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Director ofCenhalIntelligence

Nationol Intelligence Estimate

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Prospects for Bosniaf]I

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This Nationol InteWigencc Estimote representsthe views of thc Director of C-entral Intelligencewith thc advice ond assistonce of theUS Intelligence C-ommunity,

NrE 93-22May 1993

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Prospects for Bosn

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May 1993

Director ofCentralIntelligence

NIE 93-22

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Figure IThe UN Proposal and Controlled Areas in Bosnia and Herzegoryl

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Key Judgments

The Vance-Owen Plan holds little prospect of preserving a unitaryBosnia in the long run:

. The agreement runs afoul of the conflicting territorial goals of Serbs,Croats, and Muslims.

. Serbs and Croats will consolidate their military gains regardless ofboundary adjustments agreed to under international negotiation.

. Bosnian Muslims expect that Serbia and Croatia will try to absorbcontiguous portions of a fragmented Bosnia and can be expected toresist stronglv.[.--l

The warring parties doubt that the international community has thewill to undertake major military operations and sustain the long-termpresence necessary to preserve a multiethnic Bosnia. They will test thisresolve at every opportunity but probably will avoid large-scale, directattacks on UN forces.

None of the parties can match a NATO-led force operating under rulesof engagement that allow all necessary means to enforce the Plan.Under such circumstances, assuming early challenges were met withforce, fighting would be reduced and humanitarian problems mitigat-ed. But terrorist campaigns are possible within and outside the formerYugoslavia. Even a single attack could cause a large number ofcasualties.l ,

International military operations in Bosnia under ariy plan will be ,

difficult to organize and deploy:

Issues of command and control, rules of engagement, levels of troopcontributions, and cost sharing remain unresolved.

While capable of making modest additional contributions, NATOallies would expect the United States to commit a major share oftroops to an international forcc, as well as logistic, strategic lift, andintelligence support.

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. UN forces will have to supervise 4nd enforce demilitarization andtroop withdrawals and monitor heavy weaponry, internal routes, andexternal frontiers.

. UN forces also will have to assume major responsibilities for refugeesand displaced persons, civil administration, and rebuilding efforts inthe areas they occupy.l i

'Regardless of any decision to undertake military operations against theBosnian Serbs, Western governments will continue diplomatic effortsto end the fighting. If such efforts fail, the fighting will continueindefinitelyf _]

Most likely, the warring parties as well as the international communityare headed toward variants of the Vance-Owen Plan that will notpreserve a multiethnic state: UN safehavens for Muslims perhapsleading to a rump Muslim-dominated state, Muslim entities associatedwith Croatia, or de facto UN protected zones throughout Bosnia.l _l

Developments in Bosnia are closely related to broader regional stabil-ity. Outbreaks of violence in Croatia, Macedonia, or Kosovo coulddestroy a fragile Bosnian arrangement and imperil UN forces. Like-wise, large-scale international intervention in Bosnia could encouragevarious elements to provoke fighting and appeal for armed supportfrom UN troops, thus expanding the war outside Bosnia.

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iscussion

What Vance-Owen Would AccomplishWestern governments are likely to continuethe diplornatic process, whether or not mili-tary measures are taken against the BosnianSerbs. The approaches contained in theVance-Owen Plan, however, hold little pros-pect of stabilizing the region, even if interna-tional pressure brings about Bosnian Serbagreement to the Plan. Events on the groundare likely to drive the parties and the inter-national community toward outcomes thatwill not preserve a multiethnic Bosnia{---l

If Bosnian Serbs approve the Vance-OwenPlan, a large international military effortcould reduce the level of fighting, improvethe delivery of humanitarian aid, and protectthe remaining Muslim population of Bosnia.These objectives are achievable only as longas the United States and other contributorsmake a large, open-ended comrnitment ofmilitary ground forces rivaling in scale andduration the postarmistice effort in Korea bythe United Nations. A UN effort would alsoprovide the basis for a more gradual, lessviolent dissolution of the Bosnian sta te, adissolution that the Intelligence Cornmunitybelieves is likely in any case.

