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Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty and IAEA Safeguards

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Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty and IAEA Safeguards Ah_Lan
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Page 1: Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty and IAEA Safeguards

Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty and IAEA Safeguards

Ah_Lan

Page 2: Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty and IAEA Safeguards

Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty

Page 3: Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty and IAEA Safeguards

Provisions

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, also referred to as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), obligates the five acknowledged nuclear-weapon states (the United States, Russian Federation, United Kingdom, France, and China) not to transfer nuclear weapons, other nuclear explosive devices, or their technology to any non-nuclear-weapon state.

Page 4: Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty and IAEA Safeguards

Nuclear weapon States Parties are also obligated, under Article VI, to "pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control." Non-nuclear-weapon States Parties undertake not to acquire or produce nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices.

Page 5: Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty and IAEA Safeguards

They are required also to accept safeguards to detect diversions of nuclear materials from peaceful activities, such as power generation, to the production of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. This must be done in accordance with an individual safeguards agreement, concluded between each non-nuclear-weapon State Party and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

Page 6: Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty and IAEA Safeguards

Under these agreements, all nuclear materials in peaceful civil facilities under the jurisdiction of the state must be declared to the IAEA, whose inspectors have routine access to the facilities for periodic monitoring and inspections. If information from routine inspections is not sufficient to fulfill its responsibilities, the IAEA may consult with the state regarding special inspections within or outside declared facilities.

Page 7: Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty and IAEA Safeguards

IAEA Safeguards

Page 8: Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty and IAEA Safeguards

What are safeguards and what role do they play?

Safeguards are activities by which the IAEA can verify that a State is living up to its international commitments not to use nuclear programmes for nuclear-weapons purposes. The global Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and other treaties against the spread of nuclear weapons entrust the IAEA as the nuclear inspectorate.

Page 9: Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty and IAEA Safeguards

What verification measures are used?

Safeguards are based on assessments of the correctness and completeness of a State’s declared nuclear material and nuclear-related activities. Verification measures include on-site inspections, visits, and ongoing monitoring and evaluation. Basically, two sets of measures are carried out in accordance with the type of safeguards agreements in force with a State.

Page 10: Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty and IAEA Safeguards

One set relates to verifying State reports of declared nuclear material and activities. These measures – authorized under NPT-type comprehensive safeguards agreements - largely are based on nuclear material accountancy, complemented by containment and surveillance techniques, such as tamper-proof seals and cameras that the IAEA installs at facilities.

Page 11: Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty and IAEA Safeguards

Another set adds measures to strengthen the IAEA’s inspection capabilities. They include those incorporated in what is known as an "Additional Protocol" – this is a legal document complementing comprehensive safeguards agreements. The measures enable the IAEA not only to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material but also to provide assurances as to the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in a State.

Page 12: Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty and IAEA Safeguards

What kinds of inspections are done?

The IAEA carries out different types of on-site inspections and visits under comprehensive safeguards agreements.

Page 13: Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty and IAEA Safeguards

Ad hoc inspections typically are made to verify a State´s initial report of nuclear material or reports on changes thereto, and to verify the nuclear material involved in international transfers.

Page 14: Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty and IAEA Safeguards

Routine inspections - the type most frequently used - may be carried out according to a defined schedule or they may be of an unannounced or short-notice character. The Agency´s right to carry out routine inspections under comprehensive safeguards agreements is limited to those locations within a nuclear facility, or other locations containing nuclear material, through which nuclear material is expected to flow (strategic points).

Page 15: Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty and IAEA Safeguards

Special inspections may be carried out in circumstances according to defined procedures. The IAEA may carry out such inspections if it considers that information made available by the State concerned, including explanations from the State and information obtained from routine inspections, is not adequate for the Agency to fulfil its responsibilities under the safeguards agreement.

Page 16: Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty and IAEA Safeguards

Safeguards visits may be made to declared facilities at appropriate times during the lifecycle for verifying the safeguards relevant design information. For example, such visits may be carried out during construction to determine the completeness of the declared design information; during routine facility operations and following maintenance, to confirm that no modification was made that would allow unreported activities to take place; and during a facility decommissioning, to confirm that sensitive equipment was rendered unusable.

Page 17: Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty and IAEA Safeguards

Activities IAEA inspectors perform during and in connection with on-site inspections or visits at facilities may include auditing the facility´s accounting and operating records and comparing these records with the State´s accounting reports to the agency; verifying the nuclear material inventory and inventory changes; taking environmental samples; and applying containment and surveillance measures (e.g., seal application, installation of surveillance equipment).

Page 18: Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty and IAEA Safeguards

Status of Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty

The Treaty was opened for signature on 01 July 1968, and signed on that date by the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and 59 other countries. The Treaty entered into force with the deposit of US ratification on 05 March 1970. China acceeded to the NPT on 09 March 1992, and France acceded on 03 August 1992.

Page 19: Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty and IAEA Safeguards

In 1996, Belarus joined Ukraine and Kazakhstan in removing and transferring to the Russian Federation the last of the remaining former Soviet nuclear weapons located within their territories, and each of these nations has become a State Party to the NPT, as a non-nuclear-weapon state. In June 1997 Brazil became a State Party to the NPT.

Page 20: Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty and IAEA Safeguards

The NPT is the most widely accepted arms control agreement; only Israel, India, and Pakistan have never been signatories of the Treaty, and North Korea withdrew from the Treaty in 2003.

Page 21: Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty and IAEA Safeguards

There have been no confirmed instances of official states party transfers of nuclear weapon technology or unsafeguarded nuclear materials to any non-nuclear-weapon states party. However, some non-nuclear-weapon states, such as Iraq, were able to obtain sensitive technology and/or equipment from private parties in states that are signatories to the NPT. South Africa conducted an independent nuclear weapons production program prior to joining the NPT, however, it dismantled all of its nuclear weapons before signing the Treaty.

Page 22: Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty and IAEA Safeguards

In 1994, the United States and North Korea signed an "Agreed Framework" bringing North Korea into full compliance with its non-proliferation obligations under the NPT. In 2003 North Korea announced it was withdrawing from the Treaty effective immediately, and on October 9, 2006 became the eighth country to explode a nuclear device.


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