No. 17-2323
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
_________
CARSON CITY
Petitioner,
v.
CHUCK GAINES AND BRITTANY FIELDS
Respondent.
_________
On Writ of Certiorari to
the United States Court of Appeals
for the Thirteenth Circuit
_________
Brief for the Petitioner
_________
Team Number 347
Chicago
For Petitioner
i
TABLE OF CONTENTS
QUESTIONS PRESENTED ......................................................................................iii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .....................................................................................iv
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION..........................................................................1
STANDARD OF REVIEW .......................................................................................2
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS ...............................................................................3
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ..................................................................................6
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT .................................................................................8
ARGUMENT .............................................................................................................10
I. A rational trier of fact could not find for Chuck Gaines because, as a matter of law, the arrest
of Gaines did not violate the ADA because the ADA does not apply to on-the-scene responses to
a disturbance, and even if it does apply, the actions of the police were reasonable under the
ADA. ..........................................................................................................................10
A. The ADA does not apply to on-the-scene responses by law enforcement because an
officer’s decision-making is not subject to hindsight, and the information known to the
officer at the time is often incomplete. ..........................................................12
1. Past precedent allows for public safety to override an individual’s rights
during an altercation. ...................................................................13
B. Even if the ADA applies to on-the-scene responses, Gaines was not arrested based
on misperceived effects of his disability nor did the police fail to reasonably
accommodate his disability in the course of the arrest. .................................15
1. Gaines was not arrested for lawful conduct that appeared unlawful based on
his disability because he was not acting lawfully. .............................15
2. The CCPD did not act unreasonably in accommodating Gaines’ disability
when arresting him because the officers attempted to calm the situation and his
requests for change would violate public safety. ...............................17
a) Law enforcement acted reasonably in dealing with Gaines because the
correct way to calm the situation was not immediately apparent to the
police. .....................................................................................18
ii
b) Gaines’ requests for change would violate public safety by creating an
unnecessarily long wait during a potentially life-threatening situation.
................................................................................................20
II. A rational trier of fact could not find for Brittany Fields because, as a matter of law, the
ADA does not apply to the station house interview with Fields and, even if it does apply, the
CCPD did not violate the ADA in the station house interview. ................................22
A. The ADA does not apply to the station house interview with Fields because Fields
was not denied any benefit from the interview and complaints about general government
services are not viable claims under the ADA. ..............................................24
1. No one denied Fields a benefit when she voluntarily submitted herself to, and
participated in, the station house interview........................................24
a) Station house interviews are not a benefit for purposes of the ADA.
................................................................................................25
b) Even if station house interviews are a benefit for purposes of the
ADA, Fields was not denied any part of the benefit. .............26
2. Fields is submitting general complaints about police tactics in interviewing
individuals with disabilities, which is not a viable claim under the ADA.
............................................................................................................27
B. The CCPD did not violate the ADA during the station house interview with Fields
because Fields did not request any accommodations and the accommodations that she
later suggested would fundamentally change the nature of police interviews.
........................................................................................................................29
1. Fields did not request any accommodations for her station house interview,
which is required for a viable ADA claim .........................................30
2. The accommodations that Fields later suggested would fundamentally change
the nature of police interviews or would cause an undue financial or
administrative burden on law enforcement ........................................32
CONCLUSION ..........................................................................................................33
iii
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
I. Did the Circuit Court for the Thirteenth Circuit err when it reversed the decision of the
District Court’s decision that a police department is not required to alter its on-the-scene
investigation and arrest procedures for a mentally disabled individual who was not acting
lawfully and whose behavior threatened public safety?
II. May a police department, in a voluntary, non-custodial interview, use longstanding,
standard interview techniques without having a mental health professional present when the
interviewee is mentally impaired and never made any request for accommodation?
iv
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases Pages
Bahl v. County of Ramsey,
695 F.3d 778 (8th Cir. 2012) .........................................................................27,28
Bowers v. NCAA,
475 F.3d 524 (3d Cir. 2007)...........................................................................10,23
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
477 U.S. 317 (1986) .......................................................................................2
Choi v. Univ. of Tex. Health Sci. Ctr. at San Antonio,
63 Fed. Appx. 214 (5th Cir. 2015) .................................................................18,30,32
Doe v. Pfrommer,
148 F.3d 73 (2d Cir. 1998).............................................................................28
Duffy v. Riveland,
98 F.3d 447 (9th Cir. 1996) ...........................................................................2
Ewing v. California,
538 U.S. 11 (2003) .........................................................................................14
Gaston v. Bellingrath Gardens & Home, Inc.,
167 F.3d 1361 (11th Cir. 1999) .....................................................................31
Gohier v. Enright,
186 F.3d 1216 (10th Cir. 1999) .....................................................................15
Graham v. Connor,
490 U.S. 386 (1989) .......................................................................................13,18,21
Hainze v. Richards,
207 F.3d 795 (2000) .......................................................................................supra
Henrietta D. v. Bloomberg,
331 F.3d 261 (2d Cir. 2003)...........................................................................28
Lewis v. United States,
74 F.2d 173 (9th Cir. 1934) ...........................................................................28
Morgan v. Zant,
743 F.2d 775 (11th Cir. 1984) .......................................................................29
v
New York v. Quarles,
467 U.S. 649 (1984) .......................................................................................13
Pennsylvania Department of Corrections v. Yeskey,
524 U.S. 206 (1998) .......................................................................................9,26
Randolph v. Rogers,
170 F.3d 850 (8th Cir. 1999) .........................................................................31
Robertson v. Las Animas Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t,
500 F.3d 1185 (10th Cir. 2007) .....................................................................31
Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n,
489 U.S. 602 (1989) .......................................................................................13,14
Smith v. Rainey,
747 F. Supp 2d 1327 (M.D. Fla. 2010) ..........................................................31
Taylor v. Principal Fin. Group,
93 F.3d 155 (5th Cir. 1996) ...........................................................................17,18,30,32
United States v. Allibhai,
939 F.2d 244 (5th Cir. 1991) .........................................................................17
United States v. Castenada-Castenada,
729 F.2d 1360 (11th Cir. 1984) .....................................................................29
United States ex rel. Lathan v. Deegan,
450 F.2d 181 (2d Cir. 1971)...........................................................................29
Waller v. City of Danville,
556 F.3d 171 (4th Cir. 2009) .........................................................................12,13
Windham v. Harris Cty.,
875 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2017) .........................................................................31
Statutes
28 U.S.C. § 1254 (2012) ............................................................................................1
28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2012) ............................................................................................1
28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2012) ............................................................................................1
42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2012) .............................................................................1,7
vi
42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1)-(2) (2012) ...........................................................................16,33
42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2012) ..........................................................................................25
28 C.F.R. § 35.164 (2012) .........................................................................................30,33
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) ..................................................................................................1,2,7
Other Authorities
Fred E. Inbau & John E. Reid, Criminal Interrogation and Confessions (1962) ......33
Robert McG. Thomas Jr., Fred Inbau, 89, Criminologist Who Perfected Interrogation, N.Y.
