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' Epistemology, Learning and Educational Technology Graham Webb, University of Otago, New Zealand

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SUMMARY

It is currently popular to categorize frameworks for the understanding and interpretation of educational concerns into epistemologies associated with positivism, interpretive understanding and critical theory. In this paper, each of these is considered in tum, and some obServatjons are made concerning views of learning and uses of educational technology engendered by each framework. Positivism is criticized for its essentially limited and instrumental view of education, and both positivism and interpretive understandings for their ' neutral stances on the normative a'nd val·ue positions intrinsic in educational endeavours. Critical theory, white having its own epistemological and practical problems, is held to represent interesting possibilities for gauging progressive educatio nal practice and concomitant uses for educational technology.

INTRODUCI10N

Epistemology is the branch of philosophy concerned wtth theories of knowledge. It is often abstract, speculative and theoretical. For educational practitioners (the word 'practice' usually being defined in opposition to ' theory'), there may seem little to be gleaned from such conjectures: little to suggest immediate and practical consequences for everyday practices concerning teaching, learning and the use of educational technology. •

This is unfortunate, as some understanding of epistemology and various frameworks for the interpreta tion of social and educational endeavours is necessary in order that adequate consideration may be given to the utilization of educational technology and prescriptions for classroom practice. In this paper some relationships betw.een frameworks for the interpretation and use of educational technology will bo considered, illustrated in places with examples from the use of computers in higher education. Positivistic and interpretive frameworks will be considered critically, foiJowed by a brief discussion of critical theory and the promise it holds in making judgements concerning

the essentially value laden questions of educational practice, and the place of technology within such practice.

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FRAMEWORKS FOR UNDERSTANDING

The insights gained from the realms of philosophy concerned with epistemology have latterly become more widely appreciated in educatidnal practice "'(e.g. Carr and Kemmis, 1986; Gibson, 1986; Cherryholmes, 1988). These have developed from a body of research in the philosophy of science and sociology of knowledge, wttich has reinterpreted the bases of social theory and the nature of explanation and understanding in science (e.g. Kuhn, 1970; Feyerabend, 1975 and 1978; Bernstein, 1976). lt is currently popular to construct three major frameworks for such explanations and understandings under fhe headings of positivism, interpretive understandings and critical theory.

POSITIVISM

Positivism (positive philosophy, logical positivism,

logical empiricism) developed in an attempt to free investigation and explanation from entrenched dogmas and transcendental justifications, by limiti g enquiry to empirical investigation and thus excluding non-sensory knowle~ge claims. Non-sensory or 'intangible' infonnation such as beliefs, values or intentions, were strictly (if disparagingly), 'nonsense'. Only 'objectiv,s:' empirical data which could be observed or deteded by the senses were thus allowed in order to ensure that evidence was 'positive', meaning 'scientific' or 'certain'. Theological, philosophical and ideological systems which could ' not be 'proved' or 'verified' by recourse to observable empirical da~ were thus identified as 'metaphysical'; they confused fact with value and description with dictum. ·

The influence of positivism on the research and interpretation of the uses I of educational technology in higher education has been overwhelming. In tenns of Kuhn's ( 1970) concept of paradigms guiding and defining the boundaries of nonnal or routine investigation, positi\'ism has provided the paradigm for consideraiions of educational technology in education.

Justification for the usc of educational tecnoology has been based on empirical studies, norma!ly of an experimental or correlative type. Thus, literally hundreds of studies have reported the results of experiments where brand X method (utiliz.ing the 'new', 'innovative' , ' revolutionary' piece of educational technology) is compared with brand Y, using a ' traditional' , 'no technology' or 'other technology' method. Such studies have often been of first year college students, and mean differences of performance on 'objective' tests emphasizing factual recall, have constituted the bulk of the evidence. With the introduction of meta-analysis, many studies could be bundled together · and analysed for overall effect. Thus, for example, it is reported that Personalized Instruction is more eff~ctive than lecturing (conventiopal teaching) (Kulik et al., 1979) and so too is corrputer-based teaching (Kulik et al. , 1980).

