Developing New-to-the-FirmProducts: The Role of Micropolitical
StrategiesThis research addresses three questions: (1) To what extent do new-to-the-firm products (with market andtechnology newness) face resistance in winning approval for development during the review process? (2) To whatdegree does product development teams’ use of micropolitical strategies help reduce resistance and get approvalwith minimum compromise in the product? (3) To what extent do some of these micropolitical strategies harm thenew product’s performance? The findings suggest that products with both market and technology newnessencounter resistance in getting approval for development. If the product development team wants to reduceresistance to products with market newness, it needs to build a coalition of supporters that can help it during thereview process. Similarly, if the team seeks to minimize resistance to products with technology newness, it shouldframe the product in terms of the firms’ existing products, strategies, and competitive thrusts. However, suchframing increases resistance to market newness. If products continue to be resisted, they must be compromised(i.e., modified as a concession) to win approval. If the team wants to reduce the degree of compromise, it shouldinitially develop the product in hiding. Products that are compromised perform poorly in the marketplace.
Keywords: micropolitics, product innovativeness, product development teams, Stage-Gate process, resistance
Rajesh Sethi is Associate Professor (e-mail: [email protected]) andAnju Sethi is an instructor (e-mail: [email protected]), School of Busi-ness, Clarkson University. Zafar Iqbal is Associate Professor, Departmentof Marketing, DePaul University (e-mail: [email protected]). The authorsare thankful to Ravi Chitturi, Larry Compeau, Danneels Erwin, StephenKoernig, Santosh Mahapatra, and Fred Miao for their helpful comments.This article was accepted under the editorship of Ajay Kohli.
Journal of MarketingVolume 76 (March 2012), 99–11599
New product development is a critical activity forfirms. In their search for successful new products,firms have been increasingly reliant on teams for
product development (Page 1993; Sarin 2009). Consistentwith this trend, several researchers have studied what facili-tates or hinders the development of superior and successfulnew products by project teams. For example, studies haveexamined the effect of team composition, psychological,and contextual factors (Sethi and Nicholson 2001; Sethi,Smith, and Park 2001); communication and integrationwithin the team (Griffin and Hauser 1992; McDonough2000; Sethi 2000); team conflict and resolution (Gobeli,Koenig, and Bechinger 1998; Joshi and Sharma 2004; Sarinand O’Connor 2009); team reward systems (Sarin andMahajan 2001); team commitment and interpersonal citi-zenship behaviors (Qiu et al. 2009); and team leader charac-teristics (McDonough 2000; Sarin and McDermott 2003;Sarin and O’Connor 2009).
Although this stream of research has focused on manybehavioral issues, much less attention has been paid to therole of political behaviors. Politics refers to a party’s effortsto promote its self-interest over another through means notnormally sanctioned by the organization (Fairholm 1993).Researchers have argued, mainly on the basis of qualitative
or case studies, that the role of political behaviors in newproduct development is significant (Frost and Egri 1991;Kanter 1983). These political behaviors become particularlysalient when teams compete for resources during reviewand approval of their new product projects (Frost and Egri1991; Kanter 1983). However, considerations of politicalbehaviors in the product development and review processand the impact of these behaviors on the effectiveness ofteams have not received the attention in the literature thatthey deserve. The absence of such literature is of concernbecause political behaviors can adversely affect the newproducts developed by project teams and thus hurt thefirm’s interest (Frost and Egri 1991; Kanter 1983).
For example, a team of graphics experts at Microsoftinvented a display text on screen called Clear Type, whichgave Microsoft a major advantage for every device with ascreen (Brass 2010). However, many senior managers feltthreatened by this new product and created obstacles in thepath of its acceptance within the company. As a result,although the product received much praise and wasawarded patents, it was not incorporated into Windows untila decade after its original development.
Indeed, the type of new product the project team devel-ops influences the significance of political behaviors. Whenproducts are new to the firm, they often have the potentialof disrupting existing operations and resources under thecontrol of various senior managers, thus posing a threat totheir established power base (Buchanan and Badham 2003;Frost and Egri 1991). This threat can give rise to attempts toundermine the new product (Frost and Egri 1991; Kanter1983). When project teams perceive that their new-to-the-firm products are being undermined, they may use political
means to ensure that the products are not adversely affected(Frost and Egri 1991; Kanter 1983). However, little researchexists on the political means project teams use in view ofthe attempts to undermine their new-to-the-firm products.We aim to address this gap in the literature.
Drawing on organizational politics research, we contendthat in the initial stages of product development, seniormanagers often resist new-to-the-firm products duringproduct reviews because they are likely to perceive suchproducts as threats to the existing resources and operationsunder their control (Buchanan and Badham 2003; Frost andEgri 1991).1 The resistance manifests in the form of opposi-tion to the product and the creation of obstacles to itsapproval. It is particularly important to study the resistanceto product approval because without such approval, theproduct cannot survive. Although resistance can arise forseveral reasons, consistent with the theme of this research,our interest is in resistance that arises from political rea-sons. Newness to the firm can be technology newness (e.g.,when the product involves new technologies, engineeringand design skills, production processes) or market newness(e.g., when the product targets new markets and requiresnew sales and customer service infrastructure) (Danneelsand Kleinschmidt 2001). The irony is that rather than beingopposed to such new products, senior managers shouldencourage them because these products create opportunitiesfor growth and sustained competitive advantage (Andrewsand Smith 1996; Cooper 2001; Crawford and DiBenedetto2002). We examine the effect of both technology and mar-ket newness on resistance encountered during initial prod-uct reviews.
When a project team senses resistance to its new-to-the-firm product, it will likely take action to get the productapproved for development. While the team may use manydifferent strategies, in keeping with the focus of thisresearch, we study strategies that tend to have a politicalundertone (Fairholm 1993; Perrewe et al. 2000). To identifythese strategies and to understand their effects, we draw onthe literature on micropolitics that is useful in explainingteam behaviors in situations in which there is oppositionand conflict (Fairholm 1993; Pfeffer 1992). Becauseapproval for development occurs at the initial stages of theproduct development process, we focus on those micro -political strategies that are used at the initial stages, namely(1) coalition building (i.e., building support for and consen-sus around the product among managers/colleagues in thebusiness unit; Kanter 1983), (2) framing (i.e., presenting theproduct such that it appears to be linked to the existingproducts, strategies, and competitive thrusts of the businessunit; Dougherty and Heller 1994), (3) compromising (i.e.,
100 / Journal of Marketing, March 2012
modifying the product as a concession to get it approved fordevelopment; Pettigrew 1973; Pfeffer 1992), and (4) hiding(i.e., secret development of the new product; Burgelman1983). We study the role of such micropolitical strategies inwinning approval for the development of new-to-the-firmproducts.
Of particular concern are the compromises the team mightmake in the face of resistance to win approval for develop-ment. It is not known how serious the consequences of suchcompromises are. Do such compromises adversely affect themarket performance of the new-to-the-firm product? Thisstudy also attempts to answer this question (see Figure 1).
Currently, most firms develop new products using theStage-Gate or a similar process for improving and control-ling new product development (Cooper 1998, 2001, 2008;Page 1993).2 Typical Stage-Gate design breaks the tradi-tional new product development process into a set of dis-crete and identifiable stages, with each stage consisting of aset of prescribed activities. These stages are separated bygate reviews, which serve as the control and go/no-gocheckpoints (Cooper 2001, 2008). A committee of seniormanagers from different functional areas in the firm usuallyconducts the reviews. This review committee has the powerto effectively terminate products it deems unacceptable.
Resistance manifests mainly during initial productreviews until the business plan approval gate when theproduct is cleared for development (Cooper 2001; Kanter1983). Accordingly, a project team will employ micropoliti-cal strategies during the initial stages of development untilthis gate. In effect, the context in which we examine theresearch questions of interest is the initial stages or gates ofthe product development process until the product isapproved for development.
This research makes several important contributions.First, it extends the behaviorally oriented new productdevelopment team literature in a new direction by focusingon political behaviors, thus opening up avenues for furtherresearch. Second, the study highlights that new-to-the-firmproducts lead to the creation of obstacles to the approval ofsuch products—the very products that firms desire. Third,we identify specific micropolitical strategies that projectteams use and how some of these strategies help winapproval for development of new-to-the-firm products. Totop management of the firm, the study suggests that micro -political strategies can play an important and legitimate rolein getting new-to-the-firm products approved for develop-ment, and they should not be discouraged.
Product Newness, OrganizationalPolitics, and Micropolitical
ProcessesTo develop the conceptual foundation for the study, we pri-marily relied on the relevant literature in areas such as prod-uct newness, organizational politics, and micropolitical pro-cesses. We discuss each area in turn.
