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MODERN AGEA QUARTE RL Y REVI EW

Reason and Faith:The Fallacious Antithesis

G E R H A R TALF RE DNORTHW H I T E H E A Domewheredescribed evil as the brute motive force offragmentary purpose. If one wondersabout purpose, one would hardly gowrong to impute to Whitehead a conceptwhich, like Augustines concept of will,embraces affect, imagination andmemory, with striving. If this be valid,fragmentary purpose would be an aspectof fragmentary reality. The antonym offragmentary purpose we take to besomething like wholeness of purpose, orwholeness of reality. One is reminded ofa similar description of heresy which alsocenters on the fragmentary kind ofheretical belief Nearly every heresy is aone-sided and exaggerated expression ofsome truth. The heretic sees one side oftruth very clearly indeed, and refuses tobelieve that there are other sides. He takesa statement which is symbolic, treats it as ifit were a literal fact, and proceeds to buildan argument about it, as if he knew allabout it.(Claude B. Moss, The ChnjtiunFaith, London, S.P.C.K., 1965, p. 48 f.)

These remarks are made so that I mayenter, at one particular point, into afragmentary discussion of a huge subjectthat properly requires treatises merely forthe definition of its terms: faith andreason. The difficulty of definition is

N I E M E Y E R

augmented in this essay as I shall argueagainst an antithetical separation of thetwo but must yet make a distinction. Do wecall reason that which the human mind,left to itself spells out to explain to itselfthe world? Defined that way, the works ofthe human mind would necessarily includethose of the myth-making faculty, andthus all but the few higher religions. I talso would include the natural theologyof the philosophers or philosophicalsystems, not only Plato and the Stoa, butalso Plotinus. thusit becomes impossible todraw a line between reason and faith alongthe boundary between the natural and thesupernatural. Hence, if we insist on start-ing out from a sharply antithetical notionof reason vs. faith, we find ourselves com-pelled to locate it in the positivistic fact-value dichotomy with its initial decision todo without God, and to submit to the ob-ject. In other words, the antithesis as suchis very recent, and very, very young indeed.To reason, defined as objectivism, faithwould necessarily stand opposed as nothingbut a subjective preference. Werecognize in these terms a modem jargonsignalling to us that we are on familiar, butalso dangerously treacherous ground.Instead of making an argument inabstraction, I shall focus this essay primari-

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ly on two thinkers, Augustine and RichardHooker. Augustine is selected because he,first trained in Greek philosophy, and thenby Christ in Scripture, is the first thinkerin whom we can clearly trace what happenswhen one refuses to say either-or anddares say both-and. Richard Hooker,because he is the first thinker to recognize,and analyze as fragmentary an argumentfrom faith alone that will not stand the testof reason. Augustines thought can bedubbed meta-critical,Hookers as anti-ideological. Both thinkers can be said toachieve a wholeness of purpose, or ofconsciousness, in keeping with Whiteheadsdictum. Neither is presented here by wayof a contribution to specialist studies ofthese thinkers.

IA GENERALLY accepted assumption aboutAugustine says that he was strongly in-fluenced by Neo-Platonism and that heChristianized it as he worked it into his in-tellectual building. I prefer to take mypoint dappui with Rudolf Schneider, whoin the course of an intensive effort extend-ing over a quarter of a century, (D mwandelbare Sein, Frankfurt, Klostermann,1938; Seele und Sein, Ontologie beiAugustin und Aristoteles, Stuttgart,Kohlhammer, 1957) has definitivelyestablished: (a) that Augustines entirethought is shot through and through withontology even though he never establisheda system of ontology, and (b) thatAugustines ontology s wholly Aristotelian.It seems that Augustine, who of Aristotlesworks read only The Categories, obtainedhis knowledge of Aristotelian philosophy nthe schools of Carthage, and from his lec-ture of Cicero. At any rate, all of Aristotlesimportant ontological concepts can befound in Augustines de tnnitate, decivitate Dei, de genesi ad l itteram, and inhis controversy with Julian of Eclanum, notto speak of many other works. Schneiderslater book focuses on the soul, a topic inwhich all important ontological conceptsplay a key role. Schneider shows that thefollowing conceptual elements of ontology

are common to Aristotle and Augustine:The anulogia entis, by virtue of whichboth thinkers distinguish between hierar-chical levels of being;potency and act, by virtue of which bothagree that a being having active andpassive potency cannot be pure act andthus cannot exist by itself;the categories;the transcendental qualities, for exam-ple, the concept of oneness (unum) usedvirtually as a synonym for a being com-posed of form and matter:the inner seme that apperceives thesituation of being, the norm, and the ap-

