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DISCLOSURE APPENDIX CONTAINS ANALYST CERTIFICATIONS AND THE STATUS OF NON US ANALYSTS. US Disclosure: Credit Suisse does and seeks to do business with companies covered in its research reports. As a result, investors should be aware that the Firm may have a conflict of interest that could affect the objectivity of this report. Investors should consider this report as only a single factor in making their investment decision. CREDIT SUISSE SECURITIES RESEARCH & ANALYTICS BEYOND INFORMATION ® Client-Driven Solutions, Insights, and Access 07 March 2013 Europe/Switzerland Equity Research Food Producers (Food Producers & Processors (Europe)) Nestle (NESN.VX) COMMENT Keeping its powder dry We raise our TP to CHF76 and rating to Outperform, while marginally adjusting our 2013E15E earnings on better margin progression. Nestlé has been consistentwhether looking at 3, 5, 10, or 15 years, it has average organic EBITA growth of 8.75% pa. In this report we look at how this can be broadly maintained while adding a greater focus on returns. Nestlé can be viewed as two distinct parts. A high growth, high margin, high return ‘legacy’ powders business (brands: Nescafe, Milo, NAN), 45% of 2012 sales, and a non-powders business (frozen food, water, ice cream), for which the reverse is the case. The powders business has seen heavy investment in developing market capacity, start-up innovations (launch of Dolce Gusto) and escalation in commodity prices diluting margins and returns progression. We see these factors easing in the coming 1224 months. The rest of the group has seen significant invested capital sunk over the last 12 years, yet growth, margins and returns are below the group average. We calculate 20-25% of Nestlé’s invested capital does not cover the group WACC, all in this part of the business. But increasingly the group is focusing on cash flow and returns (as is remuneration). There are several businesses here that we expect to be scrutinised. The stock trades at parity with staples peers on a PER basis, but at a discount on our return screens. The increased focus on returns, and their improvement, can, in our opinion, re-rate the stock relative to its peers. Combining a re-rating with mid-quartile TSR +11% pa to staples peers, should deliver outperformance. We raise our APV-derived target price to CHF76 and rating to Outperform. Share price performance 47 52 57 62 Mar-11 Jul-11 Nov-11 Mar-12 Jul-12 Nov-12 Price Price relative The price relative chart measures performance against the SMI PRICE which closed at 7740.3 on 05/03/13 On 05/03/13 the spot exchange rate was SFr1.23/Eu 1. - Eu .77/US$1 Performance Over 1M 3M 12M Absolute (%) 5.4 9.3 20.4 Relative (%) 0.3 -2.7 -7.6 Financial and valuation metrics Year 12/12A 12/13E 12/14E 12/15E Revenue (SFr m) 92,186 98,529 104,601 111,100 EBITDA (SFr m) 17,162 18,173 19,551 21,042 Adjusted Net Income (SFr m) 10,493.5 11,112.1 12,115.5 13,214.2 CS adj. EPS (SFr) 3.29 3.46 3.74 4.05 Prev. EPS (SFr) 3.42 3.70 4.01 ROIC (%) 12.90 13.48 14.42 15.42 P/E (adj., x) 20.3 19.3 17.8 16.5 P/E rel. (%) 130 134 138 142 EV/EBITDA 12.9 11.9 10.9 10.0 Dividend (2012E, SFr) 2.17 IC (12/13E, SFr m) 80,356.44 Dividend yield (%) 3.3 EV/IC 2.7 Net debt (12/13E, SFr m) 14,205.6 Net debt/equity (12/13E, %) 21.5 Free float (%) 100.0 BV/share (12/13E, SFr) 20.1 Number of shares (m) 3,224.80 Source: FTI, Company data, Thomson Reuters, Credit Suisse Securities (EUROPE) LTD. Estimates. Rating (from Neutral) OUTPERFORM* Price (05 Mar 13, SFr) 66.60 Target price (SFr) (from 62.00) 76.00¹ Market cap. (SFr m) 214,771.68 Enterprise value (SFr m) 216,866.7 *Stock ratings are relative to the coverage universe in each analyst's or each team's respective sector. ¹Target price is for 12 months. Research Analysts Nicolas Sochovsky 44 20 7883 8075 [email protected] Charlie Mills 44 20 7888 0325 [email protected] Alex Molloy 41 44 333 05 83 [email protected] Sanjeet Aujla 44 20 7888 0353 [email protected] Jimmie Bork 44 20 7883 9941 [email protected]
Transcript
Page 1: Nestle - Credit Suisse

DISCLOSURE APPENDIX CONTAINS ANALYST CERTIFICATIONS AND THE STATUS OF NON US ANALYSTS. US Disclosure: Credit Suisse does and seeks to do business with companies covered in its research reports. As a result, investors should be aware that the Firm may have a conflict of interest that could affect the objectivity of this report. Investors should consider this report as only a single factor in making their investment decision.

CREDIT SUISSE SECURITIES RESEARCH & ANALYTICS BEYOND INFORMATION®

Client-Driven Solutions, Insights, and Access

07 March 2013

Europe/Switzerland

Equity Research

Food Producers (Food Producers & Processors (Europe))

Nestle (NESN.VX) COMMENT

Keeping its powder dry

We raise our TP to CHF76 and rating to Outperform, while marginally

adjusting our 2013E–15E earnings on better margin progression.

■ Nestlé has been consistent—whether looking at 3, 5, 10, or 15 years, it has

average organic EBITA growth of 8.75% pa. In this report we look at how

this can be broadly maintained while adding a greater focus on returns.

■ Nestlé can be viewed as two distinct parts. A high growth, high margin, high

return ‘legacy’ powders business (brands: Nescafe, Milo, NAN), 45% of 2012

sales, and a non-powders business (frozen food, water, ice cream), for

which the reverse is the case.

■ The powders business has seen heavy investment in developing market

capacity, start-up innovations (launch of Dolce Gusto) and escalation in

commodity prices diluting margins and returns progression. We see these

factors easing in the coming 12–24 months.

■ The rest of the group has seen significant invested capital sunk over the last

12 years, yet growth, margins and returns are below the group average. We

calculate 20-25% of Nestlé’s invested capital does not cover the group

WACC, all in this part of the business. But increasingly the group is focusing

on cash flow and returns (as is remuneration). There are several businesses

here that we expect to be scrutinised.

■ The stock trades at parity with staples peers on a PER basis, but at a

discount on our return screens. The increased focus on returns, and their

improvement, can, in our opinion, re-rate the stock relative to its peers.

Combining a re-rating with mid-quartile TSR +11% pa to staples peers,

should deliver outperformance. We raise our APV-derived target price to

CHF76 and rating to Outperform.

Share price performance

47

52

57

62

Mar-11 Jul-11 Nov-11 Mar-12 Jul-12 Nov-12

Price Price relative

The price relative chart measures performance against the SMI

PRICE which closed at 7740.3 on 05/03/13

On 05/03/13 the spot exchange rate was SFr1.23/Eu 1. -

Eu .77/US$1

Performance Over 1M 3M 12M Absolute (%) 5.4 9.3 20.4 Relative (%) 0.3 -2.7 -7.6

Financial and valuation metrics

Year 12/12A 12/13E 12/14E 12/15E Revenue (SFr m) 92,186 98,529 104,601 111,100 EBITDA (SFr m) 17,162 18,173 19,551 21,042 Adjusted Net Income (SFr m) 10,493.5 11,112.1 12,115.5 13,214.2 CS adj. EPS (SFr) 3.29 3.46 3.74 4.05 Prev. EPS (SFr) — 3.42 3.70 4.01 ROIC (%) 12.90 13.48 14.42 15.42 P/E (adj., x) 20.3 19.3 17.8 16.5 P/E rel. (%) 130 134 138 142 EV/EBITDA 12.9 11.9 10.9 10.0

Dividend (2012E, SFr) 2.17 IC (12/13E, SFr m) 80,356.44 Dividend yield (%) 3.3 EV/IC 2.7 Net debt (12/13E, SFr m) 14,205.6 Net debt/equity (12/13E, %) 21.5 Free float (%) 100.0 BV/share (12/13E, SFr) 20.1 Number of shares (m) 3,224.80

Source: FTI, Company data, Thomson Reuters, Credit Suisse Securities (EUROPE) LTD. Estimates.

Rating (from Neutral) OUTPERFORM* Price (05 Mar 13, SFr) 66.60 Target price (SFr) (from 62.00) 76.00¹ Market cap. (SFr m) 214,771.68 Enterprise value (SFr m) 216,866.7

*Stock ratings are relative to the coverage universe in each

analyst's or each team's respective sector.

¹Target price is for 12 months.