1We focus on new-to-the-firm products but not on new-to-the-world products. By definition, all new-to-the-world products arealso new to the firm. However, the converse is not true; not allnew-to-the-firm products are new to the world. Thus, by focusingon new-to-the-firm products, we are considering a broader rangeof products. In other words, if we were to focus on new-to-the-world products, we would have left out some new-to-the-firmproducts that might threaten the operations and resources underthe control of various senior managers and give rise to politicalbehaviors.
2Stage-Gate is a registered trademark of Product DevelopmentInstitute Inc.
Product NewnessNew products vary in both their degree and type of newness(Cooper 2001; Crawford and DiBenedetto 2002). A com-monly used typology for new products classifies new prod-ucts along two dimensions: newness to the market and new-ness to the firm (Booz Allen & Hamilton 1982; Cooper2001; Danneels and Kleinschmidt 2001). The higher thenewness on these dimensions, the higher is the degree ofinnovativeness attributed to the product (Cooper 2001).
Danneels and Kleinschmidt (2001) argue that productnewness to a large extent is in the “eye of the beholder.” Ithas been suggested that when studying the product develop-ment process, newness is more appropriately defined from afirm’s perspective, because it is the firm that must allocateresources for a new product’s development (Danneels andKleinschmidt 2001). Because we are examining the dynam-ics during new product development and review processes,we focus on newness from the perspective of the firm that isdeveloping the new product.3
Our interest in product newness is due to its potential tothreaten the existing resources and operations under thecontrol of various senior managers. Therefore, we concep-tualize newness from the perspective of new resources,
Developing New-to-the-Firm Products / 101
infrastructure, and operations required for the product.Product newness can be either market newness or technol-ogy newness (Danneels and Kleinschmidt 2001). We define“technology newness” as the extent to which the new prod-uct needs new technologies, engineering and design skills,and production processes compared with other products ofthe firm. We define “market newness” as the extent towhich the product potentially targets new markets andrequires new sales and customer support infrastructurecompared with other products of the firm. Organizational PoliticsTo understand the difficulties that new products face, con-sistent with the previous research, we draw on the organiza-tional politics literature. At their core, new ideas and changeare about uncertainty and ambiguity and are often accompa-nied by conflicts among the varying perspectives of the par-ties affected by the new idea or change (Fairholm 1993;Frost and Egri 1991). When it comes to tolerating uncer-tainty and ambiguity, most people prefer order and pre-dictability. Thus, new ideas and change may be opposed orresisted.
We draw on concepts from the organizational politicsliterature to understand the difficulties that new-to-the-firmproducts encounter in getting approval for development.Thus, we introduce the concept of “resistance” in ourframework, which refers to the extent to which a new prod-uct faces opposition and hurdles in getting approval.
While teams may take several actions to overcomeopposition, many of these strategies have a political under-tone (Fairholm 1993; Perrewe, et al. 2000). Because ourfocus is on political behaviors, we discuss how the literature
3We do not focus on radical product innovations, which involvesubstantially new technology and provide substantially greatercustomer benefits per dollar than existing products (Chandy andTellis 1998, 2000; Tellis, Prabhu, and Chandy 2009). Radicalinnovations are not developed using the traditional product devel-opment and gate review process that nonradical products follow(Leifer et al. 2000; McDermott and O’Connor 2002). Because ourstudy is on politics during the traditional development and reviewprocess, we do not consider products that do not follow the tradi-tional process.
FIGURE 1Hypothesized Model
TechnologyNewness
Market Newness
CoalitionBuilding
Framing
Hiding
CompromiseResistance MarketPerformance
H3
H1
H4
H2
H6
H5
H8
H7 H9
–
––
–+
+
–
+ –
on micropolitics can help identify relevant team actions orstrategies.Micropolitical TheoryPrior research has used micropolitics as a lens throughwhich to analyze the behavior of managers and teams facedwith situations involving conflict and opposition (Fairholm1993). Narayanan and Fahey (1982) highlight the role ofmicropolitical behavior in strategic decision making, partic-ularly in the context of resource allocation. Although somedegree of politics can occur throughout the product devel-opment process, our focus is on micropolitical strategiesthat are used to win approval for the product by the businessplan approval gate.
Coalition building and framing. Kanter (1983) suggeststhat managers within firms build coalitions—a politicalaction—to garner resources for their new ideas. Similarly,Ancona and Caldwell’s (1992) research finds that teamsengage in activities such as persuading others to support theteam, lobbying for resources, and protecting the team fromoutside pressure. Another micropolitical strategy, issueframing, is highlighted in the work of Dutton and her col-leagues; it refers to the actions that managers take to influ-ence senior management to view their projects favorably andto ensure adequate resource availability (Dutton and Duncan1987; Dutton and Jackson 1987). Similarly, Dougherty andHeller (1994) highlight the need to frame new products cor-rectly, making linkages with existing products, processes,and structures to make the products more acceptable.
We study product development teams’ use of coalitionbuilding and framing strategies to reduce resistance to prod-uct newness. We define coalition building as building sup-port for and consensus around the product among managersand colleagues in the business unit during the initial stagesof product development to win approval for the product(Kanter 1983). Framing refers to presenting the product tothe review committee and others during the initial stages ofproduct development in such a way that it appears to belinked to the existing products, strategies, and competitivethrusts of the business unit (Dougherty and Heller 1994).
Compromise and hiding. There are two additionalmicropolitical strategies that have appeared in the literatureand are relevant to our context: compromise and hiding.Managers sometimes need to engage in the most basic ofpolitical actions—namely, compromise—to overcome obsta-cles and move the process forward (Pettigrew 1973; Pfeffer1992). Burgelman (1983) finds that managers’ attempts tohide their efforts on projects until they have something posi-tive to show can help a project’s survival. Similarly, Anconaand Caldwell (1992) find that teams that practice secrecy bycontrolling how much of their project information flows outto others in the organization are more effective.
Consistent with the foregoing discussion, we study theuse of compromise. If strategies such as coalition buildingand framing cannot mitigate resistance, the members of thereview committee who oppose the product may ask forchanges or compromises before approving the new product.Compromise refers to the extent to which a new product’sparameters are changed as a concession in negotiations with
102 / Journal of Marketing, March 2012
senior managers to make it possible to gain approval fordevelopment (Pfeffer 1992). This compromise, for example,can take the form of incorporating existing firm technologyinto the product instead of pursuing a new technology.
We also study the role of hiding in the face of resistanceto win approval for product development with as fewchanges as possible. Hiding refers to a project team’sattempt to work on product development in secret duringthe initial stages of the development process (Burgelman1983; Frost and Egri 1991). The team may quietly bootlegresources for product development from various depart-ments or suppliers of the firm (Burgelman 1983; Kanter1983). This secret product development can demonstratethat it is possible to develop the new product and that it islikely to perform as the team claims it will. However, devel-oping a prototype and demonstrating that it performs wellwill not likely reduce the threat the new product poses tothe power base of senior managers and thus may not miti-gate the resistance that new-to-the-firm products face. Yethiding may be useful if the project team thinks that, as aconsequence of resistance, the review committee mightdemand compromise in the product. However, it remains tobe examined whether hiding can reduce the extent of com-promise that emerges in response to resistance.
Theory and HypothesesEffect of Market and Technology Newness onResistanceProducts with a high level of technology and market new-ness have the potential to upset the power base of well-entrenched senior managers in the firm because such prod-ucts often disrupt the existing operations and resourcesunder the control of these managers (Buchanan and Bad-ham 2003; Dougherty and Heller 1994; Frost and Egri1991). For example, if a product involves a cutting-edgenew technology, it can make the existing technology in thefirm less useful, central, and important. Senior managers,who feel secure in the knowledge that the firm deems theirtechnology to be a key asset and source of competitiveadvantage, may feel threatened by the proposed productthat brings this new technology in the firm, which may notbe under their control. Similarly, a product may target anew market, which in turn may involve the development ofa new sales and service infrastructure that is different fromthe one the firm currently has. If it appears that the newmarket and the new sales and service infrastructure will fallunder the control of the managers who are promoting thenew product, the senior managers who oversee the existingmarket and control the existing infrastructure are likely toconsider the new product a threat to their power base.
To protect their power, entrenched senior managers arelikely to oppose the new product and create obstacles in itspath to approval for development (Buchanan and Badham2003; Frost and Egri 1991). The way for senior managers tocreate such opposition toward the new product is throughtheir functional representatives on the review committee.This opposition will begin to surface when the product ispresented to the review committee, and most opposition
will likely emerge by the time the business plan is pre-sented—that is, when major details about the project aremade available and formal approval for product develop-ment is sought. Thus:
H1: The greater the technology newness of the new product,the greater is the review committee’s resistance to theproduct.
H2: The greater the market newness of the new product, thegreater is the review committee’s resistance to the product.
