Nos. 17-3752, 18-1253, 19-1129, 19-1189
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees,
v. PRESIDENT, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al.,
Defendants-Appellants, and
LITTLE SISTERS OF THE POOR, SAINTS PETER AND PAUL HOME, Defendant-Intervenor-Appellant.
On Appeal from the U.S District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania, No. 2:17-cv-4540
Brief of Defendant-Intervenor-Appellant The Little Sisters of the Poor, Saints Peter and Paul Home
NICHOLAS M. CENTRELLA Conrad O’Brien PC 1500 Market Street, Suite 3900 Philadelphia, PA 19102-2100 (215) 864-8098 [email protected]
MARK L. RIENZI LORI H. WINDHAM ERIC C. RASSBACH DIANA M. VERM The Becket Fund for
Religious Liberty 1200 New Hampshire Ave. NW Suite 700 Washington, DC 20036 (202) 955-0095 [email protected]
Counsel for Defendant-Intervenor-Appellant
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CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 26.1, the Little Sis-
ters represent that they do not have any parent entities and do not is-
sue stock.
Dated: February 15, 2019
/s/ Mark Rienzi MARK L. RIENZI
The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty
1200 New Hampshire Ave. NW Suite 700 Washington, DC 20036 (202) 955-0095 [email protected] Counsel for Defendant-Appellant
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT ............................................ i
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ..................................................................... vi
INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................... 1
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT ........................................................... 5
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ............................................................... 5
STATEMENT OF RELATED CASES ...................................................... 6
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ................................................................ 12
A. The mandate and its exceptions ................................................ 12
B. The First IFR ............................................................................. 14
C. The Second IFR .......................................................................... 15
D. RFRA litigation and the Third IFR ........................................... 18
E. Supreme Court litigation ........................................................... 19
F. The Fourth and Fifth IFRs ........................................................ 21
G. The Final Rule ........................................................................... 25
H. The decisions below ................................................................... 25
STANDARD OF REVIEW....................................................................... 27
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT ........................................................ 28
ARGUMENT ........................................................................................... 30
I. The States lack standing. ............................................................... 30
A. The States cannot bring Establishment Clause, Equal Protection, or Title VII claims. ....................................... 30
B. The States lack injury in fact .................................................... 31
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1. The States’ purported injuries are generalized and speculative ...................................................................... 31
2. The States cannot sue as parens patriae ............................... 35
3. The States cannot overcome these deficiencies with “special solicitude.” ....................................................... 35
C. The States’ purported harms are neither traceable to the Final Rule nor redressable by enjoining it ..................... 36
1. Any injury to the States is self-inflicted ................................ 36
2. The Court cannot redress the alleged harm .......................... 37
3. The Court cannot reinstate rules that are subject to the same alleged APA problems ............................ 38
II. The States cannot succeed on the merits. ..................................... 41
A. The States are not likely to succeed on their claim that the Final Rule is contrary to law ............................. 41
1. The agencies may make exemptions from a mandate they were never obligated to create in the first place. .................................................................... 41
2. The States’ reasoning would also invalidate the preexisting religious exemptions and accommodation. ..................................................................... 46
3. The agencies are permitted to issue the Final Rule to comply with RFRA. ......................................... 46
a. RFRA applies broadly to federal laws, federal agencies, and religious exercises. .......................... 47
b. The mandate as it existed before the Fourth IFR violates RFRA ............................................................ 48
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c. After Zubik, courts have unanimously found the mandate as applied to religious employers violated RFRA ................................................. 51
d. Neither Geneva College nor Real Alternatives forecloses a RFRA finding ................................................ 52
e. Where courts are divided, government has discretion to err on the side of not violating civil rights ......................................................................... 55
f. The Fourth IFR and Final Rule do not violate the Establishment or Equal Protection Clauses ............... 56
g. The Final Rule does not violate Title VII or the Pregnancy Discrimination Act. ................................... 59
B. The States are not likely to establish that the Final Rule is procedurally invalid ............................................. 60
1. The agencies had good cause to issue the Fourth IFR............................................................................. 60
2. If the States’ procedural arguments are correct, the underlying mandate and “accommodation” are equally invalid. ............................................................... 64
3. Any procedural defect in the interim rules is harmless. ............................................................................ 66
III. Ordering the agencies to enforce the same supposed violations of law used to justify the preliminary injunctions is an abuse of discretion. ............................................. 75
IV. The States cannot satisfy the remaining injunction factors ............................................................................................. 76
A. The States are not suffering irreparable harm ......................... 76
B. The public interest and the balance of the equities favor broad protection of religious exercise .............................. 79
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CONCLUSION ........................................................................................ 81
CERTIFICATE OF BAR MEMBERSHIP .............................................. 83
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE WITH FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32(A) AND LOCAL RULE 31.1 .......... 84
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ................................................................. 85
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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page(s)
Cases
1621 Route 22 W. Operating Co., LLC v. NLRB, 825 F.3d 128 (3d Cir. 2016) ................................................................ 52
Adams v. Freedom Forge Corp., 204 F.3d 475 (3d Cir. 2000) ................................................................ 76
Advocates for Highway & Auto Safety v. Fed. Highway Admin., 28 F.3d 1288 (D.C. Cir. 1994) ............................................................. 74
AFGE, Local 3090 v. FLRE, 777 F.2d 751 (D.C. Cir. 1985) ............................................................. 69
Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984) ............................................................................. 31
Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Emps., AFL-CIO v. Block, 655 F.2d 1153 (D.C. Cir. 1981) ........................................................... 62
Brown v. City of Pittsburgh, 586 F.3d 263 (3d Cir. 2009) ................................................................ 28
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682 (2014) ..................................................................... passim
Catholic Benefits Ass’n LCA v. Hargan, No. 5:14-cv-00240-R, Order, Dkt.184 (W.D. Okla. Mar. 7, 2018) .................................................................................................... 24
Corp. of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987) ............................................................................. 58
County of Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573 (1989) ............................................................................. 57
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Dam Things from Denmark v. Russ Berrie & Co., 290 F.3d 548 (3d Cir. 2002) ................................................................ 27
Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724 (2008) ............................................................................. 30
Diocese of Fort Wayne-S. Bend, Inc. v. Sebelius, 988 F. Supp. 2d 958 (N.D. Ind. 2013) ................................................. 63
Edmonson v. Lincoln Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 725 F.3d 406 (3d Cir. 2013) ................................................................ 27
Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976) ............................................................................. 80
Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) ............................................................................. 48
Friends of Iwo Jima v. Nat’l Capital Planning Comm’n, 176 F.3d 768 (4th Cir. 1999) ............................................................... 74
Geneva Coll. v. Sebelius, No. 14-1376, 2014 WL 2812346 (3d Cir. June 10, 2014) ................... 53
Geneva Coll. v. Sebelius, No. 2:12-cv-00207 (W.D. Pa.) (Jul. 5, 2018)........................................ 52
Geneva Coll. v. Sec’y Dep’t Health & Human Servs., 778 F.3d 422 (3d Cir. 2015) ................................................................ 53
GenOn REMA, LLC v. EPA, 722 F.3d 513 (3d Cir. 2013) ................................................................ 68
Georgetown Univ. Hosp. v. Bowen, 821 F.2d 750 (D.C. Cir. 1987) ............................................................. 75
Green Island Power Auth. v. FERC, 577 F.3d 148 (2d Cir. 2009) ................................................................ 67
Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171 (2012) ............................................................................. 57
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Idahoan Fresh v. Advantage Produce, Inc., 157 F.3d 197 (3d Cir. 1998) ................................................................ 44
Kikumura v. Hurley, 242 F.3d 950 (10th Cir. 2001) ............................................................. 80
Levesque v. Block, 723 F.2d 175 (1st Cir. 1983) ............................................................... 73
Little Sisters of the Poor v. Burwell, 794 F.3d 1151 (10th Cir. 2015) ........................................................... 19
Little Sisters of the Poor v. Hargan, No. 13-1540 (10th Cir. June 27, 2016) ............................................... 21
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) ............................................................................. 37
Mack v. Warden Loretto FCI, 839 F.3d 286 (3d Cir. 2016) ................................................................ 55
Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007) ....................................................................... 35, 36
Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923) ............................................................................. 35
Mid-Tex Elec. Co-op., Inc. v. FERC, 822 F.2d 1123 (D.C. Cir. 1987) ........................................................... 61
Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass’n v. State Farm Auto Mutual Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983) ............................................................................... 63
NRDC v. EPA, 683 F.2d 752 (3d Cir. 1982) ................................................................ 69
NVE, Inc. v. HHS, 436 F.3d 182 (3d Cir. 2006) ................................................................ 61
PDK Labs. Inc. v. U.S. Drug Enf’t Admin., 362 F.3d 786 (D.C. Cir. 2004) ............................................................. 67
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Pennsylvania v. New Jersey, 426 U.S. 660 (1976) ............................................................................. 37
Pennsylvania v. President, 888 F.3d 52 (3d Cir. 2018) .............................................................. 6, 24
Pennsylvania v. Riley, 84 F.3d 125 (3d Cir. 1996) .................................................................. 31
Priests For Life v. HHS, 772 F.3d 229 (D.C. Cir. 2014) ................................................. 61, 62, 64
Rappa v. New Castle Cty., 18 F.3d 1043 (3d Cir. 1994) ................................................................ 75
Reaching Souls Int’l, Inc. v. Azar, No. CIV-13-1092-D, 2018 WL 1352186 (W.D. Okla. Mar. 15, 2018) ........................................................................................ 24, 52
Real Alternatives, Inc. v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 867 F.3d 338 (3d Cir. 2017) ....................... 54
Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Atlanta v. Sebelius, No. 1:12-CV03489-WSD, 2104 WL 1256373 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 26, 2014) ..................................................................................... 63
Sharon Steel Corp. v. EPA, 597 F.2d 377 (3d Cir. 1979) ................................................................ 68
Sheller, P.C. v. HHS, 663 F. App’x 150 (3d Cir. 2016) .......................................................... 32
Sheppard v. Sullivan, 906 F.2d 756 (D.C. Cir. 1990) ............................................................. 71
Shinseki v. Sanders, 556 U.S. 396 (2009) ....................................................................... 66, 67
South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966) ............................................................................. 31
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Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488 (2009) ............................................................................. 30
Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2015) ......................................................... 35, 36
Texas v. United States, No. 4:18-CV-00167-O, 2018 WL 6589412 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 14, 2018) .................................................................... 42
Town of Chester v. Laroe Estates, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1645 (2017) ......................................................................... 30
Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811 (2014) ......................................................................... 57
In re Union Pac. R.R. Employment Practices Litigation, 479 F.3d 936, 942 (8th Cir. 2007) ...................................................... 59
United States v. Cooper, 750 F.3d 263 (3d Cir. 2014) ................................................................ 72
United States v. Dimpfl, 523 F. App’x 865 (3d Cir. 2013) .......................................................... 72
United States v. Johnson, 632 F.3d 912 (5th Cir. 2011) .......................................................... 73-74
United States v. Reynolds, 710 F.3d 498 (3d Cir. 2013) .......................................................... 28, 71
Wheaton Coll. v. Azar, No. 1:13-cv-8910 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 22, 2018), Dkt.119 ........................... 51
Wheaton Coll. v. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. 2806 (2014) ......................................................................... 18
Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7 (2008) ................................................................................. 41
Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952) ............................................................................. 58
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Zubik v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016) ................................................................. passim
Zubik v. Sebelius, No. 2:13-cv-01459 (W.D. Pa.) (Dec. 20, 2013) ............................. passim
Statutes
5 U.S.C. § 553 .................................................................................... 60, 61
5 U.S.C. § 706 .............................................................................. 28, 47, 66
26 U.S.C. § 4980D ............................................................................. 13, 48
26 U.S.C. § 4980H ................................................................. 13, 14, 38, 48
26 U.S.C. § 9815 ................................................................................ 12, 42
28 U.S.C. § 1292 ........................................................................................ 5
28 U.S.C. § 1331 ........................................................................................ 5
29 U.S.C. § 1185d .............................................................................. 12, 42
42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13 ....................................................................... passim
42 U.S.C. § 2000bb .......................................................................... passim
42 U.S.C. § 7607 ...................................................................................... 36
42 U.S.C. § 18011 .................................................................................... 13
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) .......................................... 12
Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054 (2017) .......................................................................... 42
Regulations
68 Fed. Reg. 56,430 (Sept. 30, 2003) ....................................................... 55
73 Fed. Reg. 38,030 (July 2, 2008) .......................................................... 72
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75 Fed. Reg. 41,726 (July 19, 2010) .................................................. 14, 66
75 Fed. Reg. 81,849 (Dec. 29, 2010) ........................................................ 72
76 Fed. Reg. 46,621 (Aug. 3, 2011) .................................................. passim
77 Fed. Reg. 8,725 (Feb. 15, 2012) .................................................. passim
77 Fed. Reg. 16,501 (Mar. 21, 2012) ....................................................... 16
78 Fed. Reg. 8,456 (Feb. 6, 2013) ...................................................... 16, 17
78 Fed. Reg. 39,870 (July 2, 2013) .......................................................... 16
79 Fed. Reg. 51,092 (Aug. 27, 2014) ........................................................ 18
80 Fed. Reg. 41,318 (July 14, 2015) ........................................................ 19
81 Fed. Reg. 47,741 (July 22, 2016) ........................................................ 22
82 Fed. Reg. 47,792 (Oct. 13, 2017) ......................................................... 22
82 Fed. Reg. 47,838 (Oct. 13, 2017) ......................................................... 22
83 Fed. Reg. 25,502 (June 1, 2018) ......................................................... 50
83 Fed. Reg. 57,536 (Nov. 15, 2018) .................................................. 25, 70
Other Authorities
American Heritage Dictionary (3d ed. 1992) .......................................... 43
Application of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act to the Award of a Grant Pursuant to the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act, 31 Op. O.L.C. 162 (2007) ...................... 55
Jonathan Bearak & Rachel K. Jones, Did Contraceptive Use Patterns Change After the Affordable Care Act? A Descriptive Analysis, Guttmacher Institute (Mar. 13, 2017), https://bit.ly/2NyhHIR ............................................................. 79
Becket, HHS Case Database, https://bit.ly/2zlzvOs ............................... 18
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Centers for Consumer Information & Insurance Oversight, Affordable Care Act Implementation FAQs – Set 12, Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, https://go.cms.gov/2I54sZV ........................................................... 44, 45
Christian Medical Association, Comment Letter on NPRM (Mar. 21, 2013), https://bit.ly/2O28k3p .............................................. 17
Congressional Research Service, Federal Support for Reproductive Health Services: Frequently Asked Questions (2016), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44130.pdf .................................. 14
EBSA, Coverage of Certain Services Under the Affordable Care Act (Aug. 27, 2014), https://bit.ly/2Nv8Kjh. ............................... 18
Fed. R. Evid. 201(b) ................................................................................. 63
HRSA, Women’s Preventive Services Guidelines, U.S. Department of Health & Human Services (Aug. 2011), https://bit.ly/2irrzlT ................................................................ 13, 15, 42
HRSA, Women’s Preventive Services Guidelines, U.S. Department of Health & Human Services (Oct. 2017), https://bit.ly/2OHsmgH ....................................................................... 44
Institute of Medicine, Clinical Preventive Services for Women: Closing the Gaps, The National Academies Press (2011), https://bit.ly/2QOysgH. ..................................................... 13, 78
Kaiser Family Found., Employer Health Benefits 2018 Annual Survey (2018), https://bit.ly/2T4qwbQ............................. 13, 32
Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 1409 (1990) .................................................................................. 57
Mark L. Rienzi, Fool Me Twice: Zubik v. Burwell and the Perils of Judicial Faith in Government Claims, 2016 Cato Sup. Ct. Rev. 123 (2015-2016) ............................................................ 50
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State Attorneys General, Comment Letter on Fourth IFR (Dec. 5, 2017), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=CMS-2014-0115-58168 ................................................ 23
U.S. Dep’t of Labor, FAQs About Affordable Care Act Implementation Part 36 (Jan. 9, 2017), https://bit.ly/2O7yJNr ................................................................... 22, 70
U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO-13-21, Federal Rulemaking: Agencies Could Take Additional Steps to Respond to Public Comments (Dec. 2012), http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/651052.pdf ................................................................ 73
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INTRODUCTION
This case concerns the validity of the federal government’s latest ef-
fort to both provide contraceptive access and protect religious liberty. In
2017, after many years of unsuccessful litigation against religious objec-
tors, the federal government finally admitted that it did not need to hi-
jack the health plans of unwilling religious entities. Instead, the gov-
ernment found it has many less restrictive alternatives to provide con-
traceptive access.