Research Analysts

Nicolas Sochovsky

44 20 7883 8075

[email protected]

Charlie Mills

44 20 7888 0325

[email protected]

Alex Molloy

41 44 333 05 83

[email protected]

Sanjeet Aujla

44 20 7888 0353

[email protected]

Jimmie Bork

44 20 7883 9941

[email protected]

Page 2: Nestle - Credit Suisse

07 March 2013

Nestle (NESN.VX) 2

Nestle NESN.VX Price (05 Mar 13): SFr66.60, Rating: (from Neutral) OUTPERFORM, Target Price: SFr(from 62.00) 76.00

Income statement (SFr m) 12/12A 12/13E 12/14E 12/15E

Sales revenue 92,186 98,529 104,601 111,100 EBITDA 17,162 18,173 19,551 21,042 Depr. & amort. (3,150) (3,337) (3,515) (3,706) EBIT (CS) 14,012 14,836 16,036 17,336 Net interest exp. (481) (682) (576) (420) Associates — — — — Other adj, — — — — PBT (CS) 13,531 14,154 15,460 16,916 Income taxes (3,451) (3,822) (4,174) (4,567) Profit after tax 10,080 10,333 11,285 12,349 Minorities (449) (471) (519) (570) Preferred dividends — — — — Associates & other 863 1,251 1,349 1,436 Net profit (CS) 10,494 11,112 12,115 13,214 Other NPAT adjustments 117 — — — Reported net income 10,611 11,112 12,115 13,214

Cash flow (SFr) 12/12A 12/13E 12/14E 12/15E

EBIT 14,012 14,836 16,036 17,336 Net interest (454) (482) (376) (220) Cash taxes paid (3,201) (3,822) (4,174) (4,567) Change in working capital 1,988 (170) (100) (110) Other cash & non-cash items 3,427 3,337 3,515 3,706 Cash flow from operations 15,772 13,699 14,901 16,145 CAPEX (5,135) (4,328) (4,608) (4,909) Free cash flow to the firm 10,637 9,371 10,292 11,236 Acquisitions (10,918) — — — Divestments 274 1,237 130 130 Other investment/(outflows) 2,302 — — — Cash flow from investments (14,053) (3,689) (5,100) (5,425) Net share issue/(repurchase) 667 — — — Dividends paid (6,439) (6,532) (6,958) (7,435) Issuance (retirement) of debt — — — — Other 446 468 492 516 Cash flow from financing activities

(5,326) (6,064) (6,466) (6,919) Effect of exchange rates (226) — — — Changes in Net Cash/Debt (3,833) 3,946 3,334 3,801 . Net debt at start 14,319 18,152 14,206 10,871 Change in net debt 3,833 (3,946) (3,334) (3,801) Net debt at end 18,152 14,206 10,871 7,071

Balance sheet (SFr m) 12/12A 12/13E 12/14E 12/15E

Assets Cash and cash equivalents 9,425 13,371 16,706 20,506 Accounts receivable 14,432 15,425 16,376 17,393 Inventory 9,125 9,753 10,354 10,997 Other current assets 2,223 1,488 1,544 1,603 Total current assets 35,205 40,037 44,979 50,500 Total fixed assets 26,903 28,932 31,086 33,374 Intangible assets and goodwill 46,258 46,162 46,066 45,970 Investment securities — — — — Other assets 17,863 18,063 18,254 18,459 Total assets 126,229 133,194 140,385 148,302 Liabilities Accounts payable 14,455 15,450 16,402 17,421 Short-term debt 18,568 18,568 18,568 18,568 Other short term liabilities 5,288 5,652 6,000 6,373 Total current liabilities 38,311 39,669 40,970 42,362 Long-term debt 9,009 9,009 9,009 9,009 Other liabilities 16,305 18,365 20,101 21,946 Total liabilities 63,625 67,043 70,080 73,317 Shareholders' equity 60,947 64,494 68,648 73,328 Minority interest 1,657 1,657 1,657 1,657 Total equity & liabilities 126,229 133,194 140,385 148,302 Net debt (SFr m) 18,152 14,206 10,871 7,071

Per share data 12/12A 12/13E 12/14E 12/15E

No. of shares (wtd avg) 3,192 3,214 3,240 3,266 CS adj. EPS (SFr) 3.29 3.46 3.74 4.05 Prev. EPS (SFr) — 3.42 3.70 4.01 Dividend (SFr) 2.05 2.17 2.30 2.44 Dividend payout ratio 62.37 62.85 61.60 60.35 Free cash flow per share (SFr)

3.33 2.92 3.18 3.44

Key ratios and valuation

12/12A 12/13E 12/14E 12/15E

Growth(%) Sales 10.2 6.9 6.2 6.2 EBIT 11.8 5.9 8.1 8.1 Net profit 11.3 5.9 9.0 9.1 EPS 11.7 5.2 8.2 8.2 Margins (%) EBITDA margin 18.6 18.4 18.7 18.9 EBIT margin 15.2 15.1 15.3 15.6 Pretax margin 14.7 14.4 14.8 15.2 Net margin 11.4 11.3 11.6 11.9 Valuation metrics (x) EV/sales 2.4 2.2 2.0 1.9 EV/EBITDA 12.9 11.9 10.9 10.0 EV/EBIT 15.8 14.6 13.3 12.1 P/E 20.3 19.3 17.8 16.5 P/B 3.5 3.3 3.1 3.0 Asset turnover 0.73 0.74 0.75 0.75 ROE analysis (%) ROE stated-return on equity

18.0 17.7 18.2 18.6 ROIC 12.9 13.5 14.4 15.4 Interest burden 0.97 0.95 0.96 0.98 Tax rate 25.7 27.0 27.0 27.0 Financial leverage 0.45 0.43 0.40 0.38 Credit ratios (%) Net debt/equity 29.0 21.5 15.5 9.4 Net debt/EBITDA 1.1 0.8 0.6 0.3 Interest coverage ratio 29.1 21.8 27.8 41.3

Source: FTI, Company data, Thomson Reuters, Credit Suisse Securities

(EUROPE) LTD. Estimates.

47

52

57

62

Mar-11 Jul-11 Nov-11 Mar-12 Jul-12 Nov-12

Price Price relative

The price relative chart measures performance against the SMI PRICE which

closed at 7740.3 on 05/03/13

On 05/03/13 the spot exchange rate was SFr1.23/Eu 1. - Eu .77/US$1

Page 3: Nestle - Credit Suisse

07 March 2013

Nestle (NESN.VX) 3

Key charts Figure 1: Whether looked at over 3, 5, 10, 15yrs the group

has averaged organic EBITA growth of 8.75% pa and the

components behind it have been very steady

Figure 2: Powders: 45% of 2012 sales with over 20%

margin and higher growth than group average, given 65%

of sales in developing markets …

0.0%

1.0%

2.0%

3.0%

4.0%

5.0%

6.0%

7.0%

8.0%

9.0%

10.0%

3yr CAGR 5 yr CAGR 10 yr CAGR 15 yr CAGR

RIG Price margin progression

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

Developed market Developing market

Source: Company data, Credit Suisse research Source: Credit Suisse research, Company data

Figure 3: …means Nestlé’s overall developing market

margins are above the group average, driving positive

geographic mix (2012)

Figure 4: …Non-powders operations still have room for

improvement in margin and returns, we estimate 20-25% of

group’s invested capital not covering cost of capital

Nestle

L'OrealUnilever

Reckitt

Henkel

Beiersdorf

ABI

SABCarlsberg

Danone

Pernod

Diageo

IMPS

BAT

Colgate

Kraft

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50%

Deve

lope

d w

orld

mar

gin

Developing market margin

Emerging market margins higher

0

2000

4000

6000

8000

10000

12000

14000

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

Inve

ste

d C

ap

ital (

CH

F, 0

00

's)

RO

IC, 2

01

2

Invested capital ROIC

20-25% of group's invested capital < cost of capital

Source: Company data, Credit Suisse estimates Source: Company data, Credit Suisse research

Figure 5: Forecast increased emphasis on returns should

result in step up in returns, most pronounced on ex

goodwill basis

Figure 6: …based on 2016 forecasts on an EV/IC to

ROIC/WACC basis Nestlé looks undervalued relative to

peers

0.0%

5.0%

10.0%

15.0%

20.0%

25.0%

2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014E 2016E

ROIC excluding goodwill ROIC including goodwill

Nestle

Carlsberg

SAB

Diageo

Pernod

Danone

ABI

Unilever

Henkel

L'OrealReckitt

Oriflame

R² = 0.9522

0.5

1.0

1.5

2.0

2.5

3.0

0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5

EV

/IC

ROIC/WACC

Overvalued relative to

sector

Undervalued relative

to sector

Source: Company data, Credit Suisse estimates Source: Company data, Credit Suisse estimates

Page 4: Nestle - Credit Suisse

07 March 2013

Nestle (NESN.VX) 4

Table of contents Nestle NESN.VX 2 Key charts 3 Background—2000, a crossroads for Nestlé 5 The pow(d)er behind group performance 9 Non-powders 13 Focus on capital 18

ROIC by sub category—renewed management focus 18 Working capital, an opportunity? 21 What does this view of Nestlé tell us? 22

Modelling Nestlé 23 1: What is the likelihood of it selling L’Oreal stake? 23 2: 2013 outlook 24 3: Long term: more A&P? 24 Longer-term outlook 25

Nestlé valuation 28 Credit Suisse PEERs 33

Page 5: Nestle - Credit Suisse

07 March 2013

Nestle (NESN.VX) 5

Background—2000, a crossroads for Nestlé In early 2000, Peter Brabeck-Letmathe, at the time CEO of Nestlé for three years,

presented a paper to the Board that set out his vision of transforming the company—that it

could become a food, cosmetic and pharmaceutical company, and at the heart of this

strategic change, the group would/should take a majority stake in L’Oréal.

This was a far-reaching and significant change for what had historically been an extremely

conservative company, and was rejected by the board of directors and the bankers.

However it resonated with many, and a watered-down approach was adopted as Nestlé

set off in the direction of “Health, Wellness and Nutrition”.

