38

Justyna Gotkowska

Norway aNd the BearNorweGiaN defeNce policy– lessoNs for the Baltic sea reGioN

NUMBER 38WARSAWJANUARY 2014

Norway aNd the BearNoRWEgiAN dEfENcE policY – lESSoNS foR thE BAltic SEA REgioN

Justyna gotkowska

© copyright by ośrodek Studiów Wschodnichim. Marka Karpia / centre for Eastern Studies

content editorolaf osica

EditorKatarzyna Kazimierska

co-operationAnna Łabuszewska

translationMaciej Kędzierski

co-operationJim todd

graphic design pARA-BUch

dtp groupMedia

photograph on cover: Shutterstock

Map and graphsWojciech Mańkowski

pUBliShERośrodek Studiów wschodnich im. Marka Karpia centre for Eastern Studies

ul. Koszykowa 6a, Warsaw, polandphone + 48 /22/ 525 80 00fax: + 48 /22/ 525 80 40osw.waw.pl

iSBN 978-83-62936-38-0

Contents

KEY poiNtS /5

iNtRodUctioN /8

I. NoRWAY’S dEfENcE policY ANd thE high NoRth /9

1. Norway’s national interests /102. Legal issues /133. Challenges and threats /15

II. NoRWAY’S dEfENcE policY: coopERAtioN ANd dEtERRENcE /20

1. Cooperation with Russia /212. Strengthening NATO’s collective defence /253. Building up Norway’s own defence capabilities /304. Cooperation across Northern Europe /35

III. NoRWAY ANd thE BAltic SEA REgioN /39

Appendix 1. Norwegian Maritime Boundaries /43Appendix 2. Norway’s participation in international operations /44Appendix 3. Military Expenditure /46Appendix 4. Norwegian Armed Forces: Personnel strength and categories /47Appendix 5. Norwegian Armed Forces: Domestic Activity /49

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Key points

• AfteraperiodofreducedsignificancefollowingtheendoftheColdWar,theNorwegianHighNorth–whichconsistsofthe(mainly)maritimeareasintheArcticlocatedwithintheNor-wegianbordersorfallingunderNorwegianjurisdiction–hasrecentlyonceagainbecomea strategically important regionforOslo.Itisregardedasthethirdmostenergy-richpartofthecountry,andplaysasignificantroleinbothfishingandmari-timetransportviatheemergingNorthernSeaRoute.

• Dueto the importanceof theNorwegianHighNorthfor theNorway’seconomicdevelopmentanditsgeopoliticalstandingin theworld,Oslo’s economic and foreignpolicy is basedonensuringtheabilitytobothmaintainaccesstoandutilisetheregion’s natural resources. Consequently, any challenges orthreatstothebroadlydefinedsecurityoftheregionareseenasofparamountimportanceforNorway’sdefencepolicy.

• Sincepartsof theNorwegianHighNorthusedtobe,orstillare,subjecttolegaldisputes–mainlywithRussia–theregionisperceivedasthemostsignificantsourceofchallengesandthreatstoNorway’ssoftandhardsecurity.

• Inordertosuccessfullydealwiththepotentialchallengesandthreats facing theNorwegianHighNorth,Norwayhas beenpursuing a defence policy based on cooperation and deter-rence.CooperationmeansestablishingcontactsandimprovingcollaborationwithRussiaincross-borderrelations,inthepe-troleumsectorandinthemilitarysphere.Thedeterrentmeas-ures include maintaining NATO’s credibility as a collectivedefenceallianceandstrengtheningitspresenceintheregion;increasingmilitarycooperationwiththeUnitedStates;build-ingupNorway’sownmilitarycapabilitiesforpotentialopera-tionsinthenorthofthecountry;anddevelopingpoliticalandmilitary cooperation across Northern Europe. The primary

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objectiveofOslo’sdefencepolicyistominimisethelikelihoodofcrisesandconflictsemergingintheHighNorthwhichcouldprovetoo‘big’forNorwaybuttoo‘small’forNATO.

• ThepolicyofdeterrencecurrentlypursuedbyNorway,how-ever,isqualitativelydifferenttothatadoptedintheColdWarera. Norway’s and NATO’smilitary presence in the Norwe-gianHighNorthisenvisagedasastabilisingfactorprevent-ing anypotential crises. It is thereforevital that it doesnotprovokeareactionfromRussiaanddoesnotunderminethestabilityandsecurityoftheHighNorthbysettingoffanarmsrace.Furthermore,inNorway’spublicdiscourseRussiaisnotexplicitly portrayed as a threat. According to Oslo, overag-gressive rhetoric could jeopardise cooperation between thetwocountries.Nonetheless,thelackofsuchrhetorichasnotstoppedNorwayfromadoptingcoherentandconsistentdeter-rentmeasures.

• Oslo’s focus on security issues in theHighNorthhas intro-ducedareviewof itsmilitaryengagementabroad.However,thishasnotmeantawithdrawalfromoverseasoperations(bytheUN,NATO,the‘coalitionofthewilling’,ortheEU).NorwaycontinuestoseeitsengagementinmilitarymissionsabroadasawaytoconsolidateitsownpositionwithinNATOandinitsrelationswithitsallies.Butitsdecisionstotakepartininter-nationaloperationsareincreasinglycontingentonthefollow-ing factors: theextent towhich theycould impactNorway’sabilitytodefenditsownterritory;whetherornotthemissionshavereceivedaUNSecurityCouncilmandate;andthepoten-tialpoliticalbenefitsofNorwegianmilitaryengagement.

• Norwayhasbeencautiousaboutcooperatingwith thealliesfromtheBalticSearegionwithregardtoNATO’scollectivede-fence.ForOslo,thesecountriesarecompetingagainstNorwayinattractingtheattention,securityguaranteesandmilitarypresenceofbothNATOandthemostimportantallies.Norway

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isalsoconcernedthatanincreaseintensionsintheBalticSearegion betweenNATO and Russia could have a detrimentaleffect onNorwegian-Russian relations. Similarly,Oslo fearsthatNorway’smilitaryorpoliticalinvolvementinNATO’sac-tivitiesnear theRussianborder–whichRussia seesashos-tile–couldhaverepercussionsfortheHighNorth.DespitetheratherdistancedattitudeOslohasadopted,onecannonethe-lessidentifypotentialareasforcooperation.

• Inrecentyears,thebilateraldimensionofrelationsbetweenNorwayandPolandhascreatedgreateropportunitiesforcol-laboration.Themostpromisingofthesehasbeenapragmaticmilitary-technical co-operation thatmay benefit the armedforcesandthedefenceindustriesofbothcountries,butwhichdoes not have a distinctive political character and will notcausecontroversyinNorway’srelationswithRussia.

• Norway’sdefencepolicy,formulatedduringthetwotermsofaleft-winggovernmentledbyPrimeMinisterJensStoltenberg(2005-2013),enjoyscross-partyconsensusinthecountry.Itisthereforeunlikelythatthenewcoalitiongovernmentformedby the Conservatives and the Progress Party (following theparliamentary elections in autumn 2013)will introduce anymajorchangestotheexistingpolicy.However,ifchangesaremade, the new government ismore likely to increasemili-tary spendingand to revise the reformsof theArmedForc-es inorder toboostNorway’s operational capabilities in theHighNorth.Theright-wingcoalitiongovernmentcouldalsostrengthen Norway’s ties with the United States and some-whatincreaseNorway’spresenceinNATO’soperations.

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introduction

Norway is currently the onlyWestern European state and ‘old’NATOmemberthatstronglyreliesonthetraditionaldimensionofNATO'scollectivedefence.ItisalsotheonlyallyinWesternEu-ropewhichperceivesRussiaasathreattoitsmilitarysecurity,intheso-calledHighNorth.

ItisthereforeworthtakingacloserlookathowNorway’sdefencepolicy is being shaped, including the country’s activity withinNATOandacrossNorthernEurope,aswellasitspolicytowardsRussia.Thispaperalsoconsidersthepossibilitiesandlimitationsofpolitical,militaryandtechnicalcooperationwithNorway.FortheBalticSeacountries,Norway’sdefencepolicymaybeaninter-estingcaseforcomparativeanalysis,andasourceofinspirationforthedevelopmentofnationaldefencepolicies.

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i. norway’s defence policy and the high north1

Norway is currentlyoneof theworld’swealthiest countries. Itsprosperity is linked predominantly to the extraction of oil andnatural gas from the Norwegian continental shelf, which firstbegan in the 1970s. The Norwegian petroleum sector gener-atesathirdofstatebudgetrevenueandaccountsformorethanhalfof thecountry’sexports.Equally important for theNorwe-gianeconomyare thefishing industryandmaritime transport.WhetherornotthecurrenteconomicgrowthcanbemaintaineddependslargelyonNorway’sabilitytoretainaccesstothesere-sources,aswellasonmanagingthemsustainably.Inthiscontext,the norwegian high north – which consists of those (mainly) maritime areas in the arctic located within the norwegian borders or falling under norwegian jurisdiction2 – has in recent years once again3 become strategically important for oslo (seeAppendix1).AstheArcticicecovercontinuestoshrink,andnewtechnologiesaredeveloped,theHighNorthisbecoming

1 The ‘High North’ (Norwegian term for the Arctic) is defined as an areawheretheaveragetemperatureofthewarmestmonthsoftheyearremainsbelow10˚C.ItcoverstheareassurroundingtheNorthPoleandtheadjacentseas,togetherwithanumberofislandsandsomepartsofthemainland.

2 TheNorwegianHighNorthcovers:theNorwegianterritorialseaandpartofNorway’snorthernregions(Nordland,TromsandFinnmark);Norway’s200-mile exclusive economic zone in theBarents Sea and theNorth Sea;adisputedpartofthecontinentalshelfbeyondthe200nauticalmilelimitinseveralspecificregionsoftheArctic;theSvalbardarchipelago,andJanMayenisland.

3 TheHighNorthplayedanimportantroleforNorwayandNATOthroughouttheColdWar,duringwhichtimetherewasaneedtomaintainastrategicbalancebetweenthemajorpowers(theUS,theUSSR)intheNorthAtlantic.Inthe1990s,theregionexperiencedstrategicmarginalisationanddemili-tarisation.Securityissuesgraduallygavewaytoenvironmentalconcerns.CallsweremadeforthepreventionofpotentialaccidentsintheoperationofaRussiannuclearpowerplant,thedisposalofradioactivewaste,thestor-ageofnuclearweapons,aswellasthestationingandscrappingofnuclearsubmarinesontheKolaPeninsula.Duetogeographicalproximity,suchac-cidentscouldhavehaddisastrousconsequencesforthenorthernregionsofNorway.

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anincreasinglyattractiveareaforprospectingandextractionofoilandgas,aswellasforfishingandmaritimetransport.Conse-quently,Norway’seconomicandforeignpolicyistoalargeextentdeterminedby the country’s ability tomaintain access to theseresourcesandtocontinuetoexploitthem.any challenges and risks that could in the future threaten the economic develop-ment of norway’s high north are seen as being of paramount importance for norway’s defence policy. Sincepartsofthere-gionusedtobe,orstillare,subjecttolegaldisputes–withMos-cowasOslo’smainadversary–RussiaisseenasamajorsourceofchallengesandthreatstoNorway’sbroadlydefinedsecurityandnationalinterestsintheregion.

