New The impact of social power on the evaluation of offensive jokes · 2019. 11. 5. · the...

Hans Knegtmans, Wilco W. van Dijk*, Marlon Mooijman,Nina van Lier, Sacha Rintjema and Annemieke Wassink

The impact of social power on the evaluationof offensive jokes

https://doi.org/10.1515/humor-2017-0106

Abstract: The current research examined whether social power affects whatpeople find funny. In two experiments, participants’ psychological state of socialpower was experimentally manipulated and their evaluations of offensive jokeswere assessed. Results showed that participants in a psychological state of highpower – as compared to low power – evaluated offensive jokes as less inap-propriate, less offensive, and funnier. Mediation analyses showed that powerincreased the funniness of offensive jokes through decreasing the perceivedinappropriateness of these jokes. Implications for research on power andhumor are discussed.

Keywords: power, offensive jokes, benign violation theory, social psychology

1 Introduction

People’s attempts to be funny come in many forms, for instance, by tellingjokes that make fun of other people (e.g., members of a minority group).Although these jokes may amuse people, they can also be perceived as inap-propriate and offensive, thereby attenuating the extent to which these jokes areperceived as funny. What makes such humor attempts more or less successfuldepends on the appraisals (i.e., subjective evaluations) of the receivers of thesejokes. A recent theory on humor – Benign Violation Theory (BVT) – suggeststhat humor occurs when something seems wrong (i.e., a violation) yet alsookay (i.e., benign; Peter and Warren 2010; Peter et al. 2015). According to BVT,humor is a psychological response characterized by the appraisal that some-thing is funny, the positive emotion of amusement, and the tendency to laugh(Gervais and Wilson 2005; Martin 2007; Veatch 1998). The current research

*Corresponding author: Wilco W. van Dijk, Leiden University, Leiden, Netherlands,E-mail: [email protected] Knegtmans, Leiden University, Leiden, Netherlands, E-mail: [email protected] Mooijman, Northwestern University, Evanston, USA,E-mail: [email protected] van Lier, Sacha Rintjema, Annemieke Wassink, Leiden University, Leiden, Netherlands

Humor 2018; 31(1): 85–104

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addresses a straightforward but interesting question: does a psychologicalstate of social power influence the appraisal and perceived funniness ofoffensive jokes? Based on BVT and theories on social power, we propose thata state of high social power – as compared to low – decreases the appraisedinappropriateness of offensive jokes and thereby increases the perceived fun-niness of these jokes.

1.1 Social power as a psychological state

Social power has been defined as asymmetric control over valued resources insocial relations (Keltner et al. 2003; Magee and Galinsky 2008; Rucker et al.2012). Ample research has shown that power is a psychological state. Feelingpowerful or powerless can be activated by instructing participants to recallautobiographical events where they felt powerful or powerless and has theexact same effects as those obtained using structural and role-based manipula-tions of power (Anderson & Galinsky 2006; Galinsky et al. 2003). Such psycho-logical states of power have been demonstrated to have important and far-reaching consequences for how people behave. In their review paper onpower, Keltner et al. (2003) concluded that individuals feeling powerful: (a)experience and express more positive – approach related – emotions (e.g.,amusement) and less negative – inhibition related – emotions (e.g., embarrass-ment), (b) attend more to social rewards, (c) construe others in terms how theysatisfy their own goals and needs, (d) cognize their social environment in moreautomatic, simplistic fashion, and (e) behave in disinhibited and sometimescounter-normative ways. In contrast, individuals feeling powerless: (a) experi-ence and express less positive emotions and more negative emotions, (b) attendmore to punishment and threat, (c) make more careful, controlled judgmentsabout others’ intentions, attitudes, and actions, and (d) inhibit their own beha-vior and act contingently on others.

More recent research corroborated and strengthened the notion that socialpower has important and far-reaching consequences for many aspects of humanbehavior. For example, studies have shown that the powerful act more (e.g., aremore likely to take another card in a game of blackjack or are more likely toremove an annoying electric fan), supporting the notion that powerful indivi-duals experience less social constraints and show less inhibition as compared tothe powerless (Galinsky et al. 2003). Furthermore, consistent with the notionthat people in power have control over valued resources and are therefore lessdependent on others, studies have shown that a high-power state hindersperspective-taking (Galinsky et al. 2006) and compassion (Van Kleef et al. 2008).

86 Hans Knegtmans et al.



1.2 Social power and humor

The aforementioned theorizing and findings concerning social power provide aclear basis for predictions how social power will influence the evaluation ofoffensive jokes. As a psychological state of high power – compared to low – isassociated with less social constraints, less inhibition, more psychological dis-tance from others, and less distress and compassion in reaction to the sufferingof others, we should observe that powerful individuals evaluate offensive jokesas less inappropriate and less offensive. We should also observe that morepowerful individuals evaluate offensive jokes as funnier and are more willingto tell these jokes to someone else – because they tend to experience moreapproach related positive emotions (e.g., amusement) and behave in moredisinhibited and counter-normative fashion. Moreover, we propose that theselatter effects are mediated by differences in appraised inappropriateness. That is,we expect that more social power increases the perceived funniness of andwillingness to tell offensive jokes through a decreased perceived inappropriate-ness of these jokes.