Times, May 28, 1998, at BI ...........................................................................33
Presidential Statement on Signing the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 26 WEEKLY
COMP. PRES. DOC. 1165 (July 30, 1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 601.
....................................................................................................................................29
1
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The United States District Court for the District of Carson had jurisdiction over this case
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 and under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The District Court granted
the Carson City’s Motion for Summary Judgment under Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. R. at 20. The United States Court of Appeals for the Thirteenth Circuit had
jurisdiction to review Gaines’ and Fields’ appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. The Thirteenth Circuit
reversed the ruling of the District Court. R. at 32. Carson City filed a timely petition for
certiorari, which was granted. R. at 33. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1254.
2
STANDARD OF REVIEW
This Court reviews de novo a grant of summary judgment. Duffy v. Riveland, 98 F.3d
447, 452 (9th Cir. 1996). In order to grant a motion for summary judgment, the Court must show
that there is no genuine dispute as to a material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). When the non-moving party holds the burden of
production at trial, such as here, the non-moving party must submit evidence that would allow a
reasonable jury to find for the non-moving party. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322
(1986). If the non-moving party fails to provide this evidence, summary adjudication for the
moving party is appropriate. Id.
3
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
THE ROBBERY. On February 21st, 2014, the Carson City Police Department (CCPD)
received a phone call from Jenny Smith (Smith) reporting a break-in and robbery at her home. R.
at 5. The CCPD arrived at the scene, and Smith demanded answers. R. at 5. Officers promised
Smith that they would investigate. R. at 5. After the CCPD left the scene, Smith conducted her
own informal investigation, which led her, as well as numerous members of her community, to
believe that Chuck Gaines (Gaines) and Brittany Fields (Fields) had committed the robbery. R. at
5. Gaines and Fields were a couple in a romantic relationship living in the community. R. at 2.
THREATENING BEHAVIOR. On February 24th, 2014, Smith called CCPD once more. R. at 5-
6. She reported that Gaines was on the sidewalk across from her house. R. at 6. He was pacing, muttering,
and looking over at Smith’s house. R. at 6. He was also holding a baseball bat, and Smith felt threatened.
R. at 6. CCPD sent Officers James Klein and Sam Taylor to de-escalate the situation. R. at 6. When
Officers Klein and Taylor arrived at Smith’s house, they confirmed that her reports were true. R. at 6. The
police report from the robbery reported Gaines as “mentally ill” and “potentially violent.” R. at 6.
CCPD APPROACHES GAINES. The officers left Smith’s house to talk to Gaines. R. at 6.
While crossing the street, Officer Taylor yelled to Gaines, “Hey Chuck. Let’s talk.” R. at 6.
Gaines responded in the negative by shaking his head, backing away slowly, and audibly telling
the officers “no” and “stay away.” R. at 6. As the officers approached, they told him to sit down
and explained why they were there and that they wanted to talk to him. R. at 6.
GAINES’ NONCOMPLIANCE. Gaines did not listen to the commands. R. at 6. Instead, he
turned away from the officers and began pointing his bat at the community center. R. at 6. He
told them, “I don’t want to talk to you. You need to leave me alone. I am feeling bad.” R. at 6-7.
Officer Taylor then yelled at Gaines that he needed to drop the bat, sit down, and listen to the
officers. R. at 7. Gaines dropped the bat. R. at 7. However, instead of sitting down as instructed,
4
Gaines turned around to face the police officers standing up. R. at 7. Officer Taylor asked Gaines
if he had a weapon, to which Gaines responded “Can’t tell you.” R. at 7. Officer Klein then
ordered Gaines to sit down or the officers would “make” him sit down and would detain Fields
as well. R. at 7.
THE ARREST. Gaines became agitated and started making erratic movements with his
arms. R. at 7. Because of the violent motion, Officer Klein lunged at Gaines to stop the
movement. R. at 7. Gaines fell to the ground and hit his head. R. at 7. On the ground, Gaines
continued the violent movements with his arms and legs and started screaming. R. at 7. Officer
Taylor used his taser to subdue Gaines. R. at 7. From that point forward, Gaines was compliant
with the arrest. R. at 7.
THE SEARCH FOR FIELDS. Because of her possible involvement in the robbery,
Officers Taylor and Klein returned to the neighborhood in search of Fields. R. at 7. They did not
find her in her apartment. R. at 7. The case manager of her community confirmed her identity
and her job. R. at 7. He informed the officers that she worked part-time in the service industry at
that time. R. at 7. He expressed disbelief that she would be involved in a robbery and concern
about her talking to the police. R. at 7. The officers gave him a note for Fields requesting her to
come to the station for an interview. R. at 8.
VOLUNTARY AND NON-CUSTODIAL. In the early evening, Fields arrived at the police
station. R. at 8. She was visibly upset, but she agreed to speak with Officers Taylor and Klein. R.
at 8. Once in the room, Fields immediately began asking the officers about Gaines. R. at 8. She
asked when they could go home. R. at 8. Officer Klein told her that she was allowed to leave, but
in order to Gaines to leave she would need to talk to them. R. at 8. She affirmed that she agreed
5
to speak with the officers. R. at 8. The officers proceeded with the interview in compliance with
department standards. R. at 8.
THE REID TECHNIQUE. During the interview, Officers Taylor and Klein told Fields
about evidence they had against her for the robbery. R. at 8. This included eyewitnesses and
Gaines incriminating her. R. at 8. These statements were not true but did comply with
department protocol. R. at 8. Fields expressed disbelief and denied involvement. R. at 8. The
officers did not accept her story and told her she was lying and they had evidence against her. R.
at 8-9. After several hours, Fields again asked if she could leave, and the officers told her that
Gaines could not leave with her unless she talked. R. at 8.
FIELDS’ CONFESSION. As Officers Taylor and Klein continued to zealously question
Fields, she became agitated, confused, and began to cry. R. at 8. The officers told her that she
needed to tell the truth. R. at 8. Finally, Fields said “Ok. If this can be over, then Chuck and I did
it.” R. at 8. The officers proceeded to obtain a detailed admission using leading questions. R. at
8. Fields remained confused and sometimes asked about what she needed to say. R. at 8. The
officers then charged Gaines and Fields with burglary. R. at 8. They also charged Gaines with
disorderly conduct and resisting arrest. R. at 8. The officers later discovered that someone else
had broken into Smith’s apartment and dropped the burglary charges against Fields and Gaines.
R. at 8.
GAINES’ ADA CLAIM. Gaines has been diagnosed with Autism Spectrum Disorder and
Bipolar Disorder Type 1. R. at 3. These disabilities manifest themselves as social impairment,
difficulties with nonverbal communication, sensory-processing challenges, problems managing
emotions, and a tendency towards impulsive behavior. R. at 3. He is a member of Summerville
Heights Integrated Living Community (SHILC), a subsidized housing community for individuals
6
with mental illnesses. R. at 4. Members of this community live in apartments that are integrated
into communities of people not involved in SHILC. R. at 4. Gaines filed suit against the CCPD
under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) for his physical injuries and mental and
emotional distress. R. at 9.
