Neutral Monism

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Neutral Monism

First published Thu Feb 3, 2005; substantive revision Thu Jan 28, 2010

Neutral monism is a monistic metaphysics. It holds that ultimate reality is all of one kind. To thisextent neutral monism is in agreement with idealism and materialism. What distinguishes neutral

monism from its better known monistic rivals is the claim that the intrinsic nature of ultimate

reality is neither mental nor physical. This negative claim also captures the idea of neutrality: being intrinsically neither mental nor physical in nature ultimate reality is said to be neutral

between the two.

1. Introduction

2. History

3. The Neutral Entities

o 3.1 Mental, Physical, Neutral

o

3.2 Different Notions of Neutrality o 3.3 Identifying the Neutral Entities

4. Background: Realism and Empiricism

o 4.1 Neutral Entities and the Given

o 4.2 Realism about the Given

o 4.3 Giving up Substance

o 4.4 Giving Up the Ego

5. Reduction and Construction

o 5.1 What Is it to Reduce?

o 5.2 Reduction of the Mental

o 5.3 Reduction of the Physical

6. Arguments for Neutral Monism o 6.1 Suggested by the Development of Physics and Psychology

o 6.2 Philosophy of Physics

o 6.3 Unity of Science

o 6.4 Parsimony

7. Objections to Neutral Monism

o 7.1 Not Neutral but Mental

o 7.2 Leaving out ―What it's Like‖

o 7.3 The Nature of the Extra-Cranial World

o 7.4 Principles of Bundling

o 7.5 Error

8. Philosophical Applications

o 8.1 The Mind-Body Problem

o 8.2 The Problem of Perception

o 8.3 Knowledge and the War against Introjection

9. Neutral Monism and Other Doctrines

o 9.1 Neutral Monism and Other Forms of Reductionism

o 9.2 Neutral Monism and Panpsychism

o 9.3 Neutral Monism and Emergentism

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o 9.4 Neutral Monism and the Dual Aspect Theory

o 9.5 Neutral Monism and The Neo-Russellians

10. Concluding Remarks

Bibliography

Academic Tools

Other Internet Resources Related Entries

1. Introduction

Monisms, neutral or otherwise, differ on the question whether ultimate reality is one or many.With the possible exception of Spinoza (see the section ―Neutral Monism and the Dual Aspect

Theory‖) neutral monists have chosen pluralism: there are many neutral entities, but they are all

of one basic kind. Moreover, neutral monism is noneliminativist: there is more to reality than just

the basic neutral entities. There are also all of the commonly recognized physical and mentalentities. This minimal characterization of the doctrine suffices to define the two central questions

neutral monism must answer. First, what is the nature of the neutral entities that form ultimate

reality? Second, what is the relationship of these neutral entities to everything else that exists?

Though neutral monism is a quite general doctrine about the nature of reality, it is usually

understood in a much narrower sense, viz., as an attempt to come to terms with the mind-body problem. This focus on the relationship of mind and body has naturally led neutral monists to

break the second question into two more limited ones. Thus we end up with three questions:

i. What is the nature of the neutral entities that form ultimate reality?

ii.

What is the relationship of these neutral entities to matter?iii. What is the relationship of these neutral entities to mind?

Most versions of neutral monism are versions of noneliminativist reductionism. Mental and

physical phenomena are real but reducible to/constructible from the underlying neutral level. Itdiffers from other versions of reductionism — be they materialistic or mentalistic, eliminative or

noneliminative — by insisting on the neutrality of the basis. And its reductionism sets it apart

from certain versions of nonreductive theories — emergentism and the dual aspect theory come tomind — with which it is sometimes compared or identified.

Not all versions of neutral monism answer questions (i) – (iii) in the same way. A commitment to

just the core of the doctrine places only minimal constraints on the final shape of a fleshed outversion of the theory. Any given version of neutral monism is, to a large extent, a function of the

philosophical goals and the other philosophical commitments that guide its creator in the

construction of the theory. What we confront, in every single case, is a core of neutral monisticideas, mixed up with a rich and varying set of better or worse philosophical ideas and aspirations

that are largely independent of neutral monism proper. This must be kept in mind when

evaluating the versions of neutral monism on record. Some of their features that tend to offendcontemporary philosophical sensibilities the most may be dispensable scaffolding only.

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2. History

The notion of neutrality once occupied a central position in the discussion of the mind-body

problem. No fewer than nine of the seventeen possible types of mind-body theory on C. D.Broad's famous list of 1925 (Broad 1925) are classified as forms of ―neutralism.‖ An updated

version of this list would most likely not even contain the term ―neutrality‖ (or any of itscognates). The notion of neutrality, and hence the doctrine of neutral monism, plays no role inthe current debate. It lives on only as an obscure encyclopedia entry.

The number of neutral monists is small; the number of self-declared neutral monists isconsiderably smaller; the number of philosophers whose classification as neutral monist has gone

unchallenged is probably zero. The lists of neutral monists vary considerably in length and

composition. The list below contains the names contained in the intersection of most of them,

plus a few additions.

Baruch Spinoza (1632 – 77) leads off most lists. It can be argued, however, that he is better

classified as a dual aspect theorist or a panpsychist rather than as a neutral monist. (see thesection ―Neutral Monism and the Dual Aspect Theory‖ below).

Phenomenalists, dualists, materialistically inclined naturalists, and neutral monists have, by

turns, recognized and rejected David Hume (1711 – 1776) as one of their own. The attempt to

claim him as an ancestor of neutral monism is therefore controversial. But the following

quotations make a strong case for counting Hume as an early proponent of the doctrine.

I shall at first suppose; that there is only a single existence, which I shall call indifferently object

or perception, according as it shall seem best to suit my purpose, understanding by both of themwhat any common man means by hat, or shoe, or any other impression, convey'd to him by his

senses. (Hume 1739, 366)

What we call a mind , is nothing but a heap or collection of different perceptions, united together by certain relations…Now as every perception is distinguishable from another, and may be

consider'd separately existent; it evidently follows, that there is no absurdity in separating any particular perception from the mind; that is, in breaking off all its relations, with that connected

mass of perceptions, which constitute a thinking being…If the name of perception renders not

this separation from a mind absurd and contradictory, the name of object , standing for the verysame thing, can never render their conjunction impossible. External objects are seen, and felt,

and become present to the mind; that is, they acquire such a relation to a connected heap of

perceptions, as to influence them very considerably in augmenting their number by present

reflexions and passions, and in storing the memory with ideas. The same continu'd anduninterrupted Being may, therefore, be sometimes present to the mind, and sometimes absent

from it, without any real or essential change in the Being itself. An interrupted appearance to the

sense implies not necessarily an interruption in the existence. The supposition of the continu'dexistence of sensible objects or perceptions involves no contradiction. (Hume 1739, 207 – 208)

These passages suggest two central ideas of Neutral monism. First, there is the idea of neutralentities: entities that are not intrinsically or essentially percepts or objects but can be counted as


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either, given the relevant context. Second, the idea that mind and body are reducible

to/constructible from these neutral entities. Though this may not be the only plausible reading of

these passages (see, e.g., Bricke 1980, Flagge 1982, 1991, Backhaus 1991) the case for countingHume as an early neutral monist has considerable merit. While it may be controversial whether

Hume really was a neutral monist, his enormous influence on the development of subsequent

versions of neutral monism is beyond serious doubt.