Moderating Effect of Coalition BuildingCoalition building involves bringing on board various seniormanagers from different parts of the company. Project teammembers need to take a variety of actions to win this support,such as drawing on their personal relationships, using theinfluence of senior colleagues in their own department, andoffering to share some of the gains from the product in lieuof support for the product (Fairholm 1993; Kanter 1983;Pfeffer 1992). As a result of such actions, team membersmay be able to persuade some review committee membersor senior departmental colleagues of committee members tojoin their coalition.
Because new-to-the-firm products have the potential togenerate new revenue streams and/or introduce new tech-nologies and production processes, there is an expectationthat coalition members will benefit in some way from them(Burgelman 1983; Kanter 1983). For example, the managerson the demand side of the business (e.g., the marketingmanager, after-sales service manager) may join the coalitionin the hope of getting under their control some of the new business that a product with market newness may gen-erate. Similarly, the managers on the supply side of thebusiness (e.g., operations manager, research-and-developmentmanager) may join the coalition because a product withtechnology newness can result in the enhancement of exist-ing operations or design activities under their control, thusmaking them more important and powerful. Consequently,these new-to-the-firm products do not appear to be a threator create uncertainty; instead, they seem to have the poten-tial to enhance the power base of coalition members. As aresult, with coalition building, the effect of product newnesson resistance is diminished. Thus:
H3: The greater a project team’s use of coalition building, theweaker is the relationship between technology newnessand the review committee’s resistance to the product.
H4: The greater a project team’s use of coalition building, theweaker is the relationship between market newness andthe review committee’s resistance to the product.
Moderating Effect of FramingFraming involves linking the product’s definition to firm-specific familiarities (Burgelman 1983; Dougherty andHeller 1994; Dutton and Duncan 1987; Dutton and Jackson1987). When a product is framed in terms of the firm’sexisting products, markets, strategies, and competitivethrusts, the perceptual gap between the new product and thefirm’s existing thinking and beliefs is likely to be reduced.In general, products with stronger links to the firm’s exist-
Developing New-to-the-Firm Products / 103
ing products, strategies, and markets are given a higher pri-ority because such products can lead to better utilization offirm resources (Cooper 1998, 2001).
Framing a product in terms of the firm’s existing prod-ucts, strategies, and competitive thrusts should help reduceresistance to products with both market and technologynewness. Such framing seemingly reduces perceived uncer-tainty, ambiguity, and the resulting threat (Dougherty andHeller 1994). For example, if new product and productiontechnologies are required for a new component in the prod-uct, the project team may frame the product such that itappears linked to the firm’s existing outsourcing strategy(i.e., the component will be designed and procured fromoutside). With such framing, the technology newness of theproduct should be less of a disruption to the operations andresources under the control of various senior managers onthe supply side of the business. Similarly, if a new productthat targets a new market is expected to produce large sales,it may seem to threaten the star status of an existing productunder the control of a well-entrenched senior manager.However, if the product is framed such that it appears to belinked to the firm’s competitive imperative (i.e., the urgentnecessity to respond to the main competitor’s attempts todevelop a similar product), the threat the new product cre-ates might be tolerated more. In effect, framing reduces theeffect of product newness on resistance. Thus:
H5: The greater a project team’s use of framing, the weaker isthe relationship between technology newness and thereview committee’s resistance to the product.
H6: The greater a project team’s use of framing, the weaker isthe relationship between market newness and the reviewcommittee’s resistance to the product.
Effect of Resistance on CompromiseResistance to the product means that the review committeecreates obstacles to the progress of the product by exhibit-ing opposition to the product and by enforcing conditionsfor the project team to satisfy before approval for develop-ment. Many of these conditions are likely to be changes thatneed to be made to the product. In general, the greater theresistance the product faces, the more significant are thechanges the opposing members of the review committeedemand as a precondition for approval (Burgelman 1983;Kanter 1983).
Although the team may not want to deviate from theoriginal plan that it believed in, the team is also likely toacknowledge that without incorporating many of thesedemanded changes, it may not be able to get the productapproved for development (Dougherty and Heller 1994).Successfully steering the product through the developmentprocess and launching it on time is important for teammembers because these achievements influence their per-formance evaluation, rewards, and growth within the com-pany (Sarin and Mahajan 2001). The team might not acqui-esce to all the expected changes and may enter intonegotiations to minimize the changes it needs to make tothe product (Burgelman and Sayles 1986). Ultimately, how-ever, the team may need to make compromises to get
approval for development (Dougherty and Heller 1994; Pet-tigrew 1973; Pfeffer 1992). Thus:
H7: The greater the review committee’s resistance to the prod-uct, the greater is the project team’s compromise.
Moderating Effect of HidingThe project team may discover early in the product devel-opment process that despite its efforts to reduce oppositionto the product, some of the review committee members con-tinue to resist the product and that the team is likely to beasked to make changes or compromises before the productcan be approved for development. To minimize such com-promises, an option before the team is to secretly developthe product, hiding it from most others in the firm, includ-ing the review committee (Burgelman 1983; Frost and Egri1991).
Developing the product in hiding means that the reviewcommittee can no longer interfere in the developmenteffort. Thus, hiding provides the project team freedom todevelop the product according to the specifications it deemsappropriate and evaluate the product’s performance(Burgelman 1983). In effect, the team is able to verify foritself the feasibility of developing a successful product withthe specifications it desires. Thus, the opposing reviewcommittee members cannot easily demand changes or com-promises with arguments such as “it will not be feasible todevelop a product with such specifications” or “the pro-posed product in its current form will not be able to deliverthe desired performance.” The more the team is able to hidethe initial development effort, the more effective it is likelyto be in gathering both the evidence and the confidence tosuccessfully counteract the opposing review committeemembers’ demands for changes in the product. Thus:
H8: The greater the use of hiding by the project team, theweaker is the relationship between the review committee’sresistance and the project team’s compromise.
Effect of Compromise on New ProductPerformanceThe project team that originally conceptualized the productclearly understands different aspects of the product, such asthe customer needs to be targeted, market infrastructurerequired to effectively reach end customers, product featuresand technology needed for a superior design, and productionprocess necessary for producing the appropriate quality.Such an understanding is necessary for building effectiveproduct plans. The team also understands the need for syn-ergy among these aspects of the plan for the development ofa winning strategy (Crawford and DiBenedetto 2002; Parkand Zaltman 1987). Altering some aspect of the plan candisturb the consistency among its different components.
When the opposing review committee members ask forcompromises in the product’s target market, design andtechnology, and/or production processes, they can move theproduct away from a good fit with the market and competi-tive situation. These opposing review committee membersare likely to be more interested in protecting their powerbase and may pay less attention to how the changes they
104 / Journal of Marketing, March 2012
demand will affect the strategic fit. Thus, the more signifi-cant the compromises the project team makes to get theproduct approved for development, the more the productcan lose its ability to effectively compete in the marketplace(Crawford and DiBenedetto 2002; Park and Zaltman 1987).Such a product’s market performance is likely to be affectedadversely. Thus:
H9: The greater the project team’s compromise, the weaker isthe new product’s market performance.
MethodData Collection ProcedureWe tested the hypotheses using survey data, collected fromkey informants involved in recent major new product initia-tives. Following similar key informant research, our goal wasto identify a person who would be highly knowledgeableabout the new product development project and the reviewprocess (Cini, Moreland, and Levine 1993). In the currentstudy, this person was the project manager of the team thatwas responsible for managing new product development.
It was important that the data for all the constructs in themodel be collected from the project team or its manager.For example, the data about the four micropolitical strate-gies needed to be obtained from the team because the teamalone could correctly report the extent to which it resortedto the use of these strategies. Similarly, data about the per-ception of resistance needed to be collected from the team,because it is the team’s perception of resistance that decidesthe extent to which it pursues some of the micropoliticalstrategies. Likewise, market performance data needed to begathered from the project team because product perfor-mance had to be measured relative to the initial perfor-mance expectations the team had before taking the productto the review committee and compromising it.
The criteria for participation in the survey were that (1)the key informant surveyed completed a new product devel-opment project within two years preceding the survey as aproject manager, (2) a team was involved in the develop-ment of the product, and (3) the project underwent sometype of gate reviews. To identify candidate projects andrelated key informants, we searched secondary sources ofinformation, such as a variety of trade publications, and cre-ated a list of firms and their divisions that had developedand introduced new products within two years precedingthis survey. We contacted the short-listed firms, identifiedproject managers who met the criteria, and requested theirparticipation in our study. The project managers who agreedto participate were asked to complete questionnaires thatwe e-mailed to them. They could either fax or mail theirquestionnaires back.
