard fdirectorsnd accusedofprovokingivisiveness.27CANACINTRA nderiege

Thetensionsroduced ythe conomic ndpolitical onjuncturefthe1980s rystallizeduringhebitterampaigneading p tothe ham-ber's 1986 lections.nNovember 985, ANACINTRA's utgoing resi-dent, arlosMirelesGarcia, esignated uanJoseMoreno ada,thefirstvice-presidentnddirectorfforeignrade, s hischoice or successorobeelectednFebruaryf he oming ear. he"officialandidate" asop-posedbyRoberto omo antillan,he wner f wofoundries.n his onghistoryf nvolvementnCANACINTRA, omohadserved s presidentof he hamber'smetallurgyouncil nd the oundryection.The dissidentsrguedthatMoreno's lose personal nd profes-sionaltiestotheSecretarfae Comercio FomentondustrialSECOFI)andmembershipnthe overningRIcompromisedim oomuch ocon-fronttate olicymakers.nfact,everal ewspaperseportedarlyn thecampaignhat wo ECOFIundersecretariesad nstructedutgoingres-identMireles o selectMoreno s his successor.28lthough hese llega-tionsremained nsubstantiated,oreno's lose relations ithSECOFIwerenever ndispute.Onebusiness olumnist entured hatMoreno'sclose tiesto the statewould "weigh heavily n the finaldecisionof

25.Journal fCommerce,8Mar. 1985.26. For a sector-by-sectorreakdown of tradeliberalizationduring thisperiod, see TenKate (1992).27. See LaJornada,July 985, nd 2 Aug. 1985.CANACINTRA's sectoral tructure onsistsofapproximately 15 sections ntegratednto ten councils. Foundry s one ofthe sectionswithin hemetallurgy ouncil.28.See El Universal, Nov. 1985; nd La Jornada,Dec. 1985.By these ccounts,Moreno was"a productof the dedazo," hePRI's mechanismforpresidential uccessionwhereby he out-going president ersonally electstheparty's andidate. See Excelsior, Nov. 1985.84


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SMALL BUSINESS POLITICAL ACTIVISM IN MEXICOCANACINTRAmembers hohaverepeatedlyemonstratedhatheyretiredf he ackof trongnd ndependentositionsn thepart f hedi-rectors... "29Thusquestionsbout he fficialandidate'sndependenceand concernsverfurtherrosion fthechamber'sutonomyolarizedthe ampaign.30Thedivide etween ANACINTRAndthedissidents idenednthe ftermathf theFebruary986 lections, henRomoandfour up-porterslaimed hatMoreno's ictory as fraudulent.31hey hargedhatMireles ndMorenohad used chamber unds obuysupport,hat tateofficialsaid some CANACINTRA elegates ochange heir otes, ndthat ECOFIhad manipulatedhe lectoralrocess o ensure hat hepro-governmentandidate ouldwin.Although oneofthese ccusationsfgovernmentnterferencenchamberlections ere roved,heyontributedtothedissidents'oliticalormation.hat s,Romo's upportersttributedtheir lectoral etback o thestate'scapacity ointervenen CANA-CINTRA ffairsoguaranteehevictoryfdocile eaders, key haracter-istic f orporatism.Thefive issidentsccused fpublicly efaminghe hamber eresuspended ndthen xpelled rom ANACINTRA. heyresponded yimmediatelynnouncingheformationftheAsociacion acionalde In-dustrialesela TransformacionANIT), n associationhatwouldrespond"totheyearningfmany ntrepreneursohave norganizationhat rulyrepresentshem."32 hengrantedegalregistrations a civil ssociationlater n1986, NIT counted4 members,nd the oundersf hedissidentassociationxpected membershipf ,000 yyear's nd.33The onflictetween ANACINTRAeadersnd the issidentsidnot ndwithhe xpulsionf he ppositioneadersnd he reationfANIT.The newgroupquicklymounted frontalssaultonCANACINTRA'sstatuss the epresentativef mall ndustrynMexico. tatinghat on c-count f he eople hat ave ontrolledndmanipulatedhe rganizationfor he ast everalyears,CANACINTRA] asstopped ervingtsmem-bers,"Romoproclaimedhatt was "necessaryo throwut those hingsthat olongererve purpose."34eferredobyoneobservers "one ofthe woCANACINTRAshat xist oday,"35NITopened tsfirstfficesblock wayfrom ANACINTRA'smmense ine-storyfficeomplexnMexicoCity.

29. HerminioRebollo Pineda, "De IP,"El Universal, Nov. 1985.30. "Theygiveeachother irty ooks,they hout t each other,nd they ven threatenachother." ee LaJornada,7Jan. 986.31. LaJornada,6 Feb. 1986.32. Romo,as cited n La Jornada,4 Apr.1986.33.El Nacional, 4 Aug. 1986.34.La Jornada,4 Aug. 1986.35.AlbertoBarrancoChavarrfa,Empresa,"La Jornada,July 986.

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LatinAmerican esearch eviewStateProtectionfCANACINTRA

State nterventionn behalf f CANACINTRA tymied hedissi-dents' hallenge, owever,nd ANIT's ambitionsfdisplacing ANA-CINTRAquickly issipated. nalysis f theways nwhich heMexicanstate elped ANACINTRAurn ack his hallenge illhelp xplainwhythedissidents ecame o vehementlynti-corporatisty theend of thedecade.CANACINTRA ppealedto SECOFIfor ssistancen fendingffANIT'schallenge,nd SECOFI ntervenednthe hamber'sehalfn sev-eralways.First, he tate pparentlyeployed oerciveconomicnstru-ments o harass omeofthedissidentndustrialistsndtherebytunt hegrowthf thefledglingusiness rganization.econd, ECOFI officialsuseda setofdiscretionaryrerogativesffordedy theChambers aw topreventhe reationf rival ndustrialhamber.hird,ECOFIemployedanother spectof the Chambers aw to upholdthe egal standing fCANACINTRAeaders. ourth,ydenyingNITaccess opolicymaking,state fficialsnderminedhe issidents'ffortsorepresentmall ndustry.Themost rominent embersfANITfound hemselvesubjectogovernmenteprisalshat ncludedudits,nspections,nd denials fper-mits.36 ne ANIT directormaintained hatgovernmentfficials,tMoreno'sbehest, nstigatedaborproblemsnhis and Romo'sfirms.37Romoeventuallysoldhisfoundriesnd movedtoHouston opursuebusiness enture ith colleague, romptingnecolumnisto uggesthathe hadbeendrivennto xileby"hisenemies" t CANACINTRA.38ikethe llegationsffraud ollowinghe ebruary986 hamberlections,herole f he taten thesendustrialists'ifficultiess hard o document.hesignificantoints notwhat he tate id or didnotdobutthedissidents'belief hat he tatewould helpCANACINTRA nd that hisnterventionwouldmake he hambervenmorendebtedo thegovernment.