Full Cornpliance Is UnlikelySerbian President Milosevic takes seriouslythe prospect of tightened sanctions and possi-ble airstrikes on Serbia, as demonstrated byhis failed attempt to push the Bosnian SerbAssembly into endorsing the Vance-OwenPlan. He is prepared to use pressure onSerbia-including restricting the flow ofweapons, fuel, and other supplies-so long as

it prevents the West from acting forcefully oruntil the Bosnian Serbs sign on to Vance-Owen:

o Sealing the border completely will be diffi-cult, and its military and economic irnpactwill be not be immediate. The IntelligenceCommunity has begun rnonitoring the Ser-bian-Bosnian border. Initial observationsindicate that traffic has tapered off at thatborder, but some goods continue to movefrom the former Yugoslavia to Bosnia andwe are not yet certain of the full extent ofcompliance.

o Milosevic's willingness to make good histhreats to seal the border will depend onhow credible Western resolve appears, howmuch compliance the West demands, andhow vulnerable he believes he is to threatsfrom domestic ultranationalists opposed to

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his effort to force Bosnian Serb acceptanceof Vance-Owen. In any case, sorne Serbianofficials will not fully comply. Should Bos-nian Serbs face a dire threat, Milosevicwill undoubtedly help them.[__]

Although there is still a chance that BosnianSerbs may join Bosnian Croat and Muslimauthorities in approving the Vance-OwenPlan, the goal of preserving Bosnia as asingle, decentrali zed state runs counter tothe long-term Serb objective of absorbinglarge parts of Bosnia. Moreover, none of theparties can be trusted to act in good faith:

. Serbs, Muslirns, and Croats in Bosniadoubt that the international communitywill be willing to sustain the burden of thelong-term military occupation necessary toirnplement the Plan.

o The Bosnian Serbs almost certainly willattempt to consolidate their military gainsin territory not assigned to them under thePlan.

. The Bosnian Croats have little interest inpreserving Bosnia and are content to main-tain their grip on western Herzegovina.While willing to support an independentBosnian state, Zagreb increasingly viewsBosnia-Her zegovina as unviable and wouldbe happy to absorb parts of it should it fallapart. In any case, Croatia will allow theSerbs to bear the blame for continuing theconflict.

o Demoralized by the failure of Vance-Owento create a strong multiethnic central gov-ernment, Muslim fighters will resist movesby Serbia and Croatia to absorb the re-maining parts of a fragmented Bosnia.

All sides will scrutinize the behavior of UNforces to determine their resolve. An earlytest will be whether Bosnian Serb forceswithdraw from areas assigned to the BosnianGovernment that the Athens agreement des-ignates for UN occupation, such as thenorthern corridor. Unless a substantial inter-national force is deployed rapidly and dem-onstrates a willingness to use force, allsides-especially the numerous irregularmilitary units, acting independently or inconcert with national contingents-will tryto subvert the terms of the Plan:

o Serbs are likely to mount periodic guerrillaand sabotage operations against UNforces. They may also threaten the civilianpopulation and take hostages.

. The Muslims and rernnants of governmentforces will be tempted to create violentincidents that could be blamed on theSerbs or the Croats.

o Demilitarization provisions almost certain-ly will require seizing heavy weapons anddisarming combatants. Few UN membersare willing to commit their forces to thistask.

. Each party will try to hide as much weap-onry as possible. The Serbs and Croats arelikely to move weapons to their respectiveprovinces to avoid UN monitoring.