propriate action;the ground (aitia),entering into the on-tological structure of the soul as form, end,and movement, and into the general no-tion of composite beings;the sotena tou einai, which Augustinetranslates as both sal^ and esse comer-vare, and which we may render asrenewalof being orpreservation of being althoughsalvation of being would be literal:the concept of nature, comprising theprinciples of movement, essence, andessence-end-.movementThis list, while not full, suffices as a foil forpointing out Augustines further develop-ments by means of Scripture.We shall emphasize here chiefly the dif-ferences between Augustines andAristotles anthropology and theology,always keeping in mind the basic conceptsshared between the two. Aristotles an-thropology centers on the insight that man,composedof body and soul, form and mat-ter, depends on other beings for therenewal and preservation of hisbeing. Heneeds food to sustain the growth of hisform, and, after completion of the growth,.to sustain the continued existence of thedeveloped form. Thus in order to be hap-py, man requires external goods as well asgoods of the body. As he also needs goods

of the soul, he is dependent on thefellowship with other human beings to en-joy them. Still, Aristotle is aware that thecombination of form and matter cannot besecured indefinitely. While the f o rmis theruling element, matter retains a certain

4 Winter1981

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autonomy by virtue of which it outlasts thedestruction of the form. Hence man, tosave his being, must rely on procreation,saving human being through the species.Also man requires for hi s well-being apolitical association so that he may attainto the good life in which rulers and ruledcombined seek to save their being inassociation. To his gnawing concern withmans propensity to destruction Aristotleprovides two ultimate answers: (a) in a vir-tuous political order which fully developsthe potency of the human soul, in companywith others, man can attain what Aristotlecalls self-sufficiency, i. e. a deliverancefrom his ontic precariousness; and (b) evenbeyond this, man, striving to im-mortalize, may lift his mind to the con-templation of theaitia, the eternal things,in pure theonu, in which his human con-cerns with external goods and goods of thebody recede in importance, so that thethreat of changes and misfortunes seemsforgotten. These two constitute Aristotlesattempt to find solutions to the problemof mans ontic instability and dependence,solutions that seem to lie within humanpowers of attainment.

At this point Augustine carriesAristotles ontological insights consistentlyfurther, beyond Aristotles psychologicalconclusions and practical remedies. Hedoes this by introducing the concept ofmans mutable being, mutable as con-trasted with the actus purus of God.Mutability means, on the one hand, thatman is the one created being that also canconduct itself so as to change his nature forthe worse. Thus, where Aristotle sees main-ly the propensity of circumstances tochanges, and the likely turns of fortuneswheel, Augustine sees human life moreprofoundly insecure than that. To use themodem words of Romano Guardini in-stead of Augustines:. he existing orderof things, indeed of life itself seems butloosely, precariously balanced across thechaos of existence and its uncontrollableforces. All rules seem temporary, andthreaten to give way at any moment.Things themselves appear now shadowy,now ominous. Reality is by no means as

substantial as it may seem, and personalexistence, like all existence, is surroundedby and suspended over the powerful andperilous void.. .(M editations before Mass,Newman Press, Westminster, Md. 1955, p.192) With all his closeness to Aristoteliancategories and conceptual structures,Augustine draws from them a view that isworlds beyond the sun-lit cosmos of theStagirite. Sharing Aristotles insight thatthe renewal and preservation of being en-tails dependence on other beings (thingsand creatures), Augustine translates thisinto a general law of created being (essecum) and logically extends it to essentialdependence on the immutable being ofGod. It follows that, speaking ontological-ly, the salus, the salvation of mansprecarious being, can ultimately not be at-tained in this world of mutability. Aristo-tles self-sufficiencycan be realized not inthe polis, but only in a new life of unionwith God. Likewise, Augustine replacesAristotles contemplation (theonu), theforgetting of lifes care over the vision ofthe ai ti a, with mans peregrinatio, hispilgrimage to God. This implies more thana shift from a solution in the mind to asolution in the whole of life. It also means ashift from a static to an historical anddynamic principle. Yet those doubtlessjudge better who prefer to that knowledgethe knowledge of themselves: and thatmind is more praiseworthy which knowseven its own weaknes... for he has pre-ferred knowledge to knowledge, he haspreferred to know hisown weakness, ratherthan to know the walls of the world, thefoundations of the earth, and the pinnaclesof heaven. And by obtaining thisknowledge, he has obtained also sorrow(dolor);but sorrow for straying away fromthe desire of reaching his own proper coun-try, and the Creator of it....Visions havebeen sent to us from heaven suitable o ourstate of pilgrimage, in order to remind usthat whatweseek is not here, but that fromthis pilgrimage we must return thither,whence unless we originated we should nothere seek these things. (DeTnn. IV , 1- 2)Augustine does not discard the treasure ofAristotles contemplation, but realizes that