CANACINTRA lsocalledonthegovernmentopreventhedissi-dents rom reatingseparatendustrialhamber.hroughouthehistoryofCANACINTRA, roups f ndustrialistsad left heorganizationndformedector-specifichambershat rovidedhemwithmore pecializedrepresentationndservices. hedissidents ho formed NITsought ofollow he amepath, ttemptingo create heCaimara acionalde la In-dustria e Bienesde Capital CANABICA).39 ANACINTRA, earingdrain n ts evenues,pposed he issidents'lan oform heir wn ham-ber.CANACINTRA nd ANITwere ncompetitionormembers,uton36.LaJornada,7 Oct. 1986.37. Excelsior, Jan. 987.38. La Jornada,4 Nov. 1986.39. The initial ffortsocreatethischamberoccurredwhen the eventual eaders ofANITwere still membersof CANACINTRA. Its titlenotwithstanding, NIT founders imed toattract roducers f capitalgoods and metal goods.

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SMALL BUSINESS POLITICAL ACTIVISM IN MEXICOuneven erms ue toANIT'sunofficialtatus. ecause heChambers awrequiredhat ach ndustrialistoin ndpaymembershipuesto a singlechamberndbecauseCANACINTRAwasanofficiallyecognizedndus-trialhamber,orporatismuaranteedtsmembershipnda robustourceof evenue.n contrast,NIT's tatuss a fledglingssociation ademem-bershipoluntary,nd anyduespaid bymembers ere aid nadditionothedues already aidto CANACINTRA. ecause new chamber ouldtake housandsf mall irmsn the apital oodsandmetal ectorswayfromANACINTRA,he issidents'ffortoconvertNIT nto chamberthreatenedANACINTRA's bilityo retain ts substantialues-payingmembership.ANACINTRAhereforeppealed oSECOFItopreventhedissidentsromreatingseparatendustrialhamber.40Thedissidents'movementocreate separate hamberwas still-born ecauseCANABICA idnot eceive tate uthorization.fANITweretocompete ith ANACINTRA ormembers,twouldhaveto do so as avoluntaryndustrialssociation. roducers f smallcapitalgoods andmetal emainedegally bligatedo continueayingheir uesto the ffi-cialorganization.lthough ostANITmembersefusedopay heirmem-bership ues toCANACINTRA, otall potentialmembers ouldbe ex-pected oengagensuch ivil isobedience.41

Inaddition oharassinghedissidenteaders nd blocking utho-rizationfCANABICA, he hird ay nwhich he tatentervenednbe-halfof CANACINTRAwas byauthorizing change n the chamber'sstatuteshat leared p doubts boutthe egalstandingf a numberfhigh-rankingfficials. hen hedissidentsontested heFebruary986electionesults,heyhallengedotustMoreno's ictorynthepresiden-tial ontestut he egalityf he hamber's xecutiveoard swell.Theymaintainedhat he lection esults iolated hechamber'swn statutessettingtwo-yearimit nservice n theCANACINTRA xecutiveoard.40. A second reason whyCANACINTRA objectedto thedissidents'efforto gain officialstatuswas that hechamberdid not wanta constant ource ofcriticism nd attacks o be le-gitimated.ANIT caused CANACINTRA officialserious public-relationsroblems.The dis-sidentswere determined o embarrassthe chamberand its leadership publiclyand wereequipped to do so. The leaders ofANIT had been activeand risento prominent ositionswithinCANACINTRA. As presidents f ections nd councilsand members f theexecutiveboard, theyhad become familiarwith the nner workingsofthe chamber.Theircriticismscould be damagingifcoming from n officiallyecognized ndustrial hamberthatmightcompetewithCANACINTRA formembership nd government ttention. ut ANIT criti-

cisms would be much moremanageable so long as CANACINTRA's leadershipcould dis-miss them s theranting fa small associationformed ya groupofdissidentsdisgruntledby their rustrated id forpower.Concernedwith thedamage that hedissidents'criticismswere inflictingn CANACINTRA's image, the chamber's leaders also appealed to otherbusiness organizations o repudiateANIT. See LaJornada,8May 1987.41. The sanctions or hose who did not pay their nnualmembership ues includedfines,blocking fpermits,nd forfeituref the right o conductbusiness withthe publicsector.87


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LatinAmerican esearch eviewMoreno,woofhis vice-presidents,ndthe reasurerouldallegedly eexceedinghese imits nce reelected.42ore than year fterward,hechamber's eneral ssemblyonsideredmodifyinghe tatutes.he newstatutesroposed yMorenowouldclarifyhe mbiguityegardingermlimitsnd deflectuch riticismsn the uture. ccordingotheChambersLaw, ny nterpretationfCANACINTRA'statutes as tobe resolvedySECOFI, nd the evisedtatuteslso requiredECOFIapproval.The dissidentshosenot to remain assivebystandersn whatmight avebeen n ssuebetween ANACINTRAnd SECOFI.ANITwasengagedna battlewith ANACINTRA verwhowouldrepresentmallindustry.hedissidents ere osing he attle ftereingweakened yha-rassmentndtheirnabilityo form separatehamber.he controversyoverCANACINTRA'statutes astheir hance ounderminehe hamberin return. NIT calledfor ECOFI to reject ANACINTRA's roposedchanges.n a full-pageetter ublishedn a MexicoCitynewspaper,hedissidentsrgued hatMoreno's ttemptoreformhe tatutesecognizedthat NIT claimswere ccurate,hathe residentnd the xecutiveoardwere ndeed ervingnviolationf he hamber's tatutes.he etteron-cludedwith statementummarizinghedissidents'rganizationalriev-ances: We xpress urcompleteepudiationf he urrentleadership'fCANACINTRA eadedbyMoreno ada,whichnaddition o notrepre-sentinghenterestsf ndustrialists,asbecome n mportantbstacle orthe ormationf pecificrganizations.eemphasize nce gainour up-port f he mputationsfMexican ndustrialists,hoby aw, reobligedtobelong othis hamber."43Onceagain,with heChambers awmakingECOFIthe efereensuch a dispute,CANACINTRAofficialsppealedforhelp. Again,thegovernmentntervenedn behalf fthe hamber. he egalityfCANA-CINTRA's xecutiveoardwasupheld,nd the hamber's evisedtatuteswere pproved.44Finally,NIT alsosufferedrom he tate's ailure orecognizeheneworganizationsa business epresentativendprovidetwith ccess opolicy-makingorums.WhileCANACINTRAeaders elt hat heir eak-ness ndcontingentccess opolicymakingeft hemwith ittle oom ordissent, NIT was locked utaltogether.hedissidents ere ffectivelyconsignedo therole fpermanentritic,ssailing othCANACINTRA's

42. In theweek prior otheelection, omo's campaignhad formally equested hat ECOFIinvalidateMoreno Sada's slate of candidateson thesegrounds.See La Jornada,7 Feb. 1986.The dissidents lso argued that113of the 190 representativeso the chamber'sboard of di-rectorswerealso in violationof the chamber'sstatutes. ee El Sol deMexico, 24 Apr.1986.43. El Universal, 8 Apr.1987, apitalization n original.44. See Diario Oficial, 1 Jan. 988.

