DISCLOSURE APPENDIX CONTAINS ANALYST CERTIFICATIONS AND THE STATUS OF NON US ANALYSTS. US Disclosure: Credit Suisse does and seeks to do business with companies covered in its research reports. As a result, investors should be aware that the Firm may have a conflict of interest that could affect the objectivity of this report. Investors should consider this report as only a single factor in making their investment decision.
CREDIT SUISSE SECURITIES RESEARCH & ANALYTICS BEYOND INFORMATION®
Client-Driven Solutions, Insights, and Access
07 March 2013
Europe/Switzerland
Equity Research
Food Producers (Food Producers & Processors (Europe))
Nestle (NESN.VX) COMMENT
Keeping its powder dry
We raise our TP to CHF76 and rating to Outperform, while marginally
adjusting our 2013E–15E earnings on better margin progression.
■ Nestlé has been consistent—whether looking at 3, 5, 10, or 15 years, it has
average organic EBITA growth of 8.75% pa. In this report we look at how
this can be broadly maintained while adding a greater focus on returns.
■ Nestlé can be viewed as two distinct parts. A high growth, high margin, high
return ‘legacy’ powders business (brands: Nescafe, Milo, NAN), 45% of 2012
sales, and a non-powders business (frozen food, water, ice cream), for
which the reverse is the case.
■ The powders business has seen heavy investment in developing market
capacity, start-up innovations (launch of Dolce Gusto) and escalation in
commodity prices diluting margins and returns progression. We see these
factors easing in the coming 12–24 months.
■ The rest of the group has seen significant invested capital sunk over the last
12 years, yet growth, margins and returns are below the group average. We
calculate 20-25% of Nestlé’s invested capital does not cover the group
WACC, all in this part of the business. But increasingly the group is focusing
on cash flow and returns (as is remuneration). There are several businesses
here that we expect to be scrutinised.
■ The stock trades at parity with staples peers on a PER basis, but at a
discount on our return screens. The increased focus on returns, and their
improvement, can, in our opinion, re-rate the stock relative to its peers.
Combining a re-rating with mid-quartile TSR +11% pa to staples peers,
should deliver outperformance. We raise our APV-derived target price to
CHF76 and rating to Outperform.
Share price performance
47
52
57
62
Mar-11 Jul-11 Nov-11 Mar-12 Jul-12 Nov-12
Price Price relative
The price relative chart measures performance against the SMI
PRICE which closed at 7740.3 on 05/03/13
On 05/03/13 the spot exchange rate was SFr1.23/Eu 1. -
Eu .77/US$1
Performance Over 1M 3M 12M Absolute (%) 5.4 9.3 20.4 Relative (%) 0.3 -2.7 -7.6
Financial and valuation metrics
Year 12/12A 12/13E 12/14E 12/15E Revenue (SFr m) 92,186 98,529 104,601 111,100 EBITDA (SFr m) 17,162 18,173 19,551 21,042 Adjusted Net Income (SFr m) 10,493.5 11,112.1 12,115.5 13,214.2 CS adj. EPS (SFr) 3.29 3.46 3.74 4.05 Prev. EPS (SFr) — 3.42 3.70 4.01 ROIC (%) 12.90 13.48 14.42 15.42 P/E (adj., x) 20.3 19.3 17.8 16.5 P/E rel. (%) 130 134 138 142 EV/EBITDA 12.9 11.9 10.9 10.0
Dividend (2012E, SFr) 2.17 IC (12/13E, SFr m) 80,356.44 Dividend yield (%) 3.3 EV/IC 2.7 Net debt (12/13E, SFr m) 14,205.6 Net debt/equity (12/13E, %) 21.5 Free float (%) 100.0 BV/share (12/13E, SFr) 20.1 Number of shares (m) 3,224.80
Source: FTI, Company data, Thomson Reuters, Credit Suisse Securities (EUROPE) LTD. Estimates.
Rating (from Neutral) OUTPERFORM* Price (05 Mar 13, SFr) 66.60 Target price (SFr) (from 62.00) 76.00¹ Market cap. (SFr m) 214,771.68 Enterprise value (SFr m) 216,866.7
*Stock ratings are relative to the coverage universe in each
analyst's or each team's respective sector.
¹Target price is for 12 months.
Research Analysts
Nicolas Sochovsky
44 20 7883 8075
Charlie Mills
44 20 7888 0325
Alex Molloy
41 44 333 05 83
Sanjeet Aujla
44 20 7888 0353
Jimmie Bork
44 20 7883 9941
07 March 2013
Nestle (NESN.VX) 2
Nestle NESN.VX Price (05 Mar 13): SFr66.60, Rating: (from Neutral) OUTPERFORM, Target Price: SFr(from 62.00) 76.00
Income statement (SFr m) 12/12A 12/13E 12/14E 12/15E
Sales revenue 92,186 98,529 104,601 111,100 EBITDA 17,162 18,173 19,551 21,042 Depr. & amort. (3,150) (3,337) (3,515) (3,706) EBIT (CS) 14,012 14,836 16,036 17,336 Net interest exp. (481) (682) (576) (420) Associates — — — — Other adj, — — — — PBT (CS) 13,531 14,154 15,460 16,916 Income taxes (3,451) (3,822) (4,174) (4,567) Profit after tax 10,080 10,333 11,285 12,349 Minorities (449) (471) (519) (570) Preferred dividends — — — — Associates & other 863 1,251 1,349 1,436 Net profit (CS) 10,494 11,112 12,115 13,214 Other NPAT adjustments 117 — — — Reported net income 10,611 11,112 12,115 13,214
Cash flow (SFr) 12/12A 12/13E 12/14E 12/15E
EBIT 14,012 14,836 16,036 17,336 Net interest (454) (482) (376) (220) Cash taxes paid (3,201) (3,822) (4,174) (4,567) Change in working capital 1,988 (170) (100) (110) Other cash & non-cash items 3,427 3,337 3,515 3,706 Cash flow from operations 15,772 13,699 14,901 16,145 CAPEX (5,135) (4,328) (4,608) (4,909) Free cash flow to the firm 10,637 9,371 10,292 11,236 Acquisitions (10,918) — — — Divestments 274 1,237 130 130 Other investment/(outflows) 2,302 — — — Cash flow from investments (14,053) (3,689) (5,100) (5,425) Net share issue/(repurchase) 667 — — — Dividends paid (6,439) (6,532) (6,958) (7,435) Issuance (retirement) of debt — — — — Other 446 468 492 516 Cash flow from financing activities
(5,326) (6,064) (6,466) (6,919) Effect of exchange rates (226) — — — Changes in Net Cash/Debt (3,833) 3,946 3,334 3,801 . Net debt at start 14,319 18,152 14,206 10,871 Change in net debt 3,833 (3,946) (3,334) (3,801) Net debt at end 18,152 14,206 10,871 7,071
Balance sheet (SFr m) 12/12A 12/13E 12/14E 12/15E
Assets Cash and cash equivalents 9,425 13,371 16,706 20,506 Accounts receivable 14,432 15,425 16,376 17,393 Inventory 9,125 9,753 10,354 10,997 Other current assets 2,223 1,488 1,544 1,603 Total current assets 35,205 40,037 44,979 50,500 Total fixed assets 26,903 28,932 31,086 33,374 Intangible assets and goodwill 46,258 46,162 46,066 45,970 Investment securities — — — — Other assets 17,863 18,063 18,254 18,459 Total assets 126,229 133,194 140,385 148,302 Liabilities Accounts payable 14,455 15,450 16,402 17,421 Short-term debt 18,568 18,568 18,568 18,568 Other short term liabilities 5,288 5,652 6,000 6,373 Total current liabilities 38,311 39,669 40,970 42,362 Long-term debt 9,009 9,009 9,009 9,009 Other liabilities 16,305 18,365 20,101 21,946 Total liabilities 63,625 67,043 70,080 73,317 Shareholders' equity 60,947 64,494 68,648 73,328 Minority interest 1,657 1,657 1,657 1,657 Total equity & liabilities 126,229 133,194 140,385 148,302 Net debt (SFr m) 18,152 14,206 10,871 7,071
Per share data 12/12A 12/13E 12/14E 12/15E
No. of shares (wtd avg) 3,192 3,214 3,240 3,266 CS adj. EPS (SFr) 3.29 3.46 3.74 4.05 Prev. EPS (SFr) — 3.42 3.70 4.01 Dividend (SFr) 2.05 2.17 2.30 2.44 Dividend payout ratio 62.37 62.85 61.60 60.35 Free cash flow per share (SFr)
3.33 2.92 3.18 3.44
Key ratios and valuation
12/12A 12/13E 12/14E 12/15E
Growth(%) Sales 10.2 6.9 6.2 6.2 EBIT 11.8 5.9 8.1 8.1 Net profit 11.3 5.9 9.0 9.1 EPS 11.7 5.2 8.2 8.2 Margins (%) EBITDA margin 18.6 18.4 18.7 18.9 EBIT margin 15.2 15.1 15.3 15.6 Pretax margin 14.7 14.4 14.8 15.2 Net margin 11.4 11.3 11.6 11.9 Valuation metrics (x) EV/sales 2.4 2.2 2.0 1.9 EV/EBITDA 12.9 11.9 10.9 10.0 EV/EBIT 15.8 14.6 13.3 12.1 P/E 20.3 19.3 17.8 16.5 P/B 3.5 3.3 3.1 3.0 Asset turnover 0.73 0.74 0.75 0.75 ROE analysis (%) ROE stated-return on equity
18.0 17.7 18.2 18.6 ROIC 12.9 13.5 14.4 15.4 Interest burden 0.97 0.95 0.96 0.98 Tax rate 25.7 27.0 27.0 27.0 Financial leverage 0.45 0.43 0.40 0.38 Credit ratios (%) Net debt/equity 29.0 21.5 15.5 9.4 Net debt/EBITDA 1.1 0.8 0.6 0.3 Interest coverage ratio 29.1 21.8 27.8 41.3
Source: FTI, Company data, Thomson Reuters, Credit Suisse Securities
(EUROPE) LTD. Estimates.