In completing the questionnaire, respondents were askedto focus on their most recently completed new productdevelopment project. Questionnaires were sent to 200 projectmanagers. A reminder with another copy of the question-naire was e-mailed to managers who had not respondedafter two weeks. We received 114 usable responses, yieldinga 57% response rate. The respondents belonged to a variety of
industries, such as telecommunications and electronics (30%),services (22%), engineering products (16%), software (8%),consumer products (8%), pharmaceuticals (3%), chemicalproducts (3%), and others (10%). In addition, the largestnumber of respondents (67%) were from large enterprises(> 500 employees), the next largest number of respondents(24%) were from medium enterprises (> 100 and ≤ 500employees), and the least number of respondents (9%) werefrom small enterprises (< 100 employees). The averagebusiness unit in our study had sales of $3.8 billion and hadbeen in existence for 30 years.
The average project length was 15 months. The projectmanagers that completed the survey had an average newproduct development experience of seven years. Therespondents had diverse backgrounds: marketing (34%),product development and research and development (39%),general management (10%), and operations (17%). Therewere no significant differences on study variables amongrespondents with different backgrounds. There were also nosignificant differences between responses that were mailedin and those that were faxed.
To assess the degree of nonresponse bias, we dividedresponses into two categories: those received beforereminders and those received after reminders. We con-ducted t-tests to examine the possible difference betweengroups using mean responses to each of the variablesincluded in the model. We performed these calculationsunder the assumption that those who responded late weresimilar to nonrespondents (Armstrong and Overton 1977).There were no significant differences between groups.
As a further check for nonresponse bias, we randomlycontacted 12 project managers among those who did notrespond to the survey to explore the reasons for nonre-sponse and to check if their projects or companies in someway differed from those that responded. These managerstold us that they did not respond because either they werevery busy around the time the survey reached them or, afterlooking at the survey, they felt that their company wouldnot permit sharing of the information required to beincluded in the survey. The new product developmentprocess that nonresponding managers used was typical ofthe projects and companies that were in the sample. There-fore, we inferred that managers who responded were notvery different from those who did not respond.MeasuresWherever possible, we used existing measures of con-structs. For the new measures, we created a pool of itemsbased on the existing literature. As others have acknowl-edged, when asking questions about political processes, bla-tantly political statements should not be included becausethey may evoke a biased or a socially desirable response(Buchanan and Badham 2003). Thus, the wording of someof the items was kept less explicitly political. Collectively,items in various measures capture the political aspects ofbehaviors.
We pretested all measures on 15 project managers andacademics. The academics also assessed whether the mea-sures covered the domain of the construct. On the basis of
Developing New-to-the-Firm Products / 105
the pretest, we refined the measures. We conducted detailedinterviews with five of these managers to ascertain theirinterpretation of the items in the measures. This feedbackhelped us revise the questionnaire, which we then adminis-tered to the full sample. Descriptive statistics and reliabilityfor each refined measure appear in Table 1, and correlationsamong measures appear in Table 2. The Appendix showsthe final scale items.
Technology newness. This measure assessed the extentto which the product requires new technologies, engineer-ing and design skills, and production processes comparedwith other products of the business unit. We adapted someof the items for this measure from Danneels and Klein-schmidt (2001). We used a three-item, seven-point Likert-type scale for technology newness ( = .73).
Market newness. We operationalized market newness asthe degree to which the new product targets new marketsand requires new sales and customer support infrastructurecompared with other products of the business unit. Weadapted some of the items for this measure from Danneelsand Kleinschmidt (2001). We used a three-item, seven-pointLikert-type scale for market newness ( = .69).
Coalition building. The coalition-building measureassessed the extent to which the team built support for andconsensus around the product among senior managers orcolleagues in the business unit during the initial stages ofproduct development. We based the items for this new mea-sure on the literature on coalition building (Burgelman1983; Fairholm 1993; Kanter 1983; Pfeffer 1992). We used
Project expenditure 1 3.68 .94 —Notes: The sample size for all measures except product market per-
formance is 114. For product market performance, the sam-ple size is 104. Means and standard deviations of perceptualscales, except for duration of the project and industry, areexpressed on a seven-point scale metric. The duration of theproject is measured in months and industry is a dummyvariable.
106 / Journal of Marketing, March 2012
TABLE 2
Correlations
12
34
56
78
910
1112
1314
1516
1718
1.Market newness
12.Technology newness
.39***1
3.Coalition building
–.04
.05
14.Framing
–.11
.11.32***1
5.Resistance
.30***.29***.01
–.01
16.Compromise
.27***.18*
.03
–.31***
.34***1
7.Hiding
.20**.03
.07
–.01
.22**.06
18.Performance
–.15
.01
–.05
–.06
–.11
–.19*–.12
19.Number of gates
–.11
–.08
.10
–.07
.16*
–.01
.02
.07
110.Entrepreneurial focus
–.01
–.10
.05
.19**–.29***–.17*–.01
–.03
–.19*1
11.Strictness of review criteria
–.09
–.01
.04
.15
.06
–.22**
.01
.13
.45***–.03
112.Prior product success
.14
.07
.10
.10
–.22**–.23**–.05
.17*
.01
.37***.23**1
13.Project duration
.08
.20**–.07
–.04
.12
.05
–.03
–.02
.13
–.10
.09
.00
114.Market turbulence
.09
.29***–.07
.03
.22**.05
.14
–.09
.28**–.21**
.20**.03
.15
115.Technological turbulence
–.006
.02
.12
.08
–.02
–.03
.02
.25***.37***.10
.17*
.21**–.08
.26***1
16.Industry
–.09
–.03
.08
–.05
.03
–.04
.02
.01
.04
–.13
–.09
–.25***
.08
.16*
–.03
117.Technology-created opportunities
–.03
.02
.15
.10
–.09
.01
–.02
.24**.31***.14
.22**.29***.02
.21**.78***–.10
118.Project expenditure
–.10
–.01
.18*
.12
–.15
–.01
.05
–.17*–.19**
.02
–.01
–.05
–.15
–.04
–.16*–.13
–.09
1*Significant at p
<.1.
**Significant at p< .05.
***Significant at p
<.01.
Notes: The sample size for all measures except product market performance is 114. For product market performance, the sample size is 104.
a four-item, seven-point Likert-type scale to measure thedegree of coalition building used by teams ( = .72).
Framing. We operationalized framing as the extent towhich the product was presented to the review committeeand others in the organization during the initial stages ofproduct development in such a way that it appeared to belinked to the business unit’s existing products, strategies,and competitive thrusts. We based the items for this newmeasure on Dougherty and Heller’s (1994) work. We used athree-item, seven-point Likert-type scale to measure thedegree of framing used by teams ( = .69).
Compromise. We developed the compromise measureby drawing on the literature on micropolitics (Pettigrew1973; Pfeffer 1992). We asked respondents to rate theextent to which the product had to be modified duringreviews as a concession to get the product approved fordevelopment. We used a three-item, seven-point Likert-typescale for compromise ( = .79).
Hiding. To develop this measure, we drew on workrelating to hiding or secrecy (Burgelman 1983; Feldman1988). Specifically, respondents rated the extent to whichthe product development team worked on the developmentof the product hidden from most others in the business unitduring the initial stages of product development. We used athree-item, seven-point Likert-type scale to assess hiding ( =.74).
Resistance. We developed the measure of resistancedrawing on the literature on resistance to new ideas (Burgel-man 1983; Frost and Egri 1991). We asked the key infor-mants to rate the extent to which reviewers created obsta-cles to the product and were reluctant to approve theproduct. We used a four-item, seven-point Likert-type scalefor resistance ( = .82). This measure focuses on the teams’actual experiences of opposition they faced in getting theproduct approved.
New product market performance. We adapted the per-formance measure from a measure used in previous studies(e.g., Sethi 2000). The scale for market performance is aseven-point, three-item scale. The key informants rated thenew product’s performance on sales, market share, andprofits compared with the initial goals they set for the prod-uct before it was taken to the review committee. The mea-sure of performance is a formative measure (Diamantopou-los and Winklhofer 2001).Scale TestingWe refined the scales on the basis of the results of confir-matory factor analyses. First, we assessed a five-factor con-firmatory model including all constructs used to examinethe effect of newness on resistance (i.e., market newness,technology newness, resistance, coalition building, andframing) through structural equation modeling with LIS-REL. The results indicate good fit of the confirmatory mea-surement model (2 = 132.8, p = .06; goodness-of-fit index[GFI] = .90; comparative fit index [CFI] = .95; and rootmean square error of approximation [RMSEA] = .044).