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SMALL BUSINESS POLITICAL ACTIVISM IN MEXICOcontinuingccommodationnd the entralizednd exclusionaryrocessof policymaking.45NIT's failureogainaccessto thestatepromptedmanyndustrialistsoremainwithin rreturnoCANACINTRA.Mem-bershipn CANACINTRA ontinuedoprovide t eastminimal ccess opolicymakersnd somemeans or esolvingroblemsffectingheirwnfirms. NITcouldoffer othingnthis egard. husdespite tsconsider-able organizationalffortsnd thepublic elationstormtcreated, NITnever earedts tated oal of3,000members.To summarize,ANACINTRA, nder iegefrom NIT, ppealedtothe tate or rganizationalrotection,nd the tate espondedyusingvariousnstrumentsohelp he hamber ard ff he issidents'hallenge.ANITfaced tumblinglocks s its eadersbecameburdenedwith co-nomic roublesttheirirmsndthe reationf separatendustrialham-berwas blocked. t he ame ime, ANACINTRAeaderswere pheld ythereformedtatues,nd the hambermanaged o retaintsvirtualmo-nopoly n officialepresentationf mallndustryothe tate. NIT'sproj-ect o reate rival usinessrganizationodisplace ANACINTRA ailed.THE TRANSFORMATION OF DISSIDENCE:ANIT'S CAMPAIGN AGAINST CORPORATISM

Statenterventionid notdemobilize NIT,however.hewaythatthe leadersof the dissidentmovementwitnessed heir hallenge oCANACINTRA efeated erved o radicalizehem n the ssueofcorpo-ratism.t is importanto notethatANIT's initial hallengesoCANA-CINTRA onformedothe ules f hegame stablishedythe orporatistframework:hedissidents ttemptedo win eadership ositionswithintheorganization,hey ried ocreate n officialndustrialhamber,ndtheyppealed othe tate ouse the equirementsf heChambers aw toregulateCANACINTRAstatutes. ailure to displaceCANACINTRAwithinhe orporatistramework otivatedhe issidentsodedicateheirresourcesoa campaigno repeal heChambers aw and dismantleusi-nesscorporatism.hile heywere nitiallyanti-CANACINTRA,"osingthe onflictith he fficialhambermadethem anti-corporatist."

45. Good examples are ANIT's regular references o CANACINTRA's leadership as"pseudoleaders," as is the followingcommentby ANIT PresidentAdolfo Valles Septfen(1991-1993)op theNAFTA consultations: It is worrisome hat n the face of NAFTA, twogroupshave been formed nMexico: on one side the nstitutionalroup,represented ythetrade uthorities,nd fedwith nformation,tudies, nd monographs ftheCOECE; and [ontheother ide] the egislative, onsisting f the chambersofsenators nd deputies, togetherwithsmalland medium businesses,who have not beenproperlynotified boutthe propos-als because theyhave no direct nput ntothe processand the discussions."See Excelsior,6June 991.

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Latin mericanesearcheviewWagingWar nCorporatism

Defeated ythe orporatistramework,he eaders fANITaimedtoabolish t.By he ate1980s nd early 990s, NIThadbeen ransformedfrom fledglingusiness rganizationeekingxternalupportn repre-sentingmall ndustrialistso the eader f n anti-corporatistovementcommittedorepealingheChambers aw.ANIT used themedia owagewaron the orporatistramework.olding egular ress onferences,hedissidents onsistentlyriticized he unrepresentativeature f state-business nteraction.46NIT eadersmade nsistentttacks n the fficialorganizations,specially ANACINTRA, nd they alled repeatedlyorreformf heChambersaw.Their allyingrywas that ompulsory em-bership iolatedheMexican onstitutionndtheUniversal eclarationfHumanRights, hichMexicohad signed.ANIT eaders lso organizedseries fpublic orumso nalyze heChambersaw anddevelop revisedlaw tobe submittedotheMexican ongress.ANIT eaders sedthemedia uccessfullyndbegan o directig-nificantublic crutinyf compulsory embershipnd business orpo-ratism. significantreakthroughccurrednFebruary 989,whenthedissidents erefeaturednExpansi6n,he eadingbusinessmagazine nMexico. his xpose ikenedheirampaigno reformheChambers awto the trugglefDavid versusGoliath.47he article ttracted ore resscoveragewhen hedissidents' ndocumentedand exaggerated)ssertionthat early wentyhousand usiness wnerswererefusingopaymem-bership ueswasreportedy prominentusiness olumnistnLaJornadainMarch 989.ThusANIT leadersmanaged o keepthemselvesndtheChambersaw nthe ublic ye.AsearlysJuly989, umorsegan ocir-culate hat ECOFIofficials ouldconvoke a forum fpopular onsulta-tion" o considerhangesn the aw that ECOFI would presentoCon-gressnNovember.48Thedissidents' oncernwith heChambers aw was notentirelynew. rom he ime hey ounded NIT n 1986, hey ad beendemandingthat ompulsory embershipe abolished,49nd eachyear, NIT mem-

46. Rub6n BarriosGraff president rom 989to 1991) held weekly press conferences,ndValles Septien 1991-1993) attempted o do the ame, according o Puga (1992,42). Since 1993ANIT has held a regularpress conference he ast Thursdayof each month.47. "Microindustriales: e la disidenciaa la organizaci6n,"Expansi6n,5 Feb. 1989.48. La Jornada,9 July 989. The dissidents' mmense kill nusingthepressalso broughtthem imited ttention rom he cademic community. ee,for xample, heopening entenceof CristinaPuga's monograph on small business representationn Mexico: "The curiosityawakened by the political activity f a businessgroup-the Asociaci6n Nacional de Indus-trialesde la Transformaci6nANIT), which since 1989 has led a visible and well-directedmedia campaign n defenseof the country's mall ndustrialists-was the origin f thisproj-ect" (Puga 1992,11).49. See, for xample,El Universal, 4Aug. 1986.90


