Avoiding “Eternal Dishonor”1: The U.S. Motivations behind Voluntary Repatriation in the Korean Armistice, 1950-1953

1 Statement by President Truman on the Armistice Negotiations, May 7, 1952, In “The United States and the Korean Problem” in United States Congressional serial set. 11675, 62.3,h3w

2

Introduction

The Korean War, while often termed “The Forgotten War”, is a subject that consistently

gains more attention from scholars.2 For the last half a century, historians have debated the

causes of the war, analyzed the military strategies utilized by both sides, and discussed its overall

impact on both the countries involved and those loosely associated with the war effort. One

widely discussed element of the war was the armistice that the Communists and the United

Nations diplomatic leaders agreed upon. Historians scrutinize the inability of all of the members

of the ceasefire to come to a satisfactory decision quickly, blaming China and the North Koreans

for evading any real discussion and attempting to tire the United Nations Command (UNC)

However, what has perhaps received less attention is the United Nations’, particularly the United

States’ role in the prolonged conclusion of the Korean War.

What the armistice negotiations ultimately boiled down to was a fight, on the side of the

South Koreans and the United States’-led UNC, for the inclusion of voluntary repatriation of

prisoners-of-war in the ceasefire.3 This meant that instead of having all POWs repatriate to their

respective nations at the end of the war, the armistice would allow them to choose where they

returned. As the war escalated, UNC guards of POW camps began to learn that they should

expect heavy resistance if they tried to force many Chinese and North Korean soldiers to go back

to their home countries for fear of permanent imprisonment, enslavement, or death. In a war

fighting to protect people from oppressive forms of government, the UNC saw forcible

repatriation as both hypocritical and inhumane. However, besides humanitarian notions, in a war

essentially over ideology, this concept also held a lot of weight; if POWs refused to go back to

2 Clay Blair, The Forgotten War: America in Korea 1950-1953, (New York: Times Books, 1987).3 Donald W. Boose, Jr., “United Nations Command (UNC),” In Encyclopedia of The Korean War: A Political, Social, and Military History, ed. Spencer C. Tucker (New York: Checkmark Books, 2002), 679-680.

3

their communist motherlands—China and North Korea—it would suggest to the citizens of other

communist and borderline communist states that their way of life was inferior to that of those in

other nations.

The Communists had a lot to lose over the acceptance of this issue in the armistice, but

the United States, as the new Leader of the Free World and the driving force in the United

Nations, had both a lot to gain from the success of non-forcible repatriation, and a lot to lose if

they settled to an agreement without it. This essay examines why the United States defended this

concept with unshakable resilience. With the thousands of men’s lives, both American and

foreign, dependent on the conclusion of a ceasefire, it is important to understand why the United

States could not afford to agree to an armistice without voluntary repatriation, politically,

militarily, and ideologically.

The fate of the prisoners-of-war not only relied on the United States, but was also

controlled by the outcomes of American intervention. Few scholars have studied the effect that

non-forcible repatriation had on the lives of these prisoners. David Cheng Chang, in his

dissertation "To return home or ‘Return to Taiwan’: conflicts and survival in the "Voluntary

Repatriation" of Chinese POWs in the Korean War," thoroughly explains the role of the POWs

themselves in gaining the right to voluntary repatriation, with a focus on the Chinese prisoners.

The Chinese POWs were in a complex position, influenced by Communist threats, anti-

communist threats, propaganda, and those keeping them as prisoners, making UNC POW camps

a dangerous and confusing place to be.4

4 David Cheng Chang, "To return home or "Return to Taiwan" : conflicts and survival in the "Voluntary Repatriation" of Chinese POWs in the Korean War," (University of California, 2011).

4

The notable author, Ha Jin also paints a picture of the lives of the prisoners in his

historical-fiction novel War Trash. He shows the inner struggles Chinese prisoners dealt with in

having to take sides on the matter of repatriation.5 Following the story of Chinese POW who

knows English, he shows the terror wrought by both the Communist and anti-communist factions

of the camp, as well as the despair that came with realizing that one may have to compromise

their family, their ideology, or both to navigate the prison camps during the process of

repatriation.

Even with the growing literature on the conditions of the prisoners and of the prison

camps, many historians gloss over the United States’ role in instituting voluntary repatriation in

the Korean Armistice. Scholars such as Clay Blair, author of The Forgotten War: America in

Korea 1950-1953, recognize the push for the voluntary repatriation doctrine as both a

humanitarian feat of the United States, as well as a propaganda scheme, yet historians have paid

little attention to what the United States precisely hoped to gain from supporting non-forcible

repatriation.6 To understand all cases of American intervention in international affairs, including

the Korean War and the battle for voluntary repatriation, we not only need to understand the

impact it has on other nations, but we need to also analyze why the United States makes the

choices it does. Through looking at both the causes and the effects, we can better assess the

levels of practicality, the necessity, and the magnanimity in current and potential U.S.

interventions.

By looking through White House documents—including letters, conversations, and

meetings—as well as memoirs of leading figures, opinion pieces of the time, and speeches, I

have attempted to bring together a picture of the American motivations in handling the Korean

5 Ha Jin, War Trash, (New York : Vintage International, 2005).6 Clay Blair, The Forgotten War, 964.

5

Armistice, focusing on the POW issue. Looking through multiple lenses not only shows the

differences (and similarities) between the private and publically declared incentives of the United

States, but also gives a look at how those motivations altered with a change in the presidency.

Both the Truman and Eisenhower administrations had goals for the reputation of the nation, but

as we will see, international diplomacy was often handled to preserve party-based interests of

each administration. Through putting all of the opposition to the Korean War, and particularly to

the prolonged armistice talks, in contrast with the potential gains of the successful inclusion of

voluntary repatriation in the armistice, we can start to see even the most principled cases of

American interventionism from a more critical approach.

In order to do this, we have to look at a variety of sources. In this essay, I evaluate

primary source materials ranging from publications in the New York Times to memoranda of

conversations in the White House, as well as memoirs from key American figures during the

Korean armistice negotiations and official government messages to the public. To supplement

the primary source material, I have used the Encyclopedia of The Korean War: A Political,

Social, and Military History, edited by Spencer C. Tucker, as well as renowned histories on the

Korean War, such as Bruce Cumings’ The Origins of the Korean War, and William Stueck’s The

Korean War in World History. Using these sources, I have attempted to develop an all-

encompassing picture of the United States’ role in the Korean War and in the armistice

negotiations.

Part one begins our exploration into this issue by examining the causes of the war and the

part the conflict played in the general scheme of the Cold War, while also establishing the roles

of the North Koreans, South Koreans, United Nations, Americans, Chinese, and the Soviets in

the conflict. Part two will focus on the development of the POW problem in the context of the

6

United States’ involvement in the Korean War. Part three will establish the disadvantages the

United States faced through taking on the task of demanding voluntary repatriation for the

Korean War POWs. From understanding of the origins of the problem , especially within the

context of the opposition the United States government faced to prolonging the Korean War, part

four will dive deeper into the United States’ motivations—domestic, international, military, and

humanitarian—in demanding the inclusion of voluntary repatriation in the ceasefire of the

Korean War. We will see that while the leaders of the United States initially pushed for non-

forcible repatriation due to humanitarian principles, they ultimately utilized the issue for anti-

communist propaganda, as a method of saving face, to promote their reputation abroad, and to

gain much-needed support domestically. While agreeing with historians like Blair, who label the

encouragement of the voluntary repatriation doctrine as both a humanitarian move, as well as a

propaganda campaign, I will argue that support for non-forcible repatriation was more complex,

involving military considerations, domestic political issues, and the fate of the United Nations.

I. Historical Background

The Korean War is a unique war in its origins. The foundations of the Korean War trace

back to the Japanese occupation of Korea, before WWII even started. The Japanese did not

prepare Korea for political independence during their rule. In fact, no other occupying nation had

tried so hard to destroy Korea’s basic cultural and political institutions. Children were educated

in Japanese and the Korean language was banned altogether. Very few Koreans, even the

aristocratic elite, had any political voice.7 The Japanese occupation limited the Koreans’ political

choices to either joining an anti-communist group and helping Japan fight the Pacific War, or

7 Louis Hayes, Political Systems of East Asia: China, Korea, and Japan (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 2012), 91.

