Nietzsche: Virtue Ethics ...Virtue Politics?

Nietzsche: Virtue Ethics …Virtue Politics?Author(s): Christine DaigleSource: Journal of Nietzsche Studies, No. 32 (AUTUMN 2006), pp. 1-21Published by: Penn State University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20717883 .

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Nietzsche: Virtue Ethics . . . Virtue Politics?

Christine Daigle

In this article, I propose to reconstruct Friedrich Nietzsche's ethical teachings and read them as a form of virtue ethics.1 This reading is partly inspired by

Kaufmann's generous rendering of Nietzsche's ethics. In his classic study, Kaufmann supposes that Aristotle's philosophy had a great influence on

Nietzsche's ethics. He also asserts that Nietzsche's criticism of Christianity can

not be rightly appreciated without noting the Aristotelian ethics that inspired it.2 Kaufmann's assertions are grounded in a connection he establishes between the Aristotelian notion of megalopsychia found in Nicomachean Ethics and the

figure of the ?bermensch. I will approach this connection in a variety of ways in the first section of my essay and will show how we must go beyond Kaufmann. If one chooses to dismiss the connection between Aristotle's and Nietzsche's

ethics, as I will do, this does not mean that Nietzsche's ethics cannot be read as an instance of virtue ethics. In the second section, I will articulate how it is

possible to interpret the ethical ideas of Nietzsche as forming a type of virtue ethics that focuses on the character development of the agent. I will define virtue ethics and show how Nietzsche can be seen as a virtue ethicist. I will explain how he shares the critical moment found in the revival of virtue ethics mostly articulated in the twentieth century and also how he shares in the constructive

program found therein.3 In a third section, I will address the problem that awaits those who want to read Nietzsche generously, as I do, as a virtue ethicist. This

problem arises with respect to his aristocratic politics found in certain texts. It will then become clear that an articulation of his ethical ideas with respect to his

political ideas is problematic. I will attempt to solve this problem, though my proposed solution will emphasize a certain part of the corpus while necessarily overlooking another.

Nietzsche and Aristotle

In an article titled "Aristotle and Nietzsche: 'Megalopsychia' and

'Uebermensch,'" Bernd Magnus argues that the Aristotelian reading ofNietzsche, initiated by Walter Kaufmann, must be dismissed. In the classic Nietzsche:

Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist, Kaufmann suggests that Aristotle's con

ception made a tremendous impression on Nietzsche, so much so that his

JOURNAL OF NIETZSCHE STUDIES, Issue 32, 2006

Copyright ? 2006 The Pennsylvania State University, University Park, PA.

1



2 Christine Daigle

Opposition to Christianity can only be understood in those terms. According to

Kaufmann, Nietzsche's debt to Aristotle's ethics is considerable. His assertions stem from a connection he establishes between Aristotle's conception of pride in book 4 of the Nicomachean Ethics, also referred to as "greatness of soul," and the

?bermensch. Magnus argues that Kaufmann 's reading of the proud man and the

?bermensch is a superficial reading of both. Magnus continues: "Aristotle's ethics?even his conception of pride?has very little to do either with Nietzsche's moral philosophy, or with his conception of Uebermenschen"4 He is inspired by aphorism 198 of Beyond Good and Evil in which Nietzsche rejects Aristotelian ethics as an instance of "[m]orality as timidity." Magnus's main point has to do with the Aristotelian concepts of eudaimonia

and phronesis. In the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle talks about the one good that is sought by human beings by nature: eudaimonia, that is, happiness.

Happiness is the only overarching good that we seek. The good for the human

is the fulfillment of one's distinctive function, which, according to Aristotle, is the activity of reason. The concept of eudaimonia specifies that "one lives a

flourishing life if one is engaged in the successful development and active

exercise of one's nature, characteristically human capacities across time."5 For

Aristotle, the human capacity in question is rationality in thought and action.

Therefore, the individual lives a flourishing life if one lives a rational life, that

is, a life guided by phronesis, practical wisdom. The phronemos is the person who possesses this practical wisdom that allows him to determine virtue, which

is understood as the mean between a vice by excess and a vice by default. He determines virtue in view of the good, happiness, which is ultimately a life of intellectual activity. Using reason as the foundation for happiness, Aristotle establishes virtue as the way to one's own flourishing. Essentially, virtues are

those character traits that we need to flourish as human beings. Virtues are

chosen by the phronemos in view of his maturation as a human being, that is, the development of his distinctive quality, rationality. Because he is practically

wise, he cannot fail in identifying proper virtues in certain situations in relation to himself. That being said, the practically wise person does not choose virtues

for what they will yield but, rather, for their own sake. Charles M. Young

explains:

Having the correct conception of human flourishing, that of N[icomachean] Efthics] 1.7, [the virtuous] will see themselves as beings whose essence is the

capacity for the realization of rationality in thought and action. Since acting on the

principles of rational choice constitutes rationality in action, the virtuous will see their acting on these principles as constitutive of who they are. This is a perspec tive that is unavailable to the nonvirtuous. They cannot see what they do as the

expression of who they are, for they lack the correct conception of who they are.6

Magnus rightly points out that Aristotle's good life could not appeal to Nietzsche

because it is too intertwined with the contemplative or rational activity of the



Virtue Ethics , . . Virtue Politics? 3

soul. As another instance of Platonic rationalism, Aristotle's view of the moral

life must be rejected by Nietzsche. Indeed, Nietzsche, who rejects this view of

the human as an essentially rational being, would certainly resist such a view of

morality in which an individual moderates his or her own flourishing by using practical reason to establish the mean in every course of action. The other aspect that would have been displeasing to Nietzsche is that of eudaimonia. It is not

morality as goal oriented that Nietzsche would reject so much as Aristotle's con

ception of happiness. In Antichrist ?2, Nietzsche is clear: "What is happiness?? The feeling that power increases?that a resistance is overcome." Happiness comes upon the exercise of will to power, when one's own self is the expression of this will to power. This assertion of power is in no way the same as the con

templative life advocated by Aristotle.7 Lester Hunt agrees that Nietzsche's ethics pertains to human flourishing and

character building. He also considers that Nietzsche's views have little to do with Aristotle's ethics. Nietzsche's claims about virtues present them as lacking prudence and cleverness, which are two essential ingredients in the Aristotelian

phronemos's virtues. Nonetheless, according to Hunt, Nietzsche holds a pure ethics of virtue. Apure ethics of virtue, as Trianosky defines it, is a form of virtue

ethics that "holds that only judgments about virtue are basic in morality, and that the Tightness of actions is always somehow derivative from the virtuousness of traits. [...] [F]or the pure ethic of virtue the moral goodness of traits is always both independent of the Tightness of actions and in some way originative of it as well."8 According to Hunt, Nietzsche's pure ethics of virtue is one in which vitalism is the key to goodness. The only intrinsic good for Nietzsche is life; "all the goods that human beings seek are only good to the extent that in some sense

they promote life."9 We will return to this. I agree with Magnus and think that Kaufmann goes too far when he equates

the two ethics based on a minor similarity between the two represented figures. As Cameron says in his book Nietzsche and the "Problem" of Morality, when Nietzsche talks about Aristotle, it is mostly to his rhetoric and poetics that his attention is devoted. Nietzsche was familiar with the Nicomachean Ethics and the Politics but did not generally deal with Aristotle as ethician. Cameron points out that, generally, Aristotle escapes harsh condemnation from Nietzsche, but

that, in itself, is not enough to make Nietzsche an Aristotelian. In many instances, Nietzsche presents direct or indirect positive assessments of Aristotle's thought. For example, in Antichrist ?7, Nietzsche talks about Christianity as the religion of pity and, in the process of doing so, declares that "Aristotle, as is well known, saw in pity a morbid and dangerous condition that one did well to get at from time to time with a purgative: he understood tragedy as a purgative." Nietzsche would have to appreciate such a stance, one coming from a morality that requires a toughness of character. However, there are also instances where Aristotle suffers some blows. As Cameron says, "Since Nietzsche regards Aristotle's philosophy