. Repewed ethnic conflict in Bosnia andelsewhere in the formef Yugoslavia willflare up, with UN troops caught in themiddle.[--l

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The Military ChallengeUN forces are almost certain to face situa-tions requiring the use of force, most likelyshort of rnajor combat operations. Attackswill consist mainly of sniper fire, hit-and-runattacks on convoys and bases, and mining oftransport routes. However, even a singleisolated attack on UN forces could cause alarge number of casualties and sap the re-solve of participants to remain engaged. Thelevel of fighting will vary throughout Bosnia,depending on how well senior military com-manders of all warring factions can or wantto control local units:

o If the UN continues to operate as it hasin Bosnia-that is, limiting the use offorce to self-defense-local factional com-manders will tolerate aggressive behaviorby their units and defeat the Plan'simplementation.

r If the UN permits troops to exercise "allnecessary means," including the use offorce, the various factions rnost likely willternporarily moderate their behavior. Theshelf life of this moderation will depend oncontinuing and consistent UN willingnessto employ force and on the success ofdemilitarization.

. The draft UN resolution authorizes "use ofall necessary means" to implement Vance-Owen proposals, but it is unclear howvarious UN contingents will apply theserules of engagement. The UN probablywill approve rules of engagernent permit-ting preemptive action-similar to therules adopted in Somalia-largely in orderto ensure participation of a large contin-gent of US ground troops.[--l

Tecret

A UN force-particularly heavily armoredunits-would have difficulty maneuvering inBosnia's rugged terrain and probably wouldhave to adopt counterinsurgency tacticsagainst a guerrilla resistance. British,French, and US forcesi the main contribu-tors to a Vance-Owen troop packago, arewell trained and experienced in counterinsur-gency tactics. Other potential contributorsmay not be as capable, however, which couldlimit their usefulness. [---lLong-Term ChallengesThe modifications to the Vance-Owen Planreached in Athens indicate that efforts toimplement a settlement will be underminedby protracted negotiations over boundaryadjustments and population resettlement.For example, each party is likely to interpretto its own advantage the provision that UNforces replace combatant troops protectingvillages in which their conationals form amajority:

. The Serbs most likely will claim that areasdesignated for UN protection be demarcatedaccording to their current ethnic composi-tion, including ethnically cleansed easternBosnia. !

o The Bosnian Government, however, willdemand that the l99l census (which wasthe basis of the Vancs-Owen Plan) beaccepted as the justification for demarca-tion. (s Nr)

UN forces will face major problems withcontinuing population movements. Even ifhostilities cease and transportation routesopen uF, tens of thousands of refugees willtry to move into regions under the control of

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Armed Forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina

We estimate that fishting forcesinEosni,aconsist of about 60,000 to 80,000 predom-inantly Muslim troops in the Bosnianarmy, 50,000 to 75,:000 troops tn theBosnian Serb Army (BSA), and 40,000 to50,000 combatants in the CroatianDefense Forces. Irregular forces probablyinclude about 25,000 Serbs, 50,000Muslims, and 40,000 Crootians.l-l

The most potent military threat to UNforces would come from the BSA, tf therewere a political decision by Bosnian Serbleaders to organize a militafy resistance.The BSA is the best organized andequipped armed force in Bosnia and Her-zegovina and will remain a threat untildemilttarized. In the unlikely event thatthe entire BSA did resist, however, itwould be no match for srfficientlymanned and equipped NATO-led forces.Under a sustained attack, the Army'sresistance would be reduced to attacks bysmall units and bands of Serb partisans.BSA supplies, in addition to small-scalearms smuggltng across the border in Ser-bta, would permit'these bands to conductlow-leuel partisan warfare for an extendedtime.l--l

Croatian Defense Forces (HVO) consoli-dated a loose collection of Croatian Dem-ocratic Union activists, local citizens, ex-Territorial Defense Forces personnel, andformer Yugoslav Army officers andtroops. The HVO ts principally responsi-ble for defending Croat areas of Herzegbvina, but it lacks heavy weapons, logisticsupport, and an effective command struc-ture, However, allied with the CroatianArmy, the HYO could hold off BosnianSerbs indertnitely in the'regions lt nowoccupies in Bosnia.l