Incidentally this is part of the reason why we believe Nestlé is unlikely to buy L’Oréal,

together with the limited overlap, synergies, etc. But more on that later.

It seems easy to point to this fundamental trend in the food industry today, but had

investors known at the time how radical the changes were about to be at Nestlé, they

might have been more than a little surprised.

A step up in M&A followed

As Figure 7 shows, between 2000 and 2012, Nestlé’s M&A activity stepped up. Most of

the focus was on the group’s non-powders operations. These businesses were sub-scale,

with low growth, low margins and low returns. Over that period Nestlé has spent over

CHF70bn largely (but not exclusively) on building out these areas, gaining critical mass.

Some areas have not fitted—there has been CHF47bn of disposals as well (largely but not

exclusively Alcon at CHF39bn).

Page 6: Nestle - Credit Suisse

07 March 2013

Nestle (NESN.VX) 6

Figure 7: M&A history

1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s 2010s

Non-powders

Pet Food Friskies (1985) Alpo (1994) Ralston Purina

(2001)

Spillers (1998) Waggin Train

(2010)

Ice Cream Motta (1993) Dreyers (2003)

Scholler (2001)

Haagen-Dazs

(2001)

Movenpick

(2003)

Water Perrier (1992)

San Pellegrino

(1998)

Chilled Dairy Chambourcy

(1978)

Nutrition Powerbar

(2000)

Vitaflo (2010)

Jenny Craig

(2006)

Prometheus

(2011)

Novartis Medical

(2007)

Q Med (2011)

Gerber (2007) Chi Med (2012)

Frozen/chilled Food Stouffer (1973) Buitoni (1988) Chef America

(2002)

Kraft Pizza

(2010)

Thomy (1971)

Stakes L'Oreal (1974)

Alcon (1977)

Confectionery Rowntree

(1988)

Hsu Fu Chi

(2011)

Powders

Infant milk formula Wyeth (2012)

Milk Yinlu Foods

(2011)

Source: Company data, Credit Suisse research

Despite the material M&A the powders operations, what might be described as its legacy

businesses of coffee, culinary (Maggi), milk powders, powdered beverages and infant

nutrition remain significant. As Figure 8 shows, the powders operations still account for

45% of its sales (2012) and we estimate over 55% of profits.

Page 7: Nestle - Credit Suisse

07 March 2013

Nestle (NESN.VX) 7

Figure 8: Nestlé sales breakdown 2012

Chocolate11%

Cereals

1%

Frozen food

7%

Chilled food2%

Petfood

12%

Ice Cream

5%

Nutrition

3%

Coffee Creamers

2%

Water

8%

Nespresso

4%

Coffee

11%

Powdered beverages

6%

Milk Powder

12%

Infant Formula

9%

Culinary/Ambient

7%

Powders

45%

Source: Company data, Credit Suisse estimates

This report

A decade of expanding through acquisition and organically has built a better business.

Indeed Nestlé has an extremely consistent record over any time frame. Whether looked at

over 3, 5, 10 or 15 years the group has averaged organic EBITA growth of 8.75%, and the

components behind that have also been markedly steady.

Figure 9: Components to organic EBITA growth, 3yr vs 5yr, 10yr and 15yr

0.0%

1.0%

2.0%

3.0%

4.0%

5.0%

6.0%

7.0%

8.0%

9.0%

10.0%

3yr CAGR 5 yr CAGR 10 yr CAGR 15 yr CAGR

RIG Price margin progression

Source: Company data, Credit Suisse research

Page 8: Nestle - Credit Suisse

07 March 2013

Nestle (NESN.VX) 8

For 10 years investors have focused on the organic performance, be it RIG, organic

growth or margin.

What has been most striking of late is the increasing commentary coming from Nestlé on

returns.

■ At the Shanghai investor presentation working capital was very much front of mind.

Virtually every presentation by the business units focused on it.

■ On the full year roadshow the group was talking more about return on capital and

capital allocation than before.

This is not meant to imply that ROIC has not been an important metric in the past, but

rather we think it is becoming increasingly important in decision-making at the group. We

see no better way of illustrating this than in 2013 management remuneration, which will be

based on growth, EBITA, FCF (previously working capital) and, for the first time, return on

capital.

So we divide our thoughts on Nestlé into two distinct parts:

■ The high growth, high margin, high return legacy powders businesses.

■ The rest of the group, where significant invested capital has been sunk over the last

12 years, and growth and margins are below group average as indeed are returns.

What are the implications of this?

Page 9: Nestle - Credit Suisse

07 March 2013

Nestle (NESN.VX) 9

The pow(d)er behind group performance Powders are the easiest product form in which to transport and sell branded food (long

shelf life, multiple pack sizes, production scale). The result—Nestlé was able to rapidly

globalise its reach, even in the early part of the last century. Nestlé built, organically,

global leadership in these categories, meaning the high margins translate into very high

returns.

Powders – higher growth

Although the brands are old (Nescafe is 75 years old in 2013) the powder operations

growth profile benefits from 65% of 2012 sales being in developing markets.

Figure 10: Developed versus developing market split by category

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

Developed market Developing market

Source: Company data, Credit Suisse estimates

Driven by the powder franchises’ dominant market share, Nestlé’s developing market

sales growth rate has been particularly strong in the last two years, as it recouped the

spike in raw material price inflation without great volume slippage.

Figure 11: Nestlé’s developing market sales growth versus peers

0.0%

2.0%

4.0%

6.0%

8.0%

10.0%

12.0%

14.0%

16.0%

Sector average developed market growth Nestle's developing market growth

Source: Company data, Credit Suisse research

Page 10: Nestle - Credit Suisse

07 March 2013

Nestle (NESN.VX) 10

This meant Nestlé’s growth accelerated above its global peers’ developing market growth

rates. Importantly, organic investment (capex) is now being spent behind the high

returning powders franchises—powdered beverages now accounts for 25% of capex

spend 2012 double the rate of five years ago.

The mind-set change and the growth opportunity is best summed up, in our view, by an

increasingly used measurement at Nestlé—capacity availability—rather than capacity

utilisation, as plants that wait until their utilisation rates reach 85% in markets that are

growing at 20% pa will constrain the company's future growth. The recent pull back to peer

group growth rates in developing markets is a reflection of the normalisation in pricing as

cost inflation is set to be immaterial in 2013.

Powders—high margin

The powder operation’s structurally high EBITA margins explain why Nestlé’s developing

market operations generate higher EBITA margins than the group average. The result—

Nestlé does not suffer from negative geographic mix, unlike the majority of its food and

beverage peers.

Figure 12: Powders operating performance versus non-powders

CoffeePowdered Bev

Milk Powders

Infant NutritionCulinary/Ambient

Nespresso

WaterCoffee Creamers

NutritionIce Cream Cereals

Chilled Foods

Frozen

PetfoodChocolate

-5.0%

0.0%

5.0%

10.0%

15.0%

20.0%

25.0%

0.0% 5.0% 10.0% 15.0% 20.0% 25.0% 30.0% 35.0%

2009

-12

Sal

es C

AG

R

EBITA Margins 2012

Powders faster growth and

higher margins - ac 45% of

sales and 55% of EBITA

Non-powders lower growth

and margins - ac 55% of

sales and 45% of EBITA.

Source: Company data, Credit Suisse estimates

Page 11: Nestle - Credit Suisse

07 March 2013

Nestle (NESN.VX) 11

Figure 13: Developing market vs developed market margins (2012)

Nestle

L'OrealUnilever

Reckitt

Henkel

Beiersdorf

ABI

SABCarlsberg

Danone

Pernod

Diageo

IMPS

BAT

Colgate

Kraft

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50%

De

velo

pe

d w

orl

d m

argi

n

Emerging market margin

Emerging market margins higher

Source: Company data, Credit Suisse estimates

The heavy investment in emerging market capacity (greenfield sites in Africa), start-up

innovations such as the global roll out of Nescafe Dolce Gusto (made a small profit in

2012 on CHF1bn in sales five years after launch) and the escalation in commodity prices

diluted the powder franchises EBITA margin progression. We estimate in aggregate the

powder franchises margins have fallen by circa 150bp. We calculate that a recovery in

the powder franchises margins to their previous high translates into group wide

margin uplift of circa 75bp.

Figure 14: Change in powdered franchises EBITA margins

0.0%

5.0%

10.0%

15.0%

20.0%

25.0%

30.0%

35.0%

2007 2012 Group margin pre unaollcated items 2012

Source: Company data, Credit Suisse estimates. Note 2007 adjusted for change to IFRS accounting

(netting off of trade promo form sales)

Powders margins have

fallen in last few years given

focus on sales growth

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Nestle (NESN.VX) 12

Summary

So Powders have:

■ Higher growth

■ Higher Emerging Market exposure

■ Higher margins

■ And higher returns

This last point we have not yet touched on, but will do so in the section below. It is

instructive to look at the returns in these legacy businesses when looking at those in

businesses that have been built out over the last 10-12 years, where the invested capital

has significantly increased.

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Nestle (NESN.VX) 13

Non-powders Non-powders: Sales growth

The significant investment (M&A) in non-powders of the last decade+ has built out these

businesses and given them critical mass. However it has not added incrementally to

Nestlé’s group growth. Looking at the last 2 years in isolation, it is striking that all these

areas (Nespresso the exception) have shown less organic growth than the legacy/core

powders businesses.