The relationship between social power and (offensive) humor has beenaddressed in prior research. These previous studies, for instance, examined howjoking can serve to help structure local interaction hierarchies (Robinson andSmith-Lovin 2001), how high status group members differ from low status groupmembers in their ratings of appropriateness of (offensive and non-offensive) jokes(Smeltzer and Leap 1988), or how the frequency of using subversive humor differsbetween informal and workplace meetings (Holmes and Marra 2002). The presentresearch adds importantly to this prior work by being the first to combine socialpsychological research on social power with a recent theory on humor – BenignViolation Theory. Important, our research is the first to study the evaluation ofoffensive jokes using an experimental manipulation of social power, therebyallowing to draw causal conclusions regarding the impact of social power onthe perceived appropriateness, offensiveness, and funniness of offensive jokesand people’s willingness to tell these jokes to others.

1.3 Overview of the present research

The present research examines the impact of social power on the evaluation ofoffensive jokes. Moreover, we sought to provide a first test of a possible mechan-ism through which social power might affect humor. Experiment 1 examines theeffects of social power on participants’ evaluations of offensive jokes by placingthem into a psychological state of high or low power and assessing their

Social power and offensive jokes 87



evaluations of offensive jokes in terms of inappropriateness, offensiveness,funniness, and willingness to tell the joke to someone else. Experiment 2 is aconceptual replication and extension of our first experiment and tests the samehypotheses as Experiment 1. In this second experiment, we included additionalmeasures and also explored whether social power increases moral hypocrisy inthe context of offensive jokes. Both experiments demonstrate that participantswho feel more powerful evaluate offensive jokes as less inappropriate, lessoffensive, and funnier. Moreover, both experiments provide mediation evidencethat more powerful participants evaluate offensive jokes as funnier, becausethey appraise them as less inappropriate.

2 Experiment 1

In Experiment 1, we hypothesized that participants induced to feel powerful willevaluate offensive jokes as less inappropriate, less offensive, and funnier, andthat they will be more willing to tell these jokes to someone else – relative to apowerless condition. Moreover, we hypothesized that powerful participantsevaluate offensive jokes as funnier and are more willing to tell these jokesbecause they appraise them as less inappropriate.

2.1 Method

2.1.1 Participants, design, and procedure

Eighty-nine undergraduates at a Dutch university (60 women; Mage = 20.42 years,SDage = 2.69) were randomly assigned to a high-power (n= 39) or low-power condi-tion (n= 50). Although participants were told that they would take part in twounrelated studies, in reality they participated in one experiment consisting of two(related) parts. In the first part of the experiment, a psychological state of high orsocial power was experimentally induced. Whereas in the second part, participantswere asked to evaluate a series of jokes. Upon completing both parts, participantswere probed for suspicion, debriefed, thanked, and rewarded for their participation.

2.1.2 Power manipulation

Power was experimentally manipulated through an episodic priming task (cf.Galinsky et al. 2003; Mooijman et al. 2015). Participants in the high-power




condition were asked to recall and write about a situation in which they hadpower over others. More specifically, they were asked the following:

Please recall a particular incident in which you had power over another individual orindividuals. By power, we mean a situation in which you controlled the ability of anotherperson or persons to get something they wanted, or were in a position to evaluate thoseindividuals. Please describe this situation in which you had power – what happened, howyou felt, etc.

Participants in the low-power condition were asked to recall and write about asituation in which others had power over them. More specifically, they wereasked the following:

Please recall a particular incident in which someone else had power over you. By power,we mean a situation in which someone had control over your ability to get something youwanted, or was in a position to evaluate you. Please describe this situation in which youdid not have power – what happened, how you felt, etc.

2.1.3 Joke evaluations

Participant were asked to read 21 jokes and to evaluate each joke in terms ofinappropriateness (Cronbach’s α=0.93), offensiveness (α=0.93), and funniness(α=0.89) – on scales from 1 to 7 (a higher score indicated that participantsevaluated the joke as more inappropriate, more offensive, or funnier). They werealso asked to indicate for each joke – on scales from 1 to 7 – their willingness totell the joke to somebody else (α=0.91; a higher score indicated a higher will-ingness to tell the joke).1

The jokes were selected on the basis of a pilot study, in which 37 under-graduates at a Dutch university evaluated 60 jokes in terms of inappropriate-ness, offensiveness, and funniness. Of the selected jokes, seven were related to adisability, seven were related to ethnicity, and seven were related to gender.These jokes had inappropriateness ratings that were higher than the overallmean of all jokes of one type. The mean funniness of selected jokes did not differbetween types of jokes (Moverall = 3.14, SD= 1.02), F(1, 36) = 2.81, p=0.13.