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The Muslim-dominated Bosnian army isnumerically equivalent to the BSA but fsinferior to it in heavy weapons (tanks,APCs, and artillery) by at least an orderof magnitude. It can neither hold its terri-tory against determined Serb offensivesnor retake lost ground. A c:ease-frre andthe deployment of troops would reducepressure on the Bosnian army, whichmight try to occupy areas vacated by theretreating BSA units. The Bosnian armymight also conduct gaerrilla attacks onSerb forces. Should UN forces try to stopthis activity, the Muslims might respondviolently, while trying to place blame onthe Serbs

their respective ethnic groups. Clashes be- UN forces will also have to assume responsi-tween returning refugees and members of bility for civil administration, humanitarianother ethnic groups are likely. UN forces relief, and rebuilding infrastructure in theprobably will be expected to provide humani- areas they occupy, pending agreement on atarian assistance and overall security for new government for Bosnia.flpcrsons seeking resettlement and those de-ciding to remain in place. The Plan is muteon this point.--l

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A Limited European CommitnrentAlthough most NATO allies have forcesthey could contribute to UN operations, theywill link the size of any additional troopcontributions for Bosnia to the dimensions ofcommitted US ground forces. They believethat 25,000 to 40,000 US ground troops willbe required to fill out the force of 70,000 to80,000 troops that NATO planners deemnecessary. In the Allies' view, a significantlysmaller commitment of US forces would cast

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doubt on Washington's staying power andfail to provide sufficient manpower. [--lThe Allies face legal, resourco, political, andhistoric constraints that will limit their will-ingness to cornmit significant ground forcesto any Bosnian operation. The bulk of theaddiiional European contribution will haveto come from France and Britain, but bothare hard pressed to provide trained manpow-er beyond levels already comrnitted. Other

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Whatb Expected of the Warring Parties

The Vance-Owen Plan calls for a cease-fire within 7 2 hours of the passage of aUN implementing resolution. Each side isthen obligated to:

Avoid forward deployme:nts or offensiveactions.

o Exchange information on the size andlocation of forces, defensive works, andheavy weapons.

. Withdraw heavy weapons from corfrictQreas.

o Withdraw forces from ddensive posi-tions to designated provinces

. Open free passage routes for UN forces,civilians, and humanitarian aid.

. Guarantee the restoration of civil ad-ministration[---l

Implementing the Vance-Owen Plan willrequire international forces to oversee

the disengagement, disarmament, andeventual demobilization of the combat-ants in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The roleof an expanded UN force will be to:

. Supen ise force withdrawals and moni-tor redeployment of heavy weapons todesignated areas.

. Establtsh and patrol demarcation linesand checkpoints between opposing forces.

Monitor external borders to prevent theentry af troops, arms, or military equip-ment.f-----l

Additional UN responsibilities, based on"clai,rtfications" agreed to at the Athensmeeting, would require internattonalforces to occupy areas vacated by with-drawing Bosnian Serb forces and the pblicing of a Serb corridor running througha Croatian-controlled province in northernBosnia.f---l

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Figurc 3. "Call the Americans and ask whatthey intend doing about all this!"[-l

Inoking Ahead to DissolutionBosnian Serbs and Croats expect Bosnia-Herzegovina to fall apart regardless ofWestern efforts to implement a negotiatedsettlement. For now, they may be willing totolerate a rump central government inMuslim-controlled areas, but Belgradewould oppos e a state that harbored revanch-ist sentiments against Serbs. Serbia is alsodetermined to prevent linkages betweenBosnian Muslims and Sandzak Muslims.Because of heightened Croat-Muslim ten-sions, Croatia will oppose Muslim efforts toacquire weaponry in quantities large enoughto threaten Croatian areas in Bosnia. [_]The Muslirns will be embittered by Westernlack of support for the government's defenseeffort, indifference to the collapse of thepeace process, or a diplomatic process thatleads to the partition of Bosnia. They wouldview UN reluctance to roll back Serb territo-rial gains as a betrayal by the West, whichrecognized the Bosnian state and admitted itto the UN a year ago. Terrorist attackswould probablv occur inside and outside theformer Yugoslavia. Serbian- or Croatian-ledterrorist attacks would be less likely if itbecame clear that UN forces have no inten-tion of fully implementing the Vance-OwenPlan.[--_-l