Figure 15: Powders vs non powders organic sales growth, 2010-12

-5.0%

0.0%

5.0%

10.0%

15.0%

20.0%

25.0%

Source: Company data, Credit Suisse estimates

In part this reflects the Developed Market skew in these businesses—we repeat the chart

showing these non-powder businesses in Figure 16, which highlights only c20% of non-

powder sales are in Emerging markets compared to powders, which are two-thirds

Emerging Markets.

Figure 16: Developed versus developing market split by category

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

Developed market Developing market

Source: Company data, Credit Suisse estimates

Non-powders over-skewed

to developed markets

impacting sales growth

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Nestle (NESN.VX) 14

Perhaps it is fairer instead to compare Nestlé’s organic growth in the developed world with

that of its peers—which shows Nestlé has got consistently more from these mature

developed economies than its peers, outperforming the sector quarter in, quarter out.

Figure 17: Nestlé’s developed market organic sales growth rate versus peers

-2.0%

-1.0%

0.0%

1.0%

2.0%

3.0%

4.0%

5.0%

6.0%

7.0%

8.0%

Sector average developed market growth Nestle's Developed market growth

Source: Company data, Credit Suisse research

Margin: Non-powders margin

In contrast to the powders business, the non-powders have seen improved returns

(margins) over the past five years.

■ Over the period, non-powders’ margin progression has slowed to +50bp pa, after more

sizeable changes between 1996 and 2008.

■ This is primarily due to the end of the material portfolio change, which saw the

acquisition of higher value-added segments (nutrition, dry pet food) and the sale of

commoditised/structurally weak assets (chilled dairy/Trinks).

■ We believe the portfolio could be set for a more radical portfolio change than in the

last five years. Nestlé is now putting together a common language framework that can

be used from the Executive Board to each BEM (Business Executive Manager) who

runs each business cell (i.e. coffee in China).

■ This should enable a more factual, granular framework for seeing where the value is

and where it can be created in the future. At the FY12 results roadshow and investor

meetings CEO Paul Bulcke commented 'we are sharpening our pen' on looking at the

portfolio and Wan Ling Martello, the new CFO, talks about management being more

unforgiving to underperforming cells.

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Nestle (NESN.VX) 15

Figure 18: Non-powders EBITA margin 2007 vs 2011

0.0%

5.0%

10.0%

15.0%

20.0%

25.0%

2007 2012 Group margin pre unaollcated items 2012

Source: Company data, Credit Suisse estimates. Note 2007 adjusted for change to IFRS accounting

(netting off of trade promo form sales)

The spread in EBITA margins amongst the non-powder categories is wide. Management

needs to continue to tackle those categories, see Figure 18 (ice cream, water, cereals,

frozen and chilled foods), where EBITA margins are well below the group average.

By way of illustration we estimate lifting these categories margins to the group average,

represents a 200bp uplift to group margins.

How achievable is this? We divide the categories into those with structural problems and

those in investment phase.

Categories in investment phase, 8% of group sales

Nutrition, primarily Nestlé Health Science (sales CHF1.6bn), is an area of key strategic

importance. Under the leadership of Nestlé veteran Luis Cantarell, the business has been

rapidly acquiring capabilities. The acquisitions of Vitaflo, CM&D and Prometheus are all

aimed at increasing the division's focus on specialised nutrition needs and disease

modifying nutrition, namely, gastrointestinal, brain and metabolic diseases. The medium-

term goal is for the division to become a value creator for Nestlé rather than a major

contributor to the group's volumes and sales growth—in a similar manner to Alcon, which

generated 7% of group sales in 2009 but when sold was worth over 15% of Nestlé's

market cap. Already, part of the remuneration of the employees in the Health Science

division is with phantom equity, linked to the performance of nutritional rather than staples

peers.

On the margin, a peer such as Danone’s clinical nutrition division generates margins of

over 18% compared to Nestlé Health Science margins of 16%. This is primarily due to the

high fixed cost Jenny Craig, weight management business, dragging down margins

because of weak demand.

Cereal Partners Worldwide (CPW) and Nespresso are on aggressive geographic roll-outs.

In those markets where CPW and Nespresso have achieved critical mass and leadership

positions, margins are above the group average. For example, in France and Switzerland,

Nespresso accounts for nearly 30% of the total profit pool of the coffee market, meaning

margins are close to coffee levels and overall Nespresso margins are at the group

average, despite the heavy roll out costs. Cereals margins are far lower in their mature

markets than Nespresso and so overall margins are lower than the group.

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Nestle (NESN.VX) 16

Categories with structural issues, 23% of group sales

Nestlé has made progress in improving ice cream’s profitability from very low levels.

However, it remains a long way off the group average. In the US, the bulk of the business

is in the take-home tub market, a market to which Nestlé is committed with the purchase of

Dreyers for CHF4bn in 2003. At the time of the acquisition, Dreyers’ margins were 4-5%—

they have risen since as Nestlé invested in coast to coast production and it was integrated

into Nestlé’s frozen pizza direct store delivery (DSD) system. But, margins remain single

digit as for too long Nestlé (Dreyers) and Unilever (Breyers), the Number 1 and 2 in the

market, have spent their marketing dollars on trade promotion reinforcing the

commoditisation of the category. Over the last year, they have both recognised this and

are focusing their initiatives on premiumising the category, via innovation. Nestlé is looking

to refocus on the ‘slow churn’ technology first launched in the late 2000s.

In Europe, the challenge is different. The market is predominantly impulse, making it highly

seasonal, translating into high stock levels, low annual capacity utilisation rates and high

distribution costs. Management has exited a number of loss-making markets in Europe but

medium term, we think a solution is to invest in smoothing out the seasonality by

positioning ice cream as an everyday dessert.

These actions in the US and Europe point to a period of investment in brand equity rather

than capital—if this fails we believe the probability of an exit from larger cells in ice cream,

such as Dreyers rises. Unilever’s ice cream division, the global leader, which is further

down the road on this strategy generates margins of circa 10% compared to Nestlé’s 8%.

Frozen food is an historically strong business for Nestlé, with dominant shares in the US

(over a third of the market) and high-teen margins leading to plenty of capital being

deployed to the division (Chef America/Kraft frozen pizza acquired for CHF7.7bn in the

last decade). The division’s high fixed cost DSD system is a competitive advantage but the

slow reaction of Nestlé to changing US consumer demands (to value packs from single

serve), a lack of innovation and increased trade promotion has hurt sales growth and

margins. Nestlé is now taking a more selective approach to the DSD model, looking at the

cost/benefit of it on state by state basis. More importantly, management recognises the

need to invest back into the category via higher innovation and media support, which will

dilute near term margins. Similar actions in the UK suggest this strategy does not

necessarily work, and led to Nestlé exiting the category. The US prepared food operations

margins of Heinz or Kraft’s are in the high teens compared to Nestlé’s 14-15%.

Water suffers from too much capacity in Europe as it is difficult to close down given each

brand comes from its own local source. Management’s original plan to tighten capacity

had been to use the multi-sourced, low priced spring water brand, Pure Life. But,

supermarkets In Europe did not want Nestlé undercutting their private label offering. In the

US, Nestlé won volume share from Coke/Pepsi, which now stands at over 40%—more

than double the combined share of the cola giants. This came at a cost to Nestlé and the

industry’s retail prices fell by 30% in the last decade, more than offsetting any cost savings

and volume gains. Private label is now the clear number two in the US market, with over

30% volume share meaning promotion remains too prominent a feature.

After a decade of heavy capital investment in the US (water in 2005 accounted for +20%

of total group capex), in the last few years, Nestlé has been investing in raising its

developing market exposure. It remains under-indexed in the developing markets, at 20%

of sales. These markets lack state investment in clean water supply, meaning bottled

water operators are capable of generating mid teen margins. Danone’s water business

generates higher growth and EBITA margins, 13% post unallocated items, due to a better

geographic skew, 60% of sales in developing markets, and increasingly product skew,

over 30% of sales sold as ‘Aquadrinks’—flavoured water—which sell at ~50% premium to

bottled water. We do not expect Nestlé to shift the focus to ‘Aquadrink’s’, but rather to

focus on the fact fresh water is an undervalued asset, given its increased scarcity. By

2030 demand for water is forecast to be 50% higher than today (source Water Resources

Page 17: Nestle - Credit Suisse

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Nestle (NESN.VX) 17

Group 2009) and withdrawals could exceed natural renewal by over 60%, resulting in

water scarcity for a third of the world’s population. Nestlé’s current water margins are 9.4%.

Figure 19: Margin comparison of Nestlé categories to best in class (2012)

0.0%

2.0%

4.0%

6.0%

8.0%

10.0%

12.0%

14.0%

16.0%

18.0%

20.0%

Frozen food Nutrition Cereals Water Ice cream

Nestle margin Uplift to best in class

Source: Company data, Credit Suisse estimates

Chilled Food is primarily a European operation and is a category where we have difficulty

seeing the value-added contribution that a branded player brings. The problem is the

trade-off between automation and innovation. The complexity of a 'ready meal' offering

(the horsemeat scare highlights this point from supply chain aspect) means that

automating the process is very difficult and those categories where it is possible, such as

pizzas, have become commoditised. More complex offerings, especially if quality is not to

be affected, require less automation and far higher labour costs, making margin

progression something of a predicament.