How good are these alternatives? So good that to date neither of the
Plaintiff States can find even a single woman among their 21.8 million
residents who stands to lose contraceptive access as a result of the rules
at issue here. Nor can the 23 states engaged as plaintiffs or amici in
parallel litigation in California.
Accordingly, in issuing new religious exemption rules, the federal
government did the only thing it could do: it stopped trying to force reli-
gious objectors to comply with the contraceptive mandate. And although
the federal government was free (and remains free) to simply revoke the
mandate entirely, it instead tailored its response to only the small class
of employers with religious or moral objections. The federal government
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also ensured that other programs to provide free and low-cost contra-
ceptives will remain in place. It has even sought to expand Title X to
create additional access in case any employee of a religious or moral ob-
jector seeks coverage.
That should have been the end of the long and unseemly culture-war
battle over whether the federal government is permitted to force nuns to
participate in the distribution of contraception. But the Plaintiff States
sued to advance a more radical claim: that the federal government is
required to force nuns to participate in the distribution of contraception.
That position is so extreme it was never advanced in the five years of
litigation over the contraceptive mandate from 2011-2016. To the con-
trary, the Obama Administration—like the Trump Administration—
believed that the agencies had discretion to avoid burdening religious
employers. See 76 Fed. Reg. 46,621, 46,623 (Aug. 3, 2011). And lest the
regulators had any doubt about their obligation to avoid such burdens,
federal judges have entered more than 50 injunctions forbidding apply-
ing the mandate against religious objectors. Those injunctions from Ar-
ticle III courts remain in place and continue to bind the agencies.
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Despite all this, the district court issued two separate nationwide in-
junctions that purport to require the federal government to apply the
contraceptive mandate to religious objectors. Those injunctions cannot
stand, both because the district court lacked jurisdiction, and because
the rules at issue are both procedurally and substantively valid. Simply
put, the agencies were obeying Congress (which enacted RFRA) and the
courts (dozens of which found that the mandate violated RFRA) in issu-
ing the rules. The agencies were given discretion about what to include
in the preventive services mandate and what “guidelines” should apply
to it, but they were not given discretion about whether to obey RFRA.
The court’s contrary injunction thus orders the agencies to violate fed-
eral law.
But the strangest aspect of the district court’s injunction—what it
called “the elephant in the room”—is that the very analysis the court
used to invalidate the religious exemption rules would also invalidate
the contraceptive mandate for all employers. For example, if issuing fi-
nal rules after interim final rules violates the Administrative Procedure
Act, Appx.85-91, then the entire contraceptive mandate is unlawful.
Likewise, if the agency lacks authority to change the mandate to ac-
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count for religious burdens, Appx.93-100, then the agency also lacked
the authority to create the prior exemptions on which the district court
relied. Any legal theory that would invalidate the religious exemption
rules would simultaneously invalidate the old version of the contracep-
tive mandate-plus-exemptions that the district court reinstated.
The district court was well aware of this problem. The court called
the legality of the prior regime “puzzling,” “an important question,” and
“the elephant in the room.” Appx.703, 705, 736. And when the States
insisted that the court could enter the injunction anyway because “this
case is not about those prior exemptions,” the district court candidly re-
sponded “Well, that wouldn’t really help me.” Appx.704.
Nevertheless, the district court ultimately issued the nationwide in-
junction without explaining how its legal reasoning did not simultane-
ously invalidate the version of the mandate-plus-exemptions it reinstat-
ed. Instead, the court simply claimed, as the States had at argument,
that the legality of the prior exemptions was “not before this court.”
Appx.93 n.20.
But this Court cannot affirm an injunction that would render invalid
the very relief the States seek. Under RFRA, the prior version of the re-
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ligious accommodation must go, or the entire contraceptive mandate
must go. Either way, the Little Sisters are entitled to protection, and
the decisions below must be reversed.
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The States asserted jurisdiction in the district court under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331. Nonetheless, that court was without jurisdiction because the
States lack Article III standing. See infra Part I. The district court en-
tered a preliminary injunction on December 15, 2017, Appx.51, and a
second preliminary injunction on January 14, 2019, Appx.124. This
Court’s appellate jurisdiction rests on 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
The Little Sisters’ appeal presents four main issues:
Standing. Was the district court correct that the States have stand-
ing, despite the fact that they identified no employers who plan to drop
contraceptive coverage, nor any citizens who stand to lose such cover-
age, nor any citizens who would then qualify for and turn to the gov-
ernment for coverage? Dkt.108 at 10-15; Appx.14-23; Appx.71-78.
Success on the merits. Have the States demonstrated a likelihood
of success on the merits of their claims that the government lacked good
cause to issue the interim final rule, that the interim final rule was con-
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trary to law, and that the final rule was contrary to law? Dkt.108 at 16-
32; Appx.19-37; 82-110.
Remedy. Can the Court reinstate the underlying mandate that pre-
dated the interim final rule and final rule if that underlying mandate
violates the Administrative Procedure Act, the Affordable Care Act, and
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act? Dkt.108 at 20-24; Appx.91.
Preliminary injunction. Do the remaining injunction factors justi-
fy the district court’s decision to issue nationwide injunctions against
the interim final rule and the final rule? Dkt.108 at 43-44; Appx.43-49;
110-23.
STATEMENT OF RELATED CASES
This case has been before this Court previously in the related appeal
No. 17-3679, resulting in the decision reported at 888 F.3d 52.
All of the actions listed below are related to this action. These actions
include claims or defenses that overlap with the States’ claims here and
are either pending, involve decisions of this Court at issue in this case,
or resulted in permanent injunctions against former versions of the
mandate. Unless otherwise noted, the dates listed are the dates the
permanent injunction was issued.
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Pending cases challenging the rules at issue here:
1. Massachusetts v. HHS, No. 1:17-cv-11930 (D. Mass.) (defend-ants’ Mot. for Summary Judgment granted April 4, 2018; on ap-peal to 1st Cir. No. 18-1514)
2. California v. Azar, No. 4:17-cv-05783 (N.D. Cal.) (preliminary injunction issued Jan. 13, 2019; on appeal to 9th Cir. No. 19-15072, Jan. 14, 2019)
Pending cases challenging prior versions of the rules:
3. Bindon v. Azar, No. No. 1:13-cv-01207 (D.D.C.)
4. DeOtte v. Azar, No. 4:18-cv-00825 (N.D. Tex.)
5. Dobson v. Azar, No. 1:13-cv-03326 (D. Colo.)
6. E. Tex. Baptist Univ. v. Azar, No. 4:12-cv-03009 (S.D. Tex.)
7. La. Coll. v. Azar, No. 1:12-cv-00463 (W.D. La.)
8. Triune Health Group, Inc. v. HHS, No. 1:12-cv-06756 (N.D. Ill.)
Cases resulting in permanent injunctions issued prior to Octo-ber 2017 against prior versions of the rules:
9. Am. Pulverizer Co. v. HHS, No. 6:12-cv-03459 (W.D. Mo.) (Oct. 30, 2014)
10. Annex Medical, Inc., v. Solis, No. 0:12-cv-02804 (D. Minn.) (Aug. 19, 2015)
11. Armstrong v. Sebelius, No. 1:13-cv-00563 (D. Colo.) (Oct. 7, 2014)
12. Autocam Corp. v. Sebelius, No. 1:12-cv-01096 (W.D. Mich.) (Jan. 5, 2015)
13. Barron Indus., Inc. v. Sebelius, No. 1:13-cv-01330 (D.D.C.) (Oct. 27, 2014)
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14. Bick Holdings, Inc. v. HHS, No. 4:13-cv-00462 (E.D. Mo.) (Nov. 18, 2014)
15. Brandt, Bishop of the Roman Catholic Diocese of Greensburg v. Sebelius, No. 2:14-cv-00681 (W.D. Pa.) (Aug. 20, 2014)
16. Briscoe v. Sebelius, No. 1:13-cv-00285 (D. Colo.) (Jan. 27, 2015)
17. Catholic Diocese of Beaumont v. Sebelius, No. 1:13-cv-00709 (E.D. Tex.) (Jan. 2, 2014)
18. C.W. Zumbiel Co. v. HHS, No. 1:13-cv-01611 (D.D.C.) (Nov. 3, 2014)
19. Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sebelius, No. 5:12-cv-06744 (E.D. Pa.) (Oct. 2, 2014)
20. Daniel Medford v. Sebelius, No. 0:13-cv-01726 (D. Minn.) (Nov. 20, 2014)
21. Doboszenski & Sons, Inc. v. Sebelius, No. 0:13-cv-03148 (D. Minn.) (Nov. 18, 2014)
22. Domino’s Farms Corp. v. Sebelius, No. 2:12-cv-15488 (E.D. Mich.) (Dec. 3, 2014)
23. Eden Foods, Inc. v. Sebelius, No. 2:13-cv-11229 (E.D. Mich.) (Feb. 12, 2015)
24. Feltl & Co. v. Sebelius, No. 0:13-cv-02635 (D. Minn.) (Nov. 26, 2014)
25. Gilardi v. HHS, No. 1:13-cv-00104 (D.D.C.) (Oct. 20, 2014)
26. Grote Indus., LLC v. Sebelius, No. 4:12-cv-00134 (S.D. Ind.) (Apr. 30, 2015)
27. Hall v. Sebelius, No. 0:13-cv-00295 (D. Minn.) (Nov. 26, 2014)
28. Hartenbower v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., No. 1:13-cv-02253 (N.D. Ill.) (Nov. 3, 2014)
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9
29. Hastings Chrysler Center, Inc. v. Sebelius, No. 0:14-cv-00265 (D. Minn.) (Dec. 11, 2014)
30. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, No. 5:12-cv-01000 (W.D. Okla.) (Nov. 19, 2014)
31. Holland v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., No. 2:13-cv-15487 (S.D. W. Va.) (May 29, 2015)
32. Johnson Welded Products, Inc. v. Sebelius, No. 1:13-cv-00609 (D.D.C.) (Oct. 24, 2014)
33. Korte v. HHS, No. 3:12-cv-1072 (S.D. Ill.) (Nov. 7, 2014)
34. Lindsay v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., No. 1:13-cv-01210 (N.D. Ill.) (Dec. 3, 2014)
35. M&N Plastics, Inc. v. Sebelius, No. 5:13-cv-14754 (E.D. Mich.) (Nov. 17, 2015)
36. March for Life v. Azar, No. 1:14-cv-01149 (D.D.C.) (Aug. 31, 2015)
37. Mersino Dewatering Inc. v. Sebelius, No. 2:13-cv-15079 (E.D. Mich.) (Feb. 27, 2015)
38. Mersino Mgmt. Co. v. Sebelius, No. 2:13-cv-11296 (E.D. Mich.) (Feb. 4, 2015)
39. Midwest Fastener Corp. v. Sebelius, No. 1:13-cv-01337 (D.D.C.) (Oct. 24, 2014)
40. MK Chambers Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., No. 2:13-cv-11379 (E.D. Mich.) (Nov. 21, 2014)
41. Newland v. Sebelius, No. 1:12-cv-01123 (D. Colo.) (Mar. 17, 2015)
42. O’Brien v. HHS, No. 4:12-cv-00476 (E.D. Mo.) (Nov. 12, 2014)
43. Randy Reed Auto., Inc. v. Sebelius, No. 5:13-cv-06117 (W.D. Mo.) (Nov. 12, 2014)
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44. Roman Catholic Archdiocese of N.Y. v. Sebelius, No. 1:12-cv-02542 (E.D.N.Y.) (Dec. 16, 2013)
45. Sioux Chief MFG. Co. v. Sebelius, No. 4:13-cv-00036 (W.D. Mo.) (Nov. 12, 2014)
46. SMA, LLC v. Sebelius, No. 0:13-cv-01375 (D. Minn.) (Nov. 20, 2014)
47. Stewart v. Sebelius, No. 1:13-cv-01879 (D.D.C.) (Feb. 2, 2015)
48. Stinson Electric, Inc. v. Sebelius, No. 0:14-cv-00830 (D. Minn.) (Nov. 18, 2014)
49. Tonn and Blank Constr. LLC v. Sebelius, No. 1:12-cv-00325 (N.D. Ind.) (Nov. 6, 2014)
50. Tyndale House Publishers, Inc. v. Sebelius, No. 1:12-cv-01635 (D.D.C.) (Jul. 15, 2015)
51. Weingartz Supply Co. v. Sebelius, No. 2:12-cv-12061 (E.D. Mich.) (Dec. 31, 2014)
52. Wieland v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., No. 4:13-cv-01577 (E.D. Mo.) (Jul 21, 2016)
53. Williams v. Sebelius, No. 1:13-cv-01699 (D.D.C.) (Nov. 5, 2014)
54. Willis and Willis PLC v. Sebelius, No. 1:13-cv-01124 (D.D.C.) (Oct. 31, 2014)
55. Zubik v. Sebelius, No. 2:13-cv-01459 (W.D. Pa.) (Dec. 20, 2013) (appeal dismissed Oct. 20, 2017)
Cases resulting in permanent injunctions issued since October 2017 against prior versions of the rules:
1. Ass’n of Christian Sch. v. Azar, No. 1:14-cv-02966 (D. Colo.) (Dec. 10, 2018)
2. Ave Maria Sch. of Law v. Sebelius, No. 2:13-cv-00795 (M.D. Fla.) (Jul. 11, 2018)
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11
3. Ave Maria Univ. v. Sebelius, No. 2:13-cv-00630 (M.D. Fla.) (Jul. 11, 2018)
4. Catholic Benefits Ass’n LCA v. Sebelius, No. 5:14-cv-00240 (W.D. Okla.) (Mar. 7, 2018)
5. Colorado Christian Univ. v. HHS, No. 1:13-cv-02105 (D. Colo.) (Jul. 11, 2018)
6. Dordt Coll. v. Sebelius, No. 5:13-cv-04100 (N.D. Iowa) (June 12, 2018)
7. Geneva Coll. v. Sebelius, No. 2:12-cv-00207 (W.D. Pa.) (Jul. 5, 2018)
8. Grace Sch. v. Sebelius, No. 3:12-cv-00459 (N.D. Ind.) (June 1, 2018)
9. Little Sisters of the Poor v. Hargan, No. 1:13-cv-02611 (May 16, 2018)
10. Reaching Souls Int’l Inc. v. Sebelius, No. 5:13-cv-01092 (W.D. Okla.) (Mar. 15, 2018)
11. Sharpe Holdings, Inc. v. HHS, No. 2:12-cv-00092 (E.D. Mo.) (Mar. 28, 2018)
12. S. Nazarene Univ. v. Hargan, No. 5:13-cv-01015 (W.D. Okla.) (May 15, 2018)
13. Wheaton Coll. v. Burwell, No. 1:13-cv-08910 (N.D. Ill.) (Feb. 22, 2018)
Case challenging the prior rules resulting in judgment against plaintiff:
14. Real Alternatives, Inc. v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 867 F.3d 338 (3d Cir. 2017)
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. The mandate and its exceptions
This case originates with the Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act of 2010 (ACA).1 The ACA requires certain employers to offer “health
insurance coverage” that includes “preventive care and screenings” for
women without “any cost sharing requirements.” 42 U.S.C.