We believe that all the protagonists andWestern parties have moved incrementallyaway from the original Plan and will movefurther toward less ambitious concepts.Modifications of the Plan already concededto the Muslims in exchange for their signa-ture and to the Serbs at the Athens meetingportend further demands for changes by allsides. Redefining the initial goals of theVance-Owen Plan, however, will strain coali-tion cohesiveness and diminish the credibility

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Allies, including Spain and the Netherlands,have expressed a willingness to contributemodest additional forces. [-lMajor issues remain unresolved in NATCmilitary and political consultations, includ-ing member participation, the level of na-tional force commitrnents, cost sharing, andthe rules of engagement. US assistance instrategic lift and intelligence assets will beessential. Command and control will contin-ue to be a thorny problern within the UN andNATO. UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali insists on UN authority over anyoperation. NATO authorities will oppose ex-tending this beyond political supervision andwill seek wide latitude over operations.l

Contingent on the necessary command andcontrol arrangements, NATO has agreed toconvene a group to facilitate the participa-tion of non-NATO countries in planning theimplementation of the Vance-Owen agree-ment. Additional forces might be availablefrom East Europe, Ukraine, and Russia, butthey would pose both political and militaryburdens. The UN almost certainly will seekto include Islamic and other non-Europeanstates. Such participation will increase com-rnand and control problems and run intoresistance frorn the Serbs and perhaps theCroats.[----_l

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of Western resolve.f----l

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Country Ctrrrent Ground Forces I :kely Additional CrnHbution

Francc 4r'l90 2,0m - 5,000

United Kingdom 1ffi 2,000 - 5,(x)0

C-anada ?.5s9 500

Denmark 1,107 100 - 300I

Netherlands 1,020 500 - 1,000

Belgium 989 300

Spain 930 20G5m

Russia r8 400 - 1,000

Poland 870 2W

Czccb Rcpublic 478 rm

Noruray 427 100

Ukraine 4m 400

Sweden 256 1,000

Finland 216 r00

Slovalcia t20 0

hxemboug 4l 0

Pornrgal 30 0

Tlukey 0 0

Italy 0 0

Total 17,7Sg 7,9(Xl - 15500

Figure 4Curreht and Likely Eumpean Ground Force Commitnentsin the Former Yugoslavia I

"Tte Europeans also have a snall number of troops in Serbia the combatants and personnel on AWACS monitoring the no0yad Goatia as Europcan Community monitors and airseun zone over Bosnia. Flnally, tbe Britidr and the Frerrch haveffying rclief supplies to Goatia and Bocoia Morcover, thc some ships on standby in thc Adriatic to evaoratc their forccsAllics also have uaval warshipe in tbc Adriatic as part of NATO . if neccssaryand WEU taskforccs monitori4g the ban onarmsshipoents to

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The gradual modification of the Vance-Owen proposals suggests at least three possi-ble outcomes. All would require a largeinternational military presence and the ac-quiescence, if not agreement, of all parties toborder changes and population movements.

UN-Sponsored Safehayens or Eventually aRump Muslim StateUN Security Council resolutions designatingSrebrenica, Sarajevo, and other cities asprotected areas is a step in this direction butstill requires operational clarification. Alarge international presence. would ensure asemblance of Bosnian Muslirn control, facili-tate humanitarian assistance, and keep Ser-bia and Croatia at arm's length-but at acost of supplying military and financial sup-port indefinitely. Belgrade would remain sus-picious of Muslim intentions toward theSandzak; Croatia would fear both renewedSerbian incursions and a rearmed Muslimpopulation. The current Bosnian Govern-ment would be placed in limbo. These tem-porary safehavens could lead over time to arump Muslim-dominated state that would beheavily dependent on UN military protectionand Western assistance.l

