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ii
Approval
Name: Anointing Ogie Momoh
Degree: Master of Public Policy
Title: Nigerian Asylum Seekers: “A Long Walk to Freedom” or “The Pursuit of Happiness”
Examining Committee: Chair: Nancy Olewiler Professor, School of Public Policy, SFU
Dominque Gross Senior Supervisor Professor
Doug McArthur Supervisor Professor
John Richards Internal Examiner Professor
Date Defended/Approved: March 13th, 2019
iii
Abstract
The pattern, trends and conditions of Nigerians migrating irregularly yearly to seek
asylum around the world has been on the increase and is worrisome. It was about 48
persons per 100,000 of the Nigerian population in 2017 (UNHCR, 2018b). On the
journey to Europe through North Africa, many die or are caught up in significant human
rights abuse situations. In North America where the journey is arguably less dangerous,
irregular migration from Nigeria has found its way into political discourses. This capstone
applies panel regression techniques to pooled macro-level data to examine the origin
and destination country factors driving the irregular migration of Nigerians. It considers
the policy problem that: “There are too many Nigerians migrating irregularly to seek
asylum in several countries”. Primarily, it recommends that the government employ
coordinated and targeted information campaigns to counter incorrect narratives on
migration and highlight the legal processes for migrating.
Appendix A. Nigerian asylum seekers and Irregular migration ............................. 64
Box 1: Top 10 destinations of Nigerian asylum seekers in 2000, 2010 and 2017 ... 64
Box 2: Why do Nigerians migrate irregularly? ......................................................... 65
Box 3: Death on the Mediterranean ........................................................................ 67
Appendix B. Variables, data summary and data sources ....................................... 69
Appendix C. Policy options and Evaluation ............................................................. 73
Box 4: The Philippines Overseas Employment Program ........................................ 73
Box 5: National commission for Refugees, Migrants and Internally Displaced Persons (NCFRMI) ................................................................................................. 73
Box 6: Abroad Mata: IOM Nigeria’s 13-episode radio program ............................... 74
viii
List of Tables
Table 1. Explanatory variables and hypothesis .................................................... 24
Table 2. Panel data estimation results ................................................................. 27
Table 3. Policy criteria and measures .................................................................. 36
Table 4. Summary of policy evaluation................................................................. 50
ix
List of Figures
Figure 1. Nigerian population growth trends, 1950 - 2016: Total, Males and Females ................................................................................................... 4
Figure 2. Total Nigerian asylum seekers globally 2000 - 2017 and the number per 100,000 of the total population ................................................................. 5
Figure 3. Nigerian asylum applicants in Europe by age groups, 2008 - 2017 .......... 6
Figure 4. Nigerian asylum applicants in Europe by sex (percentage), 2008 – 2017 . 7
Figure 5. Nigerian asylum seekers in various regions of the World, 2000 - 2017 ..... 9
Figure 6. Nigerian asylum seekers in Canada and the US., 2000 - 2017 ............... 12
x
List of Acronyms
CEPII Centre d'Études Prospectives et d'Informations Internationales
ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States
EU European Union
FE Fixed Effects
GMDAC Global Migration Data Analysis Centre
IOM International Organization for Migration
MIDAS Migration Information and Data Analysis System
MSCs Migrant Service Centres
NAPTIP National Agency for the Prohibition of Trafficking In Persons
NCFRMI National Commission for Refugees, Migrants and Internally Displaced Persons
NIS Nigeria Immigration Service
OLS Ordinary Least Squares
UN United Nations
UNDESA United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs
UNHCR United Nations High Commission on Refugees
UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund
xi
Executive Summary
This study identifies, analyzes and offers recommendations to address the policy
problem that “There are too many Nigerians migrating irregularly to several countries to
seek asylum”. Although the migration of people in search of economic and other
opportunities is normal and is a central part of human civilization, the recent patterns and
trends and conditions of Nigerians leaving the country yearly to seek asylum around the
world is significant, has been on the increase and is a cause for concern. Over the past
two decades and particularly since 2010, there has been a drastic increase in the
total number of Nigerians seeking asylum in several countries. From about 3,500
individuals in the year 2000, the number increased to over fourteen thousand in
2005. It dropped off slightly in the period until 2010 and since then has risen
precipitously up to over fifty-one thousand individuals in 2015 and almost ninety-two
thousand by 2017.
The available data shows that there are a significant number of Nigerians
seeking asylum across Europe and in fact, most of the increase seen in the last
decade has been driven by this. Regardless, a significant number has been going to
North America, African countries and other regions of the world; and are for the most
part doing so irregularly. On the journey to Europe through North Africa, many are
victims of significant human rights abuse situations and several deaths have been
recorded as they attempt to cross the Mediterranean Sea. Even in regions like North
America where the journey is arguably less dangerous, the number of those crossing
the US-Canada borders has found its way into political discourses. Overall, and in
addition to the dangers of irregular migration, this has a negative impact on the
international image of Nigeria and Nigerians.
But why are Nigerians migrating irregularly? This paper applies panel
regression techniques to pooled macro-level data from the UNCHR, UNDESA, the
World Bank database, the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (ACLED), Freedom
House and the World Bank Climate Change Knowledge Portal to examine the origin
and destination country factors driving the irregular migration and asylum-seeking of
xii
Nigerians. The data are collected from 2000 to 2017 for 195 countries in which
asylum claims can be made by Nigerians.
The UN 1951 convention Relating to the Status of Refugees effectively
requires that asylum seekers can show that they face persecution as individuals or
for being members of certain groups and as a result are unable to stay in their
country of origin. The evidence obtained in this study does not show this to be the
case for most of the Nigerians seeking asylum. Rather, economic factors; such as
relative income differences and the potential of gaining employment in the
destination country, social networks and immigration policies in the destination
countries as well as Nigeria’s youth bulge tend to be more prominent determining
factors.
Given the significant factors identified as driving irregular migration, the paper
presents three possible options for addressing the current situation; namely migration
information campaigns, bilateral labour migration arrangements and enhanced border
management capabilities for Nigeria’s immigration service. These options are evaluated
against six distinct criteria (and eleven underlying measures) including effectiveness,
freedom, safety, administrative complexity, costs and stakeholder acceptance. It
recommends primarily that coordinated and targeted migration information campaigns
be employed to counter incorrect narratives on migration and highlight the legal
processes for migrating from the country. It, however, notes that the three policy options
identified are not mutually exclusive and would need to be employed to varying degrees
to ensure a sustained impact on the problem.
Given Nigeria’s strategic position on the African continent, and its
representativeness of the migration trends of the West African sub-region,
understanding the underlying dynamics at play in irregular migration from the country
contributes to a broader conversation on how migration from the region has come to
impact and influence the immigration policies and border regimes of several Western
democracies and how it is, in turn, shaping relations between the states, citizens and
noncitizens.
1
Chapter 1. Introduction
Globalization has led to an increase in the migration across international
boundaries in search of economic and other opportunities, and this is normal. However,
the pattern, trends and conditions of Nigerians leaving the country yearly to seek asylum
around the world is significant, has been on the increase and is worrisome. In 2000, the
number of Nigerian asylum seekers globally was about 3,465 persons. The number rose
to about 14,663 persons by 2003, and between 2011 and 2017 rose from 10,532 to
91,862 persons. This number represents 0.048% of the total population in 2017
compared with 0.0028% in 2000 (UNHCR, 2018b).
Most of these individuals migrate irregularly and their living conditions are
worrisome. Several are trapped in precarious conditions before, during and after their
journeys. In the two main regions where they have migrated and sought asylum - Europe
and North America, they are a significant part of the irregular migrant population.
Irregular migration poses dangers - such as human smuggling, trafficking and forced
labour of women and children and associated costs. Arguably, the irregular migration to
North America – Canada and the US - is less arduous. However, surveys of Sub-
Saharan Africa migrants – including Nigerians - have indicated that those in North
America are usually more educated than their counterparts elsewhere in Europe. This is
a loss of human capital to the Nigerian economy.
This capstone addresses the policy problem that: “There are too many Nigerians
migrating irregularly to seek asylum in several countries”. The research question it
answers is: Why are many Nigerians migrating irregularly to seek asylum in several
parts of the World? The available literature and the macro-level econometric analysis
carried out points to an array of economic, socio-political, and demographic factors in the
origin (Nigeria) and destination countries. A key finding is that persecution – as defined
by the United Nations 1951 convention on refugees – is not the main motivation for the
asylum claims being made. Rather, most Nigerians are seeking asylum in response to
severe relative income inequalities with the destination, unemployment, social networks,
immigration policies and the youth bulge.
2
The primary policy objective of the study is to control the number of Nigerians
leaving to seek asylum1 in various parts of the world. In the medium to long term, this
objective translates into reducing the overall level of out-migration from the country and
the associated loss of human capital. Three policy options are chosen to meet these
objectives; migration information campaigns, bilateral labour migration arrangements
and enhanced border management capabilities. After analyzing the options, migration
information campaigns are recommended; with the possibility to extend to include the
other two options.
The capstone is divided into eleven chapters. The next chapter two contains an
overview of the profiles of Nigerian asylum seekers. Chapter three discusses the
patterns in Nigerians seeking asylum in different parts of the World. Chapter four is a
discussion of irregular migration. In chapter five the policy problem is discussed, and the
stakeholders are identified. Chapter six contains the analytical methodology. Chapter
seven is the empirical analysis and a discussion of the secondary methodology. Chapter
eight contains the policy objectives, criteria and policy options. Chapters nine, ten and
eleven contain the evaluation of the policy options, policy recommendations and
conclusion respectively.
1 As discussed later in chapter 4, there is no data clearly differentiating irregular migrants from asylum seekers due to the inherently clandestine nature of the activity. Hence throughout this capstone the number of asylum seekers (or asylum applications) is been used as a conservative measure of irregular migration.
3
Chapter 2. Nigerian asylum seekers
This chapter presents a legal definition of asylum seekers. It outlines and
compares the characteristics of Nigerian asylum seekers to Nigeria’s total population
and maps out their socio-demographic and geographic profiles globally.
2.1. Who is an asylum seeker?
The United Nations (UN) is the apex global organization for migration and in its
1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, it set up the key
documents that provide the minimum2 legal basis for asylum consideration by UN
member states (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees UNHCR, 2010).
According to the UN 1951 Convention,
“A refugee is someone who is unable or unwilling to return to their country of origin owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion” (UN General Assembly, 1951, p.152).
An asylum seeker is someone who has applied for protection as a refugee in a
country other than their country of citizenship and is awaiting the determination of status.
In some instances, the distinction between an asylum seeker and a refugee is made with
regards to the place where the individual is when they ask for protection. Whereas an
asylum seeker typically asks for protection after arriving in the host country, a refugee
asks for protection and is granted this protected status outside of the country of asylum
(United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation, UNESCO, n.d.).
Regardless, however, the key distinction to be made is in the status of the individuals’
application. A refugee is someone who has already been granted protection and
residence in the host country, while an asylum-seeker has made an application for
2 Exact definitions of refugee and asylum seeker may vary from country to country, depending on the laws of each country.
4
protection and is pending the determination of their application for refugee status
(UNESCO, n.d.).
2.2. Population and asylum seekers
Nigeria is Africa’s most populous country, with an estimated population of 196
million people in 2018 and is projected to have the third largest population in the world
by 2050 (United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, UNDESA, 2017). It
has a relatively young population with about 44 percent less than 15 years old and about
75 percent less than 35 years old. Figure 1 shows the trend of Nigeria’s total population
between 1950 and 2016 and the number of males and females. Males and females are
near equally distributed, accounting for 50.7% and 49.3% of the total population
respectively.
Figure 1. Nigerian population growth trends, 1950 - 2016: Total, Males and Females
Source: UNDESA, (2017).
Figure 2 shows the total number of Nigerians who sought asylum globally
between 2000 and 2017 and the number per 100,000 of the total population. Over the
past decade, the number of citizens leaving the country and seeking asylum elsewhere
has been rising strongly. In 2000, there were about 3,465 persons (Figure 2). It
increased to 14,663 persons by 2003. After a slight decrease in 2006, it remained stable
for a few years until 2011. Another big rise occurred between 2011 and 2017 when the
0
20
40
60
80
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120
140
160
180
Mill
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s (
pe
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Total population, both sexes Males Females
5
number rose from 10,532 to 91,862 persons. The number was less than 48 persons per
100,000 of the overall population (0.048 percent)3 in 2017, but it is a jump from less than
3 persons in 2000 (Figure 2). UNHCR, (2018a) data shows that the country was among
the main countries of origin of new asylum seekers globally from 2008 to 2017. It came
behind such violence and war-torn countries as Afghanistan, Syria, Iraq, Democratic
Republic of Congo, Venezuela, and El Salvador in 2017.