1 Inappropriateness was significantly correlated to offensiveness (Pearson’s r=0.88; p < 0.001),funniness (r=–0.30; p=0.004), and willingness to tell (r=–0.40; p < 0.001). Offensiveness wassignificantly correlated to funniness (r=–0.25; p=0.017) and willingness to tell (r=–0.26;p=0.013). Funniness was significantly related to willingness to tell (r =0.79; p < 0.001). Thepatterns of these correlations were similar in both power conditions.




2.2 Results and discussion

To test our hypotheses, we conducted four mixed Analyses of Variance(ANOVAs) with power (high, low) as between-participants variable, type ofjoke (disability-jokes, ethnicity-jokes, gender-jokes) as repeated measure, andinappropriateness, offensiveness, funniness, and willingness to tell as depen-dent variable, respectively.

2.2.1 Inappropriateness

Results yielded a statistical significant main effect of power on inappropriateness,F(1, 87) = 14.41, p < 0.001, pη=0.14. High-power participants evaluated the jokes asless inappropriate (M= 3.59, SD=0.87) than low-power participants (M=4.34,SD=0.96). Results also showed a significant main effect of type of joke, F(2,174) = 438.95, p < 0.001, pη2 = 0.84. Gender-jokes (M= 2.11, SD= 1.14) were evaluatedas less inappropriate than ethnicity-jokes (M= 5.16, SD= 1.14; t[89] = 23.76,p < 0.001) and disability-jokes (M=4.77, SD= 1.19; t[89] = 22.19, p < 0.001). The lattertwo means also differed significantly from each other, t(89) = 4.99, p < 0.001.No significant interaction effect was found between power and type of joke, F(2,174) = 1.84, p=0.16.

2.2.2 Offensiveness

Results yielded a significant main effect of power on offensiveness, F(1, 87) = 12.25,p=0.001, pη2 = 0.12. High-power participants evaluated the jokes as less offensive(M= 3.35, SD=0.96) than low-power participants (M= 4.08, SD= 1.01). Results alsoshowed a significant main effect of type of joke, F(2, 174) = 430.54, p < 0.001,pη2 = 0.83. Gender-jokes (M= 1.91, SD= 1.04) were evaluated as less offensive thanethnicity-jokes (M= 4.91, SD= 1.27; t[89] = 24.50, p < 0.001) and disability-jokes(M=4.46, SD= 1.30; t[89] = 22.78, p < 0.001). The latter two means also differedsignificantly from each other, t(89) = 4.93, p < 0.001. No significant interaction effectwas found between power and type of joke, F(2, 174) = 2.29, p=0.10.

2.2.3 Funniness

Results yielded a significant main effect of power on funniness, F(1, 87) = 4.54,p=0.038, pη2 = 0.049. High-power participants evaluated the jokes as funnier(M= 3.38, SD=0.93) than low-power participants (M= 2.92, SD= 1.08). Results




also showed a significant main effect of type of joke, F(2, 174) = 54.45, p < 0.001,pη2 = 0.39. Gender-jokes (M= 3.93, SD= 1.14) were evaluated as funnier thanethnicity-jokes (M= 2.63, SD= 1.36; t[89] = 8.45, p < 0.001) and disability-jokes(M= 2.81, SD= 1.27; t[89] = 7.41, p < 0.001). The latter two means also differedsignificantly from each other, t(89) = 2.36, p =0.021. No significant interactioneffect was found between power and type of joke, F < 1.

2.2.4 Willingness to tell

Results yielded a trend of power on willingness to tell, F(1, 87) = 2.57, p =0.11,pη2 = 0.029. High-power participants were slightly, but not statistical significant,more willing to tell the jokes to someone else (M = 2.60, SD= 1.05) than low-power participants (M= 2.25, SD=0.98). Results did show a significant maineffect of type of joke, F(2, 174) = 29.06, p < 0.001, pη2 = 0.25. Participants weremore willing to tell gender-jokes (M= 2.95, SD= 1.23) than disability-jokes(M= 2.16, SD= 1.15; t[89] = 5.76, p < 0.001) or ethnicity-jokes (M= 2.11, SD= 1.27;t[89] = 5.93, p < 0.001). No significant interaction effect was found between powerand type of joke, F(2, 174) = 1.11, p=0.33.

2.2.5 Mediation analyses

We hypothesized that social power increases the funniness of offensive jokesthrough decreasing the perceived inappropriateness of these jokes. To test forthis mediation, we followed the recommendations of Preacher and Hayes (2008)who suggest using a bootstrapping procedure to compute confidence intervalsaround the indirect effects (i.e., the path through the mediator). If zero fallsoutside an interval, mediation can be said to be present. We used the SPSSmacros that Preacher and Hayes provide for this procedure. In a first mediationanalysis, condition (high-power vs. low-power) was the independent variable,funniness was the dependent variable, and inappropriateness was the mediator.Whereas in an additional second mediation analysis, we included offensivenessas the mediator. We used a bootstrapped mediation analysis with 5,000 boot-strap resamples and bias-corrected and accelerated intervals. We used singlemediator analyses with either inappropriateness or offensiveness as mediator.Because of multicollinearity (i.e., the possible mediators were correlated, seeFootnote 1), we could not include inappropriateness and offensiveness in onemodel, as multiple mediation analyses are conducted under the assumption thatthe possible mediators are uncorrelated.