47
52
57
62
Mar-11 Jul-11 Nov-11 Mar-12 Jul-12 Nov-12
Price Price relative
The price relative chart measures performance against the SMI PRICE which
closed at 7740.3 on 05/03/13
On 05/03/13 the spot exchange rate was SFr1.23/Eu 1. - Eu .77/US$1
07 March 2013
Nestle (NESN.VX) 3
Key charts Figure 1: Whether looked at over 3, 5, 10, 15yrs the group
has averaged organic EBITA growth of 8.75% pa and the
components behind it have been very steady
Figure 2: Powders: 45% of 2012 sales with over 20%
margin and higher growth than group average, given 65%
of sales in developing markets …
0.0%
1.0%
2.0%
3.0%
4.0%
5.0%
6.0%
7.0%
8.0%
9.0%
10.0%
3yr CAGR 5 yr CAGR 10 yr CAGR 15 yr CAGR
RIG Price margin progression
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
Developed market Developing market
Source: Company data, Credit Suisse research Source: Credit Suisse research, Company data
Figure 3: …means Nestlé’s overall developing market
margins are above the group average, driving positive
geographic mix (2012)
Figure 4: …Non-powders operations still have room for
improvement in margin and returns, we estimate 20-25% of
group’s invested capital not covering cost of capital
Nestle
L'OrealUnilever
Reckitt
Henkel
Beiersdorf
ABI
SABCarlsberg
Danone
Pernod
Diageo
IMPS
BAT
Colgate
Kraft
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50%
Deve
lope
d w
orld
mar
gin
Developing market margin
Emerging market margins higher
0
2000
4000
6000
8000
10000
12000
14000
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
Inve
ste
d C
ap
ital (
CH
F, 0
00
's)
RO
IC, 2
01
2
Invested capital ROIC
20-25% of group's invested capital < cost of capital
Source: Company data, Credit Suisse estimates Source: Company data, Credit Suisse research
Figure 5: Forecast increased emphasis on returns should
result in step up in returns, most pronounced on ex
goodwill basis
Figure 6: …based on 2016 forecasts on an EV/IC to
ROIC/WACC basis Nestlé looks undervalued relative to
peers
0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014E 2016E
ROIC excluding goodwill ROIC including goodwill
Nestle
Carlsberg
SAB
Diageo
Pernod
Danone
ABI
Unilever
Henkel
L'OrealReckitt
Oriflame
R² = 0.9522
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5
EV
/IC
ROIC/WACC
Overvalued relative to
sector
Undervalued relative
to sector
Source: Company data, Credit Suisse estimates Source: Company data, Credit Suisse estimates
07 March 2013
Nestle (NESN.VX) 4
Table of contents Nestle NESN.VX 2 Key charts 3 Background—2000, a crossroads for Nestlé 5 The pow(d)er behind group performance 9 Non-powders 13 Focus on capital 18
ROIC by sub category—renewed management focus 18 Working capital, an opportunity? 21 What does this view of Nestlé tell us? 22
Modelling Nestlé 23 1: What is the likelihood of it selling L’Oreal stake? 23 2: 2013 outlook 24 3: Long term: more A&P? 24 Longer-term outlook 25
Nestlé valuation 28 Credit Suisse PEERs 33
07 March 2013
Nestle (NESN.VX) 5
Background—2000, a crossroads for Nestlé In early 2000, Peter Brabeck-Letmathe, at the time CEO of Nestlé for three years,
presented a paper to the Board that set out his vision of transforming the company—that it
could become a food, cosmetic and pharmaceutical company, and at the heart of this
strategic change, the group would/should take a majority stake in L’Oréal.
This was a far-reaching and significant change for what had historically been an extremely
conservative company, and was rejected by the board of directors and the bankers.
However it resonated with many, and a watered-down approach was adopted as Nestlé
set off in the direction of “Health, Wellness and Nutrition”.
Incidentally this is part of the reason why we believe Nestlé is unlikely to buy L’Oréal,
together with the limited overlap, synergies, etc. But more on that later.
It seems easy to point to this fundamental trend in the food industry today, but had
investors known at the time how radical the changes were about to be at Nestlé, they
might have been more than a little surprised.
A step up in M&A followed
As Figure 7 shows, between 2000 and 2012, Nestlé’s M&A activity stepped up. Most of
the focus was on the group’s non-powders operations. These businesses were sub-scale,
with low growth, low margins and low returns. Over that period Nestlé has spent over
CHF70bn largely (but not exclusively) on building out these areas, gaining critical mass.
Some areas have not fitted—there has been CHF47bn of disposals as well (largely but not
exclusively Alcon at CHF39bn).
07 March 2013
Nestle (NESN.VX) 6
Figure 7: M&A history
1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s 2010s
Non-powders
Pet Food Friskies (1985) Alpo (1994) Ralston Purina
(2001)
Spillers (1998) Waggin Train
(2010)
Ice Cream Motta (1993) Dreyers (2003)
Scholler (2001)
Haagen-Dazs
(2001)
Movenpick
(2003)
Water Perrier (1992)
San Pellegrino
(1998)
Chilled Dairy Chambourcy
(1978)
Nutrition Powerbar
(2000)
Vitaflo (2010)
Jenny Craig
(2006)
Prometheus
(2011)
Novartis Medical
(2007)
Q Med (2011)
Gerber (2007) Chi Med (2012)
Frozen/chilled Food Stouffer (1973) Buitoni (1988) Chef America
(2002)
Kraft Pizza
(2010)
Thomy (1971)
Stakes L'Oreal (1974)
Alcon (1977)
Confectionery Rowntree
(1988)
Hsu Fu Chi
(2011)
Powders
Infant milk formula Wyeth (2012)
Milk Yinlu Foods
(2011)
Source: Company data, Credit Suisse research
Despite the material M&A the powders operations, what might be described as its legacy
businesses of coffee, culinary (Maggi), milk powders, powdered beverages and infant
nutrition remain significant. As Figure 8 shows, the powders operations still account for
45% of its sales (2012) and we estimate over 55% of profits.
07 March 2013
Nestle (NESN.VX) 7
Figure 8: Nestlé sales breakdown 2012
Chocolate11%
Cereals
1%
Frozen food
7%
Chilled food2%
Petfood
12%
Ice Cream
5%
Nutrition
3%
Coffee Creamers
2%
Water
8%
Nespresso
4%
Coffee
11%
Powdered beverages
6%
Milk Powder
12%
Infant Formula
9%
Culinary/Ambient
7%
Powders
45%
Source: Company data, Credit Suisse estimates
This report
A decade of expanding through acquisition and organically has built a better business.
Indeed Nestlé has an extremely consistent record over any time frame. Whether looked at
over 3, 5, 10 or 15 years the group has averaged organic EBITA growth of 8.75%, and the
components behind that have also been markedly steady.
Figure 9: Components to organic EBITA growth, 3yr vs 5yr, 10yr and 15yr
0.0%
1.0%
2.0%
3.0%
4.0%
5.0%
6.0%
7.0%
8.0%
9.0%
10.0%
3yr CAGR 5 yr CAGR 10 yr CAGR 15 yr CAGR
RIG Price margin progression
Source: Company data, Credit Suisse research
07 March 2013
Nestle (NESN.VX) 8
For 10 years investors have focused on the organic performance, be it RIG, organic
growth or margin.
What has been most striking of late is the increasing commentary coming from Nestlé on
returns.
■ At the Shanghai investor presentation working capital was very much front of mind.
Virtually every presentation by the business units focused on it.
■ On the full year roadshow the group was talking more about return on capital and
capital allocation than before.
This is not meant to imply that ROIC has not been an important metric in the past, but
rather we think it is becoming increasingly important in decision-making at the group. We
see no better way of illustrating this than in 2013 management remuneration, which will be
based on growth, EBITA, FCF (previously working capital) and, for the first time, return on
capital.
So we divide our thoughts on Nestlé into two distinct parts:
■ The high growth, high margin, high return legacy powders businesses.
■ The rest of the group, where significant invested capital has been sunk over the last
12 years, and growth and margins are below group average as indeed are returns.
What are the implications of this?
07 March 2013
Nestle (NESN.VX) 9
The pow(d)er behind group performance Powders are the easiest product form in which to transport and sell branded food (long
shelf life, multiple pack sizes, production scale). The result—Nestlé was able to rapidly
globalise its reach, even in the early part of the last century. Nestlé built, organically,
global leadership in these categories, meaning the high margins translate into very high
returns.
Powders – higher growth
Although the brands are old (Nescafe is 75 years old in 2013) the powder operations
growth profile benefits from 65% of 2012 sales being in developing markets.
Figure 10: Developed versus developing market split by category
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
Developed market Developing market
Source: Company data, Credit Suisse estimates
Driven by the powder franchises’ dominant market share, Nestlé’s developing market
sales growth rate has been particularly strong in the last two years, as it recouped the
spike in raw material price inflation without great volume slippage.
Figure 11: Nestlé’s developing market sales growth versus peers
0.0%
2.0%
4.0%
6.0%
8.0%
10.0%
12.0%
14.0%
16.0%
Sector average developed market growth Nestle's developing market growth
Source: Company data, Credit Suisse research
07 March 2013
Nestle (NESN.VX) 10
This meant Nestlé’s growth accelerated above its global peers’ developing market growth
rates. Importantly, organic investment (capex) is now being spent behind the high
returning powders franchises—powdered beverages now accounts for 25% of capex
spend 2012 double the rate of five years ago.