Figure 2. Total Nigerian asylum seekers globally 2000 - 2017 and the number per 100,000 of the total population
Source: UNHCR (2018)
2.3. Age, sex and educational qualification of Nigerian asylum seekers
There is no public data that disaggregates the total number of asylum seekers by
age, sex or educational qualification. However, Eurostat, (2018) showed that between
3 As some of the literature suggests, migration is often also an outcome of rising population. However, within this context, it is important to recognize the difference between the number Nigerians migrating from the country for several other reasons (such as education, family reunification, work etc.) to those seeking asylum. As the UNHCR definition of asylum seekers in section 2.1 suggests, legally (at least) these are significantly different categories of migrants. Hence the comparison shown in the figure.
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
0
10
20
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50
60
70
80
90
100
per
10
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00
of
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Total asylum-seekers Asylum seekers per 100,000 population
6
2008 and 2017 most Nigerians applying for asylum in the EU4 were aged between 18
and 35 years (60 – 80%)(Figure 3).
Figure 3. Nigerian asylum applicants in Europe by age groups, 2008 - 20175 Source: Eurostat (2018)
There were more males than female asylum applicants between 2008 and 2017
(Figure 4). The UNHCR Bureau for Europe, (2017) reported that about 11,009 Nigerian
women (29.3% of Nigerians) reached Italian shores in 2016 (almost double the number
in 2015 – 5,633 women). There were also 3,040 Nigerian Unaccompanied and
Separated Children (UASC) who arrived in Italy in 2016.6
4 According to the UNHCR, in 2017 almost 70% of Nigerian asylum seekers (41,855 persons) were in Europe.
5 The number of Nigerian asylum seekers reported by Eurostat for 2017 and previous years is lower than what is reported by the UNHCR. The UNHCR database includes individuals who have sought international protection and whose claims for refugee status have not yet been determined, irrespective of when such claims may have been lodged. On the other hand, Eurostat database identifies asylum applicants with respect to specific reference periods.
6 14% of Nigerian new arrivals are UASC, as opposed to 7% in 2015.
Figure 4. Nigerian asylum applicants in Europe by sex (percentage), 2008 – 2017
Source: Eurostat (2018)
There is no similar data on the asylum seekers in several other countries and
regions such as the US and Canada. However, data on the 3,916 asylum applications
made by Nigerians in Canada, which were finalized between January 2013 and
September 20177, showed that 1,973 (50.4%) were made by females. Many of the
applications alleged gender-based persecution including domestic and non-domestic
violence, female genital mutilation, forced marriage and widowhood rites.
Data on the educational levels of asylum seekers and irregular migrants are
generally lacking. However, a survey by IOM (2017a) reports that among Nigerian
migrants in Libya - on the journey to Europe - 23% had no education, 24% had primary
education, 25% had secondary education, and 10% had some post-secondary
education. 9% had some form of vocational education, and 9% had Koranic (or Arabic)
education. On the other hand, Anderson, et al., (2018) find that Sub-Saharan African
immigrants – including Nigerians - in the US are often more educated than those in top
European destinations including the United Kingdom, France, Italy and Portugal.
7 The primary data was first obtained and made public by Tara Carman & Anita Elash, from the Immigration and Refugee Board through (IRB) an Access to Information request for their CBC investigates article: “Gender persecution the top reason women seek asylum in Canada’. It includes 89,517 claims that were finalized, or concluded, between Jan. 1, 2013, and Sept. 30, 2017
34.2
36.5
40.6
34.0
42.5
35.8
29.2
28.5
32.9
37.2
65.8
63.5
59.3
65.9
57.4
60.2
70.8
71.5
67.0
62.8
60.0 40.0 20.0 0.0 20.0 40.0 60.0 80.0
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
Females Males
8
In summary, the reviewed data shows that the number of Nigerians seeking
asylum in several parts of the world has increased recently. Although this increase is
correlated with the growth of the total population, it has trended faster than population
growth. An attempt to disaggregate the data shows some patterns. Firstly, most of the
asylum applications were made to EU countries and were by males compared to the
case in North America where there appear to be relatively more asylum applications by
females. Secondly, there is an implicit demographic cost as most of the asylum seekers
comprise those in the prime population - aged 18-34years. Thirdly, arguably, those going
to North America are more educated than those going to Europe.
9
Chapter 3. Nigerian asylum seekers around the World
This chapter examines the trends of Nigerian asylum seekers in continents of the
World to address “where are Nigerians seeking asylum?”.
Figure 5 shows the evolution of Nigerian asylum seekers in three major world
regions: Europe, Africa and North America. Between 2000 and 2005, most were in
Africa and their number reached 10,851 persons in 2005. After 2006 most of them were
in Europe, making up over 70% of the total by 2017. Historically, North America has
been the third main region of asylum for them. However, in 2017, it became second as
those in North America (11,159 persons) exceeded those within Africa (9,822 persons).
Figure 5. Nigerian asylum seekers in various regions of the World, 2000 - 2017 Source: UNHCR Database (2018)
Europe is by far the main region. From about 17% in 2000, between 2006 and 2017, the
number in Europe rose to between 50 and 80 percent of their total number globally
(UNHCR, 2018b). As shown in Appendix A, the destination countries varied quite a bit
during that time.
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70
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Africa Australia EuropeAsia & M. East N. America S. America
10
3.1. Nigerian asylum seekers in Europe
Nigerians accounted for between 2.32% (2015) to 5.69% (2017) of the total
asylum seekers in Europe between 2008 and 2017 (Eurostat, 2018). Most of them follow
a well-worn Central Mediterranean Route (CMR)8 through North Africa (Libya), across
the Mediterranean sea to Italy (IOM, 2017c). The UNHCR Bureau for Europe, (2017)
observed that among the 181,436 sea arrivals of potential asylum seekers in Italy in
2016, 37,551 were Nigerians (about 20%) – they were the most of any other nationality.
The UNHCR Bureau of Hope (2017) numbers may not effectively capture the
extent of Nigerians en route Europe to seek asylum as they do not account for those
trapped in precarious situations on the journey including those being smuggled,
trafficked, used as slaves or having their body parts harvested (IOM, 2017c). According
to IOM (2017), as of August 2017, there were 20,871 Nigerian migrants in Libya. A year
later, there were 64,980 of them. Most of them indicated that they had entered Libya
through an unofficial entry point and Europe was their intended final destination (IOM,
2018).
The drastic upturn in the number of people going to Europe since 2011 (figure 5)
is not unrelated to the overthrow of the Libyan Gaddafi regime in October of the same
year. The resulting chaos and instability created by the leadership vacuum made
migration through Libya more dangerous. It, however, also allowed smuggling and
human trafficking networks to thrive and created a sudden opening up of the CMR to
Nigerians and migrants from other Sub-Sahara African countries (Altai Consulting &
IMPACT Initiative, 2017).
3.2. Nigerian asylum seekers in North America – Canada and the US
North America has been an asylum destination for Nigerians. As a proportion of
the number globally, those in North America have ranged between 43.3% in 2000,
8 The UNHCR Bureau for Europe, (2017) identifies three main migrant routes for asylum seekers entering Europe namely, the Western Balkan/Eastern Mediterranean route from Turkey to Greece, the Central Mediterranean route from Libya to Italy and the Western Mediterranean route from Algeria and Morocco to Spain.
11
4.03% in 2014, and more recently, 12.1% in 20179 (UNHCR, 2018b). Specifically,
Canada and the US featured among the top 10 asylum countries for Nigerian asylum
seekers in 2000, 2010 and 201710.
The number in Canada increased from 1,495 persons in 2016 to 6,005 persons
at the end of 2017 (IRCC, 2018b). Since 2016, the Canadian media have reported
people entering irregularly from the US into the country at unofficial border crossings to
seek asylum. In 2016, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) apprehended 2,464
such individuals (Kathleen Harris, 2018). In 2017, 20,593 apprehensions were made
(IRCC, 2018a), and an additional 11,769 apprehensions in the first quarter of 2018.
Many of these individuals where Nigerians (IRCC, 2018b). In the first quarter of 2018,
the number of Nigerian asylum seekers was 2,995 – including those applying at official
and unofficial border crossings (IRCC, 2018b). These numbers placed Nigeria as the top
country of origin of asylum seekers to Canada in 2018.
The influx of asylum seekers from the US into Canada has been attributed to the
changing immigration policy stance of the US government which threatens the continued
stay of ‘illegal immigrants’ and certain categories of individuals in the country (Proctor,
2017). As of August 2018, 444 deportation orders had been issued against Nigerians in
the US who had violated immigration rules, compared with 227, 248 and 279 deportation
orders in 2015, 2016, and 2017 respectively (TRAC Reports, n.d.).
The irregular migration of Nigerians (and other nationals) from the US to seek
asylum in Canada, has also been tied directly to the ‘Safe Third Country Agreement’
STCA between Canada and the US – which effectively prevents individuals from seeking
asylum at official Canadian border crossings if they have first been in the US (Proctor,
2017). As figure 6 shows, however, it is not clear that the higher number of asylum
seekers in Canada have displaced the number in the US. Since 2012, the number in the
US has increased as well as in Canada.
9 As shown in figure 3, until recently, the number of Nigerian asylum seekers in North America have followed a relatively stable trend. The variation in the proportion/percentage is driven by the higher increase in Nigerian asylum seekers in Europe over the period from 2000 to 2017.
10 See Appendix A, figures a, b and c which show the top 10 countries of asylum of Nigerians in 2000, 2010 and 2017 respectively.
Figure 6. Nigerian asylum seekers in Canada and the US., 2000 - 2017 Source: UNHCR Database, (2018)
3.3. Nigerian asylum seekers in Africa
The data from UNHCR, (2018b) shown in figure 5 shows that most Nigerian
asylum seekers have not been in Africa - especially in the last decade. As Spinks,
(2013) observes, typically people tend to first seek asylum and become refugees in
neighbouring countries. This is also true for Nigerian refugees. For example, according
to UNHCR, (2017) as of November 30, 2017, there were 206,597 Nigerian refugees
displaced by the Boko Haram11 insurgency in Chad, Cameroon and Niger. However, as
figure 5 suggests, less than 11 percent of Nigerians sought asylum in African (9,822
persons) in 2017.
The main reason for the disparity between the number of Nigerian refugees and
the asylum seekers in Africa arises from the provisions of the 1969 ‘OAU Convention
Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa’. In addition to the
definition by the 1951 UN convention, the OAU Convention defines the term ‘refugees’ to
11 The Boko Haram insurgency in the North Eastern part of the country started in 2009 and claimed many lives and led to several internally displaced persons (IDPs). The jihadist rebel group leads an armed rebellion against the government of Nigeria and has continued to operate in the country.
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Nigerian asylum-seekers in Canada Nigerian asylum-seekers in the US
13
“apply to every person who, owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public order in either part or the whole of his country of origin or nationality, is compelled to leave his place of habitual residence in order to seek refuge in another place outside his country of origin or nationality” (Organisation of African Unity (OAU), 1969, p.2).
The 1951 UN Convention (and UNHCR, 2018b) reflects the individual nature of the
asylum seekers in the traditional sense, while the OAU convention tries to accommodate
mass exoduses of persons who are forced to leave their home countries as result of civil
wars or other armed conflicts without being persecuted on a more individual level. This
potentially leads to a situation where African asylum seekers go to neighbouring
countries and are automatically refugees without going through traditional channels to
seek asylum. A second related reason may be due to generally poor immigration and
border data management in several African countries (Shaw, 2007).
Overall, from 2000 to 2017, the direction of asylum flows from Nigeria has shifted
remarkably from being concentrated in African countries; the majority are now going to
European countries. Also, the magnitude of the flows has increased significantly from
less than 1000 Nigerian asylum seekers per destination in 2000 to as much as 37,967 in
Italy in 2017. At the same time as the number of asylum seekers in European countries,
the number going to Canada and the US have also been increasing.
14
Chapter 4. Irregular migration from Nigeria
There is no generally accepted definition of the term irregular migration. Across
jurisdictions, other nuanced terms such as illegal migration12, undocumented migration
or clandestine migration may be used interchangeably with irregular migration. However,
IOM (2011:p5), defines irregular migration as “movement that takes place outside the
regulatory norms of the sending, transit and receiving countries”. This chapter discusses
some of the reasons why Nigerians may migrate irregularly. It identifies the dangers of
irregular migration as well as its implications for the social economy of Nigeria.