§ 300gg-13(a)(4); 26 U.S.C. § 9815; 29 U.S.C. § 1185d.
Congress did not specify what “preventive care and screenings”
should be included. Instead, it delegated that task to the agencies, de-
ferring to whatever “comprehensive guidelines” are “supported” by the
Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA), which is within
the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). 42 U.S.C.
§ 300gg-13(a)(4). HHS asked for recommendations from the Institute of
Medicine (IOM), 77 Fed. Reg. 8,725, 8,726 (Feb. 15, 2012), which pro-
1 Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119, amended by the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029.
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posed including, inter alia, all FDA-approved contraceptives and sterili-
zation methods.2
The agencies then adopted IOM’s recommendations as the “compre-
hensive guidelines.” HRSA, Women’s Preventive Services Guidelines,
U.S. Department of Health & Human Services (Aug. 2011)
https://www.hrsa.gov/womens-guidelines/index.html. The penalty for of-
fering a plan that excludes coverage for even one of the FDA-approved
contraceptive methods is $100 per day for each affected individual. 26
U.S.C. § 4980D(a)-(b). If an employer larger than 50 employees fails to
offer a plan at all, the employer owes $2,000 per year for each of its full-
time employees. 26 U.S.C. § 4980H(a), (c)(1).
The mandate includes many exemptions. For example, plans that
have not made certain changes since March 2010 are grandfathered and
exempted indefinitely. 42 U.S.C. § 18011. In 2018, approximately one
fifth of employers offered grandfathered plans.3
2 Institute of Medicine, Clinical Preventive Services for Women: Closing the Gaps, The National Academies Press 3 (2011), https://bit.ly/2QOysgH. 3 See Kaiser Family Found., Employer Health Benefits 2018 Annual Survey 209 (2018), https://bit.ly/2T4qwbQ.
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Additionally, employers with fewer than 50 full-time employees are
not required to provide health coverage at all. See 26 U.S.C.
§ 4980H(c)(2). In 2014, 34 million Americans—more than a quarter of
the private-sector workforce—worked for such employers. Burwell v.
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 699 (2014). The statute also
does not cover government plans such as Medicare and some Medicaid
programs, which may impose cost-sharing or exclude some forms of con-
traception.4
B. The First IFR
The preventive services mandate was first implemented by invoking
the good cause exception from the APA’s notice and comment require-
ment in an interim final rule (IFR) on July 19, 2010, published by HHS,
DOL, and Treasury (the agencies). 75 Fed. Reg. 41,726, 41,728 (July 19,
4 See Congressional Research Service, Federal Support for Reproductive Health Services: Frequently Asked Questions 13 (2016), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44130.pdf (“There is no explicit statutory requirement for Medicare to cover contraceptive services . . . . Steriliza-tion is not covered as an elective procedure or for the sole purpose of preventing any effects of a future pregnancy”); id. at 7 (“States have discretion in identifying the specific services and supplies (including emergency contraception) covered under the traditional Medicaid state plan.”).
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2010) (First IFR). The First IFR stated that HRSA would produce
guidelines and provided further guidance concerning cost sharing. Id.
This IFR went into effect on the day that comments were due. The
agencies reasoned that “it would be impracticable and contrary to the
public interest to delay putting the provisions in these [IFRs] in place
until a full public notice and comment process was completed.” Id. at
41,730.
C. The Second IFR
In July 2011, IOM issued a recommendation including coverage of all
FDA-approved contraceptives. Appx.1009. Thirteen days later, the
agencies promulgated the next IFR. 76 Fed. Reg. 46,621 (Second IFR).
That same day, HRSA published guidelines on its website adopting the
IOM recommendations in full.5 The Second IFR granted HRSA “discre-
tion to exempt certain religious employers from the Guidelines.” 76 Fed.
Reg. at 46,623. But it defined the term “religious employer” so narrowly
5 77 Fed. Reg. 8,725 & n.1; see also HRSA, Women’s Preventive Services Guidelines, U.S. Department of Health & Human Services (Aug. 2011) https://bit.ly/2OHsmgH.
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that it excluded religious non-profits that, like the Little Sisters, serve
people of all faiths. Id. at 46,626.
The Second IFR was effective immediately without prior notice or
public comment. The agencies stated that they had “good cause” be-
cause public comment was “impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to
the public interest.” Id. at 46,624.
The agencies received “over 200,000” comments on the Second IFR.
77 Fed. Reg. at 8,726. Many of the comments explained the need for a
broader religious exemption. However, on February 15, 2012, the agen-
cies adopted a rule that “finaliz[ed], without change,” the Second IFR.
Id. at 8,725.
The agencies then published an Advance Notice of Proposed Rule-
making (ANPRM), 77 Fed. Reg. 16,501 (Mar. 21, 2012), and a Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM), 78 Fed. Reg. 8,456 (Feb. 6, 2013), which
were later adopted in a final rule making further changes to the man-
date, 78 Fed. Reg. 39,870 (July 2, 2013). The agencies received over
600,000 comments on those proposals, many of which explained how the
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mandate would violate the conscience of religious believers who objected
to the contraceptives at issue.6
In the final rules, the agencies amended the definition of religious
employer but continued to limit that definition to churches and the “ex-
clusively religious” activities of religious orders, not including religious
nonprofits like the homes run by the Little Sisters. 78 Fed. Reg. at
39,874. The final rules did not finalize the list of recommended preven-
tive services; those remain on HRSA’s website and have never been sub-
ject to notice and comment. See supra note 5.
Also in the final rules, the agencies adopted an arrangement—
termed an “accommodation”—by which religious objectors could offer
the objected-to coverage on their health plans by executing a self-
certification and delivering it to the organization’s insurer or third-
party administrator (TPA). The self-certification would trigger the in-
surer or TPA’s obligation to “provide[] payments for contraceptive ser-
vices.” 78 Fed. Reg. at 39,876 (insurers); id. at 39,879 (TPAs). 6 78 Fed. Reg. 8,456, 8,459 (Feb. 6, 2013); 78 Fed. Reg. at 39,871; see al-so, e.g., Christian Medical Association, Comment Letter on NPRM (Mar. 21, 2013), https://bit.ly/2O28k3p (NPRM “fails to avoid moral compro-mise for faith-based objectors”).
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D. RFRA litigation and the Third IFR
The “accommodation” did not address the concerns of all religious or-
ganizations, and some filed lawsuits under the Religious Freedom Res-
toration Act (RFRA).7 The Little Sisters were part of a class action filed
on September 24, 2013. Complaint, Little Sisters of the Poor Home for
the Aged v. Sebelius, 6 F. Supp. 3d 1225 (D. Colo. 2013) (No. 13-2611).
In August 2014, the agencies published a third IFR “in light of the Su-
preme Court’s interim order” in Wheaton College v. Burwell, again
without notice and comment. 79 Fed. Reg. 51,092 (Aug. 27, 2014) (Third
IFR); Wheaton Coll. v. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. 2806 (2014).
This Third IFR amended the “accommodation” to allow a religious
objector to “notify HHS in writing of its religious objection” instead of
notifying its insurer or TPA. 79 Fed. Reg. at 51,094. The Third IFR re-
ceived over 13,000 comments.8
To justify bypassing notice and comment, the agencies said that they
must “provide other eligible organizations with an option equivalent to 7 See Becket, HHS Case Database, https://bit.ly/2zlzvOs (last accessed Feb. 15, 2019). 8 See EBSA, Coverage of Certain Services Under the Affordable Care Act (Aug. 27, 2014), https://bit.ly/2Nv8Kjh.
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the one the Supreme Court provided to Wheaton College . . . as soon as
possible.” 79 Fed. Reg. at 51,095. The Third IFR was ultimately final-
ized on July 14, 2015. 80 Fed. Reg. 41,318 (July 14, 2015).
E. Supreme Court litigation
The Third IFR did not accommodate the Little Sisters’ religious be-
liefs. It continued to require the Little Sisters to authorize the provision
of objectionable drugs and services on their health plan. The Little Sis-
ters’ case proceeded to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, which ruled
against them. Little Sisters of the Poor v. Burwell, 794 F.3d 1151 (10th
Cir. 2015), vacated and remanded sub nom. Zubik v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct.
1557 (2016).
The Little Sisters’ appeal to the Supreme Court was consolidated
with similar cases from the Fifth and D.C. Circuits and this Circuit. See
Zubik v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016). At the Supreme Court, the
agencies abandoned the arguments and factual findings upon which
they had relied below. First, the government admitted for the first time
that the accommodation required contraceptive coverage to be “part of
the same plan as the coverage provided by the employer,” Br. for the
Resp’ts at 38, Zubik, 136 S. Ct. 1557 (No. 14-1418) (quotations omitted),
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https://bit.ly/2DiCj32.9 The government thus removed any basis for the
lower courts’ prior holding that the mandate did not impose a substan-
tial burden on the religious exercise of objecting employers because the
provision of contraceptives was separate from their plans.10
Next, the agencies admitted to the Supreme Court that women who
do not receive contraceptive coverage from their employer can “ordinari-
ly” get it from “a family member’s employer,” “an Exchange,” or “anoth-
er government program.” Br. for the Resp’ts at 65, Zubik, 136 S. Ct.
1557, https://bit.ly/2DiCj32. The government also acknowledged that
the mandate “could be modified” to be more protective of religious liber-
ty, Suppl. Br. for the Resp’ts at 14-15, Zubik v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 1557,
https://bit.ly/2O0oUAJ, thus admitting the mandate was not the least
restrictive means of achieving the government’s interests. 9 See also Tr. of Oral Arg. at 60-61, Zubik v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 1557 (Chief Justice Roberts: “You want the coverage for contraceptive ser-vices to be provided, I think as you said, seamlessly. You want it to be in one insurance package. . . . Is that a fair understanding of the case?”; Solicitor General Verrilli: “I think it is one fair understanding of the case.”). 10 See Tr. of Oral Arg. at 61, Zubik v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016) (No. 14-1418) (Solicitor General Verrilli “would be content” if Court would “assume a substantial burden” and rule only on the government’s strict scrutiny defense).