The mind-set change and the growth opportunity is best summed up, in our view, by an
increasingly used measurement at Nestlé—capacity availability—rather than capacity
utilisation, as plants that wait until their utilisation rates reach 85% in markets that are
growing at 20% pa will constrain the company's future growth. The recent pull back to peer
group growth rates in developing markets is a reflection of the normalisation in pricing as
cost inflation is set to be immaterial in 2013.
Powders—high margin
The powder operation’s structurally high EBITA margins explain why Nestlé’s developing
market operations generate higher EBITA margins than the group average. The result—
Nestlé does not suffer from negative geographic mix, unlike the majority of its food and
beverage peers.
Figure 12: Powders operating performance versus non-powders
CoffeePowdered Bev
Milk Powders
Infant NutritionCulinary/Ambient
Nespresso
WaterCoffee Creamers
NutritionIce Cream Cereals
Chilled Foods
Frozen
PetfoodChocolate
-5.0%
0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
0.0% 5.0% 10.0% 15.0% 20.0% 25.0% 30.0% 35.0%
2009
-12
Sal
es C
AG
R
EBITA Margins 2012
Powders faster growth and
higher margins - ac 45% of
sales and 55% of EBITA
Non-powders lower growth
and margins - ac 55% of
sales and 45% of EBITA.
Source: Company data, Credit Suisse estimates
07 March 2013
Nestle (NESN.VX) 11
Figure 13: Developing market vs developed market margins (2012)
Nestle
L'OrealUnilever
Reckitt
Henkel
Beiersdorf
ABI
SABCarlsberg
Danone
Pernod
Diageo
IMPS
BAT
Colgate
Kraft
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50%
De
velo
pe
d w
orl
d m
argi
n
Emerging market margin
Emerging market margins higher
Source: Company data, Credit Suisse estimates
The heavy investment in emerging market capacity (greenfield sites in Africa), start-up
innovations such as the global roll out of Nescafe Dolce Gusto (made a small profit in
2012 on CHF1bn in sales five years after launch) and the escalation in commodity prices
diluted the powder franchises EBITA margin progression. We estimate in aggregate the
powder franchises margins have fallen by circa 150bp. We calculate that a recovery in
the powder franchises margins to their previous high translates into group wide
margin uplift of circa 75bp.
Figure 14: Change in powdered franchises EBITA margins
0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
30.0%
35.0%
2007 2012 Group margin pre unaollcated items 2012
Source: Company data, Credit Suisse estimates. Note 2007 adjusted for change to IFRS accounting
(netting off of trade promo form sales)
Powders margins have
fallen in last few years given
focus on sales growth
07 March 2013
Nestle (NESN.VX) 12
Summary
So Powders have:
■ Higher growth
■ Higher Emerging Market exposure
■ Higher margins
■ And higher returns
This last point we have not yet touched on, but will do so in the section below. It is
instructive to look at the returns in these legacy businesses when looking at those in
businesses that have been built out over the last 10-12 years, where the invested capital
has significantly increased.
07 March 2013
Nestle (NESN.VX) 13
Non-powders Non-powders: Sales growth
The significant investment (M&A) in non-powders of the last decade+ has built out these
businesses and given them critical mass. However it has not added incrementally to
Nestlé’s group growth. Looking at the last 2 years in isolation, it is striking that all these
areas (Nespresso the exception) have shown less organic growth than the legacy/core
powders businesses.
Figure 15: Powders vs non powders organic sales growth, 2010-12
-5.0%
0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
Source: Company data, Credit Suisse estimates
In part this reflects the Developed Market skew in these businesses—we repeat the chart
showing these non-powder businesses in Figure 16, which highlights only c20% of non-
powder sales are in Emerging markets compared to powders, which are two-thirds
Emerging Markets.
Figure 16: Developed versus developing market split by category
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
Developed market Developing market
Source: Company data, Credit Suisse estimates
Non-powders over-skewed
to developed markets
impacting sales growth
07 March 2013
Nestle (NESN.VX) 14
Perhaps it is fairer instead to compare Nestlé’s organic growth in the developed world with
that of its peers—which shows Nestlé has got consistently more from these mature
developed economies than its peers, outperforming the sector quarter in, quarter out.
Figure 17: Nestlé’s developed market organic sales growth rate versus peers
-2.0%
-1.0%
0.0%
1.0%
2.0%
3.0%
4.0%
5.0%
6.0%
7.0%
8.0%
Sector average developed market growth Nestle's Developed market growth
Source: Company data, Credit Suisse research
Margin: Non-powders margin
In contrast to the powders business, the non-powders have seen improved returns
(margins) over the past five years.
■ Over the period, non-powders’ margin progression has slowed to +50bp pa, after more
sizeable changes between 1996 and 2008.
■ This is primarily due to the end of the material portfolio change, which saw the
acquisition of higher value-added segments (nutrition, dry pet food) and the sale of
commoditised/structurally weak assets (chilled dairy/Trinks).
■ We believe the portfolio could be set for a more radical portfolio change than in the
last five years. Nestlé is now putting together a common language framework that can
be used from the Executive Board to each BEM (Business Executive Manager) who
runs each business cell (i.e. coffee in China).
■ This should enable a more factual, granular framework for seeing where the value is
and where it can be created in the future. At the FY12 results roadshow and investor
meetings CEO Paul Bulcke commented 'we are sharpening our pen' on looking at the
portfolio and Wan Ling Martello, the new CFO, talks about management being more
unforgiving to underperforming cells.
07 March 2013
Nestle (NESN.VX) 15
Figure 18: Non-powders EBITA margin 2007 vs 2011
0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
2007 2012 Group margin pre unaollcated items 2012
Source: Company data, Credit Suisse estimates. Note 2007 adjusted for change to IFRS accounting
(netting off of trade promo form sales)
The spread in EBITA margins amongst the non-powder categories is wide. Management
needs to continue to tackle those categories, see Figure 18 (ice cream, water, cereals,
frozen and chilled foods), where EBITA margins are well below the group average.
By way of illustration we estimate lifting these categories margins to the group average,
represents a 200bp uplift to group margins.
How achievable is this? We divide the categories into those with structural problems and
those in investment phase.
Categories in investment phase, 8% of group sales
Nutrition, primarily Nestlé Health Science (sales CHF1.6bn), is an area of key strategic
importance. Under the leadership of Nestlé veteran Luis Cantarell, the business has been
rapidly acquiring capabilities. The acquisitions of Vitaflo, CM&D and Prometheus are all
aimed at increasing the division's focus on specialised nutrition needs and disease
modifying nutrition, namely, gastrointestinal, brain and metabolic diseases. The medium-
term goal is for the division to become a value creator for Nestlé rather than a major
contributor to the group's volumes and sales growth—in a similar manner to Alcon, which
generated 7% of group sales in 2009 but when sold was worth over 15% of Nestlé's
market cap. Already, part of the remuneration of the employees in the Health Science
division is with phantom equity, linked to the performance of nutritional rather than staples
peers.
On the margin, a peer such as Danone’s clinical nutrition division generates margins of
over 18% compared to Nestlé Health Science margins of 16%. This is primarily due to the
high fixed cost Jenny Craig, weight management business, dragging down margins
because of weak demand.
Cereal Partners Worldwide (CPW) and Nespresso are on aggressive geographic roll-outs.
In those markets where CPW and Nespresso have achieved critical mass and leadership
positions, margins are above the group average. For example, in France and Switzerland,
Nespresso accounts for nearly 30% of the total profit pool of the coffee market, meaning
margins are close to coffee levels and overall Nespresso margins are at the group
average, despite the heavy roll out costs. Cereals margins are far lower in their mature
markets than Nespresso and so overall margins are lower than the group.
07 March 2013
Nestle (NESN.VX) 16
Categories with structural issues, 23% of group sales
Nestlé has made progress in improving ice cream’s profitability from very low levels.
However, it remains a long way off the group average. In the US, the bulk of the business
is in the take-home tub market, a market to which Nestlé is committed with the purchase of
Dreyers for CHF4bn in 2003. At the time of the acquisition, Dreyers’ margins were 4-5%—
they have risen since as Nestlé invested in coast to coast production and it was integrated
into Nestlé’s frozen pizza direct store delivery (DSD) system. But, margins remain single
digit as for too long Nestlé (Dreyers) and Unilever (Breyers), the Number 1 and 2 in the
market, have spent their marketing dollars on trade promotion reinforcing the
commoditisation of the category. Over the last year, they have both recognised this and
are focusing their initiatives on premiumising the category, via innovation. Nestlé is looking
to refocus on the ‘slow churn’ technology first launched in the late 2000s.
In Europe, the challenge is different. The market is predominantly impulse, making it highly
seasonal, translating into high stock levels, low annual capacity utilisation rates and high
distribution costs. Management has exited a number of loss-making markets in Europe but
medium term, we think a solution is to invest in smoothing out the seasonality by
positioning ice cream as an everyday dessert.
These actions in the US and Europe point to a period of investment in brand equity rather
than capital—if this fails we believe the probability of an exit from larger cells in ice cream,
such as Dreyers rises. Unilever’s ice cream division, the global leader, which is further
down the road on this strategy generates margins of circa 10% compared to Nestlé’s 8%.
Frozen food is an historically strong business for Nestlé, with dominant shares in the US
(over a third of the market) and high-teen margins leading to plenty of capital being
deployed to the division (Chef America/Kraft frozen pizza acquired for CHF7.7bn in the
last decade). The division’s high fixed cost DSD system is a competitive advantage but the
slow reaction of Nestlé to changing US consumer demands (to value packs from single
serve), a lack of innovation and increased trade promotion has hurt sales growth and
margins. Nestlé is now taking a more selective approach to the DSD model, looking at the
cost/benefit of it on state by state basis. More importantly, management recognises the
need to invest back into the category via higher innovation and media support, which will
dilute near term margins. Similar actions in the UK suggest this strategy does not
necessarily work, and led to Nestlé exiting the category. The US prepared food operations
margins of Heinz or Kraft’s are in the high teens compared to Nestlé’s 14-15%.