4 Christine Daigle

as anti-Dionysian, and labels his own morality as 'der Dionysos-Moral,' one can

conclude that Nietzsche did not feel a moral kinship with Aristotelian ethics

despite the fact that both emphasize 'human excellence.'"10

Nietzsche and Virtue Ethics

Now that I have established that a connection between Aristotle and Nietzsche is not possible, it remains for me to show how one can read Nietzsche as a virtue ethicist. I think that his ethical thought is best understood as being akin to virtue ethics as we find it in its twentieth-century revival. What is twentieth-century virtue ethics really about? We need to say more than, "Virtue ethics focuses on

character rather than rules," and, "Virtue ethics talks about virtues instead of

right actions." Of course the aforementioned affirmations are correct but far from complete. We need more specifications if we are to decide whether Nietzsche's ethics is an instance of virtue ethics.

The definition of virtue ethics presents a theory that focuses on the inner states of the moral agent rather than on the moral agent's performance of certain actions. Virtue ethics is concerned with determining the virtuousness of actions. It does so by concentrating not on the actions but, rather, on the character and virtuous ness of the agent. Robert Louden suggests that virtue ethics has two comple mentary aspects: a critical program and a constructive program.11 First, I would

like to examine the critical program. What exactly is the critical program? Virtue ethicists always criticize, explicitly or implicitly, traditional views of morality. This is essentially the reason why they present us with an alternative. The tradi tional moralities under attack are deontological-Kantian and utilitarian-conse

quentialist ethics. Specifically, the points called into question in traditional moralities are the following: the overreliance on rule models of moral choice, the

overly rationalistic accounts of moral agency, and the formalism inherent in such theories. The first point calls attention to the universal rules and principles pre sented in some theories as the ultimate guides for action. The second point calls attention to the negation of any active role on the part of emotions and desires in

the moral life. The criticism uttered by virtue ethicists in relation to the second

point says that "the people we most admire morally are not simply those who do their duty and act on the correct principles, but those who do so with the right kinds of desires and emotions."12 Virtue ethicists can be said to be in favor of a

rehabilitation of emotions and desires, that is, nonrational parts of ourselves. With

respect to formalism, the third point, virtue ethicists note that morality is more

than a mere conceptual analysis of duty concepts and logical arguments. They want to include other methodological approaches in ethical thinking.

Now I will turn to the second aspect, the constructive program. What exactly is the constructive program? Having discarded traditional ethics, virtue ethicists



Virtue Ethics . . . Virtue Politics? 5

have an alternative to offer.13 Briefly, the constructive program aims to refocus attention on the moral agent and on a determination of virtues. In doing so, virtue ethics presents a view of human flourishing. There is a distinction to be made between those ethics that concentrate on the character of the agent and those that busy themselves with a determination of virtues. The brand I find more

interesting in terms of ethical "potential" is the character-based one. Indeed, its

focus on the agent and his or her character allows for the development of an

ethics that has the flourishing of the individual as its strict preoccupation. If a

virtue ethics makes proposals that accommodate the flourishing of individuals, it is, of necessity, relativistic or broad enough so that various individuals are

allowed to flourish in their own way. That is a tenet of Aristotle, who claims that virtue is relative both to the agent and to circumstances. However, there is a way to avoid an extreme relativism that would relegate virtue ethics to the ranks of those ineffective ethics.

Here I want to consider a suggestion made by Christine McKinnon. She pres ents a virtue ethics based on a naturalistic approach. She says that "virtue theo ries show us how the putative gap between the descriptive and the normative is to be closed: by showing what it is naturally good for humans to care about, they show why a life centered around these cares is a good life for humans."14 She

says that virtue ethics is unique in its proposition of various models, but she also

argues that virtues can be established objectively by considering the nature of individuals. To support this claim she gives the example of the coyote. For the

coyote, given its nature, possessing a warm coat is an intrinsically good thing, and the subj ective evaluation of the coyote has nothing to do with it.15 Similarly, for McKinnon, human virtues are good things to possess for humans given the

kind of beings that humans are, independent of any teleological consideration or preference. What distinguishes the human from a coyote is the fact that virtues are not innate and one has to choose a virtue in order to possess it. The human

being is not born with virtues but, rather, with the capacity to cultivate them. McKinnon defines virtues as dispositions to act in certain ways, what she calls

dispositional properties. Accordingly, agents choose virtues as dispositions that can lead them to a flourishing human life by way of beneficial actions and deci sions entailed therein.16

It is to be noted that a virtue ethics that adopts such a naturalistic approach will still present a variety of possibilities for the flourishing of moral agents while connecting the flourishing-conducive virtues to their nature. Not any chosen character trait will qualify as virtue. Virtue ethics that concentrates on the character of agents is thus a "character-building" theory. The agent chooses virtues to build his own character. Given the kind of being an agent is, she will have an ultimate goal in view (Aristotle considered it was happiness, but it can

be something else) and will build her character in such a way as to bring her closer to this goal. The process and the attainment of the goal may be coined



6 Christine Daigle

human flourishing. Virtue ethics is thus an ethics that is primarily concerned with this flourishing.

Is Nietzsche's ethics an instance of virtue ethics in its renewed, non

Aristotelian sense? Brian Leiter would say no, as he has argued that Nietzsche's ethics cannot be understood as an instance of virtue ethics.17 He argues that Nietzsche only shares in the critical program of virtue ethicists. Not only that, but according to Leiter, Nietzsche goes much further in his rejection of moral

ity than virtue ethicists, in that he rejects not only traditional morality but also all forms of morality. Contra Leiter I think that there is an ethical program in Nietzsche even if it reveals itself unsystematically and might be in need of recon

struction. Leiter is right in saying that Nietzsche shares the critical program of

"Morality Critics," as he calls them, but is mistaken with respect to Nietzsche's immoralism.