7

resisting colonial rule and risking potential penalties.8 On top of the political oppression, the

Japanese did not build an industrial infrastructure that could keep Korea economically

independent. All of Korea’s resources were exploited for the benefit of Japan. Ultimately, when

the Japanese occupation ended, they left Korea with a complete lack of stability.9

Korea lacked stability not only because of what the Japanese had taken away from them,

but also because of what they had given them while they occupied the peninsula. Giving Koreans

factory jobs in the city had showed the agricultural peasants a new lifestyle. Japan left Korea

with an improved transportation system and exposure to an organized bureaucracy—the

Japanese had given Koreans a taste of a better life without helping the nation truly transform into

a functional, industrialized nation.10 Politically, since Koreans were denied real bureaucratic

positions, factions grew amongst the few Koreans that had any power. Leaders could not come to

conclusions on how a new political regime would approach fundamental questions, such as

whether or not there should be private ownership, what social practices they would institute, and

how to distribute rudimentary resources.11

While each contained their factions, the Japanese occupation essentially had spurred two

rival uprisings: the Korean Nationalists, who submitted to and advocated a Western, capitalist

ideology, and the Korean Communists, supported Marxist philosophy. Syngman Rhee, an

American-educated, controversial, and deeply anti-communist Korean led the Korean

Nationalists in a movement for Korean independence.12 The North Korean Communists looked

towards Kim Il Sung, who had helped advocate a communist people’s democracy, which later 8 Bruce Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press), c1981-c1990., 1981, 329 Hayes, Political Systems of East Asia, 91.10 Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War, 66.11 Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War, 9912 Priscilla Roberts, “Syngman Rhee,” In Encyclopedia of The Korean War: A Political, Social, and Military History, ed. Spencer C. Tucker (New York: Checkmark Books, 2002), 624-628.

8

proved to become a centrally organized authoritarian system.13 Both revolutionary movements

had grown in number and in power, with the Communists having sought assistance from the

Chinese and the Soviet Union, and the Nationalists gaining support from the United States.14

Leaders of each party had escaped Japanese rule by taking refuge in supportive nations, and

quickly returned to fight for power at the end of WWII.15

Internally, neither movement had enough power and support to overcome the other.16

However, a seemingly domestic issue quickly gained international attention. As early as the

Cairo Conference in 1943, the Allied powers recognized that Korea would face serious

challenges once they attained freedom from the Japanese. They did not believe that Korea was

ready to run itself independently, so they agreed to put Korea under Allied occupation.17 While

the Allied powers discussed a four-way trusteeship—under the United States, the Soviet Union,

Britain and China—at the Yalta Conference in early 1945, the Potsdam Conference sealed the

fate of Korea to undergoing temporary occupation underneath two nations, the US and the

U.S.S.R.18 As the world would come to find out, the differences between the American and

Soviet occupation only reinforced the political divide within the worn-torn nation, making the

reunification between North and South Korea increasingly less possible.

Ideological differences between the U.S.S.R. and the United States became apparent in

post-war these negotiations. The United States had a different vision for rebuilding Korea, as

13 Dong-man Suh, “Korea, Democratic People’s Republic of: 1945-1953,” In Encyclopedia of The Korean War: A Political, Social, and Military History, ed. Spencer C. Tucker (New York: Checkmark Books, 2002), 331-333.14 Allan R. Millet, “The Korean People: Missing in Action in the Misunderstood War, 1945-1954.” In The Korean War in World History, ed. William Stueck (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 2010), 1515 Millet, “The Korean People,” 19.16 Millet, “The Korean People,” 15.17 Conrad Schirokauer and Donald Clark, Modern East Asia: A Brief History. 2nd ed., ( Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2008), 336.18 Sherman Pratt, “Korea: History, 1945-1947,” In Encyclopedia of The Korean War: A Political, Social, and Military History, ed. Spencer C. Tucker (New York: Checkmark Books, 2002), 347.

9

well as other war-torn nations, than the U.S.S.R. did. However, in order to maintain equality, the

agreement reached at the Potsdam conference in 1945 allowed each victorious country to have a

say in how to run and organize the defeated country.19 Korea was divided into North and South

Korea, where the North was occupied by the U.S.S.R. and the South was occupied by the United

States.

The division of Korea presented a unique set of problems. The Soviet Union had entered

the war against Japan only a day before the United States dropped the atomic bomb on

Nagasaki.20 Initially, President Roosevelt welcomed Soviet assistance in the effort against Japan,

and he had invited the Soviet Union into the potential three-way trusteeship, between the US,

China, and the U.S.S.R.—which eventually turned into the four-way trusteeship, and finally the

two-way trusteeship—over Korea after the war. He knew that including the Soviet Union in the

Pacific front would help the U.S. defeat the Japanese more quickly, and remaining on good terms

with the U.S.S.R. was crucial to securing their help.21 However, since the U.S.S.R. had already

occupied Manchuria, the U.S. quickly became suspicious and aware of the Soviet Union’s

growing sphere of influence in the East, especially once the war against the Japanese came to a

close. Many began to speculate that the Soviet Union entered the Pacific War in order to have a

voice in rebuilding the East in the post-war negotiations.22

Regardless of its intentions in entering the war against Japan, the U.S.S.R. did, in fact, get

its opportunity to assert influence in North Korea. When the U.S.S.R. occupied North Korea

after the war, it set it up as a nation that solely relied on other communist nations for economic

19 Hayes, Political Systems of East Asia, 95.20 Schirokauer and Clark, Modern East Asia, 335.21 Mark P. Barry, "The U.S. and the 1945 Division of Korea: Mismanaging The 'Big Decisions.'," International Journal on World Peace 29.4 (2012): 39.22 Barry, “The U.S. and the 1945 Division of Korea,” 39.

10

support; the only country it traded with was the Soviet Union, aside from limited trading with

Hong Kong and the Communist-controlled Manchuria.23 Not only was North Korea

economically dependent on the U.S.S.R., but North Korea’s leader, Kim Il Sung, and his

administration also relied on support from Stalin.24 Kim Il Sung had risen to power with the

economic aid of the U.S.S.R., and completely continued to rely on them fully.25 Between the end

of WWII and the start of the new decade, the U.S.S.R. had supported the North Korean

Communists’ increasing hostility towards South Korea, as well as their drive to occupy the rest

of the peninsula.

While the Soviet Union clearly played a role in setting up the stage for the Korean War,

they were not the only foreign power that contributed to the problem in Korea. Before WWII,

neither the United States nor the U.S.S.R. had given Korea much consideration to Korea in their

world views.26 However, the post-war nation provided an opportunity for the U.S.S.R. and

presented a problem to the U.S.; the U.S.S.R. suddenly had access to many unstable nations that

were susceptible to communist conversion, and the United States had to justify their post-war

intervention in the nations freed in a war against imperialism to the international community that

had watched the U.S. free the nations.27 The trusteeship under the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. took

some time to materialize, and by the time it did, there were already two distinct regimes in North

Korea and South Korea.28 President Franklin Roosevelt had desired to contain the spread of

communism in the east, and he had hoped that bringing the Soviet Union into an international

contract made within the United Nations would prevent the U.S.S.R. from starting something

23 Kathryn Weathersby, “The Soviet Role in the Korean War: The State of Historical Knowledge.” In The Korean War in World History, ed. William Stueck (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 2010), 65.24 Weathersby, “The Soviet Role in the Korean War,” 65.25 Weathersby, “The Soviet Role in the Korean War,” 65.26 Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War, 102.27 Schirokauer, 336; Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War, 131.28 Hayes, Political Systems of East Asia, 99.

11

like the Korean War.29 However, letting the Soviet Union stay in Korea at all allowed for the

national division and the conversion of many North Koreans to the communist ideology.

Due to both the problems in domestic politics and in influence of the increasingly torn

international community, tensions built up on either side of the 38th parallel past the point of

containment. On June 25, 1950, North Korea launched an invasion into South Korea, quickly

pushing South Korean forces, as well as the United Nations forces that had remained during the

temporary occupation, to the southern-most point of the peninsula.30 America and the United

Nations reacted quickly, driving the Communists back towards the dividing line in a matter a

months. With the rapid success of the UN and South Korean troops, North Korea called in for

reinforcements. By mid-October, China joined the Communists, truly turning a civil war into an

international affair.

With the arrival of China in the Korean War, the UN suddenly met a force that they could

not hope to defeat.31 A war that began with intensions to unify a broken country turned into a war

of words, propaganda, and fruitless truce negotiations within a year. For three years after the

North Korean invasion, men from both sides fought on while diplomats from the United States,

the United Nations, South Korea, China and North Korea sought a ceasefire that satisfied

everyone. There were a number of issues each side had to agree upon, such as where to put the

demilitarized zone that divided North Korea from South Korea. However, it soon became

apparent that three issues made a quick ceasefire impossible: the North Korean and Chinese

proposal for inclusion of the Soviet Union in the military armistice commission (MAC), the UN

and South Korean suggested ban on airfield repair and construction, and the UN demand for non-

29 Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War, 130.30 Clay Blair, The Forgotten War, 317-319.31 Donald W. Boose, Jr., “Truce Talks (July 1951-July 1953),” In Encyclopedia of The Korean War: A Political, Social, and Military History, ed. Spencer C. Tucker (New York: Checkmark Books, 2002), 653.

