NOTES

CHAPTER 1

1 J.R. Weinberg, Abstraction, Relation and Induction, The Univ. of Wisconsin Press, Madison & Milwaukee, 1965. 2 I. Hacking, Representing and Intervening, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, London, New York, 1983.

CHAPTER 2

1 J. Largeault, Enquete sur Ie nominalisme, Nauwelaerts, Louvain, 1971, p.68-78.

2 E. Gilson, La Philosophie au Moyen-Age, Payot, Paris, 1962, p.640: "Joignons acette severe conception de la demonstration un gout tres vif pour Ie fait concret et Ie particulier, qui devait s'exprimer dans un des empirismes les plus radicaux que l'on connaisse, et nous aurons les deux donnees initiales, qui nous aideront Ie mieux a comprendre sa philosophie toute entiere".

3 Weinberg, Abstraction, Relation and Induction, p.4. 4 Ibidem, p.3.

5 R. Camap, The Logical Structure of the World, University of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1967, p.50, § 27. 6 Ibidem, p.107, § 66. 7 Ibidem, p.23.

8 Cf. J. Ruytinx, La Problematique de l' Unite de la Science, Les Belles Lettres, Paris, 1962, p.217. 9 Ibidem, p.223. 10 Ibidem, p.220.

11 E. Gilson, La Philosophie au Moyen Age, p.529. 12 Ibidem, p.649: "TI y aura donc chez lui un sentiment tres vif de l'independance absolue du philosophe en tant que tel et une tendance extremement accusee a releguer tout Ie metaphysique dans Ie domaine du theologique, et un sentiment, non moins vif, de I 'independance du theologien, qui, sur les verites de la foi, se passe aisement du secours caduc de la metaphysique".

13 G. Leff, William of Ockham. The Metamorphosis of Scholastic Discourse, Manchester University Press I Rowman and Littlefield, Manchester, Totowa 1975, p.322: "Ockham, it seemed, did not write his projected commentary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle and he left no other work on this subject. His references to metaphysics in the Ordinatio and the Logic, particularly as they concern the notion of being, present a

NOTES 213

very incomplete picture. Before, however, we are led to conclude that the absence of any developed theory of metaphysics leaves a gap in Ockham's system, it is as well to examine what he does say and whether he has any place for a full-fledged independent metaphysics. If we begin with his view of being it may be recalled that he treated the concept of being on the one hand as a transcendental term which when understood univocally was the most universal of all concepts; as such it had no real signification since it refers to nothing in particular. On the other hand, being could be predicated equivocally of real individuals by means of the ten categories; it was then signified by the ten different ways in which individual beings could be denoted". 14W.V.O. Quine, The Ways a/Paradox, Random House, New York, 1966. 15 Carnap, The Logical Structure a/the World, p.295, § 182. 16 Quine, Ibidem.

17 W.V.O. Quine, "On Carnap's Views on Ontology", in: Quine, The Ways o/Paradox, p.127. 18 W.V.o. Quine, From a Logical Point a/View, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1964, p.l. 19 W.V.O. Quine, Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, Columbia Univ. Press, N.Y. and London, 1969, p.5l. 20 W.v.O. Quine, Word and Object, MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1960, p.233. 21 Quine, Ontological Relativity, p.49. 22 Quine, The Ways a/Paradox, p.128. 23 Ibidem, p.128. 24 Quine, Word and Object, p.VII.

25 Carnap, The Logical Structure o/the World, p.49 § 27. 26 Ibidem, p.50, § 27.

CHAPTER 3

1 Largeault, Enquete sur le nominalisme, p.290. 2 Ibidem, p.329. 3 "On Sense and reference", in: Translations from the Philosophical Writings o/Gottlob Frege, Eds. P. Geach, M. Black, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1966, p.57. 4 D. Pears, Bertrand Russell and the British Tradition in Philosophy, Fontana/Collins, London, 1967, p.13.

5 Cf. B. Russell, My Philosophical Development, Unwin Books, London, 1959, p.118. 6 D. Pears,BertrandRussell, p.14. 7 Ibidem.

8 A. Ayer, Russell, Collins, London, 1972, Prisma, Antwerp, Utrecht, 1974, p.54-55. 9 J. Hintikka, Models/or Modalities, Reidel, Dordrecht, Boston, 1969, p.27.