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SMALL BUSINESS POLITICAL ACTIVISM IN MEXICObers elebratedhe ssociation'snniversarys anotherear indefense ffree ssociation."ut hemultiprongedampaign oreformheChambersLaw marked significanthange nthedissidents'oals. n the mmediateaftermathfANIT's splitfrom ANACINTRA, epealingheChambersLaw was anattractiveeans funderminingANACINTRA. y he ate1980s, NIT'sexperienceith he tate ad caused themeans" obecome"the nd."The broadening fthe dissidents' ampaignfrom nti-CANA-CINTRA o nti-corporatistllowed hem o ap nto wider aseofdissent.Many nthebusiness ectorwho had nothingo do withCANACINTRAharboredheir wngrievancesgainst he ystemfbusinessnterestrga-nizationnd representation.any regional usiness ssociationsharedthis esentmentf he fficialhambersnd confederations.heChambersLaw argelygnored egionsnorganizinghe ndustrialectorlmost xclu-sively ytype fproductivectivityatherhan y ocation.hemembersofCONCAMINare ector-specificational rganizations.herendustryisorganizedccordingoregion,t sfor hemost artnvoluntarynoffi-cial ssociations.50hile hese ssociationsan oinCONCAMIN nd takeadvantagef he onfederation'services,heyrenot llowed o votebe-causeonly fficiallyecognizedhambers an be fullvotingmembersfconfederations.anyregional ssociations ecame oncernedboutthelack of representationtemming rom heir econd-classtatuswithinCONCAMIN.51 his ense funderrepresentationasexacerbatedytheeconomic islocationsf he1980s nd 1990s ndbythe xclusionaryat-terns f tate onsultationsith eakbusiness rganizationsn the ripar-tite conomicacts nd NAFTA.By he arly 990s, arious usiness rga-nizations epresentingmix fregions ndbranches f ndustryad cometo share common esentmentf thewaybusinessnterestsereorga-nized ndarticulatedn theMexican oliticalystem.

Smallbusiness issidents ound hemselvest thecoreof a broadanti-corporatistoalitionhatncluded multitudefvoluntaryusinessassociationsromhroughoutexico.Animportantctor nunitingndmobilizinghisheterogeneousnti-corporatistoalitionwas theConsejo50.Exceptions an be foundto both these generalrules.CANACINTRA, for xample, s amixed-activityndustrial hamber. imilar hambers xist nthe tatesofJalisco theCamaraRegionalde la Industriade Transformaci6n,rCAREINTRA) and Nuevo Le6n (Camara de

la Industriade Transformaci6n,r CAINTRA), as well as a few single-sectoregional ndus-trial hambers thefootwear ndustries f Guanajuatoand Jaliscohave their wn chambers).The basic pattern f organizationby activity ather han ocation contrastswiththat n thecommercial nd service ectors,where chambers restrictly egionalorganizations.51. Fora morecompletediscussion of how the activity-based attern f nterest epresen-tation n the ndustrial ector eft egional groupsunderrepresented,ee Hernandez (1991)and Luna and Tirado 1992).91


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Latin mericanesearcheviewCoordinadoreAsociacionesndustrialesCOCAI).52naddition oANIT,COCAI's membershiponsisted f a variety fvoluntaryssociations.COCAIthus ridged arious ources fdiscontentverhowprivate-sectorinterests ereorganized ndrepresented,nitinghem round hecam-paign oreformheChambers aw.53The anti-corporatistoalition ecame ncreasinglyctive n the1990s iapress onferences,orums,ewspapernnouncementsdesplega-dos), nd,critically,hedraftingfan initiativeoreformheChambersLaw,whichwassubmittedotheMexican ongress. hese ctivities adetheChambers aw,particularlyompulsorymembership,prominentissue nMexican olitics. any fficialrganizationseltompelledo un-dertaketudies oevaluate heChambers aw, o aunch ublic elationscampaigns o defendompulsory embership,ndto obby tate fficialstoforestall ajor evisionsf he aw.54The 1941 awwasreplaced nJanuary997by thenew Leyde Ca'-marasEmpresariales Sus Confederaciones.55ather handefusingheoppositionobusiness orporatism,owever,he 997 awonly eightenedthe onflict.lthoughhenew awcomplied ormallyith hewords f heSupreme ourt's uling yabolishingompulsoryhambermembership,itrequired articipationna national usiness egistryndawarded hechambersontrol ver hefunds eneratedytheregistry.anyregardthis pproach s a disguised fforto retaintate ontrolverbusiness r-ganizationsnd havemobilized orepeal he1997 aw aswell.Dissidentsprepared undreds f egal omplaintshat henationalegistrys uncon-

52.AlthoughCOCAI was founded n 1982, t was inactivefornearly decade and has re-ceivedeven less scholarly ttention hanANIT. Hernandez, for xample,noted thatCOCAIwas formednprotest fthebanknationalization utsaid virtually othing lse abouttheor-ganization 1991,461-62). Puga dismissedCOCAI in a footnote s "ghostlike" 1992, 37, n.37). These observers' ack ofattentionswarrantedgiven thedatesof their ublications.Ac-cording o a former resident, OCAI was merely social club formost ofthe 1980s inter-view withSergioRico,MexicoCity, Dec. 1993). found ittle vidence oftheorganization'sactivityuntil 1992. In the February 1989 Expansion featureon private-sector issidence,COCAI was theoutlier, till auding the unity f theprivate ector.Thisonce-dormant rga-nization was awakened in theearly 1990s and unitedvarious business associations n thecampaignagainst the ChambersLaw.53.Nearly halfofCOCAI's membership onsistedofassociations from ndustrial egionsinMexicoCityand the stateofMexico, such as Azcapotzalco,Iztapalapa,Tlalneplantla, ndVallejo.54. See, forexample,CANACINTRA (1992), CONCAMIN (1992), and CONCANACO(1995).55. In 1992the Mexican SupremeCourtruled thatcompulsorymembershipn businesschambersviolatedArticle of theMexicanConstitution, hichguarantees very ndividualfreedom f ssociation. nMexico,the ameaspect of lawmustbe declaredunconstitutionalfive imes oestablish legal precedent.Although hefirst uling gainst theChambersLawcame inJuly 992, twas not untilAugust 1995 thatthefive-rulinghresholdwas reached.