12

forcible repatriation of the prisoners-of-war after the ceasefire. The UN believed it was

inappropriate for the Communists to rebuild during peace negotiations, recognized that the

Soviet Union would not act neutrally if they were given a position in the armistice negotiations,

and thought anything but voluntary repatriation was inhumane. Of course, the Communists felt

differently on all three of these issues, making it difficult to come to any conclusions.32

By the second year of negotiations in 1952, none of these questions had found

satisfactory conclusions. The China and North Korea refused to acknowledge that the Soviet

Union, just because it was not actively participating in the Korean War, was far from a neutral

nation. The UN negotiators continued to decline the request of China and North Korea to include

the Soviet Union in the MAC. The way they saw it, the Soviets had clear intentions to spread

communism in Korea and the rest of the East, so allowing it to supervise the logistics of the

ceasefire would put the UN at a distinct disadvantage in the scheme of the Cold War. Similarly,

the UN delegates found the Chinese and North Korean desire to continue to rebuild and even

construct new airfields during a ceasefire disconcerting.

Yet, as one New York Times article voiced that as “knotty” as these two issues appeared,

“both might be considered practical military or military political matters capable of a concrete

solution.”33 The real source of delay in the negotiations came from the question of voluntary

repatriation. On this question, as the Times article articulated, “the rival ideologies [came]

squarely into conflict.” The United States and the United Nations argued that it was inhumane to

force POWs back home against their will, especially with the understanding that their home

nations were likely going to treat them as traitors who should have died for their country before

32Ibid. 65433 Lindesay Parrott, “Reds Accuse U.N. of Germ War Tests on Korea Captives,” The New York Times, March 23, 1952, 1. http://search.proquest.com/docview/112506651?accountid=13554

13

surrendering to enemy captivity.34 This argument turned what was normally used as military

negotiation tool into a group of individual human beings, with the UN fighting for the individual.

However, fighting for the individual proved to hit the heart of the ideological differences each

side was ultimately fighting for. As General Matthew Ridgway, the UNC commanding general

for the majority of the truce negotiations stated, “it is the principle which is anathema to them

[the Communists] since the question of the individual versus the state is the essential difference

between democracy and communism.”35

With such a philosophically charged problem, it is no surprise that voluntary repatriation

delayed the ceasefire. However, a two year stalemate over what had historically always been a

logistical issue raises some questions. What exactly made this issue create such tension between

the fighting sides? How important was voluntary repatriation to the United States as a

humanitarian victory? Was it worth the loss of thousands of lives of American, South Korean,

and UN soldiers? What would have been the consequences if the U.S. had compromised on the

issue of non-forcible repatriation?

This essay hopes to answer some of these questions. By focusing on the motivations of

the United States presidents and their administrations throughout the Korean War, it is evident

that there was a lot to gain from successfully incorporating voluntary repatriation into the

armistice, but equally just as much to lose by agreeing to a ceasefire without it. As we will

discover, the initially humanitarian intentions behind the United States’ demand for non-forcible

repatriation were manipulated by the desire to save face internationally and domestically and to

secure an advantage in the overarching fight against communism.

34 Boose, “Truce Talks (July 1951-July 1953), 65435 Walter G. Hermes, Truce Tent and Fighting Front, (Washington, D.C.:Office of the Chief of Military History, United States Army, 1966), 146-7.

14

II. A Problem on Our Hands

At the onset of the Korean War, no one suspected that the exchange of POWs would

provide one of the greatest dilemmas in agreeing to an armistice. In regards to POW exchange—

according to the Article 118 of the Geneva Convention, written just a year before the war—the

only responsibility of nations who accepted the Geneva Convention as international law was to

return all prisoners to their country of origin immediately following an armistice, treaty, or

truce.36 This was emphasized due to the Soviet Union’s actions after the war was over; instead of

immediately letting their German and Japanese prisoners-of-war go back to their homes, the

U.S.S.R. kept them and forced them to help repair the damage the war had caused.37 The Geneva

Conventions were updated to help protect those prisoners without considering how such a

statement could limit possibilities in POW negotiations in the future. Even through the first year

of the war, the United States saw no reason to press the issue of non-forcible repatriation and,

although neither the U.S. nor its communist enemies (People’s Republic of China and North

Korea) had ratified the particular document regarding POWS, accepted the terms presented by

the Geneva Convention as humanitarian in nature.38

As the war progressed, the United States and United Nations combined forces became

increasingly aware of a threat of resistance to repatriation amongst the prisoners held in the

United Nations Command POW camps. The first indication that POWs in this war were going to

play a different role than in wars past came from the North Korean prisoners. As more fell into

the hands of the UNC, many complained that they were neither communist nor North Korean,

36 Hermes, Truce Tent and Fighting Front.37 Hermes, Truce Tent and Fighting Front.38 "United States Position Regarding a Cease-Fire in Korea," National Security Council Report #95, December 13, 1950, In The Korean War and Its Origins, http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/korea/large/documents/pdfs/ci-4-9.pdf#zoom=100; Zsolt Varga, “Geneva Convention of 1949,” In Encyclopedia of The Korean War: A Political, Social, and Military History, ed. Spencer C. Tucker (New York: Checkmark Books, 2002), 224.

15

indicating that the Communists had forced these South Koreans into their army. Once the

Chinese entered the war, the UNC forces commanding the POW camps listened to a similar story

told by the incoming Chinese prisoners. Many claimed that their loyalty belonged to the Chinese

Nationalist Party, and that they had been impressed into the Chinese Communist military.39

This development raised a great number of issues, ranging from logistical to ideological:

Was this issue the responsibility of the military, or should the UN Command approach it

politically? Would the enemy even agree to non-forcible repatriation—was the idea of non-

forcible repatriation a concept that even occurred as a possibility in communist philosophy? If

not, would the UNC’s demand for non-forcible repatriation jeopardize the lives of American and

UN troops held in enemy captivity? If so, who would mediate the prisoner exchange, and

therefore take on the duty of caring for non-repatriated prisoners? If they did not pursue the

issue at all, would the non-communist prisoners revolt from within the camps and during

repatriation, putting the lives of the UNC forces in danger? Was it the Free World’s moral

obligation to defend the choices of these prisoners?40

This was the first time the discussion of the concept of non-forcible repatriation actively

prevented any armistice. However, the world had, in fact, encountered a similar problem at the

end of WWII. When Robert McClure, chief of the Army Psychological Warfare branch first

suggested that the U.S. and the UN demand that the enemy accept non-forcible repatriation, he

reminded the Chief of Staff of the horrors of forcing Soviet prisoners to return to their oppressive

39 Hermes, Truce Tent and Fighting Front, 2.40 Dean Acheson, Present at the creation; my years in the State Department, (New York: Norton [1969], 1969), 653; Kearney, “The Heart of PW Issue,”; “U.S. Bars New Red Plan on Prisoners: Opposes Sending Men Out of Korea to Long Detention in Neutral State,” The New York Times, April 27, 1953, 1; Edmond Taylor to Mallory Browne, With Attachments, February 19, 1952, In The Korean War and Its Origins, http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/korea/large/documents/pdfs/kp-4-15.pdf#zoom=100; Telegram to Dean G. Acheson With Related Correspondence, November 14, 1952, In The Korean War and Its Origins, http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/korea/large/documents/pdfs/kp-3-17.pdf#zoom=100; Hermes, Truce Tent and Fighting Front, 3.

16

government after World War II.41 Many of the soldiers committed suicide instead of going back

to the U.S.S.R., and those who did return and expressed anti-communist views were sent to the

Gulags. Dwight D. Eisenhower, who was a general at the beginning of the Korean War and who

the people elected president before the final year of the war, remembered the repatriation of the

U.S.S.R. prisoners as a tragedy that he would never allow himself to oversee again.42

While memory and regret of the post-WWII situation in the U.S.S.R. aroused

humanitarian sentiments in those intertwined in the Korean War, those dictating the United

States’ role in the war announced publicly, and repeatedly, that defending non-forcible

repatriation was simply the right thing to do. The Department of State claimed in a press release

that it was “a fundamental humanitarian principle vital to the whole Free World,” and Secretary

of State Dean Acheson himself declared that he did not want “to compromise the human

principles”43 In a letter to a concerned father of a questioning young man, Secretary Acheson

reinforced this attitude about the U.S. involvement in the war, suggesting that it was only natural

and right for a young adult to question the administration, while encouraging the father to remind

his son of the principles that the U.S. was founded on and its commitment to them.44

The New York Times also aided in proclaiming the humanitarian principles. The Times

chose excerpts from the Acheson report to the UN Assembly Committee on U.S. Conduct of the

Korean War that highlighted America’s altruistic motives in the war. Acheson, as the paper

reported, stated that the United Nations “would have been quite satisfied to have all prisoners

41 Demaree Bess, “The Prisoners Stole the Show in Korea,” The Saturday Evening Post 225, no. 18 (November, 1952): 36.42 Walter H. Judd, "'The Real Test is Our Moral Strength'." Vital Speeches Of The Day 20, no. 14 (May 1954): 427.43 Statement by the Department of State on the Exchange of Prisoners of War, May 15, 1953, In “The United States and the Korean Problem” in United States Congressional serial set. 11675, 80; Acheson, Present at the Creation, 696.44 Clarence E. Moullette to Dean Acheson, January 19, 1951, In The Korean War and Its Origins, http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/korea/large/documents/pdfs/kp-8-13.pdf#zoom=100.