Ernst Mach (1838 – 1916) occupies a central position in the history of neutral monism. He

influenced William James and Bertrand Russell and, through them, all of the writers on neutralmonism in the English speaking world. His importance for the development in the German

speaking world is hard to overestimate. Among the philosophers to build on Mach's ideas was

Rudolf Carnap in his Aufbau. (Carnap 1928) As a physicist who also did physiological and

psychological research, Mach strove to adopt an inclusive and economical framework that wouldallow him to pursue all of these inquiries in a unified and coherent fashion. In the simple

components of experience — hot and cold, red and green, sweet and sour, etc. — he finds the basic

elements whose functional interrelations are studied by the various sciences. While a given

element is, intrinsically, neither mental nor physical, the various groups to which it belongs maydisplay functional relationships that are characteristic of physics or of psychology. In this case

the neutral element forms part of the subject matter of physics and of psychology. It can becalled physical, qua constituent of the one group, and mental, qua constituent of the other group, but is the same unchanging element that is regarded in these two different contexts:

Thus the great gulf between physical and psychological research persists only when weacquiesce in our habitual stereotyped conceptions. A color is a physical object as soon as we

consider its dependence, for instance, upon its luminous source, upon other colors, upon

temperatures, upon spaces, and so forth. When we consider, however, its dependence upon theretina…it is a psychological object, a sensation. Not the subject matter, but the direction of

investigation, is different in the two domains. (Mach 1886, 17 – 18)

The primary source for Mach's views on neutral monism are a number of essays and chapters

contained in his books that were originally published in (Mach 1886), (Mach 1905), and (Mach

1923). The size of these books grew significantly as they went through numerous editions. Someof the important papers on neutral monism are not contained in the available English translations

of these works.

Richard Avenarius (1843 – 96) wrote at the same time as, but independently of, Mach. They

happily acknowledged the considerable convergence of their thoughts about neutral monism (and

numerous other topics). Together with Mach he was the main target of Lenin's attack on

empiriocriticism. His influence on German Positivism was strong. Due to its difficulty his workfinds few readers. Avenarius's name is now primarily associated with the notion of introjection.

It happens when the object of perception is mistakenly taken to exist in the perceiver —it is ―the

internalization of the ‗seen‘ etc. into the human being‖ (Avenarius 1891, 200). According to

Avenarius, the consequences of this mistaken inward projection are momentous:

And it is this introjection which, as a rule turns the ‗before me‘ into an ‗in me‘, the ‗disclosed‘into an ‗imagined‘ [Vorgestelltes], the ‗constituent of the (real) environment‘ into a ‗constituent


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of the (ideal) thinking,‘ the ‗tree‘ with its mechanical energies into an ‗appearance‘ of the stuff of

which dreams are made. (Avenarius 1891, 201)

In thus creating an inner world, the natural monism of experience is bifurcated into a world in

which mind and matter, self and world stand opposed to each other. The purpose of Avenarius's

monumental Critique of Pure Experience is to overcome this pathological development and torestore the natural, thoroughly monistic, conception of the world. The main sources for his

reflections on neutral monism are contained in his (Avenarius 1888/90), (Avenarius 1891), and

(Avenarius 1894/95). Beginning with the second edition of his (Avenarius 1891), the last threeessays were reproduced as an appendix to this work.

Joseph Petzoldt (1862 – 1929) is one of a number of German speaking positivists who tookthemselves to be working in the tradition of Mach and Avenarius. Petzoldt is notable for the

dedication with which he tried to bring this philosophy to a broader audience. About three

quarters of his substantial (Petzoldt 1900) are dedicated to a careful and more approachable

exposition of the main ideas of Avenarius's Critique of Pure Experience (1888/90). And in his

(Petzoldt 1906) is a somewhat popularized retelling of the history of philosophy seen through thecritical eyes of his heroes Mach and Avenarius. Petzoldt is included in this list as a representative

of the many less well known philosophers in the positivist tradition who were enthusiasticchampions of neutral monist thought as we find it set out in the much more original works of

Mach and Avenarius.

William James's (1842 – 1910) empiricism —his ―radical standing by experience‖ (James 1904a,

52) — plays a central role in his adoption of neutral monism. His critique of the of the relational

account of experience — according to which the self directs an act onto an object — was the model

upon which Russell shaped his analysis of experience. James presents this argument as an attackon a particular conception of consciousness. He finds it in the Neo-Kantian tradition and in the

early analytic tradition. And today we can find it in philosophies as diverse as existentialism and philosophical naturalism. Roughly, it is the notion of consciousness as a diaphanous, transparent,elusive medium or container of some sort in which the objects of consciousness appear. The

objects in consciousness are clearly before the mind. But consciousness itself seems to elude our

grasp forever. This thin notion of consciousness is the one James wants to eliminate:

I believe that ‗consciousness,‘ when once it has evaporated to this estate of pure diaphaneity, is

on the point of disappearing altogether. It is the name of a nonentity, and has no right to a placeamong first principles. Those who still cling to it are clinging to a mere echo, the faint rumor left

behind by the disappearing ‗soul‘ upon the air of philosophy. (James 1904b, 2)

His radical proposal is to simply discard this shadowy something and to make do with what

remains, with what used to be the object of the conscious act. He introduces the term ―pure

experience‖ to stand for this datum. Prior to any further categorization, pure experience is,

according to James, neutral — neither mental nor material:

The instant field of the present is at all times what I call the ‗pure‘ experience. It is only virtuallyor potentially either object or subject as yet. For the time being, it is plain, unqualified actuality,

or existence, a simple that. (James 1904b, 23)


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Mind and matter, knower and known, thought and thing, representation and represented are then

interpreted as resulting from different groupings of pure experience. The essays in which James

sets out his radical empiricism are among the most influential and most readable documents ofthe neutral monistic literature. It is probably fair to say that James converted Russell to neutral

monism. And his influence on the neutral monists among the American New Realists is massive.

The primary source for James's views on neutral monism are the essays collected in his (James1912).

Ralph Barton Perry (1876 – 1957) is the most visible of the American New Realists to adoptneutral monism. As student and friend of James he spent considerable time explaining James's

views. He produced some of the clearest expositions of the doctrine. But he also extended

James's radical empiricism. His treatment of realism in his (Perry 1912a) does, for example,

contain a chapter on ―A Realistic Philosophy of Life‖ in which such topics as faith, value, andmorality are treated. But Perry did not shy away from criticizing James's views. He is, for

example, keenly aware that James's writings on neutral monism invite the objection that neutral

monism is but phenomenalism relabeled. James is criticized for not making it sufficiently clear

that pure experience must be able to exist outside of all consciousness.

If pure experience is indeed neutral, then it is capable of being actual in the absence of that peculiar modification of itself which constitutes consciousness. But James frequently writes as

though experience and conscious experience were the same thing…it is regrettable that James

was not more persistently and stubbornly consistent in this own radicalism. If experience is to

have the physical and metaphysical scope which he attributed to it, it must be boldlyemancipated from all conscious or mental implications. (Perry 1938, 98 – 100)

The main source for Perry's views about neutral monism is contained in his (Perry 1912a).

Edwin B. Holt (1873 – 1946), one of the American New Realists, developed a detailed neutralmonist theory of consciousness. After arguing that ―the fact is that both minds and physicalobjects are and are ‗real‘, and they are composed of one and the same substance—neutral stuff‖

(Holt 1914, 124), Holt tries to show how consciousness can find its place in this world of neutral

elements. He begins with the idea that an organism is capable of responding to certain aspects ofits environment. The features of the environment that are thus selected he calls a cross-section of

the environment. This environmental cross-section is ―comparable with the cross-section [of the

environment] defined by a searchlight‖ (Holt 1914, 174). Armed with these notions, Holt isready to present his account of consciousness:

We have seen that the phenomenon of response defines a cross-section of the environmentwithout, which is a neutral manifold. Now this neutral cross-section outside of the nervous

system, and composed of the neutral elements of physical and nonphysical objects to which the

nervous system is responding by some specific response, — this neutral cross-section, I submit,

coincides exactly with the list of objects of which we say we are conscious. This neutral cross-section as defined by the specific reaction of reflex-arcs is the psychic realm: — it is the manifold

of our sensations, perceptions and ideas: — it is consciousness. (Holt 1914, 182)

This makes consciousness external and objective in the highest degree:


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Consciousness is extended in both space and time: — in space as spatial objects are extended,

consciousness being actually such parts of the objects as are perceived, i.e., such parts as are

consciousness; and in time as a quarter-hour, a day, or a week, is extended…Consciousness also,of course, changes in time and moves about in space. (Holt 1914, 210 – 211)

There is no trace of ‗introjection‘ in this picture; ―the house of the brain is not haunted‖ as Holt puts it. (Holt 1914, 310). There is much else in Holt's work that is remarkable. Though his focus

is on the mind-body problem and on consciousness in particular, Holt's neutral monistic picture

is notable for its ambition to present a more comprehensive neutral monistic metaphysics. Hisattempt to find a place for logic and mathematics in his neutral monism are remarkable, if

perhaps not successful. The main sources for Holt's views about neutral monism are his (Holt

1912) and (Holt 1914).

