+ All Categories
Home > Documents > No.8 1930s and War Economy Economic Development of Japan.

No.8 1930s and War Economy Economic Development of Japan.

Date post: 25-Dec-2015
Category:
Upload: shannon-oliver
View: 217 times
Download: 0 times
Share this document with a friend
Popular Tags:
18
No.8 1930s and War Economy Economic Development of Japan
Transcript
Page 1: No.8 1930s and War Economy Economic Development of Japan.

No.8 1930s and War Economy

Economic Development of Japan

Page 2: No.8 1930s and War Economy Economic Development of Japan.

Pure dictatorship

Full democracy

Democratic institution

(Form)

Political competition

ConstitutionLawsParliamentElectionCourt

Reform vs conservatism, big vs small government, other policy debates

EdoMeiji

Taisho

Fascism

ConstitutionParliament

Democracy movement,

Party cabinet

DemocratizationNew constitution

Showa2

War1937

1945-51 LDP dominanceLack of policy debate

Male suffrage

1960Now

US rule

Defeat

Showa1

1889

1925

1931Military rises

1937-45

(Content)Political fights

Page 3: No.8 1930s and War Economy Economic Development of Japan.

Two-party Politics 1924-1932 PP.130-32

Minsei Party 民政党 (Kenseikai until 1927)

Seiyukai 政友会(Estab. in 1900 by Hirobumi Ito)

Economy Small government, free market, fiscal austerity & industrial restructuring for return to gold

Big government, fiscal activism, local public works for securing votes

Foreign policy

Oppose militarism, protect Japan’s interest by diplomacy, promote disarmament

To attack Minsei Party, support military and fascism if necessary, even deny democracy

Remark Peace orientation is laudable, but stubborn deflation policy caused fascism to gain force

Economic recovery policy was welcomed, but its opportunism severely undermined democracy

Seiyukai statements:“Prof. Minobe’s theory denies the supreme dignity of Emperor. Just banning his books is not enough.”“Go, go, Japan, the leader of Asia, the vast land of Manchuria and Mongolia is waiting for you!!!” (election campaign song)”

Page 4: No.8 1930s and War Economy Economic Development of Japan.

Northeastern China today

Page 5: No.8 1930s and War Economy Economic Development of Japan.

Shidehara Diplomacy

His policy was more moderate than before or after him• Maintain good relations with US and UK• Respect Washington Naval Disarmament Treaty (1921-22)• No military intervention in China; secure Japan’s economic

interest through diplomacy and negotiation• When China protests and resists, his diplomacy breaks down• Domestically, criticized as Coward Diplomacy• Fail to stop Manchurian Incident (1931) started by Kantogun

(Japanese Army stationed in China)

PP.106-9

Kijuro Shidehara, 1872-1951 Foreign Minister, 1924-27, 1929-31 Prime Minister 1945-46

Page 6: No.8 1930s and War Economy Economic Development of Japan.

Tanaka Cabinet (Seiyukai), 1927-1929

• The Oriental Conference (Japan’s policy towardChina): defend Japan’s interests in Manchuria-Mongolia 満蒙 , but welcome FDI from any country.

• Send Japanese troops to prevent Chiang Kai-shek 蒋介石’ s army to unify China (1927 & 1928).

• Suppress communists and proletariat parties.• Strengthen Security Maintenance Law 治安維持法

(introduce death penalty).• Kantogun 関東軍 (Japanese army in China) kills

Chinese military leader 張作霖 by train bombing. PM Tanaka did not report the truth to Emperor. Emperor criticizes him and he resigns.

Giichi Tanaka 1864-1929

Page 7: No.8 1930s and War Economy Economic Development of Japan.

Hamaguchi Cabinet (Minsei Party), 1929-31

• Fiscal austerity and industrial restructuring for returning to gold standard ($1=2 yen)

• Disarmament (supported by people, opposed by navy)

• Social policies for workers and farmers

Prime MinisterOsachi Hamaguchi

Finance MinisterJunnosuke Inoue

Foreign MinisterKijuro Shidehara

Hamaguchi Cabinet is regarded as the crown of pre-WW2 democracy achievement. However, its stubborn deflation policy encouraged fascism and militarism, despite Minsei Party’s peace orientation.

Page 8: No.8 1930s and War Economy Economic Development of Japan.

Promoting Naval Disarmament

• London Naval Disarmament Treaty (1930) signed and ratified against opposition by Navy and Privy Council (cruisers & submarines, 69.75% vs 70% of US/UK tonnage)

• Navy attacks government for “violation of Emperor’s supreme command authority” 統帥権干犯

• Seiyukai supports Navy to undermine Minsei Party Government (=helping fascism)

• PM Hamaguchi shot at Tokyo Station (1930), dies next year

Note: Before WW2, many PMs were assassinated or almost killed: Ito, Okuma, Hara, Inukai, Hamaguchi, Takahashi, Saito, Suzuki

Page 9: No.8 1930s and War Economy Economic Development of Japan.

Showa Economic Crisis 昭和恐慌Causes

(1) Impact of global depression

(2) Austerity policy initiated and continued by FM Inoue

Consequences

(1) Severe price deflation

(2) Rural impoverishment, coupled with famine

(3) Cartelization and rationalization (“free market doesn’t work”)

(4) Rise of fascism (army, navy, right-wing groups)

--Rejection of party politics--“Reform” movement 1/ Military readiness for total war 2/ Totalitarian state for the benefit of farmers and workers

PP.126-130

0

5

10

15

20

1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934

Nominal GNP (bil yen)

Page 10: No.8 1930s and War Economy Economic Development of Japan.