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The Supreme Court unanimously vacated the decisions of the Courts
of Appeals of the Third, Fifth, Tenth, and D.C. Circuits. Zubik, 136 S.
Ct. at 1560. It ordered the government not to impose taxes or penalties
on petitioners for failure to comply with the mandate and remanded the
cases so that the parties could be “afforded an opportunity to arrive at
an approach going forward” that would resolve the dispute. Id.
The Little Sisters’ case was stayed while the government reconsid-
ered the exemptions to the mandate. See, e.g., Order, Little Sisters of the
Poor v. Hargan, No. 13-1540 (10th Cir. June 27, 2016) (ordering parties
to file periodic status reports). In May 2018, after failing to reach a set-
tlement with the government, the Little Sisters sought and obtained a
permanent injunction from the district court. Little Sisters of the Poor v.
Azar, No. 1:13-cv-02611 (D. Colo. May 29, 2018), Dkt.82.
F. The Fourth and Fifth IFRs
After making the concessions that prompted the Supreme Court’s or-
der in Zubik, the agencies issued a “Request for Information” in July
2016 to seek input on “whether there are modifications to the accommo-
dation that would be available under current law and that could resolve
the RFRA claims raised by organizations that object to the existing ac-
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22
commodation on religious grounds.” 81 Fed. Reg. 47,741, 47,743 (July
22, 2016). The agencies received “over 54,000 public comments.” 82 Fed.
Reg. 47,792, 47,814 (Oct. 13, 2017). The agencies concluded, in a set of
FAQs published only on the Department of Labor’s website, that they
were unable to modify the accommodation in a way that respected both
the agencies’ goals and the religious objectors’ concerns.11
In October 2017, the agencies engaged in another round of rulemak-
ing and issued the IFRs at issue in this lawsuit. 82 Fed. Reg. 47,792
(Fourth IFR).12 The Fourth IFR protected those with religious objec-
tions, referring to the litigation as the impetus for the regulatory
change: “Consistent with . . . the Government’s desire to resolve the
pending litigation and prevent future litigation from similar plaintiffs,
the Departments have concluded that it is appropriate to reexamine the
exemption and accommodation scheme currently in place for the Man-
11 U.S. Dep’t of Labor, FAQs About Affordable Care Act Implementation Part 36 at 4 (Jan. 9, 2017), https://bit.ly/2O7yJNr. 12 The agencies issued another IFR on the same day, addressing a “mor-al exemption.” 82 Fed. Reg. 47,838, 47,849 (Oct. 13, 2017) (Fifth IFR). The States also challenge the Fifth IFR, but the Little Sisters’ argu-ments focus on the Fourth IFR. Likewise, the Little Sisters focus on the final rule that grants a religious exemption.
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date.” Id. at 47,799. The agencies reasoned that they had good cause to
issue the exemptions “in order to cure such violations [of RFRA]
(whether among litigants or among similarly situated parties that have
not litigated), to help settle or resolve cases, and to ensure, moving for-
ward, that our regulations are consistent with any approach we have
taken in resolving certain litigation matters.” Id. at 47,814. The Fourth
IFR set a sixty-day period for comments, which ended on December 5,
2017.
Pennsylvania filed a complaint less than a week after the Fourth IFR
was issued, seeking an injunction against the religious exemption that
protected the Little Sisters and other religious objectors. Appx.164-97.
This was the first time Pennsylvania involved itself in any mandate
case, despite six years of litigation in which dozens of religious objectors
received preliminary and permanent injunctions against the mandate.
See Statement of Related Cases. Pennsylvania also, for the first time in
six notice and comment periods, filed comments on the Fourth IFR in
December 2017. See State Attorneys General, Comment Letter on
Fourth IFR (Dec. 5, 2017), https://www.regulations.gov
/document?D=CMS-2014-0115-58168.
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Pennsylvania moved for a preliminary injunction against the Fourth
and Fifth IFRs, asking the court to instead reinstate the rules estab-
lished by the first three IFRs. Dkt.8. On November 22, the Little Sisters
moved to intervene. On appeal, this Court reversed the district court’s
denial of intervention. Pennsylvania v. President, 888 F.3d 52 (3d Cir.
2018). The district court granted Pennsylvania’s motion for a prelimi-
nary injunction on December 15, 2017. The Little Sisters and the agen-
cies appealed and filed opening briefs on September 21, 2018.
While the Fourth IFR was enjoined and this appeal was pending,
other courts enjoined the federal government from enforcing the man-
date against religious objectors, including the Little Sisters of the Poor.
Some of those injunctions were in open-ended class actions or associa-
tional standing cases that allow new members to join. See, e.g., Reach-
ing Souls Int’l, Inc. v. Azar, No. CIV-13-1092-D, 2018 WL 1352186, at
*2 (W.D. Okla. Mar. 15, 2018); Catholic Benefits Ass’n LCA v. Hargan,
No. 5:14-cv-00240-R, Order, Dkt.184 (W.D. Okla. Mar. 7, 2018) (grant-
ing permanent injunction of Mandate to current and future nonprofit
members of Catholic Benefits Association). These injunctions were in
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25
addition to the over 50 injunctions that were already in place following
the Zubik decision. See Statement of Related Cases.
G. The Final Rule
While the appeal was pending, the agencies received comments and
reviewed them over a period of several months. They then finalized the
religious exemption in a final rule that took effect on January 14, 2019.
83 Fed. Reg. 57,536 (Nov. 15, 2018) (Final Rule). Pennsylvania
amended its complaint and the State of New Jersey joined as a plaintiff.
Searches of public documents reveal no comments from New Jersey
during any of the comment periods. The States then sought a
preliminary injunction of the final rules on December 17, 2018. The
district court granted the second preliminary injunction on January 14,
2019 without modifying or dissolving its prior injunction.
H. The decisions below
In granting the first injunction, the district court ruled that Pennsyl-
vania had Article III standing to challenge the exemption because it
“seeks to protect a quasi-sovereign interest—the health of its women
residents,” and because the exemption “will likely inflict a direct injury
upon the Commonwealth by imposing substantial financial burdens on
State coffers.” Appx.19-20. The district court held that Pennsylvania
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26
can assert “a procedural right under the APA . . . without meeting all
the normal standards for redressability and immediacy.” Appx.23.
The district court then ruled that Pennsylvania was likely to succeed
on the merits because the agencies did not have good cause to forgo no-
tice and comment, and because the exemption “contradict[s] the text of
the [ACA]” by creating “sweeping exemptions” to the ACA’s require-
ments. Appx.35, 40.
In granting the second injunction, the district court held that the
States have standing even in the context of non-procedural claims. The
court held that the States have “special solicitude” in standing when
protecting the “quasi-sovereign interests” in the “health and wellbeing”
of their residents. Appx.19. The district court also held that the States
have shown a “causal connection” between the final rules and financial
injury. Appx.22.
On the merits of the injunction, the district court held that the States
are likely to succeed on their procedural APA claim because the lack of
notice and comment in promulgating the IFRs “fatally tainted the issu-
ance of the Final Rules.” Appx.91. The district court held that the
States are likely to succeed on their substantive APA claim because the
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final rules “exceed the scope of the Agencies’ authority under the ACA,
and, further, cannot be justified under RFRA.” Appx.93. Though the
district court recognized at the hearing that the question of how the
agencies had authority to issue the exemptions in the prior mandate
regulations but did not have the authority to issue the Final Rule was
“the elephant in the room,” Appx.736, the district court opinion did not
address that question, noting only that “the 2011 religious exemption is
not before this Court,” Appx.93 n.20. In invalidating the Final Rule, the
district court essentially reinstated the initial mandate and its initial
exemptions.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Legal conclusions regarding standing are reviewed de novo. Edmon-
son v. Lincoln Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 725 F.3d 406, 414 (3d Cir. 2013). This
Court reviews the district court’s decision to enjoin the United States
for an abuse of discretion, but a district court necessarily abuses its dis-
cretion if it bases its ruling on legal errors, which are reviewed de novo.
See Dam Things from Denmark v. Russ Berrie & Co., 290 F.3d 548, 556
(3d Cir. 2002). With regard to factual determinations, “Where, as here,
First Amendment rights are at issue . . . [courts of appeal] have a con-
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28
stitutional duty to conduct an independent examination of the record as
a whole[.]” Brown v. City of Pittsburgh, 586 F.3d 263, 268-69 (3d Cir.
2009) (internal quotation omitted). Finally, as suggested by Reynolds,
an agency’s assertion of good cause to bypass notice and comment in
rulemaking calls for deference to agency factual findings (unless they
are arbitrary and capricious) and de novo review on matters of law. See
United States v. Reynolds, 710 F.3d 498, 508-09 (3d Cir. 2013); 5 U.S.C.
§ 706(2).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The two injunctions should never have issued because the States
lack standing. They have suffered no harm and have no concrete inter-
est at stake. Their constitutional claims are foreclosed as a matter of
law. And any injuries they allege are not redressable. Any harm they
allege is a result of their own voluntary programs, not the Final Rule;
the injunctions cannot stop religious objectors from receiving protection
in other ways; and the regime they ask the district court to implement
is unlawful and foreclosed by their very arguments against the Final
Rule.
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29
Even assuming standing, the States are not likely to succeed on the
merits. The district court held that the agencies do not have the author-
ity to create religious exemptions, but did not explain how it could re-
implement a scheme that has assumed that same authority in prior it-
erations going back to 2011. Moreover, the agencies have statutory au-
thority—indeed, an express statutory obligation—to comply with RFRA
in offering a religious exemption.
The States’ arguments that the Final Rule violates the Establish-
ment Clause and the Equal Protection Clause cannot be reconciled with
a long tradition of providing religious exemptions to prevent burdening
consciences. And the States’ arguments that the Final Rule violates Ti-
tle VII and the Pregnancy Discrimination Act has been rejected by the
only court to consider that contention.
The States’ procedural arguments fare no better. The Fourth IFR
never violated the APA because the agencies had good cause to issue a
rule that complied with pressing court orders and ameliorated an in-
fringement on fundamental civil rights. Moreover, any procedural defect
in the IFRs cannot prevent the agencies from issuing a new rule follow-
ing full notice and comment.
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30
At bottom, the district court abused its discretion by reimplementing
regulations that violate RFRA and are themselves illegal under the dis-
trict court’s own reasoning.
ARGUMENT
I. The States lack standing.
“To seek injunctive relief,” the States must show that they are “un-
der threat of suffering ‘injury in fact’ that is concrete and particularized;
the threat must be actual and imminent, not conjectural or hypothet-
ical; it must be fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defend-
ant; and it must be likely that a favorable judicial decision will prevent
or redress the injury.” Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 493
(2009). And they must “demonstrate standing for each claim [they]
seek[] to press and for each form of relief that is sought.” Town of Ches-
ter v. Laroe Estates, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1645, 1650 (2017) (quoting Davis v.
FEC, 554 U.S. 724, 734 (2008) (internal quotation marks omitted)). The
States fail every part of this test.
A. The States cannot bring Establishment Clause, Equal Pro-tection, or Title VII claims.
The States cite no authority for the idea that states can bring Estab-
lishment Clause claims against the federal government to challenge a
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31
religious accommodation. Since the States challenge a federal exemp-
tion rather than an expenditure, they cannot have offended observer or
taxpayer standing in relation to the federal government.
Similarly, states are not “person[s]” under the Fifth Amendment ca-
pable of asserting an equal protection claim. Pennsylvania v. Riley, 84
F.3d 125, 130 n.2 (3d Cir. 1996) (“A State . . . is not entitled to due pro-
cess protection”) (citing South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301
(1966)).
The States also lack standing to bring their Title VII claim, as they
are not employees, and the federal government is not their employer.
B. The States lack injury in fact.
1. The States’ purported injuries are generalized and spec-ulative.
The States ask this Court to set national policy through litigation,
based upon vague assertions of harm. Most of the injuries that the
States do assert are to unnamed citizens. See, e.g., Appx.168, 189-91;
Appx.314-18. The only alleged harms specific to the States are the lack
of opportunity to comment—an argument their own actions foreclose—
and downstream financial burdens on state-funded health programs.
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32
See Appx.185, 189-91. The district court found standing on this basis.
Appx.20-23.
The States’ claims of injury are no more than a “chain of contingen-
cies” that “amount[] to mere speculation” about the actions of third par-
ties. Sheller, P.C. v. HHS, 663 F. App’x 150, 156 (3d Cir. 2016). The
States have not identified a single employer in their borders that plans
to drop contraceptive coverage because of the IFRs or the Final Rule.
Many employers in the States are already exempt from the federal
mandate, either through grandfathering (a fifth of employers have
grandfathered plans),13 the prior religious exemption that the district
court reinstated, or because they are small employers and are not re-
quired to provide insurance at all.14 And many religious objectors have
had opportunities to seek and receive injunctions from the mandate in
court. See Statement of Related Cases. These employers are not obligat-
13 See Kaiser Family Found., supra note 3, at 204; Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 698-700 (grandfathered plans are exempt from the preventive services mandate).
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33
ed to provide contraceptive coverage, regardless of the Final Rule, and
their decisions therefore cannot cause injury via the Final Rule.
If the States could locate even one employer who plans to drop cover-
age because of the Final Rule, it must next speculate as to the religious
beliefs and choices of employees. For example, women working for reli-
gious employers may share their employers’ religious beliefs. See 82
Fed. Reg. at 47,802. They might prefer a contraceptive method still cov-
ered by their employer, since many objectors object to only 4 out of 20
FDA-approved methods. See Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 696-98. Or they
may “obtain coverage through a family member’s employer, through an
individual insurance policy purchased on an Exchange or directly from
an insurer, or through Medicaid or another government program.” Br.
for the Resp’ts at 65, Zubik v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016) (No. 14-
1418), https://bit.ly/2DiCj32. That is what the Obama Administration
told the Supreme Court in 2016, and it remains true today. Given the
alternatives available—and their apparent efficacy in preventing the
States from feeling any effects from the prior and much larger exemp- 14 Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 698-700 (discussing small employer exemp-tion).