Results showed that the effect of power on funniness was mediated by adecrease in inappropriateness (95% CI = [–0.51, –0.01]), but not by a decrease inoffensiveness, 95% CI = [–0.41, 0.02]. More specific, the significant effect ofpower on funniness (β=–0.22, t=−2.11, p =0.038) was reduced to non-signifi-cance (β=–0.12, t=−1.13, p=0.26) when inappropriateness was added to themodel (which by itself still predicted funniness, β=–0.25, t=−2.23, p=0.023).These results indicate that power increased the funniness of offensive jokesthrough decreasing perceived inappropriateness.

Results of Experiment 1 showed a clear effect of power on the evaluation ofoffensive jokes. High-power participants – as compared to low-power partici-pants – evaluated offensive jokes as less inappropriate, less offensive, andfunnier. Moreover, results indicate that these effects were not contingent onthe type of joke. Although results did not yield a significant effect of power onthe willingness to tell an offensive joke, they did reveal a (slight) trend in theexpected direction.

3 Experiment 2

The second experiment was a conceptual replication and extension ofExperiment 1. In this experiment, we used a different and smaller set of offensivejokes, included two additional measures, added several items to measure ourmain dependent variables, and added another experimental factor to the design.

More specific, participants’ feelings of power and mood were assesseddirectly after the episodic priming task. The first assessment enables us tocheck whether our power manipulation had an effect on participants’ feelingsof power and indicates whether or not our manipulation of social power wassuccessful. The second assessment enables us to check whether our powermanipulation affected participants’ general mood. This is important to check,as a diffuse (positive or negative) mood may predispose participants to experi-ence similarly toned emotions as a suitable emotion-evoking stimulus is pre-sented to them (e.g., an offensive joke). If our power manipulation shows theintended effect on participants’ feelings of social power, but not an unintendedeffect on their general mood, the observed differences between experimentalconditions in the evaluation of offensive jokes can be attributed to differences infeelings of social power, but not to differences in general mood and thereby to ahigher predisposition to experience similarly toned emotions.

We also included a more specific assessment of offensiveness. That is, weassessed the extent to which participants considered the jokes about disabilities,




ethnicity, and gender offensive to members of these specific groups.Furthermore, we assessed participants’ joke evaluations in terms of inappropri-ateness and funniness with two items instead of one.

In addition to conceptually replicating our first study, we explored whetherpower increases moral hypocrisy in the context of offensive jokes. Earlierresearch has shown that – compared to individuals lacking power – powerfulindividuals judge their own moral transgressions more acceptable, but the sametransgressions committed by others less acceptable (Lammers et al. 2010).Therefore, we asked some participants to evaluate offensive jokes imaginingtelling these jokes themselves, whereas we asked others to evaluate the jokes ifthese were told by another person. A moral hypocrisy effect would be obtained ifhigh-power participants evaluate offensive jokes as less inappropriate, lessoffensive, and funnier when these jokes were told by themselves as comparedto when they were told by another person.

3.1 Method

3.1.1 Participants, design, and procedure

Participants were 164 undergraduates at a Dutch university (83 women;Mage = 20.42 years, SDage = 2.69), who were randomly assigned to one of fourconditions of a 2 (power induction: high, low) X 2 (perspective: self, other)between-participants design (with 40 to 42 participants in each condition). Theprocedure was similar to Experiment 1.

3.1.2 Power manipulation, manipulation check, and mood assessment

Power was manipulated using the same episodic priming task as in Experiment 1.Following the power induction, participants were presented with 23 words andasked to indicate – on scales from 1 (not at all) to 4 (very much) – how applicableeach word was to their current thoughts and feelings. Answers to the followingseven items were averaged and served as a power manipulation check: influential,powerful, dominant, important, submissive, unimportant, and dependent (answers tothe last three items were reverse-scored; α=0.74). Answers to the following 16 itemswere averaged and served as an assessment of participants’ mood: lively, happy,caring, satisfied, energetic, calm, loving, active, sad, tired, unenergetic, cranky, ner-vous, jumpy, down, and dissatisfied (answers to the last eight items were reverse-scored; α=0.87). The 23 items were presented in a mixed order to participants.




3.1.3 Joke evaluations

Participants were asked to read 12 jokes (three disability-jokes, four ethnicity-jokes, five gender-jokes) and to indicate – on seven-point scales (1 = not at all;7 = very much) – the extent to which they evaluated the joke as funny andenjoyable (averaged to form an assessment of funniness; α=0.91) and as inap-propriate and indecent (averaged to form an assessment of inappropriateness;α=0.91). Next, they were asked to indicate – on three seven-point scales (1 = notat all; 7 = very much) – the extent they evaluated the joke as offensive fordisabled people (α =0.73), members of certain ethnic groups (α=0.80), andmen or women (α=0.84). Last, participants were asked to indicate – on aseven-point scale (1 = I would never tell this joke to somebody; 7 = I would cer-tainly tell this joke to somebody) – their willingness to tell the joke (this questionwas only asked in the self condition; α =0.73).2

3.1.4 Self- versus other-perspective manipulation

In the self-perspective condition participants were asked to answer all questionswhile imagining that they themselves would tell the joke, whereas participantsin the other-perspective condition were asked to answer all questions whileimagining that somebody else, who was unknown to them, would tell the joke.

