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Norberto Bobbio Theory of Democracy

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On Norberto Bobbio's Theory of Democracy Author(s): Corina Yturbe Reviewed work(s): Source: Political Theory, Vol. 25, No. 3 (Jun., 1997), pp. 377-400 Published by: Sage Publications, Inc. Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/191985 . Accessed: 02/11/2011 23:26 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. Sage Publications, Inc. is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Political Theory. http://www.jstor.org
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Page 1: Norberto Bobbio Theory of Democracy

On Norberto Bobbio's Theory of DemocracyAuthor(s): Corina YturbeReviewed work(s):Source: Political Theory, Vol. 25, No. 3 (Jun., 1997), pp. 377-400Published by: Sage Publications, Inc.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/191985 .Accessed: 02/11/2011 23:26

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range ofcontent in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new formsof scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

Sage Publications, Inc. is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Political Theory.

http://www.jstor.org

Page 2: Norberto Bobbio Theory of Democracy

ON NORBERTO BOBBIO'S THEORY OF DEMOCRACY

CORINA YTURBE Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Me6xico

INTRODUCTION

One of the central objectives of the work of Norberto Bobbio is to reflect on contemporary democracy, through the critical examination of both the development and present state of democratic theories and democratic re- gimes. In his observations and analyses of democracy, which are as much historical-sociological as philosophical, we find a valuable contribution to the understanding of the possibilities and limits of democratic government, which Bobbio points out "[have] become in these years the common denomi- nator of all the politically relevant, theoretical and practical questions."' Two aspects of Bobbio's discussion of democracy provide insights into his own understanding of democratic theory and practice, and help distinguish his approach from that of other contemporary theorists like Robert Dahl and Giovanni Sartori. The first is Bobbio's examination of the relationship between liberal democracy and socialism. There is a tension in Bobbio's thought between his commitment to liberalism and democracy and his realization (both theoretical and practical) that liberal democracy alone cannot guarantee social justice. The second aspect of Bobbio's democratic theory is his reflection on the "unfulfilled promises" of democracy. Bobbio believes the election of democratic procedures in itself entails the realization of certain fundamental values. These values give sense to democracy, render- ing it the most desired-or at least, the less undesired-form of government, and establish its superiority over other forms of political organization, especially its historical counterparts, autocracy or dictatorship. However, according to Bobbio, the promises of democracy have not been fulfilled, and

AUTHOR'S NOTE: I am most grateful to the editor of Political Theoryfor comments on earlier versions of this essay; I want also to express my warmest thanks to Mary Lyndon Shanley for reading earlier drafts on this essay and making many constructive comments.

POLMICAL THEORY, Vol. 25 No. 3, June 1997 377-400 ? 1997 Sage Publications, Inc.

377

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the nature of this failure illuminates the continuous need to rethink not only democratic theory in the light of the lessons of democratic practice itself.

I. BOBBIO'S UNDERSTANDING OF DEMOCRACY

A. The "Minimum Definition" of Democracy: Procedural Democracy

Bobbio's theoretical-political writings, especially those on democracy, are the product of two fundamental interests: one theoretical, where philosophy and political science come together and which Bobbio calls "political the- ory"; the other, the practical analysis of convergent situations and participa- tion in ideological political debates. His writings are an attempt not only to conceptualize politics but also to participate in politics. Even in his most abstract texts, we find this political "vocation" a constant reference to a certain theoretical-cultural fusion through which he moves his analyses between facts and values, and between the feasible and the desirable. Thus, on one hand, some of Bobbio's writings are theoretical in the strict sense, where the principal objective is the construction of a general theory of politics.' Bobbio carries out this task by defining precisely the essential philosophical problems in the political field, by classifying and clarifying and testing the definition of the concepts, as well as by reconstructing theoretical models, which are understood as instruments for the understanding of the world.3 He constantly tries to recuperate and rethink the "lessons of the classics," returning to the ideas of the great writers that have been considered "classic" in the strict sense-from Plato to Kelsen-that is to say, those whose theory or model is indispensable for an understanding of reality,4 working them out anew for the statement and resolution of our own problems.5

Bobbio deals straightforwardly with practical concerns in his writings on specific ideological political debates. A defender of individual rights, he has become the special interlocutor of the Italian Left, which by virtue of its particular history has managed to attain and maintain an autonomy vis-a-vis Marxist-Leninist dogmas.6 With the withdrawal of the Italian Communist Party from the international communist movement, and with the fall of so-called real socialism, this discussion has acquired a new strength. In the new context, an understanding of what should be meant by democracy has become a crucial problem for the Left.

Bobbio's reflections on democracy can be recorded as developments of a theory that considers democracy as a form of government and which, from

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the outset, poses two fundamental questions: (i) who governs and how do they govern? and (ii) who decides who governs and under which procedures? One of the answers to these questions leads Bobbio to work out what he calls a "minimum definition" of democracy. As we shall see, this definition regards democracy as a set of procedural rules for the taking of collective decisions and must include, in addition to the specification of the rules, a specification of what sort of conditions are required for their application.

In its descriptive or analytical use, "democracy" describes a specific form of government: democracy designates that form of government in which political power is exercised by the many, or by the greater number, in comparison with monarchy and aristocracy, forms of government of one and the few, respectively. This classical tripartite division is replaced over time, Bobbio says, by a "primary and fundamental" distinction between democracy and autocracy, no longer based on the number of rulers, but on the distinction Kelsen makes between autonomy and heteronomy.7 This second criterion gives priority to the procedures according to which collective decisions are made: the distinction is based on whether the decisions are taken according to an ascending or descending process, which leads to a distinction between democracy (the power ascending from below) and autocracy (the power descending from above).

In spite of the vast transformation that democracy has undergone to adapt to new historical circumstances and social changes, "democracy" for Bobbio has always kept its fundamental meaning: "As for the persons called upon to take (or collaborate in the taking of) collective decisions, a democracy is characterized by conferring this power ... to a large number of members of the group";8 it is thus the government of the many or of the majority, the government of the people,9 whose legitimacy is grounded in the ascending form of power.

The fundamental difference, in the analytical sense, between ancient and modem democracy lies in the distinction between direct and representative participation. In the former, the citizens were directly involved in the decision processes, while in the latter, the citizens choose the representatives to undertake the collective decisions in their name. In other words, what has changed over the course of the centuries is the way in which the people exercise the right of governing. Power in a modern democracy is the power of the representatives of the demos, who are those charged with making collective decisions by means of a complex process. According to Bobbio the essential elements of democracy-a certain equality and a certain lib- erty-are the same in modern democracy as in the ancient.10

In addition to the prescriptions on the entitlement to and exercise of power, forms of government are also distinguished on the basis of the ethical

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principles that inspire and justify them. In its prescriptive or evaluative use, democracy has been considered, depending on the historical moment, as the best, the least bad, or the worst form of government, with equality being its principle or philosophical foundation. For democracy, equality is defined fundamentally as equality of political power, that is to say, as equal opportu- nity for citizens to participate in the government of their society. They are equal from the point of view of politics: being equal before the law, all individuals are equally worthy of governing and making the decisions which affect their society. Minimal political equality, for modern democrats, occurs with universal suffrage.