FIELDS’ ADA CLAIM. Fields has a mild intellectual disability as well as Borderline
Personality Disorder. R. at 3. These disabilities manifest in Fields as poor perceptual reasoning,
verbal comprehension, memory, abstract thought, and problem solving, as well as gullibility,
naivete, obliviousness to risk, tendency to follow others, inflexible thinking, and fear of rejection
or abandonment. R. at 3-4. Fields was also a member of SHILC. R. at 4. Fields has filed suit
against the CCPD under the ADA for ongoing mental and emotional distress, loss of her job, and
damage to her and Gaines’ reputations as a result of the entire situation. R. at 9.
7
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
NATURE OF THE CASE. This is an appeal from the Court of Appeals for the Thirteenth
Circuit’s ruling on Defendant Carson City Police Department’s Motion for Summary Judgment.
R. at 21. The Supreme Court of the United States Granted certiorari. R. at 33.
COURT PROCEEDINGS. Gaines and Fields filed suit against the Carson City Police
Department (CCPD) in the United States District Court in the District of Carson. R. at 2. The
complaint alleged that the CCPD violated the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§
12101-12213 (“ADA”). R. at 2. CCPD filed a Motion for Summary Judgment pursuant to Rule
56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. R. at 10. The District Court granted CCPD’s
Motion for Summary Judgment. R. at 20. Gaines and Fields timely appealed. R. at 21.
DISPOSITION BELOW. The United States Circuit Court for the Thirteenth Circuit
reversed the District Court’s grant of the Motion for Summary Judgment and remanded for
further proceedings. R. at 32.
8
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Respondents are seeking to expand the protections of the ADA beyond the original intentions
of the statute. Respondents contend such expansions are necessary to protect the disabled when
they interact with law enforcement. However, the additional protections respondents seek would
detrimentally hinder law enforcement by fundamentally altering the way law enforcement must
interact with those with disabilities and would grant those with disabilities privileged protection
beyond that of non-disabled people.
First, Respondent Gaines wants to require ADA accommodations for on-the-scene police
encounters. In Hainze v. Richards, 207 F.3d 795 (2000) the Fifth Circuit refused to extend
accommodations to such contexts due to the threat to both officer safety and public safety in
general. The Fifth Circuit reasoned that such a requirement would make officers hesitate when
responding to potentially dangerous situations involving disabled persons; resulting in potentially
fatal consequences to officers or bystanders.
Even if the ADA applies the accommodations Respondent Gaines seeks are impractical.
In effect, he wants to require law enforcement officers to take a non-confrontational, hands-off
approach when dealing with disabled individuals, even when those individuals act aggressively
and suspiciously and refuse to cooperate with the officers. This requested accommodation
threatens to out both officer and public safety at risk by barring officers from acting immediately
to neutralize a potential threat. In Hainze v. Richards, 207 F.3d 795, 801 (2000) the Fifth Circuit
refused to require officers to contemplate potential ADA claims in the course of carrying out
their duties because such a requirement would be absurd. The officers of CCPD responded
reasonably, giving Gaines multiple opportunities to cooperate before initiating physical contact
with him.
9
Second, Respondent Fields wants to require ADA accommodations for station house
interviews. Her argument relies on the misapplication of Pennsylvania Department of
Corrections v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206 (1998). The inmate in Yeskey was denied the opportunity to
participate in the boot camp and would have derived a clear benefit from participation in the boot
camp. However, in the present case Respondent Fields had the opportunity to participate in the
interview and did so of her own volition. Furthermore, there is no benefit from the station-house
interviews because police do not begin and end investigations based solely on what people say in
station house interviews. Rather police corroborate what the person says with other information
before coming to a conclusion about the investigation.
Finally, and most damaging to both Respondents’ claims, is the fact neither asked for
accommodations at the time they interacted with police. While Respondent Gaines did state he
wanted to be left alone, this cannot be considered a reasonable accommodation because people
do not have the right to left alone by police when out in public, particularly when acting in a
suspicious manner. Because neither Respondent made any request for accommodations, their
claims seek to shift the onus to law enforcement to identify any disabilities an individual may
have and provide the correct accommodations without any information from the individual.
Putting such a responsibility on law enforcement is ridiculous, instead, the individual should
provide law enforcement with information regarding necessary accommodations because the
individual is the one with the best knowledge about the necessary accommodations.
10
ARGUMENT
I. A rational trier of fact could not find for Chuck Gaines because, as a matter of law,
the arrest of Gaines did not violate the ADA because the ADA does not apply to on-the-
scene responses to a disturbance, and even if it does apply, the actions of the police were
reasonable under the ADA.
Chuck Gaines is asking this Court to excuse his unlawful behavior because of his
disability. His request calls for law enforcement officers to ignore public safety and allow
someone acting unlawfully to continue acting that way simply because the officers have some
knowledge of a disability. This misguided application supposedly falls under Title II of the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), which, in relevant part, states:
“[N]o qualified individual with a disability, by reason of such disability, be excluded
from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a
public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132.
Congress designed the ADA to level the playing field for individuals with disabilities, not to
create an unlevel playing field where individuals with disabilities receive more favorable
treatment than the general public.
In order to make a prima facie case under Title II of the ADA, Gaines must show that “1) he is
a qualified individual, 2) with a disability, 3) he was excluded from participation in or denied the
benefits of the services, programs, or activities, of a public entity, or was subjected to
discrimination by any such entity, 4) by reason of his disability.” Bowers v. NCAA, 475 F.3d 524,
553 n.32 (3d Cir. 2007). There is no question here that Gaines is a qualified individual with a
disability. Therefore, he meets the first two elements. Gaines does not contend that he was
excluded from participation in or denied the benefits of anything, but he does argue that a public
entity discriminated against him in the manner in which he was arrested because of his disability.
This argument fails as a matter of law.
11
First and foremost, the ADA does not apply to on-the-scene encounters by law enforcement
such as the one in dispute. Encounters with suspects are highly dangerous for officers; requiring
them to account for a possible ADA lawsuit during that period is absurd and violates public
safety. Hainze v. Richards, 207 F.3d 795, 801 (5th Cir. 2000). This Court has created a public
safety exception in numerous cases for constitutional violations. If the Court finds that public
safety can outweigh even our most basic guaranteed rights, it would be counterintuitive to not
create a public safety exception for a mere statutory right.
Even if the ADA does apply to on-the-scene encounters, the law enforcement officers who
interacted with Gaines still did not violate Gaines’ rights for two reasons. First, law enforcement
could not have mistaken Gaines lawful manifestation of his disability as criminal activity
because his actions actually constituted criminal activity. He cannot be wrongfully arrested if he
was acting in an illegal manner. Even if law enforcement caused the manifestation of his
disability in an unlawful manner, it would be unreasonable to require the officers to adjust their
behavior because of the minimal amount of information available to them about the the threat
and Gaines. Second, law enforcement acted reasonably in accommodating Gaines’ disability.
Gaines’ disability and the necessary accommodation were not immediately apparent, and he did
not request an accommodation. Therefore, the law enforcement officers had no duty to find the
correct accommodation in the split second they had to decide how to handle a potentially violent
suspect. Furthermore, the requests for accommodation that Gaines made later were unreasonable
in that he received accommodations to the extent that were necessary or the accommodations
would be dangerous to the public by elongating potentially dangerous situations.