We estimate if Nestlé’s margins rose to their relevant best in class peers margins

for the structurally challenged categories, and to the group average for cereals and

nutrition, group wide margins would rise by circa 100bp.

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Nestle (NESN.VX) 18

Focus on capital So we have concluded that the last decade has seen:

■ Sales growth driven by Powders

■ Margin growth driven by the acquired non-powder businesses

■ Nestlé has historically downplayed the impact of the M&A component within its

operating model, highlighting net M&A has been a negligible contributor to sales

growth, with a 10 year CAGR of 1%, compared to organic sales growth of 6.1% pa.

■ However, the impact of M&A on the balance sheet has been material. In the last ten

years, the cumulative capex spend has been CHF18bn, delivering organic sales

growth of 6% pa.

■ The cumulative net capital outlay on M&A over the ten year period has been CHF

40.5bn.

■ This M&A outlay has seen returns including goodwill fall…

■ …while returns pre-goodwill have been held back by a focus on growth over margins

in powders.

Figure 20: ROIC Pre Alcon/L’Oreal, including and excluding goodwill, 2002-12

0.0%

5.0%

10.0%

15.0%

20.0%

25.0%

2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012

ROIC excluding goodwill ROIC including goodwill

Source: Company data, Credit Suisse estimates

As we touched on earlier, the message from the company seems increasingly to be

focusing on returns.

ROIC by sub category—renewed management focus

We have attempted to break down the return by sub-category. As Figure 21 shows:

■ the powder franchises generate high returns. The exception is infant nutrition where

the recent acquisition of Gerber and Wyeth has diluted returns.

■ The non-powders franchises generate far lower returns with a number of categories

returns below the cost of capital—namely ice cream, cereals, frozen food, nutrition and

water.

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Nestle (NESN.VX) 19

Figure 21: 2012 ROIC by category

0.0%

10.0%

20.0%

30.0%

40.0%

50.0%

60.0%

70.0%

80.0%

Source: Company data, Credit Suisse estimates

In total, we calculate around 20-25% of the group’s invested capital is not covering its cost

of capital today.

Figure 22: Invested capital and ROIC by category, 2012

0

2000

4000

6000

8000

10000

12000

14000

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

Inve

sted

Cap

ital (

CH

F, 0

00's

)

RO

IC, 2

012

Invested capital ROIC

20-25% of group's invested capital < cost of capital

Source: Company data, Credit Suisse estimates, Dark blue columns = powders and grey = divisions

Looking at the categories, water, frozen food, ice cream and cereals are neither

generating the group average margin or asset turn. Management could be less forgiving of

underperforming assets, while investors would likely look for decisive action—possibly

portfolio change—if returns do not improve.

Page 20: Nestle - Credit Suisse

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Nestle (NESN.VX) 20

Figure 23: Asset Turn vs NOPAT margin, by category (2012)

Source: Company data, Credit Suisse estimates, Bold font highlights powders franchises

A final screen management could consider is looking at returns pre goodwill. As Figure 24

shows, six categories have consumed the bulk of the M&A in the last decade or so and

therefore account for circa 90% of the group’s goodwill.

Figure 24: Goodwill and invested capital ex goodwill by category, 2012 (CHFm)

0

2000

4000

6000

8000

10000

12000

14000

Goodwill Invested capital ex goodwill

Source: Company data, Credit Suisse estimates

On this basis, the returns of petfood, nutrition and frozen food are significantly higher,

which could mean management would be more accommodating.

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Nestle (NESN.VX) 21

Figure 25: Returns by category including and excluding goodwill (2012)

0.0%

10.0%

20.0%

30.0%

40.0%

50.0%

60.0%

70.0%

80.0%

Return including goodwill Return ex goodwill

Source: Company data, Credit Suisse estimates

Working capital, an opportunity?

The sharp improvement in Nestlé’s working capital in 2012 means that as a percentage of

sales, it now sits in the middle of its global peer group. However, there remains a clear gap

with the best in class, which operate with negative working capital.

Figure 26: Working capital as % of sales (2012)

-10%

-5%

0%

5%

10%

15%

Source: Company data, Credit Suisse research

Breaking down working capital into its three components, we find Nestlé’s trade payables

are close to best in class at well over 100 days. The focus needs to be on collecting

debtors’ payments, with no improvement in the ratio of trade debtors past their due date—

18% of total debtors in the last five years. Lowering the trade debtor days to best in class

levels of 25 days from 50 days, would see the group cash conversion ratio fall into

negative territory.

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Nestle (NESN.VX) 22

Figure 27: Breakdown of cash conversion, 2012

-200

-150

-100

-50

0

50

100

150

Days receivable Inventory days Days payable Cash conversion

Source: Company data, Credit Suisse research

What does this view of Nestlé tell us?

1. Nestlé’s acquisitions, when put in the context of its history, look targeted and

measured. The major phase of building the non-powders business was completed

under Peter Brabeck’s tenure as CEO, as shown in the M&A table on page 6. This

phase achieved global leadership in the chosen categories, such as pet food (Ralston

Purina) and ice cream (Dreyers).

2. The growth and margin structure of the powders operations underpins the strength of

the group’s developing market business and the positive geographic mix to group

margins.

3. The non-powders operations continue to provide a key leg to the group’s margin

improvement, rising to 15% in 2012 from 11% in 2007. However, it remains well below

the powders level. We estimate the margin gap between powders and non-powders

has further to close. In the last five years the gap has closed by over 250bp but

remains over 600bp below the powders operations.

4. The gap between the non-powders and powders returns is even wider than the margin

gap. We estimate powders generate mid 20% returns—double non-powders returns.

Given the M&A bias to non-powders, the gap narrows if we look at returns ex goodwill.

5. Water, ice cream, cereals, frozen food and chilled foods—circa 25% of the group’s

invested capital—generate sub cost of capital returns and we think investors are likely

to want greater action from management, including potential sale/discontinuation.

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Nestle (NESN.VX) 23

Modelling Nestlé Before looking at valuation we will touch on three other topics on modelling Nestlé:

1. What is the likelihood of it selling its L’Oreal stake?

2. 2013 forecasts—some thoughts

3. Long term—can the group sustain its 8.75% CAGR organic EBITA growth?

1: What is the likelihood of it selling L’Oreal stake?

Ultimately we do not know. Nestlé acquired its stake in L’Oreal in 1974 for CHF100m or so

and currently owns a 29.8% stake worth CHF24.5bn, a 15% pa CAGR. If it were to sell,

Nestlé is unlikely to pay any tax as in the case of Alcon, which would make the stake worth

CHF7.7 per share, on our calculations. The expiry of the current agreement with the

Bettencourt family in April 2014 does not trigger any need for action from either party.

The agreement foresees the ‘non-transferability of their respective stakes in L’Oreal’ and

the ‘pre-emption, escrow, prohibition on constituting a concert with any third party’.

An end to the agreement could in our view mean the ‘non-transferability element ends,

which could increase existing press speculation as to whether Nestlé would exit its stake.

However, we think it highly unlikely that Nestlé would bid for L’Oreal with the board having

rejected the proposal in 2000 to buy out the rest of L’Oreal, instead embarking on

becoming the leading nutrition, health and wellness company. In our report entitled

‘Optically expensive’ published 21 September 2012, we discussed L’Oreal’s ability to buy

Nestlé’s stake.

If L’Oreal bought out Nestlé’s stake, we would think it likely that Nestlé would acquire and

cancel its own stock, as with the Alcon proceeds. In this scenario, we calculate the EPS

impact would be mildly positive, +1% to our 2014 forecasts. If Nestlé paid the proceeds

out in special dividend, the payout would equate to a 10% yield, offsetting the EPS dilution

of -9.5%.

Figure 28: Scenario analysis: Potential EPS impact of a sale of L'Oreal and buyback CHF in millions, unless otherwise stated

Nestlé 14E Adjustments Nestlé ex

L'Oreal

Adjustments Nestlé with BB

Sales 104,601 104,601 104,601

EBIT 16,872 16,872 16,872

% margin 16.1% 16.1% 16.1%

Interest (576) 391 (185) (391) (576)

Divs received

PBT 16,296 16,687 16,296

tax (4,400) (4,506) (4,400)

% tax rate 27.0% 27.0% 27.0%

minorities (519) (519) (519)

associates 1,349 (1,207) 142 142

Net income 12,726 11,805 11,520

# of shares, m 3,240 3,240 (334) 2,906

EPS, CHF 3.93 3.64 3.96

% accretion/dilution -7.2% 1%

Source: Credit Suisse estimates; 2014 estimates are based on pre-restructuring EBITA and EPS

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Nestle (NESN.VX) 24

2: 2013 outlook

Nestlé now includes what might be referred to as assorted “non-trading” items in its

“trading operating profit”. These include restructuring, impairments, etc.

Figure 29: Other income/expenses in Nestlé trading operating profit CHF in millions, unless otherwise stated

2010 2011 2012

Loss on disposal -9 -15 -20

Restructuring -469 -100 -95

Impairments -194 -150 -75

Litigation/bad debts -584 -341 -378

Other -274 -130 -88

Profit on asset sales 41 18 53

Other 127 33 88

TOTAL -1362 -685 -515

As a % sales -1.5% -0.8% -0.6%

Source: Company data

In 2013 we would expect these items to be rather higher than 2012 (we calculate 0.8%),

which is a 20bps “hit” to the margin progress. Should we worry? We think not. After two

years or more of significant input cost inflation, 2013 looks considerably more benign, in

our view.