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pure contemplation will begin only at theend of that pilgrimage, where being isultimately delivered from any threat ofnothingness. Here roots Augustinespsychology, here his concept of will prom-inently involving the affects, memory andimagination, here also roots ultimately hi sChristology, all ontologically founded.Augustine has established the prevalenceof ontnlngy in Christian theology!(Schneider, Seele und Zed , 1.c. p. 31)

Theology is Augustines other great im-provement over Aristotle. Both Plato andAristotle, and not only they but Stoics andNeo-Platonists as well, had developedmore or less of a philosophical (natural)theology. Aristotles was confined to a fewbare outlines. His God is ac tus $urus andthus self-subsistent, and prime origin of allmovement. Plato, Aristotles teacher, hadknown more. He had more than once givenprofound and convincing accounts ofnoetical mystical experiences of theBeyond. Apart from psychology, however,quate. Aristotle does not see that, whenhe understands God as a being existing inhimself, everything outside God must in itsexistence and essence depend on God, ifthe concept of God is not to be mademeaningless.(ibid., p. 30) That leads tothe following appraisal of Augustine ascompared with Aristotle: Aristotle hasfailed to carry through his ontological in-sights in the other disciplines, systematical-ly and consistently. Augustine has proceed-ed much more systematically and con-sistent:y.(ibid., p. 31) The reason forAugustines greater powey of unity andprinciple lies in his biblical faith. Thatfaith, of course, did not come to him as thefruit of analysis and contemplation. All thesame, he accepted it and committedhimself not without regard to itsreasonableness.Thus Augustines conversion must havehad not only that deeply liberating per-sonal effect of which he tells us in the Con-fessions but also the effect of supplying forhis philosophy the other half, hithertomissing. Beginning with Aristotles primemover, he now sees further that God is

Aiistui:es is oi,iu~ag~-;ca~~yi 1d&

creator of everything, the origin of all ex-istence because he is existence itself, themaker of all essences, a good God whosecreated things are all good, a God who an-nihilates nothing but cares for, and saves,being. Thus to the total ancient philosophyAugustine adds a) the personal Cod, b) thegoodness of God andof all created natures,c) the Christian faith in the recovery of thebeyond temporal-spatial existence. Fur-ther, Augustine had learned through hisown experience that the situation of be-ing, the unum, must firstbe changed if oneis to attain to the knowledge of theuerum.Augustines great achievement in ontologyis his insight that the oneness of being hasprimacy before knowledge and will,- ninsight which in general theory was alreadyavailable before him.(ibid., p. 21)Even though Augustine boasts that hewas taught by Christ and not by Aristotleand Chrysippus he has no practical dif-ficulty of assimilating one to the other.Cnristian faith provided insights that couidnot be attained by philosophers on theirown, but fitted harmoniously withphilosophically secured truth. MortimerAdler has said: Philosophy produces ashell into which faith can be poured. I tmay be more accurate that philosophy pro-vides a structure in which faith finds con-firmation of its reasonableness, in turnproviding that structure with depth andheighth in which consciousness attainswholeness. Whiteheads wholeness of pur-pose certainly must include the concernswith vision of eternal things capable ofovercoming mans exclusive preoccupationwith short-range temporal purposes. Theproblem of faith and reason, however, isnot located at this point. The problem isfound in the way in which the philosopherarrives at the idea of God by way of infer-ring strong probabilities from his observa-tion of things seen and unseen. Theremust be...is what he says. There must bea prime mover, an ultimate One, aworkman-creator, a divinity beyond thegods of our fathers, and so on. God is aproduct of philosophic intuitive specula-tion. This is essentially belief. Belief also

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figures in religion, but religion movesbeyond belief to commitment, reliance,trust, and submission. Thus Augustine, infilling his works with scriptural quotations,even though his thought merged them withphilosophical structures, created for hisreaders the difficulty that they could notaccept the authority of Scripture except bya leap of faith, a personal risk which tothem might appear a betrayal of reason.Reason was taken for something all menhad in common, but faith as somethingcommon only to those who had personallycommitted themselves, and thus assomething subjective. Augustine himselfmade clear that praise of God is a re-quirement for that kind of knowledgewhich he had added to ancient philosophy.Faith and love, thanksgiving and praise,are personal as well as corporate acts,which, to those who for some reason will orcannot join, appear as illegitimate in-truders in the impersonal universe ofphilosophical reasoning and a false note inthe philosophical ideal of practical life ac-cording to Aristotles formula, delibera-tion without passion. Reason vs. faith,then, is a conflict not between two varietiesof belief, but rather between an intelligibleuniverse that opens up only as an in-dividual submits to it with praise andthanksgiving, and one that seems accessi-ble on no more of a risk than the accep-tance of its axioms.Two remarks can be made about this.The first rests on the findings of a modembook, that the supposed risklessness ofphilosophical and scientific thinking is anillusion, an illusion erected into a dogmaby objectivism in our modem age. Thebook is Michael Polanyis PersonalKnowledge (Univ. of Chicago Press, 1962).Polanyi proves in countless ways that thereis no such thing as the impersonal action ofthe object on the human mind, SO that ob-jectivism itself is a belief, and anunreasonable one at that. Rather, saysPolanyi, all knowledge involves an elementof intellectual passion, a tacit componentof previous beliefs, as well as a personalcommitment. Like the tool, the sign orthe symbol can be conceived as such only in