4.1. Why do Nigerians migrate irregularly?
The reasons why people migrate can be categorized on three levels namely
macro-level, micro-level and meso-level factors (Carbone, 2017). Macro-level factors
affect all types of individuals that leave a country. This could include the demographics
of the origin and destination, distance, economic and socio-political factors. Micro-level
factors affect the individual migrant distinctively; such as their personal features (age,
gender, health, language, ethnicity, etc.) and the resources available to them to facilitate
their migration (finances, skills and education). Meso-level factors are the middle, less
obvious factors and wider networks connecting the individual with the broader society.
These different sets of factors could be responsible for the migration (irregular) seen in
the country13.
4.2. Dangers of irregular migration
Libya has been a focal transit point for people heading towards Europe – through
the CMR (UNHCR Bureau for Europe, 2017; IOM, 2017b). Adepoju (2017, p.132)
observed that the collapse of the Gaddafi regime in Libya in 2011, and the political
12 There is a tendency to restrict the use of the term illegal migration to cases of smuggling of migrants and trafficking in persons.
13 See chapter 6.2 and Appendix A, box 2 for further discussion of these individual factors.
15
instability in the years following, created a situation that left many migrants “stranded,
apprehended and deported”. Many have been reportedly killed, maimed and robbed of
their property and others have persisted to flee to Europe in dangerous conditions on
rickety and inflatable boats – some of which have capsized. In a joint report with the UN
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), the United Nations
Support Mission in Libya (2016, p.1) reported that after interception by armed men
believed to be from the Libyan Coast Guard, refugees and migrants “are often beaten,
robbed and taken to detention centres or private houses and farms, where they are
subjected to forced labour, rape and other sexual violence”.
There are gendered risks involved in irregular migration. Women and young girls
face greater risks of human right abuses and death. In addition to the risks which
irregular migrants face, they are often victims of sexual and gender-based violence and
exploitation, various forms of human trafficking – including being subjected to forced
labour and marriage (Black, et. al., 2017). Adepoju, (2017) estimates that some 40,000
to 45,000 Nigerian women have become victims of trafficking over the past century –
about two-thirds to Europe and the remaining third to the Gulf States. Young women
from Nigeria are lured into prostitution by promises of education, good jobs and a better
life in Europe. The (UNHCR Bureau for Europe, 2017) has also expressed concerns that
around 80% of Nigerian women who arrived by sea to Italy in 2016 may be victims of
trafficking.
The total numbers of people who die or who go missing during their migration
journeys cannot be known for certain. This is more so for irregular migration which is
clandestine in nature (Black et al., 2017). However, the IOM (2018b) recorded a total of
6,163 migrant deaths worldwide at the end of 2017. Of this number, 1,708 were in Africa,
3,139 were on the Mediterranean14 and the main causes of death included drowning
from shipwrecks, hypothermia, vehicle accidents, suffocation and murder. The number
14 The records of deaths in the Mediterranean do not include all deaths that occur in this body of water, as many people drown and are not recovered from the sea. Without passenger lists of those on boats, IOM relies on the estimates of survivors once they are rescued, with the lowest reasonable estimate always used as the number of missing persons. This information is then cross-checked with that of the United Nations High Commission for Refugees and of various non-governmental organizations (NGOs) operating in the Mediterranean. As such, the numbers of persons known to be missing in the Mediterranean remain, at best, a minimum estimate, especially in large shipwrecks where estimates vary greatly (Black et al., 2017).
16
of migrant deaths in 2017 was less than the 8,070 recorded in 2016 (1,831 in Africa and
5,143 on the Mediterranean)15. It nevertheless highlights the extreme dangers that
migrants face on their journeys. The Mediterranean continues to account for the vast
majority of migrant deaths recorded globally, and again, as observed by the UNHCR
Bureau for Europe (2017), of the 181,436 potential asylum seekers who crossed the
Mediterranean sea into Italy in 2016, 37,551 (about 20%) were Nigerians.
4.3. Impacts of irregular migration on Nigeria
There are three basic aspects of the impacts of migration on Nigeria’s economic
development, brain-drain, brain waste and brain gain (Isiugo-Abanihe & IOM Nigeria,
2016). Brain drain describes the loss of highly skilled nationals of a country through long-
term employment abroad. It impacts negatively on developing countries because it
deprives them of enough skilled manpower needed to drive development. Brain waste
occurs when skilled migrants are under-employed abroad resulting in deskilling. Finally,
brain gain captures the benefit of reverse migration of individuals who have gained skills
abroad.
There is a security dimension to irregular migration. The context of most irregular
migration includes the activities of human smugglers and traffickers. In a variety of ways,
this fosters the establishment of cross-border criminal networks and international
terrorism (Flahaux & De Haas, 2016). Schmid (2016) explains that “migrants can be
terrorists, and terrorists can be migrants”. For example, the Boko Haram terrorist group
in Nigeria has often abducted and forced migrants – including women and children – to
join their ranks and be engaged in a series of suicide attacks. Also, terrorists have been
known to travel through irregular migrant routes to engage in acts of terrorism.
Migration (including irregular migration) could also have subsequent positive
impacts on the economic livelihood of the migrant and their families through remittances.
Remittances are a potential economic development tool in Nigeria as it is typically
channelled into financing cottage industries, business and real estate investment (Isiugo-
15 See in Appendix A, Box 3 and Table A which shows the average number of fatalities per incident recorded in the Central Mediterranean between January 2014 and June 2017 as well as Table B which shows the number of migrant deaths in the Mediterranean by age between January 2014 and June 2017.
17
Abanihe & IOM Nigeria, 2016). The World Bank (2017) identifies Nigeria as the largest
recipient of remittances in sub-Saharan Africa, and the fifth largest globally, receiving as
much as $22billion in remittances in 2017. These figures do not, however, include
remittances by irregular migrants through informal and unregulated channels – which
often greatly improve the living standards of the family of the migrant that is left behind.
Currently, there is no empirical literature measuring the remittance and gains from
irregular migration.
In summary, there are significant financial, social and human capital costs
associated with irregular migration. It also negatively impacts on the image of the
country. However, there are dividends if migration is managed properly – regular
migration. It can be engaged in the socioeconomic development of the country.
18
Chapter 5. Policy problem and stakeholders
The policy problem addressed in this capstone is: “There are too many Nigerians
migrating irregularly to seek asylum in several countries”.
The number of Nigerians migrating irregularly to seek asylum in different parts of
the world has been increasing and their living condition is worrisome. On the journey to
Europe on the Central Mediterranean Route (CMR), many deaths have been recorded.
This is in addition to frequent reports of human smuggling, trafficking and forced labour
of an increasing number of women and children. Even in cases where the journey is
arguably less dangerous as is the case of those in North America there is a significant
loss of human capital to the Nigerian economy.
The UN 1951 convention and the laws of different destination countries set out
the conditions on which asylum can be granted. These conditions require that asylum
seekers can show that they face persecution as individuals or for being members of
certain groups and as a result are unable to stay in their countries. Currently, there is no
definite evidence to show that this is the case for most of the Nigerians seeking asylum
around the World. There is, therefore, the possibility that many of them will have their
claims rejected and they might fall into more precarious living conditions in the
destination country or eventually be repatriated to Nigeria. Furthermore, the situation is
painting a negative picture of Nigeria and Nigerians around the World.
Relevant stakeholders include the Nigerians in Diaspora Europe (NIDO Europe)
and the members of the Partners Against Trafficking and Irregular Migration (PATIM)
network in Nigeria.16 They have raised concerns about the conditions of the asylum
seekers and irregular migrants trying to reach Europe. The host and transit countries of
the asylum seekers and irregular migrants such as the government of Libya, the
government of Italy, the European Union and the government of Canada have also
16 NIDO Europe is the European arm of the global Nigerian Diaspora network and serves as the umbrella organization for Nigerians in Europe
19
actively sought to reduce the numbers of asylum seekers and irregular migrants
reaching their shores and borders. Effective policies to address the problem may require
some collaboration with them.
Currently, the International Organization for Migration (IOM), the United Nations
High Commissioner of Refugees (UNHCR) and other multilateral agencies have been
funded by the government of Germany, the European Union, the government of
Switzerland, the Japanese government to implement migration management initiatives
and programs in Nigeria. All these are relevant stakeholders to be considered.
20
Chapter 6. Analytical Methodology
This chapter is a description of the analytical methodology. The primary
methodology is an econometric analysis of the determinants of the number of Nigerian
asylum seekers around the World. Publicly available quantitative data is obtained for
2000 to 2017 from the UNCHR database, UNDESA database, the World Bank database,
the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (ACLED) and the World Bank Climate Change
Knowledge Portal. The secondary methodology is an empirical literature review to
determine the validity of the results from the primary methodology. Next, the estimation
model, the variables and technique used are described.
6.1. The theoretical model
A simple gravity model for international-migration is estimated for the
determinants of irregular (asylum) migration from Nigeria. The gravity model is a
reduced form equation derived from a system of demand and supply relationships
(Karemera, Oguledo, & Davis, 2000). Although it is mostly used in the empirical literature
to investigate voluntary migration, there is growing consensus that the distinction
between voluntary and involuntary migrants (including asylum seekers and refugees) is
not as pronounced as previously assumed (Koser & Van Hear, 2005).
In a simple international migration model, bilateral migration flows are expressed
as a function of three broad classes of explanatory variables over time, namely (a)
political, economic and demographic factors in the origin country – push factors; (b)
political, economic and demographic factors in the destination country – pull factors; and
(c) factors enhancing or restraining migrant flows to the destination country – artificial
factors such as migration policies of destination countries and government limitations on
freedom of travel in origin countries or natural factors including distance, transport,
information or other costs (Karemera et al., 2000; Maria Mayda, 2005).
Here, the focus is on the factors that influence bilateral asylum flows from a
single origin country (Nigeria) to several destination countries. Adjustments are made to
21
the migration model by emphasizing the relevant origin country factors and including
variables which attempt to capture the underlying basis on which individuals can claim
asylum – as per the United Nations’ 1951 convention.
6.2. The dependent and explanatory variables
The following panel regression model is estimated for the determinants of
irregular migration of Nigerians in various countries over time;
𝐴𝑠𝑦𝑆𝑁𝑗,𝑡 = 𝜑1𝑍𝑁𝑡 + 𝜑2𝑋𝑗,𝑡 + 𝜑3𝐷_𝑁𝑗,𝑡 + ω𝑗𝑡 … (1)
The subscript j represents the destination country/cross-sections and subscript t
represents time (the year). 𝐴𝑠𝑦𝑆𝑁𝑗,𝑡 is the number of asylum applications by Nigerians in
country J in year t, 𝑍𝑁𝑡 is a matrix of the origin country explanatory variables, 𝑋𝑗𝑡 is a
corresponding matrix of destination explanatory variables, 𝐷_𝑁𝑡𝑗 is a matrix of variables
associated with both countries and ω𝑖𝑡 is a composite error term. The equation is a
typical time-series cross-section model and it has an advantage of allowing for different
individual and time effects for each country pair.
The dependent variable for the model is the log17 of the number of asylum
applications made by Nigerians in various countries (𝑙𝐴𝑠𝑦𝑆𝑁𝑗,𝑡) from 2000 to 2017
(Hatton, 2009).18 Four categories of explanatory variables are identified; economic,
political conflict, demographic and environmental variables. There is ample empirical
evidence showing that economic factors are major determinants of migration flows
(Hatton, 2009; Hatton et al., 2004; D. Karemera, Oguledo, & Davis, 2000; Neumayer,
2005). The first period lag of the natural log of relative GDP per capita (𝑙𝑅𝑒𝑙𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑁𝑗,𝑡−1)
between the origin and destination and the first period lag unemployment rate
(𝑈𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑗,𝑡−1) in the destination are used as measures of economic conditions. Asylum
applications are expected to be a positive function of the destination country’s income
and a negative function of the origin country’s income. Conversely, it is expected to be a
17 The data is publicly available on the UNHCR online database. Before taking the log of this variable, the values for years in which the number of asylum seekers is equal to zero are set to 1.
18 See Table E in Appendix B for summary of the dependent and independent variables; mean, median, minimum, maximum and standard deviations.
22
positive function of the origin country’s unemployment rate and a negative function of
unemployment in the destination country. However, in the origin country, the results
could be ambiguous as higher levels of income could help to facilitate migration
expenditures (Karemera et al., 2000).