There is much to a ttract practically minded teachers to 'objective • prescriptions for the 'efficient ' achievement of learning, soundly based upon empirical , scientific investigation. And for tho~e teachers troubled by the notion of learning as a singular phenomenon, or who may claim that not all of thei r students learn in the same way,

more scientific research into 'learning theory' and 'cognitive style' purports to provide answers necessary for effecting a match between educational technology, student and task. Thus, . famous classifications of learning were constructed by Bloom et al. {1956) and by Gagne {1970), both daiming to describe types of learning ranging from the simple to the complex. ln terms of variation among students, Witkin (e~g. 1975) and Pask Rnd Scott {1972), although starting from different points and using differing methods, both reached broadly similar conclusions concerning cognitive style. Students could therefore be ranged along a psychological continuum from the 'analytical', ' field independent' or 'scrialist.ic' to the 'global'. 'field dependent' or 'holistic'. Field independent students would tend to be .active participants in learning, intrinsically motivated, analytical, irndividually orientated, and typically males in science subjects. Field dependence, on the other ha nd, indicated passive learners, motivated by social rewards and punishments, orientated towards synthesis, social interaction, and typical of females in arts subjects {Goodenough, 1976)~ Educational technology could thus be chosen to fi~ the· 'cognitive' or ' learning' style of the student~ latterly from within the educational technology itself. Thus ' intelligent tutoring systems' {ITS) or 'intelligent computer-assisted learning' ( ICAL) programmes charted diffe ring pathways through computer-based materials and tasks according to a diagnosis of the student's learning style.

At the epistemological level there arc many difficulties with positivism. Indeed, the principle of verification by empirical observation appears to be neither verifiable by obscrvat.ion itself, nor is it an allowable statement of funnal logic (Morris, 1966, pp. 87- 88). Proscribing others from adopting metaphysical arguments because of its own metaphysical position, certainly appears to p lace positivism in ;yt awkward position. And th9 very nature of a or the scientific method appears to be no more' than rationalization after the fact. The way that science actually proceeds, seems to have little in common with the structured diagrams of deductive or inductive method, so popular of tbe educational research methods text. Instead, the social and political nature of the scientific process has come to the fore, followed quite naturally by questions of power in the process of the adjudication of ideas, and of interests served. This

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has led some to ground scientific epistemology within a general democratic and emancipatory tradition of enquiry (e.g. Carr and Kemmis, p. 121), while others have argued philosophical anarchism to be the most suitable basis for method in science (Feyerabend, 1975 and 1978).

A predominance of instrumental values sees education reduced to the empirical investigation of the most ,'effective' means to gain a series of predetermined ends. With educational research providing answers to the effective matching of means and ends, education becomes a technical concern, and 'the importance of educational technology in this' process is inflated. Where recalcitrant problems remain , the progressive view of science readily transfers into the field of educational technology in exhortations to take up the1atest technology. as the answer to all problems. Thus teaching machines, educational radio and television, CAL, ICAL, multi- and hypermedia have all been touted as technological solptions to the pressing educational problems of the day.

There are of co.urse many problems with an instrumental view of education. based on a positivistic epistemology. Perhaps the most serious aspect of this concerns a failure to realize the intrinsically value ladened nature of the relationship between means and ends in education. Our understandings of the 'hidden curriculum' and of the 'medium as message' ought to suggest fhat educational ends should be anticipated in educational means. Thus, educational ends of improved problem solving, c~itical thinking, skills in analysis, synthesis, evaluation and so on, a ll intrinsically suggest means for attaining these ends. An electronic page ~urning CAL tutorial followed by a multiple choice test calling for rote memoril!lltion, for example, would seem by the very nature of the ends, to be inappropriate as means. •

This is not to blame the technology itself for its use in poor educational practice, but instead to blame a view of education which allows or encourages such unintelligent activities to persist. Indeed, intelligent and critical educational activities may be constructed from the most trivial offerings of <;ducational technology. For example, researching the ambiguities and constructing alternatives to the ' right' answers given in a computer-based multiple choice test , or critically appraising the assumptions and value positions behind a

supposedly objective piece of 'courseware'. may utilize unremarkable materials in quite educationally stimulating ways. At the heart of these alternative uses of the technology are value positions concerning education itself and the development of human beings as opposed to the instrumental accrual of knowledge. However, by and lar~ the uses of educational technology have mostly been defined within the limits prescribed by an instrumental view of education.