There is no genuine issue of material fact. This Court should grant summary judgment in favor
of the Carson City Police Department (CCPD) for the claims by Chuck Gaines because Title II
12
of the ADA does not apply to on-the-scene encounters, and even if it does, CCPD’s officers did
not violate the law during their encounter with Gaines.
A. The ADA does not apply to on-the-scene responses by law enforcement because an
officer’s decision-making is not subject to hindsight, and the information known to the
officer at the time is often incomplete.
It is easy in any case to look back and think of what an officer could have done. However, that
luxury is not available to a law enforcement officer in the midst of an altercation with a
potentially dangerous suspect. During on-the-scene encounters, law enforcement officers already
have to “instantaneously identify, assess, and react to potentially life-threatening situations.”
Hainze v. Richards, 207 F.3d 795, 801 (5th Cir. 2000). Officers must use what little information
is available to them in order to make a real-time, split second decision. Requiring officers to take
an individual’s possible mental illness and possible triggers into account when making these
assessments would “pose an unnecessary risk to civilians.” Id. The protection of public safety is
far more important than an officer’s one-time split-second assessment which could very well be
wrong.
To ask that law enforcement officers immediately understand exactly what is needed to
de-escalate a situation with a mentally ill individual is to ask the officers to use unavailable
hindsight. Waller v. City of Danville, 556 F.3d 171, 175-76 (4th Cir. 2009). A suspect may, at a
later point, be able to prove that he or she was not violent or could have been quelled with certain
actions, but that information was not available to the officer at the time of the encounter. In
evaluating on-the-scene conduct, the conduct of officers must be judged by what they knew at
the time, not using “20/20 hindsight.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989). This means
an officer would be able to make a perfect decision in every moment if the officer had all of the
13
information in every moment. No law enforcement personnel, nor any human, is able to possess
all this information all of the time.
Scared citizens who make 911 calls are merely trying to get the police to help them.
When individuals make 911 calls they do not know or think about all the information might be
helpful to police. Instead, they give the information they think is most relevant to getting help.
Furthermore, the person making the 911 call often does not know all of the information. It would
be unreasonable to require officers to have all possible information on a mentally ill person and
to determine what would be the best possible remedy for the situation prior to acting.
To apply the ADA to on-the-scene encounters with police officers is but a science
experiment to determine what is best for one person ahead of public safety. Allowing claims
against police departments for law enforcement officers using their best judgment to stop a
potentially life-threatening situation will lead to officers second-guessing their decisions, which
leads to ineffective law enforcement practices. The delay caused by second-guessing officers and
waiting for the right solution at the expense of public safety is unreasonable. Waller, 556 F.3d at
176. Title II of the ADA does not bar other remedies at law, and Congress would not have
intended to put the rights of an individual ahead of public safety. Hainze, 207 F.3d at 801.
1. Past precedent allows for public safety to override an individual’s
rights during a altercation with law enforcement.
The Supreme Court has created a public safety exception to constitutional rights held by
individuals. New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984) (creating a public safety exception for
statements made prior to Miranda warnings); Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S.
602 (1989) (creating a public safety exception for drug testing of railroad workers without a
warrant); Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003) (finding that the public safety requirements of
incarceration outweigh the Eighth Amendment rights of an individual).
14
In Quarles, law enforcement apprehended a rape suspect in a crowded grocery store.
Quarles, 467 U.S. at 652. When the officers stopped the suspect, they noticed that the suspect
had an empty holster on his person. Id. One of the officers, without administering Miranda
warnings, asked the suspect where the gun was. Id. The suspect told the officer, and the gun was
retrieved. Id. The court held that suppressing the statement of the gun’s location did not violate
the suspect’s Fifth Amendment rights because “the need for answers to questions in a situation
posing a threat to public safety outweighs the need for a prophylactic rule protecting the Fifth
Amendment’s privilege against self-incrimination.” Quarles, 467 U.S. at 658 (emphasis added).
In Skinner, a railroad employee challenged regulations made through the Federal
Railroad Safety Act of 1970 on Fourth Amendment grounds. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 606. Through
the Federal Railroad Safety Act, the Federal Railroad Administration and Secretary of
Transportation created mandates for blood and urine testing of railroad employees who were
involved in certain train accidents. Id. The new regulations also authorized breath and urine tests
for individuals who break certain safety rules. Id. The Court ruled that the regulations did not
violate the Fourth Amendment rights of railroad workers because the regulations were for the
promotion of public safety, and that outweighed the individual rights. Id. at 620.
In Ewing, a repeat felon challenged his sentence under the California “Three Strikes and
You’re Out” law, which is designed to increase prison sentences for repeat offenders. Ewing, 538
U.S. at 14-15. The individual challenged the law on Eighth Amendment principles. Id. at 14. The
Court found the law constitutional because it protects public safety by “targeting the class of
offenders who pose the greatest risk to public safety: career criminals.” Id. at 24. The Court
decided that the interest in public safety is so high that it outweighs the individual’s interest in
the possibility of gross disproportionality. See id. at 29-30.
15
The ADA is not a constitutional right, and the court has not explicitly found a public
safety exception to it. However, if the Supreme Court is regularly willing to find that public
safety more important than the most basic rights guaranteed to each individual citizen in the
constitution, then it only translates that public safety can be more important than those rights
merely given by statutory law.
B. Even if the ADA applies to on-the-scene responses, Gaines was not arrested
based on misperceived effects of his disability nor did the police fail to
reasonably accommodate his disability in the course of the arrest.
Courts have generally found that the ADA applies to arrests in two circumstances. First,
it applies to wrongful arrests in which the police arrest someone because the police mistook the
effects of the disability as unlawful activity. Gohier v. Enright, 186 F.3d 1216, 1220 (10th Cir.
1999). Second, courts have found that the ADA applies when police fail to take reasonable
accommodations for a person’s disability during an investigation or arrest causing the person to
suffer indignity because of the failure to accommodate. Id. Gaines’ claim fails under both of
these theories. A reasonable trier of fact must find against Gaines under either theory because his
actions were not lawful and because the police acted reasonably within the scope of their duties.
1. Gaines was not arrested for lawful conduct that appeared unlawful
based on his disability because he was not acting lawfully.
The purpose of the ADA is to create a comprehensive mandate for the elimination of
discrimination based on disability and to provide strong standards for addressing discrimination.
42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1)-(2). These purposes do not set out a course of action to excuse illegal
behavior simply because it was a manifestation of a disability.
Gaines is attempting to do just this. His threatening behavior towards the police officers
and the physical altercation, while a manifestation of his disability, was still unlawful behavior.
Gaines’ behavior prior to the altercation with the police was suspicious enough for the neighbor
16
to call the police. While Gaines’s actions at the start may have been lawful, the altercation
certainly became unlawful when Gaines failed to listen to police commands and made erratic,
violent movements.