3.2 Results and discussion3

3.2.1 Manipulation check and mood assessment

An independent samples t-test yielded a significant effect of power on themanipulation check items, t(162) = 2.26, p=0.025. High-power participants felt

2 Inappropriateness was significantly correlated to offensiveness (r=0.68; p < 0.001), funniness(r=–0.49; p < 0.001), and willingness to tell (r=–0.49; p < 0.001). Offensiveness was significantlycorrelated to funniness (r=–0.26; p=0.001), but not to willingness to tell (r=–0.19; p=0.09).Funniness was significantly correlated to willingness to tell (r=0.89). The patterns of thesecorrelations were similar in both power conditions.3 We did not include gender as a factor in our research. When we checked Experiment 2 forpossible gender differences, we found no significant interaction effect between social powerand gender on any of the assessed dependent variables. This indicates that indeed our socialpower manipulation had the same effect for female and male participants. However, women, ascompared to men, evaluated disability-jokes as more inappropriate, more offensive, and less




more powerful (M= 2.79, SD=0.45) than low-power participants (M = 2.63,SD=0.49). Results of an additional t-test showed that – before they read andevaluated the jokes – high-power participants (M= 3.14, SD=0.46) did not differin their mood from low-power participants (M= 3.04, SD=0.44), t(162) = 1.54,p=0.13. This indicates that our manipulation of power was successful – it hadthe intended effect on participants’ feelings of social power, but not an unin-tended effect on their general mood.

3.2.2 Self- versus other-perspective

Initial mixed ANOVAs with power (high, low) and perspective (self, other) asbetween-participants variables, type of joke (disability-jokes, ethnicity-jokes,gender-jokes) as repeated measure, and inappropriateness, offensiveness, andfunniness as dependent variables yielded no significant main or interactioneffects of perspective (Fs < 2.21, ps > 0.13). Therefore we, subsequently, conductedfour separate mixed ANOVAs with power as between-participants variable, typeof joke as repeated measure, and inappropriateness, offensiveness, funniness,and willingness to tell the joke as dependent variable, respectively.

3.2.3 Inappropriateness

Results yielded a significant main effect of power on inappropriateness, F(1,162) = 6.88, p =0.010, pη2 = 0.041. High-power participants evaluated the joke asless inappropriate (M= 3.26, SD= 1.20) than low-power participants (M= 3.72,SD= 1.07). Furthermore, results yielded a significant main effect of type ofjoke, F(2, 324) = 99.62, p < 0.001, pη2 = 0.38. Disability-jokes (M=4.19, SD= 1.47)were evaluated as more inappropriate than ethnicity-jokes (M= 3.18, SD= 1.24;t[164] = 11.05, p < 0.001) and gender-jokes (M = 3.11, SD= 1.23 t[164] = 10.62,p < 0.001). The latter two means did not differ significantly from each other,t(164) = 1.17, p=0.24.

Also a significant interaction effect was obtained between power and type ofjoke, F(2, 324) = 4.48, p=0.012, pη2 = 0.027. Inspection of the relevant means

funny and were less willing to tell these jokes to someone else. Furthermore, women evaluatedethnicity-jokes as more inappropriate and less funny and they rated gender-jokes as moreoffensive. Note that we did not check for possible gender differences in Experiment 1, becausein this experiment the absolute number of male participants was too low to conduct anymeaningful analyses with gender as an additional factor in our design.




showed that the difference in inappropriateness between high-power and low-power participants was larger for disability-jokes (M= 3.81 [SD= 1.51] vs. M=4.56[SD= 1.33]; t[162] = 3.39, p =0.001) than for gender-jokes (M= 2.98 [SD= 1.29] vs.M= 3.24 [SD= 1.18]; t[162] = 1.36, p=0.18) and ethnicity-jokes (M= 2.99 [SD= 1.29]vs. M= 3.37 [SD= 1.18]; t[162] = 1.99, p=0.05). The finding that the effect of poweron the evaluation of offensive jokes in terms of inappropriateness was morepronounced for jokes that were perceived as more offensive is, in our view,consistent with our theoretical framework.