The distinctions that Bobbio establishes between the democracy of ancient times and that of modern times, as well as between the different ways of understanding or conceiving this form of government, enable him to specify the distinctive features of democratic regimes. However, Bobbio insists that it is necessary to have an analytical criterion that allows us to decide whether a particular state is democratic or not. Taking as a point of reference the standpoint of jurists like Ross and Kelsen who start from a purely procedural conception of democracy, as a means for making collective decisions, Bobbio proposes a minimum definition, "but not a poor one," that contrasts democ- racy as a form of government to "all forms of autocratic government."'' Around this "minimum definition," the nucleus of his theory of democracy, Bobbio will weave diverse ways of approaching the question of democracy.

Compared to other contemporary theories on democracy, Bobbio's work accords great importance to the "juridical" dimension. Democracy is to be understood as a set of procedures assuring the citizens' direct or indirect participation along the different stages of the decision-making processes. Bobbio thus focuses on the so-called rules of the game. In contrast, other theorists like Dahl and Sartori focus on the relations and agreements of the different existing forces or interest groups. The politically relevant subjects in the democratic regimes are, from this perspective, those relatively autono- mous groups, organizations, or associations that, as competing forces, are able to exert influence and to select authorities. For these theorists competi- tion among groups constitutes a democratic regime; thus Dahl refers to "polyarchies" instead of "democracies."'2

These conceptions of democracy do not exclude one another. As M. Bovero suggests: "in spite of the diversity of perspectives, of influential traditions and languages, . . . none of them puts forward an image or an interpretation or a re-definition of the reality of democratic regimes, that ends up rendering it incompatible with the other perspectives."'3 Bobbio himself has considered the results of the theories of Dahl and Sartori in his own theory, while at the same time defending his procedural conception of democracy. 14 Besides their

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agreement on the fundamentals of the nature of democracy, Bobbio, Dahl, and Sartori have in common realistic perspectives. They consider the phe- nomena on democracy not from the standpoint of its ideal image, but from actual regimes: "the only way to save democracy is by taking it as it is, with a realistic spirit, without deluding oneself or deluding others."'" Bobbio departs from Dahl and Sartori in his definition of the values upon which democracy stands, particularly as to the role of equality as a founding principle and to the ways of identifying the empirical dimensions of the values of democracy.

As an alternative to the conception of politics as antagonistic conflict, Bobbio proposes a vision of politics in which the procedural rules are minimum requirements, the necessary point of departure. "To embark on a discussion of 'alternative politics' . . . it is essential to consider not just possible new themes and new strategies, but first and foremost the rules of the game in which the political contest unfolds in a given historical situ- ation."'6 Our historical context is characterized by the victory of democracy, whose predominant significance lies in the fact that it is a set of rules, which not only govern the members of a community but also connect the people among themselves. Democracy's rules facilitate the widest participation of the majority of citizens in the resolution of the conflicts in the political sphere, "the sphere in which the decisions are taken that most affect the community as a whole."'7

The definition of these rules is fundamental since it is through them that it is established who must make the decisions and by what procedures these decisions should be made: 'Those that we call the forms of government," Bobbio writes, "are distinguished one from another, on the basis of the rules whereby the collective decisions are made."'8 In short, the meaning of democracy refers to the procedure through which decisions are taken and not to the content of those decisions, so that through democracy different social and economic policies can be adopted depending on the will of the majority.

Two conditions must be met before speaking of a minimum definition of democracy. First, the power of making decisions must be distributed among a very high number of citizens. Modern democracy is "a regime in which all adult citizens have political rights, one in which there is universal suffrage."'9 When they have a "maximum extension of political rights," all the citizens have the right to participate, directly or indirectly, in the decision-making process. Second, the basic rule of democracy requires that such decisions be taken based on the majority principle.20 Given that unanimity is practically impossible when there are many people having to make the decisions, one must seek the consensus of the majority. In the case of contemporary democracies-representative democracies-each of the individuals with a

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right to participate in the making of collective decisions appoints his or her representatives, through elections based on the majority rule, to make collec- tive decisions which, in turn, will be made under the same rule.2'

Bobbio adds a third condition to these two initial conditions, the guarantee of real alternatives, and as a result of this, the existence and guarantee of the four basic liberties of the modem world, freedom of opinion, of expression, of meeting, and of association, which allow individuals to decide among political options, beyond any sort of coercion. Democracy "cannot function if it does not presuppose the whole tradition of liberalism, this is to say, the whole tradition of the declarations of the rights of freedom, which are the presupposition of democratic action itself."22 Besides the two fundamental values presupposed by democracy-political equality (political rights for all) and the rights of liberty (personal liberty and the civil liberties)-the procedural definition presupposes the presence of values in the procedures themselves. Among these values Bobbio mentions peace, nonviolence, tol- eration, and brotherhood, which are necessary to guarantee organized com- munity existence, create the possibility of resolving conflicts of interests and of values peacefully, and maintain links between members of a specific

23 society.

The ultra-minimum definition of democracy proposed by Bobbio- universal suffrage and majority rule-has certain basic distinguishing fea- tures that render it original: (1) it must be interpreted in the light of the values implicit in the procedures; (2) it is based upon a clear recognition of the value of participation, because to guarantee participation in power is, for Bobbio, what distinguishes a democratic regime; (3) it links democracy and liberalism because democratic liberty will be the guarantor of liberal liberty: "While civil liberties are a necessary condition for the exercise of political liberty, this-in other words, the popular control of political power-is a necessary condition, first, for the achievement, and then, for the conservation of civil liberties."24

B. Democracy's Necessary Relationship to Liberalism

Bobbio has never abandoned liberalism, which holds that the rights of freedom are the necessary condition of all possible democracies. In his attempt to state anew the relation between democracy and socialism, one of Bobbio's first objectives is to demonstrate the possible relation between democracy and liberalism. This relation-that is, the relation between a form of government characterized by a certain distribution of power and by certain specific procedures, and a political ideology that conceives reality in a certain

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way and prescribes certain values-is for Bobbio a possible but not inevitable relation: under certain conditions, the conditions of development generated by modem society, democracy would of necessity-in the sense of "historical necessity" rather than "logical necessity"-be connected to liberalism.