INTERPRETIVE UNDERSTANDINGS

The second major framework for the exegesis of educational undertakings has been from the perspective of interpretive understanding. At the base of this tradition is the definition of a difference between explanation in causal terms (perceived as the model for the physical sciences) as opposed to interpretation by understanding (empathy or verstehen), as an appropriate model for the _ humanities. In the eighteenth century Giambattista Vico argued that the social world was in principle more intelligible than the natural world since it was of human creation, and this humanistic epistemology was later developed by Dilthey, Husser! and otbers (see Nicholson, 1984). Hermeneutics, the method for achieving such understanding originated in the' Protestant quest for a direct extraction of individual meanings from the Bible, but was later applied to the interpretation of texts in law, history. literature and later to any form of human interaction.

-According to the interpretive ·view of the world, the single, unproblematic 'reality' of the positivist· is replac(!ti by multiple, mind constructed realities, and these 'subjective' constructions · form the principal concern· for . re~earch. · Qualitative methods of collecting information are emphasized and, thc research attempts to be ·naturalistic' and 'low impact'. Thus, students and practices are studied in natural rather than experimental settings, and an attempt is made to ·get closr.' to the people and situations involved in order to gain direct experience of .'what it feels !.ike'. The humanistic emphasis is seen in the importance attached to the uniqueness of individual experience.

During the 1970s and 1980s, interpretive research into higher education in the UK and Sweden

particularly, focused on processes of student learning as discerned from interviews with students and textual examinations of their work. From these, and contrary to the idiographic (individual) emphasiJ indicated above, researchers constructed a general framework for the interpretation of their results, based upon the concept of 'deep' and 'surface' learning (see, for example, Marton e t al., 1984). Students showing a 'surface' approach tended to concentrate on the material t to be learned itself and thus upon memorizing material 'as it is'. The 'deep' approach, on the other hand. was typified by students looking beneath the material to an' underlying meaning, and a reworking of the material so as to give indi~idual meaning was thus typical.

It will be noted that there is some overlap between the cognitive psychology constructs of field dependent, field independent an'd serialist/holist , and notions of 'deep' and 'surface' learning. A major difference emerged, however, in the emphasis given latterly in interpretive research to the importance of ·context'. Thus. recent ~esearch using the deep/surface metaphor has stressed that approaches arc largely determined by the learning environment , the curriculum and in particular the assessment regime. Conversely, cognitive psychology, tended to assume an ' innateness' in the learning competencies brought by individuals to a learning task.

One of the main benefits from individually based descriptive studies was a focus on the complexity and variation in learning processes and act ions employed by students. Positivistic attempts to objectify both students and learning, to discover 'laws of learning'. were shown to be hopelessly simplistic in the light of this complexity. The implications for educational technology were profound. in that the myth of learning as a unitary pherft>menoo, best delivered in predetermined, hierarchical , sequential and progressive segments, was abrogated, as were reductivist attempts to model purported ' learning styles' in ICAL systems. The k.ey word became ' flexibili ty', with studies pointing out the variety of ways in which students usc educational technology-based systems. For example, in an observational study of students using a relatively inflexible interactive video tape system, Laurillard reported as follows .

Some began by looking at what they already knew. others by looking at what they had no idea of. Some worked through system1tically. others left an exercise to look at another section. and then returned to the first exercise: ... it was clear that the imposition or a program designer's 'optimal' route would have seriously C:Qnstrained the students' own optimal routes. (Laurillard, 1985)

Undeniably, insights may be gained from studies which observe students in learning activities. and from studies of students reporting and describing how they go about learning. Observation is not unproblematic, however, as clearly not all possible observations are recorded, and those that arc will inevitably be selected in accordance with preordained concepts and theories. Similarly, the neutrality of the researcher in simply 'collecting' or ' reflecting' the subjective understandings of the indivic,luals under study, is a lso questionable. This is especially so where previous work has raised a metaphor (such ns the deep/surface distinction for student learning in higher education). to the status of orthodoxy. It is thus hard to accept the interpretive researchers' stance that their owrt theories, values and preconceptions concerning a research endeavour may be 'bracketed'; that the researchers are simply the .media through which the authentic voice of the individuals under scrutiny is broadcast. The introduced notion of 'context' as a kind of dissipated replacement for social structural factors, also poses problems. Is context to be evaluated and interpreted by the students themselves, in tine with qualitative methodology, or by 'objectiv~ or 'external' means such as by the researcher? In either case, upon what are the claims for validity to be based?