Quite simply, not following commands of law enforcement and making threatening and
violent gestures is not lawful behavior. Gaines is not saved from this even if the police, in doing
their job, caused his disability to manifest in this manner for two reasons.
First, creating an ADA claim when law enforcement officers, in the regular course of
duty, caused a violent manifestation of a disability would create a requirement for law
enforcement to know the disabilities of a suspect without any reasonable manner to obtain such
information. Effectively law enforcement would be required to read the minds of suspects. In
Gaines’ situation, the extent of the information that the officers had on Gaines’ disability was the
911 call from Smith, who provided vague and jarring information. Other than the descriptions of
past crimes that Smith believed Gaines had committed, the extent of the information she gave on
his disability was that “he’s from the institution” and “he is unstable.” R at 6. This is hardly
enough information for the police to know the nature of his disability or to understand exactly
how to interact with Gaines without triggering his disability. Law enforcement officers deal with
disabled individuals every day, and each individual manifests their disability in a different way.
In order for law enforcement officers to avoid triggering every individual’s disability, especially
with so little information about the given disability, they would need to be able to read the mind
of the individual or see into the future of what would happen in given circumstances. Even if
those were within the realm of human capabilities, it would still take too much time in order to
quell a potentially or already violent actor.
17
Second, by arguing that law enforcement is at fault for inadvertently triggering a violent
manifestation of his disability, Gaines is saying that he has a right to be left alone. However,
individuals have no right to be left alone or to be free from investigation. United States v.
Allibhai, 939 F.2d 244, 248-49 (5th Cir. 1991). The ADA does not create special rights for
individuals with disabilities that the law has not recognized for all citizens, and this extends to
the right to be left alone by law enforcement.
The ADA does not have a safe haven for individuals with a disability to free from police
investigation. Rather, the ADA protects individuals from discrimination based on disability, and
in the moment of his altercation and ultimate arrest, Gaines was not being discriminated against.
The police treated Gaines as what he was in that moment -- a suspect who happened to have a
disability.
2. The CCPD did not act unreasonably in accommodating Gaines’
disability when arresting him because the officers attempted to calm
the situation and his requests for change would violate public safety.
Gaines’ claim that the CCPD failing to reasonably accommodate his disability fails as a matter
of law because the CCPD did not act unreasonably in any way. In order for Gaines to even
qualify for an accommodation, he must either request an accommodation or the necessary
accommodation must be “open, obvious, and apparent.” Taylor v. Principal Fin. Group, 93 F.3d
155, 164 (5th Cir. 1996) (emphasis added) accord Choi v. Univ. of Tex. Health Sci. Ctr. at San
Antonio, 63 Fed. Appx. 214, 216 (5th Cir. 2015) (applying the standard to Title II). Gaines
neither requested an accommodation nor was his disability or accommodation obvious to police,
therefore their actions were reasonable. Further, the accommodations Gaines demanded after he
filed suit were either followed to the extent necessary by law enforcement or are unreasonable
because they would threaten public safety.
18
a. Law enforcement acted reasonably in dealing with Gaines
because the correct way to calm the situation was not
immediately apparent to the police.
Courts judge how reasonable an officer acted on the scene based on the information he or she
had at the time of the encounter, and the analysis does not rely on hindsight. Graham v. Connor,
490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989). Because Gaines did not directly ask for an accommodation, in order
for him to receive an accommodation, his “disability, resulting limitation, and necessary
accommodation were open, obvious, and apparent” to the entity’s relevant agents. Taylor v.
Principal Fin. Group, 93 F.3d 155, 164 (5th Cir. 1996) (emphasis added) accord Choi v. Univ. of
Tex. Health Sci. Ctr. at San Antonio, 63 Fed. Appx. 214, 216 (5th Cir. 2015) (applying the
standard to Title II). The information available to the officers at the scene of the encounter with
Gaines was that he was “from an institution” and “unstable.” That may have informed clue the
officers that Gaines was disabled, but it gave no indication as to the extent of the disability or the
necessary accommodation. Therefore, the law enforcement officers had no way of knowing in
what way they would have needed to accommodate Gaines’ disability other than treating him
like they would any other suspect.
In Hainze v. Richards, law enforcement officers were sent to a scene with the knowledge that
a suicidal young man who had consumed medication and alcohol was carrying a knife and
threatening to commit suicide or kill a law enforcement officer. Hainze v. Richards, 207 F.3d
795, 797 (5th Cir. 2000). Law enforcement found the young man holding a knife and standing by
a pickup truck that occupied by two people. Id. at 801. The officer ordered the young man to get
away from the truck. Id. He then walked towards the officer with the knife despite repeated
orders to stop. Id. The officer shot the young man when he was within twenty feet of the officer.
Id. The entire encounter lasted approximately twenty seconds. Id. The court found that Title II
19
does not necessitate reasonable accommodations in such circumstances because of the split-
second, life-or-death decisions involved. Id. at 801-02.
The officers in Hainze actually had more information available to them than those at the
CCPD. In Hainze, the officers knew the young man was suicidal, they knew he was on different
drugs, and they knew his intentions. Rather, in the current case, the officers knew next to nothing
about Gaines or his condition, which would create an even greater risk to the officers because of
the element of surprise. For all the CCPD officers knew, Gaines had every intention of killing a
police officer. He might have had a hidden knife or a gun, and when the police asked, he refused
to answer. Like the young man in Hainze, Gaines refused to follow the commands of law
enforcement, thus causing the officers to make a split-second decision that could have been the
difference between life or death for the officer. Furthermore, the CCPD officers chose to take a
less violent route than the officers in Hainze when they chose to make verbal commands until the
moment that Gaines displayed acts of physical aggression and violence. At that point, the
officers only used reasonable force to calm Gaines, in order to physically apprehend him and
ultimately deployed a taser. Unlike the officers in Hainze, the CCPD officers never fired their
service pistol.
The officers in Hainze knew at the beginning of the encounter exactly the type of situation
they were encountering, and the Fifth Circuit still felt that it was within the officer’s purview to
reasonably act in the situation without an accommodation. The split-second decisions made by
officers cannot be muddied with guessing about what an appropriate accommodation would be
for a situation the officers know nothing about. This will help law enforcement reasonably
enforce society’s laws and preserve the safety of all citizens. The CCPD officers acted
reasonably as they would with any suspect who was not obeying commands and even restrained
20
themselves from using force until the last possible moment. Therefore, a reasonable fact finder
could not find that the officers acted unreasonably in accommodating Gaines’ disability.
b. Gaines’ requests for change would violate public safety by
creating an unnecessarily long wait during a potentially life-
threatening situation.
Gaines argues that law enforcement could have changed the way they interacted with Gaines
by doing the following things: 1) calling a mental healthcare professional or officers trained in
dealing with mentally ill individuals, 2) approached Gaines in a non-confrontational manner, 3)
allowed Gaines “cooling off time,” 4) respected Gaines’ personal space. Two of these were done
to the extent that law enforcement was able to do them, and two of them were just plain
dangerous for the moment.