17

returned, provided no humanitarian considerations of the matter,” and they “could be perfectly

happy if there were not other considerations, no humanitarian considerations, and simply to

exchange prisoners and forget about them.”45 One article, featured by the Times ensured the

American people that the United States and the United Nations, when interrogating the POWs in

the camps on their desire to go home, used questions “loaded in the favor of the Communists.”46

III. Pressure to End the War

While America preached a story of natural rights, the tale did not change the minds of

everyone. The U.S. involvement in the Korean War was controversial from the beginning, and

supportive public opinion, both domestically and abroad, only declined as the war continued.

General Douglas MacArthur, who led the U.S. forces into Korea, had told the American mothers

that they could expect their sons to come home before Christmas of 1950.47 When the Chinese

intervened—to the at least apparent surprise of MacArthur, Truman, and the State Department in

the press—letters from angry parents and wives flowed into the President Truman’s office. One

father accused Truman of being “directly responsible” for the death of their son, suggesting that

President Truman keep his letter on display in his “trophy room.”48 Other letters disagreed not

only with the ongoing war, but with the desire for non-forcible repatriation specifically. One wife

wrote to her senator, declaring that her husband was “worth more than 500 Communist prisoners

of war,” while a father wrote to President Truman, stating that he “would not trade the life of one

American boy for all of the Koreans.”49 Another wife respectfully reminded her senator, Senator

45 “Exceprts from Acheson Report to U.N. Assembly Committee on U.S. Conduct of Korean War,” The New York Times, October 25, 1952, 4. 46 Murray Schumach, “U.N. Tells Full Story of Poll of Prisoners,” The New York Times, April 26, 1952, 1.47 Duane L. Wesolick, “MacArthur, Douglas,” In Encyclopedia of The Korean War: A Political, Social, and Military History, ed. Spencer C. Tucker (New York: Checkmark Books, 2002), 402.48 William Banning to Harry S. Truman, ca. 1953, In The Korean War and Its Origins, http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/korea/large/documents/pdfs/8-16.pdf#zoom=100.49 Francis Case to Harry S. Truman With Reply From Robert A. Lovett, October 1, 1952, In The Korean War and its Origins, http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/korea/large/documents/pdfs/kp-1-

18

Paul Douglas that the United States’ “FIRST obligation” was to its own soldiers, proposing to

begin a petition to bring them home unless he responded with information that could convince

her otherwise.50

Truman not only got angry letters, but he took on the greater political consequences of

the Korean War as well. Support for his administration fell, and to many, his foreign policy

appeared weak.51 While poor public opinion is always unfavorable, Truman did not plan to run

for reelection in 1952, so its entire legacy was at stake. Moreover, Truman’s choices influenced

the success of his party. One editorial to The Saturday Evening Post predicted how an armistice,

even a temporary one, could benefit the Democratic candidate, Adlai Stevenson, governor of

Illinois in the election, whereas the absence of an agreement would work in the favor of the

Republican candidate, Dwight D. Eisenhower.52

The Republican Party utilized the Korean War as political leverage too, blaming

Truman’s administration for MacArthur’s unexpected and humiliating defeat at the Battle of the

Yalu.53 A Times article did not help the Truman administration or the Democratic Party, calling

attention to “Acheson’s great blunder” at the beginning of his appointment as Secretary of State

—in addressing America’s foreign policy objectives, he specifically left out Korea as an area of

21.pdf#zoom=100; James T. Mayall to Harry S. Truman With Reply From William D. Hassett, June 13, 1952, In The Korean War and Its Origins, http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/korea/large/documents/pdfs/kp-1-17.pdf#zoom=10050 Correspondence Between Paul Douglas and Harry S. Truman, With Attachments, June 12, 1952, In The Korean War and Its Origins, http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/korea/large/documents/pdfs/kp-1-18.pdf#zoom=10051 Correspondence Between James E. Noland and Harry S. Truman, August 29, 1950, In The Korean War and Its Origins, http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/korea/large/documents/pdfs/ki-11-10.pdf#zoom=100.52 Bess, “The Prisoners Stole the Show in Korea.”53 Arthur Krock, “’Mistakes’ of Korea War Again a Political Issue,” The New York Times, June 28, 1953, E3.

19

political and military interest, leading the Communists to believe they could quickly take Korea

without getting the United States involved.54

Of course, the most severe domestic opposition both Truman and Eisenhower faced—

although Truman more so than Eisenhower—came from Senator Joseph McCarthy. The

Republican senator from Wisconsin had started wild accusations of communism within the U.S.

government near the end of WWII, and they only escalated as the repercussions of the war

unfolded.55 Secretary of State Dean Acheson quickly became a victim of such accusations when

the Korean War broke out. His “great blunder” fueled McCarthy’s belief that people within the

State Department were in cahoots with Russia in “a conquest of terror” similar to those of

Genghis Khan and Hitler.56 Acheson had left Korea out of the Far East policy, so according to

McCarthy’s logic, the State Department clearly wanted to “deliver vast areas and millions of

people into communist slavery without having it appear that we pushed them.”57 Every move by

Truman, and even the Republican Eisenhower came under McCarthy’s scrutiny; with McCarthy

at the height of his political influence, the executive branch could hardly afford to let the war

continue, much less make any decisions that may have appeared sympathetic to the

Communists.58

Ultimately, the war did Truman and the Democrats no favors. At the beginning of 1953,

Dwight D. Eisenhower replaced Truman in the Oval Office and appointed John Foster Dulles as

the new Secretary of State. Although they won the election, the new administration did not

54 Krock, “’Mistakes’ of Korea War,”; Claude R. Sasso, “Stalin, Josef,” In Encyclopedia of The Korean War: A Political, Social, and Military History, ed. Spencer C. Tucker (New York: Checkmark Books, 2002), 613.55 Priscilla Roberts, “McCarthy, Joseph R.”, In Encyclopedia of The Korean War: A Political, Social, and Military History, ed. Spencer C. Tucker (New York: Checkmark Books, 2002), 421.56 John Fenton, “M’Carthy Brands Korea a ‘Betrayal’,” The New York Times, June 30, 1951, 2. 57 “M’Carthy Urges Acheson be ‘Fired’,” The New York Times, May 16, 1950, 14.58 Roberts, “McCarthy,” 422; “Dulles, McCarthy Views on Rhee’s Revolt Differ,” The New York Times, June 19, 1953, 2.

20

escape the difficulties brought on by the Korean War. As the Times reported, Acheson had not

wanted to “commit the new administration to an involved plan [for Korea] that, if accepted,

might land General Eisenhower and Mr. Dulles in difficulties in which they could then blame

their predecessors,” so the U.S. and the UN had made no formal plans for ending the war or

settling on an armistice when Eisenhower took office.59

Not only was the war at a stalemate, but the international community looked towards the

new administration for a way out of the war. One Dutch editorial expressed concerns, saything

that the new administration was isolationist, an unflattering image for the representing party of

the leader of the Free World.60 Great Britain pressured the United States to accept the resolution

proposed by the neutral India—in which the Communists and the UN would agree to a ceasefire,

let all prisoners who wanted to repatriate go home, and then leave the rest to a repatriation

committee made of neutral nations.61 Domestically, politicians worried that Eisenhower’s

administration was uninterested in shifting America’s “Europe-first” policy to give the

increasingly threatening East more attention in foreign policy. Senator Walter Judd of Minnesota

worried that a lack of a reformed plan for the Far East would resemble Acheson’s foreign policy,

undermining the strength of the new administration.62

Regardless of political standing, all political and military leaders understood that

continuing a war in Korea could quickly lead to a conflict beyond America’s capacity to control.

Both the Truman and the Eisenhower administrations considered the size and power of the Red

59 Thomas J. Hamilton, “Reticences of Eisenhower Influence U.N. Talk on Korea,” The New York Times, November, 26, 1952, 3.60From Mr. Hanes to Mr. Bonbright, July 22, 1953, The papers of John Foster Dulles and of Christian A. Herter, 1953-1961. The White house correspondence and memoranda series.61 Elizabeth D. Schafer, Nehru Jawaharlal (1889-1964),” In Encyclopedia of The Korean War: A Political, Social, and Military History, ed. Spencer C. Tucker (New York: Checkmark Books, 2002), 481; Thomas J. Hamilton, “Eden Urges Enemy Yield on Captives to End Korean War,” The New York Times, November 12, 1952, 1.62 Telephone Conversation with Congressman Judd March 6, 1953, Minutes of telephone conversations of John Foster Dulles and of Christian Herter (1953-1961).

21

Armies a serious threat. Both Truman and Eisenhower had both taken careful steps to avoid a

war with China, including Truman’s risky move of firing MacArthur. From the earliest U.S.