After sympathizing with neutral monism for some time (see especially Russell 1914, Russell

1918), Bertrand Russell (1872 – 1970) finally adopted it in his (Russell 1919). Russell's enduring

fame is responsible for the fact that neutral monism did not completely vanish from the

philosophical spotlight. But the identification of neutral monism with Russell's views has alsohad some unfortunate consequences. First, over the years Russell's account of neutral monism

underwent considerable change. That made it difficult to get a clear fix on the doctrine. Second,the final version of Russell's neutral monism is very far removed from the sort of view we find in

James, Mach, and Avenarius. It does, for example, exhibit the ―sin‖ of introjection in the most

striking way. That has caused considerable confusion about the nature of neutral monism and the

question whether or when Russell did or did not reject it. None of this helped to improve thereputation of neutral monism. While Russell is responsible for some of the darkness currently

surrounding neutral monism, a good part of it must be attributed to impatient and unsympathetic

readings of his work. The detail and rigor of his presentation of neutral monism surpasses thatfound in the works of the other authors working in this tradition. Hence Russell's work will be

referenced frequently throughout this entry. The main sources for Russell's views on neutral

monism are his (Russell 1921), (Russell 1927a, b), and (Russell 1956a).

In the course of the recent Russell renaissance a number of authors have started to pay attention

to the considerations that led Russell to neutral monism. While all of these authors stop short ofembracing neutral monism, their works show marked parallels to Russell's central ideas. Daniel

Stoljar (2001, 2006), Grover Maxwell (1978), Galen Strawson (2003), and Michael Lockwood

(1981, 1989, 1998) gravitate toward physicalism. David Chalmers (1996, 2003) and Peter Unger

(1999) are more inclined to consider neutral monism as a live option.

Kenneth Sayre's (1929-) version of neutral monism is highly original. It shares none of the

striking but nonessential features that are common to all the other versions of neutral monismdiscussed here. Unlike all the other versions of the doctrine it is not an outgrowth of an amalgam

of realist and empiricist philosophemes. Information theory and Platonism form the background

in which Sayre's interpretation of neutral monism is rooted. Sayre sets out his project in the

following terms:

If the project…is successful, it will have been shown not only that the concept of information provides a primitive for the analysis of both the physical and the mental, but also that states of


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information…existed previously to states of mind. Since information in this sense is prior to

mentality, but also implicated in all mental states, it follows that information is prior also in the

ontological sense…Success of the present project thus will show that an ontology ofinformational states is adequate for an explanation of the phenomena of mind, as distinct from an

ontology of physical events. [And Sayre adds:] It is a reasonable conjecture that an ontology of

information is similarly basic to the physical sciences… (Sayre 1976, 16)

More recently Sayre has provided the following helpful characterization of his position:

Neutral Monism is the view that neither mind nor matter is ontologically basic, but are both

reducible (in some appropriate sense of reduction that requires specification) to another more

fundamental principle that is ―neutral‖ between them. The neutral monism I advocate holds thatthe fundamental principle to which both mind and matter are reducible is not a substance in any

sense (Aristotelian, Cartesian, whatever), but is rather [a] structure of a sort that can only be

represented mathematically. This structure is what information theorists…call ―information.‖

The neutral monism I advocate, accordingly, has more in common with the ontology of the late

Platonic dialogues than with that of the early Russell which the name ‗neutral monism‘commonly brings to mind. (Memo circulated in the Notre Dame philosophy department)

Many of the objections directed against neutral monism are primarily concerned with the

peculiarities that mainstream neutral monism inherits from its accidental rootedness in realist and

empiricist traditions described below. The fact that nearly all extant forms of neutral monismshare these peculiar but nonessential features makes it easy to overlook that they are merely

accidental features of neutral monism. The existence of Sayre's version of the doctrine is a most

welcome check on these sorts of arguments. By comparing it to the standard versions of neutral

monism we can, for example, see that the pervasive link between the neutral elements and perceptual contents is a mere historical artifact: most neutral monists happened to be empiricists

of sorts — hence this particular link. Sayre's choice of mathematical structures as the―fundamental stuff‖ forcefully brings home the point that this near universal way of specifyingthe neutral basis is not written into the neutral monist doctrine. The main source for Sayre's

views on neutral monism is his (Sayre 1976).

3. The Neutral Entities

3.1 Mental, Physical, Neutral

Given that the definition of ―neutrality‖ involves the notions of the mental and the physical (ormind and body), the neutral monist must rely on some notion of the physical and the mental. But

the explication of these notions is not the main task of neutral monism. Different ways ofdrawing the mind/body distinction will yield different versions of neutral monism. For the natureof the entities that are neutral between mind and body will depend on the nature of mind and

body. Neutral monism is not committed to any particular way of drawing the mind/body

distinction. That is not to say, of course, that neutral monism is compatible with all possibleways of drawing the distinction. Proposals that define the mental and the physical ascomplements of each other are unacceptable; for they leave no room for a realm that is neutral

between the two. Proposals that make irreducibility into a defining characteristic of mind or body


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are unacceptable; for they rule out reductionist approaches by fiat. Within these constraints there

is a wide variety of notions of mind and body that neutral monists can and do work with.

The main task of a neutral monist theory is therefore to show how, given a certain notions of

mind and body, a class of neutral entities can be specified and how mental and physical states

can be reduced to/constructed from these entities. The success of a given version of neutralmonism should be judged primarily on the basis of how well it handles these three problems.

One may still want to reject a theory that passes this test if it is based on a problematical or

absurd way of drawing the mind/body distinction. But this sort of critique is not a critique ofneutral monism as such; it is a critique of the way in which the problem is posed, not a critique

of the way in which this ill-posed problem was solved.

3.2 Different Notions of Neutrality

In the opening paragraph the notion of neutrality was introduced as follows:

1.

A basic entity is neutral just in case it is intrinsically neither mental nor physical.

But there are other plausible ways of spelling out this notion. Reflection on the thesis that all

nonbasic physical and mental entities are reducible to/constructible from basic neutral entities

may lead one to one of the following explications of the notion of neutrality:

2. A basic entity is neutral just in case it figures in the reduction bases of both physical and

mental nonbasic entities.

3. A basic entity is neutral just in case it can figure in the reduction bases of both physicaland mental nonbasic entities.

Another approach to the notion of neutrality begins with the notion of law:

4. A basic entity is neutral just in case mental and physical laws are applicable to it.

These notions of neutrality are not equivalent and can pull apart. But neither proponents nor

opponents of neutral monism have been careful to distinguish them, thus inviting needlessconfusions.