the eyes of a person who relies on them toachieve or signify something. This relianceisa personal commitment which is involvedin all acts of intelligence by which we i n-tegrate some things subsidianly to the cen-tre of our focal attention. Every act of per-sonal assimilation by which we make athing form an extension of ourselvesthrough our subsidiary awareness of it, is acommitment of ourselves.. ( o f i . cit.,This personal element, however, mustnot be confused with subjectivism.

I . . .personal knowledge in science is notmade but discovered, and as such claims toestablish contact with reality beyond theclues on which it relies. It commits us, pas-sionately and far beyond our comprehen-sion, to a vision of reality. Of this respon-sibility we cannot divest ourselves by settingup objective criteria of verifiability- orfalsifiability, or testability, or what youwill. For we live in it as in the garment ofour own skin. L ike love, to which it is akin,this commitment is a shirt of flame, blaz-ing with passion, and, also like love, con-sumed by a devotion to a universal de-mand. (ibid., p. 64). . this personal coef-ficient, which shapes all factualknowledge, bridges in doingso the disjunc-ti on between subjectivi ty andobjectivity.(ibid., p. 17) For myself, I wishthat Polanyi had chosen another term inlieu of passion. Henri Bergson,philosophizing in a similar vein, points toemotion as the source of all creation.Augustines wide-spanning concept oflove comes to mind; and a modem writermight well speak of the affects. All theseamount to what Polanyi means. Goingbeyond a mere analysis of the process ofknowledge, Polanyi severely criticizes theprinciple of moral and religious indif-ference which prevails throughout modemscience(p. 153) and insists that sciencecan then no longer hope to surviveon anisland of positive facts, around which therest of mans intellectual heritage sinks tothe status of subjective emotionalism.(p.134)The other remark must question thesubjectivism attributed to Augustine by

P. 61)

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those who find his Scriptural dependenceone which is invalid because they cannotpersonally share it. Augustine, saysRudolf Schneider, does not insist ex-clusively on the world of his own ex-periences, but believes firmly in the ex-istence of real, external being beyond allexperiences. Because there is being, therecan be experience. Because there is reality,27) To put it differently, Augustinebelieves in, and speaks of, the same realityas the philosophers. He might have invok-ed Bergsons distinction between theknowledge of the object. ..a knowledge at-tained by the intellect.. .that is sought forits utility to man, and which enables him tomanipulate matter, and thereby, to con-trol it and act upon it, and absoluteknowledge which does not move aroundits object but enters into it and which at-tains the absolute but, in order to do so,must be in sympathy with reality withoutany thought of relation or comparison.I nus I raii~yiasUIIIICIISIUIIS I I ICUwhich onemust enter with faith, praise, and worshipif one is to understand at all. Believe thatyou may understand; understand that youmay believe.(Augustine, Sermo 43, 7, 9and 118,l)There are dimensions of realitywhich must remain not only unintelligiblebut even unimaginable to the closed soul.The open soul, however, loving and prais-ing, while disciplined in virtue, will attaina width of vision in which its knowledge ofobjects is not denied but finally placed inthe fullnessof context.On the other hand nobody can deny thatAugustinesConf essi ons is a most subjectivework. I t had been called the firstautobiography. Wrongly, I believe, for themodern autobiography, on the model ofRousseau, penetrates into the self in isola-tion from the world, indeed, in hostilityagainst all that exists. By contrast, in hisConfessions Augustine describes themutation of his subjectivity to God.(Schneider, loc. cit, p. 20) The proof isthat he, through divine grace, rediscoveredan interest in the things of this world. Thepath to this point goes through theawareness and experience of the fallibility

there c a n he sub jec t iveness. . . (c,h. cit., p.