Interpretive researchers often claim to be subjective rather than objective in orientation, but by this they generally mean that the understanding of people's motives, intentions :~ncl purposes (subjective meanings) is of importance for their research. It is certainly true that actions can only be interpreted by understanding the meanings conferred upon them by actors, and this accounts for the inherent weakness of purely behavioural explanation. However, to afford the researcher a neutral position in the description and inter­pretation of ac tions is equally weak. In the final analysis, the qualitative and hermeneutic methods employed by interpretive researchers assume an

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objectivity or observational detachment similar to that of the ~sitivist.

Recently, attempts have been made to counter this problem, and Olsen {1986), for example: has suggested that both positivism and hermeneutics may be relativized and reformed in similar ways. Thus, just as it is now accepted in science that observations are relati"e to theory, so too must we realize that 'texts' and discourses of all kinds do not have a single meaning: the meaning is constructed by the reader and is relative to a framework ofl interpretation (post-structuralism and the deconstruction movement have been influential in this regard) . A framework of objectivity and value neutrality is clearly inappropriate for the educational and thus by definition, value-laden questions ofhow we should teach , and how we should use educational technology. As was apparent ea.rlier, value deci.sions concerning the kinds of human beings educators envisage their students becoming, actually foreshadow the kind of educational experiences which are seen as valid, and the uses made of educational technology. lntewretive research into education and the use of educational technology has little to say in this regard, and thus by default tends to an essentially conservative orientation; a concern with what is, rather than what might be.

CRITICAL THEORY

A central concern of critical theory is the development of people in accordance with rational, democratic and emancipatory values. In this respect, cri tical theory is intrinsically radical an·d forward looking; it is concerned with changing people's understandings of their situations and in using these new understandings in order to gain power over their own lives and tin: structures and processes which oppress them~

Critical theory developed out of structuralisr explanations of social relations, which stress the effect of the predominant structures of society in forming and determining the actions of individuals. Marxism, laying stress on the importance of the economic structure of society in determining social roles, has been the major force in structuralist explanation. The main criticism of this kind of argument concerns the lack of importance it places

on human agency. Thus, huma!,l beings not only inherit roles and functions but also act to change and reform structures. While ackt~owledging the importance of s~ctures in conditioning and constraining human actioq, critical theory expresses optimism in the ability of people, through their collective actions, to change their social conditions by removing obstacles to their freedom.

It should be said at the outset that critical theory has thus lar exerted little influence upon the field of higher education. There arc signs of development in this area, however, as calls for and examples of critical action research enter the literature. Moreover the appeal of critical theory for those involved in higher education is easy to comprehend, encompassing as it does ideals of emancipation, autonomy and participation. Such notions have long been popular with many of those concerned in the endeavour of higher education, the problem has been in justifying the inclusion of such ideals within the curriculum. It is here that critical theory may provide a rationale.

Whereas pos1t1V1Sm saw the educational practitioner as an instrument for the technical applica~on of educational theory, critical theory has regenerated the Aristotelian idea of praxis, of theory and practice growing and developing in unison. Praxis is thus practice subjected to critical scrutiny, a scrutiny of empowerment for those engaged in the process and one which is based upon social and educational values. The practitioner engage9 in praxis ~earns from the outcome of practical actions taken. and through critical reflection adapts his or her educational theories accordingly. Praxis is thus learning and adapting one's educational theories and practices in the light of critical reflection on actions taken to serve educational and social purposes.