By "liberalism" Bobbio understands a particular conception of the state; the liberal state according to which this has limited powers and functions, contrasting with the absolute state and the social state. This conception of the state forms part of a particular ideology, that is, a general conception of the political world, defined by certain models for interpreting reality and history and by a specific constellation of values or aims proposed for political activity.25 The principles of freedom and equality which are shared by liberalism and democracy make it possible to speak of some sort of relation between the two. Those principles play such an important role in Bobbio's work that he prefers to analyze the relation between liberalism and socialism under the terms of liberty and equality:

In the face of the enormous problems we find before us, . . . referring to problems of liberty and to problems of equality may be less pretentious but also more useful: about liberty for those countries, namely those in which democratic governments do not exist, which happens to be the case of most of the countries, and about equality, regarding distribution of wealth. If we wish to consider that the first problem turns to the liberal doctrine and the second one to the socialist doctrine, so be it. However I recognize myself better, and even emotionally, in the slogan "Justice and Liberty."26

On the institutional level, liberalism consists in the search for constitu- tional mechanisms to limit the power of the state and to guarantee certain liberties to individuals. The doctrine of the liberal state is "the doctrine of the juridical limits of the power of the State."27 On the ethico-political level, a constant of this political doctrine is the defense of the principle of the liberty of the individual against the power of the state or of the church if this impedes the free development of the individual's personality. The different charters and declarations of the rights of man are the juridical manifestation of the defense of the liberty of the individual.

Is there a difference between the liberty defended by liberalism and liberty understood as one of the foundations of democracy? Bobbio believes that the answer to this question contains the key to understanding any sort of liberal- ism and its possible relation with democracy and with socialism; it also shows that the discussion of this political problem is more than an academic exercise: it is a pressing political question of our day.

In political language, the concept of liberty has two fundamental mean- ings: liberty meaning absence of interference, like the faculty of carrying out, or not, certain actions without being obliged or impeded by others or by the

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power of the state, and liberty as autonomy, as the power of not obeying norms other than those that one has imposed on oneself. Liberty in the first sense is a constant in classical liberal theory. The second meaning of liberty is used in modem democratic theory, where "to be free" does not mean to be governed by laws, but to give laws to oneself. Democratic liberty tends to lead to the creation of organizations of self-government.

In the first sense, the problem of liberty is, in Berlin's term, that of "negative liberty," which demands that there be limits to the action of the state.28 The prototypes of negative liberty, or the liberty of modem times, are civil liberties, those that must be protected by the law.

In the struggle against the absolute state, the liberal doctrine defends the principle of the rule of law-the constitutional state-this is to say, a state where not only public powers are subordinated to laws (constitutional state/the rule of law in the weak or formal sense), but the laws are also subordinated to some constitutional rights, and therefore in principle, "invio- lable" (constitutional state/the rule of law in the strong sense). Individual liberties are guaranteed in accordance with liberal thought only in a state based upon the principle of the rule of law, wherein constitutional mecha- nisms limit the powers of the state and impede the arbitrary and illegitimate exercise of power.29 Against the maximum state or the so-called social state, liberalism is the defender of the minimum state whose functions must be limited to the minimum necessary for the survival of the community. Classi- cal liberalism is therefore a specific conception of the state, "according to which the State has limited powers and functions, and as such, [it] opposes the absolute State as much as it does the State that today we call social."30

The principal meaning of liberty for liberal doctrine is therefore the liberty to confront the state,31 whose powers are limited by the so-called civil liberties and the so-called economic liberties, headed by the right of property. Bob- bio's commitment to liberalism is to the first type of liberties and not to liberalism as an economic theory that adheres to the market economy.32

Democracy is a form of government in which power is in the hands of the citizens, who exercise this power in an indirect way through elections based on majority rule. The fundamental problem of this form of government does not consist in the limitation of power, but in its distribution. The problem is the demand to limit all forms of legislation imposed from above: this is the liberty of the ancients, according to Constant-and Berlin's positive freedom-or liberty understood as autonomy or self-determination. It is the concept of liberty accepted by Rousseau who gave it the famous interpreta- tion according to which liberty coincides with collective self-determination. In this sense, positive liberty-political liberty-insofar as it means partici- pation in political decision-making, refers to the individual who is not

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considered as an isolated unit, but as a member of a community at the moment when this community must take decisions that concern its members. Bobbio writes: "For political theory, the historically relevant problem is not so much that of the individual's self-determination (a theological or philosophical or moral problem) as the self-determination of the social entity of which the individual forms part."33

In the history of the modern state, liberal and democratic freedom are closely interconnected. Without civil liberties, popular participation in politi- cal power is a deception, this is to say, certain liberties are necessary to guarantee the correct exercise of democratic power. Similarly, without popu- lar participation in power, these liberties are unlikely to last, since democratic power is indispensable to guarantee the existence and maintenance of funda- mental liberties.34 Liberal ideals and the democratic method "have gradually become so interwoven that, if it is true that the rights of liberty have been from the beginning the necessary condition for the correct application of the rules of the democratic game, it is also true that the development of democ- racy has become successively the principal instrument in the defense of the rights of liberty."35

Once the two meanings of liberty have been defined in political language, liberal liberty and democratic liberty become not only compatible, but they also reinforce one another: "the evolution of the representative modern State has been characterized by an uninterrupted struggle, with gains and losses, in favor of the extension of civil liberties and political liberty."36 The formal, procedural definition of democracy is, then, in Bobbio's work, linked to the fundamental rights of liberty and to the rule of law:

We can define democracy as that regime that permits the taking of decisions witi the maximum consensus of citizens, founded on the principles of liberty, so that the citizens can elect their governors and, at the same time, the principle of the rule of law obliges the governors not to go beyond their power and to exercise it within the sphere of a system of written norms.37

In history, the democratic state ends up being the natural continuation of the liberal state, in the sense that only with the democratic state can the liberal states continue being liberal.

C. Liberal Democracy and the Problem of Equality

In Bobbio's defense of procedural democracy, what happens with regard to equality? There is a tendency to consider liberty and equality as values that are invariably in conflict, so that the fulfillment of one of them in the social

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sphere appears to limit the fulfillment of the other. While liberty would be a value for people as individuals, equality would be a value for people as social beings. According to this, the classical liberal doctrine would tend to search for a sort of minimum and fornal equality, while the doctrines which defend social equality might restrain liberties.38

Equality is compatible with the liberty of liberal doctrine if it is understood as equality in liberty, in which two fundamental principles of the liberal state are inspired: equality before the law (equal protection) and equality of rights. From the point of view of procedural democracy, equality is defined basically as equality of political power, that is, as the equal opportunity of citizens to participate in the government of their society. It is fulfilled at its basic level by equal universal suffrage.

When democracy is understood not only as the equal distribution of power, but as the equal distribution of goods, liberalism and democracy enter into a state of tension: the conflicts between the defenders of liberalism and the defenders of democracy occur when democracy is understood as substantial democracy, that is, when it is conceived not only as a mechanism to choose or authorize governments, promulgate laws and adopt political decisions (political democracy), but also as including a certain economic equality, which presupposes more than a minimum state.