Muslim Entities Affiliated With CroatiaAffiliation of Muslim areas to Croatia pro-vides a rnore feasible arrangement than long-

' term international protected areas. Despitefrictions between Muslims and Croatians,President lzetbegovic has discussed "confe-deration" between Bosnia and Croatia onseveral occasions. Under such an arrange-ment, Croatia would provide the Muslimsprotection from the Serbs. The Croats wouldgain access to Bosnia's mineral resources andprovide the Muslims protection against theSerbs while viewin g a Muslim client state as

a buffer against future Serbian aggression.Nonetheless, mutual Muslim-Croat distrustwill most likely exacerbate tensions andwould make implepentatlon of this arran ge-

rnent problematic. | |

The Rrssf an Problem

Russf a has expressed concern about the"restricted" command structure for theproposed operation to implement theVance-Owen Plan and the possibilitythat Russl an forces would be subordi-nated to NATO. Moscow believes thatUN authorities must have more thannominal operational control and thatthe UN should establish a commandstructure that includes all the majorcontributing countries. Rrrssf an officiolshave urged U^S-R ussian consultationsand suggested using the North AtlanticCooperation Council, which links EastEuropean countries and former Sovietrepublics to NATO, as a forum forplanning operations:

. Russi an ofrcials across the politicalspectrum suspect that NATO forceswould be used only against the Bosni-an Serbs.

The Foreign Ministry probably be-Iieves that UN contral of operationswould ease Russf an military reluc-tance to participate and would under-cut domesttc critictsm that Moscow isselling out to the West.l

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De Facto UN Protected AreasUnder another variant, the parties mightrequest UN protected zones for their disput-ed areas. As in the Croatian case, BosnianSerbs are likely to refuse to permit the returnof areas they occupy to Muslim control. InAthens, Bosnian Serb leaders insisted thatUN.forces repl ace their forces withdrawirigfrom eastern Bosnia. Under this scheme,they would hope to consolidate administra-tion by local Serbs and eventually to secureformal international acceptance of their au-thority. Sirnilarly, Bosnian Croats and Mus-lims might resist relinquishing territory toSerbs or to each other unless it were part of ageneral land swapi i

Bosnia and Regional InstabilityIn the absence of an internationally super-vised settlement, fighting will continue indeFinitely. Even with an agreement, the Bosnian

situation will remain vulnerable to develop-ments elsewhere in the former Yugoslavia.Outbreaks of violence in Croatia, Kosovo, orMacedonia would jeopa rdize the fragilecease-fire, strain UN_gpgI4lions, and threat-en regional stabilitv.l

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Likewise, a larger UN operation in Bosniarisks encouraging various elernents in neigh-boring states to use force to achieve theirgoals. The Croatian Government reportedlyplans to attack Croatian Serbs in the event ofa Western military intervention in Bosnia.Albanian radicals in Kosovo also reportedlyhope to take advantage of a Western militarypresence in the area by fomenting an upris-ing against the Serbs. Such elernents arclikely to provoke fighting and then appeal forarmed support frorn Western troops{---l

SduGL

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TYarning Notice

Nationat SecurityInformation

Unauthorized DisclosureSubject to Criminal Sanctions

Information eveilable es of 14 May 1993 wtlt rnedin the preprration of this Natioml Intelligence Estimate.

The following intelligence organizetions parti cipatedin the of this Estimate:

The Central Intelligence AgencyThc Dcfense Intelligence AgencyThe National Security AgencyThe Bureau of Intelligence and Research,Department of State

also participating:

The Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence,Department of the ArmyThe Director of Naval Intelligence,Department of the NavyThe Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence,Department of the Air ForceThe Director of Intelligence,Headquarters, Marine Corps

This Estimate was approved for publication by theNational Foreign lntelligence Board.

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