It is in the articulation of these purposes that critical theory seeks to distinguish and clarify differing intentions or interests. Thus: Habermas defines the three basic interests of knowledge as tech~ical, practical and emancipatory. Technical knowledge is gained for technical control over natural objects, and is the domain of positivist epistemology and the empirical methodology of natural science. Practical knowledge is for insight to the social world and the ways in whicth individuals construct their understandings; it is the province of interpretive epistemology and

qualitative and hermeneutic methods. The third interest is described as emancipatory, and the province of c{itical theory.

... critical ~ial science focuses its attention on forms of social life which subjugate people ... on the ways of thinking which support such subjugation . .. in the dominance of a way of thinking which makes such oppression unproblematic, inevitable, incidental, or even justified (Carr and Kemmis, 1986, p. 138).

Critical explanation or critical theory is clearly driven by normative values concerning what should happen in the world and how people ought to act. According to Habcnnas, there is a basic human int~rest in autonomy and freedom, which can only be realized. through a commitment to rational and open discourse. His justification for this is the theory of 'communicative competence' and the concept of the 'ideal speech act': a situation hypothesized as necessary for rational, critical discourse to proceed and which anticipates or overshadows all 'non-ideal' speech situations. The conditions for rational discourse turn out to be democratic in nature, with no/ person having power over another, with all free to participate and with the power of the argument alone holding

. sway in the development of consensus. Thus, acts of communication essentially mirror the enterprise of critical theory and the favoured conception of social life itself. Emancipation comes through rational discourse and re{onn ; the message is the medium and the medium is the message.

PRAXIS AND EDUCATIONAL TECHNOLOGY In seeking to become critical in classroom practices, the idea that subject matter (content, message) can be separated from teaching method (process, medium) must be abandoned. Being critical means participating in a group process with defined value positions. This in itself pr~clude,s a range of teaching methods whil_e at the same time foreshadowing others. Thus, it is no longer feasible to think of the lecturer considering and finally choosing the most 'efficient' teaching method to 'get over' the subject matter, from a. value neutral position. 'Getting over', meaning 'instilling' and ' learning' meaning 'memorizing', are obviously anathema to a critical pel'.ipective.

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Adopting a critical stance thus calls into question tht whole nature of teaching and learning.

The're- are guiping principles rrom which to proceed, however. The discourse is to be rational and subject to critical analysis. It is also to be held in the open forum of the class, where a basic commitment to egalitarian principles holds sway. Not only will all have the right to participate equally, but participation will be actively encouraged. Arising from the rational discourse of equally empowered class members will be a commitment to work towards consensus and democratic decision making. The decisions taken will be emancipatory in nature, they will free class members from external controls and hefp them to take responsibility for their own destinies. In so

, doing, the class process will mirror values which may be translated into a wider social process; by acting in the classroom, class members are already acting 'in society', and it is important that the relationship between classroom and society is understood . This is the 'ideal classroom' equivalent to Habermas' 'ideal speech situation', and as such it may be used in measuring progressive or retrogressive movement instituted by each change in classroom process .

The implications for the use of educational technology are fairly obvious. 'Good' uses of • educational technology happen when those using the technology acknowledge that it helps to liberate or emancipate them in some way, whereas 'bad' uses of technology add to people's subjugation or oppression. Arguments concerning 'goodness' or 'badness' emanate from the open, e~alitarian, democratic, rational and critical model of classroom practice indicated above. In fact, this is not a particularly revolutionary view as many writers have take.Y similar ~tances concerning the limitations of educational technology, and the overriding importance of making hard educational decisions (based on philosophical and social positions), from which uses of technology quite logically follow. Thus, for example, one could agree with Lawless ( 1980) that we have 'new chips but old problems', with Bigum (1985, p. 477) that 't he more you think about educational computing, the fllOre you find yourself thinking about education rather than computing', and with Simpson (1983), that in seeking technological solutions to educational problems we are 'heading for the ha-ha'.