Take, for example, Russell's discussion in The Analysis of Mind. Russell holds that there aresensations, images, and particulars ―probably equally (or almost equally) transient, which make

up that part of the material world that does not come into the sort of contact with the living body

that is required to turn it into a sensation‖ (Russell 1921, 144). In the following passage Russelltells us how particulars of these three kinds differ from each other and what sorts of laws areapplicable to them:

The American Realists are partly right, though not wholly, in considering that both mind andmatter are composed of a neutral-stuff which, in isolation, is neither mental nor material. I should

admit this view as regards sensations: what is heard or seen belongs equally to psychology and to

physics. But I should say that images belong only to the mental world, while those occurrences


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(if any) which do not form part of any ―experience‖ belong only to the physical world. There are,

it seems to me, prima facie different kinds of causal laws, one belonging to physics and the other

to psychology. The law of gravitation, for example, is a physical law, while the law ofassociation is a psychological law. Sensations are subject to both kinds of laws, and are therefore

truly ―neutral‖ in Holt's sense. But entities subject only to physical laws, or only to psychological

laws, are not neutral, and may be called respectively purely material and purely mental. (Russell1921, 25 – 6)

Here we find Russell making use of three or four of the four neutrality criteria listed above. First,sensations are classified as neutral, according to (1). Then images are declared not neutral,

according to (2) (or (3) — both interpretations are plausible). Next particulars of the third kind are

deemed to be not neutral, according to (2). Finally criterion (4) is invoked to classify sensations

as neutral, and to explain what the notions of pure mentality and materiality amount to. AndRussell seems to imply that images and particulars of the third kind are, respectively, purely

mental and purely physical, according to criterion (4). Up to this point the liberal use of different

criteria has not caused any problems — the various criteria cohere in yielding a position that,

remarkably, isn't recognizably neutral monist. But at the end of the book we find Russellspeculating about the ultimate scientific account, a fundamental unifying science. These passages

privilege (4) — the law criterion — and suggest a quite different picture (a much more truly neutralmonist picture, in fact):

I think…that an ultimate scientific account of what goes on in the world, if it were ascertainable,

would resemble psychology rather than physics…such an account would not be content to speak,even formally, as though matter, which is a logical fiction, were the ultimate reality. I think that,

if our scientific knowledge were adequate to the task, which it neither is nor is likely to become,

it would…state the causal laws of the world in terms of…particulars, not in terms of matter.Causal laws so stated would, I believe, be applicable to psychology and physics equally; the

science in which they were stated would succeed in achieving what metaphysics has vainly

attempted, namely a unified account of what really happens, wholly true even if not the whole of

truth, and free from all convenient fictions or unwarrantable assumptions of metaphysicalentities. (Russell 1921, 305 – 6)

This is a powerful expression of a monistic vision. One set of laws governs all particulars. So all

particulars are neutral, according to the ―law criterion.‖ And there are other passages in Russell's

text — utilizing criterion (1) — that also suggest a neutral monistic interpretation:

The data of psychology do not differ in their intrinsic character from the data of physics. I have

maintained that sensations are data for psychology and physics equally, while images, which

may be in some sense exclusively psychological data, can only be distinguished from sensations by their correlations, not by what they are in themselves. (Russell 1921, 297)

Particulars that form part of no experience are not mentioned in this passage. But the idea itconveys is that all particulars are intrinsically the same. So if sensations are neutral because they

are intrinsically neither mental nor physical, and all other particulars have the same intrinsic

nature as sensations, then all particulars are neutral, at least according to the first definition of


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neutrality. In this way criteria (1)-(4) do pull apart, sorting some of Russell's particulars — images

and particulars of the third kind — into mutually exclusive groups.

This has made it difficult to understand The Analysis of Mind. And there are other ways in which

the failure to distinguish these criteria has caused confusion. Some of the most prominent

interpreters of Russell appear to work with criterion (2), according to which neutral monismholds that all constituents of the world must be experienced (be a constituent of a mind). This

vividly raises the suspicion that neutral monism is a version of phenomenalism. Moreover, this

interpretation makes it incomprehensible how Russell could continue to call himself a neutralmonist after admitting inferred and unexperienced particulars into the basis of his system. What

these critics fail to see is that Russell had other, nonequivalent, criteria of neutrality to work

with. Given these other criteria, the idea of neutrality does not give rise to the phenomenalism

suspicion and the existence of inferred and unexperienced particulars is unproblematical.

The point of this discussion is not to accuse Russell or his critics of being unclear about the

notion of neutrality. Nor is the goal to arbitrate between these (and other possible) notions of

neutrality. The purpose is to draw attention to the fact that a number of disputes centered onquestions such as: Can an unexperienced particular be neutral? Is X really a neutral monist?

When did X embrace/reject neutral monism? are fueled by no more than an insufficiently precisenotion of neutrality. Different criteria of neutrality are available and they yield different results

when applied to a given body of work. A critique of neutral monism that overlooks this point

will hold little interest.

3.3 Identifying the Neutral Entities

The minimal characterization of neutral monism yields limited information about the neutralelements. One learns that (i) there are neutral elements, and that (ii) mind and matter are

constructible from them. This places certain constraints on what falls into the domain of neutralentities: it must be neutral and the kind of thing from which mind and matter can be constructed.

The preceding discussion of neutrality has shown that this notion can be spelled out in variousways, and that the consequences of adopting any one of them will vary according to how the

mind/matter distinction is spelled out.

Sense-data — considered as possible candidates for the basic entities of neutral monism —

strikingly illustrate this point. Different ways of drawing the mind/matter distinction have placed

sense-data on the side of matter (e.g., Russell, 1914a,b; 1915); on the side of the mind (e.g.,Frank Jackson, 1977); or on neither side (e.g., H.H. Price, 1932). If these three philosophers were

to help themselves to the first definition of neutrality — a basic entity is neutral just in case it is

intrinsically neither mental nor physical — sense data would count as neutral for Price, butRussell and Jackson would have to deny their neutrality (albeit for different reasons).

The requirement that mental and physical things be constructible from the neutral elementsfurther narrows down the scope of possible candidates for the basic elements of neutral monism.

Mach, for example, thinks that the basic entities of physics (considered as neutral) could not

serve as the elements of neutral monism because they do not satisfy the constructibilityconstraint:


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Notice one thing. While there is no difficulty in building up every physical experience from

sensation, that is mental elements, we can foresee no possibility of representing any mental

experience in terms of elements currently used in physics: i.e., from the masses and motions inthe rigid form that alone is serviceable in that special branch of science. (Mach 1905, 12, fn 7)

Many contemporary philosophers will suspect that Mach got it backwards. For present purposesit matters not whether Mach or his modern critics are right. Either way, the point illustrates the

claim that certain views about the construction of mind and matter appear to place substantive

limitations on what the basic elements of neutral monism can be.

Similar considerations apply to attempts to construct concrete reality out of abstract objects.

Neutral monists are not the only ones to have attempted this. The materialist Quine, for example,has proposed to construe physical objects as ―classes of quadruples of numbers‖ (Quine 1981,

17). One version of neutral monism finds the neutral basis in the domain of abstract objects:

mind and matter are viewed as information structures. Recently Chalmers has explored this idea

in his (Chalmers 1996). But the abstractness of his scheme is limited by the concession that the

information states that make up the world might have to be grounded in protophenomenal properties. (See the section ―The Neo-Russellians‖). Sayre, on the other hand, makes no such

concession. He holds a pure information view according to which both mind and matter are,ultimately, mathematical structures:

Contrary to current dogma in some quarters that materialism and dualism are the onlyontological options on the horizon, a more plausible alternative from the cybernetic point of view

is some version of neutral monism…Sayre attempts to articulate a monism in which neither

information-functions [in Shannon's technical sense] of cognitive activity nor probabilistic

functions at the quantum level of matter are further reducible to mental or physical features,making mathematical (statistical) structures more basic ontologically than either mind or matter.