3: Long term: more A&P?

As we highlighted in our recent report ‘Ad spend – The good cholesterol’ (11 October

2012), Nestlé had low ad spend, as a percentage of sales, of circa 3%. We think this is

partially explained by the high brand awareness in the developing markets for Nestlé’s

powder franchises (and the limit to which traditional media can be used in these regions).

These are brands with heritage of close to 100 years and a very high degree of trust, given

baby formula (Nan), children’s chocolate (Milo) and milk (Nido) powder underpinning their

high margins.

Figure 30: Powders versus non-powders trade promotion spend as % of sales, 2010

0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%

30%

Source: Company data, Credit Suisse estimates

Marketing spend low, as

powder’s brand awareness

high

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Nestle (NESN.VX) 25

The non-powdered operations, especially the structurally challenged margin operations in

ice cream and frozen food, skewed marketing spend too far towards trade promotion—

push rather than pull tactics. We estimate that based on the change to IFRS accounting in

2010 and the subsequent adjustment to net from gross sales, the overall non-powdered

franchises trade promotion levels of close to 20% of sales.

Our other observation, is the up/down nature of the group’s marketing spend dovetails with

the inverse relationship between the change in COGS as a percentage of sales and

marketing & administration as a percentage of sales. Part of the ‘savings’ from lower input

costs are reinvested back into higher marketing support to drive share and vice versa.

In 2013, after two years of higher cost inflation, management expects inflation to be

immaterial. We envisage a rise in gross margin and subsequent increase in A&P but with

the restructuring charge so low in 2012, we expect a rise in 2013E, implying the underlying

margin rises faster than the trading profit margin.

Figure 31: Nestlé’s media spend US$ 000’s Figure 32: Change in A&P inversely correlated to COGS

0

500

1000

1500

2000

2500

3000

3500

Developed market Developing market

1996

1997

1998

1999

20002002

20032004

20052006

20072008

2009

2010

2011

2012

R² = 0.5618-150.0

-100.0

-50.0

0.0

50.0

100.0

150.0

-300.0 -200.0 -100.0 0.0 100.0 200.0 300.0 400.0

Chg

in m

ktin

g as

% o

f sal

es

Chg in COGS

Source: Ad Age Source: Company data, Credit Suisse estimates

Longer-term outlook

We conclude that Nestlé’s model has plenty of room left to grow driven by stronger

portfolio management.

■ Powders continue to focus on driving above average group growth

■ Non-powders split between categories organically rolling out global coverage and

those focused on restructuring over growth

■ Brand investment saw a recovery in 2012 and with raw materials outlook benign in

2013, it looks set for further rise.

■ Non-powder returns are increasingly put under the microscope

And so we expect the Nestlé model to continue to compound at the historical rate. Over

the last fifteen years, the group’s EBITA growth has achieved an 8.75% pa CAGR with the

near equal contribution between volume, price and margin progression. This despite the

faster growing/higher margin Alcon no longer being part of the group. It is this balance that

we think enables Nestlé to deliver consistent operating numbers, which underpin its status

as a low beta stock.

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Nestle (NESN.VX) 26

Figure 33: Components to organic EBITA growth, 3yr vs 5yr, 10yr and 15yr

0.0%

1.0%

2.0%

3.0%

4.0%

5.0%

6.0%

7.0%

8.0%

9.0%

10.0%

3yr CAGR 5 yr CAGR 10 yr CAGR 15 yr CAGR

RIG Price margin progression

Source: Company data, Credit Suisse research

The sustained compounding of Nestlé’s operating performance has meant organic sales

growth has risen by 80% and EBITA by 130% in the last ten years.

Figure 34: Organic Sales, EBITA, EPS and DPS, rebased 100 from 2002-12

100

150

200

250

300

350

400

450

2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012

Organic sales Organic EBITA EPS DPS

Source: Company data, Credit Suisse research

What we do expect to change compared with the past is the group’s ability to outperform

its peers in earnings and dividends growth to the same extent. In the last decade, Nestlé’s

EPS in constant rates has risen over 150%, 10% CAGR, and DPS at 300%, 15% CAGR.

This was a function of selling Alcon and buying back 15% of the stock and the decision to

raise the dividend in Swiss francs every year, contributing to the payout ratio doubling to

over 60%. 2012 was the first year in a decade the payout ratio fell.

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Nestle (NESN.VX) 27

Figure 35: Net income and EPS growth in constant rates,

rebased to 100 from 2002

Figure 36: Dividend payout ratio, 1998-12

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

Net income EPS growth

0.0%

10.0%

20.0%

30.0%

40.0%

50.0%

60.0%

70.0%

1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012

Source: Company data, Credit Suisse research Source: Company data, Credit Suisse research

In summary, Nestlé’s model has delivered and, we believe, will continue to deliver

consistent performance. The stock’s organic EBITA CAGR has averaged 8.75% pa over a

3, 5, 10 and 15 year period, with the contribution from RIG (volume/mix), price and margin

progression all the same. As our analysis suggests, the individual components of the

group’s portfolio are at various stages of evolution, meaning the aggregate is not reliant on

one or two drivers.

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Nestle (NESN.VX) 28

Nestlé valuation The de-rating in Nestlé's share price outperformance over the past year has meant that

looking at performance over 10 years, earnings growth has contributed nearly 100% of the

90% move in the Swiss franc share price to CHF66. We calculate that multiple expansion

has added very little as the 12m fwd P/E in 2002 was 17x-18x—similar to today. Finally,

converting Nestlé’s share price into US dollars, FX has added 30%, delivering an

compounded share price appreciation of 8.4% pa.

Figure 37: Nestlé share price drivers 2002 to YTD2013, US $

24

20.99

0.0

10.0

20.0

30.0

40.0

50.0

60.0

70.0

Starting share price EPS contribution Multiple expansion FX contribution Share price today

Source: Thomson Reuters, Credit Suisse estimates

We look at these drivers, starting with FX.

■ We have little insight into how spot rates will move over time and do not try to predict

them. On top of this, for a non-Swiss franc investor, Nestlé is a good currency hedge,

with less than 1% of sales in Switzerland—i.e., the opposite of any positive or negative

FX impact on EPS is reflected in the translation of the share price into US dollars, euro

or sterling.

■ Re-rating. On 17.8x our current 2014 P/E estimates Nestlé now trades in line with its

15 year average.

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Nestle (NESN.VX) 29

Figure 38: 12mth fwd PE, 1996-2012

10

12

14

16

18

20

22

24

26

28

30

1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012

Source: Thomson Reuters, Credit Suisse research

And on a PER basis Nestlé is back to parity with the Pan European staples sector

(food/HPC/beer/spirits) and its long run average after a sharp de-rating over the last

twelve months.

Figure 39: PER to Pan European peers

0.80

0.85

0.90

0.95

1.00

1.05

1.10

1.15

1.20

1.25

1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012

Source: Thomson Reuters, Credit Suisse research

So Nestlé’s current valuation is back to its long run average in absolute and relative terms.

However, on our EV/IC to ROIC/WACC screen, Nestlé trades below the line of best fit in

2013E and 2016E, implying the recovery in the group’s returns is not being reflected in the

current valuation. This points to the potential of a small re-rating to its staples peers.

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Nestle (NESN.VX) 30

Figure 40: EV/IC to ROIC/WACC, 2013E vs 2016E

Nestle 16E

Carlsberg 16E

SAB 16E

Diageo 16E

Pernod 16E

Danone 16E

ABI 16E

Unilever 16E

Henkel16E

L'Oreal 16E

Reckitt 16E

Oriflame 16E

ABI 13E

Carlsberg 13E

SAB 13E

Diageo 13E

Pernod 13E

Danone 13E

Nestle 13E

Unilever 13E

Henkel 13E

L'Oreal 13E

Reckitt 13E

Oriflame 13E

R² = 0.9451

R² = 0.9811

0.00

0.20

0.40

0.60

0.80

1.00

1.20

1.40

1.60

1.80

2.00

2.20

2.40

2.60

2.80

3.00

3.20

3.40

0.30 0.40 0.50 0.60 0.70 0.80 0.90 1.00 1.10 1.20 1.30 1.40 1.50 1.60 1.70 1.80 1.90 2.00 2.10 2.20 2.30

EV

/IC

ROIC/WACC Source: Company data, Credit Suisse estimates

■ The primary drive of the share price should continue to be EPS growth, which we

expect to average +8% in 2013E-16E with organic revenue growth of +5.9%

contributing over half of this, margin expansion of 20-30bp pa, another 2.5%-3% pa

and the rest of the P&L provides no material earnings leverage (tax rate broadly

stable/deleveraging effect minimal given cost of debt sub 2%). This translates into

mid-quartile EPS growth versus pan European staples peers, meaning Nestlé should

continue to mirror the sector’s EPS growth as it has done for the last ten years or so.

The exception was 2008, when the financial crisis knocked peers’ earnings off course.