Then, again using LISREL, we assessed a three-factorconfirmatory model including the constructs that examine
Developing New-to-the-Firm Products / 107
the effect of resistance on compromise (i.e., resistance,compromise, and hiding). The results indicate good fit ofthe confirmatory measurement model (2 = 40.60, p = .14;GFI = .94; CFI = .98; and RMSEA = .049). In both the con-firmatory analyses, each loading was significant.Covariates and Their MeasuresTo control for other possible explanations of resistance,compromise, and new product performance, we includedseveral covariates. Some of these covariates capture thenonpolitical explanations.
Covariates affecting resistance. If the firm has an entre-preneurial focus, the review committee may offer less resis-tance to newer ideas. Accordingly, we included entrepre-neurial focus as a covariate. We used a three-item, seven-pointLikert-type measure of entrepreneurial focus of the firm ( =.73). This measure asked respondents about the extent towhich the firm was an entrepreneurial place, the extent towhich the firm had a commitment to innovation, and theextent to which the business-unit leader was an innovatorand risk taker (Deshpandé, Farley, and Webster 1993). Fur-thermore, if there are a large number of review gates, thereview process until product approval can become moredemanding and can give rise to more resistance to the prod-uct. Thus, the number of review gates is a covariate in thisstudy. Then, as the length of the project increases, thereview committee can have reservations about the projectbecause it is likely that the project may face cost overrunsas well as be competitively delayed in its time to market.Therefore, we included the duration of the project as acovariate affecting resistance.
If a firm has a history of new product success, thereview committee may be more open to newer products. Wemeasured prior new product success using a three-item,seven-point Likert scale that asked respondents to rate theextent to which new products launched by the firm hadtaken the business unit in new directions and had accountedfor an increasing percentage of the business unit’s sales ( =.78). Then, we included the strictness of the criteria againstwhich products are reviewed during review meetings as acovariate (Sethi and Iqbal 2008). If all products arereviewed with strict evaluation criteria, many products maynot meet the criteria and are likely to face resistance. Wemeasured the strictness of review criteria using a three-item, seven-point Likert scale ( = .89) that asked therespondents to rate the extent to which criteria were for-mally established and used and strictly enforced. Finally,we included market and technological turbulence as covari-ates because high turbulence creates uncertainty and ambi-guity, which in turn can make the review committee resistthe new product. We operationalized market turbulence asthe degree to which rapid changes occurred in the market.We used a seven-point, three-item Likert-type scale formarket turbulence ( = .76). We assessed technological tur-bulence as the extent to which rapid technological changesoccurred in the environment. We measured technologicalturbulence using a seven-point, three-item Likert-type scale( = .84). We based the measures for both types of turbu-lence on Jaworski and Kohli’s (1993) measures.
Covariates affecting compromise. If the firm has anentrepreneurial focus, the review committee may ask forsmaller compromises in the product. Accordingly, weinclude entrepreneurial focus of the firm as a covariateaffecting compromise. As we discussed previously, when thenumber of review gates increases, the review process untilproduct approval can become more demanding, and thusthere can be more demands for compromise. As a result, thenumber of review gates is a covariate of compromise. Fur-thermore, because business-to-business products are morelikely to be designed in response to defined requirements ofindustrial customers (Hutt and Speh 2004), the review com-mittee may ask for fewer compromises. Therefore, weincluded industry as a covariate and operationalized it as adummy variable categorizing products as either consumerproducts (business to consumer) or business products (busi-ness to business). Finally, we included market and techno-logical turbulence because high turbulence creates uncer-tainty and ambiguity, which can make the review committeedemand more changes in products.
Covariates affecting performance. When the length ofthe project increases, it is likely that the project will facecost overruns and be competitively delayed in its time tomarket, which can adversely affect the product’s perfor-mance. Therefore, we included the duration of the project asa covariate. If the firm makes more money available to aproject than the standard for comparable projects, it mightinfluence the superiority and success of the product. Weassessed the expenditure relative to other similar projects inthe firm using a seven-point, single-item scale. Moreover, ifnew technologies create opportunities for breakthroughproducts in the firm’s industries, market performance of thenew product may be favorably affected. As such, weincluded technology-created opportunities as a covariateaffecting market performance. We measured technology-created opportunities with a single-item, seven-point Likertscale that asked respondents to rate the extent to which alarge number of new product ideas were made possiblethrough technological breakthroughs. Furthermore, becausethe number of gates that a project has to go through mightdelay the project and thus affect its performance, we alsoincluded number of gates as a covariate. Finally, becausebusiness-to-business products may take off at a differentpace in the market than business-to-consumer products(Hutt and Speh 2004), we included the type of industry as acovariate.
ResultsHypothesis TestingWe tested H1–H6 using moderated regression analysis. Wemean-centered measures for market newness, technologynewness, coalition building, and framing (Aiken and West1991). As Table 3 shows, the independent variables andmoderators in the model (i.e., market newness, technologynewness, coalition building, and framing), along withcovariates, account for 24% of the variance in resistance,and the F-statistic is 3.44 (p < .01).
108 / Journal of Marketing, March 2012
We also tested H7 and H8 using moderated regressionanalysis, and again, we mean-centered measures for theconstructs in the model. Resistance, the moderator hiding,and covariates account for 9.4% of the variance in compro-mise, and the F-statistic is 2.48 (p < .01). Finally, we testedH9 using multiple regression. Compromise, along withcovariates, accounts for 7% of the variance in performance,and the F-statistic is 2.23 (p < .05).4
Effect of Product Newness on ResistanceAs H1 predicted, technology newness is positively relatedto resistance (b = .22, t = 2.29, p < .01). We found that mar-ket newness is also positively related to resistance (b = .19,t = 1.73, p < .05). Therefore, the results support H2.
We wanted to understand the extent to which resistanceto market and technology newness arises for political rea-sons. For this purpose, we used a single-item measure thatcaptures the extent to which various senior managers in thefirm perceived the product as a political threat. Specifically,the single-item measure is “various senior managers feltthat the new product would disturb their power base.” Weregressed this item on both market newness and technologynewness. The results suggest that the two types of newnessindeed give rise to a threat to the power base of senior man-agers (bTechnology newness = .07, p < .05; bMarket newness = .14,p < .01). We then explored the relationship between threatand resistance using multiple regression. We included allthe covariates for the resistance model in the analysis.Again, the results show that threat gives rise to resistance(bThreat = .98, p < .01). Taking this a step further, we exam-ined the extent to which the effect of the two types of new-ness on resistance is mediated through threat (Kenny,Kashy, and Bolger 1998). The results suggest that the effectof technology newness on resistance is fully mediatedthrough threat to the power base and the effect of marketnewness is partially mediated. These results confirm that apolitical threat to senior managers from new-to-the-firmproducts plays an important role in giving rise to resistance.
We also examined whether technology and market new-ness have a nonlinear relationship with resistance, becauseit is possible that only high levels of newness (vs. low andmoderate levels) create resistance. Therefore, we tested themodel with quadratic terms for the two types of newness.These terms were not significant, suggesting that the effectsof newness are linear.Moderating Effect of Coalition Building andFramingThe interaction between coalition building and technologynewness was not significant (b = .03, t = 1.03, p < .30).Thus, the results do not support H3. Consistent with H4,coalition building weakened the positive relationship
4For examining the relationship between compromise and perfor-mance, we did not consider the products that had not been launchedat the time of the survey. As such, we only have 104 projects in themodel. However, we wanted to examine whether the rest of theresults change with only 104 projects in the model. Therefore, wetested the other model with a sample size of 104. The rest of theresults do not change in any significant way.
between market newness and resistance (b = –.07, t = –2.77,p < .01).
H5 predicted that the positive effect of technology new-ness on resistance would be weakened by framing. Theinteraction effect between technology newness and framingwas negative and significant, in support of the hypothesis (b =–.09, t = –2.22, p < .05). We also expected that the positiveeffect of market newness on resistance would be weakenedin the presence of framing. However, the interaction effectbetween market newness and framing was positive and sig-
Developing New-to-the-Firm Products / 109
nificant (b = .09, t = 2.11, p < .05). Thus, the results do notsupport H6.Effect of Resistance on CompromiseConsistent with our expectation, resistance was positivelyrelated to compromise (b = .25, t = 3.27, p < .01), in supportof H7. As an additional analysis, we examined whetherproduct newness and the moderators (coalition building andframing) have a direct effect on compromise or if these fac-tors influence compromise through resistance (Kenny,
TABLE 3Regression Results
Variables in the Equation B t-ValueDependent Variable = Resistance (N = 114)
Adjusted R2 = .07, F-statistic (6, 97) = 2.23***Significant at p < .10.**Significant at p < .05.***Significant at p < .01.