(Sayre 1996, 312)

Those who fail to see how to construct the concrete out of the abstract will hold that the

constructibility constraint on the neutral entities eliminates proposals along these lines. These are

some of the ways in which the possible domain of neutral entities is limited by such factors aswhich criterion of neutrality is chosen, how the mind/matter distinction is drawn, and how the

process of construction is envisioned. But general constraints of this sort do not uniquely specify

a set of neutral entities. Which entities are singled out as the neutral base is, therefore, largely amatter of the philosophical background assumptions guiding the neutral monist in the process of

theory construction.

4. Background: Realism and EmpiricismSayre's version of neutral monism is rooted in the Platonic tradition, but the philosophical

background that shapes the development of the mainstream versions of the doctrine ischaracterized by two factors: (i) a strong reaction against idealism; (ii) a wholehearted embrace

of empiricism. This shared philosophical background makes for a certain uniformity across the

different versions of neutral monism advocated by Mach, James, the New Realists, and Russell.

This mainstream version of the doctrine finds the neutral elements in the immediate data of


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experience — in the given of traditional empiricism. And it construes these given elements of

experience as real and mind-independent — in keeping with its anti-idealist or realist bias.

The expression ―the given,‖ as it is used here, stands for the phenomenal features immediately

presented to us in experience: the tastes, the smells, the colors, the sounds, etc. that experience

(both veridical and nonveridical) acquaints us with. H.H. Price points to these features in thefollowing well known passage:

When I see a tomato there is much that I can doubt. I can doubt whether it is a tomato that I amseeing, and not a cleverly painted piece of wax. I can doubt whether there is any material thing

there at all. Perhaps what I took for a tomato was really a reflection; perhaps I am even the

victim of some hallucination. One thing however I cannot doubt: that there exists a red patch of around and somewhat bulgy shape, standing out from a background of other colour-patches, and

having a certain visual depth, and that this whole field of colour is directly present to my

consciousness. (Price 1932, 3)

Price's red, bulgy patch is a characteristic example of an element given in experience.Empiricism — the doctrine that all our concepts and all our knowledge are grounded in

experience — assigns a central role to the given. (For discussions of the given see: Price 1932,Lewis 1929, Moser 1985, Fales 1996). The idea to identify the neutral elements with the

elements given in experience therefore naturally suggests itself to a neutral monist under the

sway of empiricism. Their realism leads the mainstream neutral monists to construe the givenelements of experience as mind-independent entities. The idealistic view that for these items to

be is to be perceived is rejected as fallacious. There is nothing intrinsically mental about Price's

red patch, nor does the existence of this red patch depend on Price's awareness of it. The patch

can exist prior to Price's awareness of it, and it can continue to exist after Price's attention haslapsed. Thus the elements given to us in experience are credited with an autonomous existence.

Price's red patch — realistically construed — is one of the neutral elements forming ultimatereality. According to the mainstream version of neutral monism mind and matter are constructsout of just such entities. This is how the joint operation of the empiricism and the realism that

shape mainstream neutral monism gives rise to its most characteristic claim: that the neutral

elements of being are given to us in experience.

The two sections that follow provide more detail about how empiricism and realism — the two

broad philosophical commitments in which mainstream neutral monism is rooted — shape thedoctrine we find in the writings of Mach, James, the American New Realists, and Russell. The

subsequent sections on substance and the ego point to further consequences of the empiricist

point of view adopted by the mainstream neutral monists. The Humean dissolution of substance

together with the abandonment of the ego play an important role in establishing the case for theneutrality of the given. Another trait of mainstream neutral monism is its embrace of the bundle

theory of concrete particulars (encompassing both persons and other things). This too is a

consequence of the empiricism informing the view. The relationship between neutral monism

and the bundle theory is discussed in the section ―Objections to Neutral Monisms‖ subsection―Principles of Bundling.‖


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It must be stressed that neutral monism is independent of the realism and empiricism that happen

to have shaped its best known versions. It does not entail them, nor is it entailed by them. The

close historical association of these doctrines makes it very difficult to understand the traditionalversions of neutral monism in isolation from this particular background.

4.1 Neutral Entities and the Given

The influence of a broadly Humean empiricism on the mainstream versions of neutral monism is

profound. The empiricist background is powerfully present in the thinking of the central figures

of neutral monism: Mach, James, and Russell. This basic empiricist stance played a big role inshaping the doctrines that we now know as neutral monism. It guided the neutral monists to look

to the given in their search for the neutral entities. It encouraged them to deny substance, both

material and mental, thereby allowing them to construe the given in a suitably neutral manner. It

also made it quite natural for them to opt for bundle-theoretic accounts of persons and otherconcrete particulars.

Neutral monism insists on the neutrality of the basic entities; nothing is said about theirepistemic accessibility. But a neutral monist who is also an empiricist will tend to search for

neutral entities in a domain that is immediately accessible in experience. The empiricist

sympathies of the neutral monists manifest themselves in their choice of neutral entities. James's pure experience, Mach's elements, the sensations and images of the earlier Russell, and the

events and percepts of the later Russell are all rooted in the given of the empiricist tradition. In

this way the notion of a neutral entity gets tied up with the idea of immediate accessibility. Thisconnection between the notions of neutrality and givenness is a pervasive but inessential

ingredient at the core of most neutral monist doctrines.

When James tries to explain the nature of pure experience — the ―materia prima of everything‖

(James 1905b, 138) — he always points us to our sensations and feelings. Though he went backand forth on the question of just how tight the connection between ordinary sensation and pure

experience is, he never broke this connection entirely. Sometimes he holds that it takes a specialstate of consciousness to discover pure experience:

‗Pure experience‘ is the name which I gave to the immediate flux of life which furnishes the

material to our later reflections with its conceptual categories. Only new-born babes, or men in

semi-coma from sleep, drugs, illnesses, or blows, may be assumed to have an experience pure in

the literal sense…Pure experience in this state is but another name for feeling or sensation.(James 1905c, 93 – 4)

At other times James suggests that pure experience is readily given to us in everyday experience:

Let the reader arrest himself in the act of reading this article now. Now this is a pure experience,

a phenomenon, or datum, a mere that or content of fact. ‗Reading‘ simply is, is there; andwhether there for some one's consciousness, or there for physical nature, is a question not yet

put. At the moment, it is there for neither; later we shall probably judge it to have been there for

both. (James 1905b, 145 – 6)


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But at all times he holds that the domain of pure experience is right there, before our eyes, as it

were.

―Elements‖ is the term that Mach prefers to use for his neutral entities. Red, green, blue, warm,

cold, etc. are typical examples. Despite the fact that Mach much prefers the less loaded term

―elements,‖ he acknowledged that ―usually, these elements are called sensations‖ (Mach 1886,22). This is so because our primary way of encountering elements is in the form of sensations:

We only use the additional term ―sensation‖ to describe the elements, because most people aremuch more familiar with the elements in question as sensations (colors, sounds, pressures,

spaces, times, etc.). (Mach 1886, 16)

Mach makes it quite clear that his elements — whether they be sensations or not — are to be found

in the given elements of experience:

For me the elements A B C…[these are ―complexes of colors, sounds, and so forth, commonly

called bodies‖] are immediately and indubitably given, and for me they can never afterwards bevolatilized away by considerations which ultimately are always based on their existence. (Mach1886, 45)

In Russell's early writings on neutral monism experience is an important source of neutralentities. Those that are experienced are our sensations and images:

The stuff of the world, so far as we have experience of it, consists, on the view that I am

advocating, of innumerable transient particulars such as occur in seeing, hearing, etc., together

with images more or less resembling these…Sensations are what is common to the mental and

physical worlds; they may be defined as the intersection of mind and matter. (Russell 1921, 143 –

4)

Russell's switch to an event ontology does not break the tight connection between the neutralentities — now understood as events — and experience. All of the examples he picks to illustrate

his notion of an event are experiences:

Everything in the world is composed of ‗events‘…An ‗event,‘ as I understand it…is something

occupying a small finite amount of space-time…When I speak of an ‗event‘ I do not mean

anything out of the way. Seeing a flash of lightning is an event; so is hearing a tyre burst, orsmelling a rotten egg, or feeling the coldness of a frog. (Russell 1927b, 222)

And Russell's way of singling out those events that are percepts nicely ties in with the traditionalepistemic claims made on behalf of the given. A percept, he tells us, ―is what is most indubitable

in our knowledge of the world‖ (Russell 1927b, 105).