1. norway’s national interests

TounderstandtheimportanceoftheHighNorthforNorway,oneneedstoconsidertheregion’ssignificanceforthethreemainsec-tors of the Norwegian economy: energy, fishing and maritimetransport.

the third energy region4.Thepetroleumsector (oilandnatu-ralgas)isNorway’smostimportantbranchofindustry5.In2012,itcreated23%ofGDPandgenerated30%ofstaterevenue.Inad-dition,thesector’soutputaccountedformorethanhalfthetotalvalueofNorwegianexports.Accordingtothecurrentlyavailabledata,thelargestremainingandundiscoveredreservesofNorwe-gianoilandnaturalgasarelocatedintheNorthSea,followedbytheNorwegianSeainsecondplace,andtheBarentsSeainthirdplace.However,productionlevelsinmanyoftheNorthSeafieldshavealreadypeaked.Itisverylikelythatlargedepositsofnatural

4 Source of data: The Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, ‘Facts 2013 – TheNorwegianpetroleumsector’,March2013,pp.19-29,http://npd.no/Global/Engelsk/3-Publications/Facts/Facts2013/FACTS_2013.pdf

5 In2011,Norwaywastheworld’s7th largestoilexporterand14th largestoilproducer.Inthesameyear,Norwaywastheworld’s3rdbiggestnaturalgasexporterand6thbiggestnaturalgasproducer.

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gasandoilwillbediscoveredintheBarentsSeaintheNorwegianHighNorth.Thisareahasnotyetbeenexploredanditisonlynowbeinggraduallyopenedfordevelopment.Untilrecently,explora-tionandextractionwaspermittedonlyinthesouthernsectionsofthesea6.Inthefirsthalfof2013,Norway’sgovernmentagreedtostartexplorationinthesouth-easternregionofthesea–anareapreviouslyaffectedbyaboundarydisputebetweenNorwayandRussia.Thenorthernpart of theBarentsSea remains closed toextractionactivities.Takingintoaccounttheexpectedfuturede-clineinproductioninboththeNorthSeaandtheNorwegianSea,the Barents sea basin is seen by the norwegian petroleum in-dustry as the third most important, and in the long term, as norway’s most promising energy region.

fish stocks7. Since the 1990s, the value ofNorwegian fish andseafoodexports(frombothtraditionalcatchesandfishfarming)rosesteadily,toreacharound€7billionin2010-2011,orabout6%ofNorway’stotalexports.In2010,Norwaywastheworld’ssecondlargestexporteroffishandseafood(basedonthevalueoftheex-ports),sellingabout90%ofitsproduction8.However,90%oftheNorwegiancatchcomesfromstocksoffishalsoharvestedbyoth-ercountries,primarilyRussiaintheBarentsSeaandEUmemberstatesintheNorthSeaandtheNorwegianSea.IntheHighNorth,NorwayandRussiasharethestocksofAtlanticcod,haddockandcapelin.Inthecaseofcod,thecatchesallocatedforexportcomemostly from this stock. In 2011 capelin and codwereNorway’s

6 In thecaseof the so-calledBarentsSeaSouth,onlyonefield is currentlybeing developed (natural gas deposits on Snøhvit). In 2013,work is to belaunchedatanotherfield(oilandnaturalgasdepositsonGoliat),followedbythedevelomentoftheSkrugardandHavisfields(oilandnaturalgas)in5-10years’time.

7 Source:NorwegianMinistryofFisheriesandCoastalAffairs,FactsaboutFisheries andAquaculture 2012, http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/FKD/Brosjyrer%20og%20veiledninger/2012/FKD_Fiskeri_Havbruk_2012_eng_web.pdf

8 In2010,Norwaywastheworld’s10thbiggestfishandseafoodproducer(in-cludingcatchesandfishfarming).

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second and thirdmost harvested fish species respectively.the Barents sea is therefore a vital area for the norwegian fish-eries sector.

new maritime transport route.Climatechangeandtheresult-antmeltingofseaicecoverintheArcticisopeningupnewoppor-tunitiesformaritimetransportintheHighNorth.TheemergingNorthernSeaRoute(alsoknownastheNortheastPassage)wouldshortenthesearoutefromEuropetoAsia(Rotterdam-Shanghai)byabout5000km,cuttingjourneytimefrom30to14dayscom-paredtothetraditionalroutethroughtheSuezCanal.TherouterunsmainlyalongtheRussiancoast,butontheapproachtocon-tinentalEuropeitalsoflanksthecoastofNorway.AlthoughtheNorthernSeaRouteisunlikelytobecomeaseriouscompetitorforthetraditionalrouteinthenexttwodecades,itmaynonethelessprovideaviablealternative,particularlyinthesummermonths.Theuse of thepassage is currentlyvery limited,mainlydue todifficultnavigationconditionsassociatedwithunpredictablefastandfloatingicecover,thetechnicalrequirementsforvesselsop-eratinginsuchconditions,shallowwatersonpartsoftheroute,aswellastheratherslowimprovementinmaritimeandportinfra-structureandinsufficientmaritimesearchandrescuecapabili-ties9.Accordingtoavailableforecasts,thenextfewyearswillseeagradualincreaseinthenumberofcargoships,oiltankersandgascarriersusingtheroute(thelattertwoduetoanexpectedriseinexploitationofresourcesintheArctic),aswellasinthenum-ber of fishing vessels and cruise liners10.norway is therefore

9 HarriMikkola,JuhaKäpylä,‘ArcticEconomicPotential:Theneedforacom-prehensiveandrisk-awareunderstandingofArcticdynamics’,FIIABrief-ingPaper127,April2013,p.6;http://www.fiia.fi/en/publication/337/

10 In2012,46vessels,jointlycarrying1.2milliontonnes,sailedthewholeNorth-ernSeaRoutefromEuropetoAsia. In2011, just34vesselssailedthewholeroute,shipping820,000tonnes,whilein2010,only4shipsmadethejourney,carryingjust111,000tonnesofcargo.SeeTrudePettersen,‘Preparingforre-cordseasonontheNorthernSeaRoute’,BarentsObserver, 6June2013,

http://barentsobserver.com/en/business/2013/06/preparing-record-sea-son-northern-sea-route-06-06

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currently preparing for a gradual rise in the volume of mari-time traffic along its coast.

2. legal issues

Some of the areas in theNorwegianHighNorth used to be, orstillare,subjecttolegaldisputes,inwhichNorwayhasadoptedamarkedlydifferentpositiontothattakenbythirdcountries–es-peciallyRussia.Theseareasarevitalforthefishingindustry,andmaybeimportantforthepetroleumsectorinthefuture.

Until2010,oneofthemainproblemsinNorwegian-Russianrela-tionswasthelack of delimitation of the maritime border be-tween russia and norwayinthesouth-easternBarentsSeaandtheArcticOcean.Thedispute,whichdatesbacktothe1970s,cen-tredondisagreementsoverthedelineationofexclusiveeconomiczones11 andon thedivisionof thecontinental shelfbetween thetwocountries12.Thedisputewasfinallysettledin2010whenthetwogovernmentssignedanagreementonmaritimedelimitationandcooperation,whichtheyratifiedthefollowingyear.Thedoc-umentdividedthedisputedareaintotwoapproximatelyequallysizedparts,andsetoutcooperationproceduresintheexplorationoftheasyetundiscoveredoilandnaturalgasdepositsthatpoten-tiallyextendacrosstheNorwegian-Russianborder.Asaresultoftheagreement,oneofthepossiblesourcesofNorwegian-Russiantension,overtheextractionoffossilfuelsorfishingintheHighNorth,hasthusbeenremoved.

11 Withintheir200-mileexclusiveeconomiczoneastatehassovereignrightstoexplore,exploit,protectandmanagenaturalresources(livingandmineral),and the jurisdictionover theestablishmentand theutilisationofartificialislands, installations and equipment,maritime scientific research and theprotectionof themaritime environment. SeeRemigiuszBierzanek, JanuszSymonides,PrawoMiędzynarodowePubliczne,Warsaw2005,p.226.

12 Accordingtothe1982UnitedNationsConventionontheLawoftheSea(UN-CLOS),exploitationrightsoverthecontinentalshelfmayextendbeyondthestandard200nauticalmileslimit(i.e.beyondtheeconomiczone)ifthecon-tinentalshelfextendsbeyondthatlimit.

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In2006,Norwayfiled a claim to parts of the continental shelfwhichextendbeyond200nauticalmilesoutfromitscoastalbase-linein the high north13.OslosubmittedtherelevantdocumentstotheCommissionontheLimitsoftheContinentalShelf,whichissued its recommendations in 2009. Although the 2006 appli-cationdidnot ruleoutadditional claims in the future, it seemsthat the issueofNorway’saccess to theArcticcontinental shelfbeyond the 200 nauticalmile limit has been largely resolved –at leastwithregardtoNorwegian-Russianrelations–thankstothemaritimedelimitationagreementsignedin2010.However,itshouldbenotedthatotherArcticcountries,namelyRussia,Can-ada,DenmarkandtheUnitedStates,havealsolaidclaimstotheArctic continental shelf beyond the standard 200nauticalmilelimit,andareeitherplanningto,orhavealreadysubmittedthenecessarydocumentstotheCommission.Inaddition,allofthemhavebeentryingtobolstertheirclaims,forexamplebydevelop-ing theirmilitary capabilities and infrastructure in the Arcticregion.Nonetheless, in 2008allfive states adopted the IlulissatDeclarationwhichstates thatanydisputes in theArcticwillberesolvedwithintheexistingframeworkofinternationallaw,andwithoutresortingtounilateralactions.