Kashy, and Bolger 1998). Therefore, we first regressedcompromise on market and technology newness, the mod-erating effects of coalition building and framing, and thecovariates of the compromise model. The results show thatmarket newness leads to increased compromise but technol-ogy newness has no effect. The moderating effects of coali-tion building and framing were also not significant. As asecond step, we included market newness (which was sig-nificant in the first step), resistance, and the covariates forcompromise in the model. With the inclusion of resistancein the model, the coefficient for market newness wasreduced compared with its coefficient in Step 1. Thus, theeffect of market newness is partially mediated by resis-tance. In addition, note that market and technology newnessand the moderating effects of coalition building and fram-ing affect resistance (except for the moderating influence ofcoalition building on the effect of technology newness), andresistance is related to compromise (Table 3). FollowingKenny, Kashy, and Bolger (1998), if these antecedents arerelated to resistance and resistance is related to compro-mise, we can conclude that these antecedents influencecompromise through resistance. In other words, together,the results suggest that product newness and the moderatingeffects of coalition building and framing (except the moder-ating influence of coalition building on the effect of tech-nology newness) influence compromise through resistance,which is consistent with our model.Moderating Effect of HidingH8 predicted that the positive effect of resistance on com-promise would be weakened by hiding. The interactioneffect between resistance and hiding was negative and sig-nificant, in support of H8 (b = –.03, t = –1.85, p < .05).
In addition, we wanted to examine whether hiding mod-erates the relationship between newness and resistance. Wetested the moderating effect of hiding along with the mod-erating effect of coalition building and framing. The resultssuggest that hiding does not moderate the effect of the twotypes of newness on resistance, which is consistent with ourmodel. Thus, as we argued previously on a conceptuallevel, hiding influences only the resistance–compromiserelationship.Effect of Compromise on New ProductPerformanceWe hypothesized that compromise would have a negativerelationship to performance. This effect was significant (b =–.15, t = –2.03, p < .05), in support of H9. We also wantedto study if resistance has a direct effect on performance or ifit influences performance through compromise. We regressedperformance on resistance along with the covariates affect-ing performance. The results show that resistance does nothave a direct effect on performance. However, becauseresistance is related to compromise and compromise isrelated to performance (Table 3), following Kenny, Kashy,and Bolger (1998), we can conclude that the effect of resis-tance on performance is mediated by compromise, which isconsistent with our model.
110 / Journal of Marketing, March 2012
CovariatesAn entrepreneurial focus did not reduce resistance (b =–.16, t = –1.32, p < .1). Prior new product success reducedresistance (b = –.32, t = –2.64, p < .01). As we expected, thecovariate number of gates had a positive effect on resistance(b = .18, t = 1.70, p < .05). Duration of the project did nothave an effect on resistance (b = .004, t = .11, p < .91).Strictness of review criteria did not affect resistance (b =.02, t = .21, p < .82). Finally, there is no effect of marketturbulence (b = .05, t = .41, p < .78) and technology turbu-lence (b = –.02, t = –.23, p < .75).
An entrepreneurial focus did not have an effect on com-promise (b = –.10, t = –1.08, p < .27). Industry type did nothave any influence on compromise (b = –.66, t = –.92, p <.37). Contrary to our expectation, the covariate number ofgates did not have any relationship with compromise (b =–.08, t = –1.02, p < .27). There is also no effect of marketturbulence (b = .001, t = .01, p < .95) and technology turbu-lence (b = .002, t = .03, p < .98) on compromise.
Duration of the project did not affect market perfor-mance (b = –.01, t = –.47, p < .29). Technology-createdopportunities increased market performance (b = .46, t =2.41, p < .01). Industry type did not influence market per-formance (b = .08, t = 0.14, p < .44). Number of gates didnot affect market performance (b = –.02, t = –.32, p < .75).Projects that spend significantly more money than othersimilar projects turn out to be less successful, though theeffect is marginal (b = –.44, t = –1.57, p < 0.1).
Discussion and ConclusionsWe explored the extent to which new-to-the-firm productsface resistance from the project review committee in win-ning approval during the initial stages of the product devel-opment process. We also studied how project teams thatdevelop new-to-the firm products use micropolitical strate-gies to obtain approval for their products in the face ofresistance and demands for changes and how these micro -political strategies help or harm the new product.
Our results suggest that products with both market andtechnology newness face resistance in getting approval. Wealso show that newness tends to threaten the power base ofsenior managers and this threat gives rise to resistance tothe new product. Micropolitical strategies such as coalitionbuilding and framing of the product carried out by projectteams during the initial stages of product development canhelp overcome resistance selectively. Specifically, coalitionbuilding reduces resistance when the product has marketnewness. Conversely, framing reduces resistance when theproduct exhibits technology newness but increases resis-tance for market newness. The resistance voiced during thereview process leads project teams to compromise the prod-uct to gain approval for development. Hiding mitigates theadverse effect of resistance on compromise. Eventually,compromise results in poor market performance of theproduct. The finding that the political variables we studyexplain only limited variability in various models suggeststhat several other factors, including nonpolitical factors,also play a role.
One of the two hypotheses that were not confirmed isthe moderating effect of coalition building on the relation-ship between technology newness and resistance. Wehypothesized that coalition building would decrease resis-tance in the case of technology newness. The reason forproposing this negative moderating effect was that seniormanagers, particularly those on the supply side of the busi-ness (e.g., operations manager, research-and-developmentmanager), may join the coalition because technology new-ness of the product can result in enhancement of the exist-ing operations or design activities under their control,which is likely to make these managers more important andpowerful. However, it is possible that coalition building didnot moderate the relationship between technology newnessand resistance because a few of the senior supply-side man-agers might view technology newness as causing significantinternal restructuring and changes to the operations withintheir control. These supply-side managers might believethat significant restructuring is not acceptable because it isdifficult to predict how the new technology or operationswill affect them in the future. Such senior managers canbecome unfavorably disposed toward the product. Thiscombination of some senior managers with a favorable atti-tude to technology newness and others with an unfavorableattitude might have made it difficult to find a significanteffect of coalition building on the influence of technologynewness. However, we do not have data to empirically sup-port this contention. Therefore, the moderating effect ofcoalition building on the relationship between technologynewness and resistance needs to be examined in depth infurther research.
The other hypothesis that was not confirmed predictedthat framing strategy would reduce the adverse effect ofmarket newness on resistance. Instead, we found a positivemoderating effect of framing. A possible explanation forthis positive moderating effect is that framing a productwith market newness in terms of existing products andstrategies gives rise to a sense of territoriality among somesenior managers. For example, in a company that makessophisticated heart defibrillators for hospitals, a projectteam may propose the development of a defibrillator for thegeneral market that would be sold by a new sales forcethrough a new distribution channel that reaches the generalmarket. If the project team frames the new product as a sim-pler and cheaper version of the existing sophisticated defib-rillator, senior marketing and after-sales service managersmay view the new project in terms of “turf encroachment.”From the perspective of these managers, the new product issimilar to the product they currently manage and thusshould be under their control. However, because the newproduct is going to a new market and will involve a differ-ent selling arrangement, a different department may be cre-ated to manage it. Thus, the new product might be viewedas disrupting the importance or power of these senior man-agers. Such managers may create hurdles for the projecteither directly or through their functional representatives onthe review committee (Kanter 1983). However, this is apost hoc explanation of an unexpected effect and thus needsto be examined more carefully in further research.
Developing New-to-the-Firm Products / 111
LimitationsThe following limitations of the study need to be kept inmind when interpreting the findings. First, this is a cross-sectional study, and as such it includes many of the limita-tions typically associated with such studies. Second, weused a single informant for all perceptual measures. As weexplained previously, although the study design required usto collect data for all the measures from project team man-agers, the use of a single informant for all perceptual mea-sures can introduce the possibility of common method bias.To detect the presence of this bias, we examined the itemsused to measure the different constructs for semantic over-lap, and there did not seem to be an obvious overlap in theitems in different measures (Podsakoff and Organ 1986).Third, we kept the wording of some of the items in ourmeasures less explicitly political, because if all the items inthe measures are blatantly political, they might evoke abiased or socially desirable response. Researchers in futurestudies might try to make the measures more political with-out being blatant.Research ImplicationsOur study has several implications for academic researchers.First, we show that political considerations lead the reviewcommittee to create obstacles or resistance in the approvalof new-to-the-firm products in the initial stages of develop-ment. This resistance eventually creates problems for thenew products and thereby hurts the company’s interests.Although many researchers have looked for ways todevelop truly new products, they often overlook the realitythat an obstacle for such products is their very newness.
Second, the study makes an important contribution to theproduct development team literature. Behavioral-orientedresearch on teams tends to overlook the role of politicalbehaviors in influencing the effectiveness of product devel-opment teams. These political behaviors become especiallysalient when new product development teams compete forresources during initial reviews. By drawing attention to therole of political behaviors in influencing the effectivenessof teams, our study extends the new product team literaturein a new and important direction.