T L .. ...- 1 ! . - ~ 1 . - . A. - !... :~.

of external things and of virtue. Along thispath the interest in things is diminisheduntil i t is completely destroyed by despairso that there is left only the knowledge ofthe hopeless infirmitas. Through grace anew interest in the things is kindled andthey are seen in the way in which they arefrom God. The relation of God as uctilrpurus to the mutable world becomes theCent??! the--e 2nd t h e ne::. -.?s:cE cf mar:renewed by grace.(ibid., p. 48) One mustdistinguish here between the personalelements of religion and its public aspects.Augustine has portrayed his personal con-version and salvation. What he com-municated publicly, however, was the doc -trim chrzjtiunu, which results in generalassumptions commonly held, entering intoany human endeavor and awareness. Thisis what one may call Christian culture, apattern largely independent of personalreligious events, even though such eventscontinuously feed and develop t. Christianculture is not the same as the Church. TheCnurch, in turn, exists as a pubiic com-munity of praise and worship, of faith andlove, independent of whether every singleof its members isor is not a believing Chris-tian. In the same way Christian culture willlong survive the Christian convictions of in-dividual members. Its basic assumptionswill continue to govern much of humanthinking, feeling, knowing and acting evenwhen Christianity itself in its midst mayhave come under severe attack and, in-deed, disdain.One must expectr then, that Augustinesability to penetrate, with the love of theopen soul, into aspects of reality barred tothe critically closed soul, would bringabout a net increase of rationality in thetotal world view. Let us corroborate thisexpectation by means of three samples:Augustinesview of human nature, his con-cept of history, and his idea of the state.

I1

. .

SINCELATO ND ARISTOTLE,he conceptof nature, and especially that of humannature, has provided the chief norm for theorder of human life. The essence was taken

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as the ultimate ground of the innerpossibility, so that mans essence rules hismovement, i.e., his coming-to-be what heis. Reliance on nature as norm, however,led Plato to the remark that a city in accor-dance with human nature was not to befound on earth, but was laid up in heaven;while Aristotle despaired of finding a citywith a hundred fully developed, maturemen (spoudaioi) in it. Both Plato andAristotle, the former in TheLaws, the lat-ter in Books IV-VI of the Politics, werecompelled to speak of order in the midst ofperversion, where nature appeared as aconcept of scant relevance. Augustine, bycontrast, developed two concepts of humannature. The first describes human natureas it is from God, good in the proportionand hierarchical order of all its parts, andmeant to cleave to God for the security ofits being. The second concept is that ofhuman nature as vitiated by the sin ofdefection from God. Augustine saw man asthe only creature capable of changing hisnature, or rather, corrupting it, whichwould not be possible if his nature were notoriginally good. The result is a pervertednature, having become subject to inferiorforces, bad habits, and inner disunity.Fallen man is endemically disobedient notonly to God, but also to himself. Thevitiated nature, however, still has the en-durance of a form, albeit a form defectivein its false loves and bad dispositions.Augustines two concepts enable him to ac-count for the irrationalities of social andpolitical life on this earth, for thediscontents besetting all civilization. Hecan also refer the problem of inescapablefailure of even our best efforts to theperfection awaiting those who cleave toGod, without thereby committing himselfto a gnostic declaration of war on the worldof created things around US.Augustines concept of history wasperhaps his most incisive break with an-cient philosophy and culture. He perceivedthe contingency of the universe andthereby opened the gate for science.(Stanley L. Jaki) For the ancients, wholooked to nature for final ends, history waswithout meaning or order. On the other

hand, they considered the future predic-table, since augury and oracle containedkeys to its knowledge. Men relying on thisknowledge, however, again and againfound themselves misled, so that preciselywhere they looked for certainty they reapeda besetting insecurity. Tyche and Fortunawere powerful deities, but also notoriouslycapricious. Mans well-being in this worldwas subject to radical and lightning-fastturns of the wheel of history. Worse yet,the quest for the good state or the beststate seemed almost quixotic. In thewords of FrederickD. Wilhelmsen: Givena polity firmly based on an understandingof the structure of reality; given a compactnucleus of virtuous men heading this socie-ty and governing it according to good laws;given the ideal of virtue as a public goal act-ing as a leaven throughout the whole com-munity making good men better, indif-ferent men good, and bad men ashamed;given the material power and technologynecessary to maintain itself against all in-ternal and external enemies; given a levelof civilization incomparably superior tothat of the rest of the world; given all thesethings, and then add to them failure, not afailure unforeseen but one first adum-brated as the most remote and trivial ofpossibilities and later sensed as a realmenace which ought to be rejected as ab-surd and even indecent, and then addagain a failure now accepted as an in-evitable fatality whose sentence of deathcan only be postponed by rearguard tac-tics; given all this, and we are given a polityconfronted crudely and inexorably withthe powers of unintelligibility, the vacantstare of the absurd.(Chr&ianity andPolitical Philosophy,U. of Georgia Press,1978, p. 67)This is a conclusion which MarcusTullius Cicero, falling under themurderers steel, had to acknowledge withhis last breath. It also would have been theconclusion to which Romes sack by thebarbarians, in 410, would have driven apagan philosopher. For Augustine,however, the death of Jesus Christ on thecross, and his resurrection to eternal life,were the great light planted at the very