CCPD officers approached Gaines in as non-confrontational of a manner as they could and
respected his personal space as much as they could. In approaching Gaines, the officers were not
aggressive and merely spoke to Gaines in a manner in which he would know their authority
while still trying to calm him down by saying things like “let’s talk” and “calm down. Sit down.”
It would be difficult for the officers to have been less confrontational with an individual who was
carrying around a baseball bat and acting threatening. Furthermore, the officers respected
Gaines’ personal space as much as they could. They moved as close as they needed to to make
sure they could apprehend Gaines if he went awry, but they did not touch Gaines until after he
became violent. At the point of him making erratic movements, the officers had no choice but to
apprehend him, which would violate his personal space. However, this was necessary to keep
him from hurting himself or others.
Calling someone in to handle the situation sounds perfect in hindsight. However, that is not
the standard by which we judge law enforcement. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989).
21
An officer has no time to spare in the moment. There is an individual in front of him with a
deadly weapon who is not following commands. Waiting the requisite amount of time for
another officer or healthcare professional to arrive on the scene could lead to the suspect hurting
the officers, the suspect hurting himself or passersby, or it could lead to exactly what happened
with Gaines where the officers ultimately have to take control of the situation. In a perfect world,
every person, whether or not they have a disability, would be able to speak with someone who
understands them and would be able to perfectly diffuse the situation. However, requiring
officers to spend precious time waiting for another professional could be disastrous, and
ultimately leads to the opposite of what law enforcement is designed to accomplish.
Similarly, allowing Gaines to have “cooling off time” seems reasonable if the officers have a
perfect understanding of Gaines. If the officers knew that this was all he needed in order to no
longer be a threat to the public, then the officers would have employed this tactic. However,
allowing a suspect who is acting in a threatening and ultimately violent manner to continue
acting that way on the hope that he might calm down or start listening to law enforcement is a
naive misconception of law enforcement interactions with dangerous suspects. If law
enforcement had even attempted to place Gaines in a position in which he could cool off without
being a threat to others, it would require the officers to violate his personal space, which would
violate the accommodations he wanted. Without violating the accommodations, officers would
be required to allow a person with a deadly weapon to continue acting threatening and possibly
become violent in a public space. This is unreasonable at best. Therefore, a reasonable fact finder
could not find that law enforcement officers could have even given Gaines the accommodations
he demands.
22
II. A rational trier of fact could not find for Brittany Fields because, as a matter of law,
the ADA does not apply to the station house interview with Fields and, even if it
does apply, the CCPD did not violate the ADA in the station house interview.
Law enforcement interviewed Brittany Fields like anyone else who comes to the station. She
voluntarily submitted to a non-custodial interview. She answered police questions. She had
knowledge of the context of the interview and her role in getting herself and Gaines released.
She naturally became upset because of her circumstances, and she regrettably incriminated
herself for a crime that law enforcement ultimately determined she did not commit. Brittany
Fields also happens to suffer from an intellectual disability and borderline personality disorder.
Because of these ailments she believes she has a case under Title II of the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA), which, in relevant part, states
“[N]o qualified individual with a disability, by reason of such disability, be excluded
from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a
public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132.
In order to make a prima facie case under Title II, Fields must be able to show that 1) she is a
qualified individual, 2) she has a disability, 3) she was excluded from participation in or denied
the benefits of the services, programs, or activities or subjected to discrimination by a public
entity, and 4) because of her disability. Bowers v. NCAA, 475 F.3d 524, 553 n.32 (3d Cir. 2007).
Fields is a qualified individual with a disability. Therefore, the first two elements are met. Fields
claims that she was subject to discrimination by the CCPD during her interview and that she was
denied a benefit by the CCPD during her interview. There is no dispute as to the facts. This fails
as a matter of law.
First and foremost, the ADA does not apply to Fields’ interview because, quite simply, CCPD
did not deny her any benefit of the CCPD’s services, programs, or activities. Station house
interviews are not a benefit because interviewees do not receive benefits from the interviews.
Station house interviews merely function for the purpose of finding the truth. The truth seeking
23
function is solely for the benefit of law enforcement and not the interviewee. Therefore, the
interview cannot be a benefit. Even if the opportunity to clear one’s own name is considered a
benefit of the interview, CCPD did not deny Fields that benefit because she participated in the
interview and made statements of her own innocence.
Furthermore, the ADA does not apply to Fields’ claim because Fields is attempting to make a
general complaint about police tactics while interviewing disabled individuals. While law
enforcement may eventually need to more closely scrutinize interview tactics with disabled
individuals, the ADA does not provide an avenue for general complaints about the services of a
public entity, which is what Fields has provided.
Even if the ADA does apply to the interview with Fields, the CCPD did not violate the ADA
because the officers were unaware of any necessary accommodations. The officers were unaware
because Fields made no requests for accommodation and her disability was not open and obvious
to law enforcement during the interview. The fact Fields became stressed and emotional during
the police interview is not unusual as such a response is typical of anyone being interviewed by
police, disabled or not.
Furthermore, most of the accommodations that Fields requested at the time of her lawsuit
would fundamentally alter the police interviewing process by disallowing the main interview
technique used by law enforcement for any individual who exhibits agitated behavior such as
Fields. The other accommodation would require law enforcement to provide mental health
personnel for every person who exhibits Fields’ behavior, which would effectively require
mental health personnel during nearly every police interview. This is an undue financial and
administrative burden on law enforcement.
24
There is no genuine issue of material fact. This Court should find for CCPD as a matter
of law because the ADA does not apply to Fields’ station house interview and because even if
the ADA applies to the interview, the CCPD did not violate the ADA during its interview of
Fields.
A. The ADA does not apply to the station house interview with Fields because Fields
was not denied any benefit from the interview and complaints about general government
services are not viable claims under the ADA.
In order for this Court to find for Fields, the ADA must first apply to her station house
interview. Courts on numerous occasions have found that Title II applies to certain interview
scenarios and claims. However, those scenarios are not present here. Fields was not denied a
benefit when she submitted herself to the station house interview because the interviewee does
not receive a benefit from the interview. Even if one considers participation in the interview a
benefit, Fields still was not denied the benefit because she actually participated in the interview.
An individual cannot be denied a benefit that they received. Lastly, Fields’ claim is a complaint
about general police tactics because her experience with the tactics resulted in a bad outcome for
her. This claim is not viable under the ADA because it does not assist in leveling the playing
field for individuals with disabilities. Because no one denied Fields a benefit and because her
claim does not assist in leveling the playing field for individuals with disabilities, a reasonable
trier of fact could not find that the ADA applies to Fields’ claim, and this Court should find for
the CCPD as a matter of law.
1. No one denied Fields a benefit when she voluntarily submitted herself
to, and participated in, the station house interview.
In order for Fields to have a triable claim under the ADA, she must have been “denied the
benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132. Station
house interviews are solely for the benefit of law enforcement to determine the truth. The
25
interview itself does not have a beneficial function for the interviewee. Even if the ability to clear
one’s own name in an interview is considered a benefit for purposes of the ADA, Fields was not
denied of this benefit as she was given the opportunity to answer questions and clear her own
name. Therefore, no rational trier of fact would be able to find that Fields was denied any benefit
of a public service when she submitted herself to the station house interview.
a. Station house interviews are not a benefit for purposes of the
ADA.