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Two practic,a1 examples of using computers within this kind of framework may be appropriate. Firstly, a case study of using computers integrated into a program for developing a reflective attitude towar.ds writing skills is outlined in Webb (1990). Liberating and emancipating aspects of this project included students recognizing and overcoming irrational apprehensions concerning the use of computers, developing reflective criticisms of their own writings and those of their peers, and req!iving critical feedback from ·their peers and tutor prior to any grading exercise. It should be noted that no empirically derived prescriptions for either 'good writing' or for 'correct' use of the computer technology were given, as would often be the case in positivist­based projects. However, open and critical discussion was employed to suggest that progress could be made beyond the interpretive position of simple idiographic description.

A second examp!e concerns the building of computer-based simulations using generic system building software (Wharton and Webb1 1989; Webb and Wharton , forthcoming). While it has become a part of CAL folklore that simulation exercises are 'educationally sound' forms of activity, allowing students to ask 'what if questions, it may be argued that ready-made simulations are frequently used by students with little knowledge of the design, assumptions and limitations of the models. If students do not develop the simulation or model themselves, but simply change the values of preprogrammed variables, then an impression ma"y be gained of a neatly functioning world, a world bereft of the difficult decisions and compromises implicit in constructing explanations of it. The richest part of the learning experience is the design and CQnstruction of the model itself and yet this is the very part which students usio.g prebuilt models bypass. Where the teacher is the model builder, this is one more example of the teacher deriving• most learning benefit from the activities he or she originates.

Educational technology in this exercise was again used by students in giving themselves a greater control over the educational activities in which they were engaged. By working co-operatively in an environment open to suggestions and critical scrutiny ,. the process of learning reflects aspects of the essential values inherent in a critical approach

' to educational activities. h is also worth noting that in this exercise and in the writin'g development project, a great• deal of enthusiasm was engendered in the participants. This is not a remarkable finding in itself, as teachers in higher and adult education have long believed that co­operative, problem-solving exercises containing large degrees of autonomy and freedom for the learner, Sfnerally provoke interest, enthusiasm and motivation. What is perhaps more remarkable is that such activities form so small a part of many first and second year undergraduate programmes, and of educational technology usages within programmes.

CONCLUSIONS

It would be misleading to suggest that critical theory provides answers to all questions of classroom practice and the use of educational technology. In fact, critical theory raises as many problems as it gives illumination to oth~rs. For example, at the epistemological level, how compellipg arc Habcrmas' three varieties of interest? There are many other interests which could be argued with logic and conviction; the three discussed earl.ier are claimed a priori and it seems we simply have to accept them . Further, despite the fact that Habermas sought vindication of the values he espouses by the theory of communicative competence, it ~ far from clear that this theory defines a universal and necessary condition: that such values, even though they be 'good' values, are not inherently valid but represent individual preference. While some may eschew any absolute claim to 'truth' and argue a relativistic case for these simply as 'good' value~. others might regard abandonment of the absolutist justification as a weakening of the message.

• At the more practical level , how can teachers ever fully assume the role of 'citizen' as opposed to that of 'master' in their own classes? Haberm.as (1974) tells us that in the process of emancipation there

. are only participants , yet while we might find many and varied ways to de-emphasize the authority role of being 'lecturer' or 'teacher' , there must still remain a difference between this role in compari­son with the roles of the other participants. And what of those who do not wish to play the same game? The problem is expressed as follows:

There is no simple position to take on all this, either philosophically or practically. I keep being trapped into wanting student.s to have autonomy but to adopt the values I believe in. Even. for instance, an a ttempt to generate autonomy in people who do not want it illustrates one of many paradoxes in the education game. (Potts, 1988. p. 149.)

Despite these and other problems, it is the author's belief that much may still be gained from casting procedural problems concerning classroom practice and the place of educational technoiO&)', within the framework afforded by critical theory.

REFERENCES Bernstein. R.J . ( 1976) The.Restrucwring of Social and Political Theory. Methuen & Co Ltd , London.

Bigum. C. {1985) Educational computing in teacher education at Deakin. In Bowden J . A . and Lichtenstein , S. {eds.) Studl nt Control of Learning: Computers in Tertiary Education. Centre for the Study of Higher Education,

· University of Melbourne.

Bloom. B.S .• Englehart , M.B., Frost, E.J. , Hill , W.H . and Krathwohl, D .R. {1956) Taxonomy of Educational Objectives. The Classification of Educational Goals. Handbook I - Cognitive Domain. Longmans, New York.