Third, by focusing attention on specific micropoliticalprocesses that teams pursue to minimize opposition to theirnew-to-the-firm products, our study opens up a potentiallyrich area for further research. We studied coalition buildingand framing as the two possible strategies that project teamsuse to reduce resistance to approve the product in the initialstages of product development. We examined the use ofcompromise to get the product approved for developmentwhen review committee members opposing the product askfor changes. We also explored the role of a hiding strategyin mitigating the adverse effect of resistance on compro-mise. Importantly, we show that not all strategies are goodfor all situations. For example, coalition building helpsminimize the adverse effect of market newness only. Fram-ing minimizes the adverse effect of technology newness butincreases resistance in the case of market newness. Ineffect, we have identified some boundary conditions aboutthe effectiveness of these micropolitical behaviors.
Fourth, while this article focuses on four key micro -political strategies product development teams use, moreresearch is needed to understand the complex politicalbehaviors that emerge during the initial stages of new prod-uct development. There are likely to be many nuances inand details about how teams respond to resistance that oursurvey-based research did not capture. For example, it isimportant to understand in detail the process through whichcompromise is reached between the team and the reviewcommittee. To address such research questions, an in depthqualitative study might be a better approach. It would alsobe beneficial to understand what factors influence the use ofdifferent micro-political strategies by a team.
Finally, the literature on product development may pre-sent the changes or compromise demanded during initialproject reviews in a benign light as necessary changes forimproving the performance of the product. However, whenthese changes are viewed through a micropolitical lens,they do not always appear so benign. Such changes in thecase of new-to-the-firm products can be forced compro-mises that move the product away from the parameters thatwould have made it successful in the competitive market-place. Indeed, as we show, the greater the compromise, thepoorer the market performance of the product. However, itwould be worthwhile to examine the extent to which com-promise is for nonpolitical reasons and if such compromisehelps or harms the performance of the product.Managerial ImplicationsOur study also offers important implications for managers.First, the study raises concerns by highlighting that new-to-the-firm products often face resistance in winning approvalduring the initial stages of the product developmentprocess. Such new products usually are sought after byfirms because they create opportunities for growth, improveprofitability, and provide long-term competitive advantage.Yet political behaviors that create such resistance cannot bewished away. Politics is an integral part of organizationallife. However, to minimize the adverse effect of politics onnew-to-the-firm products, top management may want toappoint one of their own members as a mentor who canfacilitate and ensure a smooth flow of such important prod-ucts through the initial reviews until their approval.
Second, our study highlights the significant role ofmicropolitical strategies such as coalition building, framing,and hiding in facilitating the approval of new-to-the-firmproducts in the initial stages of product development. Thepursuit of these micropolitical strategies by project teams
112 / Journal of Marketing, March 2012
should not be labeled as “dirty politics” and discouraged. Inthe face of messy politics, the use of micropolitical strate-gies constitutes legitimate efforts on the part of projectteams to get their new-to-the-firm products successfullyapproved. The irony is that managers in project teams,whose behaviors are meant to be controlled through reviewsfor improved product development, end up rescuing new-to-the-firm projects through their autonomous behaviorsfrom the problems created by reviewers, the very peoplewho are supposed to improve new product development.
The third implication of our study is that organizationsneed to ensure that it is possible for managers in projectteams to form effective coalitions and bootleg resources tosuccessfully get their products approved for development.If power and resources are centralized and reside high up inthe organization, they will not be easily accessible to pro-ject teams. Thus, as researchers have argued previously,organizations should delegate power and resources downthe hierarchy and within the reach of project teams (Kanter1983). Such delegation will enable project teams to haveaccess to organizational members with influence andresources and thus will be able to build effective coalitionsand, if needed, conduct hidden product development workon new-to-the-firm products. Similarly, the literature onproduct championing also argues that the organizationshould make it easier for individual people or teams togather necessary resources and influence to get their newproducts successfully implemented (Markham 1998;Markham and Aiman-Smith 2001; Markham and Griffin1998; Schon 1963). In other words, such delegation ofpower is critical for encouraging and sustaining innovationthat makes a real difference.
Finally, our study warns managers in product develop-ment teams that micropolitical strategies should be usedjudiciously in the initial stages of product development. Ourfindings help managers decide when to selectively useframing and when to use coalition building to effectivelyreduce resistance to the project. While coalition buildingworks in the case of market newness, framing works fortechnology newness. Unbridled framing can be detrimentalto getting products with market newness approved by thereview committee.
In conclusion, politics plays a significant role in newproduct development, and the judicious use of micropoliti-cal strategies can enhance the ability of project teams tosuccessfully navigate their project through the developmentprocess with reduced resistance and minimal changes suchthat the likelihood of new product success is increased.
Construct ItemsTechnology newnessa •The technology involved in the development of this product represented a new technology for our
business unit.•The engineering and design work involved in this new product idea represented new work for ourbusiness unit.•The production process required was new for our business unit.
Market newnessa •The market for the product was new for our business unit.•The product required a new sales force system.•The customer service infrastructure required for this product was new.
APPENDIXRefined Measures
Developing New-to-the-Firm Products / 113
Construct ItemsCoalition buildingb •Other people in the business unit were informally approached to seek their buy-in on the product.
•Support from co-workers and other department members was used to convince seniormanagement of the product’s potential.•Support of other people in the company was relied on to show that this would be a feasibleproduct.•Support of some important people in the company was relied on to show that the product couldbe implemented successfully.
Framingb •Care was taken to present a strong link between the product definition and the strategy of thebusiness unit.•The market for the product was so defined that it appeared consistent with the market for otherproducts in the business unit.•The product was so defined that its competitive necessity was highlighted.
Hidingb •A lot of secret work, hidden from senior management, was done on this product.•The product was not exposed to others until it was reasonably developed.•To increase the likelihood of it becoming a reality, initially the product was kept hidden.
Compromiseb •In order to be approved at gate reviews, the product definition had to be compromised to satisfythe demands of senior managers present at gate reviews. •In order to be approved at gate reviews, the product had to be significantly modified to cater tocompeting demands from various company stakeholders.•After being approved at gate reviews, the product parameters differed significantly from thoseprior to gate reviews.
Resistancec •Getting this product approved was a big struggle.•There was reluctance on the part of gate reviewers to approve the product.•The product encountered a lot of resistance during gate reviews.•It was quite easy to get this project through the gate review process. (reverse coded)
Market performanced •Sales•Market share•Profit
APPENDIXContinued
aThe statements describe how different the initial new product was from the other products of the business unit (7 = “strongly agree,” and 1 =“strongly disagree”).bThe statements are related to the actions that were taken at the initial stages of the product development process to ensure the approval ofthe product for development (7 = “strongly agree,” and 1 = “strongly disagree”).cWhen responding to the following, keep in mind the initial gate reviews until product approval (7 = “strongly agree,” and 1 = “strongly disagree”).dInitially planned goals for the new product refer to the goals that were set for the product before it was taken to the review committee. Com-pared with the initially planned goals, how would you rate your product’s? (seven-point scale, anchored by “far below expected” and “far aboveexpected”).
Buchanan, David and Richard Badham (2003), Power, Politicsand Organizational Change: Winning the Turf Game. London:Sage Publications.
Burgelman, Robert A. (1983), “A Process Model of Internal Cor-porate Venturing in the Diversified Major Firm,” Administra-tive Science Quarterly, 28 (June), 223–44.
——— and Leonard R. Sayles (1986), Inside Corporate Innova-tion. New York: The Free Press.
Chandy, Rajesh C. and Gerard J. Tellis (1998), “Organizing forRadical Product Innovation: The Overlooked Role of Willing-ness to Cannibalize,” Journal of Marketing Research, 35(November), 474–88.
——— and ——— (2000), “The Incumbent’s Curse? Incumbency,Size, and Radical Product Innovation,” Journal of Marketing,64 (July), 1–17.
Cini, Marie A., Richard L. Moreland, John M. Levine (1993),“Group Staffing Levels and Response to Prospective and NewGroup Members,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychol-ogy, 65 (October), 723–34.
REFERENCESAiken, Leona S. and Stephen G. West (1991), Multiple Regres-
sion: Testing and Interpreting Interactions. Newbury Park,CA: Sage Publications.
Ancona, Deborah and David F. Caldwell (1992), “Bridging theBoundary: External Activity and Performance in Organiza-tional Teams,” Administrative Science Quarterly, 37 (Decem-ber), 634–65.
Andrews, Jonlee and Daniel C. Smith (1996), “In Search of Mar-keting Imagination: Factors Affecting the Creativity of Market-ing Programs for Mature Products,” Journal of MarketingResearch, 33 (May), 174–87.
Armstrong, J. Scott and Terry S. Overton (1977), “EstimatingNonresponse Bias in Mail Surveys,” Journal of MarketingResearch, 14 (August), 396–402.