This accidental but pervasive association of empiricism with neutral monism explains why most

extant versions of the doctrine locate the neutral elements in experience, in the given. The

attempt to find the neutral basis in the given has one obvious virtue: it makes the neutralelements into something with which we are intimately acquainted. This blocks the serious worry


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that neutral monism is the pointless endeavor of reducing that which is (relatively) well

understood — mind and matter — to something unknown and, possibly, unknowable. This way of

familiarizing us with the ―neutral‖ basis does, however, immediately raise the new (and equallyserious) worry that neutral monism has now become a non-neutral, mental monism. For, surely,

it is obvious that the given — assuming that it is not a myth — is as mental (and, therefore, non-

neutral) as it gets.

The neutral monists were well aware of this problem and marshaled a number of considerations

in support of the neutrality of the given. First, they argued that the given element in experience isreal, in the sense of being mind independent. Second, and in keeping with their background

empiricism, they mounted an attack on substance, both mental and material. In a world devoid of

mental (and material) substances there is nothing to impart mentality (or materiality) to the given

features of experience. If there are no substances it follows that there is no substantial self. Thearguments directed against a substantive subject (self/ego) yield a third set of considerations in

support of the neutrality of the given. The primary purpose of these attacks is to get rid of

(apparently) irreducibly mental entities and capacities. But these considerations can also serve to

support the thesis of the neutrality of the given.

4.2 Realism about the Given

The turn away from idealism at the begin of the 20th

century (pioneered by G.E. Moore, Russell,

and the American New Realists) led to an unconditional embrace of a certain form of realism

about the objects of mental states in general, and the objects of perceptual states in particular.Realism about these objects amounts to the claim that they are mind-independent: their existence

does not depend on their being the object of a mental act. This realism, accepted by all the

mainstream neutral monists, plays the crucial role of stripping the given of its mentality. This is

the single most important step in shaping the given into a viable source of neutral elements. Note

that this realism is no more part of neutral monism than the empiricism with which it tends to gohand in hand.

Moore thought that the correct analysis of sensation reveals that ―the blue,‖ for example, of a

sensation of blue was a real, independent object:

And what my analysis of sensation has been designed to show is, that whenever I have a mere

sensation or idea, the fact is that I am then aware of something which is…not an inseparable

aspect of my experience. The awareness which I have maintained to be included in sensation isthe very same unique fact which constitutes every kind of knowledge: ―blue‖ is as much an

object, and as little a mere content, of my experience, when I experience it, as the most exalted

and independent real thing of which I am ever aware…Merely to have a sensation…is to knowsomething which is as truly and really not a part of my experience, as anything which I can everknow. (Moore 1903, 27)

According to T.P. Nunn — whose views on this matter influenced Russell —―careful introspection

and the plain man‖ support the principle that ―what is existentially present to the mind in

perception is something extra-mental — something that would be as it is in perception even if itwere not perceived.‖ (Nunn 1909– 10, 202 – 3) Russell, not yet converted to neutral monism,


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concurs. He holds that the objects that become our sense-data (the notorious sensibilia) are mind-

independent:

Logically, a sense-datum is an object, a particular of which the subject is aware. It does not

contain the subject as a part…The existence of the sense-datum is therefore not logically

dependent upon that of the subject…There is therefore no a priori reason why a particular whichis a sense-datum should not persist after it has ceased to be a datum, nor why other similar

particulars should not exist without ever being data. (Russell 1914a, 146)

Russell's way of making the transition from the nonmentality of the perceptual object to the

neutrality of sensations (or percepts) is traced out in the section ―Giving up the Ego‖ below. The

quotes by Moore, Nunn and Russell emphasize the nonmentality and the independence of theobject of experience from its being experienced. Perry takes the matter further by insisting that

the independence and the neutrality of the object of experience are readily discernible in

introspection:

When I attempt to discover the generic character of the contents revealed by introspection, I meetat once with a most significant fact. Distributively, these contents coincide with other manifolds,

such as nature, history, and the contents of other minds. In other words, in so far as I divide theminto elements, the contents of my mind exhibit no generic character. I find the quality ‗blue,‘ but

this I ascribe also to the book which lies bef ore me on the table; I find ‗hardness,‘ but this I

ascribe also to the physical adamant; or I find number, which my neighbor finds also in his mind.In other words, the elements of the introspective manifold are in themselves neither peculiarly

mental nor peculiarly mine; they are neutral and interchangeable. (Perry 1912a, 277)

This is the way in which the neutral monists take their sort of realism to open up a window onto

what is subsequently identified as the world of neutral entities. Their inclination to see these

entities — the colors, noises, hardnesses, etc. — as neutral gains additional support from a furtherfeature of the traditional empiricism they embrace.

4.3 Giving up Substance

Empiricism (of a Humean variety) influences the neutral monists in another significant way. The

elimination of substance, both material and mental, smoothes out the transition from realism to

neutral monism. The items that confront us in perception — the colors, sounds, textures, etc. — are best thought of as neutral because there do not exist mental and physical substrata that might

impart mentality or physicality to these items.

According to Humean empiricism the redness one experiences when seeing a tomato cannot betaken as a physical property of the tomato's material substance; nor can it be taken to be a

modification of the spiritual substance of the perceiving mind. For on this view, neither one of

these substances exists. The redness itself is the primary datum. The tomato and the mind that perceives it are constructed from such primary data. This is the sense in which the redness is

more fundamental than and neutral between the perceived physical object and the mind that

perceives it.


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Mach's rejection of substance — in the form of Kant's Ding an sich — is not the fruit of his

empiricist philosophy but the direct result of an intuitive vision:

At about the age of fifteen, I lighted, in the library of my father, on a copy of Kant's

Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics. The book made at the time a powerful and ineffaceable

impression upon me, the like of which I never afterwards experienced in any of my philosophicalreading. Some two or three years later the superfluity of the rôle played by ―the thing in itself‖

abruptly dawned upon me. On a bright summer day in the open air, the world with my ego

suddenly appeared to me as one coherent mass of sensations, only more strongly coherent in theego. Although the actual working out of this thought did not occur until a later period, yet this

moment was decisive for my whole view. (Mach 1886, 30)

But in retrospect Mach made his allegiance to Hume quite clear when he says: ―That my starting

point is not essentially different from Hume's is of course obvious‖ (Mach 1886, 46). Russell's

rejection of material substance dates back to the period before he embraced neutral monism.

Upon adopting neutral monism this skepticism about substance is extended to mental substances.

In an amusing passage ―the substance philosophy‖ is identified as one of the ―savagesuperstitions of the cannibals‖ (Russell 1956a, 138). Writing in a more sober tone, Russell has

this to say about substance:

The conception of substantial identity with varying properties is embedded in language, in

common sense, and in metaphysics. To my mind, it is useful in practice, but harmful in theory. Itis harmful, I mean, if taken as metaphysically ultimate: what appears as one substance with

changing states should, I maintain, be conceived as a series of occurrences linked together in

some important way. (Russell 1927a, 152)

The neutral monists among the American New Realists were also fully aware of the importance

of this move away from substance. Realists, like Thomas Reid, who did not abandon substancewere accused of having an ―alliance with substantialism‖ (Perry 1912a, 103). And in reply toJosiah Royce's claim that ―realism is fond of substances, of ‗inner‘ or ‗deeper‘ fundamental facts,

and of inaccessible universes‖ Perry tells us that ―it happens that the realism of the present day

has strong aversions for these sorts of things‖ (Perry 1912a, 103).