Figure 41: Price and EPS relative of Nestlé to peers

0.80

0.90

1.00

1.10

1.20

1.30

1.40

Jan

-04

May

-04

Sep

-04

Jan

-05

May

-05

Sep

-05

Jan

-06

May

-06

Sep

-06

Jan

-07

May

-07

Sep

-07

Jan

-08

May

-08

Sep

-08

Jan

-09

May

-09

Sep

-09

Jan

-10

May

-10

Sep

-10

Jan

-11

May

-11

Sep

-11

Jan

-12

May

-12

Sep

-12

Jan

-13

Price relative: Nestle vs. European Consumer Sector

Earnings relative: Nestle vs. European Consumer Sector

Source: Thomson Reuters, Credit Suisse estimates

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Nestle (NESN.VX) 31

On a TSR basis, the sector high payout ratio means Nestlé’s 2013E dividend yield is top

quartile, +3.5%, pushing Nestlé’s TSR above +10% pa to 11% pa, a mid-quartile TSR

compared to staples peers.

Figure 42: TSR of Pan European staples stocks, 2012-17E

0%

2%

4%

6%

8%

10%

12%

14%

16%

18%

EPS 2012-17 Div Yield 2013 Average

Source: Company data, Credit Suisse estimates

Target price of CHF76

Our APV-derived target price of CHF76 is based on a cost of equity of 8.5% and terminal

growth of 2.5%. This mirrors a warranted Credit Suisse HOLT® price of CHF 76.52 when

using a 15 year fade.

Figure 43: APV

Cost of equity (Ke) 8.5%

Perpetuity growth rate 2.5%

Interest rate (pre-tax) 5.0%

Cost of debt (Kd) 3.6%

Shares in issue (million) 3,224.8

SFr million SFr/share

Free cash flow NPV 244,477

Less: Debt 2012 -18,152

Less: Pension deficit -7,105

PV of Minorities -8,015

2013 M&A 1,107

Equity Value 212,313 67

Add: tax shield 4,172 1

Theoretical share price F&B 216,485 68

Add: PV of associate/L'Oréal 27,230 9

Target value/price total group 243,716 76

Source: Suisse estimates

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Nestle (NESN.VX) 32

Figure 44: HOLT warranted price based on 15 year fade

Current Price: CHF 65.45 Warranted Price: CHF 76.52 Valuation date: 05-Mar-13

Sales Growth (parallel % point change to forecasts) Dec-11A Dec-12A Dec-13E Dec-14E Dec-15E

-2.0% -1.0% 0.0% 1.0% 2.0% Sales Growth, % -20.0 10.2 10.2 10.2 10.2

EBITDA Mgn, % 19.3 18.6 18.6 18.6 18.6

Asset Turns, x 0.89 0.95 0.97 0.99 1.01

CFROI®, % 14.2 14.3 13.8 13.7 13.4

Disc Rate, % 5.4 4.7 4.2 4.2 4.2

Asset Grth, % 8.3 3.9 7.5 7.2 6.7

Value/Cost, x 2.8 3.2 2.7 2.6 2.5

Economic PE, x 19.7 22.6 19.6 18.9 18.4

Leverage, % 16.8 18.5 18.0 18.3 18.9

HO

LT

-

C

red

it S

uis

se

An

aly

st

Sc

en

ari

o D

ata

NESTLE S.A. (NESN)

EB

ITD

A M

arg

in (

pa

rall

el

% p

oin

t

ch

an

ge

to

fo

rec

as

ts)

-2.0% -39% -25% -7%

0.0% -20% -3%

13% 37%

-1.0% -30% -14% 5% 27% 52%

97%

17% 40% 67%

82%1.0% -11% 8% 29% 53%

2.0% -1% 18% 41% 67%

More than

10%

downside

Within 10%More than

10% upside

Source: Credit Suisse HOLT®. CFROI, HOLT, and ValueSearch are trademarks or registered trademarks of Credit Suisse Group AG or its affiliates in the United States and other countries.

* Operating margin (yellow) is EBITDA (grey) plus rental expense and R&D expense

-25.00

-20.00

-15.00

-10.00

-5.00

0.00

5.00

10.00

15.00

2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 2019 2021 2023 2025 2027

Sales Growth (in %)

0.00

5.00

10.00

15.00

20.00

25.00

2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 2019 2021 2023 2025 2027

Operating Margin and EBITDA (in %) - see note*

0.00

0.20

0.40

0.60

0.80

1.00

1.20

1.40

1.60

2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 2019 2021 2023 2025 2027

Asset Turns (x)

0.00

2.00

4.00

6.00

8.00

10.00

12.00

14.00

16.00

18.00

20.00

20072009201120132015201720192021202320252027

Historical CFROI

HistoricalTransactionCFROI

Forecast CFROI

ForecastTransactionCFROI

Discount Rate

CFROI & Discount Rate (in %)

-10.00

-8.00

-6.00

-4.00

-2.00

0.00

2.00

4.00

6.00

8.00

10.00

20072009201120132015201720192021202320252027

Historical AssetGrowth Rate

Historical GrowthIncl Intang

Forecast Growth

Forecast GrowthIncl Intang

NormalisedGrowth Rate

Asset Growth (in %)

Source: Credit Suisse HOLT estimates

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Nestle (NESN.VX) 33

Credit Suisse PEERs We show below the Credit Suisse PEERs relationship map for Nestlé. PEERs is a global

database that captures unique information about companies within the Credit Suisse

coverage universe based on their relationships with other companies – their customers,

suppliers and competitors. The database is built from our research analysts’ insight

regarding these relationships. Credit Suisse covers over 3,000 companies globally. These

companies form the core of the PEERs database, but it also includes relationships on

stocks that are not under coverage.

Figure 45: Nestle PEERs map

Source: Credit Suisse PEERs research

Page 34: Nestle - Credit Suisse

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Nestle (NESN.VX) 34

Companies Mentioned (Price as of 05-Mar-2013)

Associated British Foods (ABF.L, 1866.0p) Anheuser-Busch InBev (ABI.BR, €72.5) British American Tobacco (BATS.L, 3566.0p) Beiersdorf (BEIG.DE, €67.24) Carlsberg (CARLb.CO, Dkr595.0) Christian Hansen Holding (CHRH.CO, Dkr207.9) Colgate-Palmolive (CL.N, $115.71) Campbell Soup Company (CPB.N, $41.69) Danone (DANO.PA, €54.8) Diageo (DGE.L, 1996.0p) General Mills (GIS.N, $46.49) Henkel (HNKG_p.F, €68.646) The Hershey Company (HSY.N, $85.2) Imperial Tobacco (IMT.L, 2443.0p) Kellogg Company (K.N, $61.42) Kraft Foods Group (KRFT.OQ, $49.19) Nestle (NESN.VX, SFr66.6, OUTPERFORM, TP SFr76.0) L'Oreal (OREP.PA, €115.8) Oriflame Cosmetics (ORIsdb.ST, Skr228.2) Pernod-Ricard (PERP.PA, €99.11) Philip Morris International (PM.N, $92.28) Reckitt Benckiser (RB.L, 4522.0p) SABMiller (SAB.L, 3383.5p) Swedish Match (SWMA.ST, Skr214.1) Tate & Lyle (TATE.L, 840.0p) Unilever (UNc.AS, €30.69)

Disclosure Appendix

Important Global Disclosures

Alex Molloy, Charlie Mills, Nicolas Sochovsky, Sanjeet Aujla, Jimmie Bork, each certify, with respect to the companies or securities that the individual analyzes, that (1) the views expressed in this report accurately reflect his or her personal views about all of the subject companies and securities and (2) no part of his or her compensation was, is or will be directly or indirectly related to the specific recommendations or views expressed in this report.

Price and Rating History for Nestle (NESN.VX)

NESN.VX Closing Price Target Price

Date (SFr) (SFr) Rating

30-Nov-10 54.55 60.00 N

09-Jun-11 53.15 55.00

11-Jul-11 52.20 R

16-Dec-11 51.20 58.00 N

13-Aug-12 60.45 62.00

* Asterisk signifies initiation or assumption of coverage.

N EU T RA L

REST RICT ED

The analyst(s) responsible for preparing this research report received Compensation that is based upon various factors including Credit Suisse's total revenues, a portion of which are generated by Credit Suisse's investment banking activities

As of December 10, 2012 Analysts’ stock rating are defined as follows:

Outperform (O) : The stock’s total return is expected to outperform the relevant benchmark*over the next 12 months.

Neutral (N) : The stock’s total return is expected to be in line with the relevant benchmark* over the next 12 months.

Underperform (U) : The stock’s total return is expected to underperform the relevant benchmark* over the next 12 months.

*Relevant benchmark by region: As of 10th December 2012, Japanese ratings are based on a stock’s total return relative to the analyst's coverage universe which consists of all companies covered by the analyst within the relevant sector, with Outperfo rms representing the most attractive, Neutrals the less attractive, and Underperforms the least attractive investment opportunities. As of 2nd October 2012, U.S. and Canadian as well as European ra tings are based on a stock’s total return relative to the analyst's coverage universe which consists of all companies covered by the analyst within the relevant sector, with Outperform s representing the most attractive, Neutrals the less attractive, and Underperforms the least attractive investment opportunities. For Latin American and non-Japan Asia stocks, ratings are based on a stock’s total return relative to the average total return of the relevant country or regional benchmark; Australia, New Zealand are, and prior to 2nd October 2012 U.S. and Canadian ratings were based on (1) a stock’s absolute total return potential to its current share price and (2) the relative attractiveness of a stock’s total return potential within an analyst’s coverage universe. For Australian and New Zealand stocks, 12 -month rolling yield is incorporated in the absolute total return calculation and a 15% and a 7.5% threshold replace the 10-15% level in the Outperform and Underperform stock rating definitions, respectively. The 15% and

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Nestle (NESN.VX) 35

7.5% thresholds replace the +10-15% and -10-15% levels in the Neutral stock rating definition, respectively. Prior to 10th December 2012, Japanese ratings were based on a stock’s total return relative to the average total return of the relevant country or regional benchmark.