Historically, the problem of poverty, of those who have nothing, has complicated the discussion of democracy as a form of government and led to confusion and oversimplification. Democracy is put forward now not only as a form of government, but as a definite social order. An example of this is the concept of "social democracy" or the conceptual pair "formal democ- racy"/"substantial democracy," where democracy is defined by the content and values from which the government should take its inspiration, and not by referring to the "who's" and the "how's" or the "procedures" of democ- racy. When confronted with the sorts of statements that are typical of the tradition of socialist thought, where "formal democracy" becomes a synonym of "bourgeois democracy" and is contrasted with "substantial democracy" or "social democracy," Bobbio does not cease to affirm that democracy is always formal democracy. This means that democracy only guarantees political equality, but not social equality and social justice. Bobbio never gives up his formal, minimum, and procedural definition of democracy and rejects as erroneous the concept of "social democracy."

However, we also find in Bobbio's writings a serious preoccupation with equality and justice, together with the defense of liberal freedoms and formal democracy. In his treatment of these questions, there is an oscillation between treating them as exclusive demands of socialism or making them demands of liberal democracy, in the sense that a certain dose of social equality and

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social justice would be necessary for the functioning of any democracy. On some occasions, Bobbio has tended to consider the value of equality as something that goes beyond democratic liberty, while on other occasions, as that which sustains and maintains the value of liberty.39

Liberalism is compatible with democracy "on condition that democracy is not considered from the point of view of its egalitarian ideal, but from the point of view of its political formula: popular sovereignty."40 Actually, democracy for Bobbio formally requires only political equality, even if a particular regime may need to attend to other types of equality to function effectively. The relation between liberalism and democracy becomes trouble- some in the field of these preconditions of equality. But this does not mean that a certain integration between freedom and equality may not be possible from the point of view of the procedural interpretation of democracy. The latter can be conceived as the "form of government in which all are free in so far as they are equal."'41 The search for equality of power for all tends to increase liberty, since the way that power is distributed in a society contrib- utes to the greater or lesser liberty of its members. "While there would be no point in saying," writes Bobbio, "that without freedom there is no equality, it is perfectly legitimate to say that without equality (with respect to reciprocal power) there is no freedom."42

II. BOBBIO'S UNDERSTANDING OF THE TENSIONS BETWEEN DEMOCRATIC THEORYAND PRACTICE

A. Democracy and Socialism

Up to this point, I have given an outline of Bobbio's view on the development of the theory of democracy, pointing to the characteristics of democracy that constitute the focus of his analysis. However, Bobbio also analyzes the tensions between democratic theory and practice. These are, on one hand, the relation among liberalism and democracy and socialism, and on the other, the comparison of the development of actual democracies from the ideal construction of democracy. Bobbio's reflections on these most critical problems of philosophical and political theory elucidate their com- plexity, but do not pretend to solve them.

If there is an issue that exhibits Bobbio's uneasiness and vacillation, it may be that of the relation between democracy and socialism. Bobbio's analysis of the relation between democracy and socialism occasionally conflicts with his commitment to procedural democracy, the backbone of his theory. Bobbio

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assumes that democracy cannot flourish in a social context other than that of a market society. While in Sartori's view this recognition plays the role of a value-judgment, for Bobbio it is simply a historical fact. I shall deal with this point briefly. Bobbio's reply to Sartori's remark on the "moral crisis" of democracy turns to the logic of the market as the main challenge to be faced by democratic societies:

The reason behind the moral crisis can be found in the fact that hitherto political democracy has lived together, or has been forced to live together with the capitalist system. [Capitalism is] a system that does not recognize a law other than that of the market, which is in itself completely amoral, based on the law of supply and demand and consequently, on the reduction of everything to merchandise.43

While Sartori regards liberal democracies that value liberty over equality as the only possible version of democracy (in either real or ideal terms), Bobbio puts forward a version of "social democracy," a project in which the rights of liberty-the necessary condition of any possible form of democ- racy-may be brought together with a scheme of social rights, to produce a just society.

Although Bobbio assumes that hitherto no democracy has developed in a society other than the market society, he tests this assumption by asking whether the latter is a necessary condition of the former. The logic of the market, he believes, can pervade democracy up to the point "where every- thing is tradable and therefore a merchandise"; this means that "the vote can also be converted into merchandise."" This creates a tension between democ- racy and the market. On one hand, the realist assumption cautions us not to do away with the market, for there may be undemocratic market societies but no examples of a nonmarket democracy. On the other, since we are aware of the pervasive effect of the market over democratic development, we must guard against the market doing away with democracy. In this respect, Bobbio asks whether the "vital" embrace between democracy and the market may turn out to be a "deadly" one, whether the market may end up suffocating democracy.45

In the face of this, what should we do as democrats? Bobbio puts forward a twofold answer: (a) limit the market to the extent that the logic of the market is kept within the boundaries of its own sphere; and (b) correct the effects of the market through a scheme of social rights. Bobbio's most ambitious project has been that of bringing together formal democracy with socialism, under- standing the latter as a political project entailing a basic set of policies and programs regarding social justice. However, two additional concerns arise from Bobbio's reflections on the link between democracy and market society.

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First, without minimal equality, the rights of liberty-the preconditions of democracy-are rendered futile. To this extent the social policies and pro- grams of the socialist tradition could be considered as preconditions of the preconditions of democracy. Second, in the framework of a formal democ- racy, it could be the case that the demands for social justice could be met beyond the level required for democracy to work. In such a case it would no longer be the task of democrats (concerned only with the who 's and the how's of the allocation process), but of the left (concerned with pushing the aims of social justice beyond the social minimum) to pursue a more egalitarian society.

In this way, the sense of Bobbio's proposal turns to the assumption that although the values of the liberal tradition are the necessary foundations to build up a democracy, this does not mean that they can assure its preservation. For this purpose, democracy may need to draw on some of the values of the socialist tradition too, namely on its scheme of social rights. For Bobbio, the fundamental social rights are employment, education, and health. Bobbio, in accordance with the Italian tradition, calls this conjunction between liberal- ism and socialism "liberalsocialismo,"' which should be understood as a pragmatic combination, a compromise between traditions, and not as a synthesis.

Bobbio himself concedes that attempts at conjoining both traditions- such as "liberalsocialismo" and social-liberalism-are artificial construc- tions whose theoretical value is unclear: "that liberalism and socialism are not incompatible, says nothing yet about the forms and ways of their possible conjunction."47 Bobbio suggests that this conjunction should be seen as a compromise between political liberalism (liberty rights) and socialism, un- derstood as a means to correct the effects of free-market activity, by means of social rights.48 In short, he refers to the defense of the welfare state from a double perspective: that of a democrat who sees social rights as the preconditions of the preconditions of democracy, and that of the socialist for whom social justice is the ultimate value of a well-ordered society. On these grounds, Bobbio rejects Sartori's view that social rights are meaningless. For Sartori a modern society must be competitive and meritocratic.49 In the face of this, social rights are nothing but needs that are elevated to rights that vitiate people and make them overindulgent.