Fields relies on Pennsylvania Department of Corrections v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206 (1998) in
arguing that she was, in fact, denied a benefit of the public entity. This reliance is misplaced. In
Yeskey, a prison inmate was not allowed to participate in a motivational boot camp because of
his history of hypertension. Yeskey, 524 U.S. at 208. This boot camp, which the sentencing court
recommended, would have allowed the inmate to be released on parole after six months rather
than the 18-36 months for which he was sentenced. Id. The Supreme Court decided that Title II
applies to benefits that are either voluntary or involuntary. Id. at 211.
In relying on Yeskey, Fields fails to remedy the fact that, in Yeskey, whether or not the boot
camp was a benefit for purposes of the ADA was not in question. The inmate was able to receive
real benefits from participating in the boot camp -- i.e. earlier parole and possible rehabilitation.
Id. at 208-210. The inmate was directly denied those benefits because he was denied
participation in the program. Id. In contrast, there is no benefit that Fields could have received
had she been a non-disabled person partaking in the interview.
The only benefit any person could possibly receive from a voluntary, non-custodial station
house interview is the ability to clear their own name. However, this so-called benefit does not
come immediately upon stating one’s innocence in the interview room. As much as both
innocent and guilty interviewees would like, law enforcement does not take statements of
26
innocence at face value. In fact, law enforcement must investigate any corroborating evidence to
verify an individual’s claim of innocence before clearing the individual’s name. The individual is
often not released for this investigation, and their name would not be cleared until after law
enforcement did work that they likely would have done anyway without the statement of
innocence. Because a statement of innocence does not clear one’s name, the benefit of a
voluntary station house interview is minimal at best. It does nothing more for the individual that
would not have been done without the interview. Therefore, an individual (whether disabled or
not) derives no benefit from a voluntary station house interview, and Fields’ claim fails as a
matter of law.
b. Even if station house interviews are a benefit for purposes of
the ADA, Fields was not denied any part of the benefit.
Some individuals may derive a benefit from participating in a station house interview because
they may be able to effectively communicate with law enforcement. Even if this Court finds that
participation in these interviews is a benefit for purposes of the ADA, Fields was not denied this
benefit because she actually participated in the interview.
Circuit courts have occasionally found that an individual who was not allowed to participate in
an interview did have a viable ADA claim. In Bahl v. County of Ramsey, 695 F.3d 778 (8th Cir.
2012), a deaf individual was arrested for actions he took because he could not understand a law
enforcement officer at a traffic stop. Bahl, 695 F.3d at 801. He requested an interpreter for his
custodial interrogation numerous times. Id. at 782-83. Law enforcement ceased the interrogation
at the time of the request and never resumed the interrogation nor brought an interpreter because
of the expense. Id. The court found that participation in the interview was a benefit for purposes
of the ADA because the City told the individual that he would be interviewed and the process of
27
the interview had begun. Id. at 788. Therefore, because he was not allowed to participate in the
interview, the individual was denied the benefit of participating in the interview. Id.
Unlike the individual in Bahl, Fields was interviewed. She voluntarily sat down with police
officers who asked her questions in a language she speaks, and she answered those questions.
She had the opportunity to proclaim her innocence. She also had the opportunity to request
accommodations for the interview like the individual in Bahl did. Fields did neither of these. No
rational trier of fact could find that CCPD denied her any benefit because she actually received
the benefit of participation.
2. Fields is submitting general complaints about police tactics in interviewing
individuals with disabilities, which is not a viable claim under the ADA.
In Doe v. Pfrommer, 148 F.3d 73 (2d Cir. 1998), the court decided that general complaints
about public services are not enough for a Title I ADA claim. Pfrommer, 148 F.3d at 84 accord
Henrietta D. v. Bloomberg, 331 F.3d 261 (2d Cir. 2003) (applying the standard to Title II). The
central part of the court’s analysis is that the purpose of the ADA is to provide “evenhanded
treatment” to individuals with disabilities in relation to able-bodied individuals. Id. at 83. This is
to say, disabled individuals do not need to be provided better treatment under the ADA, but
rather that services provided to non-disabled individuals cannot be denied to disabled individuals
simply because of their disability. See id. Because of this, challenging the way in which services
are provided generally does not serve to “level the playing field” because nothing is being denied
to individuals on the basis of disability. Id.
Like the individual in Pfrommer, Fields is merely seeking to challenge general standards for
police interrogation techniques. Courts have upheld law enforcement’s use of aggressive
questioning tactics, such as those used on Fields, for decades. Lewis v. United States, 74 F.2d
173 (9th Cir. 1934) (deciding that fake evidence provided to a suspect that led to a confession
28
does not render the confession involuntary); United States ex rel. Lathan v. Deegan, 450 F.2d
181 (2d Cir. 1971) (deciding that a confession was voluntary when police falsely portrayed
themselves as fellow army officers); Morgan v. Zant, 743 F.2d 775 (11th Cir. 1984) (deciding
that showing a suspect false reports of their footprints at the scene is not unconstitutional);
United States v. Castenada-Castenada, 729 F.2d 1360 (11th Cir. 1984) (deciding that lying to a
defendant about a confession by a co-conspirator that prompted a confession is still a voluntary
confession). These techniques are commonly challenged by both disabled and non-disabled
individuals.
Fields is not arguing that she was denied the benefit of a police interrogation. She is not
arguing that she was discriminated against in the interrogation because she is disabled. She is
arguing that she should be given compensation because standard, reasonable police interrogation
techniques caused a bad outcome for her. Requiring the requested accommodations in this case
will not level the playing field. What it will do is create confusion in police stations. It will
undermine precedent about what is acceptable police behavior. It will lead to disjointed and
uneven interrogation techniques because there is no precedent as to what techniques can work for
those with disabilities. It will lead to individuals with disabilities not receiving evenhanded
treatment but rather them receiving enhanced treatment on account of their disability. The
purpose of the ADA is not to require preferential treatment for the disabled, but to ensure the fair
treatment of the disabled before the law. The ADA “signals the end to the unjustified segregation
and exclusion of persons with disabilities from the mainstream of American life” Presidential
Statement on Signing the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 26 WEEKLY COMP. PRES.
DOC. 1165 (July 30, 1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 601. For these reasons, the ADA
29
does not apply to general challenges to public services, and this Court should find that Fields’
claim fails as a matter of law.
B. The CCPD did not violate the ADA during the station house interview with
Fields because Fields did not request any accommodations and the
accommodations that she later suggested would fundamentally change the
nature of police interviews.
For law enforcement to have violated the ADA during the interview with Fields, they must
have 1) been aware of the disability and necessary accommodation AND 2) not been required to
fundamentally alter the nature of their work. Taylor v. Principal Fin. Group, 93 F.3d 155, 164
(5th Cir. 1996) (emphasis added) accord Choi v. Univ. of Tex. Health Sci. Ctr. at San Antonio,
63 Fed. Appx. 214, 216 (5th Cir. 2015) (applying the standard to Title II); 28 C.F.R. § 35.164.
Fields does not meet either requirement.