National Security Council reports, it is clear that while unifying Korea was ideal, preventing a

full scale war in Asia would take priority when making all decisions throughout the course of the

war. In fact, the ultimate plan was to merely limit the spread of communism past the 38th parallel,

not to take chances by pushing it out of Korea entirely.63 A

cheson’s statements from report to the U.N Committee on U.S. involvement in Korea

were carefully worded, and widely publicized, as to not suggest that the U.S. was pursuing any

direct confrontation with the Chinese. He reiterated that the only reason the UN went to Korea

was to reunify the broken nation, or, if nothing else, protect South Korea from falling under the

influence of communism.64 Such fear continued and grew as the Korean War pressed on,

especially once China intervened. General Omar Bradley pushed for a negotiation of peace that

would help deter a future war against the Soviets, warning that general war with China and the

U.S.S.R. would be devastating. If the UN Command let the war spread into China, Bradley

cautioned, everyone would risk trading “the small deadlock in Korea, for a larger stalemate in

China.”65 As the war went on, the UN risked further Chinese agitation, leading them closer and

closer to tensions that a ceasefire in Korea may not overcome.

The Truman and Eisenhower administrations faced, yet, a final source of pressure to

settle the POW question and bring the war to an end. This came from within the POW camps

themselves. While many of the POWs in UNC camps had either been forced into either the

63 National Security Council Report 81, "United States Courses of Action With Respect to Korea", September 1, 1950, In The Korean War and Its Origins, http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/korea/large/documents/pdfs/ki-17-1.pdf#zoom=100.64 “Excerpts From Acheson Report.”65 Omar N. Bradley, “Our Hope for a Lasting Peace,” Vital Speeches of the Day, 18, no. 14 (May 1952): 445.

22

Peoples’ Volunteer Army or China or into the North Korean forces, or simply held no strong

loyalty to the Communist governments, some were fiercely dedicated Communists who saw

opportunity in their compromised position. Once the idea of voluntary repatriation circulated

around the camps, those faithful to the Communists’ cause considered themselves as active

combatants in the war and began resistance, in the form of riots, against the proposal.66 The size

and scale of the riots was not fully realized until the UNC forces began screening the prisoners in

order to determine their repatriation preferences.67 The Communists refused to adhere to the

order and rules of the camp and rejected screening.68

Violent riots persisted and Communist plans grew more complex. In what Blair calls a

“vicious and massive propaganda attack,” the Communists utilized lies and their POWs to

humiliate and to bring down the United States and the United Nations.69 They accused the UN of

using germ warfare, suggesting that they had spread dangerous bacteria throughout North Korea.

This propaganda campaign was only complemented by another Communist tactic; the

Communist forces allowed select soldiers to get taken as prisoners into the UNC camps to help

organize a resistance movement within the camps. UN forces had to use force to combat the

riots, giving the Communists the material they needed to portray the UN guards as inhumane,

bloodthirsty enemies.70 To the huge embarrassment of the U.S., the Chinese forces within the

POW camp on Koje-do (an island off of South Korea) captured General Francis T. Dodd and

forced him to admit to false accusations of maltreatment within the camps amongst other

66 Matthew B. Ridgway, The Korean War: How we met the challenge: How all-out Asian war was averted: Why MacArthur was dismissed: Why today's war objectives must be limited, (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1967) 209.67 “U.N. Prisoner Camp Scene of Violence,” The New York Times, January 22, 1952, 3; Robert Alden, “Communist Prisoners Wage New Kind of War,” The New York Times, December 21, 1952, E5.68 Acheson, Present at the Creation, 705.69 Clay Blair, The Forgotten War, 966.70 Ibid.

23

demands.71 As humiliating as it was, the U.S. could not maintain effective control within the

camps, and as resistance grew, the lives of the both the prisoners and the camp guards were

increasingly endangered.72

IV. Motivations

Demanding that the armistice between the UN forces and the Communist enemy include

a commitment to non-forcible repatriation brought on significant difficulties, yet both the

Truman administration and the Eisenhower administration pursued it. While, publicly they

declared that the United States was simply committed to the humanitarian principles inherent to a

democratic society, there was more they could gain from it. In the ongoing fight against

communism, the United States needed any leverage they could get against their enemy. When

introduced to the concept of non-forcible repatriation, the Truman administration quickly saw its

potential anti-communist propaganda. Colonel Paul C. Davis of the Psychological Strategy

Board wrote to the State Department, suggesting that they use the POW situation to develop the

United States’ “propaganda position”.73 Although Acheson worried about how the non-forcible

repatriation proposal would affect the return of all UN troops, he too saw the “possible

psychological warfare advantages.” These advantages outweighed the possibilities of UN

soldiers refusing to repatriate, especially having heard no indication that the Communists held

many Communist sympathizers in their camps.74

71 Jinwung Kim, “Koje-do Prisoner-of-War Uprising (7 May-10 June, 1952),” In Encyclopedia of The Korean War: A Political, Social, and Military History, ed. Spencer C. Tucker (New York: Checkmark Books, 2002), 326-328; Acheson, Present at the Creation, 654.72 Bess, “The Prisoners Stole the Show in Korea.”73 Memorandum For the Record, Paul C. Davis, January 24, 1952, In The Korean War and Its Origins, http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/korea/large/documents/pdfs/kp-4-2.pdf#zoom=100.74 Dean G. Acheson to George C. Marshall, August 27, 1951, In The Korean War and Its Origins, http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/korea/large/documents/pdfs/kp-4-7.pdf#zoom=100.

24

A year after the armistice, Senator Judd reflected in a speech given to The Executives

Club of Chicago that one of the great gains of the war was the propaganda that stemmed from the

POW issue. He stated, “Witness the prisoners of war, 74 percent of whom—Communist

prisoners in Korea—said they would die rather than go back to China. The great benefit of the

Korean war was that it gave time for the truth about Communism to leak out.”75 Walter Hermes,

author of Truce Tent and the Fighting Front, an official military history of the Korean War,

confirmed the use of the POW situation as “a propaganda lever.” “If a large proportion of the

prisoners in UNC hands refused to return to communism,” Hermes states, “the adverse publicity

would be hard to combat, no matter how it was rationalized. Unusual as the doctrine of voluntary

repatriation might be, its humanitarian aspects were bound to appeal to a large part of the

world.”76

There was a clear political advantage in promoting voluntary repatriation, but the U.S.

expected to achieve a military advantage as well. When Brigadier General McClure suggested

using the prisoners as a tool of psychological warfare in the Cold War, he thought beyond how

the concept would gain support internationally. He believed that if the enemy forces felt that the

UN Command would provide asylum from their oppressive homes, then enemy soldiers would

resist imprisonment less and may even willingly accept UN imprisonment.77 Not only would the

threat of non-forcible repatriation help in the Korean War, but as Acheson wrote in his memoirs,

the policy would serve as a significant deterrent to future acts of Communist aggression. If

Communist leaders knew that their soldiers had an opportunity to defect, and moreover, that they

would defect if given the opportunity, adding an element of risk to any potential physical

75 Judd, “The Real Test is Our Moral Strength,” 434.76 Hermes, Truce Tent and Fighting Front,144.77 Hermes, Truce Tent and Fighting Front, 2.

25

confrontation.78 From the very onset of the war, the Truman administration fully intended to

create plans to promote enemy defection. “[T]he treatment of POW’s, after their transfer to

places of internment, shall be directed toward their exploitation,” and “use for psychological

warfare purposes,” wrote the James Lay, the Executive Secretary in a draft of the United States

Courses of Action with Respect to Korea to the National Security Council.

When the war fell into the hands of Eisenhower and his administration, they, too, saw the

military advantage in voluntary repatriation. In a speech delivered to the American Legion in

September 1953, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles claimed that not only was enemy

defection beneficial to the U.S., but that an armistice without it would be detrimental. He stated

that the “Soviet leaders hoped that the Korean Armistice would establish a principle that would

discourage future defections and thus make their Red Armies more dependable.”79 This was

particularly important to the Eisenhower administration because as the situation in Korea was

coming to a close, the conflict in Indochina gained strength, so it was necessary to limit the size

of the Communist forces in any way possible.80

Of course, the U.S. and the UN Command did not just hope for psychological warfare

and propaganda benefits from the use of voluntary repatriation; they also hoped to prevent the

Communist forces from using destructive propaganda against them and even to protect the safety

of the troops running the POW camps. As discussed before, the UN forces had difficulty

maintaining control of the Communist riots and faced humiliation, especially after the Chinese

captured General Dodd. The stipulations Dodd was forced to agree to in order to guarantee his

safety was a great victory for the Communists—word got around and people began to believe

78 Acheson, Present at the Creation, 65379 John Foster Dulles, “Korea: Deterrents to New Aggression.”80 Department of States Breakfast, Memorandum of Conversation at White House, March 24, 1953, The papers of John Foster Dulles and of Christian A. Herter, 1953-1961. The White house correspondence and memoranda series.