3.2.4 Offensiveness

In the mixed ANOVA concerning offensiveness, the type of offensiveness questionwas included as an additional repeated measure. Results of this analysis yielded nomain effect of power on offensiveness, F < 1. Results did show a significant maineffect of type of joke (F[2, 324]= 109.16, p < 0.001, pη2 = 0.40), indicating that parti-cipants’ means for all three offensiveness questions were higher for disability-jokes(M= 2.44, SD=0.79) than for ethnicity-jokes (M= 2.02, SD=0.73; t[164] = 8.50,p < 0.001) and gender-jokes (M= 1.84, SD=0.67; t[164]= 13.85, p < 0.001). Whereasthese means were higher for ethnicity-jokes than for gender-jokes (t[164]= 5.99,p < 0.001). Results also yielded a significant main effect of type of offensivenessquestion (F[2, 324] = 86.09, p < 0.001, pη2 = 0.35), indicating that participants’meansfor the questions related to offensiveness towards disabled people were higher(M= 2.39, SD=0.71) than for those related to offensiveness towards members ofethnic groups (M= 2.01, SD=0.71; t[164] = 8.50, p < 0.001) and towards men orwomen (M= 1.91, SD=0.76; t[164] = 11.86, p < 0.001). Whereas these means werehigher for the questions related to offensiveness towards members of ethnic groupsthan towards men or women, t(164) = 3.35, p=0.001.

Furthermore, results yielded a significant interaction effect between type ofjoke and type of offensiveness question (F[4, 648] = 672.41, p < 0.001, pη2 = 0.81),indicating that participants evaluated: (a) disability-jokes more offensive fordisabled people (M=4.66, SD= 1.57) than for men or women (M= 1.37,SD=0.79; t[164] = 27.23, p < 0.001) and members of ethnic groups (M= 1.28,SD=0.68; t[164] = 27.31, p < 0.001). The latter two means also differed signifi-cantly form each other (t[164] = 2.90, p =0.004), (b) gender-jokes more offensivefor men or women (M= 3.07, SD= 1.28) than for members of ethnic groups(M= 1.24, SD=0.62; t[164] = 20.22, p < 0.001) and disabled people (M= 1.22,SD=0.55; t[164] = 20.14, p < 0.001), and (c) ethnicity-jokes more offensive formembers of ethnic groups (M = 3.50, SD= 1.41) than for men and women(M= 1.29, SD=0.64; t[164] = 21.65, p < 0.001) and disabled people (M= 1.29,




SD=0.66; t[164] = 21.34, p < 0.001). These results indicate that, as intended,participants evaluated disability-jokes as most offensive for disabled people,gender-jokes as most offensive for men or women, and ethnicity-jokes mostoffensive for members of ethnic groups.

Although results yielded no significant main effect of power, they did yield asignificant three-way interaction between power, type of joke, and type of offen-siveness question (F[4, 648] = 3.44, p=0.009, pη2 = 0.021), indicating that thedifference between high-power and low-power participants was larger for theirevaluation of offensiveness towards disabled people for disability-jokes (M= 4.94vs. M= 4.39; t[162] = 2.28, p=0.024) than for their evaluation of offensivenesstowards men or women for gender-jokes (M= 3.04 vs. M= 3.10; t[162] = 0.30,p=0.77) and their evaluation of offensiveness towards members of ethnic groupsfor ethnicity-jokes (M= 3.35 vs. M= 3.65; t[162] = 1.38, p=0.17). The other meansfor their evaluation of offensiveness varied between 1.22 and 1.37 (see Figure 1).

The obtained significant three-way interaction between power, type of joke, andtype of offensiveness question indicates that high-power evaluated disability-jokes less offensive for disabled people than low-power participants. Theabsence of a significant main effect of power might be due to the fact thatethnicity-jokes and gender-jokes were overall evaluated as less offensive thandisability-jokes and suggests that the effect of power on the evaluation of jokesis more pronounced when jokes are more offensive. This is consistent with theobtained results for the evaluation of jokes in terms of inappropriateness.

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D-jokes:Disability

D-jokes:Etnicity

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Figure 1: Mean offensiveness scores for three types of jokes and three types of offensivenessquestions.




3.2.5 Funniness

Results yielded a significant main effect of power on funniness, F(1, 162) = 6.72,p=0.010, pη2 = 0.040. High-power participants evaluated the jokes as funnier(M= 3.76, SD= 1.13) than low-power participants (M= 3.35, SD=0.99).Furthermore, results yielded a main effect of type of joke, F(2, 324) = 41.52,p < 0.001, pη2 = 0.20. Disability-jokes (M = 2.99, SD= 1.45) were evaluated asless funnier than ethnicity-jokes (M = 3.81, SD= 1.23; t[164] = 7.88, p < 0.001) andgender-jokes (M= 3.82, SD= 1.36; t[164] = 7.16, p < 0.001). No significant interac-tion effect was found between power and type of joke, F < 1.

3.2.6 Willingness to tell

Results yielded a trend of power on willingness to tell, F(1, 79) = 2.98,p =0.088, pη2 = 0.036. High-power participants were slightly more willing totell the joke (M = 3.30, SD =0.92) than low-power participants (M = 2.95,SD =0.89). Although results only yielded a trend of power, the obtainedmeans were in the expected direction. Furthermore, results yielded a maineffect of type of joke, F(2, 158) = 14.56, p < 0.001, pη2 = 0.16. Participants wereless willing to tell disability-jokes (M = 2.67, SD = 1.28) than gender-jokes(M = 3.37, SD = 1.11; t[81] = 4.38, p < 0.001) and ethnicity-jokes (M = 3.32,SD = 1.14; t[81] = 4.30, p < 0.001). No significant interaction effect was foundbetween power and type of joke, F < 1.