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34
tions—the States have no reason to believe that the mere fact that this
case concerns a religious exemption will mean that women will sudden-
ly begin generating costs for state programs.
Nor is there any reason to believe the States would bear the cost of
the feared unintended pregnancies. This would only happen if women
with health insurance did not obtain contraceptives in some other way
and did not use their health insurance for their medical expenses relat-
ed to pregnancy and qualified for state aid. The States offer no reason
to think that even a single state resident will thread this needle, or that
a single state resident ever threaded it before, despite the absence of a
federal mandate until 2012 or the much larger exemptions (such as
grandfathering) in place since 2012. If the States’ suppositions were
correct, the States would surely have been harmed prior to the Fourth
IFR. But the States never intervened in lawsuits challenging the man-
date and never sought a nationwide injunction (or any other relief)
against these far more sweeping exemptions.
A judicial decision based upon the supposition that this might theo-
retically occur now, and only now, is advisory.
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35
2. The States cannot sue as parens patriae.
Most of the injuries claimed in the amended complaint are to un-
named citizens. But the States are barred from asserting the rights of
their citizens as parens patriae against the federal government. See
Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923). Even if the claimed inju-
ries to their citizens existed, “it is the United States, and not the state,
which represents them as parens patriae, when such representation be-
comes appropriate.” Id. at 485-86. The States seek to avoid the applica-
tion of RFRA for their citizens, but that is precisely “what Mellon pro-
hibits,” namely a suit by a State “to protect her citizens from the opera-
tion of federal statutes.” Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 520, n.17
(2007) (citation omitted).
3. The States cannot overcome these deficiencies with “spe-cial solicitude.”
Any “special solicitude” the States claim does not overcome their lack
of injury in fact. The district court analogized to Texas v. United States,
809 F.3d 134, 151 (5th Cir. 2015) and Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S.
497 (2007). In Massachusetts, however, the Clean Air Act’s unique “pro-
cedural right” to challenge an EPA denial of a petition for rulemaking
on emission standards was “critical[ly] importan[t]” to standing. Id. at
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36
516, 518 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1)). The district court recognized
that “a procedural right under the relevant statute” is a necessary com-
ponent for special solicitude. Appx.73. But it did not address the proce-
dural right afforded the States in this case. Appx.75. Nothing in the
ACA, the mandate, or the Final Rule provides such a procedural right to
the States.
And in Texas, the Fifth Circuit was careful not to substitute special
solicitude for injury or for a legally protected interest. There, Texas was
able to show 500,000 people who would automatically be eligible for a
$130 subsidy benefit under the challenged federal program. “Even a
modest estimate would put the loss at several million dollars.” Texas,
809 F.3d at 155 (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, the States
have not identified even one person who would become eligible for state
benefits.
C. The States’ purported harms are neither traceable to the Final Rule nor redressable by enjoining it.
The States’ claims fail because the alleged injuries are neither trace-
able to the Final Rule nor redressable by order of this Court.
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37
1. Any injury to the States is self-inflicted.
Any increase in contraceptive-related costs is a result of the States’
decision to subsidize contraceptive access for its citizens. Thus, the
States’ alleged pocketbook injury is not “fairly . . . traceable” to the Fi-
nal Rule. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)
(citation omitted). The agencies’ decision to exempt religious entities
from providing certain contraceptives to their employees only increases
the States’ costs because of a voluntary choice the States made, and
“[n]o State can be heard to complain about damage inflicted by its own
hand.” Pennsylvania v. New Jersey, 426 U.S. 660, 664 (1976) (per curi-
am). As in Pennsylvania v. New Jersey, “nothing prevent[s] [the States]
from withdrawing” their subsidies for contraceptives. Id. at 664. The
States are free to adjust their policies, but they should not be permitted
to subsidize a service and then sue the federal government whenever a
federal action supposedly means more people may claim that service.
2. The Court cannot redress the alleged harm.
An order enjoining the Final Rule would not redress the claimed
harm. Religious objectors can bring their own RFRA lawsuits and ob-
tain injunctions, given that the government has admitted that it has no
compelling interest in enforcing the underlying mandate. Or they can
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38
join existing classes that already have injunctions against the mandate.
See supra at 24. Or, since many religious employers have fewer than fif-
ty employees, they can simply drop health insurance altogether. 26
U.S.C. § 4980H(c)(2). The district court addressed none of these eventu-
alities. See Appx.76-77.
Furthermore, the district court’s injunction also fails to redress the
claimed harm because the federal defendants remain free to eliminate
contraceptive coverage from the mandate, since Congress granted dis-
cretion to HRSA to decide which services should be covered.
3. The Court cannot reinstate rules that are subject to the same alleged APA problems.
Before the Fourth IFR and the Final Rule were issued, the regula-
tions contained variations from the mandate in the form of an exemp-
tion for churches and integrated auxiliaries and a separate “accommo-
dation” for other religious employers. That accommodation is central to
the district court’s RFRA holding. Yet—according to the district court
and the States’ reasoning—the earlier exemption and accommodation
violate the APA.
The district court held that the agencies exceeded their authority in
promulgating the Final Rule because the ACA authorized the agencies
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39
to determine only “what must be covered,” not “who must provide the
coverage,” Appx.99. The States likewise argued that the agencies do not
have statutory authority to create exemptions to the preventive services
mandate. Appx.703; Dkt.91-2 at 20 (“Nothing in the ACA[] . . . suggests
that employers may avoid their legal obligations for religious or moral
reasons”). But the States also request that the Court replace the Final
Rule with the mandate as it existed before the IFRs, Appx.791.
That relief—the revival of the prior mandate regime, complete with
the “accommodation” and religious employer exemption—cannot be en-
tered consistent with the court’s order. If HRSA has no authority to de-
cide “who must provide the coverage,” then it surely has no authority to
exempt some employers, “accommodate” others, and impose new obliga-
tions on insurers and TPAs to comply in their place. Yet that is precise-
ly the regime the district court reimposed.15
15 If the district court was correct that RFRA compels the government to exempt churches, Appx.42, it can only be for one reason: that an exemp-tion, rather than the accommodation, is compelled by RFRA. Under that reasoning, either the accommodation is illegal, or the religious exemp-tion is.
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The same is true for the States’ procedural claims. The underlying
mandate was created by the same IFR procedures that the States object
to and that the district court invalidated. The contraceptive mandate
itself was implemented only by a list of services on HRSA’s website and
has never been subjected to notice and comment. See supra note 5. And
the regulations were themselves implemented via a series of IFRs fol-
lowed by final rules. See supra at 14-19. To accept the States’ argument
is to admit that both the mandate itself and the accommodation system
upon which the district court’s RFRA analysis relies violate the APA.
The district court sidestepped this problem by claiming that the prior
regulations were “not before this Court,” but that ignores the fact that
the prior regulations are the very system the district court was asked to
reinstate. See Appx.114 (explaining that a “preliminary injunction will
maintain the status quo,” including the “exemptions or accommodations
prior to October 6, 2017”). Simply put, because the States’ arguments
would ultimately prove the mandate itself is invalid, they are self-
defeating, and the States’ claimed harms cannot be redressed by the or-
der they seek.
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For all these reasons, the States lack standing, and the case must be
dismissed.
II. The States cannot succeed on the merits.
Even if the Court were to determine that the States had standing,
the injunction should still be vacated because they have failed to estab-
lish likelihood of success on the merits. A preliminary injunction—
particularly one that prohibits enforcing a federal regulation against
nonparties—is an “extraordinary remedy never awarded as of right.”
Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008).
A. The States are not likely to succeed on their claim that the Final Rule is contrary to law.
1. The agencies may make exemptions from a mandate they were never obligated to create in the first place.
The district court enjoined the Final Rule and the Fourth IFR as con-
trary to law, reasoning that the agencies lacked authority to create ex-
emptions from the mandate. But the States face an uphill battle chal-
lenging an exemption to a contraceptive mandate that the ACA did not
require in the first place. The ACA merely requires certain employers to
offer “a group health plan” that provides coverage for “preventive care”
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42
for women. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(4); 26 U.S.C. § 9815; 29 U.S.C.
§ 1185d.16 Congress did not specify what “preventive care” means, but
instead delegated that task to HRSA. Congress directed HRSA to create
a set of “guidelines,” rather than a bare list of mandated items. HRSA
was under no obligation to include contraceptives on that list at all,
much less all FDA-approved contraceptives. It could have limited itself
to other preventive services such as domestic violence screening and
well-woman visits, made no mention of contraceptives, and still been
well within its statutory mandate. See 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(4);
HRSA Women’s Preventive Services Guidelines, U.S. Department of
Health & Human Services (Aug. 2011), https://bit.ly/2OHsmgH; Appx.9
(noting that “which preventive care and screenings should be covered by
the ACA [is] up to HRSA”). 16 Although it has not been raised in this case, the Little Sisters note that one court has held that the individual mandate, as amended by the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054 (2017), is unconstitutional. See Texas v. United States, No. 4:18-CV-00167-O, 2018 WL 6589412 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 14, 2018). Because the mandate is part of the “minimum essential coverage” required to satisfy the insurance mandate, there is strong reason to believe that the wom-en’s preventive services provisions are not severable from the individual mandate. See id. at *18-29 (striking the remainder of the law as non-severable).
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The district court held that the statutory delegation of authority did
not include authority to create exemptions from the preventive care
mandate. In making this determination, the court ignored the most rel-
evant statutory term, “guidelines.” Appx.38-41; 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(4).
The dictionary definition of guideline is an “indication of policy or pro-
cedure by which to determine a course of action.”17 Had Congress meant
for HRSA to simply create a list of covered items from which there could
be no deviation, it could have said so. It did just this for subsections (1)
and (2) of § 300gg-13:
(1) evidence-based items or services that have in effect a rating of “A” or “B” in the current recommendations of the United States Preventive Services Task Force;
(2) immunizations that have in effect a recommendation from the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices of the Cen-ters for Disease Control and Prevention with respect to the in-dividual involved;
42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13. These provisions require coverage of all “items or
services” on a particular list, or all immunizations, if recommended
“with respect to the individual involved.” Id. The language used in (4) is
markedly different: “such additional preventive care and screenings . . .
17 The American Heritage Dictionary (3d ed. 1992).
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44
(1) as provided for in comprehensive guidelines” from HRSA. 42 U.S.C.
§ 300gg-13(4). Since “it is presumed that Congress expresses its intent
through the ordinary meaning of its language,” Idahoan Fresh v. Ad-
vantage Produce, Inc., 157 F.3d 197, 202 (3d Cir. 1998), the distinction
between these provisions indicates a broader grant of discretion to
HRSA in crafting the regulations.
HHS has used that discretion, and not just on contraceptives. For
example, in average-risk women, HPV screenings are only covered for
those over 30, and mammograms are only covered for those over 40.
Women’s Preventive Services Guidelines, U.S. Department of Health &
Human Services (Oct. 2017), https://bit.ly/2irrzlT. For all preventive
services, HRSA has exercised discretion to “specify the frequency,
method, treatment, or setting for the provision of that service,” and has
directed that if such information is not specified, “the plan or issuer can
use reasonable medical management techniques to determine any cov-
erage limitations.” Centers for Consumer Information & Insurance
Oversight, Affordable Care Act Implementation FAQs – Set 12, Centers
for Medicare & Medicaid Services, https://go.cms.gov/2I54sZV. HRSA
has been exercising its statutory discretion to frame coverage require-
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45
ments for years, and the States have not claimed that it is in excess of
the mandate to limit preventive services by age (a limitation not found
in § 300gg-13(a)(4)), nor that it is improper to utilize “reasonable medi-
cal management techniques” to determine exclusions from coverage.
The upshot is that HRSA could have required coverage of some con-
traceptives and not others, or permitted employers to exclude coverage
of some due to cost considerations (which it in fact does),18 or deter-
mined that a contraception mandate was unnecessary due to wide-
spread coverage pre-dating the ACA. Indeed, HRSA could edit its web-
site tomorrow to eliminate some or all contraceptives from the list, and
the States would have no recourse, since the listing of contraceptives it-
self is not in the Code of Federal Regulations and has never been sub-
ject to formal rulemaking. To claim that the agencies have no authority
to create exemptions from the mandate in these circumstances is weav-
ing new administrative law from whole cloth.
18 Employers may exclude more expensive contraceptives if they cover a cheaper contraceptive in the same category. See Centers for Consumer Information & Insurance Oversight, Affordable Care Act Implementa-tion FAQs, Set 12, Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, https://go.cms.gov/2I54sZV (last visited Feb. 14, 2019).
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2. The States’ reasoning would also invalidate the preexist-ing religious exemptions and accommodation.
The States’ APA argument fails for another reason. If it is true, as
the district court held, that the agencies had authority only to deter-
mine “what must be provided under the ACA’s ‘preventive care’ re-
quirement” and not “who must provide it,” the agencies lacked the au-
thority to issue the 2011 religious exemption, or even the accommoda-
tion upon which the district court relied for its RFRA analysis. Appx.93-
94; 76 Fed. Reg. at 46,626. At the preliminary injunction hearing, the
States could not explain this disparity. Appx.705. The judge seemed
troubled by this, admitting that this question was “the elephant in the
room,” Appx.736, but did not answer the question in her opinion, noting
only that “the 2011 religious exemption is not before this Court.”
Appx.93 n.20. As a result, the court has enjoined one regulation and in
so doing left the government to enforce an underlying regulation that
suffers from the same purported flaws.
3. The agencies are permitted to issue the Final Rule to comply with RFRA.
The district court correctly acknowledged in its first injunction—and
the States nowhere dispute—that “any exception to the ACA required
by RFRA is permissible.” Appx.37; see also Appx.42-52. A religious ex-
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47
emption required by a federal civil rights statute cannot be “arbitrary
[and] capricious” or “not in accordance with law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).
Thus, if the agencies are correct that the Final Rule was mandated by
RFRA, the entire basis for the district court’s injunctions falls away.