26

that the UN Command was treating its prisoners in the most heinous of ways.81 However, the

Communists were not the only prisoners who posed a serious threat to both the United States’

reputation and its safety. The Chinese Nationalists and the South Korean supporters that found

themselves in the POW camps threatened violent resistance to repatriation, which also would put

everyone in danger once repatriation day game.

Worse, yet, was President Syngman Rhee’s influence over the South Korean POWs in

the UN camps. Rhee was adamant that the UN must not stop fighting until Korea was reunited,

much less waiver its demand for voluntary repatriation. As The New York Times reported, Rhee

saw an armistice without reunification as “as a death sentence for Korea and a danger to the

whole free world.”82 He encouraged resistance to repatriation, and, near the end of the war, he

staged an outbreak of 25,000 North Korean POWs.83 Rhee’s insistence on reunification put the

U.S. and the UN in a tight situation. During the outbreak, the UN troops had to choose, in the

moment, whether or not to use force on the escaping prisoners; if they had, they risked the

hypocrisy involved in using force against those “whose only motive,” as Major General Herren,

commander of the Korean Communication Zone stated, “was to resist return to Communist

control.”84 However, not controlling the outbreak had the potential to suggest U.S. and UN

approval of Rhee’s actions. This not only threatened to quash any progress in the armistice

negotiations, but also had the potential to ignite an even greater dispute between the UN and the

Communist forces.

While potential war against China weighed heavy on the minds of the U.S. military and

the administrative powers, there were other conflicts and potential conflicts that required U.S.

81 “What Price UN Pledge to the Anti-Red POW’s?” The Saturday Evening Post 226, (October 31, 1953): 10.82 Lindesay Parrott, “Rhee Rebuffs Eisenhower; Prisoner Escapes Continue,” The New York Times, June 19, 1953, 1.83 Vincent S. Kearney, “The Heart of the PW Issue,” The Saturday Evening Post 89, (June 6, 1953): 274-275.84 Parrott, “Rhee Rebuffs Eisenhower."

27

attention, resources, and a settlement in Korea. The Eisenhower administration in particular

recognized Korea as only one country faced by global threat of Communist aggression. The

public hoped and expected President Eisenhower to bring an “honorable end” to what

Eisenhower had called “’the most dramatic and painful phase’ of the world-wide struggle against

communism”, as well as settle the growing conflicts in other parts of Asia—particularly

Indochina.85 Korea had shown the world that the nations that had faced colonialism, both before

and during WWII, suffered unstable economies and governments that were vulnerable to falling

into the hands of Communist forces.

In the minds of U.S. politicians, how the conflict in Korea ended was sure to have a direct

impact on the strength of potential Communist forces in Indochina, and handling the problem in

Indochina was quickly taking priority over Korea. At a White House breakfast, Eisenhower and

Dulles concluded that the UN Command could at least keep the Communist aggression in Korea

localized, whereas Indochina was in closer proximity to the rest of Asia and Europe.86 While the

Eisenhower administration began shifting its focus from Korea to Indochina, they were not going

to back away from the principle of voluntary repatriation. In a conversation with John Hickerson,

an assistant secretary of state for the UN, Secretary of State Dulles explained that agreeing to an

armistice without it could have grave consequences. If the UNC and the Communist forces

agreed to handle the POW issue post-armistice, it would leave the UNC POWs in captivity,

while simultaneously allowing the Communists “an opportunity to build up their forces of shift

to Indochina.”87

85 Alden, “Communist Prisoners Wage New Kind of War.”86 Department of State Breakfast, Memorandum of Conversation at White House, March 24, 1953.87 Priscilla Robers, “Hickerson, John D.” In Encyclopedia of The Korean War: A Political, Social, and Military History, ed. Spencer C. Tucker (New York: Checkmark Books, 2002), 246-247; “Telephone Conversation with Mr. Hickerson,” Minutes of telephone conversations of John Foster Dulles and of Christian Herter (1953-1961), March 23, 1953.

28

How the Korean War ended did not only have an impact on the strength of the

Communist forces, but also on the strength of the United Nations. By the onset of the war, the

UN was barely five-years-old and had yet to face a conflict that was the size and magnitude of

the Korean War. From the beginning, the United States hoped that they could work with the UN

to face the Communist aggression, knowing that an international stand against it would have a

greater impact than if America stood against it on her own.88 The U.S. National Security Council

reports continually reiterated that the majority of the UN should strongly support any major war

decision before acting on it.89 Putting the war in the hands of the UN was a mixed blessing—it

took full responsibility of the outcome of the war out of the hands of the U.S., but a failed

attempt to secure peace in Korea risked destroying the young, peace-keeping institution.

As the chances of reunification dwindled, faith in the UN rested on its ability to enforce

voluntary repatriation. As the Times reported, the UN had “given birth to an idea new in modern

warfare—that prisoners are not mere military units of ‘personnel’ of armies but human beings of

thought and conscience, not to be herded back to fight again for a cause they had renounced.”90 It

was a concept “officially linked” to the UN, and both the Truman administration and the

Eisenhower administration were well aware of it.91 In a press release in the spring of 1952,

Truman declared that forcible repatriation would result in “misery and bloodshed to the eternal

dishonor of the United States and of the United Nations.”92 Similarly, Dulles emphasized in a

88 National Security Council Report 81, "United States Courses of Action With Respect to Korea", September 1, 1950, 2.89 "United States Courses of Action with Respect to Korea,", Report 81/2, James S. Lay, Jr. to National Security Council, November 14, 1950, In The Korean War and Its Origins, http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/korea/large/documents/pdfs/ci-4-9.pdf#zoom=100, 3.90 Lindesay Parrott, “Korea Prisoner Issue is Heart of Deadlock,” The New York Times, April 20, 1952, E6.91 Hermes, Truce Tent and Fighting Front, 9.92 Statement by President Truman on the Armistice Negotiations, May 7, 1952.

29

speech that since the United States was the driving force behind the United nations, it has a

growing responsibility and that it must live up to its reputation.93

The success of the UN not only depended on the ability to negotiate with the enemy, but

also on the willingness of member nations to negotiate with each other. During the negotiations,

UN members generally agreed that non-forcible repatriation was ideal. However, there was

disagreement on the logistics of handling the prisoners. In his memoirs, Secretary of State

Acheson wrote that disagreement over this issue “would bring disillusionment in the United

States regarding collective security which would not be confined to Korea but would extend to

NATO and other arrangements of the same sort.”94 The United States worried throughout the war

that the conflict within the UN would prevent any agreement between the Communists and the

UN on the issue, but with so much invested into the issue, neither the UN nor the U.S. could let

that happen.

While the United States, as the driving force of the UN, needed positive gains from the

Korean conflict, they also had domestic concerns as well. The possibility of a failed

confrontation in Korea threatened both the U.S. Constitution and the reputations of the

administrations responsible for beginning and ending the war. With McCarthyism running

rampant, there was increasing support for an amendment to the Constitution that would have

given the Senate the power to disapprove of all “executive agreements.”95 In other words,

Congress could overpower the president’s decision to sign pacts with other nations that would

alter the allocation of power in the government or affect the rights of American citizens in a way

93 John Foster Dulles, “Korea: Deterrents to New Aggression,” Vital Speeches of the Day 19, no. 24 (October 1953): 738.94 Acheson, Present at the Creation, 702.95 Priscilla Roberts, “Knowland, William Fife,” In Encyclopedia of The Korean War: A Political, Social, and Military History, ed. Spencer C. Tucker (New York: Checkmark Books, 2002), 325.

30

that was unacceptable under the law of the land.96 This movement, headed by Senator Bricker, a

Republican senator from Ohio, was a direct response to Truman’s declaration of war against

North Korea. Supporters of the Bricker Resolution, as the proposed amendment came to be

called, believed that the lives of American soldiers had been compromised as a result of

obligations Truman had agreed to indirectly by post-WWII agreements with members of the UN.

“More than a million young men have been drafted, billions of dollars expended and thousands

of casualties suffered,” one editorial claimed, as a result of a war that Congress never declared.97

In Bricker’s own words, he stated, “The resolution which I introduced intends to say to

the rest of the world that the inalienable rights of the American people are not for barter by

anybody, anywhere, anytime—and if the State Department doesn’t understand that, it’s time it

woke up and began to understand the Constitution.”98 With Bricker asserting that the State

Department ignored American’s basic rights and with portions of the public and many senators

believing that the Korean War was unconstitutional, the Truman and Eisenhower administrations

could not afford to have nothing come from the war.99 As Under Secretary of State Walter Bedell

Smith (who served under both administrations) argued, such a limitation of executive power

would make it impossible for U.S. decision making to keep up and oppose Communist

movements.100 Dulles himself stated that he thought the amendment took the America “back to

the days of the Confederation,” worrying, on a more serious note, that such changes could not

96 “Our System Could be Made Over by Treaty!” The Saturday Evening Post, May 16, 1953, 10.97 “Our System Could be Made Over by Treaty!”98 Charles E. Egans, “Bricker and Smith Clash on Treaties,” The New York Times, April 29, 1953, 16.99 Brice P. Disque, “To Ratify Treaties,” The New York Times, August 2, 1953, E6.; “Our System Could be Made Over by Treaty.”100 Priscilla Roberts, “Smith, Walter Bedell,” In Encyclopedia of The Korean War: A Political, Social, and Military History, ed. Spencer C. Tucker (New York: Checkmark Books, 2002), 601-602; Egans, “Bricker and Smith Class on Treaties.”