Fields’ interview was voluntary and non-custodial. She had every opportunity to request the
accommodations she so willingly put forward in this suit, but she chose not to. Because she did
not request any accommodations, law enforcement would have had to determine any necessary
accommodations that were obvious to them at the time. Because her disability, and the
accommodations she wanted were not open and obvious during the interview, law enforcement
could not possibly have known what accommodations Fields required for the interview.
Law enforcement employed techniques during the interview with Fields that are widely used
and considered the gold standard of police interviewing. The majority of Fields’ later-requested
accommodations completely undermine the effectiveness of these techniques by essentially
disallowing law enforcement from using these techniques with anyone who exhibited the same
behavior as Fields did in her interview. This restriction would fundamentally alter the nature of
police interviewing because the sheer number of people, disabled or not, who exhibit this
behavior would render the techniques unusable. Further, to include a mental health professional
30
in Fields’ interview because of her behavior would be an undue strain on the resources of the
CCPD and police departments everywhere. Fields exhibited behavior typical anyone in a police
interview, and if a mental health professional was required during every interview where
someone showed that behavior, mental health professionals would be required in nearly every
interview, whether or not they are actually needed.
For those reasons, no rational trier of fact could find that the CCPD violated the ADA during
the interview with Fields, and this Court should grant CCPD’s motion for summary judgment as
a matter of law.
1. Fields did not request any accommodations for her station house
interview, which is required for a viable ADA claim.
Courts have repeatedly found no requirement that public entities psychically determine if an
individual needs an accommodation under the ADA. Randolph v. Rogers, 170 F.3d 850 (8th Cir.
1999) (stating that “public entities are not required to guess what accommodations they should
provide”); Gaston v. Bellingrath Gardens & Home, Inc., 167 F.3d 1361 (11th Cir. 1999)
(holding that not requesting an accommodation when one is necessary is fatal to a Title I claim)
accord Smith v. Rainey, 747 F. Supp 2d 1327 (M.D. Fla. 2010) (extending the standard to Title
II); Robertson v. Las Animas Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 500 F.3d 1185 (10th Cir. 2007) (requiring that
a public entity have knowledge of a required accommodation in order for an ADA claim to be
viable); Windham v. Harris Cty., 875 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2017) (reasoning that the public entity
must know of the disability and its limitations).
Fields did not request an accommodation. She voluntarily entered the station house for the
interview. She affirmatively stated that she would participate in the interview. At no point did
Fields state that she had a disability that required an accommodation nor did she request a
reasonable accommodation.
31
Because Fields did not request an accommodation, the only way that CCPD could have
violated the ADA when interviewing her is if her “disability, resulting limitation, and reasonable
accommodation” was “open, obvious, and apparent” to the CCPD and its officers. Taylor v.
Principal Fin. Group, 93 F.3d 155, 164 (5th Cir. 1996) (emphasis added) accord Choi v. Univ. of
Tex. Health Sci. Ctr. at San Antonio, 63 Fed. Appx. 214, 216 (5th Cir. 2015) (applying the
standard to Title II).
Fields entered the police station of her own volition, she understood the questions and
answered them clearly and coherently. She was clearly aware of where she was and what was
happening. Nowhere in this series of actions by Fields was it openly apparent that she had a
disability or what a necessary accommodation would be. Being upset, agitated, and confused
when law enforcement asks difficult questions is not uncommon for non disabled individuals.
Crying, agitation, and false incrimination are unfortunate, but alone are not alone indicative of
disability or need for accommodation. If anything, such signs signify complete awareness of
one’s circumstances and knowledge of what is required to allow them to leave.
While the officers did have general knowledge that Fields was a part of the SHILC, that
knowledge does not equate to knowledge of her specific condition or any accommodations that
would be necessary to assist her. Even between Fields and Gaines, the necessary
accommodations would be different, so a general understanding that Fields is a part of a
supportive community for those with mental illnesses is not enough to make the reasonable
accommodation “open, obvious, and apparent.”
If Fields thought she needed an accommodation she clearly had the capacity to request one.
Because she did not and because her disability and necessary accommodation are not obvious,
this Court should find that her Title II claim fails as a matter of law.
32
2. The accommodations that Fields later suggested would fundamentally change the
nature of police interviews or would cause an undue financial or administrative burden on
law enforcement.
The ADA is designed to protect disabled individuals from discrimination on the basis of their
disability. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1)-(2). However, this protection does not mean that a public
entity must alter the way it functions. In fact, the ADA “does not require a public entity to take
any action that it can demonstrate would result in a fundamental alteration in the nature of a
service, program, or activity or in undue financial or administrative burdens.” 28 C.F.R. §
35.164.
In the interview with Fields, the CCPD used the Reid Technique, which is a nine-step
interrogation method designed to elicit a confession from those who are guilty. See Fred E. Inbau
& John E. Reid, Criminal Interrogation and Confessions (1962). This book by Inbau and Reid
has been considered the “bible of police interrogation.” Robert McG. Thomas Jr., Fred Inbau,
89, Criminologist Who Perfected Interrogation, N.Y. Times, May 28, 1998, at BI.
Fields’ claim against the CCPD is effectively challenging the use of the Reid Technique. Her
requested accommodations included using a less aggressive interview tactic, avoiding leading
questions and manipulative techniques, avoiding the use of deception, stopping the interview
when Fields’ emotional state was deteriorating, and including mental health personnel during the
interview.
Every single one of these accommodations except for the inclusion of mental health
personnel would undermine the effectiveness of the Reid Technique. The entire purpose of the
Reid Technique is to use leading questions, deceptive techniques, and to feed off of the emotions
of the interviewee. To require law enforcement to refrain from using these tactics is to reject the
gold standard of interviewing because it may upset some individuals. This would fundamentally
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alter the nature of police interviewing by barring law enforcement from using this tried and true
method every time a potentially mentally ill individual does not respond well to the Reid
Technique. At that point, court may as well require law enforcement to use a soft method of
interviewing every individual because they will never know who may be affected. This is not
reasonable, and no reasonable finder of fact could find it so.
While the inclusion of mental health personnel during the interview may not undermine the
Reid Technique, it would inflict an undue financial or administrative burden. Keeping mental
health professionals on call is expensive and time consuming for the mental health professional.
Fields clearly understood the questions being asked, understood how and when she would be
able to leave, and was able to effectively answer questions. While she may have been emotional
and upset during the process, this behavior is characteristic of any individual, disabled or not,
being interviewed by the police. To require law enforcement to bring in a mental health
professional every time an individual exhibits this behavior would be to require a mental health
professional at nearly every interview. Such a requirement is incredibly burdensome on police
departments and is incredibly unnecessary. Had Fields requested a mental health professional be
present during her interview, it may have been reasonable to provide one. However, without that
request, and given the circumstances of Fields’ behavior in the interview, providing a mental
health professional would not have been reasonable as a matter of law.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should reverse the ruling of the Court of Appeals for the
Thirteenth Circuit and reinstate the District Court’s grant of summary judgment for Carson City.