Water suffers from too much capacity in Europe as it is difficult to close down given each
brand comes from its own local source. Management’s original plan to tighten capacity
had been to use the multi-sourced, low priced spring water brand, Pure Life. But,
supermarkets In Europe did not want Nestlé undercutting their private label offering. In the
US, Nestlé won volume share from Coke/Pepsi, which now stands at over 40%—more
than double the combined share of the cola giants. This came at a cost to Nestlé and the
industry’s retail prices fell by 30% in the last decade, more than offsetting any cost savings
and volume gains. Private label is now the clear number two in the US market, with over
30% volume share meaning promotion remains too prominent a feature.
After a decade of heavy capital investment in the US (water in 2005 accounted for +20%
of total group capex), in the last few years, Nestlé has been investing in raising its
developing market exposure. It remains under-indexed in the developing markets, at 20%
of sales. These markets lack state investment in clean water supply, meaning bottled
water operators are capable of generating mid teen margins. Danone’s water business
generates higher growth and EBITA margins, 13% post unallocated items, due to a better
geographic skew, 60% of sales in developing markets, and increasingly product skew,
over 30% of sales sold as ‘Aquadrinks’—flavoured water—which sell at ~50% premium to
bottled water. We do not expect Nestlé to shift the focus to ‘Aquadrink’s’, but rather to
focus on the fact fresh water is an undervalued asset, given its increased scarcity. By
2030 demand for water is forecast to be 50% higher than today (source Water Resources
07 March 2013
Nestle (NESN.VX) 17
Group 2009) and withdrawals could exceed natural renewal by over 60%, resulting in
water scarcity for a third of the world’s population. Nestlé’s current water margins are 9.4%.
Figure 19: Margin comparison of Nestlé categories to best in class (2012)
0.0%
2.0%
4.0%
6.0%
8.0%
10.0%
12.0%
14.0%
16.0%
18.0%
20.0%
Frozen food Nutrition Cereals Water Ice cream
Nestle margin Uplift to best in class
Source: Company data, Credit Suisse estimates
Chilled Food is primarily a European operation and is a category where we have difficulty
seeing the value-added contribution that a branded player brings. The problem is the
trade-off between automation and innovation. The complexity of a 'ready meal' offering
(the horsemeat scare highlights this point from supply chain aspect) means that
automating the process is very difficult and those categories where it is possible, such as
pizzas, have become commoditised. More complex offerings, especially if quality is not to
be affected, require less automation and far higher labour costs, making margin
progression something of a predicament.
We estimate if Nestlé’s margins rose to their relevant best in class peers margins
for the structurally challenged categories, and to the group average for cereals and
nutrition, group wide margins would rise by circa 100bp.
07 March 2013
Nestle (NESN.VX) 18
Focus on capital So we have concluded that the last decade has seen:
■ Sales growth driven by Powders
■ Margin growth driven by the acquired non-powder businesses
■ Nestlé has historically downplayed the impact of the M&A component within its
operating model, highlighting net M&A has been a negligible contributor to sales
growth, with a 10 year CAGR of 1%, compared to organic sales growth of 6.1% pa.
■ However, the impact of M&A on the balance sheet has been material. In the last ten
years, the cumulative capex spend has been CHF18bn, delivering organic sales
growth of 6% pa.
■ The cumulative net capital outlay on M&A over the ten year period has been CHF
40.5bn.
■ This M&A outlay has seen returns including goodwill fall…
■ …while returns pre-goodwill have been held back by a focus on growth over margins
in powders.
Figure 20: ROIC Pre Alcon/L’Oreal, including and excluding goodwill, 2002-12
0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
ROIC excluding goodwill ROIC including goodwill
Source: Company data, Credit Suisse estimates
As we touched on earlier, the message from the company seems increasingly to be
focusing on returns.
ROIC by sub category—renewed management focus
We have attempted to break down the return by sub-category. As Figure 21 shows:
■ the powder franchises generate high returns. The exception is infant nutrition where
the recent acquisition of Gerber and Wyeth has diluted returns.
■ The non-powders franchises generate far lower returns with a number of categories
returns below the cost of capital—namely ice cream, cereals, frozen food, nutrition and
water.
07 March 2013
Nestle (NESN.VX) 19
Figure 21: 2012 ROIC by category
0.0%
10.0%
20.0%
30.0%
40.0%
50.0%
60.0%
70.0%
80.0%
Source: Company data, Credit Suisse estimates
In total, we calculate around 20-25% of the group’s invested capital is not covering its cost
of capital today.
Figure 22: Invested capital and ROIC by category, 2012
0
2000
4000
6000
8000
10000
12000
14000
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
Inve
sted
Cap
ital (
CH
F, 0
00's
)
RO
IC, 2
012
Invested capital ROIC
20-25% of group's invested capital < cost of capital
Source: Company data, Credit Suisse estimates, Dark blue columns = powders and grey = divisions
Looking at the categories, water, frozen food, ice cream and cereals are neither
generating the group average margin or asset turn. Management could be less forgiving of
underperforming assets, while investors would likely look for decisive action—possibly
portfolio change—if returns do not improve.
07 March 2013
Nestle (NESN.VX) 20
Figure 23: Asset Turn vs NOPAT margin, by category (2012)
Source: Company data, Credit Suisse estimates, Bold font highlights powders franchises
A final screen management could consider is looking at returns pre goodwill. As Figure 24
shows, six categories have consumed the bulk of the M&A in the last decade or so and
therefore account for circa 90% of the group’s goodwill.
Figure 24: Goodwill and invested capital ex goodwill by category, 2012 (CHFm)
0
2000
4000
6000
8000
10000
12000
14000
Goodwill Invested capital ex goodwill
Source: Company data, Credit Suisse estimates
On this basis, the returns of petfood, nutrition and frozen food are significantly higher,
which could mean management would be more accommodating.
07 March 2013
Nestle (NESN.VX) 21
Figure 25: Returns by category including and excluding goodwill (2012)
0.0%
10.0%
20.0%
30.0%
40.0%
50.0%
60.0%
70.0%
80.0%
Return including goodwill Return ex goodwill
Source: Company data, Credit Suisse estimates
Working capital, an opportunity?
The sharp improvement in Nestlé’s working capital in 2012 means that as a percentage of
sales, it now sits in the middle of its global peer group. However, there remains a clear gap
with the best in class, which operate with negative working capital.
Figure 26: Working capital as % of sales (2012)
-10%
-5%
0%
5%
10%
15%
Source: Company data, Credit Suisse research
Breaking down working capital into its three components, we find Nestlé’s trade payables
are close to best in class at well over 100 days. The focus needs to be on collecting
debtors’ payments, with no improvement in the ratio of trade debtors past their due date—
18% of total debtors in the last five years. Lowering the trade debtor days to best in class
levels of 25 days from 50 days, would see the group cash conversion ratio fall into
negative territory.
07 March 2013
Nestle (NESN.VX) 22
Figure 27: Breakdown of cash conversion, 2012
-200
-150
-100
-50
0
50
100
150
Days receivable Inventory days Days payable Cash conversion
Source: Company data, Credit Suisse research
What does this view of Nestlé tell us?
1. Nestlé’s acquisitions, when put in the context of its history, look targeted and
measured. The major phase of building the non-powders business was completed
under Peter Brabeck’s tenure as CEO, as shown in the M&A table on page 6. This
phase achieved global leadership in the chosen categories, such as pet food (Ralston
Purina) and ice cream (Dreyers).
2. The growth and margin structure of the powders operations underpins the strength of
the group’s developing market business and the positive geographic mix to group
margins.
3. The non-powders operations continue to provide a key leg to the group’s margin
improvement, rising to 15% in 2012 from 11% in 2007. However, it remains well below
the powders level. We estimate the margin gap between powders and non-powders
has further to close. In the last five years the gap has closed by over 250bp but
remains over 600bp below the powders operations.
4. The gap between the non-powders and powders returns is even wider than the margin
gap. We estimate powders generate mid 20% returns—double non-powders returns.
Given the M&A bias to non-powders, the gap narrows if we look at returns ex goodwill.
5. Water, ice cream, cereals, frozen food and chilled foods—circa 25% of the group’s
invested capital—generate sub cost of capital returns and we think investors are likely
to want greater action from management, including potential sale/discontinuation.
07 March 2013
Nestle (NESN.VX) 23
Modelling Nestlé Before looking at valuation we will touch on three other topics on modelling Nestlé:
1. What is the likelihood of it selling its L’Oreal stake?
2. 2013 forecasts—some thoughts
3. Long term—can the group sustain its 8.75% CAGR organic EBITA growth?
1: What is the likelihood of it selling L’Oreal stake?
Ultimately we do not know. Nestlé acquired its stake in L’Oreal in 1974 for CHF100m or so
and currently owns a 29.8% stake worth CHF24.5bn, a 15% pa CAGR. If it were to sell,
Nestlé is unlikely to pay any tax as in the case of Alcon, which would make the stake worth
CHF7.7 per share, on our calculations. The expiry of the current agreement with the
Bettencourt family in April 2014 does not trigger any need for action from either party.
The agreement foresees the ‘non-transferability of their respective stakes in L’Oreal’ and
the ‘pre-emption, escrow, prohibition on constituting a concert with any third party’.
An end to the agreement could in our view mean the ‘non-transferability element ends,
which could increase existing press speculation as to whether Nestlé would exit its stake.
However, we think it highly unlikely that Nestlé would bid for L’Oreal with the board having
rejected the proposal in 2000 to buy out the rest of L’Oreal, instead embarking on
becoming the leading nutrition, health and wellness company. In our report entitled
‘Optically expensive’ published 21 September 2012, we discussed L’Oreal’s ability to buy
Nestlé’s stake.