Interestingly, Michael Slote, a contemporary virtue ethicist, has approached Nietzsche with prudence and questioned the lack of openness to fellow humans in Nietzsche's program as a possible disqualifier. After careful deliberation Slote concludes that Nietzsche is "an ethicist who thinks we should promote the good, but who has a distinctive and controversial view of what that good is."18 Because Nietzsche has a good in mind and gives prescriptions on how to achieve that

good, he certainly qualifies as an ethicist. Slote further argues that this type of ethical thinking would be close to an agent-based virtue ethics that concentrates

its efforts on the development of the character of the agent and not on the per formance of specific actions. I agree with Slote that this is the approach one

must take with Nietzsche's ethical program. Let us see how this agent-based virtue ethics is proposed by Nietzsche.

Nietzsche's Virtue Ethics

In this section, I will delineate Nietzsche's own brand of virtue ethics. It should be clear that Nietzsche does indeed share the critical program of virtue ethicists. His attacks against the traditional view of morality and the nihilism he proposes make clear that, for him, traditional morality is alienating to any human life. In The Gay Science he says: "In the main all those moral systems are distasteful to me which say: 'Do not do this! Renounce! Overcome thyself!

' On the other hand

I am favorable to those moral systems which stimulate me to do something, and to do it again from morning till evening, to dream of it at night, and think of noth

ing else but to do it well, as well as is possible for me alone! [...] I do not like

any of the negative virtues whose very essence is negation and self-renunciation"

(?304). Elsewhere, in Twilight of the Idols, he talks about a sin of morality: "The most general formula at the basis of every religion and morality is: 'Do this and this?and you will be happy! Otherwise. . . .' Every morality, every religion is



Virtue Ethics ., . Virtue Politics? 7

this imperative?I call it the great original sin of reason, immortal unreason"

("Errors" 2). Nietzsche's view of traditional morality can be found throughout his writings; however, I think these quotations are satisfactory for our purpose. These two clarify the spirit with which Nietzsche approaches morality. The prob lem with traditional morality is that it does not take into consideration human nature. It does not look at the individual as he is and aim to embrace what he is

but, rather, aims to impose a model on him that has no ground in the reality of the human. This model is of a transcendent nature and does not fit the immanent nature of the human being.

Let us remember the three points under criticism in the critical program of virtue ethicists: the overreliance on rule models of moral choice, the overly ratio nalistic accounts of moral agency, and the formalism inherent in such theories. If we did not know that we are talking about virtue ethicists, we would readily say that this pertains to Nietzsche. Nietzsche does reject rule models. His ethics of creativity argues that one must create values for oneself and not rely on any external (transcendent) rule. Nietzsche also fiercely rejects the rationalistic account of moral agency. He struggles to rehabilitate the repressed parts of human nature, claiming that reason is but a very small part of ourselves. He talks of the human being in terms of a fiction (see D 105). We are wronged in the con

ception of ourselves: we are led to believe that we are neatly divided between reason and instinct. But this division is illusory. The human being is a "social structure of many 'souls'" (BGE19). We possess a soul that is a "social structure of the instincts and passions" {BGE 12). Nietzsche says further that "[i]f we

desired and dared an architecture corresponding to the nature of our soul (we are too cowardly for it!)?our model would have to be the labyrinth!" (D 169).

We are indeed very far from the traditional picture of the self and also far from the superiority of reason that is proposed by traditional philosophical approaches and moralities in particular. Last, it is also evident that Nietzsche rejects the formalism inherent in traditional moralities as he would generally reject any formalism in thought.

Nietzsche does share the critical program of virtue ethicists. The nihilism he

proposes is supposed to remedy the alienating traditional philosophical (and religious) discourse. But does he stop at the nihilistic moment? Is his program

purely nihilistic, as Leiter suggests? I have argued elsewhere that far from being purely nihilistic, Nietzsche's philosophy is entirely constructive.19 His challenge consists in rejecting the existing morality to construct anew. The old system's deficiencies cannot be adjusted by reorganization. One must erase everything and start from scratch. This is where his attacks on morality come into play. In this

moment Nietzsche announces the death of God and its metaphysical import. Nietzsche is clear about his self-attributedimmoralism: "At bottom my expression immor?list involves two denials. I deny first a type of man who has hitherto counted as the highest, the good, the benevolent, beneficent, I deny secondly a



8 Christine Daigle

kind of morality which has come to be accepted and to dominate as morality in itself?d?cadence morality, in more palpable terms Christian morality" (EH "Destiny" 4). His rejection of morality is thus clearly identified by him as a rejec tion of traditional morality. He also says of fellow immoralists, they "see [their] honor in affirming" (TI "Morality" 6).20 There is no question of abandoning ethics. Ethics is needed and will be his preoccupation for the first steps of his recon

struction, for it was a preoccupation before his reconstruction as it lead to the

rejection of the defective ethics. Nihilism is a necessary step toward this recon

struction. As he says in The Gay Science: "We deny, and must deny, because some

thing in us wants to live and affirm itself, something which we perhaps do not as

yet know, do not as yet see!" (307). What is it that wants to affirm itself? In Schopenhauer as Educator, Nietzsche

says that "We are accountable to ourselves for our own existence; consequently, we also want to be the real helmsmen of our existence and keep it from

resembling a mindless coincidence" (1). The ?bermensch, in Thus Spoke Zarathustra, is the figure who is successful in becoming his own master. He is an Overman, more than a man, a human being that is human and more. Why more? The ?bermensch is the individual who has overcome the fragmentation inherent in tradition. It is the person who has reunited himself, who has decided to live fully as he is. It is also the person who knows that life is will to power and that he himself is an instance of this will to power. Accordingly, he wishes to embody and respect the will to power within himself. In addition to all of this, he accepts the eternal return hypothesis. He is ready to suppose that the actions and decisions he makes during his life will return eternally the same. The change from man to ?bermensch is tremendous. So much so that we cannot talk about an elevation from man to ?bermensch but really of a transfiguration, as

Nietzsche himself refers.21 Even the highest type of human being present in Nietzsche's writings, the strong man, is far below the ?bermensch. He says: "Your souls are so unfamiliar with what is great that the Superman would be

fearful to you in his goodness! And you wise and enlightened men, you would flee from the burning sun of wisdom in which the Superman joyfully bathes his nakedness! You highest men my eyes have encountered! This is my doubt of

you and my secret laughter: I think you would call my Superman?a devil!"

(Z "Manly Prudence"). The ?bermensch is an ideal type of human being. Every individual should

emulate this figure as an illustration of what one can become if only one were

to engage oneself in the way of creation. When I speak of an ideal type, the

?bermensch, I mean that it is a figure toward which one must strive, not to be confused as a state one can reach. For one thing, it is not clear in Nietzsche's

mind whether there will ever be ?bermenschen. For another thing, I think we

should interpret the figure he presents to us as a dynamic state of being. If the

?bermensch accepts life and himself as an instance of the will to power, he will



Virtue Ethics . .. Virtue Politics? 9

be in constant becoming. The drive for more power, characteristic of Nietzsche's

being, will lead the individual into a continuous flux and constant overcoming of oneself. This is how one should understand the ?ber of ?bermensch. But even if we are talking about a "state of flux," this is a state that one should strive to acquire while engaging in the process of attainment. According to Nietzsche, there are certain things that one must do in order to approach this excellence and in turn become an ?bermensch. Among these things are the creation of oneself and the creation of values that is essential in supporting a new ethics.