The lower court misunderstood both RFRA and this Court’s prece-
dents, holding that the agencies’ view of RFRA had been “foreclosed” by
this Court “twice now.” Appx.42; see also Appx.49-50. That misreading
of precedent led the district court to reimpose a version of the mandate
that is currently forbidden by RFRA-based injunctions from dozens of
federal courts.
Properly understood, RFRA makes it illegal for the agencies to im-
pose the contraceptive mandate without a religious exemption, and
nothing in this Court’s precedents is to the contrary. Accordingly, the
district court’s order must be reversed.
a. RFRA applies broadly to federal laws, federal agencies, and religious exercises.
RFRA requires that the federal government “shall not substantially
burden a person’s exercise of religion” unless doing so is the “least re-
strictive means” of advancing a “compelling governmental interest.” 42
U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a)-(b). RFRA is not just a judicial remedy, as the dis-
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48
trict court stated, Appx.103, but applies to any “agency” and “to all Fed-
eral law, and the implementation of that law, whether statutory or oth-
erwise,” including to the agencies’ actions under the ACA. 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000bb-2, bb-3.
Congress also made clear that “religious exercise” under RFRA is a
broad term, encompassing “any exercise of religion.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-
5. Religious exercise includes “‘not only belief and profession but the
performance of (or abstention from) physical acts’ that are ‘engaged in
for religious reasons.’” Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 710 (quoting Emp’t
Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990)).
b. The mandate as it existed before the Fourth IFR violates RFRA.
The Little Sisters and other religious groups exercise religion by
providing health insurance that complies with their religious beliefs.
See Appx.340-41. It is undisputed that these groups have a sincere reli-
gious objection to complying with the “accommodation.” Id. ¶¶35-38.
That failure to comply would result in large fines under 26 U.S.C.
§ 4980D ($100/day per person); 26 U.S.C. § 4980H(c)(1) ($2000 per em-
ployee, per year)—the same fines that constituted an obvious substan-
tial burden in Hobby Lobby. 573 U.S. at 691 (“If these consequences do
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49
not amount to a substantial burden, it is hard to see what would.”). In-
deed, the agencies themselves concede that forcing religious groups to
comply with the accommodation “constituted a substantial burden” on
religious exercise. 82 Fed. Reg. at 47,806.
Under RFRA, Congress permitted agencies to impose such burdens
on religion only where they could prove that imposing the burden on a
particular person was the least restrictive means of advancing a com-
pelling government interest. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1. Here, the govern-
ment cannot carry that burden (and, to its credit, has finally stopped
trying). The mandate fails strict scrutiny for many reasons, including:
• The government’s interest in requiring employers to provide contraceptives cannot be “compelling” since small businesses, grandfathered plans, churches, and government-sponsored plans are exempt.
• The States here either have no contraceptive mandate (Penn-sylvania) or a narrower mandate that includes cost-sharing (New Jersey) and a religious exemption broader than that in the federal mandate. Appx.461; Appx.552-53. The States cannot seriously contend there is a compelling interest in prohibiting actions they themselves never prohibited.
• As the Obama Administration acknowledged to the Supreme Court, women have many other avenues to obtain coverage.
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This concession is part of why the Supreme Court remanded Zubik and why the government subsequently lost every case.19
• A range of state programs provide contraceptives. Indeed, the States’ entire case is premised on such programs. The very ex-istence of those programs proves that a plan run by nuns is not the least restrictive means of distributing contraceptives.
• As the Supreme Court explained in Hobby Lobby, “[t]he most straightforward way of [providing contraceptive coverage] would be for the Government to assume the cost of providing the four contraceptives at issue to any women who are unable to obtain them under their health-insurance policies due to their employers’ religious objections.” Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 728.
• The federal government is prepared to pay directly via Title X, foreclosing any argument that the forced involvement of the Little Sisters is necessary.20
• The agencies have publicly acknowledged that the mandate fails strict scrutiny, 82 Fed. Reg. at 47,792, 47,806; they there-fore cannot carry their statutory burden in this or any other court.
Accordingly, the mandate cannot pass strict scrutiny, and exemp-
tions to that mandate are compelled by RFRA. 19 See Mark L. Rienzi, Fool Me Twice: Zubik v. Burwell and the Perils of Judicial Faith in Government Claims, 2016 Cato Sup. Ct. Rev. 123 (2015-2016) (detailing concessions leading to the Zubik remand). 20 See 83 Fed. Reg. 25,502, 25,514 (June 1, 2018) (“[T]his proposed rule would amend the definition of ‘low income family’ to include women who are unable to obtain certain family planning services under their em-ployer-sponsored health insurance policies due to their employers’ reli-gious beliefs or moral convictions.”).
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c. After Zubik, courts have unanimously found the mandate as applied to religious employers violated RFRA.
Since the Supreme Court’s Zubik order, every single religious em-
ployer case that has been litigated to conclusion has resulted in a per-
manent injunction. Those injunctions find a RFRA violation and forbid
the agencies from enforcing the mandate. For example:
• Wheaton Coll. v. Azar, No. 1:13-cv-8910 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 22, 2018), Dkt.119 at 3 (“enforcement of the contraceptive mandate against Wheaton would violate Wheaton’s rights under” RFRA);
• Little Sisters v. Azar, No. 1:13-cv-02611 (D. Colo. May 29, 2018), Dkt.82 at 1-2 (“enforcement of the mandate against Plaintiffs, either through the accommodation or other regulato-ry means . . . violated and would violate the Religious Freedom Restoration Act”);
• Reaching Souls Int’l, Inc. v. Azar, No. 13-cv-01092 (W.D. Okla. Mar. 15, 2018), Dkt.95 at 3-4 (“enforcement of the contraceptive mandate against Plaintiffs . . . violated and would violate RFRA”).
These post-Zubik injunctions join pre-Zubik injunctions. All told,
more than 50 RFRA-based injunctions continue to bind the federal
agencies.
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d. Neither Geneva College nor Real Alternatives forecloses a RFRA finding.
The district court mistakenly thought Geneva College and Real Al-
ternatives precluded a finding of a RFRA violation. Appx.41-42;
Appx.107. But neither does.
First, Geneva College was one of the decisions vacated by the Su-
preme Court in Zubik. 136 S. Ct. at 1561. It thus “carries no preceden-
tial force” in this Circuit. 1621 Route 22 W. Operating Co., LLC v.
NLRB, 825 F.3d 128, 141 n.6 (3d Cir. 2016). Indeed, in Geneva College
itself, the district court subsequently entered a permanent injunction on
RFRA grounds. Geneva Coll. v. Azar, No. 2:12-cv-00207 (W.D. Pa. July
5, 2018), Dkt.153. The panel decision in Geneva College thus is not even
the law of the case in Geneva College; it is certainly not the law of the
Circuit.
Second, the vacated opinion in Geneva College was procured on in-
correct facts, which the government later admitted. In particular, in
Geneva College, the agencies repeatedly told this Court that contracep-
tive coverage under the “accommodation” was not part of the religious
organization’s health plan. For example:
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• “in all cases” contraceptive coverage “is provided separately from [the religious employer’s] health coverage” (Br. for the Appellants, Geneva Coll. v. Sebelius, No. 14-1376, 2014 WL 2812346, at *1-2 (3d Cir. June 10, 2014), vacated and remanded by Zubik, 137 S. Ct. 1557);
• “separate payments” (id. at *8, 9, 17, 18, 22, 28, 35, 38);
• “through alternative mechanisms” (id. at *8);
• “through other means” (id. at *38).
The Geneva College panel accepted these representations as true and
relied on them in making its substantial burden holding. See Geneva
Coll. v. Sec’y Dep’t Health & Human Servs., 778 F.3d 422, 439 (3d Cir.
2015) (coverage is “separate and apart from” religious employer’s plan)
(citation omitted).
At the Supreme Court, however, the agencies admitted that the ac-
commodation “coverage” actually is “part of the same plan as the cover-
age provided by the employer.” Br. for the Resp’ts at 38, Zubik, 136 S.
Ct. 1557 (quotations omitted), https://bit.ly/2DiCj32; see also Tr. of Oral
Arg. at 60-61, Zubik, 136 S. Ct. 1557 (admitting it is “one fair under-
standing of the case” that all services are “in the one insurance pack-
age”).
Finally, nothing in Real Alternatives revived Geneva College. The on-
ly RFRA claim in Real Alternatives concerned whether an employee
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might have a RFRA claim based on participation in a health plan that
offers objectionable benefits. Real Alternatives v. Sec’y Dep’t Health &
Human Servs., 867 F.3d 338, 354-55 (3d Cir. 2017). That claim is fun-
damentally different from the claim in Geneva College and here—that it
violates RFRA to force employers to authorize and facilitate the provi-
sion of objectionable products on the plans they sponsor. Id. (calling
employee claim “a question of first impression” and “distinct from an
employer’s RFRA claim objecting to the mandated provision” of cover-
age). Indeed, the majority in Real Alternatives specifically disclaimed
treating Geneva College as precedential, id. at 356 n.18 (“Geneva is no
longer controlling”), and specifically distinguished the RFRA claim of
the employees from that of an employer. Id. at 362 (“There is a material
difference between employers arranging or providing an insurance plan
that includes contraception coverage” and an employee’s act of signing
up for the plan).
For these reasons, nothing in Geneva College or Real Alternatives al-
ters the analysis above: RFRA requires exemptions from the mandate.
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e. Where courts are divided, government has discretion to err on the side of not violating civil rights.
Since federal agencies have to implement national policy for all 50
states, it was at least a reasonable act of discretion for the agencies to
comply with multiple injunctions and err on the side of not burdening
religious liberty. RFRA is more than a judicial remedy; it “applies to all
Federal law.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-3. RFRA “intru[des] at every level of
government, displacing laws”—and therefore the regulations—of “every
[federal] agency.” See Mack v. Warden Loretto FCI, 839 F.3d 286, 301
(3d Cir. 2016) (quotations omitted). When agencies implement federal
law, they are necessarily implementing RFRA, and they are duty-bound
to obey it. Accordingly, the Office of Legal Counsel has advised agencies
that they can accommodate persons who they have reason to believe
will face a substantial burden on religious exercise. See, e.g., Applica-
tion of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act to the Award of a Grant
Pursuant to the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act, 31 Op.
O.L.C. 162, 176-77 (2007); cf. Charitable Choice Regulations Applicable
to States Receiving Substance Abuse Prevention and Treatment Block
Grants, 68 Fed. Reg. 56,430, 56,435 (Sept. 30, 2003).
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So too, here, the agencies were correct to the extent they erred on the
side of protecting religious exercise under RFRA. This is particularly
true because more than 50 federal courts have entered RFRA-based in-
junctions. That is why Congress made the Establishment Clause—not
judicial pronouncements on the substantial burden test—the outer limit
on exemptions: “Granting . . . exemptions, to the extent permissible un-
der the Establishment Clause, shall not constitute a violation of this
chapter.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-4. RFRA thereby expresses Congress’s in-
tent that federal agencies be allowed some leeway when accommodating
religious exercise. Thus, both the Fourth IFR and the Final Rule are
well within the discretion committed to HHS under the ACA and RFRA.
f. The Fourth IFR and Final Rule do not violate the Establish-ment or Equal Protection Clauses.
In Pennsylvania’s first motion for a preliminary injunction, the
Commonwealth went so far as to argue that the Fourth IFR (and thus,
the Final Rule) violate the Establishment and Equal Protection Claus-
es. Dkt.8-2 at 32-37; Dkt.91-2 at 11 n.15 (incorporating arguments by
reference). Even if the States had standing for such claims, they would
be frivolous. Over six years of hard-fought litigation, neither the Obama
Administration, nor the lower federal courts, nor any Supreme Court
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Justice took the view that granting relief to religious organizations
would violate the Establishment Clause. And with good reason: the Fi-
nal Rule easily passes Establishment Clause muster under any test.
First, “the Establishment Clause must be interpreted ‘by reference to
historical practices and understandings.’” Town of Greece v. Galloway,
134 S. Ct. 1811, 1819 (2014) (quoting County of Allegheny v. ACLU
Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 670 (1989)) (emphasis add-
ed). There is no historical evidence supporting the notion that the Final
Rule establishes religion. To the contrary, religious accommodations
“fit[] within the tradition long followed” in our nation’s history, even
when they are broader than necessary to comply with the Free Exercise
Clause. Id. at 1820.21 Indeed, avoiding what would historically have
been understood as an “establishment” in some cases requires broad ex-
emptions for religious entities. See, e.g., Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical
Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171 (2012) (Establishment
Clause forbids government from interfering in the selection of minis-
ters). 21 See also Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Under-standing of Free Exercise of Religion, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 1409 (1990).
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Even under the Lemon test, the Supreme Court has long recognized
that accommodation of religion is a permissible secular purpose which
does not advance or endorse religion, and which avoids, rather than
creates, entanglement with religion. The leading case is Amos. There,
the Supreme Court unanimously upheld Title VII’s religious exemption,
concluding that the “government acts with [a] proper purpose” when it
“lift[s] a regulation that burdens the exercise of religion.” Corp. of the
Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 338 (1987). The same is true
here. Such religious accommodations are not just permissible under the
Establishment Clause, they “follow[] the best of our traditions.” Zorach
v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314 (1952).
The States’ equal protection argument also fails. The IFRs make no
sex classification. It is the underlying mandate, which the States wish
to enforce, that creates differential rights based on sex. The Little Sis-
ters and other religious groups cannot participate in (for example) the
sterilization of either men or women. But they only need a religious ex-
emption from the latter because that is all the States are seeking to
force them to provide. The States’ theory would mean that the Supreme
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Court violated equal protection when it granted exemptions to the same
mandate in Hobby Lobby. That cannot be the case.
g. The Final Rule does not violate Title VII or the Pregnancy Discrimination Act.