AsregardstheHighNorthregion,themostproblematicissueforNorway,andforitsrelationswithRussia,isthequestionofthele-gal regime of the maritime areas and of the continental shelf around the svalbard archipelago.SincethesigningoftheSval-bardTreatyin1920,theislandshavebeenunderNorwegiansov-ereigntybutsubjecttocertainrestrictions14.Theongoingdispute

13 Totheso-calledLoopHoleintheBarentsSea,theBananaHoleintheNor-wegianSea,andtotheWesternNansenBasinintheArcticOcean.

14 Allsignatoriestothetreatyhaveequalrightsofaccesstothearchipelago,in-cludingtheextractionofminerals,hunting,fishingandscientificresearch.Forthepurposeofenvironmentprotection,Norwayispermittedtoregulatesuchactivity,butonlybyrequiringallpartiestocomplywithNorwegianenvironmentalpolicies.IthasnorighttoimposetaxesoneconomicactivityonSvalbardbeyondwhatisnecessarytocoverthearchipelago’sadminis-trativecosts.TheTreatyalsoprohibitstheconstructionandmaintenance

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centresaroundtheinterpretationoftheTreatyinrelationtothemaritimeareasandthecontinentalshelfaroundthearchipelago.Norway interprets theTreaty literally, andbelieves that equalrightofaccesstoSvalbard(mainly,theprincipleofnon-discrim-ination in granting access tonatural resources, and the lack oftaxeswith the exceptionof administrative fees) applies only toland territoryand the territorial sea, in linewith internationallawasunderstoodin1920.Oslobelievesthatthemaritimeareasandthecontinentalshelfbeyondthe12-mileterritorialsealimitremain subject toNorway’s jurisdictionand sovereignty rights.On the basis of this interpretation, in 1977Norway establisheda200-milefisheriesprotectionzonearoundSvalbard.However,somesignatoriestotheTreaty,includingRussia15,havefocusedonthedocument’sintendedmeaning,andbelievethatitsprovisionsalsoapplytothe200-milemaritimeareasurroundingthearchi-pelago.Accordingtothis interpretation,Svalbardoughttohavea200-mileeconomiczoneenvisagedinthetoday’sinternationallawofthesea,whichwouldbeavailabletoallTreatysignatoriesonequalterms.ThereforethesesignatoriesdonotrecogniseNor-way’spositiononthisissue,andOslo’sdecisiontoestablishafish-eriesprotectionzonearoundthearchipelagoisseenbythemasunilateralandillegal.

3. challenges and threats

DuetotheimportanceoftheHighNorthforNorway’seconomicdevelopment and for its geopolitical standing in theworld, anychallengesandthreatstothebroadlydefinedsecurityofthere-gion,ortoNorway’snationalinterests,areseenasofparamount

ofnavalbasesandmilitaryinfrastructureonthearchipelago,andprohibitstheuseofSvalbardforwar-likepurposes.

15 AlsoIceland,SpainandtheUnitedKingdom.ThroughouttheColdWar,theheightenedgeopoliticalimportanceoftheHighNorthforNATOmeantthatNorway’salliesweremorelikelytoaccept,oratleastrefrainfromunder-mining,Oslo’sinterpretationofinternationallaw.

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importanceforthecountry’sdefencepolicy.Russiaiswidelyper-ceivedastheirprimarysource.

Inrelationtosoft security,thechallengesandthreatsarelinkedto the negative consequences of the exploitation of natural re-sourcesandofanincreasedvolumeofmaritimetransportintheHighNorth.ThisappliesequallytoindustrialaccidentsthatcouldthreatentheArcticecosystem(suchasspillsofnaturalgasoroilfromoffshorerigs,oil tankersorgascarriers)aswellas toanyaccidentsposingadangertohumanlifeandhealth(includingac-cidentsonoilrigs,aswellascollisionsanddamagetovesselssail-ingintheArcticseas).Asacountrythatseekstoexerciseitsju-risdictionandsovereigntyrightsintheregion,andwhichaspirestoplayasignificantroleintheArctic,Norwayneedstoconstantlymonitorandpatrolthemaritimeareasinquestion,andprovideeffectivemaritimesearchandrescuecapabilities16.Itisthereforeclearthatthese‘soft’challengeshaveanoticeableimpactonthedevelopmentofthemilitarycapabilitiesoftheNorwegianArmedForces.

Furthermore,Norwayisequallyconsciousofthechallengesandthreatsthatfallintothehard security category.Thesearemain-lylinkedtothehighlycontroversiallegalregimeofthemaritimeareasandthecontinentalshelfaroundtheSvalbardarchipelago.First,thereareconcernsoverfishingwithinNorway's200-milefisheriesprotectionzonearoundSvalbard,asthezoneisnotrec-ognised by Russia, among others. In recent years, the Norwe-gianCoastGuardhas‘arrested’severalRussiantrawlerswhichitclaimedwerefishingillegallyinsidetheconservationzone17,with

16 JonasGahrStøre,‘TheHighNorthandtheArctic:TheNorwegianPerspec-tive’, The Arctic Herald, 2/2012, 15 June 2012, http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/ud/aktuelt/taler_artikler/jgs_taler_artikler/2012/nord_arktis.html?id=685072

17 TheNorwegianCoastGuard,orKystvakten, ispartof theRoyalNorwegianNavy,and is thereforesubordinate to theMinistryofDefence. ItsprimarymissionistomonitorthefisherieswithintheNorwegianeconomiczoneandinsidethefisheriesprotectionzonearoundSvalbard.Ononeoccasionin2005,

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eachincidenttriggeringastrongresponsefromRussia.NorwayisparticularlyconcernedaboutthepossibilitythatRussiantrawlersfishingillegallyinsidetheconservationzonecouldreceiveprotec-tionfromRussianNavyshipsaccidentallyorintentionallylocatednearby.Insuchacase,wouldNorwaydecidetoignorethischal-lengetoitsjurisdictionoverthemaritimeareasurroundingSval-bard,orwouldtheNorwegianCoastGuardchoosetorespond,andifso,whatwouldbetheconsequencesofsuchaction?Inaddition,anypotentialexacerbationofdisputesovertheinterpretationofthe legal regime around Svalbard could also spark a boycott ofthebilateralregulationoffisheries intheHighNorth18.Second,potential problems could arise from the exploitation of naturalresources on the continental shelf aroundSvalbard. So far, theareahasremainedunexploredbyNorway(oranyothercountry).However,ifsignificantdepositsweretobediscoveredinthearea,thesignatoriestotheSvalbardTreaty(mainlyRussia,accordingtoNorway)coulddemandnon-discriminatoryaccesstoexplora-tionandproductionopportunities,andtheycouldinsistonpay-ingtheverylowSvalbardtaxrateratherthanthemuchhigherNorwegian tariffs19. As a result,Norway remains apprehensiveaboutRussia'sactionsandabout theprospectofbeing forced todefenditssovereignrightsoverthecontinentalshelfaroundSval-bard.Onepossiblescenariomightbethefollowing:Whatwouldhappen if aRussian company, citing theRussian interpretationofthetreaty,beganexplorationandproductionworkinsidethe

afterNorwegianinspectorsboardedaRussianfishingboat,theboat’scaptaindecidedtoheadbacktoaRussianport,withtheinspectorsstillonboard.

18 In theBarentsSea,Norwayhas collaboratedwithRussia since the 1970s;every year the countries set fishing quotas and agree on the division ofcatches of individual species of fish. It is therefore unlikely that this co-operationwouldbediscontinuedasaresultofincidentsinvolvingRussiantrawlers. Throughout theColdWar period, despite strained relations be-tweenEastandWest,fisheriesregulationswereeffectivelynegotiated.

19 Brit Fløistad, ‘Controversy over the Legal Regime outside Svalbard’s Ter-ritorialWaters’,DNAKSecurityBrief6-2008,FOCUSNORTH6-2008,TheNorwegian Atlantic Committee. http://www.atlanterhavskomiteen.no/files/atlanterhavskomiteen.no/Documents/Publikasjoner/Fokus%20Nord/FN%206-2008.pdf

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200-milezonesurroundingthearchipelago,andthentheRussiangovernmentdecidedtobecomeinvolvedinthedispute?

russia is the most important actor in the potential crisis sce-narios anticipated by norway in the high north, both in rela-tion to soft security (due to russia’s relatively poor and com-monly disregarded health and safety standards) as well as in relation to hard security issues.TheperceptionofRussiaasa potential aggressor has become particularly widespread since2007-2008.Severalfactorsprecipitatedthisshift. In2007,Russiaresumedflightsof itsstrategicbombersnear theNorwegianair-space.Inthesameyear,aRussianexpeditionplantedaRussianflagontheNorthPoleseabed,whichclearlydemonstratedthescopeofRussia’sambitionsandclaims. Inaddition, theRussian-Georgianwarin2008madeNorwayrealisethatRussiawouldbewillingtouseforceinordertoprotectitsnationalinterestsandspheresofin-fluenceinitsneighbourhood.Equallyworryinghasbeenthemod-ernisationandreformoftheRussianArmedForcesandtheir in-tensive(andoffensive)militaryexercises.Asaresult,NorwayhasbeguntofocusitsattentionontheHighNorth,fearing:

• Moscow testingNorway’s determination to defend its juris-dictionandsovereignrightsintheHighNorth,especiallyintheareasaroundSvalbard;

• Russia’s attempts to undermine the Norwegian interpreta-tionofthejurisdictionandsovereignrightsaroundSvalbard,which could either accidentally or deliberately escalate toamilitarycrisis;

• pressurefromMoscow–includingathreatofmilitaryaction–tocoerceNorwayintotakingparticulardecisionsoractionsintheHighNorth;

• Russia’spossibledecisiontotestNATO’sreactionandwilling-nesstosupportitsmemberstates(includingNorway)through

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politicalandmilitaryactioninresponsetovariouscrisissitu-ations,includingthosethatdonotnecessarilymeetthecrite-riasetoutinArticle5oftheWashingtonTreaty.

Consequently,acrisisinNorwegian-Russianrelationscouldnotberuledoutunderthefollowingcircumstances:iflargeandeas-ilyaccessibledepositsofnaturalresourcesarediscoveredinsidethe200-milezonearoundSvalbard;ifRussiawantedtodemon-strateitssuperpowerambitionsinresponsetoaworseningsitua-tionintheinternationalarenaorinresponsetopossibleconflictswith theWest inotherregions; ifMoscowwanted todivert theattentionoftheRussiansocietyfrominternalproblemscausedbypolitical, social or economic instability inRussia; andfinally, ifNorwaymadechangestoitssecurity,defenceoreconomicpolicythatcouldhaveasignificantnegativeimpactonRussia’snationalinterests.nonetheless, norway is not concerned about a pos-sible cold war-style invasion by russia, but rather about limited and focused military attacks, which in combination with non-military instruments (such as cyber-attacks, ter-rorist attacks, disinformation campaigns) could help russia achieve specific political and economic goals.

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ii. norway’s defence policy: cooperation and deterrence

in order to successfully deal with the potential challenges and threats in the norwegian high north, oslo has been pursuing a defence policy based on cooperation and deterrence. Its co-operationpolicyfocusesonincreasingcontacts&cooperationandbuildingtrustwithRussia,bothinbilateralrelationsandwithinthewidercommunityofArcticstates.Oslo’sdeterrencepolicy,ontheotherhand,aimstoachievethefollowinggoals:tostrengthenthecredibilityofNATOasacollectivedefencealliance;toincreasemilitarycooperationwiththeUnitedStates;tobuildupNorway’sown defence capabilities; and to develop political and militaryco-operationacrossNorthernEurope.the primary objective of norwegian defence policy is to minimise the likelihood of cri-ses and conflicts in the high north that could prove too ‘big’ for norway but too ‘small’ for nato20.Intheeventofa‘small’crisis,acountrylikeNorway–withrelativelyweakmilitarycapabilities,acontroversialinterpretationofthelegalregimearoundSvalbard,andwhichhasuncertaintiesaboutNATO'spotential response21 –couldfinditselfonthelosingsideofthecrisis.however, the poli-cy of deterrence currently pursued by norway is qualitatively different to that adopted in the cold war era. norway’s and nato’s military presence in the norwegian high north is en-visaged as a stabilising factor, preventing any potential crises. oslo wants to avoid russian counteractions and does not wish to undermine the stability and security of the high north by setting off an arms race22.