The human being should be the creator of oneself. She should be her own

master and define her own rules (which is what is truly meant by the famous, or

infamous, "Master morality").22 Once the sky of values has been emptied, the task is to fill it again for oneself. The individual should no longer rely on any transcendent to provide these values, as the previous experiment of Christianity and its transcendent morals has proven that its only possible result is alienation. Human beings must create an ethics for human beings. The individual must create an ethics that respects one's nature as human and as will to power. This is expressed in Nietzsche's maxim: "What Saith thy Conscience!?Thou shalt become what thou art" (GS 270). You must flourish! Note that there is nothing in Nietzsche's writings until Beyond Good and Evil that indicates that the way of the ?bermensch is bared for certain individuals. He makes clear that this

potentiality exists in every individual. It is only a matter of the individual choos

ing to actualize his or her own self as will to power.23 Thus the emphasis is placed on the flourishing of the agent via the adoption of certain virtues in line with one's own being.

To this, one must add the vitalism of Nietzsche's philosophy. This is expressed most clearly in Antichrist ?2 where he says: "What is good??All that heightens the feeling of power, the will to power, power itself in man. What is bad??All that proceeds from weakness. What is happiness??The feeling that power increases?that a resistance is overcome." As Hunt argues, according to Nietzsche, "Life is the only thing that is good in itself, and is the standard by which the value of everything else is to be measured."24 We could state his fundamental moral

principle in the following manner: "Anything that affirms, creates, and augments life is good." Values chosen by individuals must be chosen with this principle in

mind because, as Hunt puts it, "all the goods that human beings seek are only good to the extent that in some sense they promote life."25 In that, human beings will

only promote themselves and their own being as an instance of life. The individ ual will be true to him- or herself. Only then can one be said to flourish as a human

being. So we are right to say, along with Hunt, that even if one fundamental rule can be derived from the will to power, Nietzsche's focus is on the development of character and not on rules. What about virtues? Hunt suggests that, according to Nietzsche, "no list of

the virtues could be complete. [. . .] Each occurrence of a virtue is different in



10 Christine Daigle

kind from all others. There really is no virtue other than 'the peculiar virtue of each man'" (GS 120).26 As Hunt points out, we can find two lists of virtues in Nietzsche: in Daybreak and Beyond Good and Evil. In these works, Nietzsche

proposes courage, generosity, politeness, honesty, insight, sympathy, and soli tude as virtues. However, one senses that more virtues exist, because the lists are not exhaustive and there is no recipe on how to be virtuous as there is in traditional moralities that say: acquire these virtues and you will be virtuous. In

Nietzsche's mind, virtues are relative to the individual. However, virtues can

conflict with one another. All the virtues that one adopts for oneself in Nietzsche's new ethics are adopted in view of one's own accomplishments, in view of one's own flourishing. In addition to this, we can see how central the notion of character is in relation to that of virtue. Virtues are adopted in view of the development of character. Character is what needs improving. We can deter

mine if it is good when we examine the question as to how it enhances the will to power. The actions that are then accomplished by the virtuous agent are good because of the agent being virtuous, and some will be good in themselves as

actions that promote life. This is how vitalism comes to be articulated with the virtue ethics.

Besides the ?bermensch and the will to power, the notion of the eternal return

plays a major role in Nietzsche's ethical thought. I will begin by saying that I do not think that we should see the eternal return as an ontological notion. Nietzsche does not want to say what the world is like; rather, he wants to produce a thought experiment that could serve as a guide for action.27 It is an ethical

hypothesis. As such, it serves to validate the choice of action. The individual must ask himself whether the course of action he is about to undertake is some

thing that he would like to see coming back eternally. One must choose as if that choice is going to recur eternally. Under the perspective of the eternal return, I cannot choose something that would make me unhappy or that would make me

resentful because this unhappiness and resentment would haunt me in this life and forever! Further, unhappiness or resentment cannot lead to a flourishing life.

So, one's choice must be made in view of the flourishing life; thus will it be a

good choice, that is, one that we will want to eternally recur.

In the determination of what a good human life is, that toward which every human must strive, the notions of will to power and eternal return serve as guides for choice. A choice will be good if it promotes life as will to power. A choice will also be good if one can will that it eternally recurs. The two considerations

go hand in hand, as one can will that one's choice eternally recur only if it leads to the flourishing life one pursues, a flourishing life that will come about through the realization of ourselves as will to power. Nietzsche's injunctions and pre

scriptions (if we can call them that) do not seem to be fit for a perfect world. He

requires of us that we become who we are, but he also demands of us that we

become strong. Our flourishing does not lie in quiet satisfaction but, rather, in



Virtut; Ethics .. . Virtue Politics? 11

a constant overcoming. His virtue ethics and the requirements it has for human

agents are indeed very demanding.

Nietzsche's Virtue Politics?

In Antichrist 2, Nietzsche says that we should seek "[n]ot contentment, but more

power; not peace at all, but war; not virtue, but proficiency (virtue in the Renaissance style, virtu, virtue free of moralic acid)." This is his plan as he describes it following his description of his moral principle grounded in vitalism. It is followed by a statement of Nietzsche's own philanthropy : "The weak and ill-constituted shall perish[....] And one shall help them to do so" (A 2). What are the political implications of this?

It seems to me that there is an overwhelming tension in Nietzsche's philosophy between his ethics and his politics. If we have a good rationale for reading Nietzsche as a virtue ethicist, one who is concerned with the flourishing of all

individuals, how can we make sense of the things he says when he speaks polit

ically?28 Potentially, everyone can engage in the path of self-overcoming. As

every individual is an instance of will to power, it is open to everyone to under take it as a task to actualize his or her own being. Some will, and some will not. If they do not, they are then the lower types of human beings. But there is nothing, from the start and from an anthropological point of view, that would bar the way of becoming an ?bermensch.29 Given this, it seems to me that Nietzsche needs to advocate a political system that would favor the flourishing of all.