Restricted (R) : In certain circumstances, Credit Suisse policy and/or applicable law and regulations preclude certain types of communications, including an investment recommendation, during the course of Credit Suisse's engagement in an investment banking transaction and in certain other circumstances.

Volatility Indicator [V] : A stock is defined as volatile if the stock price has moved up or down by 20% or more in a month in at least 8 of the past 24 months or the analyst expects significant volatility going forward.

Analysts’ sector weightings are distinct from analysts’ stock ratings and are based on the analyst’s expectations for the fundamentals and/or valuation of the sector* relative to the group’s historic fundamentals and/or valuation:

Overweight : The analyst’s expectation for the sector’s fundamentals and/or valuation is favorable over the next 12 months.

Market Weight : The analyst’s expectation for the sector’s fundamentals and/or valuation is neutral over the next 12 months.

Underweight : The analyst’s expectation for the sector’s fundamentals and/or valuation is cautious over the next 12 months.

*An analyst’s coverage sector consists of all companies covered by the analyst within the relevant sector. An analyst may cover multiple sectors.

Credit Suisse's distribution of stock ratings (and banking clients) is:

Global Ratings Distribution

Rating Versus universe (%) Of which banking clients (%)

Outperform/Buy* 43% (54% banking clients)

Neutral/Hold* 38% (47% banking clients)

Underperform/Sell* 16% (39% banking clients)

Restricted 3%

*For purposes of the NYSE and NASD ratings distribution disclosure requirements, our stock ratings of Outperform, Neutral, an d Underperform most closely correspond to Buy, Hold, and Sell, respectively; however, the meanings are not the same, as our stock ratings are determined on a relative basis. (Please refer to definitions above.) An investor's decision to buy or sell a security should be based on investment objectives, current holdin gs, and other individual factors.

Credit Suisse’s policy is to update research reports as it deems appropriate, based on developments with the subject company, the sector or the market that may have a material impact on the research views or opinions stated herein.

Credit Suisse's policy is only to publish investment research that is impartial, independent, clear, fair and not misleading. For more detail please refer to Credit Suisse's Policies for Managing Conflicts of Interest in connection with Investment Research: http://www.csfb.com/research and analytics/disclaimer/managing_conflicts_disclaimer.html

Credit Suisse does not provide any tax advice. Any statement herein regarding any US federal tax is not intended or written to be used, and cannot be used, by any taxpayer for the purposes of avoiding any penalties.

Price Target: (12 months) for Nestle (NESN.VX)

Method: Our price target is based on our APV (adjusted present value), a hybrid DCF that splits the operating cash flows (discounted at an 8.5% cost of equity), and the tax shield (discounted at the cost of debt). A terminal growth rate of 2.5% is assumed

Risk: Significant movements in raw material costs or currency can impact the business, as can irrational behaviour by either competitors or retailers. Food scares, shortages, or contamination can also impact the business.

Please refer to the firm's disclosure website at www.credit-suisse.com/researchdisclosures for the definitions of abbreviations typically used in the target price method and risk sections.

See the Companies Mentioned section for full company names

The subject company (NESN.VX) currently is, or was during the 12-month period preceding the date of distribution of this report, a client of Credit Suisse.

Credit Suisse provided investment banking services to the subject company (NESN.VX) within the past 12 months.

Credit Suisse provided non-investment banking services to the subject company (NESN.VX) within the past 12 months

Credit Suisse has managed or co-managed a public offering of securities for the subject company (NESN.VX) within the past 12 months.

Credit Suisse has received investment banking related compensation from the subject company (NESN.VX) within the past 12 months

Credit Suisse expects to receive or intends to seek investment banking related compensation from the subject company (NESN.VX) within the next 3 months.

Credit Suisse has received compensation for products and services other than investment banking services from the subject company (NESN.VX) within the past 12 months

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Nestle (NESN.VX) 36

As of the end of the preceding month, Credit Suisse beneficially own 1% or more of a class of common equity securities of (NESN.VX).

Important Regional Disclosures

Singapore recipients should contact Credit Suisse AG, Singapore Branch for any matters arising from this research report.

The analyst(s) involved in the preparation of this report have not visited the material operations of the subject company (NESN.VX) within the past 12 months

Restrictions on certain Canadian securities are indicated by the following abbreviations: NVS--Non-Voting shares; RVS--Restricted Voting Shares; SVS--Subordinate Voting Shares.

Individuals receiving this report from a Canadian investment dealer that is not affiliated with Credit Suisse should be advised that this report may not contain regulatory disclosures the non-affiliated Canadian investment dealer would be required to make if this were its own report.

For Credit Suisse Securities (Canada), Inc.'s policies and procedures regarding the dissemination of equity research, please visit http://www.csfb.com/legal_terms/canada_research_policy.shtml.

The following disclosed European company/ies have estimates that comply with IFRS: (NESN.VX).

Credit Suisse has sent extracts of this research report to the subject company (NESN.VX) prior to publication for the purpose of verifying factual accuracy. Based on information provided by the subject company, factual changes have been made as a result.

As of the date of this report, Credit Suisse acts as a market maker or liquidity provider in the equities securities that are the subject of this report.

Principal is not guaranteed in the case of equities because equity prices are variable.

Commission is the commission rate or the amount agreed with a customer when setting up an account or at any time after that.

To the extent this is a report authored in whole or in part by a non-U.S. analyst and is made available in the U.S., the following are important disclosures regarding any non-U.S. analyst contributors: The non-U.S. research analysts listed below (if any) are not registered/qualified as research analysts with FINRA. The non-U.S. research analysts listed below may not be associated persons of CSSU and therefore may not be subject to the NASD Rule 2711 and NYSE Rule 472 restrictions on communications with a subject company, public appearances and trading securities held by a research analyst account.

Credit Suisse Securities (Europe) Limited....................................... Alex Molloy ; Charlie Mills ; Nicolas Sochovsky ; Sanjeet Aujla ; Jimmie Bork

Important Credit Suisse HOLT Disclosures

With respect to the analysis in this report based on the Credit Suisse HOLT methodology, Credit Suisse certifies that (1) the views expressed in this report accurately reflect the Credit Suisse HOLT methodology and (2) no part of the Firm’s compensation was, is, or will be directly related to the specific views disclosed in this report

The Credit Suisse HOLT methodology does not assign ratings to a security. It is an analytical tool that involves use of a set of proprietary quantitative algorithms and warranted value calculations, collectively called the Credit Suisse HOLT valuation model, that are consistently applied to all the companies included in its database. Third-part data (including consensus earnings estimates) are systematically translated into a number of default algorithms available in the Credit Suisse HOLT valuation model. The source financial statement, pricing, and earnings data provided by outside data vendors are subject to quality control and may also be adjusted to more closely measure the underlying economics of firm performance. The adjustments provide consistency when analyzing a single company across time, or analyzing multiple companies across industries or national borders. The default scenario that is produced by the Credit Suisse HOLT valuation model establishes the baseline valuation for a security, and a user then may adjust the default variables to produce alternative scenarios, any of which could occur.

Additional information about the Credit Suisse HOLT methodology is available on request.

The Credit Suisse HOLT methodology does not assign a price target to a security. The default scenario that is produced by the Credit Suisse HOLT valuation model establishes a warranted price for a security, and as the third-party data are updated, the warranted price may also change. The default variable may also be adjusted to produce alternative warranted prices, any of which could occur.

CFROI®, HOLT, HOLTfolio, ValueSearch, AggreGator, Signal Flag and “Powered by HOLT” are trademarks or service marks or registered trademarks or registered service marks of Credit Suisse or its affiliates in the United States and other countries. HOLT is a corporate performance and valuation advisory service of Credit Suisse.

For Credit Suisse disclosure information on other companies mentioned in this report, please visit the website at www.credit-suisse.com/researchdisclosures or call +1 (877) 291-2683.

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Nestle (NESN.VX) 37

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High volatility investments may experience sudden and large falls in their value causing losses when that investment is realised. Those losses may equal your original investment. Indeed, in the case of some investments the potential losses may exceed the amount of initial investment and, in such circumstances, you may be required to pay more money to support those losses. Income yields from investments may fluctuate and, in consequence, initial capital paid to make the investment may be used as part of that income yield. Some investments may not be readily realisable and it may be difficult to sell or realise those investments, similarly it may prove difficult for you to obtain reliable information about the value, or risks, to which such an investment is exposed. This report may provide the addresses of, or contain hyperlinks to, websites. 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Investment principal on bonds can be eroded depending on sale price or market price. In addition, there are bonds on which investment principal can be eroded due to changes in redemption amounts. Care is required when investing in such instruments.

When you purchase non-listed Japanese fixed income securities (Japanese government bonds, Japanese municipal bonds, Japanese government guaranteed bonds, Japanese corporate bonds) from CS as a seller, you will be requested to pay the purchase price only.

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