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SMALL BUSINESS POLITICAL ACTIVISM IN MEXICOstitutional,ndthusbusiness orporatismemained prominentlyon-testedssue nMexican olitics.56Corporatism,ANACINTRA,ndAccommodationnthe 980s nd1990s

The controversyver orporatism,hich eganwith he tate'sn-terventionnto he onflict ithANIT, ncreased ANACINTRA's epen-denceon the tate nd reinforcedhe eaders' ccommodationisttrategy.In helping hechamber end ff he challenge rom NIT,SECOFI ex-tended numerous rganizational,inancial,nd legal concessions oCANACINTRA,making he hambervermore ependent nthis rgani-zational rotectionor ts urvival, evenues,nd the egalityf ts eader-ship.CANACINTRAwas thereforenable nd unwilling o presentnyeffectiveppositiono neoliberalism.fterts nitial rotestsgainstiber-alizationweredisregarded,ANACINTRA resentednlyweak opposi-tion o the adical eorientationf conomic olicyn the1980s nd 1990s.Thisresponsewas evidentn such nstancess the hamber's ecision oratifyegularlyhe conomic acts.Also,duringheNAFTA onsultations,even s the hamber'swn economic nalysts arned f he hreatsf x-tensiveiberalization,ANACINTRA evermobilized ny oppositionothe ree-tradegreement.This xplanationf he mall usinessector'sesponseoneoliberal-ism ddsanimportantrganizationalwistoargumentshat mall ndus-trialistsid not ppose radeiberalizationecause heywelcomedt spartof largernti-inflationarytrategyPastorndWise 994).While ack f n-formation ayhave affectedmanysmall businessowners'ability oseparate he ffectsftrade iberalizationromtabilization,he eaders fCANACINTRA adenoughnformationndwere ware f he hreatshatliberalizationresentedo mallndustry.ather,he hamber's ependenceonstate oncessionsiscouragedts eaders rom obilizingpposition.hechamber'srecariousrganizationalosition ushed hemowardccom-modation. he tate eliveredrganizationalrotectiono CANACINTRAEven then, he1941 aw was not automatically epealed.The outcome merelymeant hat n-dividual plaintiffs ere able to obtain njunctionswithoutgoing throughong courtbattles.See "La rebeli6nde los empresarios," xpansi6n, 0 Sept. 1992; and SIID (1996).The plaintiffin thefirst upremeCourt rulingwas not affiliated ithANIT. But thedissidentswere quickto integrate his udicial strategy or ombating orporatismntotheir wn campaign,whichhad consisted mainly of holding press conferences, haping public opinion,and havingmeetingswith egislators. heybecameactively nvolved nmany of thecases thatfollowedthe 1992 ruling.COCAI even offeredegal services o businessesthatwere sanctionedby thegovernment orviolating he ChambersLaw by not payingtheirmembership ues.56. See, for example, "Rechazan dos millones de pequefios empresarios u afiliaci6n lSIEM," Excelsior, Oct. 1997.

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LatinAmerican esearch eviewmainlyhroughhe orporatistramework,ndtheprotractedebate verthe hambersawraised he ossibilityhathis ramework,speciallyom-pulsorymembership,ouldberemoved. he mminenthreatf revisedChambers aw hungovertheheadsofCANACINTRAeaders ikethesword fDamocles.57SHIFTING ARENAS OF POLITICAL ACTIVISM: FROM BUSINESS POLITICS TOELECTORAL POLITICS

Thedissidents'ampaigngainst orporatismllowed hemotakeadvantagefthe lectoralemocratizationhatMexicowas experiencinginthe 980s nd 1990s. tate-dominatedorporatisthannels adserved stheprincipalorms f nterestrticulationn thepast.Now,democratiza-tionpresentedewand potentially ore ffectivelternatives,speciallyaspoliticalartiesoughtobroaden heir onstituenciesy ultivatinghesupportf ocial ctorswith istoricallyowprofilesn electoralolitics.CANACINTRA nd thedissidents espondedo theopportunitiesofdemocratizationn distinct ays.CANACINTRA's ncreased epen-dence n the tate iscouragedhe rganizationromakingdvantagefthe pportunitiesresentedydemocratization.nstead,he fficialham-ber ame o seetherulingRI as itsprotector,ndthus hebondbetweenCANACINTRAeaders ndthePRItightened.58For hedissidents,he ampaigngainstheChambersawopenedavenues or uildinglliances utside hebusiness ommunity,ltimatelypositioningNIT eaders otake dvantage f he pportunitiesresentedby democratization.hebroadeningfANIT'sstruggle,rom targetedchallengeo CANACINTRA o a more eneral laim gainstnunconsti-tutionalaw that istortsnterestepresentationnddeprives itizens ftheir ightsffree ssociation,reated pportunitiesor hedissidentsoexpand he ppealof heirmovement.hat s, heirtruggle as no onger

57.NumerousCANACINTRA officials sed thisphrase nmy nterviews.Whilethecham-ber's external responsewas to defendcompulsorymembership,nternally he chamberbegan to implement eforms opreparefor hepossible loss ofthis ubsidy.These reformssoughttodiversify he chamber'ssources ofrevenueand reduce tsdependenceon dues.58. Story1986)providedevidencethat ndividualCANACINTRA leadersdid nothave in-ordinately lose relationswith thePRI from he 1940s through he 1970s.Buta new patternhad emergedby the late 1980s and early 1990s. For example, JuanMoreno, presidentofCANACINTRA (1986-1988),became a PRI representativen the Camara de Diputados(1988-1991) and then an official n the Secretariade Pesca. PresidentVicenteGuti6rrez(1992-1994)was appointedby PresidentZedillo as a Mexico City boroughpresident dele-gado).BetweenMoreno and Gutierrez, residentJorgeKawaghi (1988-1990) participatednthe PRI's 1994 campaign,and JuanSinchez de la Vara (president1990-1992)evenpledgedPRI President uis Donaldo Colosio the supportofeighty housandsmall ndustrialiststherough ize ofCANACINTRA's membership) n theeve of theAugust1991elections.