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center of apparent absurdity. Moved by hisfaith in the revealed meaning of Godsdeath, Augustine could see history as thegreat movement from the corruption ofmans being to its ultimate salvation, tomans deification in union with God. Thisalso made possible a concept of Pro-vidence, the humanly unknowable butpurposeful dispositions of a good creator-.A r ea UL *-- .~,. :__---._..I -irrationality thus vanished. A new sense offreedom resulted. The stars, in theirunalterable courses, did not, after all, im-placably control our destinies. Man, everyman, no matter who, had a direct link withthe Creator, the Ruler of the starsthemselves.. . It was no longer a small andselect company which, thanks to somesecret means of escape, could break thecharmed circle: it was mankind as a wholewhich found its night suddenlyillumined.... No more circle! No moreblind hazard! No more Fate! TranscendentGod, God the friend of men, revealed inJesus, opened for aii a way which nothingwould ever bar again.(Henri de Lubac,The Drama of Atheist H umanism, Meri-dian Book, 1963, p. 5) The future, onceconsidered predictable by magic anddeceptive means, now appeared open, itspossibilities a human responsibility, itsultimate outcome in the hands of a God ofLove. The future is open, and it is Gods.Nor was any speculation on the basis of ascriptural numbers game allowed to takethe place of faith and Christian patience.The whole of history is intelligible becauseit moves toward an ultimate eschatologicalgoal of divine justice and fulfillment.Augustines dea of the state ranks withhis double concept of human nature as oneof the greatest achievements ever inpolitical thought. A radical Christianother-worldliness would have echoed Ter-tullians view: Thus there is nothing morealien from us than public affairs. A super-ficial reading may suggest that this was alsoAugustines view. For he distinguished be-tween two principles of human association:...two cities have been formed by twoloves: the earthly by the love of self, even tothe contempt of God: the heavenly by the

u l l u I L . u L . c I ~ I b ~VU. I A L J LW y J uuy cucu avic

love of God, even to the contempt of self.The former, in a word, glories in itself, thelatter in the Lord. Neither is the earthlycity identical with the state, however, northe heavenly with the Church. They arewhat in modern jargon is calledlife-styles, diametrically opposed. Theirmutual exclusiveness, however, does notspell civil war. The state is instituted tokeep z peaceaiid aii o i d ~lia1 is common-ly good for both of these groupings. Thestate, then, is homogeneous neither inreligious nor in moral terms. Neither canthe faithful of God dictate terms of highestvirtue, nor can the mass of egotists writetheir vices into law. This means that underno circumstances can the state be aparadigm of perfection, not even in theory.On the other hand, it cannot be con-sidered a matter of indifference by Chris-tians. As a framework of peace, it con-stitutes the highest common good on thisearth. As composite as each individualperson, the state has no power to exist initseii. i t remains beset by tendenciestoward failure and nothingness. But evenin the wretchedness of alienation fromGod, Augustine finds the possibility ofpeace, i.e., order and justice. Just ashuman nature, vitiated by sin, stillmanifests an order, even in perversion, sothe state, populatedbygood and evil at thesame time, operates under a law of orderwhich Augustine spells out in the greatchapters 12-17, and 24, of Book XIX ofthe City of God. Substituting for Cicerosunduly idealizing concept of a people (anassembly of rational beings where conceptsof true justice are acknowledged) a better,because more empirical concept (anassemblage of reasonable beings boundtogether by a common agreement on theobjects of their love), Augustine likewisemoves the concept of the state to theground of realism. The state, in keepingpeace and order, is the most importantworldly institution in which all Christiansshould fully cooperate. Not being bornfrom a community in the highest virtuesnor even from one of the highest aspira-tions, the state, in keeping peace andorder, is not performing a task of salvation.

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The highest destiny of man lies beyond thestate, because it cannot be attained inspace or time, or even by human powersalone. It will come by Gods grace, beyondhistory and death. In his political theory,then, Augustine is not writing with the penof theology. Cast in wholly ontologicalterms which are adapted to this-worldlyrealism by introducing the concept oforiginal sin, Augustines political orderspeaks to all, believers and non-believersalike. Realizing that the state, comprisingwithin itself morally mixed company, cannever amount to human perfection,Augustine has created the concept of thelimited state, which has remained ahallmark of Western civilization.