Three separate variables are used to capture the level of politics and conflict in
the origin country; namely civil liberties index (𝐶𝑖𝑣𝐿𝑖𝑏𝑁𝑡), political rights index
(𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑅𝑔𝑡𝑁𝑡), and the political terror scale (𝑃𝑡𝑠𝑁𝑡) (Hatton, 2009; Hatton et al., 2004;
Neumayer, 2005; Schmeidl, 1997). The civil liberties and the political rights indices are
measured by Freedom House19 on a scale of one-to-seven. One indicates high levels of
civil liberties, and political rights, while seven indicates lower levels (Abramowitz, 2018).
It is expected that low levels of civil liberties (a high index) will contribute to a high
number of people deciding to leave the country and hence a high number of asylum
applications originating from the country. The evidence is however ambiguous as low
levels of civil liberties could signal repression to migration from the origin country
(Neumayer, 2005).
The number of conflict-related fatalities in Nigeria (𝐶𝑓𝑡𝐹𝑡𝑁𝑡) and the incidence of
armed conflicts in Nigeria (𝐴𝑟𝑚𝐶𝑓𝑡𝑁𝑡) are included to capture the incidence of conflict in
Nigeria. Relevant data are obtained from the Armed Conflict Location and Events Data
(ACLED) project which collects the dates, actors, types of violence, locations, and
fatalities of all reported political violence and protest events across various countries.
This variable is important in examining the factors that drive asylum migration as it
appears to encompass the basis on which the UN 1951 Convention grants that people
be given asylum. It is expected that a high incidence of conflicts positively correlated and
leads to high levels of asylum migration (Hatton, 2009).
The population density of the origin country (𝑙𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑛𝐷𝑒𝑛𝑁𝑡) tends to have a
positive relationship with migrant flows while the opposite is true for the population
density of the destination country (𝑙𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑛𝐷𝑒𝑛𝑗,𝑡)(Karemera et al., 2000). Population
19 The civil liberties index captures four categories of questions including: Freedom of Expression and Belief (4 questions), Associational and Organizational Rights (3), Rule of Law (4), and Personal Autonomy and Individual Rights (4). The political rights index captures three categories of questions: Electoral Process (3 questions), Political Pluralism and Participation (4), and Functioning of Government (3)
23
growth in the destination country tends to reduce its migrant absorption capacity and
hence reduces the intensity of pull factors. In the case of the origin country, a larger
population increases the number of those who are at risk and therefore tends to have an
upward effect on the long-run trend of asylum seekers (Hatton, 2009). Nigeria’s annual
population density is therefore included in the model as an explanatory variable. Also,
the log of the proportion of the Nigerian population aged 15-34years (𝑙𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑛𝑁𝑡) is
included - the migration literature suggests that this tends to be a migration-intensive
age group (Hatton, 2009).
The natural log of cumulative stock of asylum applications (𝑙𝐶𝑢𝑚𝐴𝑠𝑦𝑆𝑁𝑗,𝑡) is
included in the model to capture the networks effect of migration (Hatton, Richter, &
Faini, 2004). Underlying the networks effects is that people will tend to migrate to
countries where they have family and friends. The social networks help to reduce the
information, psychological and other costs of migration (Karemera et al., 2000; Maria
Mayda, 2005). The number of refugees per 1000 population of the destination country
(𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑔1000𝑗,𝑡) is used as a proxy for changes in the refugee acceptance policy of the
destination country. It is assumed a higher number of refugees per 1000 population
indicates that a country has more open refugee immigration policies. This will attract
more asylum applications.
Marchiori, Maystadt, & Schumacher (2012) find that weather anomalies lead to
increased internal and international migration across sub-Saharan Africa. Temperature,
(𝑇𝑒𝑚𝑝𝐴𝑛𝑁𝑡) and precipitation (𝑅𝑎𝑖𝑛𝐴𝑛𝑁𝑡) anomalies are computed for Nigeria as the
deviations from the country’s long-term mean, divided by its long-run standard
deviation20. Rainfall and temperature data are obtained from the World Bank Climate
Change Knowledge Portal for 1901 – 2015 and the entire period is used to obtain the
long-run mean. It is expected that high rates of weather anomalies will lead to higher
numbers of asylum applications.
20 𝑊𝑒𝑎𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑅,𝑡 = 𝑊𝑒𝑎𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝐴𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙_𝑡 − 𝜇𝑁𝐺𝑅
𝐿𝑅 (𝑊𝑒𝑎𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝐴)
𝜎𝑁𝐺𝑅𝐿𝑅 (𝑊𝑒𝑎𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝐴𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙)
where 𝑊𝑒𝑎𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑅,𝑡 is the weather anomaly
(rainfall or temperature) 𝑊𝑒𝑎𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝐴𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙_𝑡 is the level of rainfall or temperature in year t,
𝜇𝑁𝐺𝑅𝐿𝑅 (𝑊𝑒𝑎𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝐴) is the long-run mean rainfall or temperature, and 𝜎𝑁𝐺𝑅
𝐿𝑅 (𝑊𝑒𝑎𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝐴𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙) is the long-run standard deviation in rainfall or temperature over the reference period (Marchiori et al., 2012).
24
Finally, dummy explanatory variables are created for a common language,
(𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝐿𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑗) with Nigeria (1 if English is the official language of destination and Zero
otherwise), Europe, North America and Africa. The dependent and explanatory variables
and the data sources for each of them are summarized in appendix B.
a variable is in log form * 1 percent **5 percent ***10 percent level of significance. T-statistics in brackets.
The pooled OLS (1) and the FE (5) estimations are both significant. However, the
FE gives a better estimation for the model. The FE estimation has an adjusted R-
squared of 76.6 percent compared with 49.7 percent for the pooled OLS procedure. The
28
FE results were tested and showed evidence of serial correlation24 and so the white
period robust standard estimator is used (6)25,. Results robust to serial correlation
(column 6) and heteroscedasticity (column 7) do not show parameters significantly
strongly different from the basic FE estimation. Finally, a post-Gaddafi dummy (i.e. 1 for
every year after 2011 and 0 for the years before) was used to check the impact of fall of
the Gaddafi regime in Libya in October 2011 (indicated in section 3.1). The dummy
variable is not significant and does not empirically show a decrease in the number of
Nigerians seeking asylum by going through Libya.26 Thus, the results of the FE
estimation are interpreted.
The explanatory variables agree with the hypotheses (Table 1), except for the
unemployment rate in the destination country which has a positive coefficient. The
political rights index, political terror scale, incidence of armed conflict in Nigeria and the
population density of the destination country are not significant – but they agree with the
hypotheses.
For the destination country, the relative GDP per capita, the unemployment rate
in the previous year, and the number of refugees per 1000 population influence the
number of asylum applications. The positive and significant coefficient of relative GDP
per capita indicates that most of the asylum applications are in countries that are richer
than Nigeria. A one percent increase in the GDP per capita of Nigeria relative to the
GDP per capita of the destination can reduce the number of asylum applications by as
much as 44 percent. The lagged unemployment rate in the destination is significant but it
does not conform with the expected negative coefficient of the hypothesis. This suggests
that individuals apply for asylum in countries where the unemployment rate is higher
than the average. Although this is inconsistent with the hypothesis, it may be because
the main destination countries generally have better economies and lower
24 The results for the AR (2) estimation are: 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑗𝑡 = 0.544𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑗,𝑡−1 + 0.0414𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑗,𝑡−2 with p-
values = 0.00 and 0.046 respectively.
25 Sensitivity analysis was also carried out by dropping certain countries that had much higher numbers of asylum applications such as Italy and Germany and the coefficients of results were not significantly different.
26 See results in Appendix B; Table G (Column 4). Also, the FE estimation is done with the variables dropped out (Column 3) and like in OLS none is significant. The common language dummy is excluded since including it in the FE estimation returns a near singular matrix in Eviews.
29
unemployment rates than Nigeria and so the expected higher income in these countries
more than compensates asylum seekers despite the possibility of being unemployed
there. However, there is no correlation between the unemployment rate in the
destination and the relative GDP per capita27.
The prime population (i.e. those aged 15-34years) is significant. The estimated
coefficient is positive and confirms the hypothesis that a higher proportion of those aged
15-35years will increase the rate of migration. This confirms the point that the young
population is migration intensive. Also, the magnitude of the coefficient indicates that it is
a critical variable driving the number of asylum applications and scale of irregular
migration from Nigeria.
The immigration policy of the destination - as seen in the number of refugees per
1000 population - also influences the number of asylum applications. The coefficient is
positive and significant. This suggests that asylum applicants go to countries where their
application for refugee status is more likely to be accepted. Although this variable gives
an indication of the immigration policy situation in the destination, it does not necessarily
capture the several complex dimensions of immigration and refugee policy such as the
welfare of asylum seekers, processing times, etc. The cumulative stock of asylum
applications is also an important factor indicating that there is a networks effect. This
means that asylum seekers typically go to countries where they have social networks -
family and friends - and more information.
Civil liberties is positive and significantly different from zero at the 1 percent level
of significance. The positive coefficient confirms the hypothesis and indicates that poor
civil liberties could motivate people to leave the country. The political rights index, the
political terror scale and the incidence of armed conflict are not significant in the model.
This is surprising considering the impacts of the activities of Boko Haram in the North
East of the country over the years. However, this might be evidence to support the point
made by IOM (2017b) that most of the people directly affected by the conflicts in Nigeria
tend to remain within the country or move to neighbouring African countries where they
typically do not apply for asylum and are not captured in the asylum applications data.
27 See Appendix B for the result of the correlation between the explanatory variables.
30
Meanwhile, the results are significant for the three continental dummies Africa
(2), Europe (3), and North America (4). These regions are the destination of most of the
asylum seekers.
7.1. Summary of the significant variables
The significant variables in the model are the lagged relative GDP per capita, the
civil liberties index, the prime population of Nigeria, as well as the unemployment rate,
the cumulative stock of asylum applications and the number of refugees per 1000 of the
population in the destination country.
The lagged relative GDP per capita and the unemployment rate in the destination
capture economic considerations, the civil liberties index relates to political aspects, the
prime population variable captures demographic considerations, the cumulative stock of
asylum applications variable captures network and information effects, while the number
of refugees per 1000 population of the destination country signals the immigration policy
environment in the destination. Next, the secondary methodology examines the validity
of these variables as the major causes of irregular migration from Nigeria.
7.2. Secondary methodology
This section examines the validity of the significant variables identified in the
primary methodology by reviewing several qualitative and empirical literature on the
determinants of irregular migration from Nigeria.
7.2.1. The economics of irregular migration
There is a paucity of empirical (quantitative) literature that specifically examines
the determinants of irregular migration from Nigeria. However, the available literature
suggests that economic considerations are the main driver of irregular migration by
Nigerians. In a study involving Nigerian women who migrated irregularly to Europe,
Kastner, (2010, p.1) notes that their main reason for migrating was the desire for
economic independence and “to support their families back home”. Benhayyoun's (2018)
study of undocumented and return Nigerian migrants in the Netherlands revealed that
most had left due to economic reasons. Beber & Scacco, (2018) also find that Nigerians
31
who migrate to seek asylum in European countries are frequently deemed to have done
so for economic reasons rather than a fear of persecution or harm, and as such are
ineligible for protection by European governments.
7.2.2. The expectation of employment
Separate studies of irregular migration from Senegal28 to Europe have identified
the prospect of securing jobs and greater economic opportunity in Europe as an
important motivating factor for illegal migration (Schapendonk & van Moppes, 2007;
Mously Mbaye, 2013). This is true for migrants to Spain and Italy which have large
informal economies – which illegal migrants can easily enter - relative to the rest of
Europe. Benhayyoun (2018:p.55) also identifies the role which the search for
employment plays in motivating illegal migration. In a study of undocumented Nigerian
migrants in the Netherlands, she notes that;
almost all of the Nigerians I spoke to had first tried to move elsewhere within Nigeria in search for better job opportunities and better living conditions. Yet for many lives in the big city was even harder than before. Benhayyoun (2018:p.55)
… and hence their decision to migrate.
7.2.3. Networks and information effects
A study in Senegal observed a positive relationship between the willingness to
migrate illegally and the presence of relatives and migrant networks in the intended
destination. The presence of these networks helps to reduce the monetary and other
costs of migration (Mously Mbaye, 2013). This could be through the information which
the networks provide to potential illegal migrants on living conditions, wages etc. in the
destination – some of which may be less than accurate but nevertheless increase the
desire to migrate illegally.
28 Senegal is a West African country, facing similarly high levels of irregular migration as Nigeria. Nigeria has a population nearly thirteen times that of Senegal in 2017. However, the number of asylum applications from Nigerians in Europe in 2017 was less than four times those from Senegalese.