If L’Oreal bought out Nestlé’s stake, we would think it likely that Nestlé would acquire and
cancel its own stock, as with the Alcon proceeds. In this scenario, we calculate the EPS
impact would be mildly positive, +1% to our 2014 forecasts. If Nestlé paid the proceeds
out in special dividend, the payout would equate to a 10% yield, offsetting the EPS dilution
of -9.5%.
Figure 28: Scenario analysis: Potential EPS impact of a sale of L'Oreal and buyback CHF in millions, unless otherwise stated
Nestlé 14E Adjustments Nestlé ex
L'Oreal
Adjustments Nestlé with BB
Sales 104,601 104,601 104,601
EBIT 16,872 16,872 16,872
% margin 16.1% 16.1% 16.1%
Interest (576) 391 (185) (391) (576)
Divs received
PBT 16,296 16,687 16,296
tax (4,400) (4,506) (4,400)
% tax rate 27.0% 27.0% 27.0%
minorities (519) (519) (519)
associates 1,349 (1,207) 142 142
Net income 12,726 11,805 11,520
# of shares, m 3,240 3,240 (334) 2,906
EPS, CHF 3.93 3.64 3.96
% accretion/dilution -7.2% 1%
Source: Credit Suisse estimates; 2014 estimates are based on pre-restructuring EBITA and EPS
07 March 2013
Nestle (NESN.VX) 24
2: 2013 outlook
Nestlé now includes what might be referred to as assorted “non-trading” items in its
“trading operating profit”. These include restructuring, impairments, etc.
Figure 29: Other income/expenses in Nestlé trading operating profit CHF in millions, unless otherwise stated
2010 2011 2012
Loss on disposal -9 -15 -20
Restructuring -469 -100 -95
Impairments -194 -150 -75
Litigation/bad debts -584 -341 -378
Other -274 -130 -88
Profit on asset sales 41 18 53
Other 127 33 88
TOTAL -1362 -685 -515
As a % sales -1.5% -0.8% -0.6%
Source: Company data
In 2013 we would expect these items to be rather higher than 2012 (we calculate 0.8%),
which is a 20bps “hit” to the margin progress. Should we worry? We think not. After two
years or more of significant input cost inflation, 2013 looks considerably more benign, in
our view.
3: Long term: more A&P?
As we highlighted in our recent report ‘Ad spend – The good cholesterol’ (11 October
2012), Nestlé had low ad spend, as a percentage of sales, of circa 3%. We think this is
partially explained by the high brand awareness in the developing markets for Nestlé’s
powder franchises (and the limit to which traditional media can be used in these regions).
These are brands with heritage of close to 100 years and a very high degree of trust, given
baby formula (Nan), children’s chocolate (Milo) and milk (Nido) powder underpinning their
high margins.
Figure 30: Powders versus non-powders trade promotion spend as % of sales, 2010
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
Source: Company data, Credit Suisse estimates
Marketing spend low, as
powder’s brand awareness
high
07 March 2013
Nestle (NESN.VX) 25
The non-powdered operations, especially the structurally challenged margin operations in
ice cream and frozen food, skewed marketing spend too far towards trade promotion—
push rather than pull tactics. We estimate that based on the change to IFRS accounting in
2010 and the subsequent adjustment to net from gross sales, the overall non-powdered
franchises trade promotion levels of close to 20% of sales.
Our other observation, is the up/down nature of the group’s marketing spend dovetails with
the inverse relationship between the change in COGS as a percentage of sales and
marketing & administration as a percentage of sales. Part of the ‘savings’ from lower input
costs are reinvested back into higher marketing support to drive share and vice versa.
In 2013, after two years of higher cost inflation, management expects inflation to be
immaterial. We envisage a rise in gross margin and subsequent increase in A&P but with
the restructuring charge so low in 2012, we expect a rise in 2013E, implying the underlying
margin rises faster than the trading profit margin.
Figure 31: Nestlé’s media spend US$ 000’s Figure 32: Change in A&P inversely correlated to COGS
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
3500
Developed market Developing market
1996
1997
1998
1999
20002002
20032004
20052006
20072008
2009
2010
2011
2012
R² = 0.5618-150.0
-100.0
-50.0
0.0
50.0
100.0
150.0
-300.0 -200.0 -100.0 0.0 100.0 200.0 300.0 400.0
Chg
in m
ktin
g as
% o
f sal
es
Chg in COGS
Source: Ad Age Source: Company data, Credit Suisse estimates
Longer-term outlook
We conclude that Nestlé’s model has plenty of room left to grow driven by stronger
portfolio management.
■ Powders continue to focus on driving above average group growth
■ Non-powders split between categories organically rolling out global coverage and
those focused on restructuring over growth
■ Brand investment saw a recovery in 2012 and with raw materials outlook benign in
2013, it looks set for further rise.
■ Non-powder returns are increasingly put under the microscope
And so we expect the Nestlé model to continue to compound at the historical rate. Over
the last fifteen years, the group’s EBITA growth has achieved an 8.75% pa CAGR with the
near equal contribution between volume, price and margin progression. This despite the
faster growing/higher margin Alcon no longer being part of the group. It is this balance that
we think enables Nestlé to deliver consistent operating numbers, which underpin its status
as a low beta stock.
07 March 2013
Nestle (NESN.VX) 26
Figure 33: Components to organic EBITA growth, 3yr vs 5yr, 10yr and 15yr
0.0%
1.0%
2.0%
3.0%
4.0%
5.0%
6.0%
7.0%
8.0%
9.0%
10.0%
3yr CAGR 5 yr CAGR 10 yr CAGR 15 yr CAGR
RIG Price margin progression
Source: Company data, Credit Suisse research
The sustained compounding of Nestlé’s operating performance has meant organic sales
growth has risen by 80% and EBITA by 130% in the last ten years.
Figure 34: Organic Sales, EBITA, EPS and DPS, rebased 100 from 2002-12
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Organic sales Organic EBITA EPS DPS
Source: Company data, Credit Suisse research
What we do expect to change compared with the past is the group’s ability to outperform
its peers in earnings and dividends growth to the same extent. In the last decade, Nestlé’s
EPS in constant rates has risen over 150%, 10% CAGR, and DPS at 300%, 15% CAGR.
This was a function of selling Alcon and buying back 15% of the stock and the decision to
raise the dividend in Swiss francs every year, contributing to the payout ratio doubling to
over 60%. 2012 was the first year in a decade the payout ratio fell.
07 March 2013
Nestle (NESN.VX) 27
Figure 35: Net income and EPS growth in constant rates,
rebased to 100 from 2002
Figure 36: Dividend payout ratio, 1998-12
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
Net income EPS growth
0.0%
10.0%
20.0%
30.0%
40.0%
50.0%
60.0%
70.0%
1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
Source: Company data, Credit Suisse research Source: Company data, Credit Suisse research
In summary, Nestlé’s model has delivered and, we believe, will continue to deliver
consistent performance. The stock’s organic EBITA CAGR has averaged 8.75% pa over a
3, 5, 10 and 15 year period, with the contribution from RIG (volume/mix), price and margin
progression all the same. As our analysis suggests, the individual components of the
group’s portfolio are at various stages of evolution, meaning the aggregate is not reliant on
one or two drivers.
07 March 2013
Nestle (NESN.VX) 28
Nestlé valuation The de-rating in Nestlé's share price outperformance over the past year has meant that
looking at performance over 10 years, earnings growth has contributed nearly 100% of the
90% move in the Swiss franc share price to CHF66. We calculate that multiple expansion
has added very little as the 12m fwd P/E in 2002 was 17x-18x—similar to today. Finally,
converting Nestlé’s share price into US dollars, FX has added 30%, delivering an
compounded share price appreciation of 8.4% pa.
Figure 37: Nestlé share price drivers 2002 to YTD2013, US $
24
20.99
0.0
10.0
20.0
30.0
40.0
50.0
60.0
70.0
Starting share price EPS contribution Multiple expansion FX contribution Share price today
Source: Thomson Reuters, Credit Suisse estimates
We look at these drivers, starting with FX.
■ We have little insight into how spot rates will move over time and do not try to predict
them. On top of this, for a non-Swiss franc investor, Nestlé is a good currency hedge,
with less than 1% of sales in Switzerland—i.e., the opposite of any positive or negative
FX impact on EPS is reflected in the translation of the share price into US dollars, euro
or sterling.
■ Re-rating. On 17.8x our current 2014 P/E estimates Nestlé now trades in line with its
15 year average.
07 March 2013
Nestle (NESN.VX) 29
Figure 38: 12mth fwd PE, 1996-2012
10
12
14
16
18
20
22
24
26
28
30
1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
Source: Thomson Reuters, Credit Suisse research
And on a PER basis Nestlé is back to parity with the Pan European staples sector
(food/HPC/beer/spirits) and its long run average after a sharp de-rating over the last
twelve months.
Figure 39: PER to Pan European peers
0.80
0.85
0.90
0.95
1.00
1.05
1.10
1.15
1.20
1.25
1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
Source: Thomson Reuters, Credit Suisse research
So Nestlé’s current valuation is back to its long run average in absolute and relative terms.
However, on our EV/IC to ROIC/WACC screen, Nestlé trades below the line of best fit in
2013E and 2016E, implying the recovery in the group’s returns is not being reflected in the
current valuation. This points to the potential of a small re-rating to its staples peers.