The most unforgiving attack on the notion of substance is contained in Joseph Petzoldt's book

Das Weltproblem (1906). The book presents the last 2500 years of philosophy as a long battle

against the pernicious substance concept. After many setbacks (the worst of which was held to be

Kant) the final victory allowed the neutral monist philosophies of Mach and Avenarius to

emer ge. (Petzoldt prefers the label ―Positivism‖ for this position). The confluence of empiricism,the denial of substance, and the ideas of neutral monism is strikingly illustrated by this work.

4.4 Giving Up the Ego

Russell had given up on material substance long before accepting neutral monism. But his belief

in the substantial self and its mental acts was the main obstacle to his embracing neutral monism.

Reviewing James's Essays in Radical Empiricism he writes:


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On ground of the purest empiricism, from mere inspection of experience, I for my part should

hold it obvious that perception is in its intrinsic nature a fact of relation, involving an act as well

as an object. For this reason, I cannot accept James's view, in spite of its very attractivesimplification of the world. (Russell 1912, 574)

But by the time he wrote The Analysis of Mind Russell had changed his mind. Empiricism nowseemed to dictate that the self be given up:

Empirically, I cannot discover anything corresponding to he supposed act; and theoretically Icannot see that it is indispensable. We say: ― I think so-and-so,‖ and this word ―I‖ suggests that

thinking is the act of a person. Meinong's ―act‖ is the ghost of the subject, or what once was the

full-blooded soul. (Russell 1921, 17 – 18)

Thus he is now free to adopt a neutral monist position. The thought that leads him from the

demise of the self to the neutrality of sensations is interesting. By collapsing what used to be the purely physical sense-datum with what used to be the purely mental sensory act he arrives at a

new entity — unhelpfully called a sensation — that is neutral and can figure in both physical andmental contexts.

If we are to avoid a perfectly gratuitous assumption, we must dispense with the subject as one of

the actual ingredients of the world. But when we do this, the possibility of distinguishing thesensation from the sense-datum vanishes; at least I see no way of preserving the distinction.Accordingly the sensation that we have when we see a patch of colour simply is that patch of

colour, an actual constituent of the physical world, and part of what physics is concerned

with…But it does not follow that the patch of colour is not also psychical, unless we assume thatthe physical and the psychical cannot overlap, which I no longer consider a valid assumption. If

we admit — as I think we should — that the patch of colour may be both physical and psychical,

the reason for distinguishing the sense-datum from the sensation disappears, and we must saythat the patch of colour and our sensation in seeing it are identical. (Russell 1921, 142 – 3)

Looking back on his reasons for adopting neutral monism Russell provides a somewhat simpleraccount of the role that the denial of the self played in his thinking:

So long as the ‗subject‘ was retained there was a ‗mental‘ entity to which there was nothinganalogous in the material world, but, if sensations are occurrences which are not essentially

relational, there is not the same need to regard mental and physical occurrences as fundamentally

different. It becomes possible to regard both a mind and a piece of matter as logical constructions

formed out of materials not differing vitally and sometimes actually identical. (Russell 1959,103)

We find the same empiricism-driven connection between neutral monism and the denial of theself in Mach's thought. Treating the ego as a ―real unity,‖ Mach (1886, 28) poses scientific,

epistemic, and ethical problems. When Mach declares that ―the ego must be given up‖ (Mach

1886, 24), it is this understanding of the ego as a real unity that he has in mind. At the same timehe acknowledges the utility and importance of the ego, understood as a practical unity:


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To bring together elements that are most intimately connected with pleasure and pain into one

ideal mental-economical unity, the ego; this is a task of the highest importance for the intellect

working in the service of the pain-avoiding, pleasure-seeking will. (Mach 1886, 23)

But he is quick to point out that the utility of this ―mental-economical unity‖ is quite limited. In

purely theoretical contexts this notion ―may prove to be insufficient, obstructive, and untenable‖(Mach 1886, 23). Thus Mach's acknowledgment of the limited utility of the ego, understood as a

practical unity, does not change his verdict that ―the ego must be given up.‖

James had discarded the substantive self, or the soul, long before he officially embraced his

radical empiricism. In The Principles of Psychology he calls it ―a complete superfluity‖ (James

1890, 329) — unobservable and devoid of explanatory power. Summing up his harsh critique ofthe soul he has this to say:

Altogether the Soul is an outbirth of that sort of philosophizing whose great maxim…is:―Whatever you are totally ignorant of, assert to be the explanation of everything else.‖ (James

1890, 329)

It should not come as a surprise to find the neutral monists engaged in the battle against the ego.

The ego is the single most ―threatening‖ entity they have to deal with: a purely mental entity,

irreducible to neutral elements. Faithful to the tradition of Humean empiricism, mainstreamneutral monism attempts to circumvent this problem by adopting a bundle-theoretic account ofthe self. This opens mainstream neutral monism to all the objections that have been leveled

against the bundle-theoretic account of the self. It is an interesting question whether the bundle

theory of the self is an integral part of mainstream neutral monism, or just another accidentalhistorical accretion that can easily be discarded, should it prove troublesome. (see the section

―Objections to Neutral Monism‖ subsection ―Principles of Bundling‖).

5. Reduction and Construction

5.1 What Is it to Reduce?

Neutral monism was introduced as a form of reductionism. But a quick glance at neutral monist

writings yields many passages that sound unabashedly eliminativist. Here is a sampling. Mach:

―Both [object and ego] are provisional fictions of the same kind.‖ (Mach 1905, 9). Russell:

―What I wish to do…is to re-state the relations of mind and brain in terms not implying theexistence of either‖ (Russell 1956a, 135). Avenarius: ―What I know is neither physical nor

mental but only some third kind of thing.‖ (Approvingly quoted in (Mach 1905, 13)). James: ―It

seems to me that the hour is ripe for it [consciousness] to be openly and universally discarded‖(James 1904b, 3). But these statements are misleading. The project is not to radically redraw the boundaries of our concepts. It is not being suggested that the concepts mind, matter, belief,

desire, self, etc. fail to carve nature at her joints. The reconstructed concepts map onto the old

ones. The difference is one of metaphysical depth only. Mach's declaration, say, that the ego isirredeemable, is directed only against Cartesian dualism and, to use Dennett's illuminating term,

Cartesian materialism. Humean bundle selves are in no danger. And James would be surprised to


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learn how literally his advice to discard consciousness has been taken by some contemporary

philosophers. He was merely urging us to adopt a relational definition of consciousness.

Even if it is granted that the proponents of neutral monism did not intend it as a form of

eliminativism, the worry that it is eliminativist may persist. All reductionist doctrines give rise to

this suspicion, as is evidenced by the ongoing debate about the place of the mind in reductivematerialism. At the end of the day the reductive materialist hopes to be able to describe and

explain the world in purely physical terms. The neutral monist has an analogous vision that ―in a

com pleted science, the word ‗mind‘ and the word ‗matter‘ would both disappear, and would bereplaced by causal laws concerning ‗events‘‖ (Russell 1927b, 226). This vividly raises the

question how the distinction between explaining and explaining away is to be drawn. Some have

argued that the boundary between reductionism and eliminativism a merely pragmatic matter.

But it must be noted that the difficulties that neutral monism encounters on this front are nodifferent from those that any reductionist doctrine has to face.