32
An incentivized lab-in-the-field experiment aimed at understanding why young
people migrate illegally from West Africa to Europe was conducted with young males
aged 15 to 25 years in rural Gambia. They were given hypothetical scenarios regarding
the probability of dying on the way to Europe, and of obtaining residency status. The
data obtained suggest that the willingness to migrate affected potential migrants’
(over)estimations of both the risk of dying and the probability of obtaining residency
status. It showed that providing them with official numbers on the probability of obtaining
a legal residence permit would decrease their likelihood of migration by 1.75 percentage
points, while information on the risk of migrating would increase their likelihood of
migration by 2.78 percentage points. They found that migration decisions actively
responded to information about relevant facts regarding the costs and benefits of
migration (Bah & Batista, 2018).
7.2.4. The prime population on the move
Several reports and available data indicate the young people make up most of
the irregular migrants (see Figure 3; Altai Consulting, 2013; UNHCR Bureau for Europe,
2017). Empirical studies show that age is a significant variable in estimating the
likelihood for an individual to migrate illegally from Senegal to Europe (Mously Mbaye,
2013). One reason is that younger individuals tend to be less risk averse than older
folks.
Many youths in West Africa migrate as a household income maximization
strategy (Altai Consulting, 2015). Among some groups, “migration may be a rite of
passage for young men” (Birchall, 2016:p.15). Consequently, funding such journeys
seem like a rational household decision. Identifying young people as a population of
interest for the policy problem is significant to the extent that it helps guide the
development and implementation of policies that uniquely cater to their age-specific
needs.
7.2.5. Migration policies in the destination
The evidence is inconclusive on the role of policy in influencing migrants’
decisions regarding destination choice and further research is required (Kuschminder,
Bresser, & Siegel, 2015). One thing is clear; individuals will generally tend to migrate to
33
places where they are more likely to get residence. In a study in rural Gambia Bah &
Batista, (2018) observe this as well. Their findings suggest that potential illegal migrants
vary their willingness to migrate by the probability of obtaining residency status.
7.2.6. Nigeria’s border management
An important factor that could not be explicitly captured in the primary
methodology, but which features prominently in the qualitative literature factor on
irregular migration from Nigeria is the quality and strength of the country’s borders.
Nigeria shares an estimated 4,047 km border with Benin, Cameroon, Chad, and Niger.
These borders cut across communities, ethnic groups, and even families, with centuries of
close economic, social and cultural ties, which do not respect borders. While only 114
control posts were approved across the country’s land borders, there are over 1400
unmanned illegal routes into and out of the country (Isiugo-Abanihe & IOM Nigeria,
2016).
The size of the country and its several porous overland border crossing points
makes it difficult to control migration in and out the country (De Haas; 2007, Adeola &
Fayomi; 2012, Adepoju; 2017). Gaps in the implementation of the ECOWAS Protocol on
Free Movement of Persons, Residence and Establishment29 has also challenged the
ability of border personnel to effectively manage the mixed flows of persons across
borders (IOM, 2015). In 2015, the head of the Nigeria Immigration Service (NIS)
observed that the service would require about 5,000 new personnel annually over the
five years from 2015 to meet its manpower capacity shortages and that the less than
23,000 personnel of strength of the service was “grossly inadequate” inadequate to carry
out its enormous statutory obligations (“Immigration Boss Agrees Nigeria’s Border Is
Overall, the primary and secondary methodologies show that economic factors
are important determinants of the number of asylum applications (and by implication, the
29 The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) was established in 1975. One of the objectives of the establishing treaty is to create a borderless region and a common citizenship in West Africa. Subsequently, in 1979, ECOWAS member States adopted the protocol relating to the Free Movement of Persons, Residence and Establishment which stipulates the right of ECOWAS citizens to enter, reside and establish economic activities in the territory of other member states (ECOWAS, 1979).
34
scale of irregular migration). Also, the conditions and immigration policy environment in
the destination country has a significant effect on the size of asylum applications. This
suggests that both push and pull factors interact to determine and influence the decision
to migrate irregularly and seek asylum. There is also a network and information effect at
play and Nigerians migrate irregularly in consideration of the information available to
them from family and friends in the destination country. Related to this is the
restrictiveness of the immigration policy of the destination country of choice. Finally,
Nigeria’s youth bulge is reflected in the rates of irregular migration. Arguably, young
people are leaving the country to pursue green pastures in richer countries - with higher
real GDP per capita than Nigeria – and potentially lower unemployment rates. In the next
chapter are policy options with analysis to handle these different aspects of irregular
migration of Nigerians.
35
Chapter 8. Policy Objectives, Criteria and Options
This chapter presents the policy objectives and their assessment criteria for
validity. Three policy options for addressing the problem are identified.
8.1. Policy Objectives
The key policy objective in this capstone is to control the number of Nigerian
asylum seekers and irregular migrants30 going to various parts of the World. In the short-
term, the objective is to reverse the trend in Nigerians seeking asylum around the World
every year from the 2017 level of 91,862 persons by 50 percent31 or more over the next
year - the number in 2017 represents 48 persons per 100,000 of the population.32
Hence, this objective translates to reducing this number to about 25 persons per
100,000 of the population by 2020, less than 10 persons per 100,000 population by 2022
(the pre-2013 level) and further to less than 1 person per 100,000 by 2030 (the pre-2000
level).
Two major irregular migration hubs are identified, as they constitute the most
reports of irregular migration by Nigerians – the Central Mediterranean Route (CMR) and
the US-Canada borders. More so, the policy objective is to reduce the number of
Nigerians on the CMR from the 2016 number – 37,551 persons by 50 percent over the
next year33; and to reduce the number of Nigerians crossing the US-Canada borders
30 As identified in chapter 4, there is no data clearly identifying irregular migrants separately from asylum seekers due to the inherently clandestine nature of this activity. Hence throughout this capstone the number of asylum applications has been used as a measure of irregular migration.
31 There are currently no official targets and ideally countries would prefer to reduce the number of asylum seekers by 100%. In the current context 100% that may be too ambitious for Nigeria hence a conservative target of 50%
32 See Figure 2 which show the trend of asylum seekers per 100,000 of Nigeria’s total population from 2000 to 2017.
33 This objective will inherently reduce the number of Nigerian deaths on the Mediterranean. The exact number of Nigerian deaths on the CMR route cannot be ascertained. However, given that Nigerians are in the majority of those crossing the Mediterranean, the number ranges in the thousands - See Appendix A, Tables A and B.
36
irregularly to seek asylum in Canada from the 2017 number – 6005 persons34 by 50
percent over the next year. Implicit in the key objective is the reduction of irregular
migration among citizens.
The long-term policy objective is to reduce the overall level of out-migration and
the associated brain-drain from the country by ensuring that there are viable
opportunities (economic and otherwise) and prospects to match the socioeconomic and
demographic conditions and peculiarities of the country.
8.2. Policy Criteria
This section defines the criteria used to assess the chosen policy options to
determine which one will be the most efficient. The relevant policy criteria include
effectiveness, freedom, administrative complexity, safety, cost and stakeholder
acceptance. Effectiveness, safety and stakeholder acceptance have multiple measures
while freedom, cost and administrative complexity have one measure each. The
measures are given scores between 3 for high rank, 2 for medium rank and 1 for low
rank. The policies are assigned scores by their performance on each criterion. The
criteria which have multiple measures are divided by the number of measures to give the
final score for that criterion. The scores are summed up and the highest total indicates
the most favourable policy option. Table 3 contains a summary of the criteria, measures
and their respective scores. Each criterion is explained further after the table.
reduction The ability of the policy to reduce the total number of Nigerian asylum seekers.
How much does the policy reduce the total number of Nigerian asylum seekers yearly; > 50 percent of 2017 level – High 15 - 50 percent of 2017 level – Med. <15 percent of 2017 level – Low
High – 3 Med – 2 Low – 1
Timeliness The length of time required for the policy to be implemented and to take effect.
What is the expected timeframe within which the policy can be implemented; < 6months – High 6months - 2years – Med. > 2years – Low
High – 3 Med – 2 Low – 1
34 This number is based on data from the Immigrations Refugees and Citizenship Canada (IRCC), 2018 for Nigerian asylum claimants to Canada in 2017
37
Regional relevance - Europe and North America
The relevance of the policy to the different groups of asylum seekers and irregular migrants i.e. those going to Europe as well as North America.
Is the policy relevant for asylum seekers in Europe and North America? Relevant for both Europe and North America – High Relevant for only one of the regions – Med Limited relevance in either region - Low
High – 3 Med – 2 Low – 1
Freedom Freedom of movement
The likelihood that the policy interferes with the rights of citizens to freedom of movement
Does the policy interfere with the rights of citizens (potential migrants) to freedom of movement? Not likely – High Somewhat likely – Med Very likely – Low
High – 3 Med – 2 Low – 1
Administrative Complexity
Ease of implementation
The number of government agencies needed for the implementation of the policy.
How many agencies will be involved to implement the policy? < 2 agencies – High 2 - 5 agencies – Med. > 5 agencies - Low
High – 3 Med – 2 Low – 1
Safety Risk reduction The ability of the policy to ensure the safety and humanity of irregular migrants
Does the policy reduce the risks faced by irregular migrants? Significantly reduces risks – High Somewhat reduces risks – Med. Does not reduce risks significantly – Low
High – 3 Med. – 2 Low – 1
Protection of women
The ability of the policy to reduce the risks of trafficking of women, children and other vulnerable groups.
Does the policy reduce the incidence of trafficking of women, children and other vulnerable groups? Greatly reduces risks – High Somewhat reduces risks – Med. Does not reduce risks significantly - Low
High – 3 Med – 2 Low – 1
Cost Budgetary costs The annual budgetary cost of implementing the policy
The monetary cost of implementing the policy option < 5 percent of the 2018 NCFRMI budget i.e. low cost – High 5 - 35 percent of the 2018 NCFRMI budget i.e. medium cost – Med > 35 percent of the 2018 NCFRMI budget i.e. high cost – Low
High – 3 Med – 2 Low – 1
Stakeholder Acceptance
Destination and transit country partners
Support for the policy by the host and transit countries of Nigerian asylum seeker and irregular migrants
The likelihood that host and transit countries of Nigerian asylum seekers and irregular migrants will support the policy; Not applicable/Very likely – High Somewhat likely – Med. Not likely – Low
High – 3 Med – 2 Low – 1
Civil Society organizations
Support for the policy by relevant CSO’s
The likelihood that relevant CSO’s will support the policy Not applicable/Very likely – High Somewhat likely – Med. Not likely - Low
High – 3 Med – 2 Low – 1
38
Funding, implementation and development partners
Support for the policy by Nigeria’s current immigration policy funding partners
The likelihood that Nigeria’s current funding partners will support the policy Not applicable/Definitely/Very likely – High Somewhat likely – Med Not likely - Low
High – 3 Med – 2 Low – 1
8.2.1. Effectiveness
Effectiveness is a key criterion applied to identify the validity of the policy option
since it relates directly to the policy objectives. It has three measures. The first measure
for this criterion is the reduction of asylum seekers. Europe and North America are key
destinations and as noted in section 2.3, the asylum seekers in both regions are quite
different. Therefore, a measure of regional relevance is included to analyze the
effectiveness of the policy options in both regions. The policy is assessed against the
2017 levels. If the policy option is estimated to reduce the number of asylum seekers by
more than 50 percent of 2017 level, it scores 3; between 15 to 50 percent, it scores 2;
and less than 15 percent, it scores 1. The third measure of effectiveness is timeliness.
This measure seeks to capture the urgency of the problem and assess the length of time
required for the policy option to be implemented and to take effect. If it takes less than
6months, the option scores 3; between 6months and 2years it scores 2, and more than 2
years it scores 1.
8.2.2. Freedom
Freedom considers the constitutional guarantee of the freedom of movement of
every citizen to enter and exit from the country. It is important that the policy be
consistent with the constitution in this respect while also taking into consideration
relevant laws and guidelines governing the immigration process. This criterion measures
the likelihood that the policy interferes with the right of citizens (potential migrants) to
freedom of movement. If it is not likely, the policy scores 3; somewhat likely, it scores 2;
and very likely, it scores 1.
8.2.3. Administrative Complexity
Administrative complexity considers the ease of implementation of the policy
option. It is measured by the number of government agencies needed for the
39
implementation of the policy. If less than two agencies are required, the policy scores 3;
between two and five agencies, it scores 2; and more than five agencies it scores 1.
8.2.4. Safety
The safety criterion has two half-weighted measures namely risk reduction and
protection of women (and vulnerable groups). The risk reduction measure considers the
ability of the policy to reduce the risks faced by irregular migrants. The measure for the
protection of women (and vulnerable groups) considers the higher risk of trafficking
faced by these populations during irregular migration and assesses the ability of the
policy to reduce these risks. A normative scale is applied to both measures. If the policy
significantly reduces the risks of irregular migration it scores 3; if the policy somewhat
reduces these risks, it scores 2; and if it does not reduce the risks at all it scores 1.