31

only have an impact on recent events with the Communists, but could affect the power of NATO

to have troops stationed all around the world.101

V. Conclusions

In the beginning of 1953, the U.S. saw a change in leadership and the Soviet Union

suffered a loss. Eisenhower began taking a much more aggressive stance against communism,

and Stalin, the driving force behind the Communist movement (even if he only worked behind

the scenes in the Korean War) was dead. Whether they felt threatened by new president, or had

concerns about the future of communism now that Stalin had passed, the Communists conceded

and the United States ultimately got what it wanted. With both sides granting some concessions,

they agreed to the controversial, yet satisfactory Indian resolution and signed the armistice on

July 27, 1953.102 This meant that all prisoners-of-war were repatriated within 60 days of the

armistice, and those who declined repatriation were put under the supervision of the neutral

nations repatriation commission (NNRC). The NNRC kept the POWs for 90 days, during which

time they were questioned by both sides. Before the armistice was signed, Operation Little

Switch took place, which included all sick and wounded POWS. Once they signed the armistice,

Operation Big Switch commenced, allowing the rest of the POWs to either repatriate or transfer

to the NNRC. During this time 75,823 of the 132,000 North Korean and Chinese POWS returned

home, while the rest remained in the hands of the NNRC. After NNRC questioning, 137 Chinese

and North Koreans decided to repatriate. Those who did not repatriate were given back to the

UN Command, who released them as civilians by the beginning of 1954. Over 56,000 prisoners

refused repatriation. Many of the Chinese POWs who chose not to repatriate settled in Taiwan,

101 “Telephone Conversation with Attorney Gen. Brownell,” Minutes of telephone conversations of John Foster Dulles and of Christian Herter (1953-1961), April 6, 1953.102 Boose, “Truce Talks (July 1951-July 1953), 656.

32

and many of the North Koreans who chose not return to North Korea stayed in South Korea. Of

the nearly 13,000 UNC POWS kept prisoner by the Communists, only 359 chose not to

repatriate, initially, most of whom (335) were Koreans. However, many of them, particularly the

23 Americans who stayed behind later chose to repatriate back to the United States.103

All matters influencing the choices of the United States on voluntary repatriation came

down to the desire for saving the face of the new leader of the Free World, but labeling it purely

as propaganda simplifies the American support for the doctrine. However, the Korean War,

quickly recognized as just one chapter of the Cold War, was used by both the Communists and

by the United States as a propaganda generator. The American public expected a speedy victory

in the war, and when they did not get it, the U.S. had to compensate. The Truman administration

realized early on that the public believed the negative portrayals of its policy and action abroad,

and it needed a way to win back support.104 Both the American public and international opinion

expected Eisenhower to bring the U.S. out of Korea and into a better future.

It is the case that with the chances of Korean unification dwindling, the U.S. had to find a

way to spin the event as a success. A humanitarian motive would not only help convince the

worried mothers and wives at home that their sons and husbands had not fought in vain, but also

convince any neutral nations that communism was inhumane and a force of evil. However, the

United States, if it had not realized prior to June 25, 1950, quickly learned that they were going

to face the force of communism for some time, and it needed more than just persuasive

propaganda campaigns to combat it.

103 Clayton D. Laurie, “Big Switch/Little Switch, Operations (1953), In Encyclopedia of The Korean War: A Political, Social, and Military History, ed. Spencer C. Tucker (New York: Checkmark Books, 2002), 74-77.104 Minutes of the National Security Council Meeting with Harry S. Truman, November 28, 1950, In The Korean War and It’s Origins, http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/korea/large/documents/pdfs/ci-2-11.pdf#zoom=100.

33

Militarily, a complete defeat in the Korean War was not an option if they were to

continue to gain momentum against Communist aggression. They hoped to gain an advantage by

encouraging anti-communist troops to dissent from Communist armies. They also hoped to use

this threat of dissention to deter future conflicts and give the United States more time to build

defenses if the Cold War were to heat up. Moreover, a complete failure in Korea was viewed as

synonymous as a complete failure of the United Nations. For the UN to fail, would mean both

the weakening of the international resistance to communism and the weakening of the U.S. as an

international leader. Finally, at home, U.S. leaders had to cling onto any public approval in the

midst of headstrong McCarthyism and the threat of an amendment that would limit the

president’s ability to make quick, necessary decisions in the event of Communist aggression in

foreign nations. Perhaps if they successfully reminded the American public that the U.S. was the

good guy, fighting for the rights of individuals, the executive branch could maintain dominance

in wartime decision making, which they perceived as necessary if they were to defeat

communism. The doctrine of voluntary repatriation was not just used for humanitarian notions

and wartime propaganda, but also as a military tool, a mechanism to secure the fate of the United

Nations, and the necessary proof needed to prevent potentially hazardous political movements,

like the sweeping fear of McCarthyism and the Bricker Resolution.

As we can also see, motivations shifted with the change in administration. The American

public had already placed the blame for the failure of the Korean War on President Truman.

More than anything, the president needed to find something to rally the people behind the

prolonged armistice negotiations, as well as a legacy that did not involve a lost war followed by

the violence that would have occurred had the armistice called for forced repatriation. Despite

the political differences and the language of opposition witnessed during the election of 1952,

34

President Truman did not want to leave his successor in the difficult position of implementing a

course of action that, particularly for Eisenhower, went against his moral code.

President Eisenhower, while not carrying the burden of committing the U.S. to the

Korean War, still had to find a way to get out of the conflict quickly and with some indication of

success. Eisenhower had future Cold War conflicts to handle, and if possible, avoid. He could

not have the reputation of backing down on an issue the United States government had

committed to so ardently, and needed to have some advantage, whether militarily or

psychologically, in the war against communism. With McCarthyism at its peak, Eisenhower had

to both prove his determination to stop the spread of communism, as well as prove that policies,

such as the Bricker Resolution, that would limit the president’s powers during such a critical

time did not need implementation. This forced him to prove that the Korean War was not a

failure, and that, as the president of the United States’, he was able to navigate an armistice that

met the American ideals.

Under both administrations, United States government used the POW issue to divert

attention away from its failure, however justified, to unify the broken Korea. More than just the

fate of Korea rested in the outcome of the war; the United States had to consider how the rest of

the Cold War would play out, how it could maintain its new status as an international leader, and

how it could prevent its own people from succumbing to irrational fear and speculation that the

men leading the country did not subscribe to the American ideals. This begs further research into

much of the POW issue, some of which has already been started.105 What were the thoughts of

POWs, on either side of the war, on repatriation? Did they want it enough to continue a stalemate

two years beyond the initial talks for a ceasefire? How did this decision ultimately affect the

105 David Cheng Chang, "To return home or "Return to Taiwan" : conflicts and survival in the "Voluntary Repatriation" of Chinese POWs in the Korean War," (2011).

35

lives of the POWs after the war? Did non-forcible repatriation have any impact on the events of

the Cold War as U.S. diplomats hoped? This essay only touches on the surface of the impact that

non-forcible repatriation had on the lives of Koreans, Chinese, and American soldiers in the

Korean War.

Bibliography

“Dulles, McCarthy Views on Rhee’s Revolt Differ.” The New York Times, June 19, 1953, 2.

“Excerpts from Acheson Report to U.N. Assembly Committee on U.S. Conduct of Korean War.” The New York Times, October 25, 1952, 4.

“M’Carthy Urges Acheson be ‘Fired’.” The New York Times, May 16, 1950, 14.

“Our System Could be Made Over by Treaty!” The Saturday Evening Post. May 16, 1953, 10.

“Telephone Conversation with Attorney Gen. Brownell,” Minutes of telephone conversations of John Foster Dulles and of Christian Herter (1953-1961). April 6, 1953.

“Telephone Conversation with Mr. Hickerson,” Minutes of telephone conversations of John Foster Dulles and of Christian Herter (1953-1961). March 23, 1953.

"United States Courses of Action with Respect to Korea." Report 81/2, James S. Lay, Jr. to National Security Council, November 14, 1950. In The Korean War and Its Origins. http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/korea/large/documents/pdfs/ci-4-9.pdf#zoom=100, 3.

"United States Position Regarding a Cease-Fire in Korea," National Security Council Report #95, December 13, 1950. In The Korean War and Its Origins. http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/korea/large/documents/pdfs/ci-4-9.pdf#zoom=100

36

“U.S. Bars New Red Plan on Prisoners: Opposes Sending Men Out of Korea to Long Detention in Neutral State.” The New York Times, April 27, 1953, 1.