The States asked the district court to create a backdoor, nationwide
contraceptive coverage mandate through Title VII. Dkt.8-2 at 28-32;
Dkt.91-2 at 11 n.15. The only appeals court to have reached the ques-
tion ruled that Title VII does not mandate contraceptive coverage. See
In re Union Pac. R.R. Employment Practices Litigation, 479 F.3d 936,
942 (8th Cir. 2007). If the States were correct that failure to cover con-
traceptives violates Title VII, then how can they explain their own
choice not to mandate contraceptive coverage for all employers, or to re-
quire it only in limited circumstances? Indeed, the States’ argument
would invalidate the grandfathering exemption and New Jersey’s own
exemption from its contraceptive coverage law. Appx.321-22. Such a
sweeping conclusion would upend the orderly regulation of insurance
coverage and state-level contraceptive mandates. The States cannot
show a likelihood of success on such an overbroad and previously reject-
ed legal theory.
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B. The States are not likely to establish that the Final Rule is procedurally invalid.
After numerous courts held that the mandate violated RFRA and en-
tered injunctions, the agencies issued a Fourth IFR that complied with
the injunctions and with the agencies’ admissions at the Supreme
Court. Then, after carefully reviewing some 56,000 comments, the
agencies adopted the Final Rule. The agencies’ decision to use the IFR
as a stopgap to prevent further litigation falls directly within the APA’s
good cause exception to prior notice and comment. 5 U.S.C. § 553. And
even if the IFR were somehow procedurally deficient, the Final Rule—
which issued after notice and comment—is procedurally valid.
1. The agencies had good cause to issue the Fourth IFR.
IFRs are either permissible modes of rulemaking to impose and mod-
ify the mandate or they are not. But under no circumstance could the
law be as the district court and the States envision it: that the govern-
ment can use IFRs three times to impose a mandate, create a religious
exemption, and modify that exemption—but the fourth time, they vio-
late the APA. To the contrary, the case for proceeding by IFR is more
compelling now than it was in 2010, 2011, and 2014 because the D.C.
Circuit sustained the prior IFRs under the good cause exception. See
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Priests For Life v. HHS, 772 F.3d 229, 276-77 (D.C. Cir. 2014), vacated
on other grounds, Zubik v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016).
IFRs are procedurally valid “when the agency for good cause finds”
that notice and comment “are impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to
the public interest.” 5 U.S.C. § 553(b). Review of good cause will be “in-
evitably fact- or context-dependent.” Mid-Tex Elec. Co-op., Inc. v. FERC,
822 F.2d 1123, 1132 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (Ruth Bader Ginsburg, J.). Here,
the agencies “determined” that notice and comment rulemaking “would
be impracticable and contrary to the public interest.” 82 Fed. Reg. at
47,813. Either ground establishes good cause.
Impracticable. Under the APA, notice and opportunity to comment
need only be “sufficient to fairly apprise interested parties of all signifi-
cant subjects and issues involved.” NVE, Inc. v. HHS, 436 F.3d 182, 191
(3d Cir. 2006). “Interested parties” had at least six opportunities to
comment “about whether and by what extent to expand” the existing re-
ligious exemption,” and hundreds of thousands of them did—just not
Pennsylvania or New Jersey. 82 Fed. Reg. at 47,814.
The agencies justifiably concluded that “[d]elaying the availability of
the expanded exemption” was impracticable. Id. To start, “courts ha[d]
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issued orders setting . . . pressing deadlines,” id., for the agency to re-
solve “outstanding issues” with religious objectors, Zubik, 136 S. Ct. at
1560; see also 82 Fed. Reg. at 47,814 (noting that the IFRs “provide a
specific policy resolution that courts have been waiting to receive from
the [agencies] for more than a year”). The agencies could have “reason-
ably interpreted” that cascade of injunctions and court orders across the
country as a mandate “to take action to further alleviate any burden on
the religious liberty of objecting religious organizations.” Priests for
Life, 772 F.3d at 276; see also Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Emps., AFL-CIO v.
Block, 655 F.2d 1153, 1157 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (upholding an IFR issued in
response to an injunction, even though the trial court emphasized that
it “was not mandating the action to be taken by the Department to
comply with [the] injunction”).
The agencies also found that delay would “increase the costs of
health insurance” for religious objectors with grandfathered plans who
have forestalled cost-saving changes in order to preserve their grandfa-
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thered status and avoid the mandate.22 82 Fed. Reg. at 47,815. The dis-
trict court dismissed this finding out of hand because agencies’ exam-
ples were several years old—an irrelevant distinction both because
grandfathering remains common and because arbitrary and capricious
review precludes the court from “substitut[ing] its judgment for that of
the agency.” Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass’n v. State Farm Auto Mu-
tual Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983).
Given the need for action and the marginal utility in additional pub-
lic comment, the agencies had good cause to implement the Fourth IFR.
Contrary to public interest. The agencies also had good cause be-
cause they correctly concluded that the mandate infringed fundamental
rights and a broader exemption was necessary to “to cure such viola-
tions.” See 82 Fed. Reg. at 47,814. The Fourth IFR was issued in the
face of dozens of lawsuits and injunctions. See Statement of Related
Cases. Leaving an illegal mandate in place with the expectation that it 22 The agencies supported this proposition with two legal opinions. See Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Atlanta v. Sebelius, No. 1:12-CV03489-WSD, 2104 WL 1256373 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 26, 2014); Diocese of Fort Wayne-S. Bend, Inc. v. Sebelius, 988 F. Supp. 2d 958 (N.D. Ind. 2013). These legal opinions are judicially noticeable as public records. See Fed. R. Evid. 201(b).
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will violate federal civil rights is “contrary to the public interest.” The
agencies were thus “obligat[ed]” to “alleviate any burden on religious
liberty” by IFR. See Priests for Life, 772 F.3d at 276.
The district court decided that litigation “uncertainty” does not justi-
fy bypassing notice and comment. Appx.31. But dozens of injunctions
are certainty, not uncertainty. This reasoning also ignores that the
agencies have independently concluded that the mandate and prior ac-
commodation violated RFRA. Federal agencies invoking RFRA as a ba-
sis to stop burdening religion when implementing federal law is hardly
new. See supra Part II.A.3.e. The agencies correctly concluded that al-
lowing ongoing civil rights violations was contrary to the public interest
and warranted yet another IFR.
2. If the States’ procedural arguments are correct, the un-derlying mandate and “accommodation” are equally in-valid.
The mandate has included a religious exemption from day one, when
the agencies saw that “it is appropriate that HRSA, in issuing these
Guidelines, takes into account the effect on the religious beliefs of cer-
tain religious employers” and gave HRSA “discretion to exempt certain
religious employers from the Guidelines where contraceptive services
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are concerned.” 76 Fed. Reg. at 46,623. If the States are correct that the
agencies have no delegated authority to create exemptions from the
mandate, then each subsequent version of the exemptions must be inva-
lid too.
In its first preliminary injunction, the district court reinstated these
exemptions by invalidating the Fourth IFR and leaving the prior ver-
sion of the mandate in force instead. Appx.52. The district court justi-
fied this decision by claiming that the old religious employer exemption
is mandated by RFRA and the Constitution, but that further exemp-
tions are not. Appx.42 (citing Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 751-52 & n.14).
The court did not attempt to explain why the Constitution exempts
some religious orders, but not the Little Sisters.
The Second IFR created the nation’s first nationwide contraceptive
coverage mandate without any preliminary opportunity for public com-
ment. It did not solicit prior comments on the anticipated guidelines,
nor issue any prior notice even mentioning contraceptives, let alone the
question of conscience protections. 77 Fed. Reg. at 8,726 (noting that
“comments on the anticipated guidelines were not requested in the in-
terim final regulations”). Nevertheless, the agencies argued that “an
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additional opportunity for public comment is unnecessary” because “the
amendments made in these interim final rules in fact are based
on . . . public comments” received on the First IFR—an IFR that never
specifically mentioned contraceptives or a religious exemption. 76 Fed.
Reg. at 46,624; see also 75 Fed. Reg. 41,726. If the Second IFR could be
issued based on the public comments that had already been received,
the Fourth IFR is even more warranted after seven years of vigorous
debate and hundreds of thousands of comments.
If the Fourth IFR is invalid for failure to have pre-IFR notice-and-
comment, then so too is the rest of the IFR-based regime that the dis-
trict court reinstated. Perhaps troubled by this “elephant in the room,”
the district court was notably silent on the question of reinstating the
prior rules in its second preliminary injunction. Appx.736. But the only
conceivable purpose of that injunction is to restore the status quo
ante—the old version of the rules. See Appx.114.
3. Any procedural defect in the interim rules is harmless.
Even if the Fourth IFR contained a procedural defect, it would not, in
this circumstance, constitute “prejudicial error.” See 5 U.S.C. § 706; see
also Shinseki v. Sanders, 556 U.S. 396, 406 (2009) (holding that § 706 is
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an administrative law “harmless error rule”) (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted). The district court’s conclusion that post-IFR no-
tice and comment is categorically unable to cure a procedurally defec-
tive interim rule overreads this Court’s precedents and, if sustained,
would have destabilizing consequences. If the States were correct that
lack of prior opportunity for comment on an IFR necessarily invalidates
the resulting final rule, then HHS would have no choice but to go back
to the drawing board, eliminating the mandate and reconsidering the
entirety of the women’s preventive services regulations.
The States, of course, must carry the “burden” to “explain why” the
IFR “caused harm.” Sanders, 556 U.S. at 410. A procedural error is
harmless if “the outcome of the administrative proceedings will be the
same absent [the agency]’s error.” Green Island Power Auth. v. FERC,
577 F.3d 148, 165 (2d Cir. 2009); see also PDK Labs. Inc. v. U.S. Drug
Enf’t Admin., 362 F.3d 786, 799 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (“If the agency’s mis-
take did not affect the outcome, if it did not prejudice the petitioner, it
would be senseless to vacate and remand for reconsideration.”). The
States cannot show prejudice because, even if the IFRs do not qualify
for the good cause exception, any error could not have affected the out-
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come: the Final Rules were issued after notice and comment, and on top
of a regulatory regime that was itself implemented by interim rulemak-
ing and which had garnered hundreds of thousands of comments.
This Circuit’s precedent does not support a categorical rule that post-
IFR notice and comment is meaningless. One round of procedurally in-
valid rulemaking does not taint all subsequent rulemaking. Rather, this
Circuit’s cases rely on unique circumstances, absent here, to establish
prejudice. In Sharon Steel Corp. v. EPA, the EPA administrator
changed Pennsylvania’s Clean Air Act implementation plan without
prior notice and comment. 597 F.2d 377, 379 (3d Cir. 1979). In that con-
text, prior notice and comment with States was essential to fulfill the
Clean Air Act’s commitment to “cooperative federalism.” Cf. GenOn
REMA, LLC v. EPA, 722 F.3d 513, 516 (3d Cir. 2013). Here, no such
state implementation plan is at issue: the mandate regulates employers
directly, not via state intermediaries.
Moreover, Sharon Steel was only focused on the validity of the origi-
nal rule issued without notice and comment. The Third Circuit did not
suggest that what the agencies have done here—issued a subsequent
final rule after notice and an opportunity to comment—was also im-
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permissible. To the contrary, the Third Circuit ordered the agency to
“forbear” from enforcing the procedurally invalid rule and then provide
the type of notice and comment opportunity that has already been pro-
vided here with respect to the (enjoined) IFRs. Id. at 381-82. Sharon
Steel not only permitted but mandated the development a new final rule
after notice and comment.
The district court’s extensive reliance on NRDC v. EPA is also mis-
placed. 683 F.2d 752 (3d Cir. 1982). NRDC arose after the Reagan ad-
ministration’s EPA issued an IFR to “effectively repeal” a rule that had
been the product “of a lengthy and intensive development process” dur-
ing the Carter administration. Id. at 758, 762. Given the asymmetry be-
tween using an interim rule to repeal a rule promulgated with prior no-
tice and comment, and suspicious of the “sharp changes” in EPA policy,
id. at 760, the Third Circuit held that postpromulgation comment did
not “cure” the EPA’s original procedurally invalid action. Id. at 767-68.
Here, the underlying mandate and prior exemptions were created by
the same mechanism as the Fourth IFR and the Final Rule. Cf. AFGE,
Local 3090 v. FLRE, 777 F.2d 751, 759 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (explaining that
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an agency “seeking to . . . modify” a rule should “undertake similar pro-
cedures to accomplish such modification”).
Moreover, in marked contrast to NRDC, the Final Rule is not an ab-
rupt change in federal policy. HHS is not rescinding anything close to
the entire mandate, leaving it in place for the vast majority of employ-
ers who were subject to it before. And the narrow modifications are con-
sistent with the previous administration’s concessions regarding the
mandate. See Suppl. Br. for the Resp’ts at 14-15, Zubik, 136 S. Ct. 1557
(No. 14-1418) (mandate “could be modified” to be more protective of re-
ligious liberty). Given the previous administration’s concessions regard-
ing both the mechanism of the mandate and the availability of alterna-
tives, see supra, as well as their post-comment conclusion that they
could not adequately modify the existing accommodation scheme, nar-
row modifications to the exemption scheme were necessary. See U.S.
Dep’t of Labor, FAQs About Affordable Care Act Implementation Part 36
at 4-5 (Jan. 09, 2017), https://bit.ly/2iaSoHW; 83 Fed. Reg. at 57,544 &
n.14 (explaining that this conclusion necessitated a different approach).
Thus the agencies had no choice but to admit that the mandate and
accommodation as they stood violated RFRA. See 83 Fed. Reg. at 57,544
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(mandate “imposes a substantial burden on the exercise of religion un-
der RFRA”); see also Reynolds, 710 F.3d at 518 (noting that failure to
provide notice and comment is harmless when “an agency’s substantive
rule is ‘the only reasonable one’ that the court ‘would reverse’ [had the
agency] ‘c[o]me out the other way.’”) (quoting Sheppard v. Sullivan, 906
F.2d 756, 762 (D.C. Cir. 1990)). All of that makes this case readily dis-
tinguishable from NRDC. Here, the agencies used an interim rule to
save a regulatory regime (itself issued via IFRs), creating targeted ex-
emptions consistent with concessions made by the prior administration
and in response to injunctions.