I11AUGUSTI NEAS the first philosopher tosucceed in combining knowledge attainedby virtue of faith in revelation withknowledge attained by the criticaldiscipline of philosophical intellect. Eventhough critical philosophy as we know itcame into existence only in modem times,one may well call Augustine the first post-critical thinker, who methodically anddeliberately explored the relation betweenfaith and reason in the wholeness of con-sciousness. If we now turn to RichardHooker, we do so because we find in himanother kind of discovery regarding thatrelation. His writing was prompted byfinding in the 16th century EnglishPuritans, and their Admonition to Parlia-ment of 1572, a kind of consciousness thatwas feeding on faith while disregarding oreven abandoning the bond of reason. Itwas Hookers achievement to haverecognized and analyzed this as a type offragmentary consciousness, an awarenesswhich should have, but did not, come fromthe authorities of the Church of England.Hooker, a relatively obscure priest, wroteThe Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity thoughfor no other cause but for this; that posteri-ty may know we have not loosely throughsilence permitted things to pass away as ina dream... -surely one of the mostmemorable opening sentences of anybook.

The Puritans Admonition had demandedthat the laws of England, particularly thosepertaining to the Established Church,should be replaced by laws exclusivelyderived from the Bible, selected byCalvinist interpretation.In his Preface Hooker directly addressesthe Puritans: Surely the present form ofchurch-government which the laws of thisland have established is such, asno law ofGod nor reason of man hath hitherto beenalleged of force sufficient to prove they doill, who to the uttermost of their powerwithstand the alteration thereof. (em-phasis supplied) Contrariwise: The other,which instead of it we are required to ac-cept, is only by error and misconceitnamed the ordinance of Jesus Christ, noone proof as yet brought forth whereby itmay clearly appear to be so in very deed.(The Works of M r. Richard H ooker, 3vols., John Keble, ed., Oxford 1874,Preface ii, 1) Hookers criticism from thefirst invokes his own belief: ...there arebut two ways whereby the Spirit leadethmen into all truth: the one extraordinary,the other common; the one belonging butunto some few, the other extending itselfunto all that are of God; the one, thatwhich we call by a special divine excellencyRevelation, the other Reason. (ibid.,iii,

The Puritans held their belief not inconjunction with their reason, but separatefrom it, so that they adamantly refused toenter into any discursive conference.This led Hooker to probe for the defects ofsuch a consciousness, which defects helocated through the following symptoms:a) self-justification (a singular goodness)based indirectly on the radical nature oftheir total critique of Englands ec-clesiastical order; b) tracing all the worldsevil to the extant institutions of ec-clesiastical government; c) asserting thatthe proposed Puritan institutions will bethe sovereign remedy of all evils, d) areductionism that finds in Scripture onlyevidence supporting the Puritan demands,e) the resulting high terms of separationbetween such and the rest of the world. Inhisown summary of this attack Hooker at-

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tributes to the Puritans: A custom of inur-ing your ears with reproof of faultsespecially in your governors; an use to at-tribute those faults to the kind of spiritualregiment under which you live; boldness inwarranting the force of their discipline forthe cure of all such evils; a slight of fram-ing your conceits to imagine that Scriptureevery where favoureth that discipline; per-Scripture is a seal unto you of yournearness to God.(ibid., iii, 16) He accusesthe Puritans of having formed a cause,meaning precisely that which we mean bythat term in our age, when speaking ofsomeone as engagk. The cause is aworld apart, not merely distinct from theworld in which all men live together, butantithetical to it, and thus claiming foritself a singular, indeed, an ontic meritcompared with which the rest of the worldappears as mere refuse; the members ofthe cause being distinguished by aspecial knowledge, stemming from their1lcrliiitSS tu ihc Spiiii, or tile possession

of Marxism-Leninism, of whatever sourceof truth from which all others are barred.Such faith is neither proclaimed to otherswith a view to sharing it, nor defended byargument. It is used as a title of certaintyabout which one cannot communicate,and which admits between the cause andthe rest of men only the relation of con-quest and submission.This led Hooker to reflect deeply on therelation between faith and reason. Thegeneral and perpetual voice of men is asthe sentence of God himself. For thatwhich all men have at all times learned,Nature herself must needs have taught;and God being the author of Nature, hervoice is but his instrument.(ibid., viii, 3)In a sentence that recalls the famous dic-tum of the great Muslim mystic, Ghazali,reason is Gods scale on earth, Hookerstates, Wherefore the natural measurewhereby to judge our doings, is thesentence of Reason determining and set-ting down what is good to be done.(ibid.,viii, 8) and, with reference to the laws ofecclesiastical polity, he remarks: ...thoseLaws are investigable by Reason, without