In these terms, Bobbio's liberalsocialismo must be understood as his belief in a historical movement from liberty to social rights, as an inevitable and necessary process given the expansion of the popular base of democracy. In the face of the breakdown of communist regimes, Bobbio is unequivocal in stating that any socialist project should be based on democratic methods: "when short cuts toward socialism are taken, the rights of liberty never

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return."'S0 Just as the conjunction of liberalism and democracy occurred when universal suffrage guaranteed individual liberty and political participation, so socialism could be compatible with democracy if it assured the full exercise of liberty rights through the extension of social rights. If real socialism, while aspiring to a free and just society instead denied the rights of liberty, the challenge of democracy would be that of finding "which means and ideals are available to confront the same problems that gave birth to the communist challenge."51 On these terms, Bobbio challenges the Left to advance the aims of social justice, under the rules of democracy. Thus, in spite of the fact that in Third World countries "purely formal democracy is not capable of transforming 'no-men' into 'men,' ,52 and in spite of the fact that in these countries, due to the absence of the minimal conditions of social justice, democracy is rendered largely meaningless, the democratic option is nonetheless still to be preferred over any other, and especially over revolution.

B. The "Unfulfilled Promises" of Democracy

Against the notion that contemporary democracy is in crisis-in a crisis of such a nature that would lead us to expect "an imminent collapse"- Bobbio prefers to speak of "transformations" of democracy, showing that, in spite of-or perhaps, rather, by virtue of-these transformations, democracy has a future: "Democracy is not enjoying the best of health in the world today, and indeed has never enjoyed it in the past, but nor does it have one foot in the grave."53

To understand and evaluate the significance of the changes undergone by democracy, Bobbio traces the profile of variations in the concept of democ- racy. For Bobbio, the concept of democracy is a complex one. It is constructed by way of a network of notions and categories, and defined by a series of opposites, until arriving at the minimum definition, a formula that condenses the formal or procedural conception of democracy. Among the minimum criteria that have to exist so that a particular regime may be recognized as a democracy are certain procedural rules or rules of the game that lay down the ways in which collective decisions are to be taken: answering the double question who decides and according to what procedures. In the fulfillment of these criteria, that is to say, in satisfying the structural characteristics of the democratic model in the conceptual sense, the ideals of democracy are at stake; that is, the values made explicit in the model of democracy in its prescriptive or ideal sense. There are regimes that we can properly call democracies based on their concrete features. In these regimes-to refer to

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the minimum nucleus of the minimum definition-decisions are made on the basis of universal suffrage together with majority rule. These procedures reflect the values that give democracy its own meaning, rendering it the most desirable (or at any rate the least undesirable) form of government and serving to demonstrate its superiority over its historical alternatives, autocracy or dictatorship.

One of the fundamental premises of Bobbio's thought is that there are certain values entailed in the rules of political democracy. The ideal or the project of democracy has developed throughout the modern age around this set of values, drawing from the philosophical conceptions of Spinoza, Rous- seau, and other philosophers and thinkers, as well as from the social and political movements that gave birth to the process of democratization. Arising from the modern project of democracy-which may be considered as a family of modern reinterpretations of the concept-an ideal or a normative image of democracy emerges. This ideal of democracy, which encompasses what Bobbio calls the "promises" of democracy, pointed to certain public evils that the development of democracy was to correct and to the direction and sense of democratic development itself.54 However, democratic development failed to satisfy most of the expectations entailed in these images. In the face of this, Bobbio undertakes the task of analyzing the expectations of the project of modern democracy, to assess the extent to which real regimes might have fulfilled such expectations. He re-endorses the basic values entailed in the democratic project, attempting to find alternative ways in which it could still be carried out. His object is to correct the shortcomings of actual democratic regimes. Democracy must deliver its promises, perhaps not in the ways expected by classical democratic theory, but closer to what can still be reasonably expected from the present. If the ideal model of democracy is implausible, Bobbio must redefine the model, looking to history for guidance. His analysis-in his own terms-is "neither more nor less a realistic descrip- tion of what happened in the process of democratization in the past century, a dispassionate illustration, disillusioned, bitter, if you want, but obligatory, for those willing to remain loyal to the ethic of science, to the disinterested research of the difficulties in which democracy, conceived as 'noble and elevated,' has found itself in the path of 'brute facts.' "55

In this way, Bobbio has set himself the task of measuring and comparing the distance between ideal and real democracy. The originality of this task lies in the fact that he does not reduce the past values and expectations of democracy to "wishful thinking" or confine them to a particular historical context. He infers the "promises of democracy," the values entailed in the democratic project of the modern age, from the "lessons of the classics." And,

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unlike some of his contemporaries, he believes that those values and expec- tations can be adapted to face the present challenges of democracy."6 The aim of this comparison is to explain the characteristics that we find today in the so-called real democracies (empirically existing democratic regimes) that would appear to contradict or betray the principles of an ideal democracy. By following this path, Bobbio arrives at a redefinition of the ideal model.

In his 7he Future of Democracy Bobbio spells out the six promises that were not fulfilled:57

1. The variation offered by the different sources of modem democratic thought promised a society in which, between individuals and collective power, neither factions nor intermediations existed: democracy was supposed to be the political culmination of the individualist conception of society and history, and the definitive superseding of the ranks and intermediate bodies of the ancien r6gime. The fact is, however, that in place of the old intermediate bodies, a multitude of formal and informal organizations were bom, inter- posing themselves between the individual and the state. None of the democ- racies actually existing is an individualist democracy; contemporary democ- racies are pluralist democracies. Rousseau had envisioned the disappearance of the intermediate groups but, in actual democracies, parties and other groups exist that contradict this expectation.

2. The modem democratic doctrine promised the triumph of the general public interest over the multiplicity of particular private interests. For this reason it had gradually sketched out the project of a political representation prohibiting the imperative mandate: the elected representative would have to listen to the collective interest as such and desist from satisfying only the interests of his particular electors. But the prohibition of the imperative mandate was avoided and emptied of meaning by those many different organizations whose existence coincides with the lack of fulfillment of the first promise. Along with that, the idea of a pure political representation and the triumph of the general interest remained a project on paper, giving way to the claims of individual and group interests.

3. Aiming at the equal distribution of political power through the progres- sive expansion of suffrage until universal suffrage was achieved, democratic movements promised a form of political society in which power 6lites would disappear. But the material constitution of all contemporary democratic societies evidences the permanence of an effective disequilibrium in the distribution of power. Leaving behind a disenchanted view of reality, the promise of power for all was replaced by the reappearance of the power of the few in new guises.