This is what a "virtue politics" would be. It would be a politics that would be concerned with the flourishing of individuals in a group. A virtue politics would want to build a social structure in which every individual would have an equal chance at flourishing. No one would be placed in such a position of oppression or dire need so that he would be incapable of pursuing his own development. A virtue politics that looks after the flourishing of all individuals within a group would advocate an equality of opportunities. This does not necessarily entail that an equality of results would follow. Again, in the Nietzschean picture, some individuals will choose to be ?bermenschen, and others will not. The idea is that society or the political order should not play a determining role in deciding

whether the individual chooses to be an ?bermensch or not or even has the

ability to choose. It should be the individual's own decision. What kind of regime would a virtue politics advocate then? It seems that a democracy or even social ism (a genuine form of socialism and not some mock socialism as we found in some countries in the twentieth century) would be the best form of government to maximize an equality of opportunities. What shall follow? We know how Nietzsche despised those two forms of

political regimes. He loathed democracy and ridiculed socialism. He says, "[T]o



12 Christine Daigle

us the democratic movement is not only a form of the decay of political organi zation but a form of the decay, namely the diminution, of man, making him mediocre and lowering his value," and further:

The over-all degeneration of man down to what today appears to the socialist dolts and flatheads as their "man of the future"?as their ideal?this degenera tion and diminution of man into the perfect herd animal (or, as they say, to the

man of the "free society"), this animalization of man into the dwarf animal of equal rights and claims, is possible there is no doubt of it. Anyone who has once

thought through this possibility to the end knows one kind of nausea that other men don't know?but perhaps also a new task\? (BGE 203)30

This is where the tension lies in Nietzsche.31 When he gets political, it is not

clear at all that he is a "virtue politician." In many texts, he seems to adopt an

aristocratic, if not Platonic, stance that is concerned with the flourishing of only a select group of individuals.32 In many places, he seems to be advocating a

politics of oppression that does not cohere with the virtue ethics I delineate. In

Beyond Good and Evil he says very clearly that u[e]very enhancement of the

type 'man' has so far been the work of an aristocratic society?and it will be so

again and again?a society that believes in the long ladder of an order of rank and differences in value between man and man, and that needs slavery in some

sense or other" (257). Again in the same book he says:

Even the body within which individuals treat each other as equals, as suggested before?and this happens in every healthy aristocracy?if it is a living and not a

dying body, has to do to other bodies what the individuals within it refrain from doing to each other: it will have to be an incarnate will to power, it will strive to

grow, spread, seize, become predominant?not from any morality or immorality but because it is living and because life simply is will to power. [...] "Exploitation" does not belong to a corrupt or imperfect and primitive society: it belongs to the essence of what lives, as a basic organic function; it is a consequence of the will

to power, which is after all the will to life. (BGE 259)

Now, unless one thinks that weaker human beings will flourish on their own

terms under the wise guidance and gentle oppression of ?bermenschen, it seems

impossible to reconcile the aristocratic politics with a virtue ethics concerned

with flourishing. When providing a rationale for every individual's valuation of the freedom

of others, Simone de Beauvoir says that we need to actively promote the

liberation of other individuals so that they can do the same for us reciprocally.33 Her ideal society is one in which everyone is engaged in the liberation from

oppression, that is, engaged in making everyone else "free from" in order that

they be "free to" (be authentic, exert their freedom, make their own choices, actualize their own project). If the goal is for everyone to flourish as authentic

free beings, one needs the collaboration of all in a society that advocates an

equality of opportunities. Beauvoir 's ideal society would be a socialist society.



Virtue Ethics . . . Virtue Politics? 13

In the context of explaining how every individual must work for the liberation of the other, she criticizes Nietzsche's view in the following fashion.34 She says that a philosophy of will to power where every individual tries to exert her own

will to power would see only clashes and conflicts between individuals. No collaboration is to be expected if indeed the exertion of will to power is to be understood as the exertion of pure force. However, we know that will to power is not about exerting brute force. Nietzsche would even consider that as an

instance of decadence or declining will to power.35 Surprisingly, and probably to the dislike of Beauvoir, one can use the same argument that Beauvoir works out to support a virtue politics in Nietzsche. Because every individual is an

instance of will to power and seeks to flourish as an instance of that, everyone should collaborate in creating the best conditions for everyone's ability to flourish. In Beauvoir 's pattern, human flourishing as a free authentic individual is pursued, whereas in Nietzsche, it is the flourishing of an authentic individual as an expression of will to power that is to be pursued.36

But again, it is difficult to articulate this with the bulk of Nietzsche's texts, which favor an aristocratic form of politics. One is tempted to ask the follow

ing question: Is it, then, that Nietzsche is serious when he talks of eugenics and

eliminating the weaker individuals? Does he really mean it when he says that the weak ones and the ill-constituted should perish and that we should help them?37 He calls this his own brand of philanthropy. Are we dwelling in

metaphor, or are these concrete statements for a politics of the future? In a sense, a scary one, eliminating the weak ones erases the tension aforementioned. If all

you have in your society is strong individuals, then you can have a nonoppressive politics that favors the flourishing of all and that would cohere with virtue ethics.

However, in other passages, Nietzsche describes a society where you need weaker individuals to take care of business while ?bermenschen take care of their own flourishing. For example, in Beyond Good and Evil he says:

The essential characteristic of a good and healthy aristocracy, however, is that it

experiences itself not as a function (whether of the monarchy or the common

wealth) but as their meaning and highest justification?that it therefore accepts with a good conscience the sacrifice of untold human beings who, for its sake, must be reduced and lowered to incomplete human beings, to slaves, to instru ments. (25 8)38

Could it be, then, that Nietzsche has a different kind of virtue politics in mind than the one I earlier defined?

I said that virtue politics is concerned with the flourishing of individuals within a group. Could we have another kind of virtue politics that would be con cerned with the flourishing of individuals as a group? In this case, it seems that a society that has oppression as one of the conditions for the flourishing of

stronger individuals would be acceptable if it were to lead to the flourishing of



14 Christine Daigle

the group. Individual flourishing would not matter; rather, it would be the flour

ishing of the whole that would be of primary focus. In a way, one can say that the ancient Greek society was organized in such a way that the oppression of a

large portion of inhabitants of the city-state was a condition for the well-being of that state. It has been stressed that ancient Greek democracy was able to

flourish as it did only because of the large number of slaves it relied on to take care of the menial tasks while the higher individuals were involved in higher tasks. Although Nietzsche certainly admired some features of the ancient Greek

city-states, it is difficult to imagine him in agreement with this given what he has said of the ?bermensch.

One of the ancient Greek political models Nietzsche could relate to would be that of Plato. In The Republic, Plato talks about an ideal city-state that would be

organized in three classes: the guardians, the warriors, and the artisans and farmers. Plato explains that the children of the warriors will undergo a very strict educational program where their capacities will be tested so that only the best of them will complete the program and become guardians. In a way, there is some equality of opportunities for the children of the warrior class. All of them have an opportunity to become guardians. However, this opportunity still

depends on the existence of the lower strata of the pyramid, the artisans and

farmers. Consequentially, we still do not have a system that favors the flourishing of all; rather, we find ourselves with a system that favors the flourishing of a

select group of individuals.

Again, from an anthropological point of view, there is nothing in Nietzsche's

position that justifies advocating a system that would favor the flourishing of

only a group of individuals. In my opinion, it is impossible to talk about a virtue

politics in the second sense, that is, a virtue politics that would promote the

flourishing of individuals as a group, because it would imply that some indi viduals

' flourishing would de discarded in favor of that of others. What is needed,

then, is a virtue ethics that favors the flourishing of every individual, and that is

possible only if you adopt as a political system the very systems that Nietzsche

criticizes and rejects. How are we then to find our way out?