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SMALL BUSINESS POLITICAL ACTIVISM IN MEXICOlimitedo the epresentationf mall ndustrialistsutnow addressed hemoregeneral ssueofthe abilityo formssociations ree fstate on-straints.hiscrusade gainst orporatismesonated ith ther ocial c-tors' truggleso democratize exico nd could be integratedntothelarger ffort.Small ndustrynd PAN

Onemight xpect hat hedissidents' rievances ould have res-onatedmostwith hePartido ccionNacional PAN), traditionallynti-corporatistolitical orce. et PAN's onlyformal upport or he anti-corporatistoalitionamen1991,when deputyubmittedn nitiativenCongressorepeal heChambersaw.Presentedtthe ndof he 988-1991legislativeession,his nitiative asnever onsideredy he ull ongress.Nor did PANrepresentativesn the1991-1994nd 1994-1997egislaturesproposenew initiatives.n fact, PAN deputywas presidentf theComision e Comercio hen heCamara eDiputados eceived he xecu-tive ranch's roposal or revised hambers awin1996,nd PANsup-portedhenew aw.PAN's unwillingnesso support hedissidents' ampaign gainstthe Chambers aw is bestunderstood s an instance fstrategic arty-building onsiderationsvershadowingdeological rinciples.incetheearly 980s,ctive articipationybusinesseaders, articularlyromhenorth fMexico, adgivenPAN increased isibility,inancialesources,and fresheadershipnd hadcontributedoprofessionalizingheparty.59Many fthesenewPanistas rom he ommercialndservice ectors ar-ticipatedctivelyn ocal hambersf ommercendtheConfederacioneCamarasNacionalesde ComercioCONCANACO).Thisconfederation,which ollected ues from undreds fofficialhamberscross he oun-try, asoneof hebusiness rganizationsost hreatenedya changenthe aw.CONCANACOwas thereforeleadingdefenderfcompulsorymembershiphroughouthedebate parked ythe nti-corporatistsnthe1990s.Reluctanto alienate his mportantonstituency,ANproceededcautiouslyn thequestion f theChambers aw.60 n onehand,partyleaders onsistentlyadepublic eclarationsgainsthe aw, ndPANof-ficials riticizedhegovernmentsfPresidents arlos alinas 1988-1994)and Ernesto edillo 1994-2000)or heirongdelays nsubmittingew

59. For analyses of the relationship etween business and PAN, see Arriola 1994) andMizrahi 1994).60. Based on interviewswithPAN officials, ept.-Oct. 1993andJune1997, lso on an in-terviewwithCONCANACO's president fbusiness development, Feb. 1994.The fact hatthe dissidents also opposed theneoliberaleconomic model, whichPAN has strongly up-ported,made it easierforPAN to disregard hem.

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LatinAmerican esearch eviewlegislationndtheir onstanthreatso bypassCongress. utwhenpushcame o shove nthe egislature,AN supportedhenew aw proposed yPresidentedillo n 1996.ANIT then riticizedAN for laimingo be an"anti-corporatist,"democratic,"nd "pro-business"arty hile upport-ing egislationhat ne currentf thebusiness ommunitypposed asbeing orporatistnd anti-democratic.61nthedebates ntheCamaradeDiputados n ate1996, riticsf henew awrepeatedlyssailed AN's n-consistentosition.62Small ndustrynd the RD

Throughouthe onflictverbusiness orporatism,hedissidents'most eliabledvocate n thepolitical renawas thePRD.The party riti-cizedcompulsory embershipnd assailed he tate's xcessive apacityto ntervenenthe hambers'nternalffairs.choinghe issidents'riev-ances, he RD inked he ack f epresentationithinhe fficialusinessorganizationso the hambers' ependencen the tate. s early s 1993,PRDdeputies resentedproposed eformf heChambers aw, rguingthat he corporatistnd anti-democraticaw"produced nrepresentativeorganizationsnddeprivedMexicansn thebusiness ector ftheir ree-domto associate.63ThePRD's oppositiono orporatismhould lsobe considerednthecontextf heparty's istory.ince tsfoundingn1989,hePRD has facedconsiderablebstaclesoobtainingupportromopular-sectoronstituen-cies, uch s workersndpeasants. hesedifficultiesere ttributableocorporatist-engenderedinkagesetween hegoverningRI and Mexico'slargestabor nd peasant rganizations,heConfederacione Trabajadoresde MexicoCTM)and theConfederacionacional eCampesinosCNC).64PRD eadersame oregardhe liminationf orporatisms a means fdis-solvinghe ink etweenopular ectorsnd the RI.65WhereasmperativesrisingromAN'sparty-buildingtrategyon-tradictedts nti-corporatistrinciples,artyuildingndanti-corporatism

61. Among themany examples, ee Excelsior, 7 Sept. 1996.62. In particular,ee the testimonyf Diputado Mauro Gonzflez Luna Mendoza, Diariodelos Debates, Dec. 1996.63. The quotation s from hepreamble to the PRD's 1993 nitiative, resented n theCfi-mara de Diputados.64. Difficulties stablishing llianceswith popular-sector rganizationshave historicallybeen a problemforpartiesof theMexican Left: orporatism elped the PRI capture "their"constituencies.65. The PRD's positionon corporatisms reflectedn a June 996 nternal ocument PRD1996), n which party eaders sought to reconcile artypositionson collective epresentationinthebusinessand labor sectorswiththe SupremeCourt rulings.

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SMALL BUSINESS POLITICAL ACTIVISM IN MEXICOwerecomplementaryor hePRD. Party eaders were anti-corporatistndso were some ofthePRD's keyconstituencies. he class-basedpopular-sector inkagesthat hePRD managed to establishwere attained hroughalliances withdissidentlabor and peasant organizations. n the urbanlabormovement, or xample,thePRD founda reliable ourceof supportin the FrenteAutenticode Trabajo (FAT), an advocate of independentunionismsincethe 1960s. n the rural sector, he PRD obtainedsupportfrom the Union Nacional de Organizaciones Regionales Campesinas(UNORCA).66These autonomousorganizations, hich ntedated hePRD,brought heir wn histories f struggle gainstcorporatismntotheparty.LikeANIT, theyhad emerged n oppositionto theofficial rganizationscharged with representing heir interests n the Mexican corporatistregime.Supportfor he mallbusinessdissidents' nti-corporatistampaignwould helpthePRD broaden tscoalition. ince the ate 1980s, hePRD hasattempted o amass an array fgrievances gainstthePRI and theauthor-itarianpoliticalsystem.By incorporatingherepresentationf small in-dustry nd oppositionto business corporatismnto tscampaignagainstthePRI-by offeringtogrant hem heir reedom"67-PRDofficialseizedan opportunityobroaden theparty'sbase ofsupportto include a poten-tially ympatheticaction fbusiness.This factionwas regardedbymanyin thePRD as yetanother victimofneoliberalism."Thus thePRD inte-gratedthe private-sectorissidents'anti-corporatistampaignwith theirown criticismsf PRI authoritarianism. passage from he 1993proposalto reformheChambersLaw illustrateshisPRD attempto ntegrateriti-cisms of corporatismnd theneoliberal conomicmodel:Recently,heAsociacionNacionalde Industrialese la TransformacionANIT]andother utonomoususinessrganizationsave riticizedbligatoryffiliationwith usiness hambers.eginning ith henegotiationsorMexico's ntryntotheGATT,nd ater, ithin he urrentrameworkf henegotiationsfNAFTA,there avebeen groups f entrepreneurs,articularly edium nd small, hathave xpressedriticismsith especto the ermsfour ountry'sncorporationinto hese greements.urthermore,here ave beendeclarationsfdistincte-gional nd sectoralrganizations,omeof hemxpressednforumsfconsulta-tionnthe enate, herewhatwasbeing resentedy hese utonomoususinessorganizationsasdifferentnd contradictoryo he avorableositionsopoliciesof ndiscriminateradeiberalizationnd structuraldjustmenthathe eakbusi-nessorganizationsavedefended.68