214

10 Ibidem, p.26. 11 Ibidem. 12 Ibidem. 13 Ibidem, p.29. 14 Ibidem, p.23.

15 Ibidem, p.24. 16 Ibidem, p.27.

NOTES

17 W.V.O. Quine, "Two Dogmas of Empiricism", in: From a Logical Point of View, 1964, p.20-46. 18 Cf. G.1. Taylor, Proc. Cambridge Phil. Soc., 15, 1909, p.114. Cf. R.L. Phleegor, L. Mandel, Physic. Review, 159, 1967, p.1048. 19 R.H. Severens, "Channelling Commitments", Franciscan Studies, 1962, p.1-21. 20 Ibidem, p.3. 21 Ibidem, p.12. 22 P.F. Strawson, "On Referring", Mind, LIX, Nr. 235, 1950. 23 Ibidem, p.325 24 Ibidem, p.337. 25 Ibidem, p.337-338. 26 Cf. D. Batens, "Meaning, Acceptance and Dialectics", Proceedings of the 4th International Union o/History and Philosophy o/Science, edited by Joseph Pitt, Reidel, Dordrecht, 1985. 27 Pears, Bertrand Russell and the British Tradition in Philosophy p.56: "So his main point about existence can be put by saying that in the proposition that Sir Walter Scott exists, it cannot be the case that the ordinary proper name is being used as a logical proper name. If it were being so used, it would derive its meaning directly from its denotation without intervention of any descriptions, and in that case the proposition would be meaningless if the denotation did not exist. But that is absurd, since the proposition clearly has meaning even if the man does not and never did exist. Therefore it must be the case that his existence is being afftnned through some property". 28 B. Russell, My Philosophical Development, p.126. 29 Cf. M.J. Loux, Universals and Particulars. Readings in Ontology, Anchor Books New York, 1970, p.202. 30 Cf. Chapter 6.

31 Russell, My Philosophical Development, p.117. 32 Ibidem, p.127. 33 Ibidem, p.127.

34 Cf. Largeault, EnquCte sur Ie nominalisme, p.352-355 and N. Goodman, Of Mind and Other Matters, Harvard Univ. Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1984, p.l30. 35 Cf. Largeault, Enquete sur le Nominalisme, p.347.

NOTES 215

36 N. Goodman and W.V.O. Quine, "Steps Towards a Constructive Nominalism", Journal of Symbolic Logic, Vol. 12, Nr. 4,1947, p.105, footnote 2. 37 Cf. Quine, "Two Dogmas of Empiricism", p.20-46.

38 Quine, From a Logical Point of View, p.102-129. 39 Ibidem, p.129. 40 Quine, Word and Object. 41 Quine, The Ways of Paradox. 42 W. V.O. Quine, The Roots of Reference, Open Court, La Salle, lllinois, 1973, p.138. 43 Ibidem. 44 N. Goodman, The Structure of Appearance, Bobbs-Merill Co., Indianapolis, New York, Kansas City, 1951. 45 N. Goodman, Fact, Fiction and Forecast, Bobbs-Merril Company, Indianapolis, N.Y., 1965, frrst edition, 1955, p.59. 46 Ibidem, p.119. 47 N. Goodman, Languages of Art, Hackett, Indianapolis, 1976. 48 N. Goodman, Ways ofWorldmaking, Harvester, Indianapolis, 1978. 49 N. Goodman, Of Mind and Other Matters, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, London, 1984.

CHAPTER 4

1 W.V.O. Quine, "Designation and Existence", The Journal ojPhilosophy, Vol. 36, n 26, 1939, p.708 : "As a thesis in the philosophy of scien~e, nominalism can be formulated thus: it is possible to set up a nominalistic language in which all of natural science can be expressed". 2 G. Frege, "On Sense and Reference", in: Translationsfrom the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege, 1966, p.57. 3 G. Frege, "On Concept and Object", Ibidem, p.42-55. 4 Frege, "On Sense and Reference", p.57. 5 Ibidem, p.70. 6 Ibidem, p.70. 7 Cf. G. Frege, "ll1ustrative extracts", in: Translations from the Writings of Gottlob Frege, p.84. Abstraction is founded on oblivion of details. Commenting on Husseri's views on the subject he says: "Inattention is a very strong lie; it must be applied at not too great concentration, so that everything does not dissolve, and likewise not too dilute, so that it effects sufficient change in the things. Thus it is a question of getting the right degree of dilution; this is difficult to manage and I at any rate never succeeded". 8 Ibidem, p.85. 9 Frege, "On Concept and Object", p.43.