The district court also derived the categorical bar against post-IFR
comment from Reynolds—an inapposite case addressing the Attorney
General’s authority to impose, via an interim rule, the Sex Offender
Registration and Notification Act (SORNA)’s requirements on pre-Act
offenders. The Third Circuit held the rule invalid and determined post-
IFR comment was not harmless since the government issued the inter-
im rule to “eliminate any dispute” about the statute’s retroactive appli-
cation—“the very subject matter about which [the government] was to
keep an open mind.” 710 F.3d at 519 (internal quotation marks and ci-
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tation omitted). Critically, Reynolds only addressed whether post-IFR
comment could remove the prejudice from the earlier interim rule (the
basis of the challenged conviction). It does not support the States’ far
broader claim that an invalid interim rule “fatally infect[s]” the Final
Rule despite post-IFR comments that precede the Final Rule. Dkt.91-2
at 12.
Any suggestion that Reynolds precludes the government from utiliz-
ing subsequent comment is refuted by the fact that this Circuit has re-
peatedly upheld SORNA convictions obtained after the Justice Depart-
ment finalized the interim rule that Reynolds invalidated. See 73 Fed.
Reg. 38,030, 38,046-47 (July 2, 2008) (promulgating through notice and
comment the “SMART” guidelines to implement SORNA and reaffirm-
ing the interim rule applying SORNA retroactively); 75 Fed. Reg.
81,849 (Dec. 29, 2010) (finalizing the interim retroactivity rule); e.g.,
United States v. Cooper, 750 F.3d 263, 265 (3d Cir. 2014) (affirming the
Attorney General’s authority to issue the SMART guidelines); United
States v. Dimpfl, 523 F. App’x 865, 866 (3d Cir. 2013). The district
court’s judgment, then, could be used to upend SORNA convictions be-
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cause the Justice Department finalized the procedurally invalid interim
rule with post-IFR comment.
That result is as implausible as it sounds. Extending Sharon, NRDC,
and Reynolds to cover all circumstances in which an allegedly procedur-
ally invalid interim rule is finalized after subsequent comment would
cast a pall on thousands of regulations. According to the GAO, 35% of
all major rules were finalized with post-IFR notice and comment. See
U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO-13-21, Federal Rulemaking:
Agencies Could Take Additional Steps to Respond to Public Comments,
3 n.6, 8 (Dec. 2012), http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/651052.pdf. Moreo-
ver, since the States’ position gives agencies zero credit for undertaking
post-IFR notice and comment, agencies issuing interim rules and confi-
dent they have good cause will forgo notice and comment altogether—
an outcome that is inconsistent with the purpose of section 553. See,
e.g., Levesque v. Block, 723 F.2d 175, 188 (1st Cir. 1983) (“[C]omment
after the fact is better than none at all.”).
The better understanding of the law is that post-IFR notice and
comment—which of course precedes issuance of a final rule—is proper,
in many cases, to create a finalized rule. See, e.g., United States v.
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Johnson, 632 F.3d 912, 930, 932 (5th Cir. 2011) (sex offender not preju-
diced by post-IFR notice and comment “because the Attorney General
nevertheless considered the arguments Johnson has asserted and re-
sponded to those arguments during the interim rulemaking.”); Friends
of Iwo Jima v. Nat’l Capital Planning Comm’n, 176 F.3d 768, 774 (4th
Cir. 1999) (Wilkinson, J.) (holding harmless deficient notice because the
“identical substantive claims” to that of plaintiffs was “the main focus of
each stage in the approval process,” it “simply did not prevail”).23 Case-
specific factors can render the error prejudicial, but no such factors ex-
ist here. The Fourth IFR was consistent with the procedures used for
prior versions of the rule, and the exemptions were forced by in-court
factual concessions and court orders requiring compliance with federal
civil rights laws.
23 See also, e.g., Advocates for Highway & Auto Safety v. Fed. Highway Admin., 28 F.3d 1288, 1292 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (explaining that “tardy re-quest for public comment, however, is not necessarily fatal” where the agency “displayed an open mind when considering the comments”).
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III. Ordering the agencies to enforce the same supposed viola-tions of law used to justify the preliminary injunctions is an abuse of discretion.
The district court justified the preliminary injunctions by holding the
agencies could not impose “sweeping” changes to healthcare policy by
IFR, Dkt. 59 at 34, nor add exceptions to the preventive services provi-
sion, Dkt.136 at 42. But invalidating the IFR and later the Final Rule
“necessarily reinstated” the prior contraceptive mandate regime. See
Georgetown Univ. Hosp. v. Bowen, 821 F.2d 750, 757 (D.C. Cir. 1987);
see also Appx.114 (a “preliminary injunction will maintain the status
quo,” including the “exemptions or accommodations prior to October 6,
2017”). And, as explained above, that regime was imposed by multiple
IFRs and itself created exceptions to the preventive services regime.
Reinstating the mandate and religious exemption is tantamount to
ordering the agencies to carry out the same violation of law used to jus-
tify the injunction. Such an injunction is an abuse of discretion. See
Rappa v. New Castle Cty., 18 F.3d 1043, 1074 (3d Cir. 1994) (vacating
an injunction because “the district court’s injunction in this case itself
perpetuates the constitutional infirmity of the statute by leaving in
place” other unconstitutional restrictions on speech).
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The district court’s broad ruling does not merely lay the groundwork
for a different lawsuit; it commits reversible error in this case. By its
own reasoning, the court saws off the branch on which it sits.
IV. The States cannot satisfy the remaining injunction factors.
A. The States are not suffering irreparable harm.
The States also must show a preliminary injunction is necessary to
prevent “irreparable harm” before the merits decision, that is, “harm
that cannot adequately be compensated after the fact by monetary
damages.” Adams v. Freedom Forge Corp., 204 F.3d 475, 484-85 (3d Cir.
2000). The risk of “irreparable harm” must be “significant,” not “specu-
lative.” Id. at 484-85, 488. “This is not an easy burden.” Id. at 485. Be-
cause the States cannot establish any cognizable injury, see supra Part
I, they necessarily cannot establish an irreparable harm.
The States have not identified even one employer which will drop
contraceptive coverage due to the IFR, nor have they identified any
women who would fall into the exceedingly narrow category of women
who would choose to forego their employer’s insurance coverage and
qualify for and seek state assistance for contraceptive services.
Nor can the States rely upon wholly speculative predictions of harm
to establish entitlement to an injunction. The district court relied upon
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hypotheticals about denial of coverage and warned of the dire conse-
quences that would result from the IFRs going into effect. Appx.36-37,
43-48, 111-13. The court ignores the seven-year history of the mandate
and its legal battles. The slippery slope argument has been advanced
against every challenge to the mandate and has proven false every
time.
Most notably, the Supreme Court rejected this claim in Hobby Lobby.
573 U.S. at 733 (“Nor has HHS provided evidence that any significant
number of employers sought exemption, on religious grounds, from any
of ACA’s coverage requirements other than the contraceptive man-
date.”). There, the dissent predicted a number of consequences, raising
the specter of exemption claims by “employers with religiously ground-
ed objections to . . . [1] blood transfusions (Jehovah’s Witnesses); [2] an-
tidepressants (Scientologists); [3] medications derived from pigs, includ-
ing anesthesia, intravenous fluids, and pills coated with gelatin (certain
Muslims, Jews, and Hindus); and [4] vaccinations (Christian Scientists,
among others).” Id. at 2805. But those claims never materialized.
Searches of post-Hobby Lobby cases underscore this fact. A search for
federal and state decisions involving employers seeking to avoid cover-
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78
ing blood transfusions turns up no such cases. A search for federal and
state decisions involving employers seeking to avoid covering antide-
pressants likewise turns up no such cases. A search for federal and
state decisions involving employers seeking to avoid covering pork-
derived products turns up no such cases. And finally, a search of federal
and state decisions involving employers seeking to avoid covering vac-
cines turns up no such cases. In fact, each search turns up two kinds of
results: (1) cases which have nothing to do with employer health cover-
age, and (2) other contraceptive mandate cases discussing these dire
predictions.
It has been four years since Hobby Lobby, and the horribles have not
paraded. It is incumbent upon plaintiffs seeking a nationwide injunc-
tion to demonstrate that their fears of endless religious objection claims
will in fact come true. The States cannot.
Even fears about lack of contraceptive coverage are overblown. Con-
traceptive coverage was widespread prior to the mandate, as the IOM
acknowledged. The IOM found that “the vast majority”—89%—“of
health plans cover contraceptives.” Institute of Medicine, supra n.2, at
49. If 89% of plans covered contraceptives before the mandate, where is
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the States’ proof that many employers will choose to fake objections—
thus risking fines—due to the IFRs? Indeed, the IFRs had already been
in effect for two months before the first preliminary injunction was
granted, and yet the record is devoid of evidence of any employer, other
than those like the Little Sisters who had already challenged the man-
date, who had taken advantage of it. A Guttmacher study performed in
2017 actually found that contraceptive use among sexually active wom-
en had remained constant—not increased—after the mandate went into
effect.24 This is unsurprising given the many exceptions to the mandate
and the widespread availability of contraceptive coverage prior to the
mandate.
B. The public interest and the balance of the equities favor broad protection of religious exercise.
Unlike the speculative harms asserted by the States, enjoining the
accommodation will impinge the religious freedom of religious objectors
like the Little Sisters. “The loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even 24 Jonathan Bearak & Rachel K. Jones, Did Contraceptive Use Patterns Change After the Affordable Care Act? A Descriptive Analysis, Guttmacher Institute (Mar. 13, 2017), https://bit.ly/2NyhHIR (“We ob-served no changes in contraceptive use patterns among sexually active women.”).
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minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.”
Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976). The same is true of violations
of RFRA. See, e.g., Kikumura v. Hurley, 242 F.3d 950, 963 (10th Cir.
2001) (“[A] plaintiff satisfies the irreparable harm analysis by alleging a
violation of RFRA.”). This is why so many courts enjoined the prior ver-
sions of the mandate, and why a regulatory fix is appropriate.
This strong interest in fundamental freedoms, coupled with the lack
of demonstrated harm if the IFR goes into effect, shows that the balance
favors the IFR and religious objectors like the Little Sisters. The argu-
ments here are similar to those in Hobby Lobby, where the Supreme
Court found that it was actually the government’s position that would
lead to “intolerable consequences”: ‘Under HHS’s view, RFRA would
permit the Government to require all employers to provide coverage for
any medical procedure allowed by law in the jurisdiction in question—
for instance, third-trimester abortions or assisted suicide.” Hobby Lob-
by, 573 U.S. at 733. Indeed, given the district court’s construction of
substantial burden, the government could impose a third-trimester
abortion “accommodation” or an assisted suicide “accommodation,” and
the Little Sisters would be powerless to fight it, since the accommoda-
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81
tion would defeat any RFRA claim. See Appx.41-42 (no substantial bur-
den).
The danger in this case arises not from a sensible religious accom-
modation, but from judicial decisions which tie the government’s hands
when it attempts to comply with civil rights laws and stop burdening
religion. After seven years, the government arrived at a win-win solu-
tion in which most employers provide contraceptive coverage, but the
burden is lifted from religious employers, and employees may choose
from a broad range of alternatives. This Court should reject the States’
belated attempt to dictate federal policy via nationwide injunction.
CONCLUSION
The States lack standing, so the decisions below should be vacated
and the case remanded with instructions to dismiss. If the Court reach-
es the merits, it should hold that the States have not met any of the cri-
teria to justify a preliminary injunction, and reverse both the decisions
below.
Dated: February 15, 2019
Respectfully submitted, /s/ Mark Rienzi
MARK L. RIENZI LORI H. WINDHAM
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ERIC C. RASSBACH DIANA M. VERM The Becket Fund for
Religious Liberty 1200 New Hampshire Ave. NW Suite 700 Washington, DC 20036 (202) 955-0095 [email protected] NICHOLAS M. CENTRELLA Conrad O’Brien PC 1500 Market Street, Suite 3900 Philadelphia, PA 19102-2100 (215) 864-8098 [email protected] Counsel for Intervenor-Defendant-Appellant
Case: 19-1129 Document: 003113163537 Page: 97 Date Filed: 02/15/2019
83
CERTIFICATE OF BAR MEMBERSHIP
I hereby certify that I am a member in good standing of the bar of
the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.
Dated: February 15, 2019
/s/ Mark Rienzi MARK L. RIENZI
The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty
1200 New Hampshire Ave. NW Suite 700 Washington, DC 20036 (202) 955-0095 [email protected] Counsel for Defendant-Appellant
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84
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE WITH FEDERAL RULE OF AP-PELLATE PROCEDURE 32(A) AND LOCAL RULE 31.1
I hereby certify that the following statements are true:
1. This brief complies with the type-volume limitations imposed by
Federal Rules of Appellate procedure 29(d) and 32(a)(7)(B). It con-
tains 15,741 words, excluding the parts of the brief exempted by Fed-
eral Rule 32(a)(7)(B)(iii) and by Local Rule 29.1(b).
2. This brief complies with the typeface and typestyle requirements of
Federal Rule 32(a)(5) and 32(a)(6). It has been prepared in a propor-
tionally-spaced typeface using Microsoft Office Word 2016 in 14-point
Century Schoolbook font.
3. This brief complies with the electronic filing requirements of Local
Rule 31.1(c). The text of this electronic brief is identical to the text of
the paper copies, and the latest version of Windows Defender has
been run on the file containing the electronic version of this brief and
no virus has been detected.
Executed this 15th day of February 2019.
/s/ Mark Rienzi Mark Rienzi
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85
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on the date indicated below, I filed the foregoing docu-
ment with the Clerk of the Court, using the CM/ECF system, which will
automatically send notification and a copy of the brief to the counsel of
record for the parties. I further certify that all parties to this case are
represented by counsel of record who are CM/ECF participants.
Executed this 15th day of February, 2019.
/s/ Mark Rienzi Mark Rienzi
Case: 19-1129 Document: 003113163537 Page: 100 Date Filed: 02/15/2019