Carr. W. and Kemmis, S. {1986) Becoming Critical. EducatiQn, Knowledge and Action Research. Falmer Press, London and Philadelphia.

Cherryholmes. C. H . ( 1988) Power and Criticism. Poststructural Investigations in Education. Teachers College Press, New York.

Feyerabend . P.K. {1975) Against Method: Outlines of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge. New Left Books, London.

Feyesabcnd, P .K. {1978) Science in a Free Society. New Left Books, London.

Gagne, R. M. ( 1970) The Conditions of Learning, 2nd edition . Holt , Rinehart and Winston, New York .

Gibson. R. . ( 1986) Critical Theory and Education. Hodder and Stoughton , London.

Goodenough. D .R. {1976) The role of individual

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Epis1~mology, Lurnlna and Educational T«hnology 127

differences in field dependence as a factor in learning-and memory. Psychological Bulletin, 83, 4, 675-694.

Haberrnas, J . {1974) Theory and Practice (translated by J. Viertel). MacMillan. London.

Kuhn, T .S. ( 1970) The Strucwre of Sciemific Revolutions, 2nd Edition. University of Chicago Press, Chicago.

Kulik, J.A ., Kulik , C.C. and Cohen , P.A . (1979) A meta-analysis of outcome studies of Keller's Personalized System of Instruction . American Psychologist. 34, 4, 307- 318.

Kulik , J.A .• Kulik. C.C. and Cohen, P.A . ( 1980) Effectiveness of computer-based college teaching:

"" a meta-analysis of findings. Review of Educational Research, 50, 4. 525- 544.

Laurillard, D . (1985) Computers and the emancipation of students: giving control to the learner. In Bowden J .A . and Lichtenstein . S. {eds.) Student Contrvl of Lcaming: Computers In Tertiary Education. Centre for the Study of Higher Education, University of Melbourne.

Lawless, C . {1980) New chips but old problems . .. In Winterburn. R. and Evans, L. (eds.) Educational Technology to the Year 2000. Kogan Page, London.

Marto n , F., Hounsell . D . and Entwistle, N. (cds.) (1984) The Experience of Learning. Sconish Academic Press, Edinburgh.

Morris, V.C. (1966) Existentialism in Education. Harper & Row. London.

Nicholson, G. {1984) Seeing and Reading. Humanities Press, Atlantic.; Highlandst New Jersey.

Olsen, D .R. ( 1986) Mining the human sciences: some re lations between hermeneutics and epis temology. Interchange, 11, 2, 159- 171.

Pask, G. and Scoll , B.C.E. ( 1972) Learning strategies and individual competence. lntemational Journal of Man-Machine Swdies, 4, 217-239,242-253.

Pons, D. (1988) One-to-one leurning. ln Boud , D . (ed .) Developing Studelll Alllonomy in Lear!ring (2nd edition), 132- 149. Kogan Page, London.

Simpson , B. ( 1983) Heading for the ha-ha. British Joumal of Educational Technology, 14, I , 19- 26.

Webb, G. {1990) Developing writing with peer

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discussions and microcomputers. Educational and Training Tec;hnology International, 27, 2, 236-242.

Webb, G. and Wharton, D.A. (forthcoming) Student learning and computer based model buildipg: from theory to practice. Educational and Training Technology International. Kogan Page, London.

Wharton, D .A . . and Webb, G . (1989) An approach to the teaching of host/parasite population modelling. International Journal for Parasitology, 19, 4, 451 -455.

Witkin , H.A. {1975) Some implications of research on cognitive style for problems of education. In Whitehead, J .M. (cd.) Personality

and Learning I . Hodder and Stoughton in association with the Open University Press, UK.

BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES ,

Graham Webb lectured in geography at Ulster Polytechnic and in education at the University of the West Indies in Jamaica. He is now Head of the Research and Advisory Section of the Higher Educatio~evelopment Centre at the University of Otago in New Zealand.

Address for correspondence: Higher Education Development Centre, University of Otago, PO Box 56, Dunedin, New Zealand.

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