66. For discussionofFAT, ee Cook (1995). Fordiscussionof UNORCA, see Foley (1995)and Fox (1994).67. PRD DeputyJorge alder6n,cited n El Economista,Feb. 1993.68. PRD proposalfor eformf theChambersLaw,presented o theCfimara e Diputados,17 Feb. 1993.

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LatinAmerican esearch eviewEconomic risis, mallBusiness, nd the RD

Thedeepeconomicrisishat ollowedhepesodevaluationn De-cember994 reated reaterpportunitiesor ollaborationetween issi-dent mall irmsndthePRD.Thecrisispurredmall usinessmobiliza-tion n opposition o neoliberalism,nd widespread ocialdiscontentcreated ewopportunitiesor hePRD tobroadents lectoraloalition.Economicrisisn 1995 roughtolicynalysis ack othe orefrontofANIT'sagenda ndpromptedhedissidentso oinforces ith romi-nent ocialmovementspposing heneoliberalconomicmodel ndde-manding cceleratedolitical eforms.69or xample,n 1995ANITbeganto collaboratentensivelyithnongovernmentalrganizationsuchasAlianzaCfvica ndtheRedMexicana e Accion rentel LibreComercio(RMALC) nproposingnalternativeconomicmodel.ANIT served sco-organizerftheReferendume la Libertad,n which heproposed co-nomic lanwas disseminatedna public ignature-gatheringampaignnSeptembernd October 995.70The followingear, NIThelped oordi-nate national ornadae Condena fthegovernment'sconomic olicyon 8September996.More han iftyopular rganizationsetuptablesnpublic laces hroughouthe ountryor itizenso visit ndregisterheireconomic rievances.71he collaborationontinued hrough997,whenANIT and six popular-sectorrganizationsopublished book RMALC1997). hisbookfeaturedriticalvaluations fNAFTA ndtheneoliberaleconomicmodel, iagnosedhepost-1994conomicrisis ndthegovern-ment's esponses,ndproposed setof lternativeconomic olicies.ANIT alsobegan ocollaborate ith lBarzon, debtors' rganiza-tion reatedn 1993bysmallfarmerso protestural redit olicies. lBarzon xperiencedramaticrban rowthn 1995, s highnterestatesanda contractingconomyaddled housands fmiddle-classamiliesndsmall usinesses ith nserviceableebt bligations.72nJuly995, NIT

69. The dissidentsembarkedon an intenseoutreachprogram to make friendswithhalfthe world" and establish inkswithvarious sources ofopposition nMexicanpolitics. nter-view withANIT PresidentAdan Rivera 1997-1999),MexicoCity, 3June 997.70. Formorediscussion ofthereferendumnd ANIT's role, ee Arroyo nd Monroy 1996).See also Enrique Calder6n,"Un refer6ndumara el cambio,"La Jornada,4 June1995;andJulioBoltvinik,Hacia un modelo econ6micoalterno," a Jornada,0 June 995.Some of thedissidentshad participatedn RMALC activities rior o 1995,but theydid so as individuals.After he crisis, learer inkageswereestablishedbetween RMALC and organizations uchas ANIT and the Forode Cambio Empresarial from uebla).71. See El Universal, Sept. 1996.ANIT's press releaseto accompanytheJornadade Con-dena stated, Onlycollective ocietalactionwill be able to force hechangesthat re so nec-essaryand will be able to get the governmento modify hecurrent conomicmodel,whichis the cause of thedifficultrisis ..."72. For backgroundon theorigins nd growth fEl Barz6n and its transformationromlocalizedmovement ocusing n rural redit olicies toa broader clearinghouse" ormiddle-class grievances gainstneoliberalism,ee Williams 1996).98


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SMALL BUSINESS POLITICAL ACTIVISM IN MEXICOand four ther mallbusiness associations oinedEl Barzonindeclaringsuspensionofpayments o banks.73 ater thatyear, he dissidents nd ElBarzon repudiatedthe state's programfordebtors.ANIT President edroSalcedo described heZedillo administration'srogramadeApoyo a Deu-dores de la Banca as "a financial rick" hatwould serve only to "improvetheeconomic ituation fthebanks through he ocialization ftheir ossesand the disappearanceof ndebtedfirms."74Inthecontext feconomic risis nd increased mall business mobi-lization gainstneoliberalism, he continuing onflict ver business corpo-ratismpresented he PRD witha valuable instrumentorbroadening tselectoral oalitionby attracting segment f smallbusiness.The PRD in-tensifiedts ctivities nbehalf f hedissidents' hallenge o theChambersLaw. Throughout he ummer nd fallof1996,with dvance copies ofPres-identZedillo's revision fthe aw circulating hroughouthebusinesscom-munity, RD officials articipatedntheforums hroughout hecountry r-ganized by the anti-corporatists, arshly criticizing he government'sproposed national registry.75ne day before hepresident fficiallyub-mitted is nitiativenNovember, hePRD sponsored nother roposedre-form,writtenn collaborationwith nti-corporatistmall ndustrialists,utthisproposal was notconsidered ythefull ongress.n theDecember1996congressionalhearingson thepresident'sproposal,PRD deputiesvoicedimpassioned criticisms f the new legislation, sserting hatthenew lawcircumventedheconstitutionnd buttressedheundemocraticorporatistsystem fbusiness nterestrganization.76By late 1996and early 1997,then,neoliberalism, orporatism, ndeconomiccrisishad brought ogether segment fsmall business and thePRD. Withnationalmidterm lections cheduled forJuly 997,ANIT pro-posed explicit lectoral ollaboration, equesting hat tspresident, edroSalcedo,runas a PRD candidate.ANIT leadersdeclared,It s left o thePRD todefend he nterestsf ociety,nd ourgoal s tocontributeto your fforts....Weneedyourhelpto attract icro, mall, nd medium usi-nessmen othe RD, oconvincehemf he ffinityf deas ndprinciplesmongus.... ThePRDhas called n all socialforcesnthe ountryowork oreestablishthe overeigntyf urnationalnstitutionsndefensef urgenuinenterests. earerespondingothese alls, nd wewish ocollaborateromnside he artyndbringhe upportf hemanymembersfour ector.77