Takahashi Budget and Recovery 1932-36• Korekiyo Takahashi, FM in Inukai Seiyukai Cabinet and two

other cabinets (1932-36)--“Japanese Keynes”

• “If someone saves 30,000 yen out of his income of 50,000 yen, his savings will increase, which is fine for him. But from the viewpoint of national economy, his saving will surely reduce demand elsewhere, which lowers national output. For the nation, it is actually better that this person spend all his income of 50,000 yen.” (Takahashi speech on austerity and returning to gold standard, 1929)

• Reversing Inoue’s austerity policy

--Terminate gold standard, let yen fall

--BOJ monetization of fiscal deficit

--“Spending Policy” on public works

PP.131-32

Takahashi was assassinated by rebellion army in 1936

Page 11: No.8 1930s and War Economy Economic Development of Japan.

Manchurian Incident (1931)(Sep. 18 Incident)

• Kantogun ( 関東軍 Japanese army stationed in China) initiates well-planned invasion of Manchuria without informing Tokyo

• Tokyo Government and Army HQ try to stop it but fails Kantogun is now uncontrollable Violating “open door, equal opportunity” principle

• US Secretary of State Stimson’s press statement undermines FM Shidehara (regarding Jinzhou bombing)

• Seiyukai (Inukai) Government declares the “independence” of Manchuria (1932).

• The League of Nations determines that Manchuria is not an independent state and Japan’s action is not self-defense Japan withdraws from the League of Nations (1933)

PP.133-35

Page 12: No.8 1930s and War Economy Economic Development of Japan.

Democracy Fascism/militarism

Pro-Zaibatsu,

Pro-Capit-alism

Workers’ &

Farmers’

Rights

Multiplicity of Political Players and Policy Debates(1930s until the outbreak of Japan-China War (July 1937)

Seiyukai Party

Minsei Party

“Proletariat” partiesMilitary

Ugaki

Page 13: No.8 1930s and War Economy Economic Development of Japan.

Proletariat parties

Minsei Party

SeiyukaiParty

Discipline Faction

Imperial Faction

Navy

R Wing

Political parties in parliament Army factions

Social reform through parliament

Social reform thru coup & terrorism

Political terrorism1931‐36

Failed coupFeb. 26 Incident, 1936

XDominant & suppressive

Rivalry among fascio groups

Supports fascism to undermine Minsei Party

Lose electionFeb. 1936

Opposes fascism, promotes social policies

Gain seats under broad voter base, demands social policies

FASCIODEMOCRACY

Attempt to cooperate to fight

fascism fails

Anti-military criticism in parliament

XJapan-China War, 1937

Dissatisfied with two major parties, sympathetic to “social reform” by fascio groups

無産政党 民政党 政友会 陸軍統制派 陸軍皇道派

Page 14: No.8 1930s and War Economy Economic Development of Japan.

Why People & Media Supported Military?(Not all of them, but some)

• The Sense of “Crisis in Manchuria-Mongolia” 満蒙の危機— need to protect Japan’s interests against the emergence of anti-Japanese movement in China; Shidehara Diplomacy is regarded as too soft

• Showa Economic Crisis—workers and farmers suffer severely while big businesses make money

• Disgust with political parties—both Seiyukai and Minsei Party are regarded as corrupt and unfriendly to workers’ welfare

• However, some journalists criticized militarism consistently--Tanzan Ishibashi 石橋湛山 , Kiyoshi Kiyosawa 清沢冽

Page 15: No.8 1930s and War Economy Economic Development of Japan.

War Economy 1937-45• Political debate and democracy completely suppressed.• Economic planning to mobilize people and resources

under private ownership (no nationalization).1937-39 Planning Board, National Mobilization Law; State

Power Management Law

1939-41 Control over civil life becomes pervasive

1941-44 Total war with US--Ministry of Military Demand; Military Needs Company Act

1944-45 Economic collapse due to lack of inputs

War with China prolongs Resource shortage within Yen Bloc Invade SEA for more resources Total war with US and rest of the world

PP.136-39

Page 16: No.8 1930s and War Economy Economic Development of Japan.
Page 17: No.8 1930s and War Economy Economic Development of Japan.

0

5

10

15

20

25

1942:H1 1942:H2 1943:H1 1943:H2 1944:H1 1944:H2 1945:H1

Other

Oil from SEANonferrous metals

Iron oreCoal

Million tons

(1937=100)

0

500

1000

1500

2000

2500

1931

1932

1933

1934

1935

1936

1937

1938

1939

1940

1941

1942

1943

1944

1945

Weapons & ammunition

Planes (army)

Planes (navy)

Battleships

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

160

1933

1935

1937

1939

1941

1943

1945

1947

1949

1951

1953

Total

Food

Clothing

(1933=100)

Military Production Consumer Product Supply

Maritime Transport during Pacific War

1941-1945

Page 18: No.8 1930s and War Economy Economic Development of Japan.

Origin of the Post-WW2 Japan System• Featuring long-term commitments and official intervention

Government-led industrial drive, administrative guidance, subcontracting, lifetime employment, keiretsu, mainbanks, friendly trade unions, BOJ window guidance, etc.

• Negative view—this system was installed artificially after 1937 to execute war. It continued to work reasonably well in the 1950s-60s, but it is now obsolete.

• Positive view—advanced industrialization requires such features. Free markets do not generate high-tech or heavy industries. Japan needed such a system to develop.

This means laissez-faire policy supports light industries and simple processing only; to go further, developing countries need above features even today.

PP.140-41


Recommended