20 Gen.SverreDiesen,Norway’sChiefofDefence(2005-2009),inaninterviewwithANB-NTB,‘Vilhaprofferforsvar’,24June2013,http://www.an.no/ny-heter/article6727944.ece

21 Duetothecontroversiesmentionedearlierandthenatureofpotentialac-tionsthatcouldbeinterpreteddifferentlywithregardtotheapplicationofArt.5oftheWashingtonTreaty.

22 SvenC.Holtsmark,‘Towardscooperationorconfrontation?SecurityintheHighNorth’,ResearchPaperNo.45,NATODefenseCollege,February2009,p.11,http://www.ndc.nato.int/research/series.php?icode=1

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The principles underpinning the current defence policy havecross-partyconsensusinNorway,andtheoutcomesofthepolicyhavegenerallybeenpositivelyreceived.Consequently,thecoali-tiongovernment formedby theConservativesand theProgressParty after theparliamentary electionsheld in September 2013is unlikely to introducemajor changes to the policy. A shift inpolicyisalsounlikelyaslastyeartheNorwegianParliamentap-proved the Long-Term Defence Plan 2013-2016 prepared by theNorwegianMinistryofDefence,whichdefinestheprioritiesforNorway’sdefencepolicyandthefuturedirectionofArmedForcesreform.Havingsaidthat,themorepowerfulmemberofthecoali-tion,theConservativeParty,appearstobepayingmoreattentiontodefencematters than theprevious socialdemocraticgovern-mentheadedbyJensStoltenberg.Therefore,ifchangesaremade,wemayexpectacoalitiongovernment ledbytheConservativestochoosetoincreasedefencespendingandpotentiallyintroducearevisionof theArmedForcesreformtoboostNorway’sopera-tionalcapabilitiesintheHighNorth.Asregardstheinternationaldimension of the policy, the coalition governmentmay seek tostrengthenNorway’s tieswith theUnitedStates and somewhatincreaseNorway’spresenceinNATO’soperations23.

1. cooperation with russia

given the fact that the key objective of norway’s defence pol-icy is to avert potential crises or conflicts in the high north, oslo’s cooperation with russia in the arctic aims to minimise this risk and to build a network of contacts and enhance mu-tual trust.InitsbilateralrelationswithMoscow,Norwayseekstoensureaconsensualresolutionofanydisputesthatcouldoth-erwiseleadtoamilitarycrisis.Oneexampleofthispolicywasthesigning(in2010)andratification(in2011)ofabilateralagreement

23 ‘Politisk platform for en regering utgått avHøyre og Fremskrittspartiet’,10 July2013,pp. 39-40,http://www.hoyre.no/filestore/Filer/Politikkdoku-menter/plattform.pdf

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on the delimitation of the maritime border and cooperation,whichincludedabilateralframeworkforregulatingfisheriesintheBarentsSea.On theotherhand, theestablishmentofanet-workofcontactsintheregionisseenasamechanismforavertingtheescalationofpotentialcrisesthroughtheuseofexistingcom-municationchannels.Itaimsalsotohelpcreateapositiveimageoftheotherpartner.Norway’sactionsherearebeingcarriedoutinthreeareas:social,economic,andmilitary.

Osloseekstointensifycross-border contacts betweenNorwayandRussiainordertoincreasemutualtrustanddevelopcooperationbetweentheNorwegianandtheRussianregionsoftheHighNorth.Thesemeasuresfocusonthecultural,economicandsocialspheres.In2010,theHighNorthwasthefirstregionintheSchengenAreatoadoptalocalbordertrafficregimewhichenablesvisa-freetravelacrosstheNorwegian-Russianborder24(NorwayisamemberoftheSchengenAreabutnotamemberof theEU).Thecountrieshavealsointroducedvisafacilitationproceduresfortheircitizensfromotherregions.in the petroleum sector,Norwaysees itstechno-logicalknow-howanditsexperienceinoffshoreprojectsasaformnotjustofeconomicbutalsopoliticalcapital.Since2012,NorwayhasbeenengagedindevelopingcollaborativeprojectswithRussiancorporationsintheexplorationandextractionoffossilfuelsinboththeRussianandtheNorwegiansectionsofthecontinentalshelf25.

24 At the Norwegian-Russian border crossing in Storskog/Borisglebsk. SeeThomasNilsen,‘FirstopeningintheSchengen-regimewithRussia’,Barents­Observer, 11 February 2010, http://barentsobserver.com/en/first-opening-schengen-regime-russia

25 InMay2012,RosneftsignedacooperationagreementwithNorway’sStatoil(whosemajorityshareholder is theNorwegiangovernment)underwhichStatoilreceiveda33.4%stakeinseveralfieldsintheRussiansectionoftheBarentsSea and in theSeaofOkhotsk.On thebasis of thisdeal,Rosneftreceived a 20%participating interest in a licence for the exploration anddevelopmentofdepositsintheNorwegianpartoftheBarentsSeainMay2013.Inaddition,Russia’sLUKoilwasawardedparticipatingsharesintwolicenses. See ThomasNilsen, ‘Statoil, Rosneft sign landmarkBarents Seadeal’,BarentsObserver,5May2012,http://barentsobserver.com/en/energy/statoil-rosneft-sign-landmark-barents-sea-deal

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Norwaywouldliketheseprojectstobecomesufficientlyprofitable(also) forRussia tomakeanypotentialcrises–andtheresultantcollapseinenergycooperation–toocostlyforMoscow.in the mili-tary sphere,Norwayhasbeenseekingtobuildnewchannelsofcommunication,bothatthepoliticallevel(betweentheMinistriesofDefenceandtheArmedForces)aswellastheoperationallevel(betweenthearmedforces’unitsstationedoroperatingintheHighNorth).Itishopedthatthiswouldenablebettercommunicationatbothlevels intheeventofacrisis,soastoavoidmisunderstand-ingsthatcouldescalateintomilitaryconflict.Since2011,Norwayhasbeenintensifyingmilitarycontactsbetweenthetwocountries’MoDheadsandarmedforcescommanders-in-chief26.Inaddition,since2010NorwayandRussiahaveheldtheannualPOMORmili-taryexercises,attendedmainlybythecountries’navies(butalsoby their air forces) to improve communication and procedures,amongstotherthings,andtopracticemaritimesearchandrescueoperations27.

from norway’s point of view, co-operation with other actors in the arctic is equally important–withintheframeworksoftheso-calledArcticFive(Norway,Denmark/Greenland,Canada,RussiaandtheUnitedStates)ortheArcticCouncil(additionallyinvolvingSweden,FinlandandIceland).Thatisbecausethesta-bility and security of the Norwegian High North is intimately

26 InOctober2011,GeneralHaraldSundebecamethefirstChiefofDefenceoftheNorwegianArmed Forces to visit Russia. In February 2013,Norway’sDefenceMinisterAnne-GreteStrøm-ErichsenmadeavisittoRussia–thefirstsuchvisit in 10years.Russia’sDeputyDefenceMinisterAnatolyAn-tonovvisitedNorwayinMarch2012.SeeTrudePettersen,‘ClosermilitarycooperationbetweenNorwayandRussia’,BarentsObserver,14February2013,http://barentsobserver.com/en/security/2013/02/closer-military-coopera-tion-between-norway-and-russia-14-02

27 ThePOMORdrillstookplaceforthefirsttimein1994,andnextin2010.Inaddition,NorwegianandRussianunitsareconductingtheBARENTSmari-timesearchandrescueandoilspillemergencyexercises.TrudePeterssen,‘Norwegian-RussianPOMOR-2013navalexercisestartsthisweek’,Barents­Observer,7May2013,http://barentsobserver.com/en/security/2013/05/nor-wegian-russian-pomor-2013-naval-exercise-starts-week-07-05

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tiedupwiththestabilityandsecurityoftheentireArcticregion.Theaimof thecollaboration in theArctic is therefore toestab-lishgovernancemechanisms thatwill reduce the temptationofpoliticalrivalryoutsidethecooperationframeworks,orofviolat-inginternationallaw,andwhichwillthuspreventthemilitarisa-tionoftheregion28.In2008,theArcticFiveadoptedtheIlulissatDeclarationontheregulationofdisputesintheArcticunderin-ternationallaw.In2011,thememberstatesoftheArcticCouncilsignedtheArcticSearchandRescueAgreement,followedbytheAgreementonCooperationonMarineOilPollutionPreparednessandResponseintheArcticin2013.InJune2013,thedefencechiefsoftheArcticCouncilmemberstatesdecidedtoincreasemilitarycooperation in themonitoring ofmaritime areas and agreed toholdjointmilitaryexercises29.Inaddition,militarydrillsinvolv-ingRussiaarealsoconductedinmultilateralformats(suchasthejointUS,NorwegianandRussianNorthernEagleexercise).

importantly, russia is not explicitly portrayed as a threat in norway’s public discourse.Politicians,militaryleaders,andexpertsprefertotalkaboutmaintainingterritorialintegrityandsovereigntyintheHighNorth,andabouttheneedforcapabilitiestoenforceNorway’sjurisdictionandsovereigntyrights.Inpublicdiscourse, the reformandmodernisationof theRussianArmedForces,aswellastheresumptionofstrategicbomberflightsandofmilitaryexercisesintheHighNorth,areallfrequentlydescribedasa“returntonormalcy”similartothestateofaffairsbeforethecollapseof theRussianArmedForces in the 1990s.At the sametime,Norway is awareof the consequences for its owndefencepolicyofthechangingsituationintheHighNorth.Howeveritbe-lievesthatoverly aggressive rhetoric could threaten coopera-tion between the two countries. nonetheless, the lack of such

28 Olaf Osica, ‘The High North as a New Area of Cooperation and Rivalry’,NowaEuropa.PrzeglądNatoliński,No.I(4)/2010,p.13.

29 GerardO’Dwyer,‘Arcticnationssetcooperationguidelines’,DefenseNews,27June2013, http://www.defensenews.com/article/20130627/DEFREG01/306270013/Arc-tic-Nations-Set-Cooperation-Guidelines

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rhetoric has not stopped norway from adopting coherent and consistent deterrent measures.