3.2.7 Mediation analyses

Because of multicollinearity (i.e., the possible mediators were correlated, seeFootnote 2), we used single mediator analyses with either inappropriatenessor offensiveness as mediator. Results of a bootstrapped mediation analysis(cf. Experiment 1) showed that the effect of power on funniness was mediatedby a decrease in inappropriateness (95% CI = [-0.47, -0.07]), but not by adecrease in offensiveness, 95% CI = [-0.11, 0.02]. More specifically, the sig-nificant effect of power on funniness (β = -0.19, t =−2.45, p =0.016) wasreduced to non-significance (β =0.09, t = 1.33, p =0.19) when inappropriate-ness was added to the model (which by itself still predicted funniness, β = -0.48, t =−6.83, p < 0.001). These results indicate that power increased thefunniness of offensive jokes through decreasing its perceivedinappropriateness.




4 General discussion

In two experiments, we provide evidence that social power affects the evaluationof offensive jokes. Consistent with the notion that high-power leads one toexperience less social constraints, show less inhibition, experience more dis-tance from others, and respond with less distress and compassion to the suffer-ing of others, we found that participants in a psychological state of high power –relative to low power – evaluated offensive jokes as less inappropriate and lessoffensive. Furthermore, consistent with the notion that feeling more powerfulleads to the experience of more approach related positive emotions and lessinhibition related negative emotions, we found that high-power – relative tolow-power – individuals evaluated offensive jokes as funnier. Moreover, media-tion analyses showed that social power increased the funniness of offensivejokes through decreasing perceived inappropriateness. Last, consistent with thenotion that a state of high power leads to more disinhibited behavior, we founda slight indication that high-power – relative to low-power – individuals weremore willing to tell offensive jokes to someone else. Although this last findingdid not reach statistical significance, in both experiments we did observe trendsin the expected direction.

The present research indicates that occupying a powerful or powerlessposition matters for one’s appreciation of offensive jokes. Those who occupythe upper echelons of society may be less likely to be offended by offensivehumor compared to those who reside on the bottom rung of society. As such, ourresults add an important contextual factor to the growing psychological litera-ture on humor (Peter and Warren 2010; McGraw et al. 2012; McGraw et al. 2014).Humor is not only a property of the joke (e.g., severity of a joke, distance from ajoke) but is also dependent on the psychological state of those to whom the jokeis communicated. Benign Violation Theory (Peter and Warner 2014; McGrawet al. 2014) proposes that a potential joke is deemed funny when: (a) it violatesa norm, (b) the violation is benign, and (c) both perceptions occur simulta-neously. For a violation to be perceived as benign, it has to be appraised asacceptable. Although the jokes used in the current research were clear normviolations, results of our mediation analyses showed that participants who feltmore powerful appraised offensive jokes as less inappropriate (i.e., more accep-table) and therefore as funnier. This finding might be due to power decreasingempathic responses (Van Kleef et al. 2008) and increasing psychological dis-tance towards others (Magee and Smith 2013). Indeed, previous research hasdemonstrated how people find more humor in tragedies when they are tempo-rally, socially, or hypothetically distant (McGraw et al. 2012).




4.1 Limitations and directions for future research

One limitation of the present research is that we did not include a base-linepower condition in our experiments; therefore, it remains unclear whether theobtained effects of power are (primarily) due to a psychological state of highpower or low power. Although we have no empirical findings to answer thisquestion, we expect that our effects are affected by both psychological states ofpower. Some indication for the validity of our expectation can be derived fromcomparing the mean funniness ratings in Experiment 1 (M= 3.38 and M= 2.92 inthe high power and low power condition, respectively) with the mean funninessrating in our pilot study (M= 3.14). The observation that the mean in our pilotstudy (in which participants were in a relative power-neutral state) was inbetween the means of the high-power and low-power participants ofExperiment 1 suggests that a psychological state of powerfulness makes offen-sive humor funnier, whereas a state of powerlessness makes it less funny. This isof course a less than ideal comparison and future studies, in which a base-linepower condition is included, could provide more definite answers to thisquestion.

Another limitation of the present research is that our studies did not includenon-offensive jokes; therefore, it remains unclear whether social power leads togreater perceived funniness of jokes in general independent of how offensive thejokes are. Although this remains an empirical question that future researchcould address, our data provide some preliminary insights in this issue. InExperiment 2 we found that the effect of power on the evaluation of offensivejokes in terms of inappropriateness was more pronounced for jokes that wereperceived as more offensive. This might suggest that – even if social power leadsto greater perceived funniness of jokes in general – the effect of social powermight be larger when jokes are more offensive. It should be noted, however, thatwe did not find a significant interaction between social power and type of joke inExperiment, which one would have expected if our suggestion holds. Futurestudies could examine this interesting question in more detail to arrive at moreconclusive answers.