Could it be that in political matters as well as in moral matters we need a

r??valuation of values? In morality, one of the tasks that Nietzsche takes on is to criticize and reject existing values. He also criticizes and rejects morality. All

morality? No, as we saw earlier, only a certain kind of morality is rejected, that

is, morality that is detrimental to the human. So Nietzsche r??valu?tes morality in order to present it in a new form. The idea of a morality, then, is not thrown

overboard, but only a certain particular conception is done away with. Could it

be the same with democracy? What if Nietzsche really is criticizing and rejecting a certain particular form of democracy? What if he wants to get to a political

regime that would favor the flourishing of all (who would choose to flourish,

i.e., an equality of opportunities)? His best choice is a democratic form of



Virtue Ethics ... Virtue Politics? 15

government. But democracy as he saw it in his days leads to mediocrity.

Democracy breeds the mediocre individual and favors the cultivation of

Christian virtues, virtues for the weak. But does it need to be that way? Nietzsche thinks that there is an adequation between the two, democracy and Christianity. But we can conceive of a transfigured democracy at least as much as we can

conceive of a transvaluation of values in the realm of morality. A democracy that would adhere to the new morality that Nietzsche advocates would not end

up breeding a weaker kind of individual. Instead, it would be the kind of regime that embodies the virtue politics we need in order to cohere with Nietzschean virtue ethics. To my opinion, this is the only way we can equate the political Nietzsche and the ethical Nietzsche.

Conclusion

I have made clear in the last section that it is very difficult to articulate the ethical views and the political views of Nietzsche. Reading him as an aristocrat, as many do and as some texts allow, excludes the virtue ethics approach that I have delineated: one that seeks to favor the flourishing of all individuals as instances of will to power. Indeed, one can interpret Nietzsche's ethics as being perfec tionistic and akin to virtue ethics without universalizing it. In this context, an

aristocratic politics that caters to higher individuals' flourishing is fine.

However, this is not the line of interpretation I have adopted. Given that I consider Nietzsche's virtue ethics to be universalizable, the aristocratic politic comes as a clash. An easy way out would be to say that there is no real political program in Nietzsche. Indeed, one often gets the impression that Nietzsche's

individual, the ethical individual, is a loner. Thus Spoke Zarathustra is a good example of said perception. Zarathustra talks to people, he does not talk with them. We do not have a Thus Conversed Zarathustra but, rather, a Thus Spoke Zarathustra. Zarathustra is a loner. Nietzsche includes the virtue of solitude in his list?another biographeme?39 If one is alone and attends to one's own flouri

shing, then virtue ethics is fine. But "no man is an island." We do live together and need an ethics and a politics that will allow us to live together successfully.

What, then, would a society of ?bermenschen be like? What is the virtue politics that we need in order to cohere with the seemingly desirable virtue ethics

program? I think a revalued democracy is the virtue politics that we need, that

is, a democracy that no longer levels down but, rather, seeks to bring the individuals higher, a democracy that favors the flourishing of all.40

Brock University



16 Christine Daigle

Acknowledgments I wish to thank Leah Bradshaw for her close reading of a previous draft of this arti cle and for her insightful comments. Thanks are also due to Martine B?land, who also commented on some of my ideas on Nietzsche's politics with a most welcome

severity. Brian Lightbody contributed to the polishing of the latter sections of this article with the comments he made on one of my presentations that addressed the connection between the ethics and the politics in Nietzsche's thought.

Notes 1. Thomas H. Brobjer presents an interesting article in which he discusses Nietzsche's

ethics of virtue. Though I agree with most of what Brobjer says, my approach is very different

than his. He focuses on other elements of Nietzsche's "affirmative morality" than I do here. One

point that struck me as inaccurate is the one he makes at the outset (and reiterates toward the

end): "This kinship of Nietzsche's affirmative ethics with ethics of virtue has not been realized"

(2003, 64). As will become apparent in a later section of my article, this kinship has been both

realized and debated by people like Christine Swanton, Lester . Hunt, Michael Slote, and

myself. 2. See Kaufmann 1968. Cf. Magnus 1980, 262.

3. Twentieth-century virtue ethicists articulate their views on a critique of the ethical tradition

they inherited. They oppose this tradition (the critical moment of their program) and then propose a constructive ethical program in its stead (the constructive program). This will be explained in

more detail below.

4. Magnus 1980, 262.

5. Young 1980, 138.

6. Young 1980, 150-51. 7. In her "Outline of a Nietzschean Virtue Ethics" (1998), Christine Swanton argues that any

virtue ethics needs to address at least two basic issues that she identifies as (1) the question of

what it is that makes an action right and (2) the question of what it is that makes a character trait a virtue. Her whole article is a defense of the argument that Nietzsche addresses both issues,

although perhaps he does so in a disturbing way. What I want to note particularly is the

interesting suggestion Swanton makes to explain the difference in tone between Nietzsche's

brand of virtue ethics and Aristotle's own version. Aristotle talks about eudaimonia as being the

happiness one reaches through the exercise of virtues. But Swanton indicates, "Though in utopia eudaimonism would be our virtue ethics, in actual bad worlds we need our virtue ethics to be

driven by another value: the escape from mediocrity" (1998, 33). Because we live in an

imperfect, corrupt world, we need a specific virtue ethics, one that will promote values that a

virtue ethics in a perfect world would not necessarily promote. Aristotle's ethics would thus be

best suited for a perfect world, whereas Nietzsche's ethics would be a better fit for this imperfect world. However in both cases, virtue ethics deals with human flourishing?flourishing of a

different kind.

8. Trianosky 1990, 336.

9. Hunt 1991, 112. This book is very interesting. I agree with much of what Hunt has to say therein. However, his approach is different than mine. Hunt focuses on the virtues, whereas I focus

on the development of character and the notion of flourishing. Nonetheless, his analysis of virtues

and vitalism is illuminating. 10. Cameron 2002, 154. See especially "Nietzsche pro or contra Aristotelian Morals?"

(Cameron 2002, 146-58) for a detailed examination of the connection between the two thinkers.

Cameron's position opposes mine on the presentation of Nietzsche as a virtue ethicist. He says:



ViRTUK Ethics ... Virtue Politics? 17

Clearly, then, Nietzsche does not belong to the classical Greek tradition of virtue ethics with

its emphasis on reason and moderation. Instead, his critique of the aretaic tradition is meant to

stand virtue ethics on its head, rather than to show that he and Aristotle are of one mind.

Nevertheless, if virtue ethics is defined exclusively as pertaining to human excellence or personal

distinction, then one may be inclined to situate Nietzsche within this tradition, while still

acknowledging certain differences among its contributors. But this is not my position. (2002,

157-58) Cameron wants to talk about a Nietzschean ethics of human flourishing that would not be a

virtue ethics.