07 March 2013
Nestle (NESN.VX) 30
Figure 40: EV/IC to ROIC/WACC, 2013E vs 2016E
Nestle 16E
Carlsberg 16E
SAB 16E
Diageo 16E
Pernod 16E
Danone 16E
ABI 16E
Unilever 16E
Henkel16E
L'Oreal 16E
Reckitt 16E
Oriflame 16E
ABI 13E
Carlsberg 13E
SAB 13E
Diageo 13E
Pernod 13E
Danone 13E
Nestle 13E
Unilever 13E
Henkel 13E
L'Oreal 13E
Reckitt 13E
Oriflame 13E
R² = 0.9451
R² = 0.9811
0.00
0.20
0.40
0.60
0.80
1.00
1.20
1.40
1.60
1.80
2.00
2.20
2.40
2.60
2.80
3.00
3.20
3.40
0.30 0.40 0.50 0.60 0.70 0.80 0.90 1.00 1.10 1.20 1.30 1.40 1.50 1.60 1.70 1.80 1.90 2.00 2.10 2.20 2.30
EV
/IC
ROIC/WACC Source: Company data, Credit Suisse estimates
■ The primary drive of the share price should continue to be EPS growth, which we
expect to average +8% in 2013E-16E with organic revenue growth of +5.9%
contributing over half of this, margin expansion of 20-30bp pa, another 2.5%-3% pa
and the rest of the P&L provides no material earnings leverage (tax rate broadly
stable/deleveraging effect minimal given cost of debt sub 2%). This translates into
mid-quartile EPS growth versus pan European staples peers, meaning Nestlé should
continue to mirror the sector’s EPS growth as it has done for the last ten years or so.
The exception was 2008, when the financial crisis knocked peers’ earnings off course.
Figure 41: Price and EPS relative of Nestlé to peers
0.80
0.90
1.00
1.10
1.20
1.30
1.40
Jan
-04
May
-04
Sep
-04
Jan
-05
May
-05
Sep
-05
Jan
-06
May
-06
Sep
-06
Jan
-07
May
-07
Sep
-07
Jan
-08
May
-08
Sep
-08
Jan
-09
May
-09
Sep
-09
Jan
-10
May
-10
Sep
-10
Jan
-11
May
-11
Sep
-11
Jan
-12
May
-12
Sep
-12
Jan
-13
Price relative: Nestle vs. European Consumer Sector
Earnings relative: Nestle vs. European Consumer Sector
Source: Thomson Reuters, Credit Suisse estimates
07 March 2013
Nestle (NESN.VX) 31
On a TSR basis, the sector high payout ratio means Nestlé’s 2013E dividend yield is top
quartile, +3.5%, pushing Nestlé’s TSR above +10% pa to 11% pa, a mid-quartile TSR
compared to staples peers.
Figure 42: TSR of Pan European staples stocks, 2012-17E
0%
2%
4%
6%
8%
10%
12%
14%
16%
18%
EPS 2012-17 Div Yield 2013 Average
Source: Company data, Credit Suisse estimates
Target price of CHF76
Our APV-derived target price of CHF76 is based on a cost of equity of 8.5% and terminal
growth of 2.5%. This mirrors a warranted Credit Suisse HOLT® price of CHF 76.52 when
using a 15 year fade.
Figure 43: APV
Cost of equity (Ke) 8.5%
Perpetuity growth rate 2.5%
Interest rate (pre-tax) 5.0%
Cost of debt (Kd) 3.6%
Shares in issue (million) 3,224.8
SFr million SFr/share
Free cash flow NPV 244,477
Less: Debt 2012 -18,152
Less: Pension deficit -7,105
PV of Minorities -8,015
2013 M&A 1,107
Equity Value 212,313 67
Add: tax shield 4,172 1
Theoretical share price F&B 216,485 68
Add: PV of associate/L'Oréal 27,230 9
Target value/price total group 243,716 76
Source: Suisse estimates
07 March 2013
Nestle (NESN.VX) 32
Figure 44: HOLT warranted price based on 15 year fade
Current Price: CHF 65.45 Warranted Price: CHF 76.52 Valuation date: 05-Mar-13
Sales Growth (parallel % point change to forecasts) Dec-11A Dec-12A Dec-13E Dec-14E Dec-15E
-2.0% -1.0% 0.0% 1.0% 2.0% Sales Growth, % -20.0 10.2 10.2 10.2 10.2
EBITDA Mgn, % 19.3 18.6 18.6 18.6 18.6
Asset Turns, x 0.89 0.95 0.97 0.99 1.01
CFROI®, % 14.2 14.3 13.8 13.7 13.4
Disc Rate, % 5.4 4.7 4.2 4.2 4.2
Asset Grth, % 8.3 3.9 7.5 7.2 6.7
Value/Cost, x 2.8 3.2 2.7 2.6 2.5
Economic PE, x 19.7 22.6 19.6 18.9 18.4
Leverage, % 16.8 18.5 18.0 18.3 18.9
HO
LT
-
C
red
it S
uis
se
An
aly
st
Sc
en
ari
o D
ata
NESTLE S.A. (NESN)
EB
ITD
A M
arg
in (
pa
rall
el
% p
oin
t
ch
an
ge
to
fo
rec
as
ts)
-2.0% -39% -25% -7%
0.0% -20% -3%
13% 37%
-1.0% -30% -14% 5% 27% 52%
97%
17% 40% 67%
82%1.0% -11% 8% 29% 53%
2.0% -1% 18% 41% 67%
More than
10%
downside
Within 10%More than
10% upside
Source: Credit Suisse HOLT®. CFROI, HOLT, and ValueSearch are trademarks or registered trademarks of Credit Suisse Group AG or its affiliates in the United States and other countries.
* Operating margin (yellow) is EBITDA (grey) plus rental expense and R&D expense
-25.00
-20.00
-15.00
-10.00
-5.00
0.00
5.00
10.00
15.00
2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 2019 2021 2023 2025 2027
Sales Growth (in %)
0.00
5.00
10.00
15.00
20.00
25.00
2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 2019 2021 2023 2025 2027
Operating Margin and EBITDA (in %) - see note*
0.00
0.20
0.40
0.60
0.80
1.00
1.20
1.40
1.60
2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 2019 2021 2023 2025 2027
Asset Turns (x)
0.00
2.00
4.00
6.00
8.00
10.00
12.00
14.00
16.00
18.00
20.00
20072009201120132015201720192021202320252027
Historical CFROI
HistoricalTransactionCFROI
Forecast CFROI
ForecastTransactionCFROI
Discount Rate
CFROI & Discount Rate (in %)
-10.00
-8.00
-6.00
-4.00
-2.00
0.00
2.00
4.00
6.00
8.00
10.00
20072009201120132015201720192021202320252027
Historical AssetGrowth Rate
Historical GrowthIncl Intang
Forecast Growth
Forecast GrowthIncl Intang
NormalisedGrowth Rate
Asset Growth (in %)
Source: Credit Suisse HOLT estimates
07 March 2013
Nestle (NESN.VX) 33
Credit Suisse PEERs We show below the Credit Suisse PEERs relationship map for Nestlé. PEERs is a global
database that captures unique information about companies within the Credit Suisse
coverage universe based on their relationships with other companies – their customers,
suppliers and competitors. The database is built from our research analysts’ insight
regarding these relationships. Credit Suisse covers over 3,000 companies globally. These
companies form the core of the PEERs database, but it also includes relationships on
stocks that are not under coverage.
Figure 45: Nestle PEERs map
Source: Credit Suisse PEERs research
07 March 2013
Nestle (NESN.VX) 34
Companies Mentioned (Price as of 05-Mar-2013)
Associated British Foods (ABF.L, 1866.0p) Anheuser-Busch InBev (ABI.BR, €72.5) British American Tobacco (BATS.L, 3566.0p) Beiersdorf (BEIG.DE, €67.24) Carlsberg (CARLb.CO, Dkr595.0) Christian Hansen Holding (CHRH.CO, Dkr207.9) Colgate-Palmolive (CL.N, $115.71) Campbell Soup Company (CPB.N, $41.69) Danone (DANO.PA, €54.8) Diageo (DGE.L, 1996.0p) General Mills (GIS.N, $46.49) Henkel (HNKG_p.F, €68.646) The Hershey Company (HSY.N, $85.2) Imperial Tobacco (IMT.L, 2443.0p) Kellogg Company (K.N, $61.42) Kraft Foods Group (KRFT.OQ, $49.19) Nestle (NESN.VX, SFr66.6, OUTPERFORM, TP SFr76.0) L'Oreal (OREP.PA, €115.8) Oriflame Cosmetics (ORIsdb.ST, Skr228.2) Pernod-Ricard (PERP.PA, €99.11) Philip Morris International (PM.N, $92.28) Reckitt Benckiser (RB.L, 4522.0p) SABMiller (SAB.L, 3383.5p) Swedish Match (SWMA.ST, Skr214.1) Tate & Lyle (TATE.L, 840.0p) Unilever (UNc.AS, €30.69)
Disclosure Appendix
Important Global Disclosures
Alex Molloy, Charlie Mills, Nicolas Sochovsky, Sanjeet Aujla, Jimmie Bork, each certify, with respect to the companies or securities that the individual analyzes, that (1) the views expressed in this report accurately reflect his or her personal views about all of the subject companies and securities and (2) no part of his or her compensation was, is or will be directly or indirectly related to the specific recommendations or views expressed in this report.
Price and Rating History for Nestle (NESN.VX)
NESN.VX Closing Price Target Price
Date (SFr) (SFr) Rating
30-Nov-10 54.55 60.00 N
09-Jun-11 53.15 55.00
11-Jul-11 52.20 R
16-Dec-11 51.20 58.00 N
13-Aug-12 60.45 62.00
* Asterisk signifies initiation or assumption of coverage.
N EU T RA L
REST RICT ED
The analyst(s) responsible for preparing this research report received Compensation that is based upon various factors including Credit Suisse's total revenues, a portion of which are generated by Credit Suisse's investment banking activities
As of December 10, 2012 Analysts’ stock rating are defined as follows:
Outperform (O) : The stock’s total return is expected to outperform the relevant benchmark*over the next 12 months.