2. strengthening nato’s collective defence

Since 2008,Norway has taken steps to strengthenNATO’s sta-tusasacollectivedefencealliance,andithasbeencommittedtoincreasing NATO’s presence in the NorwegianHigh North. Al-thoughOslohasnotwithdrawnfromoverseasoperations,ithasnonethelessrebalancedits involvement insuchmissions. Inad-dition,strengtheningitsrelationswiththeUnitedStatesisbeingseenbyNorwayasatoppriority.Atthesametime,Norway’sat-temptstoincreaseNATO’spresenceintheNorwegianHighNorthandtodevelopclosertieswiththeUnitedStates,comewithasetoflimitations.

norway has been calling for the strengthening of nato’s col-lective defence.ItwouldliketoseeabetterbalancebetweenthedevelopmentofNATO’scapabilitiesforcollectivedefenceontheone hand, and the development of NATO’s capabilities for cri-sismanagement operations on the other.According toNorway,it isnecessarytorebalanceNATO’sactivitiesduetothecurrentoveremphasisofNATOmember statesandNATOstructuresondeveloping capabilities for overseas operations. Over the pasttenyears,NATOmemberstateshavebeenveryactivelyinvolvedinanumberof suchmissions.Consequently, strengthening thecredibilityofNATOasacollectivedefencealliancehasbeeniden-tifiedasthetoppriorityforNorway’ssecurityanddefencepolicy,aspresentedintheLong-TermDefencePlan2013-2016formulatedby theNorwegianMinistryofDefence30.According toOslo, the

30 InsecondplacecametheneedtoimproveNorway’sowndefencecapabili-ties;theneedforregionalcooperation, inthirdplace;andinvolvementinoverseasoperationsin lastplace.NorwegianMinistryofDefence, ‘Etfor-svarforvårtid,ProposisjontilStortinget’,Prop.73S,p.13,23March2012,http://www.regjeringen.no/pages/37583840/PDFS/PRP201120120073000D-DDPDFS.pdf

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measures refocusing onNATO’s collective defence should coverthreeareas:surveillance, intelligence and deterrence.Deter-rence refers here to the maintenance of updated and crediblecontingency plans, supported with adequate presence of bothNorwegian (military bases, exercises) and allied armed forces(exercises). Meanwhile, surveillance and intelligence shouldprovideNATOwithadequatesituationalawareness in theHighNorth.Thisstartswiththeanalysisofregionaltrendsinsecurityanddefenceaswellasinrelatedareas(suchasthepetroleumsec-torandmaritimetransport),andendswithreal-timemonitoringofcivilianandmilitaryactivitiesintheregion.Thesearealsothekeycapabilitiesnecessaryforanymilitaryaction,intheeventthepolicy of deterrence proves insufficient31. The strengthening ofNATO'ssurveillance,intelligenceanddeterrencecapabilitieswasproposedbyOslointheCoreAreaInitiative,whichwasdevisedintheaftermathoftheRussian-Georgianwar32.ThesuggestionswerelinkedtospecificprojectproposalsfortheNorwegianHighNorth.However,Oslo’sinitiativefailedtosecureNATO’sfullen-dorsement,whichiswhyNorwayhasbeentryingtoimplementitsproposalsusingnewNATOinitiatives,suchastheSmartDe-fenceandConnectedForcesInitiative.Forinstance,Oslohaspro-posedusing apilotproject to increase the cooperationbetweenthe Norwegian Joint Headquarters and NATO command struc-tures in order to improveNATO’s situational awareness in the

31 SvenC.Holtsmark,‘Towardscooperationorconfrontation?SecurityintheHighNorth’,ResearchPaperNo.45,NATODefenseCollege,February2009,p.11,http://www.ndc.nato.int/research/series.php?icode=1

32 Theproposalsincludedthefollowing:theintroductionofregionalcontin-gencyplanning and the return of responsibilities for regional defence tothe JointForceCommands (BrunssumandNaples); improvements togeo-graphicalexpertiseandsituationalawarenessalongNATOborders;thede-velopmentofcloserlinksbetweennationalandNATOcommandstructures;and increasedNATO involvement in national andmultinationalmilitaryexercises. Espen Barth Eide, ‘Collective defence in today's security envi-ronment’, 16 October 2009, http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/fd/whats-new/Speeches-and-articles/Speeches-and-articles-by-other-apolitica/statssekretaer_espen_barth_eide/2009/collective-defence-in-todays-se-curity-en.html?id=582015

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Arctic.NorwayisalsotryingtoinvolvealargenumberofalliesandpartnersinitsnationalColdResponsemilitaryexercisesheldintheHighNorth33,andisseekingtohostNATO-ledexercisesinNorway (including the regularly heldAir Force exerciseNATOTigerMeet; in2007, 2012and2013 thesedrillswereheld in theNorwegianHighNorthunderthenameArcticTiger).Inaddition,Norwayhasproposedusingthelargeandlow-populatedareasinnorthernNorwayforlargeNATOair,landandseamilitaryexer-cisesfrom201434.Norway’seffortstodrawtheallies’attentiontotheHighNorthcanbebestillustratedbyOsloinvitingtheNATOSecretaryGeneralandthemembersoftheNorthAtlanticCounciltonorthernNorwayforatwo-dayvisitinMay201335.

it should be noted that oslo’s calls for greater emphasis on nato’s collective defence do not mean that norway plans to re-frain from taking part in nato’s crisis-management missions or from the operations of the coalitions of the willing on the side of the united states or the european allies (seeAppendix2).NorwaycontinuestoseeitsinvolvementinoverseasmissionsasawaytoconsolidateitspositionwithinNATOandinitsrelationswith the allies. nonetheless, its involvement in such opera-tions has been increasingly contingent on the following fac-tors:theeffectthatsendingNorwegiantroopsabroadcouldhaveonthecountry’sabilitytodefenditsownterritory;thevisibilityofNorwegian involvement inoverseasoperationsandtheresulting

33 TheexercisesareopentoinvitedparticipantsinthePartnershipforPeaceprogramme,andsofarhavebeenheldin2006,2007,2009,2010and2012.In 2012, the drillswere attended by fifteen countries and approximately16,000soldiers.ColdResponseistobeheldeverytwoyears.Forsvaret,ColdResponse, 21 January 2013,http://forsvaret.no/aktuelt/ovelser/Sider/Cold-Response.aspx

34 NorwegianMinistryofDefence, ‘ØnskermerNATO-øvinginord’,27Feb-ruary 2013, http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/fd/aktuelt/nyheter/2013/onsker-mer-nato-oving-i-nord.html?id=715298

35 AmongtheplacesvisitedbythedelegatesweretheNorwegianJointHead-quarters in Bodø, Nordland, as well as the capital of the Troms region,Tromsø.NATO, ‘NorthAtlanticCouncilwrapsupvisit toNorway’, 7May2013,http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_100335.htm

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politicalbenefits;andthepresenceofaUNSecurityCouncilman-dateforthemissioninquestion.AccordingtoNorway,anyillegiti-mateuseofforceininternationalrelationsunderminestheprinci-plesofinternationallaw;andsettingsuchprecedentscouldhaveanindirectimpactonthesituationintheHighNorth.Consequently,NorwaydidtakepartinthemilitaryoperationinLibya,whichwascarried out in 201136 under aUNSecurityCouncilmandate – forwhichitwaspraisedbytheUnitedStatesandotherallies.Howeverin2013,Oslorefusedtobecomeinvolvedinapossiblemilitaryin-terventioninSyriaintheabsenceofaUNmandateforthatmission.

Norway’sactiveinvolvementinNATOisparalleledbyOslo’spolicy of strengthening its bilateral relations with the united states.TheUSisseenasthecountry’smostimportantNATOallyandade facto guarantor ofNorway’snationalsecurity.Consequently,Oslohas been seeking to strengthenNorwegian-American relationsandtobolsterUSpresenceinNorway.Inthemilitarysphere,theNorwegiangovernmenthasmanagedtomaintainaconstantUSpresence by storing US military equipment under the MarineCorps Prepositioning ProgrammeNorway.Of great importanceforNorway’sdefencepolicy,andalsoforitseconomy,isthecoun-tries’bilateralcooperationinthearmsindustry.Norway’sordersforAmericanmilitaryequipmentandarmament(mostrecently,forabout52multi-roleF-35fighters)havebeenplacedinexchangefor assurances about the continued development of close linksbetweenthetwocountries’armsindustries37.Osloisalsokeento

36 As part of the operation, six Norwegian F-16 fighter aircraft carried out596flightsbetweenMarchandAugust2011,whichaccountedfor10%ofallflightsconductedbythecountriestakingpartinthemission.Norwegianpi-lotslogged2000flighthoursanddropped542bombs.GerardO'Dwyer,‘Nor-waywithdrawsF-16sfromLibyaOps’,DefenseNews, 11August2011,http://www.defensenews.com/article/20110811/DEFSECT01/108110302/Norway-Withdraws-F-16s-from-Libya-Ops

37 PartsofthemanufacturingprocessfortheF-35fighteraircraftareconduct-edbyLockheedMartin,incollaborationwithNorway’sKongsbergandAIMNorway,amongothers.Kongsberghasalsowonordersformilitaryequip-mentandarmamentfortheUSNavyandtheUSArmy.

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ensurethatAmericantroopsarepresentatthemilitaryexercisesheldintheHighNorth.Finally,tosomeextentatleast,NorwayseesitsowninvolvementinNATOoperationsasawayofshoringupitsbilateralrelationswiththeUnitedStates.

however, oslo’s goal of increasing the nato presence in the norwegian high north and of securing close relations with washington does have its limitations.NorwaydoesnotwanttoprovokeRussia,asevidenced,forexample,bythelackofcallsfromNorwaytoinstallNATOmilitaryinfrastructureintheHighNorth;thescenariosandtheareasusedfortheColdResponseex-ercisesinvolvinglargenumbersofallies38;andtherejectionoftheUSproposaltoadaptandintegratetheNorwegianFridtjofNans-en-classfrigatestotheAegisBMDsystemundertheNATOmissiledefencesystem.Inasimilarvein,JensStoltenberg’sgovernment(withthesupportofmostofthecoalitionandoppositionparties)openlycriticisedthepossibilityofmilitaryinterventioninSyriawithoutaUNSecurityCouncilmandate,andarguedagainstNor-way’sinvolvementintheoperation39.ThisshowsthateveninitscooperationwiththeUS,Norwayistryingtokeepsomeroomformanoeuvre in theirpolicies,and inmakingdecisionsabout thescopeofcooperationintheregionandthecountry’sinvolvementinoverseasmissions.Furthermore,itappearsthatNorwaydoesnotwantNATOtobecometoopoliticallyandmilitarilyinvolvedintheArctic,notonlybecauseofitsreluctancetoprovokeRussia,butalsotopreventNATOmemberstatesoutsidetheArcticregionfrombeingabletoinfluencepoliticalprocessesintheHighNorth,whichwouldinevitablyweakenNorway’sstandingintheregion.

38 TheColdResponseexerciseshaveso far followedcrisismanagementsce-narios, and have not been held in the region bordering on Russia (Finn-mark);instead,thedrillswereconductedinTromsandNordland.NATO’s2011CMXexerciseheldinNorwaywasbasedonArt.5,butitwasnotaliveexercise.