216 NOlES

10 There are objections to this theory though, but we shall discuss them, in chapter 7, on "Particular and General" . 11 Ibidem, p.SS. 12 Ibidem, p.43-44.

13 Quine, "Designation and Existence", p.704: "What is left is but a bandying of empty honorifics and pejoratives - "existent" and "non-existent", "real" and "unreal"". 14 Ibidem, p.70S.

15 Ibidem, p.707.

16 Frege, The Foundations of Arithmetics, transl. IL. Austin, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 19S0, p.60e_61e.

17 Ibidem, p.61e. 18 William Ockham, Summa Logicae, I, Franciscan Institute Publications, Saint Bonaventure, N.Y. and E. Nauwelaerts, Louvain, Belgium, 1951, Cap. 1 urn, (De termino in generali), p.8. Cf. Ockham's Theory of Terms, Part I of the Summa Logicae, translated and introduced by M.J. Loux, University of Notre Dame Presse, Notre Dame, London, 1974, chapter 1, p.49. 19 Ockham, Summa Logicae, I, Cap 1 urn, p.9. Cf. Loux, Ockham's Theory of Terms, Part I, chapter 1, p.50. 20 Ibidem.

21 Leff, William ofOckham, 1975, p.25. (In this work a more comprehensive exposition of Ockham's theory of signification and supposition can be found and many useful bibliographical data). 22 Ockham, Summa Logicae, I, Cap. 3 urn, (De correspondentia inter terminos vocales et mentales), p.12. Cf. Loux, Ockham's Theory of Terms, Part I of the Summa Logicae, chapter 3, p.52.

23 Cf. L. Baudry, Lexique philosophique de Guillaume d' Ockham, Lethellieux, Paris, 1957, p.259. 24 Loux, Ockham's Theory of Terms, Part I of the Summa Logicae, introductory article: "The Ontology of William of Ockham", p.2. 25 Baudry, Lexique philosophique de Guillaume d' Ockham, p.2S9. 26 Frege, "On Sense and Reference", p.58. 27 Baudry, Lexique philosophique de Guillame d'Ockham, p.259. 28 William Ockham, Summa Logicae, I, Cap. 70, p.190. Loux, Ockhams Theory of Terms, Part 1 of the Summa Logicae, Cap. 70, p.200. 29 Loux, Ockham Theory of Terms, Part 1 of the Summa Logicae, Cap. 70, p.20l. William Ockham, Summa Logicae I, Cap. 40, p.190-19l. 30 Ibidem, p.20l. William Ockham, Summa Logicae I, Cap. 70, p.191.

31 Ph. Boehner, "Ockham's Theory of Supposition and the Notion of Truth"" ,Francis-can Studies, 1962, ,p.266. 32 N. Goodman, "On Likeness of Meaning", Analysis, 10, 1949, p.l.

NOTES 217

33 N. Goodman, "On Some Differences About Meaning", Analysis, 13, 1952, p.90-96. 34 Ibidem, p.3. 35 Ibidem.

36 G.W.F. Hegel, Wissenschaft der Logik, Felix Meiner, Hamburg, 1963, p.74. 371. Kant, Kritik der reinen VernunJt, Atlas, KOln, s.d., p.347. 38 R. Carnap, Meaning and Necessity, The Univ. of Chicago Press, Chicago and London, 1956, p.112 e.g. 39 U. Eco, Einfilhrung in die Semiotik, Fink, Mtinchen, 1972, p.72. 40 Cf. Carnap, Meaning and Necessity, p.234.