Neutral (N) : The stock’s total return is expected to be in line with the relevant benchmark* over the next 12 months.
Underperform (U) : The stock’s total return is expected to underperform the relevant benchmark* over the next 12 months.
*Relevant benchmark by region: As of 10th December 2012, Japanese ratings are based on a stock’s total return relative to the analyst's coverage universe which consists of all companies covered by the analyst within the relevant sector, with Outperfo rms representing the most attractive, Neutrals the less attractive, and Underperforms the least attractive investment opportunities. As of 2nd October 2012, U.S. and Canadian as well as European ra tings are based on a stock’s total return relative to the analyst's coverage universe which consists of all companies covered by the analyst within the relevant sector, with Outperform s representing the most attractive, Neutrals the less attractive, and Underperforms the least attractive investment opportunities. For Latin American and non-Japan Asia stocks, ratings are based on a stock’s total return relative to the average total return of the relevant country or regional benchmark; Australia, New Zealand are, and prior to 2nd October 2012 U.S. and Canadian ratings were based on (1) a stock’s absolute total return potential to its current share price and (2) the relative attractiveness of a stock’s total return potential within an analyst’s coverage universe. For Australian and New Zealand stocks, 12 -month rolling yield is incorporated in the absolute total return calculation and a 15% and a 7.5% threshold replace the 10-15% level in the Outperform and Underperform stock rating definitions, respectively. The 15% and
07 March 2013
Nestle (NESN.VX) 35
7.5% thresholds replace the +10-15% and -10-15% levels in the Neutral stock rating definition, respectively. Prior to 10th December 2012, Japanese ratings were based on a stock’s total return relative to the average total return of the relevant country or regional benchmark.
Restricted (R) : In certain circumstances, Credit Suisse policy and/or applicable law and regulations preclude certain types of communications, including an investment recommendation, during the course of Credit Suisse's engagement in an investment banking transaction and in certain other circumstances.
Volatility Indicator [V] : A stock is defined as volatile if the stock price has moved up or down by 20% or more in a month in at least 8 of the past 24 months or the analyst expects significant volatility going forward.
Analysts’ sector weightings are distinct from analysts’ stock ratings and are based on the analyst’s expectations for the fundamentals and/or valuation of the sector* relative to the group’s historic fundamentals and/or valuation:
Overweight : The analyst’s expectation for the sector’s fundamentals and/or valuation is favorable over the next 12 months.
Market Weight : The analyst’s expectation for the sector’s fundamentals and/or valuation is neutral over the next 12 months.
Underweight : The analyst’s expectation for the sector’s fundamentals and/or valuation is cautious over the next 12 months.
*An analyst’s coverage sector consists of all companies covered by the analyst within the relevant sector. An analyst may cover multiple sectors.
Credit Suisse's distribution of stock ratings (and banking clients) is:
Global Ratings Distribution
Rating Versus universe (%) Of which banking clients (%)
Outperform/Buy* 43% (54% banking clients)
Neutral/Hold* 38% (47% banking clients)
Underperform/Sell* 16% (39% banking clients)
Restricted 3%
*For purposes of the NYSE and NASD ratings distribution disclosure requirements, our stock ratings of Outperform, Neutral, an d Underperform most closely correspond to Buy, Hold, and Sell, respectively; however, the meanings are not the same, as our stock ratings are determined on a relative basis. (Please refer to definitions above.) An investor's decision to buy or sell a security should be based on investment objectives, current holdin gs, and other individual factors.
Credit Suisse’s policy is to update research reports as it deems appropriate, based on developments with the subject company, the sector or the market that may have a material impact on the research views or opinions stated herein.
Credit Suisse's policy is only to publish investment research that is impartial, independent, clear, fair and not misleading. For more detail please refer to Credit Suisse's Policies for Managing Conflicts of Interest in connection with Investment Research: http://www.csfb.com/research and analytics/disclaimer/managing_conflicts_disclaimer.html
Credit Suisse does not provide any tax advice. Any statement herein regarding any US federal tax is not intended or written to be used, and cannot be used, by any taxpayer for the purposes of avoiding any penalties.
Price Target: (12 months) for Nestle (NESN.VX)
Method: Our price target is based on our APV (adjusted present value), a hybrid DCF that splits the operating cash flows (discounted at an 8.5% cost of equity), and the tax shield (discounted at the cost of debt). A terminal growth rate of 2.5% is assumed
Risk: Significant movements in raw material costs or currency can impact the business, as can irrational behaviour by either competitors or retailers. Food scares, shortages, or contamination can also impact the business.
Please refer to the firm's disclosure website at www.credit-suisse.com/researchdisclosures for the definitions of abbreviations typically used in the target price method and risk sections.
See the Companies Mentioned section for full company names
The subject company (NESN.VX) currently is, or was during the 12-month period preceding the date of distribution of this report, a client of Credit Suisse.
Credit Suisse provided investment banking services to the subject company (NESN.VX) within the past 12 months.
Credit Suisse provided non-investment banking services to the subject company (NESN.VX) within the past 12 months
Credit Suisse has managed or co-managed a public offering of securities for the subject company (NESN.VX) within the past 12 months.
Credit Suisse has received investment banking related compensation from the subject company (NESN.VX) within the past 12 months
Credit Suisse expects to receive or intends to seek investment banking related compensation from the subject company (NESN.VX) within the next 3 months.
Credit Suisse has received compensation for products and services other than investment banking services from the subject company (NESN.VX) within the past 12 months
07 March 2013
Nestle (NESN.VX) 36
As of the end of the preceding month, Credit Suisse beneficially own 1% or more of a class of common equity securities of (NESN.VX).
Important Regional Disclosures
Singapore recipients should contact Credit Suisse AG, Singapore Branch for any matters arising from this research report.
The analyst(s) involved in the preparation of this report have not visited the material operations of the subject company (NESN.VX) within the past 12 months
Restrictions on certain Canadian securities are indicated by the following abbreviations: NVS--Non-Voting shares; RVS--Restricted Voting Shares; SVS--Subordinate Voting Shares.
Individuals receiving this report from a Canadian investment dealer that is not affiliated with Credit Suisse should be advised that this report may not contain regulatory disclosures the non-affiliated Canadian investment dealer would be required to make if this were its own report.
For Credit Suisse Securities (Canada), Inc.'s policies and procedures regarding the dissemination of equity research, please visit http://www.csfb.com/legal_terms/canada_research_policy.shtml.
The following disclosed European company/ies have estimates that comply with IFRS: (NESN.VX).
Credit Suisse has sent extracts of this research report to the subject company (NESN.VX) prior to publication for the purpose of verifying factual accuracy. Based on information provided by the subject company, factual changes have been made as a result.
As of the date of this report, Credit Suisse acts as a market maker or liquidity provider in the equities securities that are the subject of this report.
Principal is not guaranteed in the case of equities because equity prices are variable.
Commission is the commission rate or the amount agreed with a customer when setting up an account or at any time after that.
To the extent this is a report authored in whole or in part by a non-U.S. analyst and is made available in the U.S., the following are important disclosures regarding any non-U.S. analyst contributors: The non-U.S. research analysts listed below (if any) are not registered/qualified as research analysts with FINRA. The non-U.S. research analysts listed below may not be associated persons of CSSU and therefore may not be subject to the NASD Rule 2711 and NYSE Rule 472 restrictions on communications with a subject company, public appearances and trading securities held by a research analyst account.
Credit Suisse Securities (Europe) Limited....................................... Alex Molloy ; Charlie Mills ; Nicolas Sochovsky ; Sanjeet Aujla ; Jimmie Bork
Important Credit Suisse HOLT Disclosures
With respect to the analysis in this report based on the Credit Suisse HOLT methodology, Credit Suisse certifies that (1) the views expressed in this report accurately reflect the Credit Suisse HOLT methodology and (2) no part of the Firm’s compensation was, is, or will be directly related to the specific views disclosed in this report
The Credit Suisse HOLT methodology does not assign ratings to a security. It is an analytical tool that involves use of a set of proprietary quantitative algorithms and warranted value calculations, collectively called the Credit Suisse HOLT valuation model, that are consistently applied to all the companies included in its database. Third-part data (including consensus earnings estimates) are systematically translated into a number of default algorithms available in the Credit Suisse HOLT valuation model. The source financial statement, pricing, and earnings data provided by outside data vendors are subject to quality control and may also be adjusted to more closely measure the underlying economics of firm performance. The adjustments provide consistency when analyzing a single company across time, or analyzing multiple companies across industries or national borders. The default scenario that is produced by the Credit Suisse HOLT valuation model establishes the baseline valuation for a security, and a user then may adjust the default variables to produce alternative scenarios, any of which could occur.
Additional information about the Credit Suisse HOLT methodology is available on request.
The Credit Suisse HOLT methodology does not assign a price target to a security. The default scenario that is produced by the Credit Suisse HOLT valuation model establishes a warranted price for a security, and as the third-party data are updated, the warranted price may also change. The default variable may also be adjusted to produce alternative warranted prices, any of which could occur.
CFROI®, HOLT, HOLTfolio, ValueSearch, AggreGator, Signal Flag and “Powered by HOLT” are trademarks or service marks or registered trademarks or registered service marks of Credit Suisse or its affiliates in the United States and other countries. HOLT is a corporate performance and valuation advisory service of Credit Suisse.
For Credit Suisse disclosure information on other companies mentioned in this report, please visit the website at www.credit-suisse.com/researchdisclosures or call +1 (877) 291-2683.