39 Espen Barth Eide, ‘Hodet på plass’,Dagens Næringsliv, 2 September 2013,http://www.regjeringen.no/mobil/nb/dep/ud/aktuelt/taler_artikler/eide_taler/2013/svar_matlary.html?id=734852

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3. Building up norway’s own defence capabilities

ThesecondpillarofNorway’sdefencepolicycalls for themain-tenanceandexpansionofthecountry’sowndefencecapabilities.TheimportanceofsecurityanddefenceissuesforNorway(com-paredwithotherNATOcountries)canbegleanedfromboththelevelofspendingondefenceandfromtheeffortsto‘anchor’theNorwegianArmedForcesinsociety.Thetasks,structure,activi-ties,militaryequipmentandarmament,aswellasthegeographi-callocationofmilitaryinfrastructureinNorway,allillustratetherolethatthesecurityoftheHighNorthplaysindeterminingthedevelopment of theNorwegianArmed Forces. Despite the goodreputationenjoyedbythemilitary,bothdomesticallyandinter-nationally, some areas of the modernisation and restructuringarefacingdifficulty.

since 2008, norway has been increasing its military spend-ingatoneof thehighestratessincetheendoftheColdWar.Thisstemsprimarilyfromtherecognitionoftheneedforinvestmentinthecountry’sdefencecapabilities,butithasalsobeengreatlyhelpedbyahealthystatebudget.AmongtheNATOmemberstates,Norwayisoneofthefewcountriesplanningareal(i.e.abovein-flation)increaseindefencespendingoverthecomingyears(2013-2016)40. Norway’smilitary expenditure per capita is among thehighestamongNATOmemberstates,althoughitsmilitaryspend-ingaspercentageofGDPremainsbetween1.4%and1.6%(i.e.be-lowthe2%requiredbyNATO).Nominally,Norwayalsohasthebiggest defence budget among the Nordic countries: in recentyears it overtookSweden in this respect, despiteSweden’s sub-stantially largerpopulationandahigherGDP (seeAppendix3).norway is also one of few nato countries to retain compul-sory military service, and is the only nato country to extend

40 Norwegian Ministry of Defence, ‘Norway releases New Defence Plan’,23March 2012,http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/fd/press-centre/Press-releases/2012/norway-releases-new-defence-white-paper-.html?id=676237

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conscription also to women(since2013).Theintentionsbehindconscriptionareasfollows:todevelopanunderstandingandac-ceptanceinsocietyofthetasksundertakenbytheArmedForces;toincreaseasenseofcollectiveresponsibilityformaintainingthesecurityandsovereigntyofthestate;andtoprovidethebestop-portunities for recruitment into the Norwegian Armed Forces.Inpractice,however,theNorwegianmilitaryserviceis,andwillremain,largelyvoluntary–duetotherelativelysmallnumberofindividualsconscriptedinanygivenyear(in2012,thiswasabout8000outofaboutthe15,000menfitforservice,andabout6000women;seeAppendix4)41.

the primary task of the norwegian armed forces is to act,both independentlyand togetherwith its allies, toprotectNor-wegian sovereignty,national interests andvalues, aswell as toenforcethecountry’slawsacrossNorwegianterritoryandallar-easunderNorwegianjurisdiction.Takingpartinoverseasopera-tionsisregardedassecondary.TheNorwegianArmedForcesaimtopreventcrisesandconflicts,andseektoguaranteesecurityandsovereign state action in the eventofpolitical ormilitarypres-sure42.Inpeacetime,theactivitiesoftheArmedForcesfocusonthemonitoringandpolicingoftheNorwegianlandterritory,air-spaceandterritorialwaters,aswellasofallmaritimeareasunderNorwegian jurisdiction (see Appendix 5). They are responsiblefor customs, policing, environmental control and the monitor-ingoffishingactivityinmaritimeareas,aswellasformaritimeand land search and rescue.Other tasks include theprotectionofthelandborderbetweenNorwayandRussia,theprotectionof

41 Forsvaret, ‘Tallogstatistikk’,http://forsvaret.no/om-forsvaret/fakta-om-forsvaret/Sider/tall-og-statistikk.aspx.From2006womenwereinvitedtotakeapre-servicemedicalexamination,andbefore2013theycouldvolun-teerformilitaryservice.

42 Norwegian Ministry of Defence, ‘Et forsvar for vår tid. Proposisjon tilStortinget’,Prop.73S,p.12-15,23March2012,http://www.regjeringen.no/pages/37583840/PDFS/PRP201120120073000DDDPDFS.pdf

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militaryandcivilianinfrastructure,andthemanagementofcri-sissituationsinthecountry.

the modernisation and restructuring of the norwegian armed forces has reflected thesepriorities and tasks.This re-fersparticularlytotheNorwegianHighNorth43,whereNorwaywants to maintain a constant and visible military presence atsea, intheair,andonland.Toaddressthechallengeofprotect-ingNorway’seconomicinterestsandbolsteringitscapabilitiesforcrisisresponseacrosslargemaritimeareas,themodernisationoftheArmedForcesfocusedheavilyonthedevelopmentoftheNor-wegiannavy and the coast guard(abranchoftheNavy),bothofwhichhavereceivednewvessels inrecentyears44.Currently,Norway is modernising and restructuring its air force: Nor-wayhasdecidedtoreplaceitsmulti-roleF-16fighteraircraftwith52state-of-artF-35fighters(armedwithJSMlong-range,stealth,anti-shipandland-attackcruisemissiles),whichareexpectedtoenterservicegraduallyfrom2018.Norwayhasalsobeenupgrad-ingitshelicopterfleetandhasstartedreformingthestructureofitsAirForce.Inaddition,ithaslaunchedagradualrestructuringandmodernisationprogrammeof itsrelativelyneglectedarmy and home guard, aimed particularly at building up its capa-bilitiesforoperationsinArcticconditions.Withthatobjectiveinmind,adecisionhasbeentakentotransformoneoftheexistingbattalionsintheNorwegianHighNorthintoan‘ArcticBattalion’whichwillbebettersuitedforoperationsinpolarconditionsand

43 JustynaGotkowska,OlafOsica(eds.), ‘Closingthegap?Militaryco-opera-tionfromtheBalticSeatotheBlackSea’,OSWReport,October2012,p.38,http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-report/2012-12-10/closing-gap-military-cooperation-baltic-sea-to-black-sea

44 TheNavy has received five FridtjofNansen-class frigates and six Skjold-classpatrolboats,referredtoalsoascoastalcorvettes.BothtypesofvesselsaretobearmedwithKongsberg’sNavalStrikeMissiles(NSM).TheCoastGuard has 14 vessels, including theNornen-class (5 new units) and Bar-entshav-class(3units)patrolvessels.By2016,theCoastGuardistoreceiveanewvesselwitha reinforcedhull capableof icebreaking, andequippedwithahelipad.

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willbecomposedofbothconscriptsandpermanentpersonnel45.Moreover,aspartoftherestructuringprogramme,NorwayhasestablishedCyberDefenceasanewbranchofthearmedforces,taskedwiththeprotectionofbothmilitary(andalsocivilian,inspecial cases) IT infrastructure andof command& control andcommunicationssystemsagainstpotentialcyber-attacks.

The significance of theNorwegianHighNorth is also reflectedinthegeographical location in this region of military infra-structure across norway, although this has also partly beenshapedby the legacy of theColdWar era. In this context,Nor-way’snorthernregionsincludeNordland,TromsandFinnmark.Forfinancialandoperationalreasons,themilitaryinfrastructurehasbeenreducedandconcentratedinrecentyears.In2009Nor-wegianJointHeadquarters(NJHQ),whichisresponsibleforlead-ing,planning,andconductingoperationsbothinthecountryandabroad,wasmovedfromsouthernNorwaytothenortherntownof Bodø (Nordland region). In linewith the Long-TermDefencePlan2013-2016, oneofNorway’s twomainairbases (inBodø) istobecloseddownfor infrastructuralandpoliticalreasons,andthecountry’smainairstationistobelocatedinØrland,incen-tralNorway(Sør-Trøndelagregion).TheØrlandMainAirStationistohousetherecentlyorderedmulti-roleF-35fighteraircraftaswellasotherAirForceunits.However,theQuickReactionAlertdetachmentistobestationedatEvenes(Nordlandregion)inor-der tomaintain a fast response time in the High North. BasesinnorthernNorwayalsohousethecountry’sonlyfleetofpatroland reconnaissance P-3 Orion aircraft (Nordland region), anditslargesthelicopterfleet(Tromsregion).ThenorthernbasesoftheNorwegianNavy,whichisconcentratedinthesoutherncityofBergen,includetheCoastalRangerCommand(Kystjegerkom-mandoen) in Troms region; the Naval Special Operations Unit

45 Trude Pettersen, ‘Norway establishes Arctic Battalion’, BarentsObserver,29March2012,http://barentsobserver.com/en/topics/norway-establishes-arctic-battalion

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(Marinejegerkommandoen) in Nordland region; and the head-quartersoftheNorwegianCoastGuardinSortland,Nordlandre-gion.Inaddition,northernNorwayalsohousestheBrigadeNordheadquarters(theonlybrigadeintheNorwegianArmy)aswellasthefollowingBrigadeNordbattalions:themotorisedinfantrybattalion;theartillerybattalion;thebattlefieldsurveillance,in-telligence gathering& electronicwarfare battalion; the combatengineerbattalion,thearmouredbattalion;thesignalbattalion;the logistics battalion, and themedical battalion (in Troms re-gion).Furthermore,thetownofKirkenesontheNorwegian-Rus-sianborder(Finnmarkregion)housestheborderguardbattalion.

Although Norwegian management of the financing, recruit-ment,operation,restructuringandmodernisationoftheArmedForces iswell designed, there are deficiencies in some areas, whichhavebeensubjecttopublicdebateinNorwaysincespring201346.Thecurrentproblemsaremainlytheresultofinadequatefinancingregardingtheneedsanddifficultiesinrecruitingper-sonnel.Thepublicdiscussionhashighlighted the limitationsofthe current conscriptionmodel for theoperational readinessofthe Norwegian Armed Forces47. The country’s military consistof 16,000 military and civilian personnel and approximately8000conscripts(seeAppendix4).ConscriptsonlysupplementtheprofessionalNavyandAirForcepersonnel,andservemainlyintheArmy.Consequently,thelevelofoperationalreadinessofthebattalionscomposedofconscripts–whoformthecoreofthelandtroopsintheHighNorth–isquitelow.Thebattalionscomposedofprofessionalsoldiers(Telemark,specialforcesunits),whichhavealsotakenpartinoverseasoperations,arestationedinthesouth

46 ThedebatewastriggeredbythepublicationofareportonthestatusoftheNorwegianArmedForcesbytheformerdirectoroftheNorwegianDefenceResearch Institute (FFI),NilsHolme.SeeNilsHolme, ‘Forsvarspolitikkenvedetveiskille’,Civita-Rapport,April2013,http://www.civita.no/publikas-jon/forsvarspolitikken-ved-et-veiskille

47 Gerard O’Dwyer, ‘Norway's Former Defense Chief Blasts 'Dysfunctional'Conscript-basedMilitary’,30September2013,DefenseNews,http://www.de-fensenews.com/article/20130930/DEFREG01/309300031

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ofthecountry.However,staffingisalsoabigproblemforthemod-ernised Navy; despite receiving five new Fridtjof Nansen-classfrigates,theNavycurrentlyhasonlythreesetsofcrewtooperatethem.TheAirForceisfacingsimilarproblems:ofits57multi-roleF-16fighteraircraft,only15-16aircraftcouldbeusedin2010duetotechnicalproblems.Norwayalsolacksthenecessaryresourcesfor adequate equipment and training of itsHomeGuard.OthercriticismsrefertoNorway’sreluctancetocarryoutmilitaryex-erciseinareasclosetotheRussianborder(northernTromsandFinnmark)–thatis,inthosepartsofthecountrywherecrisissit-uationsarethemostlikely48.Furthermore,althoughthegovern-menthasannouncedplanstoincreaseNorway’sdefencebudget,theverycostlypurchaseof52multi-roleF-35smaymeanthatoverthenextfewyearsotherplannedpurchasesmaybesuspended,orthatthenumberofmilitaryexercisescouldbereduced,therebylowering the operational capabilities of the Norwegian ArmedForcesasawhole.