8.2.5. Cost
Costs determine the feasibility of the option. For this criterion, the recurrent
budget of the National Commission for Refugees, Migrants and Internally Displaced
Persons (NCFRMI) 35 is used as a benchmark. NCFRMI is the primary agency
responsible for managing migration in the country and its budget is arguably an
indication of the maximum amount the government is willing to spend on issues related
to asylum seekers, Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), returnees and irregular
migrants. For this measure, if the policy option costs less than 10 percent of the 2018
NCFRMI budget36 it is considered low cost and it scores 3; between 10 and 35 percent,
it is considered a medium cost option and scores 2; and more than 35 percent it is
considered a high-cost option and scores 1.
8.2.6. Stakeholder Acceptance
The final criterion is stakeholder acceptance. Three major groups of stakeholders
are identified namely, CSOs, multilateral organizations in the development,
35 See Appendix C, Box 4 for a summary of the work done by NCFRMI.
36 NCFRMI total Recurrent budget in 2018 was NGN 420,156,040 (Federal Republic of Nigeria 2018 Appropriation Bill, 2018:p.957)
40
implementation and funding of immigration policy in the country (including IOM and
UNHCR) and destination & country partners. Each one is weighted by a third and a
normative measure of the likelihood of support for the policy by the respective
stakeholder is applied. If it is very likely37 that a stakeholder group will support the policy,
the policy scores 3; if it is somewhat likely, it scores 2; and if it is not likely the policy
scores 1.
8.3. Policy Options
The policies options to address the problem are chosen based on the results of
the analysis and they address the significant variables and factors from chapter 7. They
will prevent or reduce new irregular migration and are more oriented towards individuals
in Nigeria rather than towards citizens that have already left; since the jurisdiction of the
government in those cases is highly limited.
Regarding the current policy environment, until recently, migration was not a
prominent policy issue in the country. However, since 2002, the IOM has been
supporting the efforts of the government to manage migration. The IOM’s activities have
included capacity-building, advisory services, technical assistance on migration health
and information, assisted voluntary returns, counter-trafficking and irregular migration
(IOM, 2015). It has also been involved with facilitating voluntary return and reintegration
of Nigerian migrants through its Assisted Voluntary Repatriation and Reintegration
(AVRR) programs. These AVRR programs have been in place for decades and are
recently being expanded to influence the decision-making process of potential migrants
(Beber & Scacco, 2018). At their core, however, they tend to act after-the-fact and they
do not stop first-instance irregular migration. They typically target returnees to provide
cash and in-kind assistance, employment training, or help with job searches in order to
make returning an attractive option and to reduce rates of re-emigration. Despite these
programs, however, experts predict that up to 40 percent of all returnees will take a
37 In the not applicable/not likely scenario, that is, the policy contradicts stakeholders’ stated policy stances or actions on the treatment of irregular migrants and asylum seekers. In the somewhat likely scenario, that is, the policy has no direct implication for stakeholders’ stance or actions on the treatment of irregular migrants and asylum seekers and does not contradict know its known policy stances. In the definitely/very likely scenario, that is, the policy aligns with stated policy stances or actions on the treatment of irregular migrants and asylum seekers of stakeholders
41
second attempt at migrating irregularly, as few seem to see long-term opportunities in
Nigeria (Katrin Gaensler, 2018).
In 2015, the Federal government developed a National Immigration Policy38. The
policy identifies the human and national security concerns of irregular migration, seeks
to pursue productive employment options as an alternative to irregular migration,
especially of youths and to enlighten the public on the dangers of irregular migration
(IOM, 2015). It tasks the NCFRMI as the coordinating government agency for all
stakeholders in the field of immigration in Nigeria. The impact of the National
Immigration Policy on the trends on irregular migration is yet to be seen. Next is a
description of the policy options.
8.3.1. Option 1: Migration Information Campaigns
The first policy option involves carrying out targeted information campaigns to
counter incorrect narratives on migration and to highlight the legal processes for
migrating. It addresses the networks and information effects at play in the decisions of
irregular migrants. This is information that flows through family, friends and other social
networks in the home and destination country.
Coordinated mass media campaigns through a mix of television commercials,
billboards, radio programs, social media, print and films can be employed to disseminate
the ‘right’ information to potential irregular migrants. The campaigns should be effectively
targeted with clear messaging. Importantly, it should appeal to young people as they are
more likely to migrate irregularly. Potential issues that the campaign could address
include (a) awareness and information on the processes and opportunities for regular
migration (b) awareness and information on the risks of irregular migration including
human smuggling and trafficking, and death (c) Information on the reality of life in the
destination country (Regional Support Office to the Bali Process, 2015).
Information campaigns have been employed in several places as a tool for
addressing irregular migration. One that has been successfully evaluated is the
‘Capacity building, information and awareness raising towards orderly migration in the
38 The National Migration Policy 2015 for Nigeria is available at International Organization for Migration (IOM) www.iom.int.
The third option involves increasing the number of personnel and capacity of the
National Immigration Service (NIS) to ensure better border management. It addresses
the border management gaps in Nigeria’s immigration system. It seeks to increase the
capacity of the Nigeria Immigration Service (NIS) to effectively manage the country’s
borders. As noted in chapter 7.2., the NIS is currently understaffed and its ability to
effectively carry out its mandate is severely hampered by the country’s geography, the
regional dynamics with its neighbours and a lack of adequate technology and
equipment. As part of measures to increase the capacity of the service, there is the need
for increased staffing, strategic training and retraining of border officials, and the
widescale adoption of improved border management tools and systems.
44
Over the years, the NIS has been working actively with IOM to improve the
capacity of the service through sponsored39 strategic personnel training programs. There
has also been a gradual adoption of IOM’s Migration Information and Data Analysis
System (MIDAS)40 across various border command posts of the NIS to allow collecting,
processing, storing, and analyzing traveller information in real time and across the entire
border network. There are however still significant work to do to ensure its optimum
performance.
39 This includes with funding from the European Union Trust Fund, the Federal Foreign Office of Germany and German Cooperation, the Governments of Switzerland, the Netherlands and Denmark.
40 MIDAS was developed by IOM in 2009 and has been described as is a user-friendly and fully customizable solution for States in need of a cost-effective and comprehensive border management information system. The system has been designed to be compliant with international standards and it is currently operational in 19 countries. For effective implementation, IOM provides expert guidance throughout the installation process, including the delivery of system administration training workshop and ensure that governments have full and exclusive ownership of any data recorded by MIDAS (IOM, n.d.).
45
Chapter 9. Evaluation of Policy Options
Each policy is evaluated by all the criteria defined. Table 4 summarizes the
results at the end of the evaluations.
9.1. Evaluation of Option 1: Migration Information Campaigns
In terms of effectiveness, for asylum seeker reduction, this option will potentially
reduce irregular migration by more than 15 percent41. It is not clear if the information
available to individuals when they decide to migrate irregularly is right or wrong.
However, it is safe to assume that they are not entirely ignorant of the dangers of
irregular migration. There is the possibility that they will not always act on correct
information. It is however also true that the correct information would dissuade irregular
migration, influence people’s perceptions of the reality of the journey and life in the
destination country, change attitudes towards safer methods of migration and
consequently reduce the incidence of irregular migration. So, the score is 2. For
timeliness, there are some ongoing information campaign activities by various agencies
focusing on different aspects of irregular migration. For example, there are currently
three migrant resource centres in the country, the National Agency for the Prohibition of
the Trafficking in Persons (NAPTIP) conducts campaigns, and in 2018 the IOM launched
a 13-episode radio program to inform the general public on the perils of irregular
41 In 2016, the EU trust Fund funded the project “Strengthening the management and governance of migration and the sustainable reintegration of returning migrants in Nigeria” with EUR 15,500,000. The third specific objective of the program is increasing awareness on the consequences and viable alternatives to irregular migration & support migrants and their communities to have access to accurate information to support informed and safe migration and community cohesion. This is targeted at 200 communities in high migration areas and is expected to reach 20,000 potential migrants (about 22 percent of the 91,862 asylum seekers in 2017). The IOM managed project is meant to run from 2017 until 2020 (“Annex IV to the Agreement establishing the European Union Emergency Trust Fund for stability and addressing root causes of irregular migration and displaced persons in Africa and its internal rules.,” 2016).
46
migration42. This means it will be relatively easy to engage the existing platforms and
programs to scale them within a short time i.e. less than 6months. So, the score is 3. For
regional relevance, this option can be adapted to fit the differences in the characteristics
of asylum seekers going to Europe as well as those going to North America. The score
is 3.
In terms of freedom, this option does not interfere with the freedom of movement of
the individual. The score is 3.
Regarding administrative complexity, for ease of implementation, although the input
of several agencies may be required in the design of the campaigns. It can, however, be
coordinated and directed by a single agency such as NCFRMI. The score is 3.
For safety, as already noted potential migrants might already be aware of the risks
involved in migrating irregular and still decide to undertake the journey. The nature of the
message and its targeting could, however, lead to more awareness of the legal channels
for migration thus increasing the possibility that individuals will take advantage of them
and avoid the risks associated with irregular migration. The impact might be less in
reducing the risks women and vulnerable groups face in especially if they are being
trafficked. The availability of target information that highlights the activities of human
traffickers, however, reduces the likelihood of them becoming trafficking victims.
Enforcement remains an issue. This option scores 2 for both factors.
This option is estimated to cost about NGN 658,735,71843. This amount is over 156
percent of the 2018 total recurrent budget of the NCFRMI. The score is 1.
This option is very likely to gain acceptance with the various stakeholder groups as it
does not conflict with their stances on managing irregular migration nor interfere with
their sovereignty (in the case of destination and transit countries). In fact, it aligns with
42 See Appendix C, Box 6 for a summary of the details of radio program – “Abroad Mata”
43 The third specific objective of the EU funded program - “Strengthening the management and governance of migration and the sustainable reintegration of returning migrants in Nigeria” is allocated EUR 1,585,000. That is at an exchange rate of Euro 1 = NGN 415. (“Annex IV to the Agreement establishing the European Union Emergency Trust Fund for stability and addressing root causes of irregular migration and displaced persons in Africa and its internal rules.,” 2016)
47
the steps currently been advocated and funded by the stakeholders. The score is 3 for
all the stakeholders.
9.2. Evaluation of Option 2: Bilateral Labour Migration Arrangements
In terms of effectiveness, for asylum seeker reduction, the second option creates
an additional channel for regular migration. There is evidence that lawful channels for
migration suppress unlawful migration44. A unilateral action or legislation on the part of
the destination country can also immediately regularize the status of thousands of
irregular migrants.45 However such arrangements may not have been of the scale
required to accommodate the current number of irregular migrants. It also potentially
addresses two main significant variables – real income differences and the search for
employment. The score is 2. For timeliness, bilateral agreements often take a
considerably long time to negotiate and implement as the agreeing governments need to
sufficiently research and hatch out the fine details of such agreements. They could take
anywhere between a few months to several years46. The option scores 1 score. For
regional relevance, the option applies to Europe and North America and the score is 3.
In terms of freedom, this option does not interfere with the freedom of movement
of potential migrants. It scores 3.
For administrative complexity, this option will require extensive collaboration
between government agencies in the origin as well as the destination country. Significant
input is needed from the NIS, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Labour and
Productivity, Nigeria’s high commissions in destination countries, representation from
44 Clemens & Gough, (2018) find this to be the case for migration between Mexico and the U.S., especially when the availability of lawful channels is combined with robust enforcement efforts.
45 For example, in Spain in 2005, the status of over 570,000 persons were regularized (Greenway, 2007). Other countries in Europe and the US have also had regularization programs in the past. Some of these have been targeted at individuals from specific countries.
46 Freund & McDaniel, (2016) look at the negotiation period for 20 US trade agreements and find that on the average it takes 1½ years to negotiate an FTA with the United States but over 3½ years to reach the implementation stage, though there is a lot of variation among the different countries.
48
foreign governments etc. Ultimately, it will require more than five government agencies
and it scores 1 for ease of implementation.
For safety, this option reduces the risks faced by irregular migrants – including
women and vulnerable groups - to the extent that it facilitates access to regular migration
channels. Few concerns have been raised about the operation of TLMPs. For example,
there is a tendency for migrant workers to be left in vulnerable and exploitative work
relationships with their foreign employers due to the potential precariousness of their
work. One could, however, argue that temporary workers are in more secure work and
livelihood situations than irregular immigrants and careful management of the program
would make it more responsive to the potential needs of migrant workers. This option
scores 2 for both risk reduction and protection of women and vulnerable groups.