11. Louden 1998.

12. Louden 1998, 493.

13. An interesting approach to the said constructive program is taken by Justin Oakley in

"Varieties of Virtue Ethics" (1996). Although I will not follow Oakley's detailed definition in this

essay, I think his views are worth presenting here. Oakley identifies six claims that are common

to all forms of virtue ethics. The first says "[a]n action is right if and only if it is what an agent with a virtuous character would do in the circumstances" (Oakley 1996, 129). Character is

primary in the determination of the Tightness or wrongness of an action. One could object that we

are dealing with circular reasoning here: an action is right because it is chosen by a virtuous agent, and a virtuous agent is the one who performs right actions. But virtue theories generally derive

virtuous character traits from notions of what is admirable in an agent or what contributes to

flourishing and thus escape the charge of circular reasoning. The second claim simply states that

we must first determine what the good is, i.e., human good, in order to determine the rightness or

wrongness of actions in relation to that good. The third claim says that virtues are irreducibly

plural intrinsic goods that "embody irreducibly plural values?i.e. each of them is valuable in a

way which is not reducible to a single overarching value." The fourth claim holds that "[t]he virtues are objectively good." This is related to the third claim and merely states that virtues are

good independent of desire, i.e., of our desiring the virtue. The fifth claim divides among agent relative goods and agent-neutral goods in saying that some goods such as friendship are agent relative whereas others such as justice are agent neutral. Finally, the last claim holds that "[a]cting

rightly does not require that we maximize the good" (Oakley 1996, 139^10). All versions of virtue

ethics make these six claims. I want to leave aside the further differentiations proposed by Oakley (along with this cited article, readers might be interested to consult Oakley's "A Virtue Ethics

Approach" [1998], which explores the features of virtue ethics again but also discusses

implications for bioethics). What is interesting to note is the fundamental distinction between

virtue ethics that focuses on character and virtue ethics that focuses on virtues. Oakley's approach is remarkable, but my focus will be slightly different and inspired by McKinnon's work (on which,

more below). 14. McKinnon 1999, 10.

15. True enough, this could be seen as an instrumental good, as the coyote's fur is an

"instrument" for the coyote to survive cold desert nights. However, McKinnon is using this

example to illustrate her point about human virtues. There are certain fundamental human

characteristics that demand that we be virtuous in a certain way. For the coyote, the fur is a

fundamental characteristic, and the coyote must have a warm coat to "flourish." Similarly, as I

explain, the human has certain characteristics that he or she must see to it to develop in order to

flourish as an individual.

16. According to McKinnon, one chooses virtues to build one's own character. For her, character building is the essential feature of ethics. She attempts to reconcile this view with the

unity of virtues theory that is usually related to virtue-focused virtue ethics. In McKinnon's view,

unity is an intrinsic value. A life must be unified to be worthwhile. It can be unified only when

provided continuity by its own author, i.e., the character-focused virtuous agent. For such an



18 Christine Daigle

agent, unity is brought about by choosing virtues according to what is seen as a good human life.

The unity of virtues theory, held by McKinnon, differs slightly from the traditional theory. The

traditional thesis holds that one must possess all virtues. McKinnon's thesis proposes that there is

unity of virtues when the agent chooses his or her own virtues with consideration to the

flourishing human life as a lifelong goal. One need not choose all the available virtues, but one

must choose all of one's virtues with this goal in mind. For this, one must make use of practical reason, phronesis. Virtues may be different for different individuals, but to qualify as virtuous, one

must be practically wise. In what follows, I will not claim that Nietzsche's brand of virtue ethics

is the same as that proposed by McKinnon. For one, he would not agree with what I just explained about phronesis. Nonetheless, I find McKinnon's approach worthwhile and think that it does shed

light on the process of selecting virtues to pursue. There is a sense in Nietzsche that one must be

selective in choosing one's virtues and that there is a unity to be found underlying this choice, i.e., the flourishing of oneself as an instance of will to power. There will be more on this later. I must

acknowledge, however, that McKinnon's version of virtue ethics is indeed similar to that of

Magnus, as a reviewer kindly remarked.

17. Leiter 1997.

18. Slote 1998, 23. This is something Swanton would agree with. Slote further explains that

Nietzsche is a perfectionistic consequentialist. An ethical view is perfectionistic when it holds that

moral value is intrinsically linked to a conception of the human good. 19. See my Le nihilisme est-il un humanisme? ?tude sur Nietzsche et Sartre (2005). 20. Philippa Foot sets out to examine the question of Nietzsche's, sometimes self-attributed,

immoralism in an article on Nietzsche's revaluation of values. She notes that Nietzsche is

sometimes ready to throw away notions of justice and the common good in favor of the production of stronger and more splendid men. For Foot, this is the source of Nietzsche's immoralism

because, according to her, morality is necessarily connected with such notions of justice and

common good. Foot then asks herself how it is possible that we continuously get the feeling that

Nietzsche has much in common with the moralist. Her answer is as follows: "[I]n much of his

work he can be seen as arguing about the way in which men must live in order to live well. It is

the common ground between his system and that of traditional and particularly Greek morality that

makes us inclined to think that he must be a moralist after all. [. . .] [H]e himself was interested, one might say, in the conditions in which men?at least strong men?would flourish" (1978, 92). In this, Foot is already tracking the fundamental problem related to reading Nietzsche's ethics as

an instance of virtue ethics, namely, how to make sense of his political ideas in such a context.

21. I am thinking of certain passages in Thus Spoke Zarathustra, specifically "Of the Vision

and the Riddle."

22. See the interesting development of this idea by Volker Gerhardt in "Selbstbegr?ndung. Nietzsches Moral der Individualit?t" (1992).

23. Given that Nietzsche claimed that he was saying the same thing in both Thus Spoke Zarathustra and Beyond Good and Evil, my coming claim will be problematic. In the next section, I will argue that the virtue ethics with the figure of the ?bermensch needs a political program,

which goes against what Nietzsche says in BGE. It is difficult to reconcile the views expressed in

and BGE relative to the ?bermensch because of the order of rank of which Nietzsche makes so

much in the later text.

24. Hunt 1991, 112.

25. Hunt 1991, 113.

26. Hunt 1991,78. 27. In the following, I favor the published material and not the posthumous fragments.

Specifically, I take section 341 of GS as being the most explicit passage in Nietzsche's writings about the notion of the eternal recurrence and its meaning. It is formulated as a conditional and is

presented as a test.



Virtue Ethics ... Virtue Politics? 19

28. True enough, a virtue ethics does not necessarily constitute an ethical program for all

human beings. However, as I mentioned earlier, the way of overmanliness, which is attainable by

practice of virtue ethics, is opened to all up until Beyond Good and Evil.