4. cooperation across northern europe

InadditiontothemeasuresproposedwithinNATO,andthestepstakentoboostNorway’sownmilitarycapabilities,Oslo’sdefencepolicyalsocallsforgreatercooperationonsecurityanddefenceacrossNorthernEurope, bothwith otherNATOmember statesas well as with Sweden and Finland. Norway has been one ofthemain advocates of intensifyingNordic defence cooperation;ithasdevelopeda strategyof cooperationbetweenotherNorthSeacountries,andhassupportedtheideaofpoliticalandmilitarycooperation within the Northern Group. Through these initia-tives,Oslohopes toboostdefencecapabilitiesbothathomeandacrosstheregion, inresponsetothechangingsecuritycontext.The changes relate to themodernisation and reformofRussia’s

48 SveinungBergBentzrød,‘VianerikkehvaForsvaretkanklare’,Aftenposten,3May2013,http://www.aftenposten.no/nyheter/iriks/--Vi-aner-ikke-hva-Forsvaret-kan-klare-7188615.html#.UgOZ9dj-QyI

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military capabilities against thebackgroundof increasing stra-tegicimportanceoftheHighNorth,ontheonehand;andtotheuncertaintyaboutthefuturedevelopmentandpoliticalcohesionofNATO, and about the degree ofWashington’s involvement inEuropeontheother.in norway’s view, political and military cooperation between the nordic countries and with major european allies has a deterrent effect against russia. its aim is to raise interoperability, to build closer military ties, and to increase the presence of norway’s partners and allies in the country.

norway’s involvement in the nordic defence cooperation (nordefco) initiative49, alongside Sweden, Finland and Den-mark, aims to strengthen thedefence capabilities of the regionthroughjointmilitaryexercisesandtraining,aswellasthejointprocurementofarmamentandmilitaryequipment.Workingto-gether, theNordic countries are able to achievemore, and anysavingsgeneratedthroughcollaborationcanbespentinotherar-eas. Inaddition, forSwedenandFinland,whichremainoutsideNATO,sustainedcooperationwithDenmarkandNorwayenablesthemtoadoptNATOstandardsmoreefficiently.Itincreasesinter-operabilitynotonlybetweentheNordiccountries,butalsowithNATO–bothwithintheregionandbeyond it.However,NordiccooperationshouldnotrestrictNorway’ssovereigntyinpoliticaldecision-making,norisitseenasapotentialalternativetoNATOintheregion.NorwaytreatsNORDEFCOasausefulformatfortheimplementation of Nordic projects, such as ‘pooling & sharing’and‘smartdefence’;andintheeventofjointmilitaryinvolvementoverseas.Theinitiativeisusedasabrandingexerciseforthere-gionintheUN,NATOandtheEU.AlthoughNORDEFCOhasbeenatthecoreofNorway’smilitarycooperation,duetotherelativelysmalldefencecapabilitiesof theNordiccountries,Norwaydoes

49 SeeJustynaGotkowska,‘SmartDefenseNordicStyle’,CEWEEKLY,19Sep-tember2012,http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/ceweekly/2012-09-19/smart-defence-nordic-style

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notwanttolimitthistypeofinternationalco-operationsolelytolinkswithitsimmediateneighbours.Oslopreferscooperationin-volvingmajorNATOalliesincaseitoffersgreaterpolitical,mili-taryoreconomicbenefits.

norway’s military cooperation with the north sea countriesisseeninexactlytheseterms.TheverypresenceofthesecountriesintheNorwegianHighNorth,aswellasmilitary-technical,andeveneconomiccooperationwiththe united Kingdom, germany and the netherlands,bolstersNorway’sstandinginitsrelationswithRussia.AllofthesestatesareNATOmemberswiththebig-gestmilitarycapabilitiesintheregion;andinaddition,theyarealso major importers of Norwegian oil and gas50. The strategicnatureofcooperationwiththesecountrieshasbeenemphasisedintheNorwegianNorthSeaStrategyinitiatedbytheMinistryofDefence in2003/2004.Sofar,Norwayhasdevelopedtheclosestlinkswith theUK,as exemplifiedbyanagreementonbilateraldefencecooperationsignedinMarch201251.Theoutcomesofthisagreementhave includedRoyalMarines commando training intheNorwegianHighNorth52.Meanwhile, inApril2013,Norwaysigned an agreement onmilitary cooperationwith theNether-lands; this document envisages joint training programmes andcooperationbetweenindividualbranchesofthecountries’armedforces as well as between their defence industries53. In the fu-ture,Germanyislikelytobecomeanequallyimportantpartner

50 In2010,theUnitedKingdomimported52%ofNorwegianoil,followedbytheNetherlands–with18%,andGermany–with5%.Inthesameyear,Germanypurchased30%,UK27%,and theNetherlands8%of theNorwegiannatu-ralgastransportedviapipelines.USEnergyInformationAdministration,‘Norway’,http://www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=NO

51 NorwegianMinistryofDefence, ‘Skrevunder samarbeidsavtalemedStor-britannia’,7March2012,http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/fd/whats-new/News/2012/skrev-under-samarbeidsavtale-med-storbri.html?id=674220

52 BritishMinistryofDefence,‘DefenceSecretaryvisitsRoyalMarinescom-mandosinNorway’,2March2013,https://www.gov.uk/government/news/defence-secretary-visits-royal-marine-commandos-in-norway

53 AltairAviationAgency, ‘Norwegian-Dutchcooperationagreement’,3 June2013,http://www.altair.com.pl/news/view?news_id=10585&q=Skjold

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forNorway,mainlydue toGermany’s increasing importance intheEuropeanUnion,andGermany’sgoodrelationswithRussia.Germany’seconomicand/ormilitarypresenceintheNorwegianHighNorthwouldthushaveastabilisingeffectontheentirere-gion. Currently, themilitary cooperation betweenNorway andGermanyhasbeenlimitedtolinksbetweentheBrigadeNordandtheI.German-DutchCorps.Everyfewyears,GermanandDutchgroundtroopsconductjointmilitaryexercisesinNorway54.TheinvolvementofGermancompaniesintheNorwegianpetroleumsector, including the extraction of deposits on the NorwegiancontinentalshelfinanareaclosetotheRussianborder,hasbeenequallyimportantforNorway55.

Furthermore,Norwayhasbeenhighlightingtheneedtoexplorethepossibilityofpolitical and military cooperation and dia-logue across northern europe within the framework of the northern group,whichincludestheNordicandBalticcountries,theUK, theNetherlands, Germany and Poland56. TheNorthernGroup format merges all existing formats of military coopera-tionledbyNorway:theNordicformat,theNordic-Balticformat,as well as the North Sea Strategy, with Poland’s participation.ItalsogivesSwedenandFinlandtheopportunity toparticipateintalksheldbyNATOmemberstatesaboutregionalchallengesand threats.Norway treats theNorthernGroup as a forum forstrengtheningexistingcollaborationandexploringnewformsofworkingtogether.However,thepracticaldimensionofthiscoop-erationremainstobeseen.

54 SuchastheColdChallenge2011drills,ortheplanedNobleLedger2014ex-ercise.

55 TrudePettersen,‘NorwayandGermanytalkenergy’,BarentsObserver,20Feb-ruary 2013, http://barentsobserver.com/en/energy/2013/02/norway-and-ger-many-talk-energy-20-02

56 ThisformatwasinitiatedbytheUnitedKingdom.TheGroup’sfirstmeetingwasheldinOsloin2010atthelevelofdefenceministersandsecretariesofstate.

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iii. norway and the Baltic sea region

for a number of reasons, norway would seem to be a natu-ral partner for poland and other countries in the Baltic sea region seeking closer cooperation on the bilateral, regional, and nato levels. AlthoughNorwaydoesnotseeitselfasamem-beroftheBalticSearegion,asaresultofitsintensepoliticalandmilitary cooperation with Sweden and Finland, Oslo does paycloseattentiontochangesinregionalsecurityenvironment.Justlike thestates in theBalticSearegion,NorwayalsoseesRussiaasacountrywithanunstabledomesticpolicy,anunpredictableforeignpolicy,andasastateharbouringimperialambitionsandhavingsufficientmeans(andmilitarycapabilities)totrytoreal-isetheseambitions,atleastinitsimmediateneighbourhood.LikePoland and the Baltic states,Oslo is in favour of strengtheningNATO’scollectivedefence,butatthesametimehasbeenincreas-inglyemphasisingtheneedforaregionaldimensionofmilitarycooperation.

despite sharing similar interests, norway has been rather cautious in its approach to cooperation with allies from the Baltic sea region with regard to nato’s collective defence.Thishasbeenthecasefortworeasons.First,NorwayseesPolandandtheBalticstatesascompetitorsinitseffortstoattracttheal-lies’ attention,win security guarantees, and ensure theirmili-tarypresenceintheNorwegianHighNorth.TheseconcernsseemparticularlyrelevantatatimewhenthedefencebudgetsofNATOmemberstatesarebeingcutandtheUSisredirectingitsattentionandmilitaryresourcestotheAsia-Pacificregion57.Second,Nor-wayisconcernedthatthegrowingtensionsbetweenNATOandRussiaintheBalticSearegionorinCentralEuropemayhaveadet-rimental effect on Norwegian-Russian relations. Consequently,

57 Norwegian Ministry of Defence, ‘Et forsvar for vår tid. Proposisjon tilStortinget’, Prop. 73 S, p. 25, 23March 2012, http://www.regjeringen.no/pages/37583840/PDFS/PRP201120120073000DDDPDFS.pdf