The costs involved in organizing and negotiating bilateral agreements may
include such administrative costs as additional meeting costs, the supply of new human
resources, training, running costs and possibly infrastructure. At the initial stage, most of
this cost is not very significant and can easily be absorbed in the ongoing budget of the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Fees and revenue raised from migrant workers and
employers can be used to manage programs going forward. The score is 2.
For stakeholder’s acceptance, the buy-in of the destination countries is
imperative for this option. They would be concerned about the temporary workers
becoming de facto permanent immigrants. There is, however, some appetite for TLMP-
like arrangements in some destination countries. For example, the European Union,
through its Mobility Partnerships with third-party countries provides financial aid and
some legal migration slots in exchange for efforts by origin country governments to
reduce unauthorized migration towards the EU47. On the other hand, this option will be
well received by CSO’s and other development funding partners. This option scores 2 for
destination country stakeholders and scores 3 for CSO’s and development partners.
47 Other countries have similar programs, for example, Canada operates a temporary agricultural worker program among other labour migration programs.
49
9.3. Evaluation of Option 3: Enhanced Border Management Capabilities
For effectiveness, enhanced border management policies increase the likelihood
for migrants without proper documentation to be apprehended and stopped from
migrating irregularly in the first place. It also potentially increases the costs of irregular
migration – financial and otherwise - and in turn reduces the demand for irregular
migration services e.g. smugglers. On the other hand, however, stricter border
management policies could be counterproductive if they deter potential legal migrants
more than potential illegal migrants. Also, it does not effectively deter individuals who
have the proper exit documents but do not have the legal documents to enter the
destination country. It is relevant to both irregular migrants bound for Europe and North
America. However, less so for those going to North America48. This option scores 2 for
both asylum seekers reduction as well as for regional relevance. For timeliness, this
option can be implemented within a relatively short time frame as it does not require any
significant deviation from the regular operations of the NIS. It is will however include
significant training and re-training components as well as higher levels of authorization
which may not be forthcoming which could take anywhere between 6months and two
years. The score is 2 for timeliness.
For freedom, this option could potentially interfere with the freedom of movement
of individuals if they are subjected to stricter immigration checks than usual. It scores 2
for freedom of movement.
In terms of administrative complexity, it is easy to implement as it effectively
requires only the active involvement of the National Immigration Service. The
recruitment is coordinated by the Federal Ministry of Interior with the approval of the
Presidency and it involves extensive logistics. The score is 2 for ease of implementation.
For safety, enhanced border management potentially reduces the risks
associated with irregular migration, especially the risks of trafficking, and the smuggling
of women and other vulnerable groups. There is however the possibility that human
48 Several of the irregular migrants in North America including those crossing from the US into Canada were found to have valid travel documents (“Canada working with US in Nigeria to stem asylum claims - BBC News,” 2018).
50
traffickers and smugglers might resort to deadlier means to ply their trade. The option
scores 2 for both risk reduction and protection of women and vulnerable groups.
This option includes increased budgetary funding to support the recruitment of
more NIS personnel and the purchase of needed equipment and technology to more
effectively manage the country’s’ borders. It also includes following the recommendation
of the past head of the NIS to increase the staff strength of the service by 5,000 yearly
(“Nigeria Immigration needs 25,000 new personnel - Comptroller General - Premium
Times Nigeria,” 2015). This option can be estimated to cost about NGN 623,804,00049.
This amount is over 148 percent of the 2018 total recurrent budget of the NCFRMI. This
option scores 1 on cost.
Finally, this option is likely to gain the acceptance of all stakeholders’ since it
does not interfere with their operations, policies and jurisdiction in any significant way. It
scores 3 for all the stakeholders.
Table 4. Summary of policy evaluation
Criteria Option 1: Migration Information Campaigns
Option 2: Bilateral Labour Migration Arrangements
Option 3: Enhanced Border Management Capabilities
Effectiveness /3 2.67 2 2
Asylum seekers reduction 2 2 2
Timeliness 3 1 2
Regional relevance 3 3 2
Freedom 3 3 2
Freedom of movement 3 3 2
Administrative Complexity 3 1 3
Ease of implementation 3 1 2
Safety /2 2 2 2
Risk reduction 2 2 2
Protection of women and vulnerable groups
2 2 2
Cost 1 2 1
Budgetary costs 1 2 1
Stakeholder Acceptance /3 3 2.67 3
49 This amount includes an estimate of NGN 423,804,000 based on the total amount earmarked by the Civil Defence, Immigration and Prison Service Boards for recruitment and promotion in the 2017 Federal budget proposal (Budget Office of the Federation, 2017:p12/21) and NGN 200,000,000 for the provision and installation of IOM’s Migrant Information and Data Analysis System (MIDAS) – 2018 Federal budget. (Federal Republic of Nigeria 2018 Appropriation Bill, 2018:p841)
51
Destination country 3 2 3
Civil Society organizations 3 3 3
Development partners 3 3 3
Total 14.67 12.67 12
52
Chapter 10. Recommendation
The recommendation flowing from the policy analysis is to engage in Migration
Information Campaigns. This involves targeted campaigns to counter incorrect narratives
on migration and highlight the legal processes for migrating. Specific activities should
include community-based awareness programmes developed in close coordination and
partnership with stakeholders, youths, Nigerians in the diaspora and return migrants to
ensure effective messaging and appropriate targeting. TV and radio shows can be
designed in partnership with celebrities. Strategic and appropriate national Information,
education and counselling materials can also be developed to facilitate training,
workshops and capacity building activities for potential migrants.
Migration Information Campaigns ranks higher than the other options in terms of
the various assessment criteria except for costs for which it is significantly higher than
the other options.50 The strongest appeal of information campaigns over the others
arises from its timeliness, and ease of implementation. There is still some debate on the
effectiveness of campaigns in deterring irregular migration, there is also significant
literature that alludes to their success if campaigns are properly designed, effectively
targeted and well implemented. Also, the number of people that can be reached through
these information campaigns and potential scale effects are immense. A major drawback
of this option, however, is that it fails to address the economic factors and demographic
pressures which are important drivers of irregular migration in this case.
The recommended option does not address the fact that income inequalities,
unemployment and the desire for better livelihood opportunities are driving irregular
migration to richer countries. Thus, it is important to note, that the three policy options
outlined are not mutually exclusive and in fact, they need to complement each other. In
the grand scheme of things, there is an urgent need for drastic improvements in the
various aspects of the economy to create opportunities and improved living conditions of
citizens. Given the rapid growth of the country’s population, however, it is less likely for
50 Table H in Appendix C contains a colour-coded matrix of the policy options
53
domestic job creation efforts to match the demand for jobs fast enough. The demand for
jobs should be supplemented by an outward-looking labour policy aimed at sourcing and
taking advantage of opportunities in the global labour market for the benefit of Nigeria’s
burgeoning labour force. Meanwhile, enhanced border management remains a real need
in the country. Aside from the gains of controlled migration, there are also the enhanced
security benefits to be gotten from increasing the personnel and capacity of the National
Immigration Service (NIS) for better border management. Furthermore, policies and
programs to reduce irregular migration need to be supported by programs that facilitate
the voluntary return and reintegration of irregular immigrants who have already left the
country.
54
Chapter 11. Conclusion
This capstone has highlighted the significant increase, in the number of Nigerians
migrating irregularly to seek asylum in various parts of the World over the past two
decades. The research applies panel regression techniques to pooled macro-level data
from the UNCHR, UNDESA, the World Bank database, the Armed Conflict Location &
Event Data (ACLED), Freedom House and the World Bank Climate Change Knowledge
Portal between 2000 and 2017 to examine the origin and destination country factors
driving this situation.
The UN 1951 convention Relating to the Status of Refugees requires that asylum
seekers can show that they face persecution as individuals or for being members of
certain groups and as a result are unable to stay in their country of origin. This study
finds that persecution (or the fear of persecution) is not the main motivating factor for
Nigerians. Rather, most are migrating irregularly to seek asylum due to economic factors
such as relative income differences and the potential of gaining employment in the
destination. Also, Nigeria’s youth bulge, immigration policies in the destination countries
and having social networks there tend to be prominent enabling factors. Meanwhile,
there are significant dangers and costs to migrating irregularly including human
trafficking, labour exploitation, sexual abuse, and death. There is also the loss of human
capital to the economy and it diminishes the country’s image.
Three policy options are analyzed to address the problem going forward namely;
Migration Information Campaigns, Bilateral Labour Migration Arrangements, and
Enhanced Border Management Capabilities; all of which are however not mutually
exclusive. From a careful evaluation of the options, Migration Information Campaigns is
recommended as a necessary first step to addressing the problem that “there are too
many Nigerians migrating irregularly to seek asylum in several countries”. This option is
appealing especially because of the ease of implementation and timeliness to
addressing the problem. IOM Nigeria is currently involved in some information
campaigns aimed at addressing irregular migration in the country. An evaluation of the
55
impacts and successes of these campaigns so far will necessarily inform the next steps
in scaling them.
Finally, this study relied significantly on existing studies and extensive desk
research. It is constrained by time and resources. It could, however, benefit from further
research that incorporates first-hand interviews with potential and actual asylum seekers
and irregular migrants as well as other key stakeholders. It will also be important to take
a closer look at the nuanced differences between the individuals across the various
regions of interest – Europe, North America and Africa – to ensure that the policies are
more effectively directed and targeted at their peculiarities.
56
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Appendix A. Nigerian asylum seekers and Irregular migration
Box 1: Top 10 destinations of Nigerian asylum seekers in 2000, 2010 and 2017
Figures a, b and c show the top 10 countries of destination for asylum in 2000,
2010 and 2017. In 2000 (Figure a), more sought asylum in South Africa than in any other
country, followed by Canada and the US. In all the countries (except South Africa) the
number was less than 1000. Two other African countries, Senegal and Gabon were
among the top 10 destinations of asylum and they had 123 and 24 persons respectively.
In 2010 (Figure b), seven of the top 10 destinations of asylum were in Europe (compared
with four countries in 2000). Greece had the most (1,768 persons) followed by Canada
(1,552 persons), and Germany (1,241 persons). Finally, in 2017 (Figure c), a record
number sought asylum in Italy (37,967 persons), followed by Germany (19,817 persons),
South Africa (8,877 persons), Canada (5,632 persons) and the US. (5,486 persons).
Figure a. Top 10 countries of asylum for Nigerian asylum seekers 2000 Source: UNHCR Database, (2018)
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.2
Gabon
Czech Rep.
Germany
Australia
Senegal
Switzerland
Netherlands
U.S
Canada
South Africa
Thousands (persons)
65
Figure b. Top 10 countries of asylum for Nigerian asylum seekers, 2010 Source: UNHCR Database, (2018)
Figure c. Top 10 countries of asylum for Nigerian asylum seekers, 2017 Source: UNHCR Database, (2018)
Box 2: Why do Nigerians migrate irregularly?
In Nigeria, widespread poverty and the deterioration of the wellbeing of many
have created sustained pressure for labour emigration (Adepoju, 2017). The inability of
0 0.5 1 1.5 2
Norway
Senegal
Switzerland
Italy
Ireland
Israel
Austria
Germany
Canada
Greece
Thousands (persons)
37,696
0 5 10 15 20
Israel
Austria
U.K.
France
Brazil
U.S
Canada
South Africa
Germany
Italy
Thousands (persons)
66
job creation opportunities to meet up with rapid population and labour force growth
places a tremendous strain on socio-economic development and generates high levels
of under- and unemployment and accompanying migratory pressures. This forces
citizens to leave the country in search of better income opportunities. More so, the huge
income inequalities between rich and poor countries continue to generate large
international worker mobility. Some of this international worker mobility could be through
irregular migration (Ortega & Peri, 2013).
Meanwhile, Flahaux & De Haas, (2016) and Adepoju (2017) question the general
belief that migration in Nigeria and other African countries is driven by poverty. They
argue that a higher level of economic growth and development, the spread of new
technologies and political stabilization in some African countries have increased the
capabilities and aspirations of Africans to move51 - especially over greater distances.
Similarly, Carbone (2017:p.7), has argued that “contrary to popular perceptions, it is not
the poorest and destitute that depart their home places to try and reach more advanced
nations, since some basic financial resources and skills are necessary to afford long-
distance mobility”.