“What Price UN Pledge to the Anti-Red POW’s?” The Saturday Evening Post 226, October 31, 1953: 10.

Acheson, Dean. Present at the creation; my years in the State Department. New York: Norton, 1969.

Barry, Mark P. "The U.S. and the 1945 Division of Korea: Mismanaging The 'Big Decisions'." International Journal on World Peace 29.4 (2012): 39.

Bess, Demaree. “The Prisoners Stole the Show in Korea.” The Saturday Evening Post 225, no. 18 (November, 1952): 36.

Blair, Clay. The Forgotten War: America in Korea 1950-1953. New York: Times Books, 1987.

Boose Jr., Donald W. “United Nations Command (UNC)” In Encyclopedia of The Korean War: A Political, Social, and Military History, ed. Spencer C. Tucker. New York: Checkmark Books, 2002, 679-680.

Bradley, Omar N. “Our Hope for a Lasting Peace,” Vital Speeches of the Day, 18, no. 14 (May 1952): 445.

Chang, David Cheng. “’To return home or "Return to Taiwan’ : conflicts and survival in the ‘Voluntary Repatriation’ of Chinese POWs in the Korean War." University of California, 2011.

Clarence E. Moullette to Dean Acheson, January 19, 1951, In The Korean War and Its Origins, http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/korea/large/documents/pdfs/kp-8-13.pdf#zoom=100.

Correspondence Between James E. Noland and Harry S. Truman, August 29, 1950, In The Korean War and Its Origins, http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/korea/large/documents/pdfs/ki-11-10.pdf#zoom=100.

Correspondence Between Paul Douglas and Harry S. Truman, With Attachments, June 12, 1952, In The Korean War and Its Origins, http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/korea/large/documents/pdfs/kp-1-18.pdf#zoom=100

Cumings, Bruce. The Origins of the Korean War. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1981.

37

Dean G. Acheson to George C. Marshall, August 27, 1951. In The Korean War and Its Origins, http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/korea/large/documents/pdfs/kp-4-7.pdf#zoom=100.

Department of States Breakfast, Memorandum of Conversation at White House, March 24, 1953. The papers of John Foster Dulles and of Christian A. Herter, 1953-1961. The White house correspondence and memoranda series.

Disque, Brice P. “To Ratify Treaties,” The New York Times, August 2, 1953.

Dulles, John Foster. “Korea: Deterrents to New Aggression.” Vital Speeches of the Day 19, no. 24 (October 1953): 738.

Edmond Taylor to Mallory Browne, With Attachments, February 19, 1952. In The Korean War and Its Origins, http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/korea/large/documents/pdfs/kp-4-15.pdf#zoom=100.

Egans, Charles E. “Bricker and Smith Clash on Treaties.” The New York Times, April 29, 1953, 16.

Fenton, John. “M’Carthy Brands Korea a ‘Betrayal’.” The New York Times, June 30, 1951, 2.

Francis Case to Harry S. Truman With Reply From Robert A. Lovett, October 1, 1952. In The Korean War and its Origins, http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/korea/large/documents/pdfs/kp-1-21.pdf#zoom=100

Hayes, Louis. Political Systems of East Asia: China, Korea, and Japan. Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 2012.

Hermes, Walter G. Truce Tent and Fighting Front, (Washington, D.C.:Office of the Chief of Military History, United States Army, 1966), 146-7.

James T. Mayall to Harry S. Truman With Reply From William D. Hassett, June 13, 1952. In The Korean War and Its Origins, http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/korea/large/documents/pdfs/kp-1-17.pdf#zoom=100

Judd, Walter H. "'The Real Test is Our Moral Strength'." Vital SpeechesOf The Day 20, no. 14 (May 1954): 427.

Kearney, Vincent S. “The Heart of the PW Issue,” The Saturday Evening Post 89, June 6, 1953: 274-275.

38

Krock, Arthur. “’Mistakes’ of Korea War Again a Political Issue,” The New York Times, June 28, 1953, E3.

Laurie, Clayton D. “Big Switch/Little Switch, Operations (1953).” In Encyclopedia of The Korean War: A Political, Social, and Military History, ed. Spencer C. Tucker. New York: Checkmark Books, 2002, 74-77.

Memorandum For the Record, Paul C. Davis, January 24, 1952, In The Korean War and Its Origins, http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/korea/large/documents/pdfs/kp-4-2.pdf#zoom=100.

Millet, Allan R. “The Korean People: Missing in Action in the Misunderstood War, 1945-1954.” In The Korean War in World History, ed. William Stueck. Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 2010.

Minutes of the National Security Council Meeting with Harry S. Truman, November 28, 1950, In The Korean War and It’s Origins, http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/korea/large/documents/pdfs/ci-2-11.pdf#zoom=100.

National Security Council Report 81, "United States Courses of Action With Respect to Korea", September 1, 1950, In The Korean War and Its Origins, http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/korea/large/documents/pdfs/ki-17-1.pdf#zoom=100.

National Security Council Report 81, "United States Courses of Action With Respect to Korea", September 1, 1950, 2.

Parrott, Lindesay. “Korea Prisoner Issue is Heart of Deadlock.” The New York Times, April 20, 1952, E6.

Parrott, Lindesay. “Reds Accuse U.N. of Germ War Tests on Korea Captives.” The New York Times, March 23, 1952, 1. http://search.proquest.com/docview/112506651?accountid=13554

Parrott, Lindesay. “Rhee Rebuffs Eisenhower; Prisoner Escapes Continue.” The New York Times, June 19, 1953, 1.

Pratt, Sherman. “Korea: History, 1945-1947.” In Encyclopedia of The Korean War: A Political, Social, and Military History, ed. Spencer C. Tucker. New York: Checkmark Books, 2002.

Ridgway, Matthew B. The Korean War: How we met the challenge: How all-out Asian war was averted: Why MacArthur was dismissed: Why today's war objectives must be limited. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1967..

39

Roberts, Priscilla. “Hickerson, John D.” In Encyclopedia of The Korean War: A Political, Social, and Military History, ed. Spencer C. Tucker, New York: Checkmark Books, 2002, 246-247

Roberts, Priscilla. “Knowland, William Fife.” In Encyclopedia of The Korean War: A Political, Social, and Military History, ed. Spencer C. Tucker, New York: Checkmark Books, 2002.

Roberts, Priscilla. “McCarthy, Joseph R.”, In Encyclopedia of The Korean War: A Political, Social, and Military History, ed. Spencer C. Tucker, New York: Checkmark Books, 2002.

Roberts, Priscilla. “Smith, Walter Bedell.” In Encyclopedia of The Korean War: A Political, Social, and Military History, ed. Spencer C. Tucker, New York: Checkmark Books, 2002, 601-602.

Roberts, Priscilla. “Syngman Rhee.” In Encyclopedia of The Korean War: A Political, Social, and Military History, ed. Spencer C. Tucker, New York: Checkmark Books, 2002, 624-628.

Sasso, Claude R. “Stalin, Josef,” In Encyclopedia of The Korean War: A Political, Social, and Military History, ed. Spencer C. Tucker, New York: Checkmark Books, 2002, 613.

Schirokauer, Conrad and Donald Clark. Modern East Asia: A Brief History. 2nd ed., Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2008.

Schumach, Murray. “U.N. Tells Full Story of Poll of Prisoners,” The New York Times, April 26, 1952, 1.

Statement by President Truman on the Armistice Negotiations, May 7, 1952, In “The United States and the Korean Problem” In the United States Congressional serial set. 11675, 62.3,h3w

Statement by President Truman on the Armistice Negotiations, May 7, 1952.

Statement by the Department of State on the Exchange of Prisoners of War, May 15, 1953, In “The United States and the Korean Problem” in United States Congressional serial set. 11675, 80

Suh, Dong-man. “Korea, Democratic People’s Republic of: 1945-1953.” In Encyclopedia of The Korean War: A Political, Social, and Military History, ed. Spencer C. Tucker. New York: Checkmark Books, 2002, 331-333.

Telegram to Dean G. Acheson With Related Correspondence, November 14, 1952, In The Korean War and Its Origins,

40

http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/korea/large/documents/pdfs/kp-3-17.pdf#zoom=100; Hermes, Truce Tent and Fighting Front, 3.

Varga, Zsolt. “Geneva Convention of 1949,” In Encyclopedia of The Korean War: A Political, Social, and Military History, ed. Spencer C. Tucker, New York: Checkmark Books, 2002.

Weathersby, Kathryn. “The Soviet Role in the Korean War: The State of Historical Knowledge.” In The Korean War in World History, ed. William Stueck. Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 2010.

Wesolick, Duane L.“MacArthur, Douglas.” In Encyclopedia of The Korean War: A Political, Social, and Military History, ed. Spencer C. Tucker. New York: Checkmark Books, 2002, 402.

William Banning to Harry S. Truman, ca. 1953, In The Korean War and Its Origins, http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/korea/large/documents/pdfs/8-16.pdf#zoom=100.