CHAPTERS

1 Cf. M. Gosselin, "Concerning Apes, Deaf Children and Humanists", Communication and Cognition, Vol. 12, nr. 2,1979, p.163-165. 2 Quine, Word and Object, p.17 § 5. 3 Ibidem, p.26. 4 Ibidem, p.12, footnote. 5Cf. U.Eco, "LatratusCanis",TijdschriftvoorFilosofie,47,nr.l,March, 1985,p.1-14. 6 Quine, Word and Object, p.3. 7 Leff, William ofOckham, p.l00: If, he (Ockham) says, two things suffice to verify a proposition, a third is superfluous; but all agree that propositions such as "Man is known", "Man is a subject", "Man is a species", which contain a mental object (esse fictum) are verified of real things and so must be true; for if knowledge of a man is posited in the intellect, the proposition "Man is known" cannot be false ( ... ) Nor is a fictum to be posited as the condition of a subject and predicate in a universal proposition. An act of knowing suffices for that, because an individual known both in itself and as a representation by afictum is also known by an act; otherwise afictum could be known independently of an act knowing it as an object of thought, which is impossible ( ... ) This shows clearly the distinction between the presence in the mind officta as objects of thought, which Ockham never denied, and their directly representational character, which Ockham did now deny". For a broad discussion of this intricate problem see also M. Mc Cord Adams, William ofOckham, Univ. of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, Indiana, 1987, Vol. I, p.84-107. 8 Ibidem, p.102. 9 Ibidem, p.102-103. 10 Ibidem, p.103. 11 K. Lorenz, "Gestaltwahrnehmung als Quelle wissenschaftlicher Erkenntnis", in: Yom Weltbild des Verhaltensforschers, Deutscher Taschenbuchverlag, Miinchen, 1984, p.106.

218 NOlES

12 Configurationalism has been the base of the more recent developments in the psychology of perception, such as the ecological approach of perception by 1.1. Gibson and the recent work ofD. Marr. 13 Ibidem, p.118. . 14 Cf. M. Gosselin, "Conventionalism versus Realism. Are perceptions basically particular or general?", Communication and Cognition, Vol. 17, Nr. 1, p.77, ff .. 15 Lorenz, "Gestaltwahmehmung als QueUe wissenschaftlicher Erkenntnis", p.128. 16 K. Lorenz, Die Ruckseite des Spiegels, Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, Miinchen, 1980, p.154. 17 Lorenz, "Gestaltwahmehmung als QueUe wissenschaftlicher Erkenntnis", p.128-129. 18 Quine, Word and Object, p.123 ff. S. 19 Lorenz, "Gestaltwahrnehmung als QueUe wissenschaftlicher Erkenntniss", p.105. 20 Cl. Uvi-Strauss, La Pensee Sauvage, PIon, Paris, 1962, p.62-63.

CHAPTER 6

1 G. Leff, Medieval Thought. Saint Augustine to Ockham, Quadrangle, Books, Chicago, 1958, p.282. 2 K. Munitz, Existence and Logic, New York, University Press, New York, 1974, p.45. 3 Ibidem, p.46. 4 Aristotle's Metaphysics, transl. by H.G. Apostle, Indiana Univ. Press, Bloomington and London, 1966, Book Z, 4,1030 a, 1030 b, p.112-113. 5 Aristote, La Metaphysique, transl. and commentaries by I. Tricot, Vrin, Paris, 1970, p.439, footnote 2. 6 Ibidem. 7 Aristotle's Metaphysics, (Apostle), Book Z 11,20-30, p.126-127. 8 Chapter 5, 3., Evolution, cognitivism and the notion of conceptual scheme. 9 Aristote, La Meraphysique, (Tricot), p.441. 10 Aristotle's Metaphysics, (Apostle), Book Z 15, 1040 a 30, p.133. 11 The species speciallissima expresses the similarity of individuals of the same nature and is therefore an important concept, the rejection of which is revolutionary. 12 Leff, William ofOckham, p.62. 13 Leff, William ofOckham, p.72. 14 William Ockham, Summa Logicae, I, Cap. XIX, De Individuo, p.59, Cf. M.J. Loux, Ockham's Theory of Terms, Summa Logicae, Part. 1, Chapter 19, p.90-91. 15 Baudry, Lexique philosophique de Guillaume d' Ockham, p.117 -118. 16 Leff, William ofOckham, p.167. 17 Weinberg, Abstraction, Relation and Induction, p.46.

NOTES 219

18 William Ockham, Summa Logicae, I, Cap. xvm, De quinque universalibus in generale, p.51. Cf. Loux, Ockham's Theory o/Terms, Part I o/the Summa Logicae, chapter 18, p.88. 19 Goodman and Quine, "Steps Towards a Constructive Nominalism", p.105. 20 N. Goodman, "A world of Individuals", in: J.M. Bochenski, The Problem 0/ Universals, A Symposium, Notre Dame University Press, Notre Dame, 1956, p.19. 21 Ibidem, p.21-22. 22 Cf. Chapter 4, 1. 23 Goodman, The Structure 0/ Appearance, p.4. 24 Ibidem, p.13. 25 Ibidem, p.4-5, (my italics). 26 Ibidem, p.26. 27 Ibidem, p.6. 28 Cf. Chapter 3.