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Norway’s military or political involvement in NATO activitiesin these regions–whichRussia seesashostile – couldhave re-percussions for the High North. Oslo’s concernsmight explainthecountry’s smallpresence (limited largely to staffofficers)atNATO’sSteadfastJazz2013exercisehostedbyPolandandtheBal-ticstates.SteadfastJazz2013wasafieldtrainingexercisebasedonArticle5oftheWashingtonTreaty(i.e.practisingaresponsetoanarmedattackonNATOterritory).Atthepoliticallevel,thepositionoftheNorwegiangovernmentbecameparticularlyclearduring the Russian-Georgianwar in 2008.Norway blamed theoutbreakofthehostilitiesonGeorgia,althoughitalsoarguedthatRussiaactedinviolationofinternationallaw.Duringtheconflict,Norway was among the group of countries which unofficiallyclaimedthatRussia'sactionshadbeenprovoked,amongstotherthings,bythedeclarationadoptedattheNATOsummitinBucha-rest;thedocumentofficiallyannouncedNATO’sopendoorpolicyforGeorgia’sandUkraine’sfutureaccession,andwaspassedwithstrongsupportfromtheUSandseveralCentralEuropeancoun-tries.Throughouttheconflict,Norwaycalledfordialogueandco-operationwithRussiawithintheframeworkoftheNATO-RussiaCouncil58.

despite norway’s distanced position, the countries in Baltic sea region can still find areas for cooperation based on similar interests within nato – although the principle of reciprocity ought to be a key element when dealing with oslo.Norway’scalls for the refocusingonNATO’s collectivedefencedeserve tobesupported.TheimplementationofspecificprojectsshouldtakeplacenotonlyintheHighNorth,butalsoonNATO’seasternpe-riphery. In order to improve the interoperability of the armedforcesacrossNorthernEurope,itisofinteresttoothercountriesto take part in Norway's national military exercises (e.g. Cold

58 ‘Norway among those splitting NATO’, Views and News from Norway,14February2012,http://www.newsinenglish.no/2011/02/14/norway-among-those-splitting-nato/

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Response).However, this should be donewith the proviso thatNorwegianmilitary increases itspresenceatnationalexercisesheldinPolandandintheBalticSearegion.Norway’sconservativegovernmentmayprovemoreopentotheideaofjointNATOexer-cisesandtoclosercooperationwithcountriesintheregion.Thenewcabinetmightperhapsbemoreinclinedtoaccepttheargu-mentthatanyactionsunderminingNATO’ssecurityguarantees,orallowingRussiatoexertmilitarypressureonanyNATOmem-ber in theBalticSearegionorCentralEurope,wouldautomati-callyalsoundermineNATO’scredibilityintheHighNorth.

in recent years, the bilateral dimension of relations between norway and poland has created greater opportunities for co-operation. the most promising of these have been the prag-matic military-technical collaboration, which may benefit the armed forces and the defence industries of both countries, but which has not a distinctive political character and will not cause controversy in norway’s relations with russia. Initssecuritystrategyadoptedin2012,NorwaymentionedPolandforthefirsttimeasapotentialpartnerforsuchcooperation59.Therise inthesignificancePolandhasforNorwayisaconsequenceoftheplannedmodernisationofthePolishArmedForcesenabledby a rise inmilitary spending. In addition,Polandhas recentlypurchased Norwegian armament and military equipment. Forexample, theacquisitionof thecoastalartillerysystemequipedwithNavalStrikeMissiles(acquiredbythePolishNavyfromtheNorwegiancompanyKongsbergDefenceSystemsincooperationwithseveralPolishcompanies)offersopportunitiesforexchange

59 Norwegian Ministry of Defence, ‘Et forsvar for vår tid. Proposisjon tilStortinget”, Prop. 73 S, p 28, 23March 2012, http://www.regjeringen.no/pages/37583840/PDFS/PRP201120120073000DDDPDFS.pdf. This was fur-ther emphasised during an unprecedented visit to Poland made in 2012byNorway’sroyalcouple,theDefenceMinisterandtheForeignMinister.The agenda contained an important point onmilitary-technical coopera-tion. National Security Bureau, ‘Norwegian Royal Couple visits Poland’,http://en.bbn.gov.pl/en/news/247,Norwegian-royal-couple-visits-Poland.html?search=7634118

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ofexperienceandjointexerciseswiththeNorwegianNavy(theNSMaretobecarriedbyNorwegianfrigatesandcorvettesalso)60.NorwayisalsointerestedinPolandasapotentialpartnerincol-laborationbetween thespecial forces61.Norway iscurrentlyre-structuringitsSpecialOperationsForces(SOF)62,whilePoland’sSOFalreadyconstituteaseparatebranchofthearmedforcesandare the country’s strongest asset inNATO. In exchange, Polandcould benefit from Norwegian SOF’s experience in protectingcriticalinfrastructure(suchasenergyinfrastructure,especiallysea-based and coastal infrastructure). Meanwhile, cooperationbetweenthecountries’airforcescouldfocusontheoperationofthemulti-roleF-16fighterandoftheC-130militarytransportair-craft,which(invariousversions)areusedbyboththePolishandNorwegianArmedForces.Finally,PolandmightalsobeinterestedinlearningmoreaboutOslo’spolicyonRussiaandaboutitsexpe-rienceofengaginginmilitarycooperationwithMoscow.

This research paper was completed in October 2013.

60 Inthepast,cooperationbetweenthetwocountries’naviesfocusedonPo-land’sacquisitionin2002offiveKobben-classsubmarineswithdrawnfromservicebytheNorwegianNavy.Fourofthevesselsarestillinoperation.

61 Poland’sMinistry of Defence, ‘Meeting of Polish and Norwegian SpecialForces Commanders’, 23 February 2013, http://www.mon.gov.pl/en/ar-tykul/12484

62 GerardO'Dwyer, ‘Norway revampsSpecialOperationsCapacity’,Defense­News,11May2013,http://www.defensenews.com/article/20130511/SHOWS-COUT01/305110011/Norway-Revamps-Special-Operations-Capacity.InNor-way,SpecialForcesdonotconstituteaseparatebranchofthearmedforces;separate units are subordinated to the Navy (Marinejegerkommandoen)andtheArmy(ForsvaretsSpesialkommando/HærensJegerkommando).

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appendix 1. norwegian Maritime Boundaries

NorwegianHighNorth:theNorwegianTerritorialSeaandpartsofNorway’snorthernregions(Nordland,TromsandFinnmark);Norway’s200-mileExclusiveEconomicZone in theBarentsSeaandtheNorthSea,aswellasclaimstothecontinentalshelfbe-yondthe200nautical-mile limit inselectedareasof theArctic;theSvalbardArchipelagoandtheIslandofJanMayen.

/©

source: http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/UD/Vedlegg/Folkerett/20121002_FMGT_OVERVIEW_NORGE_NORDOMRaaDENE_NORWEGIAN_MARITIME_BOUNDARIES_7.5M_H61xW52_P_JB_ED04_UGRADERT_300dpi.pdf

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appendix 2. norway’s participation in international operations63

operation / no. of troops / year 2009 2010 2011 2012

Afghanistan-UNAMA(ONZ)-ISAF(NATO)

2510

2526

1535

3628

Kosovo-UNMIK(ONZ)-KFOR(NATO)

16

14

13

13

BosniaandHerzegovina-EUFOR-NATOHQ

213 2 1 1

Sudan-UNMIS/UNISFA(ONZ) 22 20 11 19

Congo-MONUC/MONUSCO(ONZ) 1 1 1 1

Chad-MINURCAT(NATO) 154

HornofAfrica-Atalanta(UE)-OceanShield(NATO) 4 39 39

MiddleEast-UNSTO(ONZ) 13 14 12 13

SinaiPeninsula-MFO(ONZ) 6 3 3 3

63 Source:NorwegianMinistryofDefence,‘FactsandFigures.NorwegianDe-fence’fromtheyears2010-2013,http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/fd/docu-ments/Handbooks-and-brochures.html?id=2126 as well as Forsvaret, Ope-rasjoner i utlandet, http://forsvaret.no/operasjoner/internasjonalt/Sider/default.aspx

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operation / no. of troops / year 2009 2010 2011 2012

Lebanon-UNIFILII(ONZ) 5

Libya-OUP(NATO) 108

Totalavg.ofap-prox.800troops

avg.ofap-prox.700troops

avg.ofap-prox.650troops

avg.ofap-prox.700troops

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appendix 3. Military expenditure

Military expenditure in Norway and Sweden between 1989-2012 (in US$ billion)

4

6

8

10

source:SIPRIMilitaryExpenditureDatabase,StockholmInternationalPeaceResearchInstitute,figuresfrom2012inUS$,http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/milex_database/milex_database

Military expenditure between 1989-2012 (as a percentage of GDP)

1.0

1.5

2.0

2.5

3.0

source:SIPRIMilitaryExpenditureDatabase,StockholmInternationalPeaceResearchInstitute,http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/mi-lex_database/milex_database

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appendix 4. norwegian armed forces: personnel strength and categories

Strength of the Norwegian Armed Forces (2012)64 – military personnel, civilians and conscripts

NorwegianArmy 4550+4802conscripts

RoyalNorwegianNavy 2426+2277conscripts*

RoyalNorwegianAirForce 2811+1158conscripts

Logistics 2813

HomeGuard 534+54conscripts

CyberDefence 1089

Other 2778

total strength: 16,991 civilian and military personnel

8000 conscripts+approx.45,000reservepersonnel

*includingCoastGuard360(+339conscripts)

64 Forsvaret,Forsvaretsårsrapport2012,22March2013,http://forsvaret.no/om-forsvaret/fakta-om-forsvaret/publikasjoner/rapport2012/Documents/Forsvarets%20%C3%A5rsrapport%202012%20fullstendig%20versjon.pdf

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Personnel categories in the Norwegian Armed Forces (2012)65

Military personnel -permanentpersonnel(Y­befal)-undercontractuptoage35(A­befal)-undertemporarycontractsofupto3years(Vervede)

675436551241

conscripts (mandatorydraft)19­month compulsory military service with 12­month initial service, and 5 months allocated to the revision training or training with the Home Guard

approx.8000

civilian personnel approx.5300

65 Forsvaret,Forsvaretsårsrapport2012,22March2013,http://forsvaret.no/om-forsvaret/fakta-om-forsvaret/publikasjoner/rapport2012/Documents/Forsvarets%20%C3%A5rsrapport%202012%20fullstendig%20versjon.pdf

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appendix 5. norwegian armed forces: domestic activity

Norwegian Air Force – Air Policing Activity66

2008 2009 2010 2011 2012

No.offlights 32 38 36 34 41

No.ofidentifiedaircraft* 87 77 39 48 71

*NodistinctionismadebetweenthoseidentifiedaircraftwhichonlyapproachedNorway’sairspaceandthosewhichactuallycrossedit.TheidentifiedaircraftweremostlyRussianmilitarycraft.

Norwegian Coast Guard – Number of Patrol Days in Northern and Southern Norway67

2010 2011 2012

NorthernNorway 2112 2226 2137

SouthernNorway 1375 1373 1469

66 Quick Reaction Alert of themulti-role F-16 aircraft. ‘Forsvaret, Kampfly:klare på 15minutter’, http://forsvaret.no/operasjoner/norge/Sider/Kamp-fly.aspx

67 Forsvaret,Forsvaretsårsrapport2012,22March2013,http://forsvaret.no/om-forsvaret/fakta-om-forsvaret/publikasjoner/rapport2012/Documents/Forsvarets%20%C3%A5rsrapport%202012%20fullstendig%20versjon.pdf