07 March 2013
Nestle (NESN.VX) 37
References in this report to Credit Suisse include all of the subsidiaries and affiliates of Credit Suisse operating under its investment banking division. For more information on our structure, please use the following link: https://www.credit-suisse.com/who_we_are/en/.This report may contain material that is not directed to, or intended for distribution to or use by, any person or entity who is a citizen or resident of or located in any locality, state, country or other jurisdiction where such distribution, publication, availability or use would be contrary to law or regulation or which would subject Credit Suisse AG or its affiliates ("CS") to any registration or licensing requirement within such jurisdiction. All material presented in this report, unless specifically indicated otherwise, is under copyright to CS. None of the material, nor its content, nor any copy of it, may be altered in any way, transmitted to, copied or distributed to any other party, without the prior express written permission of CS. All trademarks, service marks and logos used in this report are trademarks or service marks or registered trademarks or service marks of CS or its affiliates. The information, tools and material presented in this report are provided to you for information purposes only and are not to be used or considered as an offer or the solicitation of an offer to sell or to buy or subscribe for securities or other financial instruments. CS may not have taken any steps to ensure that the securities referred to in this report are suitable for any particular investor. CS will not treat recipients of this report as its customers by virtue of their receiving this report. The investments and services contained or referred to in this report may not be suitable for you and it is recommended that you consult an independent investment advisor if you are in doubt about such investments or investment services. Nothing in this report constitutes investment, legal, accounting or tax advice, or a representation that any investment or strategy is suitable or appropriate to your individual circumstances, or otherwise constitutes a personal recommendation to you. CS does not advise on the tax consequences of investments and you are advised to contact an independent tax adviser. Please note in particular that the bases and levels of taxation may change. Information and opinions presented in this report have been obtained or derived from sources believed by CS to be reliable, but CS makes no representation as to their accuracy or completeness. CS accepts no liability for loss arising from the use of the material presented in this report, except that this exclusion of liability does not apply to the extent that such liability arises under specific statutes or regulations applicable to CS. This report is not to be relied upon in substitution for the exercise of independent judgment. CS may have issued, and may in the future issue, other communications that are inconsistent with, and reach different conclusions from, the information presented in this report. Those communications reflect the different assumptions, views and analytical methods of the analysts who prepared them and CS is under no obligation to ensure that such other communications are brought to the attention of any recipient of this report. CS may, to the extent permitted by law, participate or invest in financing transactions with the issuer(s) of the securities referred to in this report, perform services for or solicit business from such issuers, and/or have a position or holding, or other material interest, or effect transactions, in such securities or options thereon, or other investments related thereto. In addition, it may make markets in the securities mentioned in the material presented in this report. CS may have, within the last three years, served as manager or co-manager of a public offering of securities for, or currently may make a primary market in issues of, any or all of the entities mentioned in this report or may be providing, or have provided within the previous 12 months, significant advice or investment services in relation to the investment concerned or a related investment. Additional information is, subject to duties of confidentiality, available on request. Some investments referred to in this report will be offered solely by a single entity and in the case of some investments solely by CS, or an associate of CS or CS may be the only market maker in such investments. Past performance should not be taken as an indication or guarantee of future performance, and no representation or warranty, express or implied, is made regarding future performance. Information, opinions and estimates contained in this report reflect a judgment at its original date of publication by CS and are subject to change without notice. The price, value of and income from any of the securities or financial instruments mentioned in this report can fall as well as rise. The value of securities and financial instruments is subject to exchange rate fluctuation that may have a positive or adverse effect on the price or income of such securities or financial instruments. Investors in securities such as ADR's, the values of which are influenced by currency volatility, effectively assume this risk. Structured securities are complex instruments, typically involve a high degree of risk and are intended for sale only to sophisticated investors who are capable of understanding and assuming the risks involved. The market value of any structured security may be affected by changes in economic, financial and political factors (including, but not limited to, spot and forward interest and exchange rates), time to maturity, market conditions and volatility, and the credit quality of any issuer or reference issuer. Any investor interested in purchasing a structured product should conduct their own investigation and analysis of the product and consult with their own professional advisers as to the risks involved in making such a purchase. Some investments discussed in this report may have a high level of volatility. High volatility investments may experience sudden and large falls in their value causing losses when that investment is realised. Those losses may equal your original investment. Indeed, in the case of some investments the potential losses may exceed the amount of initial investment and, in such circumstances, you may be required to pay more money to support those losses. Income yields from investments may fluctuate and, in consequence, initial capital paid to make the investment may be used as part of that income yield. Some investments may not be readily realisable and it may be difficult to sell or realise those investments, similarly it may prove difficult for you to obtain reliable information about the value, or risks, to which such an investment is exposed. This report may provide the addresses of, or contain hyperlinks to, websites. Except to the extent to which the report refers to website material of CS, CS has not reviewed any such site and takes no responsibility for the content contained therein. Such address or hyperlink (including addresses or hyperlinks to CS's own website material) is provided solely for your convenience and information and the content of any such website does not in any way form part of this document. Accessing such website or following such link through this report or CS's website shall be at your own risk. This report is issued and distributed in Europe (except Switzerland) by Credit Suisse Securities (Europe) Limited, One Cabot Square, London E14 4QJ, England, which is regulated in the United Kingdom by The Financial Services Authority ("FSA"). This report is being distributed in Germany by Credit Suisse Securities (Europe) This report is being distributed in the United States and Canada by Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC; in Switzerland by Credit Suisse AG; in Brazil by Banco de Investimentos Credit Suisse (Brasil) S.A or its affiliates; in Mexico by Banco Credit Suisse (México), S.A. (transactions related to the securities mentioned in this report will only be effected in compliance with applicable regulation); in Japan by Credit Suisse Securities (Japan) Limited, Financial Instruments Firm, Director-General of Kanto Local Finance Bureau (Kinsho) No. 66, a member of Japan Securities Dealers Association, The Financial Futures Association of Japan, Japan Investment Advisers Association, Type II Financial Instruments Firms Association; elsewhere in Asia/ Pacific by whichever of the following is the appropriately authorised entity in the relevant jurisdiction: Credit Suisse (Hong Kong) Limited, Credit Suisse Equities (Australia) Limited, Credit Suisse Securities (Thailand) Limited, Credit Suisse Securities (Malaysia) Sdn Bhd, Credit Suisse AG, Singapore Branch, Credit Suisse Securities (India) Private Limited regulated by the Securities and Exchange Board of India (registration Nos. INB230970637; INF230970637; INB010970631; INF010970631), having registered address at 9th Floor, Ceejay House, Dr.A.B. Road, Worli, Mumbai - 18, India, T- +91-22 6777 3777, Credit Suisse Securities (Europe) Limited, Seoul Branch, Credit Suisse AG, Taipei Securities Branch, PT Credit Suisse Securities Indonesia, Credit Suisse Securities (Philippines ) Inc., and elsewhere in the world by the relevant authorised affiliate of the above. Research on Taiwanese securities produced by Credit Suisse AG, Taipei Securities Branch has been prepared by a registered Senior Business Person. Research provided to residents of Malaysia is authorised by the Head of Research for Credit Suisse Securities (Malaysia) Sdn Bhd, to whom they should direct any queries on +603 2723 2020. This research may not conform to Canadian disclosure requirements. In jurisdictions where CS is not already registered or licensed to trade in securities, transactions will only be effected in accordance with applicable securities legislation, which will vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction and may require that the trade be made in accordance with applicable exemptions from registration or licensing requirements. Non-U.S. customers wishing to effect a transaction should contact a CS entity in their local jurisdiction unless governing law permits otherwise. U.S. customers wishing to effect a transaction should do so only by contacting a representative at Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC in the U.S. Please note that this research was originally prepared and issued by CS for distribution to their market professional and institutional investor customers. Recipients who are not market professional or institutional investor customers of CS should seek the advice of their independent financial advisor prior to taking any investment decision based on this report or for any necessary explanation of its contents. This research may relate to investments or services of a person outside of the UK or to other matters which are not regulated by the FSA or in respect of which the protections of the FSA for private customers and/or the UK compensation scheme may not be available, and further details as to where this may be the case are available upon request in respect of this report. CS may provide various services to US municipal entities or obligated persons ("municipalities"), including suggesting individual transactions or trades and entering into such transactions. Any services CS provides to municipalities are not viewed as "advice" within the meaning of Section 975 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. CS is providing any such services and related information solely on an arm's length basis and not as an advisor or fiduciary to the municipality. In connection with the provision of the any such services, there is no agreement, direct or indirect, between any municipality (including the officials, management, employees or agents thereof) and CS for CS to provide advice to the municipality. Municipalities should consult with their financial, accounting and legal advisors regarding any such services provided by CS. In addition, CS is not acting for direct or indirect compensation to solicit the municipality on behalf of an unaffiliated broker, dealer, municipal securities dealer, municipal advisor, or investment adviser for the purpose of obtaining or retaining an engagement by the municipality for or in connection with Municipal Financial Products, the issuance of municipal securities, or of an investment adviser to provide investment advisory services to or on behalf of the municipality. If this report is being distributed by a financial institution other than Credit Suisse AG, or its affiliates, that financial institution is solely responsible for distribution. Clients of that institution should contact that institution to effect a transaction in the securities mentioned in this report or require further information. This report does not constitute investment advice by Credit Suisse to the clients of the distributing financial institution, and neither Credit Suisse AG, its affiliates, and their respective officers, directors and employees accept any liability whatsoever for any direct or consequential loss arising from their use of this report or its content. Principal is not guaranteed. Commission is the commission rate or the amount agreed with a customer when setting up an account or at any time after that.
Copyright © 2013 CREDIT SUISSE AG and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
Investment principal on bonds can be eroded depending on sale price or market price. In addition, there are bonds on which investment principal can be eroded due to changes in redemption amounts. Care is required when investing in such instruments.
When you purchase non-listed Japanese fixed income securities (Japanese government bonds, Japanese municipal bonds, Japanese government guaranteed bonds, Japanese corporate bonds) from CS as a seller, you will be requested to pay the purchase price only.
XX5707EU.doc