29 E. Luschei, The Logical Systems o/Lesniewski, North Holland Publishing Company, Amsterdam, 1962, p.149. 30 Ibidem, p.10.

31 Ibidem, p.10. 32 Ibidem, p.30.

33 N. Goodman, "Appendix to "A World of Individuals"", in: Philosophy 0/ Mathe-matics, Eds. P. Bemacerraf andH. Putnam. Prentice hall, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1964. 34 Goodman, The Structure 0/ Appearance, p.39. 35 Ibidem, p.36. 36 Cf. Chapter 6, 6.3.2. 37 For more details: MJ. Loux, Universals and Particulars, Doubleday, New York, 1910, p.196-203. 38 Goodman, The Structure 0/ Appearance, p.36. 39 Ibidem, p.156-151. 40 Ibidem.

41 H.S. Leonard and N. Goodman, "The Calculus ofIndividuals and its Uses", Journal o/Symbolic Logic, Vol. 5, Nr. 2,1940, p.51. 42 Ibidem, p.52. 43 Ibidem, p.52.

44 Luschei, The Logical Systems 0/ Lesniewski, p.35-36. "Except for its principle of hierarchical stratification, constructive relativity and other characteristics ( ... ), Lesniewski's grammar of semantic categories formally resembles simple theories of types devised ad hoc to preclude familiar paradoxes. But in grammatical conception and scope, it has greater intuitive affinity with the tradition of Aristotle's categories,

220 NOlES

Husserl 's Bedeutungskategorien, and the grammar of parts of speech in Indo-European languages". 45 Leonard and Goodman, "The Calculus of Individuals", p.45. 46 Ibidem, p.45. 47 Ibidem.

48 Luschei, Lesniewsld's Logical Systems, p.151. 49 Ibidem.

50 William of Ockham, Summa Logicae, I, Cap. XXXV, De toto, p.91, Cf. Loux, Ockham's Theory of Terms, Part 1 of the Summa Logicae, chapter. 35, p.116. 51 Cf. Luschei, The Logical Systems of Lesniewski, p.ll. 52 Goodman, The Structure of Appearance, p.53. 53 Baudry, Lexique philosophique de Guillaume d'Ockham, p.188. 54 Luschei, The Logical Systems of Lesniewski, p.lO, and also p.150: "Since any sole ingredient of any individual is the totality of ingredients of that individual and any totality of ingredients of any individual is the same individual, it follows that any sole ingredient of any individual is the same individual; i.e., any individual ("collective singular class") having just one ingredient is identical with that sole ingredient ( ... )". 55 Goodman, The Structure of Appearance, p.128-129. 56 Ibidem, p.53.

57 Ibidem, p.244. See for this problem also: Hao Wang, "What is an Individual?", P hilos. Review, 61, 1953, pp.413-420.

CHAPTER 7

1 Goodman, The Structure of Appearance, p.194. 2 Cf. Ibidem, p.193. 3 Ibidem, p.133.

4 Ibidem, p.132. 5 Ibidem, p.135. 6 Ibidem, p.249. 7 Ibidem.

8 Quine, The Roots of Reference, Open Court, La Salle, 1974. 9 Ibidem, p.2. 10 Cf. Chapter 5, 1. 11 Ibidem, p.52-53. 12 Ibidem, p.66. 13 Ibidem, p.82. 14 Ibidem, p.84. 15 Ibidem, p.85.