73. La Jornada,4 July 995.74. a Jornada, Sept. 1995.75. ForthePRD's positionon theproposedlaw,seePropuestathePRD newspaper),17Oct.1996.The president's nitiativewas officiallyubmitted oCongresson 13 Nov. 1996.76. Diariode osDebates, Dec. 1996. Notwithstanding he PRD's opposition, he nitiativewas converted nto aw, published in the Diario Oficial f 20 Dec. 1996, nd went nto effecton 1Jan.1997.77. Letter romANIT to PRD, 12 Dec. 1996. n July 997, alcedo was electedto theCamarade Diputados as PRD representative rom istrict 1ofMexico City Federal District).He de-99


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LatinAmerican esearch eviewCONCLUSION

This rticle as contrastedhe trategieseveloped y twoorgani-zations epresentingexican mallmanufacturersor espondingo thesweepingconomicndpoliticalhanges f he1980s nd1990s.t has fo-cusedon public xpressionsf upportroppositionopolicy,rientationvis-a-visorporatisttate nstitutions,nd extra-organizationaloliticall-liances.The accommodationisttrategyntailed ublicacquiescence oradical hanges n economic olicy, eploymentf ignificantesourcesopreservehe orporatistramework,nd support or he ncumbentRI. ncontrast,hedissidenttrategyntailed ersistentublic riticismfneo-liberalism,pearheadingnational ampaign gainst usinessorporatismandultimatelyormingllianceswith heCenter-LeftRD.Theaccomo-dationisttrategytrengthenedhegovernmenty mitigatingrganizedoppositiono economic eformhroughout ost f the1980s nd 1990s.More ecently,hedissidenttrategyeepened emocratizationn Mexicoby helping Center-Leftpposition arty roadentselectoral oalition.Thesedistincttrategiesavebeenexplainedn terms f hematerialndorganizationalasesof mall usiness oliticalctivism.Theanalysis f mall usiness oliticsn Mexico llustratesow n-stitutionalegacies an affectolitical conomy uring eriods fregimechange. lthougheoliberalismnda newrelationshipetweenhe tateandbigbusiness osedconsiderablehallengesor mallmanufacturersnthe1980s nd1990s, creepingrocess fdemocratizationfferedppor-tunitiesor ew venues f nterestrticulation.he mergencef lectoralavenues ornterestrticulation,owever,oes notnecessarilymply heobsolescence fcorporatisthannels. ifferentnstitutionalrrangementscandominatendifferentealms f tate-societalelationsSchmitter992).Thedurabilityf orporatistnstitutions,ven na time fdemocratization,canmake tdifficultorweak ctors o hed ld patternsf tate-societaln-teraction,otwithstandingchanged rray fmaterialndpoliticalncen-tives. In Mexico the perseverance f corporatisthannelsprovidedCANACINTRAeaderswith trongncentiveso ntensifyatherhan e-visethe ccommodationisttrategy.his trategyadsustainedhe rga-nization or ecadesand,the eadershipmaintained,roughtignificantbenefitso small ndustrialists.venthoughhedissidents valuated heaccommodationisttrategy uchmore riticallynd advocated strongerdefense f mall ndustrialists'nterests,hey idso withinhe ame orpo-ratistrameworkhat ANACINTRA asoperatingn.Thus he issidents'originalhallenge as not ocorporatismer ebut othe eaders' trategyfeated he PAN and PRI candidates by receiving ome 36 percent fthe votes.By maintain-ing thedissidents'ongoing nti-corporatistampaign n his new capacity s deputy, alcedoquickly earned a reputation s "el Diputado del SIEM," in reference o thenameof the na-tionalregistryncluded n the 1997 Chambers Law.100


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SMALL BUSINESS POLITICAL ACTIVISM IN MEXICOandresponseso the onstraintsmposed y corporatism.fter ailingnthis ampaign,hedissidentsaterwagedwaron the ame nstitutions.

Thisconflictver nstitutionsxacerbatedhedifferencesetweenthe twostrategies.he conflictver corporatismroveCANACINTRAcloser o the tate nd efthe hambern no positiono take dvantagefthe ignificantlternativeshat egan oemergenthe ate1980s nd early1990s.n contrast,hedissidentsound hemselves ell positionedoes-tablishllianceswith emocratizingpposition ovementsnMexico. healliances ormed etweenmall usiness roupsnd popular-sectorove-mentsfterhe 994 conomic risis re hus est nderstoodnthe ontextofthese arger oliticalnd nstitutionalonflicts.conomicrisis urtheraggravatedheperilous onditions fboth heMexican opular ectorsand smallbusiness, utamong he atter ector,nly hedissidents erepreparedoformuch lliances.From broaderperspective,nstrumentalollaborationetweensmallbusiness nd popularmovementss notunprecedented.n LatinAmerica,uch defensivelliances" aveemerged egularlynperiods feconomic ontraction,nly owitherwayas more ypicalonflictsverwages,benefits,nd unionizationccompanyesumed conomicxpan-sion.78 uchtensions re ikelyoreemergen Mexico oo.Butby placingthe lliance etweenmall usiness issidentsnd thePRD in the ontextofa longer rajectoryfpoliticalctivism,his rticle ashighlightedhepolitical imensionsfthe lliance. hebasisofoppositionoliticssnotlimitedoeconomic olicy ut ncludes minentlyoliticalssues uch srightsffree ssociationnd imitinghe tate's apacityo structureat-terns f nterestrganization.

78. For excellent llustrationsf such alliance patterns nArgentina,ee O'Donnell (1978)and Smith 1991). Smithwroteof the "transitory actsofconvenience" hatformed egularlyin Argentinabetween organized labor and domestic-orientedndustry n the 1950s and1960s. He emphasized,"once expansion was underway again,conflicts etween abor andcapitaleroded the alliance's cohesion" Smith1991,38).101


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Neoliberalism, Corporatism and Small Business Political Activism in Contemporary Mexico

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