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4. The democratic doctrine promised to submit, for collective decision by all the citizens (even though this might be indirect and take place in several stages), every important question that might bear on their social life and on the complex of intersubjective relations. But in the reality of the democratic regimes that have actually existed, only certain questions of importance for the lives of individuals, or some aspects of these, reach the arena of political decision and are thus submitted to the democratic method. A myriad of social authorities, aside from and beyond the political scene, continue to make decisions having important consequences for social life, without these being influenced by the democratic method. The democratization of the state did not mean democratization of social life.

5. Fighting against all the past forms of political subordination, the modern democratic doctrine projected into the future the promise of the definitive superseding of the arcana imperii, of the secrecy or invisibility of power. But in all contemporary democratic regimes, there remain, on various levels and in different forms, centers of invisible or opaque power that condition, determine, or distort the process of democratic decision-making, preventing or hindering the public control of power. The ideal of transparency has had a relative and partial realization, leaving room for broad and threatening areas of opacity.

6. The defenders of democracy formulated the conviction and cultivated the hope that the exercise of political rights would be distributed equally or the practice of participation in democratic life would itself turn individuals into citizens. But thepromise of the citizen educated through the very practice of participation in democratic life became, in the reality of contemporary democratic regimes, the disillusion of the uneducated citizen, who, in a number of ways, is not capable of exercising political rights effectively, and who for this very reason tends to become alienated from democratic life. Furthermore, several types of real political processes seem to show dangerous trends toward intermittent, inefficient, and little more than symbolic partici- pation by the typical citizen in the political process.

Bobbio's remark regarding such promises is that "some could not objec- tively be kept, and were thus illusions from the outset, others were not so much promises as misplaced hopes; still others as it turned out, came up against unforeseen obstacles."58 He wonders whether certain unfulfilled promises would render a democratic regime undemocratic. We may regroup the promises from two different perspectives, with the aim of measuring the seriousness of their lack of fulfillment: from the point of view of power, the governor, and from that of the citizens, the governed.

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From the point of view of power, of the governor, if real democracy is too far away from its ideal, this is due to the fact that a great many decisions are made without following democratic procedure. This can happen either be- cause democratic procedures have been confined to too circumscribed a space or because the exercise of as well as the struggle for power are not yet public and visible. In this respect, Bobbio radically opposes Dahl's view. For the latter, the bulwark against power abuse is the presence of a plurality of "independent organizations." For the pluralist theory of democracy, the way in which such organizations take their decisions is of no importance. What matters is their ability to curb one another as well as the power of government agencies. Thus the main feature of a "polyarchy" is its being constituted by multiple centers of power, whose decisions may affect the public, but which, however, escape public scrutiny and control (such as the decisions of corpo- rations). Only recently has Dahl shown his concern for the extension of the democratic processes to other institutions than governmental ones.59

From this same perspective, Bobbio regarded the visibility of power as a crucially important unfulfilled promise of many democratic regimes. Public- ity is a minimal goal for any serious attempt at democratization. Where failure to fulfill the other promises renders a democratic regime "less democratic," the failure to fulfill the promise regarding the visibility of power is a mortal threat to democracy. Secrecy "does not transform, but corrupts democracy. It does not more nor less gravely wound its vital organs, but kills it. Of all the unfulfilled promises, it is the one that offends its spirit the most, diverts its natural course, defeats its aim."60

From the point of view of the governed, the citizens, democracy is, in a fundamental sense, a method that aims to involve the citizens in public decision-making. If, however, the citizens lack the minimum skills and education to participate, to assume their citizenship, to be agents of their own decisions, then democracy will be rendered meaningless. It seems to be that efforts at democratization must be sustained by efforts at education to enable political participation. Failure to provide such education is the second mortal threat to democracy.

Despite the seriousness of the problems, the failure to fulfill the promises of the classical model of democracy does not necessarily lead Bobbio to the judgment that real regimes no longer deserve the name of democracy. Bobbio's prognosis regarding the future of democracy is that its possibilities are by no means exhausted, in spite of having wandered so far from the promised ideal model. Democracy does have a future-even if it is a different one from that hoped for by the classics of democratic thought-basically because the answers to the questions who and how still meet democratic criteria. In any case, each of the unfulfilled promises suggests that a pure ideal

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of autonomy is not, as such, realizable. Furthermore, each instance of failure to fulfill the promises of democracy corresponds to a genuine problem that has to be confronted by reformulations of the democratic project. In one way or another, reality shows a reduction in the influence of individuals on collective decisions. The so-called unfulfilled promises of democracy have to do with limitations on citizens' participation in making decisions that affect them, that is, with conditions of fact. These limitations are consequences of the very process of democratization that, paradoxically, reduce the efficacy or power of participation by the citizens in the decision-making process. Each of the "promises" reveals, from a different angle, the little influence that citizens actually manage to exercise on decisions that affect their lives.

CONCLUSION

The "model of democracy" in Bobbio's work does more than describe the mechanisms of that form of government; it points to the developments that must take place in the social structure to set democracy in motion. In his rigorous analysis of democracy, Bobbio identifies the prerequisites necessary for democracy to flourish. Even if democracy is supposed to satisfy certain social and economical requisites, that does not mean that there is an antithesis between real democracy and the values entailed in the promises of the democratic project. Bobbio's realism and disenchantment regarding democ- racy do not drive him to reject it, but to underline the obstacles that contem- porary societies are likely to face on the road to democratization. In the face of these problems, political philosophy is unable to put forward a set of practical solutions. It is not the task of the philosopher to anticipate the future, but to point to the complexity of its challenges: "the relevance of a ques- tion . . . lies not in the answer it brings about, but, precisely, in its being formulated, that is, in revealing that there is a problem there, where it has been believed or pretended that it does not exist."6' As a philosopher, Bobbio is reluctant to put forward a set of prescriptions to solve problems, rather he shows us where to seek the "polar stars" we should focus on if we are willing to solve them: Justice and Liberty.

NOTES

1. N. Bobbio, "Introduzione," in Ifuturo de la democrazia (Turin: Einaudi, 1991), IX.

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2. Cf. Bobbio, Stato, governo, societ. Per una teoria generale della politica (Democracy and dictatorship. The nature and limits of state power) (Turin: Einaudi, 1980), VIII, (Minnesota: Polity Press, 1989) where Bobbio points out that the themes concentrated upon there "constitute fragments of a general theory of politics, yet to be written."

3. The theoretical models are fundamental conceptual outlines, extracted from the history of thought and transformed into ideal models. For example, in Bobbio, II modelo giusnaturl- istico" (The Natural Law Model), Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia del Diritto (October- December 1973 pp. 73-93), the fundamental concepts of Aristode are compared with the natural law models from Hobbes to Kant.