In our present research is that we relied on only one experimental manip-ulation of power. Although previous research has demonstrated that an episodicpriming task yield the exact same effects as those obtained using other manip-ulations of power (Anderson & Galinsky 2006; Galinsky et al. 2003), futurestudies on the relation between power and humor could include differentmanipulations of power (e.g., structural or role-based manipulations of power).

In our second experiment, we did not obtain a moral hypocrisy effect. Therecould be several reasons for this lack of effect. For instance, in the research of




Lammers et al. (2010) – on which we based our hypothesis concerning powerand moral hypocrisy – cheating, breaking the speed limit, tax fraud, and steal-ing were used as moral transgressions. Perhaps telling offensive jokes was notconsidered as a clear moral transgression and therefore no moral hypocrisyeffect was found. Furthermore, in our research we assessed the inappropriate-ness of the jokes itself and not the moral evaluation of telling an offensive joke.In other words, we might not have assessed the most relevant variable to find amoral hypocrisy effect. Future studies could include an assessment of howacceptable it is for oneself or for another person to tell a specific offensivejoke. This would be, in retrospect, a better test for the existence of a moralhypocrisy effect in the context of offensive jokes.

The present research, in our view, provides an excellent starting point for amore extended examination of the effects of power on humor and we hope thatour experiments will spark more studies on this intriguing topic. For example,future studies could provide more insights in the impact of the characteristics ofthe individual who tells an offensive joke or the characteristics of the individualan offensive joke is being told to (e.g., group membership, status). It is con-ceivable that the former characteristics influence the perceived inappropriate-ness of an offensive joke, whereas the latter influences one’s willingness to tellan offensive joke. Furthermore, studies could investigate the extent to whichpower holders believe others to share their view on offensive humor. In otherwords, do power holders realize that others might consider inappropriate whatthey find humorous? To test this, one could manipulate the extent to whichparticipants viewed the jokes through their own perspective or the perspective ofsomeone else. Earlier research (Galinsky et al. 2006; Overbeck and Droutman2013) has indicated that power holders’ view of others is heavily anchored ontheir own attitudes, therefore one could predict that a self versus other perspec-tive matters less for powerful than for powerless individuals.

Although we used Benign Violation Theory as a theoretical framework for ourpresent research, we do not suggest that our findings are at odds with othertheories on humor, for example, incongruity theories. Benign Violation Theory is arecent theory on humor and more specific research is needed to examine whetherand when this theory contributes above and beyond other theories on humor.

5 Conclusions

In our introduction we raised the question whether the psychological state ofsocial power influences the appraisal and perceived funniness of offensive jokes.




By demonstrating that individuals in a state of high power evaluate offensivejokes as funnier research through decreasing the perceived inappropriateness ofthese jokes, we have provided not only a positive answer to this question butalso important insight in the underlying mechanisms through which socialpower affects humor.

References

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Appendix

6 examples of the 21 Jokes used in Experiment 1

Disability jokes. “What do you call a leper in a box? A do-it-yourself kit!”;“How do know when someone with Down syndrome is standing on a levelsurface? When he slavers equally from both corners of his mouth!”

Ethnicity jokes. “What is the difference between a Jew and a pizza? A pizzadoesn’t scream in the oven!”; “What do you call a negro with bone cancer? AnAero candy bar!”

Gender jokes. “Why do men love women with small hands? Because thentheir dicks look bigger!”; “Two blond girls are having a conversation. One girl istelling the other that this morning she performed a pregnancy test. Then theother girl asks: ‘Did it contain difficult questions?’”

4 examples of the 12 Jokes used in Experiment 2

Disability joke. “Doctor says to a sick man: ‘Your illness is terminal. It doesn’ttake long before you die. I can only advise you a mud bath.’ Sick man: ‘A mudbath? But would that not help at all?’ Doctor: ‘No, but then you can already getused to the earth.’”

Ethnicity joke. “Who invented the triathlon? A Turk: He went by foot to theswimming pool and came back with a bike!”




Gender jokes. “Why can’t a woman save money? Have you ever seen apiggy bank with a slit on the underside?”; “Why did Moses wander for 40 yearsin the desert? Because men never ask for directions!”

Bionotes

Hans Knegtmans

Hans Knegtmans is Assistant Professor of Psychology at the Department of Social andOrganizational Psychology at Leiden University. His main research area is the appreciation andthe use of humor. He is also a literary critic on crime fiction He can be reached [email protected].

Wilco W. van Dijk

Wilco van Dijk is Professor of Psychology at the Department of Social and OrganizationalPsychology at Leiden University. His research areas are emotions, decision making, andeconomic psychology. He can be reached at [email protected].

Marlon Mooijman

Marlon Mooijman is a postdoctoral research fellow at the Management and OrganizationsDepartment at the Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University. His research areasare ethics and morality. He can be reached at [email protected]

Nina van Lier, Sacha Rintjema, and Annemieke Wassink

Nina van Lier, Sacha Rintjema, and Annemieke Wassink are alumni of Leiden University, allthree with a MSc. in psychology.




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