Altai Consulting, (2015) and Adepoju, (2017) have associated the levels of
irregular migration from Nigeria with the level of conflicts in parts of the country. The
Boko Haram insurgency in the North Eastern part of the country which started in 2009
has claimed many lives and created several internally displaced persons (IDPs). IOM
(2017b) observes, however, that even though a share of the conflict-affected Nigerian
population seeks refuge in neighbouring countries, most displaced persons remain
within Nigeria and do not migrate from the country.
Nigerians may also migrate in response to available information. Many young
people are under pressure to migrate to Europe or some other destination as the general
belief is that living conditions are better in these countries. Adepoju, (2017) argues that
the internet has facilitated communication, but it has also increased the flow of false and
51 For example, Adepoju, (2017) argues that political independence in South Africa in 1994, opened an alternative destination for Nigerian emigrants who pursued jobs in education, commerce and industry and other sectors rather than migrate to Europe – which was had more restrictive immigration policies. However, in recent years, violent xenophobic attacks targeted at foreigners and immigrants, mostly Nigerians, blamed for the ills in the society, in several cities in South Africa may have stemmed the tide of Nigerians migrating there.
67
exaggerated information regarding living conditions abroad. Earlier migrants often return
with relatively huge earnings and remittances. They have investments in real estate at
home in Nigeria and this entices others to emulate them. Another way that the previous
migrants are a reason for subsequent migration is through the networks which they
provide to new migrants. Such networks could encourage migration by lowering the
costs of migration information and assimilation difficulties (Beine, Docquier, & Özden,
2011).
Finally, the immigration policies of the destination can be an important factor in
migration decisions. On the irregular migration of Nigerians to Europe, Adepoju (2017)
argues that the closed-door policy of the EU has inadvertently boosted irregular
migration by youths bent on securing entry into more prosperous countries. They then
resort to irregular migration because the opportunities and resources for regular
migration are not readily available to them. Czaika & De Haas, (2013) makes a similar
argument by noting that restrictive migration policies tend to exact a relatively smaller
effect on immigration when compared with other social, economic and political
constraints and drivers. Czaika & Hobolth (2014) argue that restrictive immigration
policies have often led to substitution for irregular migration.
Box 3: Death on the Mediterranean
Children and youth are also a vulnerable population of irregular migrants. Altai
Consulting (2015) finds evidence that there is a higher tendency for women and children
to be left behind if they cannot keep up with the arduous journey. Migrants report that in
several of the journeys across the Mediterranean, women and children are more likely to
be placed below deck, facing a higher risk of fuel inhalation, burns and being trapped in
the incident of a shipwreck (Black et al., 2017). On the CMR, adolescents and youth
from sub-Saharan Africa (including Nigerians) face considerably higher risks compared
with those from other regions. Most of this is because of racism as there are several
young migrants and refugees from sub-Saharan Africa (including Nigerians) who allege
that they are treated more harshly and targeted for exploitation because of the colour of
their skin (UNICEF & IOM, 2016).
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Table A. Average number of fatalities per incident recorded in the Central Mediterranean, January 2014–June 2017
Incidents recorded Total migrant fatalities recorded
Table B. Regional data on migrant deaths by age and gender, January 2014–June 2017
Region Proportion of incidents containing information on age or gender
Proportion of dead/missing containing information on gender/age
Number of female deaths
Number of child deaths
Number of male deaths
Total number of deaths recorded
Central Mediterranean
36% 12% 375 136 826 12,781
Eastern Mediterranean
86% 84% 201 377 204 1,336
Europe 90% 85% 7 24 173 246
Africa 17% 8% 51 52 118 3,805
South-East Asia*
59% 58% 35 30 285 1,835
United States– Mexico border
80% 52% 51 13 544 1,194
Central America
52% 66% 19 33 179 431
Source: Missing Migrants Project, 2017.
Notes: Only regions in which more than 100 incidents were recorded are included in this table. The omitted regions represent less than 1 per cent of the total number of deaths recorded. * The figure in South-East Asia includes a UNHCR estimate of the total number of deaths in the Bay of Bengal in 2016, which includes an estimated 250 child deaths.
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Appendix B. Variables, data summary and data sources
Table C: Dependent and explanatory variables, description and data sources
Variables Description
𝑙𝐴𝑠𝑦𝑆𝑁𝑡𝑗 The number of Nigerian asylum seekers to the destination country in the year; in
natural log (UNHCR Database)
𝑙𝑅𝑒𝑙𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑁𝑡−1𝑗
GDP per capita ratio of both countries in the previous period (destination/source); in
natural log (World Bank)
𝑈𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑡−1𝑗
Average annual unemployment rate in Nigeria (World Bank)
𝐶𝑖𝑣𝐿𝑖𝑏𝑡𝑁 Freedom House Civil liberties index (1-7) (Freedom House)
𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑅𝑔𝑡𝑁𝑡 Freedom House Political rights index (1-7) (Freedom House)
𝑃𝑡𝑠𝑁𝑡 Political terror scale Index (1-5)
𝐶𝑓𝑡𝐹𝑡𝑁𝑡 The number of conflict related fatalities recorded yearly (Armed Conflict Location and
Event Data – ACLED)
𝐴𝑟𝑚𝐶𝑓𝑡𝑁𝑡 The number of conflicts recorded yearly (Armed Conflict Location and Event Data –
ACLED)
𝑙𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑛𝐷𝑒𝑛𝑗𝑡 Total population of Nigeria divided by the area of land (sq. km); in natural log (World
Bank)
𝑙𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑛𝐷𝑒𝑛𝑁𝑡 Total population of the asylum country divided by the area of land (sq. km); in natural
log (World Bank)
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑛𝑁𝑡 Population under 35 years as a % of total population (World Bank)
𝑙𝐶𝑢𝑚𝐴𝑠𝑦𝑆𝑁𝑗𝑡 The cumulative stock of asylum applications from the origin country to the
destination; in natural log (UNHCR Database)
𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑔1000𝑗𝑡 The number of refugees in the destination divided by the population of the destination
in thousands (UNHCR Database, UNDESA Database).
𝑅𝑎𝑖𝑛𝐴𝑛𝑁𝑗𝑡 Deviations from Nigeria’s long-term mean rainfall, divided by its long-run standard
deviation (World Bank Climate Change Knowledge Portal)
𝑇𝑒𝑚𝑝𝐴𝑛𝑁𝑡 Deviations from Nigeria’s long-term mean temperature, divided by its long-run
standard deviation (World Bank Climate Change Knowledge Portal)
𝑙𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑗𝑡 Geodesic distance between Nigeria and the capital of the destination country; in
natural log (Mayer & Zignago, 2011)
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝐿𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑗𝑡 Dummy variable for a common language between Nigeria and destination. 1 if the
official language in the destination is English, 0 otherwise (Mayer & Zignago, 2011).
𝐸𝑢𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑒 Dummy variable for Europe
𝑁𝐴𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑎 Dummy variable for North America
𝐴𝑓𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑎 Dummy variable for Africa
70
Table D: Countries and total Nigerian Asylum seekers from 2000 – 2017
1. Afghanistan 0
2. Albania 1
3. Algeria 384
4. Angola 11
5. Argentina 610
6. Armenia 1
7. Australia 1,340
8. Austria 20,058
9. Azerbaijan 1
10. Bahamas 1
11. Belarus 6
12. Belgium 456
13. Belize 31
14. Benin 643
15. Bolivia 6
16. Bosnia & Herzegovina
2
17. Botswana 0
18. Brazil 9,160
19. Bulgaria 238
20. Burkina Faso 270
21. Burundi 0
22. Côte d'Ivoire 897
23. Cambodia 1
24. Cameroon 149
25. Canada 22,337
26. Central African Rep.
30
27. Chad 1,680
28. Chile 10
29. China 390
30. China, Hong Kong SAR
375
31. Colombia 1
32. Congo 102
33. Costa Rica 29
34. Croatia 63
35. Cuba 1
36. Cyprus 903
37. Czech Rep. 553
38. D R. Congo 28
39. Denmark 337
40. Dominican Rep. 1
41. Ecuador 413
42. Egypt 5,011
43. El Salvador 5
44. Eritrea 3
45. Estonia 9
46. Ethiopia 39
47. Fiji 3
48. Finland 737
49. France 9,675
50. Gabon 101
51. Georgia 91
52. Germany 68,846
53. Ghana 353
54. Greece 5,954
55. Guatemala 1
56. Guinea 29
57. Guinea-Bissau 140
58. Honduras 0
59. Hungary 644
60. Iceland 79
61. India 566
62. Indonesia 989
63. Ireland 12,587
64. Israel 5,904
65. Italy 86,836
66. Japan 1,335
67. Jordan 32
68. Kazakhstan 0
69. Kenya 96
70. Latvia 3
71. Lebanon 99
72. Liberia 69
73. Libya 29
74. Liechtenstein 3
75. Lithuania 17
76. Luxembourg 339
77. Malaysia 240
78. Mali 267
79. Malta 1,335
80. Mauritania 336
81. Mexico 243
82. Mongolia 3
83. Montenegro 17
84. Morocco 2,740
85. Mozambique 1
86. Namibia 41
87. Nepal 12
88. Netherlands 2,964
89. New Zealand 34
90. Nicaragua 4
91. Niger 37
92. Nigeria 0
93. Norway 2,180
94. Pakistan 1,334
95. Panama 255
96. Papua New Guinea
6
97. Paraguay 2
98. Peru 40
99. Philippines 36
100. Poland 111
101. Portugal 54
102. Rep. of Korea
2,023
103. Rep. of Moldova
26
104. Romania 69
105. Russian Federation
20
106. Senegal 5,393
107. Serbia and Kosovo
76
108. Sierra Leone
849
109. Slovakia 112
110. Slovenia 45
111. Somalia 5
112. South Africa 72,104
113. Spain 2,452
114. Sri Lanka 3
115. Sudan 80
116. Suriname 6
117. Swaziland 2
118. Sweden 4,679
119. Switzerland 5,628
120. Syrian Arab Rep.
30
121. Thailand 138
122. Macedonia 52
123. Timor-Leste 2
124. Togo 84
125. Trinidad and Tobago
93
126. Tunisia 8
127. Turkey 623
128. Turks and Caicos
2
129. Uganda 3
130. Ukraine 751
131. United Kingdom
9,538
132. USA 14,766
133. Uruguay 55
134. Venezuela 143
135. Yemen 17
136. Zambia 3
Source: UNHCR Database (2018)
71
Table E: Summary statistics of dependent and explanatory variables
Mean Median Std. Dev. Maximum Minimum
𝑙𝐴𝑠𝑦𝑆𝑁𝑡𝑗 0.47 0.00 0.85 4.14 0.00
𝑙𝑅𝑒𝑙𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑁𝑡−1𝑗
0.35 0.31 0.66 1.87 -1.02
𝑈𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑡−1𝑗
8.16 6.55 5.98 38.04 0.16
𝐶𝑖𝑣𝐿𝑖𝑏𝑡𝑁 4.27 4.00 0.44 5.00 4.00
𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑅𝑔𝑡𝑁𝑡 4.13 4.00 0.34 5.00 4.00
𝑃𝑡𝑠𝑁𝑡 4.07 4.00 0.44 5.00 3.00
𝐶𝑓𝑡𝐹𝑡𝑁𝑡 5980.61 4354.00 6865.45 23074.00 208.00
𝐴𝑟𝑚𝐶𝑓𝑡𝑁𝑡 892.36 402.00 824.58 2699.00 230.00
𝑙𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑛𝐷𝑒𝑛𝑗𝑡 4.12 4.23 1.43 8.96 0.44
𝑙𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑛𝐷𝑒𝑛𝑁𝑡 5.11 5.11 0.11 5.29 4.93
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑛𝑁𝑡 0.33 0.34 0.00 0.34 0.33
𝑙𝐶𝑢𝑚𝐴𝑠𝑦𝑆𝑁𝑗𝑡 1.19 1.04 1.23 4.77 0.00
𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑔1000𝑗𝑡 3.19 0.23 9.86 205.96 0.00
𝑅𝑎𝑖𝑛𝐴𝑛𝑁𝑗𝑡 -0.48 -0.48 1.16 1.74 -2.42
𝑇𝑒𝑚𝑝𝐴𝑛𝑁𝑡 1.19 1.16 0.56 2.28 0.17
𝑙𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑗𝑡 8.56 8.62 0.78 9.83 4.66
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝐿𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑗𝑡 0.27 0.00 0.45 1.00 0.00
𝐸𝑢𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑒 0.13 0.00 0.33 1.00 0.00
𝑁𝐴𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑎 0.02 0.00 0.13 1.00 0.00
𝐴𝑓𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑎 0.28 0.00 0.45 1.00 0.00
Table F: Correlation Matrix of dependent and explanatory variables