4. Cf. Bobbio, "La teoria dello Stato e del potere" (Theory of State and power), in Max Weber e I'analisi del mondo moderno (Max Weber and the analysis of modern world), ed. P. Rossi (Turin: Einaudi, 1981).

5. Cf. N. Bobbio y M. Bovero, "Premessa" (Premise), in Societa e stato nellafilosofia politica moderna (Society and state in modern political philosophy) (Milan: nI Saggiatore, 1979), 7-9, where Bobbio clarifies what the study of the authors of the past means for him: it is not so much a historical study as an attempt to determine the fundamental themes, clarify the concepts, analyze the arguments, reconstruct their systems. See also Michelangelo Bovero, "Antichi e moderni: Norberto Bobbio e la 'lezione dei classici' " (Ancients and moderns: Norberto Bobbio and the lesson of the classics), in Per una teoria generale della politica Scritti dedicati a Norberto Bobbio (Contribution to a general theory of politics. Essays dedicated to Norberto Bobbio), ed. L. Bonanate and M. Bovero (Florence: Passigli, 1986).

6. See, for example, the discussion on democracy and dictatorship, freedom and power, where Bobbio contrasts his position with those of Galvano Della Volpe and Togliatti on these fundamental themes: N. Bobbio, Politica e cultura (Politics and culture) (Turin: Einaudi, 1955). See also the wide ranging debate inspired by his essays on the lack of a political theory in Marxism and on the absence of altematives to representative democracy as a form of government in a free society: "Esiste una dottrina marxistica dello stato?" and "Quali alternative alla democrazia rappresentativa?" in Quale socialismo? ed. N. Bobbio (Turin: Einaudi, 1976) ("Is There a Marxist Doctrine of the State?" and "What Alternatives Are There to Representative Democracy?" in Which Socialism? [Oxford: Polity Press, 1986]).

7. Kelsen distinguishes between two extreme forms of govenmment: that in which collective decisions are autonomous, in the sense that it is the citizens who give laws to themselves, and that based on the principle of heteronomy, according to which laws come from above, or from governments. Cf. H. Kelsen, Esencia y valorde la democracia (Barcelona-Buenos Aires: Labor, 1934).

8. N. Bobbio, I1futuro della democrazia (hereafter, FD) (Turin: Einaudi, 1984), 5 (The Future of Democracy. A Defense of the Rules of the Game [Oxford: Polity Press, 1987] [hereafter, FD], 24).

9. "The people" must not be understood as a synonym for a collective body that "decides" as a whole, for those who participate in the maling of collective decisions are, in every case, particular individuals, each one of whom in voting, counts for one.

10. In this way, in opposition to Sartori who states that there is nothing but a "very slight resemblance" between ancient and modern democracy, Bobbio views a continuity between them. Considering that an oudine of modern democracy can be read from Pericle's Epitaph, individual liberty (the liberty of the modern according to Constant), participation and the disapproval of what is often recognized in our days as "political apathy," and the supremacy of the Law (the rule of law), see N. Bobbio, "La democrazia realistica di Giovanni Sartori" (Giovanni Sartori's Realistic Democracy), Teoria Politica 4, no. 1 (1988): 155; G. Sartori, Theory of Democracy Revisited (New York: Chatam House, 1987).

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11. There is not one or the minimum definition of democracy: it is revised and enriched, and so expressed in various formulas throughout Bobbio's work.

12. Cf. R. Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956); Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1971); G. Sartori, Theory of Democracy Revisited. The idea that the difference between the main contemporary theories of democracy lies in a difference of traditions and perspectives empha- sizing one of the aspects of democracy, that may not involve problems of compatibility between them, can be found in M. Bovero, "Democrazia Ottantanove" (Democracy eighty nine), Estudos Avangados 4, no. 10 (Universidade de Sao Paulo, 1990).

13. M. Bovero, "Democrazia Ottantanove," 43. 14. Dahl, Sartori, and Bobbio have built up their theories upon the common ground of

Schumpeter's definition of democracy that assumes democracy as a competition between political groups whose aim is to obtain popular support through elections, and to face such competition under a certain set of rules. See J. A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (London: Allen and Unwin, 1976).

15. N. Bobbio, "La democrazia realistica di Giovanni Sartori," 153. 16. FD, 55 (63). 17. Ibid., 45 (55). 18. N. Bobbio, Fundamento yfuturo de la democracia. La visita de Bobbio a Valparaiso

(Foundation and future of democracy. Norberto Bobbio's visit to Valparaiso) (Valparaiso: Edeval, 1986), 35.

19. FD, 33 (46). 20. This does not mean that the principle of the majority is exclusive to the democracies nor

that it alone defines a democratic regime. Majority rule is not exempted from limitations and defects, and Bobbio devotes extensive studies to the complicated problem of majority rule. See N. Bobbio, "La regola di maggioranza: limite e aporie," in Democrazia, maggioranza e minoranze ("The majority rule: Limits and problems" in Democracy, Majority and Minority), ed. N. Bobbio, C. Offe, and S. Lombardini (Bologna: II Mulino, 1981).

21. Bobbio discusses socialist criticisms of "representation," representative democracy (in particular, the veto on binding mandates and the representation of particular interests), and direct democracy (in particular, the inadequacy of the only two institutions of direct democracy, the assembly of citizens deliberating without intermediaries, and the referendum). See N. Bobbio, Stato, governo, societa Per una teoria generale della politica, 144-7 (Democracy and Dicta- torship. The Nature and Limits of State Power, 152-4); "Democrazia rappresentativa e de- mocrazia diretta," in FD, 29-54 ("Representative and Direct Democracy," in FD, 43-62).

22. N. Bobbio, Fundamento yffuturo de la democracia. La visita de Bobbio a Valparaiso, 40.

23. At the beginning of the section entitled "The Appeal to Values," Bobbio takes into consideration the fear, expressed by many, that a mere set of procedures is not enough to arouse an active consensus toward democratic institutions, because "to have active citizens," ideals are also necessary: "Of course ideals are necessary. But how can anyone ignore the great struggles over ideals which have produced these rules?" (FD, 41).

24. N. Bobbio, "Liberth" (Liberty) Enciclopedia del Novecento, vol. III (Rome: Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana, 1979), 998.

25. The term liberal in English tends to be used in the sense of "liberal-democratic" and/or "progressive," and even with a hint of "social-democratic" in current use. For instance, the Rooseveltian policy oriented toward welfare principles was, in general, considered liberal. We find this ambiguity in much of American so-called liberal philosophy: thus Walzer's notion of

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liberalism, for example, tends to coincide with that of social democracy. See M. Bovero, "Liberalismo, socialismo, democrazia. Definizioni minime e relazioni possibli" (Liberalism, socialsim, democracy, minimum definitions and possible relations), in I dikmnu del liberalso- cialismo (The dilemmas of liberalsocialism), ed. M. Bovero, V. Mura, F. Sbarberi (Rome: La Nuova Italia Scientifica, 1994).