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the help of Revelation supernatural anddivine.(ibid., Viii, 9) Finally, Hookersteaching is thus summed up: It suffitheththerefore that Nature and Scripture doserve in such full sort, that they both jointlyand not severally either of them beso com-plete, that unto everlasting felicity we neednot the knowledge of any thing more thanthese two may easily furnish our mindsgeneral idea can already be found inThomas Aquinas. Hookers specificachievement is the analysis of a Scripture-based political movement as one whosepretended godliness is spurious because itsmessage denies and evades the commonbond of reason that is valid for the rela-tions of men with men. In a somewhatsimilar vein, the Muslim mystic Quchairi,speaking on the subject of intuitions,states that they may come from angels,Satan, the natural man, or from Godhimself. These, he says, can be recognizedin the following way: an intuition from anangei wiii be in conformitywith reason andwill lead to good works; an intuition fromSatan will lead to sin, while an intuitionfrom Nature will lead one to follow onesnatural propensities, particularly prideand lust ...(Qu oted in R. C . Zaehner,Mysticism Sacred and Profane, OxfordU.P., 1967, p. 144)

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IV

I T SHOULD BE CLEAR by now that we havenot attempted anything general about thetopic of faith and reason but have touchedonly on two particular points suggested byWhiteheads concept of fragmentary pur-pose. Purpose, which flows from imagery,memory, love, and striving, can befragmentary in terms of a reality that isnothing but natural. The central thesis ofMichael Polanyis book, PersonalKnowledge, is that there is no such thing asa purely objectivist science, and thatfanatical adherence to that fallacious con-cept can only destroy science. The scienceof today, he says, serves as a heuristicguide for its own further development. I tconveys a conception about the nature of

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things which suggests to the enquiringmind an inexhaustible range of surmises.The experience of Columbus, who sofatefully misjudged his own discovery, is in-herent to some extent in all discove y....An empirical statement is true to the ex-tent to which it reveals an aspect of reality,a reality largely hidden to us, and existingtherefore independently of our knowing it.By trying to say something that is trueabout a reality believed to be existing in-dependently of our knowing it, all asser-tions of fact necessarily carry universal in-tent... The enquiring scientists intima-tions of a hidden reality are personal. Theyare his own beliefs which-owing to hisoriginality-as yet he alone holds. Y et theyare not a subjective state of mind, but con-victions held with universal intent, andheavy with arduous projects.. . He hasreached responsible beliefs, born ofnecessity, and not changeable at will. In aheuristic commitment, affirmation, sur-render and legislation are fused into asingle thought, bearing on a hidden reali-ty.(op, cit., p. 311)This result, which Polanyi reachedthrough a number of distinct partialanalyses, finally enables him to group theconception of religious worship as aheuristic vision and align religion in turnalso with the great intellectual systems,such as mathematics, fiction and the finearts, which are validated by becoming hap-py dwelling places of the humanmind.(ibid., p. 280) And finally: Theenquiry into the nature and justification ofpersonal knowledge...has led to the accep-tance of our calling-for which we are notresponsible- s a condition for the exerciseof a responsible judgment with universalintent... Calling; personal judgment in-volving responsibility; self-compulsion andindependence of conscience; universalstandards; all these were shown to exist on-ly in their relation to each other within acommitment. They dissolve if looked upon

non-committally. We may call this the on-tology of commitment... The paradox ofself-set standards and the solution of thisparadox are thus generalized to include thestandards which we set ourselves in ap-praising other organisms and attribute tothem as proper to them. We may say thatthis generalization of the universal pole ofcommitment acknowledges the wholerange of being which we attribute to or-ganisms at ascending levels.(ibid., p. 379)Augustines reality was less fragmentarythan that of ancient philosophy because ittook in the whole range of being whichwe

attribute to organisms at ascending levels.It also turned out to be a heuristic vision ofthe most productive kind which, amongother things, produced a rational conceptof the whole of history of which no previousthinker had been capable. The closelinkage of faith and reason, even thoughthe one is acritical and the other critical,turns out to be ontologically foundedrather than being merely a pious wish toinclude everything. Hooker taught us thesober alertness required to hold these twodimensions in the necessary balance andmutual tension of consciousness. Theirlinkage can be immensely productive butcontains also destructive potentialities.Where faith is mistaken for criticalknowledge, and critical knowledge allowedto play the part of faith, a fall into an abyssof inhumanity may result. Occurrences ofthis kind are too numerous in our memoryto make the above finding with a sense oftriumphant comfort. The radical scien-tist objectivism that has crippled moder-nity comes from a deep fear with which onecan sympathize, although emotional sym-pathy must not be allowed to seduce us intoa philosophical endorsement. We find,once again, that being human is a riskybusiness, beset on all sides with insecuritiesand pitfalls. Vigilance is the price not onlyof freedom, but also of truth and respon-sible personal commitment.