29. It has been objected to me that the theory of types that we find in Nietzsche prevents any

reading like mine. In fact, one would be determined to be of a higher or lower type. Physiology will play a role in this determination. However, I firmly believe that there is no such

determinism in Nietzsche's philosophy. Indeed, physiology will be determinant but only to a

certain extent. The individual may still act on her own physiology and engage in the ascending

path, the way of overmanliness. I think the example of Nietzsche himself is enlightening in that

relation. Nietzsche always considered himself as a decadent, as physiologically decrepit. However, by a strong act of will close to asceticism, he subjected his physiology to the necessary control so as to be of an ascending rather than declining type. (See Daniel W. Conway's

Nietzsche and the Political [1997] for an interesting discussion of asceticism in Nietzsche.) Nietzsche considered himself successful enough in this "shaping of oneself to qualify himself as a "free spirit," a figure close enough to the ?bermensch. This Nietzschean self

experimentation is revealing of Nietzsche's belief in the power of the will. Further, he expresses this faith by his many appeals to his readers. Indeed, why appeal to one's readers if those are

entirely determined by their type? 30. This is in no way a unique outburst. For example, in the later text Twilight of the Idols

Nietzsche says: "Democracy has always been the declining form of the power to organize: I have

already, in Human, All Too Human, characterized modern democracy, together with its imperfect manifestations such as the 'German Reich,'' as the decaying form of the state" ("Expeditions" ?39). But democracy is not entirely bad, as he explains in BGE ?242, in that the conditions we find in

democratization "are likely in the highest degree to give birth to exceptional human beings of the

most dangerous and attractive quality." 31. A sign of this tension is the amount of literature devoted to the political thought of

Nietzsche and the debate that is raging between the aristocratic/agonistic reading and the

democratic/agonistic reading. The former finds a noteworthy representative in Daniel W. Conway

(1997); the latter, in Lawrence Hatab (1995). 32. It has been pointed out to me that it is not "many texts" but, rather, that the "balance of

textual evidence" clearly lies on the side of the aristocratic reading. I want to grant this point. However, it does not mean that coherence would not require otherwise. Again, my claim is that if

Nietzsche is a virtue ethicist as I have delineated, then coherence requires that he be a virtue

politician, i.e., with a democratic leaning. 33. It is quite interesting and fruitful to appeal to Simone de Beauvoir. My work on her ethics

has led me to rethink some aspects of Nietzsche's own philosophy. Her critique of Nietzsche is

quite interesting and, I think, to the point. However, she is still pretty close to some Nietzschean

positions like the notion of self-overcoming. Because some of her ethical proposals are almost

Nietzschean, it is interesting to see how she bridges the gap between ethics and politics to see if it can be of any help in our examination of the Nietzschean problem. I have provided some hints

regarding the potential comparison between Beauvoir and Nietzsche in my "The Ambiguous Ethics of Beauvoir" (2006).

34. This critique by Simone de Beauvoir is found in The Ethics of Ambiguity (1948, 72). 35. Many passages in Nietzsche's work point to the fact that one should not exert brute power

or cruelty toward weaker ones but, instead, should display a healthy form of pity. An ?bermensch would be self-affirming and powerful enough so that his power would overflow, allowing him to

be pitiful of lower human beings. Nietzsche goes so far as to make it a higher individual's duty to

be gentle toward weaker individuals: "When an exceptional human being handles the mediocre more gently than he does himself or his equals, this is not mere politeness of the heart?it is

simply his duty" (A 57).



20 Christine Daigle

36. I doubt that there is much difference in this case between the freedom that Beauvoir is

talking about and the will to power that Nietzsche sees at the core of the human being. The

difference between these two views could be related to the fact that where Nietzsche says that he

finds will to power in everything that lives and in the universe as a whole, Beauvoir talks about

freedom only in relation to the individual.

37. See A 2 and also 77 "Expeditions of an Untimely Man" 36.

38. See also BGE 61 and the whole section "What is noble" in BGE.

39. Biographeme is a term I borrow from Jean-Fran?ois Louette in his Sartre contra Nietzsche

(1996) that means a theme taken out of an author's own biography. In this case, we know that

Nietzsche led a very lonely life. Nietzsche would then transpose this aspect of his life into his own

writings, making his own solitude a virtue.

40. Is this present in Nietzsche's writings in latent form? That remains to be established, and

this exegetic work is beyond the scope of this article. If it proves impossible to establish, it will

remain that a virtue politics of the kind I propose is the logical outcome of his ethical program with or without Nietzsche being its advocate.

Works Cited Beauvoir, Simone de. The Ethics of Ambiguity. Trans. B. Frechtman. Secaucus, N.J.: Citadel

Press, 1948.

Brobjer, Thomas H. "Nietzsche's Affirmative Morality: An Ethics of Virtue." Journal of Nietzsche

Studies, no. 26 (2003): 64-78.

Cameron, Frank. Nietzsche and the "Problem "

of Morality. New York: Peter Lang, 2002.

Conway, Daniel W. Nietzsche and the Political. London: Routledge, 1997.

Foot, Philippa. Virtues and Vices and Other Essays in Moral Philosophy. Berkeley: University of

California Press, 1978.

Daigle, Christine. Le nihilisme est-il un humanisme? ?tude sur Nietzsche et Sartre. Sainte-Foy: Presses de l'Universit? Laval, 2005.

-. "The Ambiguous Ethics of Beauvoir." In Existentialist Thinkers and Ethics, ed. Christine

Daigle, 120-41. Montreal: McGill/Queen's University Press, 2006.

Gerhardt, Volker. "Selbstbegr?ndung. Nietzsches Moral der Individualit?t." Nietzsche-Studien 21

(1992): 28-49.

Hatab, Lawrence. A Nietzschean Defense of Democracy. An Experiment in Postmodern Politics.

Chicago: Open Court, 1995.

Hunt, Lester H. Nietzsche and the Origin of Virtue. Routledge Nietzsche Studies. London:

Routledge, 1991.

Kaufmann, Walter. Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist. New York: Vintage Books, 1968.

Leiter, Brian. "Nietzsche and the Morality Critics." Ethics (January 1997): 250-85.

Louden, Robert B. "Virtue Ethics." In Encyclopedia of Applied Ethics, vol. 4, editor-in-chief Ruth

Chadwick, 491-98. San Diego: Academic Press, 1998.

Louette, Jean-Fran?ois. Sartre contra Nietzsche. Grenoble: Presses Universitaires de Grenoble, 1996.

Magnus, Bernd. "Aristotle and Nietzsche: 'Megalopsychia' and 'Uebermensch.'" In The Greefa

and the Good Life, ed. David J. Depew, 260-95. Fullerton: California State University, 1980.

McKinnon, Christine. Character, Virtue Theories, and the Vices. Peterborough, Ontario:

Broadview Press, 1999.

Oakley, Justin. "Varieties of Virtue Ethics." Ratio 9:2 (September 1996): 128-52.

-. "A Virtue Ethics Approach." In A Companion to Bioethics, ed. Helga Kuhse and Peter

Singer, 88-91. Oxford: Blackwell, 1998.



Virtu f. Ethics ... Virtue Politics? 21

Slote, Michael. "Nietzsche and Virtue Ethics." International Studies in Philosophy 30:3 (1998): 23-27.

Swanton, Christine. "Outline of a Nietzschean Virtue Ethics." International Studies in Philosophy 30:3 (1998): 29-38.

Trianosky, Gregory. "What Is Virtue Ethics All About?" American Philosophical Quarterly 27:4

(October 1990): 335-43.

Young, Charles. "Virtue and Flourishing in Aristotle's Ethics." In The Greeks and the Good Life, ed. D. J. Depew, 138-56. Fullerton: California State University, 1980.



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