26. "Introduzione. Tradizione ed eredith del liberalsocialismo," in I diknem del libersocial- ismo, ed. Bovero, Mura, Sbarberi. "Justice and Liberty" was the slogan of the noncommunist and antifascist movement Giustizia e Liberta, inspired in the ideas of Carlo Rosselli, creator of the "liberal socialism" doctrine that defends an anti-Marxist socialism for its liberal character. Cf. N. Bobbio, "Introducci6n," in Socialismo liberal, ed. C. Rosselli (Madrid: Pablo Iglesias, 1991).

27. N. Bobbio, Liberalismo e democrazia (hereafter LD) (Milan: Franco Angeli, 1985), 16. 28. I. Berlin, "TWo Concepts of Liberty," in Four Essays On Liberty (Oxford: Oxford

University Press, 1969). In his essay "Liberth," Bobbio deals with this distinction, modifies it, and in part criticizes it.

29. Cf. LD, 25. 30. Ibid., 7. 31. Cf. ibid., 23. 32. It is necessary to distinguish between the right to property, understood as "personal"

property, or the right of individuals against the power of the state, and the development of free enterprise. Only then can one discuss whether or not the protection of the fundamental rights of liberty necessarily implies the freedom of the market, or whether, on the contrary, it is possible to distinguish two liberalisms, economic liberalism and political liberalism. A preoccupation in Bobbio's writings is whether a free market is necessary in order to protect individual liberties and develop positive liberty.

33. N. Bobbio, "LibertA," 996. 34. Cf. ibid., 998. 35. LD, 48. 36. N. Bobbio, "LibertA," 998. 37. N. Bobbio, Fundamento yfuturo de la democracia. La visita de Bobbio a Valparaiso,

45. 38. Without going into the difficult problem of trying to define socialism, about which there

seems to be less agreement each day, it is necessary to state at least that the principle of equality defended by socialism has nothing to do with the homogenization of society: politically an equality in everything has never been expounded, but rather the elimination of certain forms of oppression which are based upon a certain type of basically economic inequality.

39. For example, N. Bobbio, "Eguaglianza" (Equality), Enciclopedia del Novecento, vol. 11 (Rome: Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana, 1977) andLe ideologie e ilpotere in crisi. Pluralismo, democrazia, socialismo, comunismo. Terza via e terzaforza (The crisis of ideologies and power. Pluralism, democracy, socialism, communism. Third way and third force) (Florence: Le Mon- nier, 1981). Despite this vacillation, when Bobbio refers to "social democracy," he points to the preconditions of the well functioning of the democratic method and not to a specific social order.

40. LD, 45. 41. N. Bobbio, Le ideologie e ilpotere in crisi, 31. 42. Ibid., 29. 43. N. Bobbio, "La democrazia realistica di Giovanni Sartori" (Giovanni Sartori's realistic

democracy), 157.

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44. N. Bobbio, "Questioni di Democrazia" (Problems of democracy), in Sisifo 17 (September 1989): 7.

45. Cf. ibid., 7. 46. In his recent text "Introduzione" (Introduction. Liberalsocialism: Tradition and heritage),

in M. Bovero, V. Mura, and F. Sbarberi (ed.) The dilemmas of liberalsocialism, Bobbio shows that this relation between liberalism and socialism has been effected in two different ways: (i) by the integration of socialism to liberalism by understanding socialism as the completion of liberal democracy, (ii) by the revision of socialism by understanding liberalism as the condition sine qua non of a nonauthoritarian socialism (p. 58).

47. Ibid., 59. 48. In his early writings, Bobbio often referred to socialism as an extension of the democratic

method beyond the parliamentary arena. But by the time of The Future of Democracy, this idea is replaced by the concern with the problem of how democracy will survive if its institutions are increasingly undemocratic. The place the socialist tradition plays in Bobbio's theoretical dis- course shifts from the formal subject of the limited space of democracy (pointed out as a problem rather than as a solution) to the substantial issue of the defense of the social rights and welfare institutions.

49. In his recent Democrazia Cosa e (What is democracy) (Milan: Rizzoli, 1993), Sartori puts forward a view of democracy suggesting that from descriptive standpoint democracy should be considered an electivepolyarchy and from the prescriptive one, a selective polyarchy, meaning the latter that in order to be "good," a democracy must proceed as an "elective meritocracy."

50. N. Bobbio and P. Anderson. "Un cartegio" (Correspondence), Teoria Politica 1989, 2&3:293-308 quote found on page 295.

51. N. Bobbio, "L'utopia capovolta" (Utopia upside down) in L'utopia capovolta (Utopia upside down) (Turin: La Stampa, 1990), 130.

52. N. Bobbio, "Adesso a la democrazia e sola" (Democracy is now alone) in Socialismo liberale. n dialogo con Norberto Bobbio oggi (Liberal socialism. Dialoguing with Norbert Bobbio today), ed. G. Bosetti (L'Unith, 1989), 91.

53. FD, 7 (17). These comments of Bobbio's find their place in the context of a particular public discussion related to the real possibilities of democracy's survival.

54. Bobbio refers to Rousseau's ideal on the end of social inequality and Tocqueville's expectation for the spread of the democratic culture throughout the body of society.

55. N. Bobbio and P. Anderson, "Un cartegio," 294. 56. R. Dahl assumes-as Bobbio does-that the notion of democracy plays a double role: it

is a normative ideal as well as a concrete reality. However, while Bobbio draws this ideal from the "lessons of the classics" to face it to the present context, Dahl seems to put forward a description of the processes drawn from the factual observation of the societies that fit his definition of "polyarchy." This may explain how a society's democratic process departs from the "polyarchy" ideal type, but not how it departs from the values and expectations of the ideal model of democracy. By the same token, Sartori views the ideal of democracy as susceptible to modification if it departs from reality, for democracy must be redefined according to the present experience. In these terms, Sartori seems to suggest that the closer the ideal gets to the reality of democracy the better. In fact, the ideal of democracy that Sartori puts forward seems to fit quite well his concept of "selective oligarchy."

57. Ibid., 27-36. 58. FD, 3 (18). 59. Cf. R. A. Dahl, Democracy and Its Critics.

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60. N. Bobbio, "Il potere in maschera" (Masked power), in L'utopia capovolta (utopia upside down), 62.

61. Qual Socialismo?, 168 (Which Socialism?, 118).

Corina Yturbe is a member of the Institute of Philosophical Research in the National Autonomous University of Mexico. She is authorofLaexplicacion de la historia (Mexico: UNAM, 1981, 1985) the editor of Teorfa de la Historia (Mexico: Terra Nova, 1981) and Charles de Montesquieu (Mexico: UNAM, 1987) and co-editor of La tenacidad dela poliftica (Mexico: IIF-UNAM, 1995).


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