Booz, Allen & Hamilton (1982), Management of New Products.Chicago: Booz, Allen & Hamilton Inc.
Brass, Dick (2010), “Microsoft’s Creative Destruction,” The NewYork Times, (February 4), A27, [available at http:// www.nytimes. com/2010/02/04/opinion/04brass.html].
Cooper, Robert G. (1998), Product Leadership: Creating andLaunching Superior New Products. Reading, MA: PerseusBooks.
——— (2001), Winning at New Products: Accelerating the Processfrom Idea to Launch. New York: Perseus Publishing.
——— (2008), “Perspective: The Stage-Gate Idea-to-LaunchProcess—Update, What’s New, and NextGen Systems,” Jour-nal of Product Innovation Management, 25 (May), 213–32.
Crawford, Merle C. and Anthony DiBenedetto (2002), New Prod-ucts Management. Chicago: Richard D. Irwin.
Danneels, Erwin and Elko J. Kleinschmidt (2001), “Product Inno-vativeness from the Firm’s Perspective: Its Dimensions andTheir Relation with Project Selection and Performance,” Jour-nal of Product Innovation Management, 18 (November),357–73.
Deshpandé, Rohit, John U. Farley, and Frederick E. Webster Jr.(1993), “Corporate Culture, Customer Orientation, and Innova-tiveness,” Journal of Marketing, 57 (January), 23–37.
Diamantopoulos, Adamantios and Heidi M. Winklhofer (2001),“Index Construction with Formative Indicators: An Alternativeto Scale Development,” Journal of Marketing Research, 38(May), 269–77.
Dougherty, Deborah and Trudy Heller (1994), “Illegitimacy ofSuccessful Product Innovation in Established Firms,” Organi-zation Science, 5 (May), 200–218.
Dutton, Jane E. and Robert B. Duncan (1987), “The Creation ofMomentum for Change Through the Process of Strategic IssueDiagnosis,” Strategic Management Journal, 8 (May/June),279–95.
——— and Susan E. Jackson (1987), “Categorizing StrategicIssues: Links to Organizational Action,” Academy of Manage-ment Review, 21 (January), 76–90.
Fairholm, Gilbert W. (1993), Organizational Power Politics.Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers.
Feldman, Steven (1988), “Secrecy, Information, and Politics: AnEssay on Organizational Decision Making,” Human Relations,41 (January), 73–90.
Frost, Peter J. and Carolyn P. Egri (1991), “The Political Processof Innovation,” in Research in Organizational Behavior, Vol.13, Barry M. Staw and Larry L. Cummings, eds. Greenwich,CT: JAI Press, 229–95.
Gobeli, David H., Harold F. Koenig, and Iris Bechinger (1998),“Managing Conflict in Software Development Teams: A Multi-level Analysis,” Journal of Product Innovation Management,15 (September), 423–35.
Griffin, Abbie and John R. Hauser (1992), “Patterns of Communi-cation Among Marketing, Engineering and Manufacturing: AComparison Between Two New Product Teams,” ManagementScience, 38 (March), 360–73.
Hutt, Michael D. and Thomas W. Speh (2004), Business Market-ing Management: A Strategic View of Industrial Organiza-tional Markets. Mason, OH: South-Western.
Jaworski, Bernard and Ajay K. Kohli (1993), “Market Orientation:Antecedents and Consequences,” Journal of Marketing, 57(July), 53–70.
Joshi, Ashwin W. and Sanjay Sharma (2004), “Customer Knowl-edge Development: Antecedents and Impact on New ProductPerformance,” Journal of Marketing, 68 (October), 47–59.
Kanter, Rosabeth Moss (1983), Change Masters. New York:Simon & Schuster.
Kenny, David A., Deborah A. Kashy, and N. Niall Bolger (1998),“Data Analysis in Social Psychology,” in The Handbook ofSocial Psychology, Vol. 2, Daniel T. Gilbert, Susan T. Fiske,and Gardener Lindzey, eds. Boston: McGraw-Hill, 233–65.
Leifer, Richard, Christopher M. McDermott, Gina ColarelliO’Connor, Lois Peters, Mark Rice, and Robert W. Veryzer(2000), Radical Innovation. Boston: Harvard Business SchoolPress.
114 / Journal of Marketing, March 2012
Markham, Stephen K. (1998), “A Longitudinal Examination ofHow Champions Influence Others to Support Their Projects,”Journal of Product Innovation Management, 15 (November),490–504.
——— and Lynda Aiman-Smith (2001), “Product Champions:Truths, Myths, and Management,” Research Technology Man-agement, 44 (May/June), 44–50.
——— and Abbie Griffin (1998), “The Breakfast of Champions:Associations Between Champions and Product DevelopmentEnvironments, Practices, and Performance,” Journal of Prod-uct Innovation Management, 15 (September), 436–54.
McDermott, Christopher M. and Gina Colarelli O’Connor (2002),“Managing Radical Innovation: An Overview of EmergentStrategy Issues,” Journal of Product Innovation Management,19 (November), 424–38.
McDonough, Edward, III (2000), “Investigation of Factors Lead-ing to Success of Cross-Functional Teams,” Journal of ProductInnovation Management, 17 (May), 221–35.
Narayanan, V.K. and Liam Fahey (1982), “The Micro-Politics ofStrategy Formulation,” The Academy of Management Review,7 (January), 25–34.
Page, Albert L. (1993), “Assessing New Product Practices andPerformance: Establishing Crucial Norms,” Journal of ProductInnovation Management, 10 (September), 273–90.
Park, C. Whan and Gerald Zaltman (1987), Marketing Manage-ment. Hinsdale, IL: Dryden Press.
Perrewe, Pamela L., Gerald R. Ferris, Dwight D. Fink, andWilliam P. Anthony (2000), “Political Skill: An Antidote forWorkplace Stressors,” The Academy of Management Executive,14 (August), 115–23.
Pettigrew, Andrew. (1973), The Politics of Organizational Deci-sion-Making. London: Tavistock.
Pfeffer, Jeffrey (1992), Managing with Power. Boston: HarvardBusiness School Press.
Podsakoff, Philip M. and Dennis W. Organ (1986), “Self-Reportsin Organizational Research: Problems and Prospects,” Journalof Management, 12 (Winter), 531–44.
Qiu, Tianjiao, William Qualls, Jonathan Bohlman, and Deborah E.Kupp (2009), “The Effect of Interactional Fairness on the Per-formance of Cross-Functional Product Development Teams: AMultilevel Mediated Model,” Journal of Product InnovationManagement, 26 (March), 173–87.
Sarin, Shikhar (2009), “Taking Stock and Looking Ahead: AnIntroduction to the Special Issue on New Product DevelopmentTeams,” Journal of Product Innovation Management, 26(March), 117–22.
——— and Vijay Mahajan (2001), “The Effect of Reward Struc-tures on the Performance of Cross-Functional Product Devel-opment Teams,” Journal of Marketing, 65 (April), 35–53.
——— and Christopher McDermott (2003), “The Effect of TeamLeadership on the Learning and Performance of Cross-FunctionalProduct Development Teams,” Decision Sciences, 34 (Novem-ber), 707–739.
——— and Gina Colarelli O’Connor (2009), “First Among Equals:Effect of Team Leader Characteristics on the Internal Dynam-ics of Cross-Functional Product Development Teams,” Journalof Product Innovation Management, 26 (March), 188–205.
Schon, Donald A. (1963), “Champions for Radical New Innova-tions,” Harvard Business Review, 41 (March/April), 77–86.
Sethi, Rajesh (2000), “Superordinate Identity in Cross-FunctionalProduct Development Teams: Its Effect on New Product Per-formance and Its Antecedents,” Journal of the Academy ofMarketing Science, 28 (Summer), 330–44.
——— and Zafar Iqbal (2008), “Stage-Gate Controls, LearningFailure, and Adverse Effect on Novel New Products,” Journalof Marketing, 72 (January), 114–34.
——— and Carolyn Y. Nicholson (2001), “Structural and Contex-tual Correlates of Charged Behavior in Product DevelopmentTeams,” Journal of Product Innovation Management, 18(May), 154–68.
———, Daniel C. Smith, and C. Whan Park (2001), “Cross-Functional Product Development Teams, Creativity, and theInnovativeness of New Consumer Products,” Journal of Mar-keting Research, 38 (February), 73–85.
Developing New-to-the-Firm Products / 115
Tellis, Gerard J., Jaideep C. Prabhu, and Rajesh K. Chandy (2009),“Radical Innovations Across Nations: The Preeminence ofCorporate Culture,” Journal of Marketing, 73 (January), 3–23.
Copyright of Journal of Marketing is the property of American Marketing Association and its content may not
be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written
permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use.