The neutral monists have employed various more or less clearly articulated strategies for the

construction or reduction of mental and physical entities. Most neutral monists will agree withSayre when he says that neither conceptual analysis nor empirical inquiry can establish the truth

of neutral monism. Instead Sayre opts for a version of the best explanation strategy, hereillustrated in its application to mental phenomena:

The appropriate tactic, I believe, rather is to offer the thesis as an explication of how perceptualconsciousness ought to be understood in the context of inquiry, and by way of support to show

that commonly recognized features of perception gain intelligibility when conceived in terms of

these informational processes. (Sayre 1976, 156)

Mainstream neutral monism starts out with the system of neutral elements — Mach imagines it as

―a viscous mass, at certain places (as in the ego) more firmly coherent than in others.‖ (Mach1886, 17) To say that a physical object or an ego exists in this system is to say that certain of thesystem's elements are interconnected in certain characteristic ways. These functional element

complexes exhibit many of the important features of the physical objects and the selves of our

commonsense ontology. Thus the commonsense ontology of physical objects and selves finds its place in the world of neutral monism. But Mach makes it clear that this constitutes only a partial

vindication of the ontology of commonsense. The scientist must transcend this superficial

ontological scheme and investigate the functional interconnections of the elements themselves.

Russell's notion of a logical construction originated in his work on mathematical logic. But he

argues that it is of quite general philosophical signif icance. He calls it the ―supreme maxim ofscientific philosophizing‖ and formulates it as follows: ―Wherever possible, logicalconstructions are to be substituted for inferred entities.‖ (Russell 1914b, 149) A somewhat fuller

explanation of the method governing constructions reads as follows:

Given a set of propositions nominally dealing with the supposed inferred entities, we observe the

properties which are required of the supposed entities in order to make these propositions true.By dint of a little logical ingenuity, we then construct some logical function of less hypothetical

entities which has the requisite properties. This constructed function we substitute for the


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supposed inferred entities, and thereby obtain a new and less doubtful interpretation of the body

of propositions in question. (Russell 1914b, 150)

Prior to his conversion to neutral monism Russell argued that physical objects are constructions

out of sense-data. Upon accepting neutral monism he rejected sense-data. But the project of

construction became even more ambitious: both physical and mental objects are now understoodas constructions out of neutral elements.

The handful of examples of neutral monistic reduction sketches presented in the next twosections may not inspire confidence. In fact, it may seem that the neutral monist reductive project

is hopeless. For it poses harder problems than those that have remained unsolved by materialistic

or idealistic versions of reductionism. Their respective starting points at least guarantee that the job of accounting for the world is half done before it is even begun. The neutral monist, on the

other hand, starts with something — the neutral entities — that is less well understood than either

matter or mind, and neither matter nor mind may be assumed at the outset of the construction.

But a less bleak assessment of the situation is possible. Neutral monism's reductive rivals havealso had limited success. The neutral monist can explain this. Idealism and materialism start from

familiar but faulty conceptions of mind and matter. This negates the alleged head-start that thesereductionisms enjoy over neutral monism. More importantly, it explains why certain reductions

are not forthcoming. Take the ―hard problem of consciousness‖ (Chalmers 1996), for example.

The neutral monist holds that the intractability of this problem is due to the faulty conception ofmatter assumed in the materialistic framework. The difficult question how matter can produce a

sensation with intrinsic qualitative character does not even arise for the neutral monist. Matter

does not cause sensations. Matter is, instead, to be understood as a complex of particulars among

which there can be sensations — as Mach laconically puts it: ―Bodies do not produce sensations, but complexes of elements (complexes of sensations) make up bodies‖ (Mach 1886, 29). It is

true that the actual constructions of matter and mind may still be lacking. But at least the neutralmonist framework is one that makes these constructions possible.

5.2 Reduction of the Mental

Among the mental items that have received particular attention in the neutral monist literature

are consciousness (Holt 1914, James 1904b, Sayre 1976), knowledge (James 1904a, 1904b), the

emotions (James 1905, Russell 1921) the will (Russell 1921), belief (Russell 1921), and, most of

all, the self (James 1912, Mach 1886, Russell 1921). Not all writers emphasize the same topics; but there is broad agreement about the mental targets for neutral monistic reduction.

Russell's Analysis of Mind is the most sustained attempt to present neutral monistic accounts ofmental phenomena. According to Russell, belief is the ―central problem in the analysis of mind.‖

It is ―the most ‗mental‘ thing we do, the thing most remote from what is done by mere matter‖

(Russell 1921, 231). A successful analysis must display it as composed solely of neutralelements. Here is how Russell sums up his proposed analysis:

(a) We have a proposition, consisting of interrelated images, and possibly partly of sensations;(b) we have the feeling of assent, which is presumably a complex sensation demanding analysis;


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(c) we have a relation, actually subsisting, between the assent and the proposition, such as is

expressed by saying that the proposition in question is what is assented to. (Russell 1921, 251)

James devotes considerable attention the analysis of knowledge. He considers the case in which

he is thinking of (or imagining) Memorial Hall and raises the question what it would take for this

to be case of knowledge. He proposes the following answer:

If I can lead you to the hall, and tell you of its history and present uses; if in its presence I feel

my idea, however imperfect it may have been, to have led hither and to be now terminated; if theassociates of the image and of the felt hall run parallel, so that each term of the one context

corresponds serially, as I walk, with an answering term of the others; why then my soul was

prophetic, and my idea must be, and by common consent would be, called cognizant of reality.(James 1904a, 55 – 56)

James uses this example to illustrate one typical form of cognition —a situation involving ―two pieces of actual experience belonging to the same subject, with definite tracts of conjunctive

transitional experience between them‖ (James 1904a, 53). In this setting the first experiencefunctions as conceptual knowledge about the object represented by the second experience.

James's provides the following description of this sort of cognitive relation:

It consists in intermediary experiences (possible, if not actual) of continuously developing progress, and, finally, of fulfillment, when the sensible percept, which is the object, is reached.The percept here not only verifies the concept, proves its function of knowing that percept to be

true, but the percept's existence as the terminus of the chain of the intermediaries creates the

function. Whatever terminates that chain was, because it now proves itself to be, what theconcept ‗had in mind.‘ (James 1904a, 60 – 1)

The primary target for neutral monistic reduction is the ego. For it promises to be the mostreduction-resistant among the many mental items awaiting neutral monistic reconstruction. In

keeping with the empiricist background, one finds mainstream neutral monists embracing some

version of the bundle theory of the self. Mach states his view as follows:

The primary fact is not the ego, but the elements (sensations)…The elements constitute the I. I

have the sensation green, signifies that the element green occurs in a given complex of otherelements (sensations, memories). When I cease to have the sensation green, when I die, then the

elements no longer occur in the ordinary, familiar association. That is all. Only and ideal mental-

economical unity, not a real unity, has ceased to exist. (Mach 1886, 23 – 24)

James's writings on radical empiricism only contain brief passages on the self. He maintains that

we can experience a peculiarly intimate relation that holds ―between terms that form states of

mind, and are immediately conscious of continuing each other‖ (James 1904a, 45). The self canthen be understood in terms of this relation:

The organization of the Self as a system of memories, purposes, strivings, fulfillments or

disappointments, is incidental to this most intimate of all relations, the terms of which seem in

many cases actually to compenetrate and suffuse each other's being. (James 1904a, 45)


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James's detailed account of a ―no-self‖ theory of the self is contained in The Principles of

Psychology, dating back to his pre-neutral monist phase. Any bundle theorist, neutral monistic or

otherwise, would be well advised to mine the resources James provides there. James is quitecritical of the associationist accounts along Humean lines and attempts to take the account

significantly further.

5.3 Reduction of the Physical

There is some measure of consensus about the mental targets of reduction. It is less clear what

the appropriate physical candidates are. Much of the discussion is devoted to the concept ofmatter. Many of the more concrete examples are taken from what Ryle calls medium sized dry

goods. But this focus on macro entities raises

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Neutral Monism

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