16 Ibidem. 17 Ibidem. 18 Ibidem, p.87. 19 Ibidem, p.88. 20 Ibidem, p.89. 21 Ibidem, p.93.

NOlES

22 Ibidem, p.95, vice = the Latin vice "more anglico". 23 Ibidem, p.95. 24 Ibidem, p.96. 25 Ibidem, p.100.

221

26 Quine, "Identity, Ostension and Hypostasis" in: From a Logical Point of View, p.70. 27 P.F. Strawson, Individuals. An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics, Methuen, London, 1961, p.203-204. 28 Ibidem, p.168. 29 Ibidem, p.207. 30 Ibidem, p.208. 31 Ibidem, p.218. 32 Ibidem, p.222. 33 Ibidem, p.222. 34 Ibidem, p.225. 35 CF. M. Gosselin, "Realism versus Conventionalism. Are Perceptions Particular or General?", Communication and Cognition, Vol. 17, N 1, pp.57-88. 36 E. Tronick, "Infant Communicative Intent. The Infant's Reference to Social Interac-tion", in: R.E. Stark, ed., Language Behaviour in Infancy and Early Childhood, Elsevier/North Holland, New York, Amsterdam, Oxford, 1981, p.5. 37 Ibidem, p.6. 38 Ibidem, p.13. 39 Ibidem, p.14. 40 Ibidem, pA. 41 Ibidem, p.87. 42 Lois Bloom, One Word at a Time, Mouton, The Hague, 1973, p.65. 43 Ibidem, p.67. 44 Ibidem, p.70. 45 Ibidem, p.67-68. 46 Ibidem, p.71. 47 Ibidem, p.72. 48 Ibidem, p.75. 49 Ibidem, p.139. 50 Ibidem, p.133.

222

51 Ibidem, p.133 and p.136. 52 Ibidem, p.I41.

NOTES

53 I.W. Schlesinger, Steps to Language, Laurence Erlbaum, Hillsdale, New Jersey, London, 1982, p.I45.

CHAPTER 8

1 Ockham, Summa Logicae, I, cap. 14, p.43-45. Cf. M.J. Loux, Ockham's Theory of Terms, Part 1 of the Summa Logicae, p.77-79. 2 Ibidem. 3 Leff, William of Ockham, p.I23 (quotation from W. of Ockham, Ordinatio, Opera Omnia, ed. luntina & Venice, 1574, p.252-253). 4 Loux, Ockham's Theory of Terms, Part 1 of the Summa Logicae, § 14, p.79. 5 Cf. Chapter 4, 2. 6 J. Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Everyman's Library, London, 1961, Vol. II, p.Il. 7 Ibidem, p.12. 8 Ibidem, Vol. 2, p.13, "( ... ) it is perverting the use of words, and brings unavoidable obscurity and confusion into their signification, whenever we make them stand for anything but those ideas we have in our own minds". 9 Ibidem, p.I6. 10 Ibidem.

11 Ibidem, Vol. 2, p.I7. 12 Ibidem, Vol. 1, p.I6. 13 Ibidem.

14 Ibidem, Vol. 1, p.I13. 15 Ibidem, Vol. I, p.116. 16 Ibidem, Vol. I, p.119. 17 D. Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, Everyman's Library, Londen, New York, 1964. Vol. 1, p.I7l. 18 Cf. E. Brehier, Histoire de la Philosophie, Tome IT, Fascicule 2, PUP, Paris, 1950, p.406. Hume,A Treatise of Human Nature, Vol. I, p.I7. 19 C. Blakemore, Mechanics of the Mind, Cambridge Univ. Press, Cambridge, 1977, p.I6-17. 20 Leff, William of Ockham, p.60. 21 Ibidem, p.56.

22 Carnap, The Logical Structure of the World, p.316. 23 Ibidem.

24 Ibidem, p.317.

NOTES

25 Ibidem, e.g. p.36. 26 Blakemore, Mechanics of the Mind, p.63. 27 P. Changeux, L' Homme Neuronal, Fayard, Paris, 1983, p.82. 28 Ibidem, p.69, Fig. 16. 29 Ibidem, p.89.

223

30 B.F. Skinner, Verbal Behavior, Appleton-Century Crofts, New York, 1957, p.6: "There is obviously something suspicious in the ease with which we discover in a set of ideas precisely these properties needed to account for the behaviour which expresses them. We evidently construct the ideas at will from the behaviour to be explained ( ... )". 31 Cf. Quotation ofG. Wallas, in: G. Blakemore, Mechanics of the Mind, p.131. 32 Quine, The Roots of Reference, p.35. See also: Word and Object, p.208, e.g .. 33 Goodman, Of Mind and Other Matters, p.14-15. "Shouldn't I remind Gardner that tracing nerve impulses from receptors to parts of the brain does not help us at all in explaining consciousness, and protest that loss of a skill when a certain part of the brain is damaged tells us no more about the nature of that skill than the fact that loss of an eye causes blindness tells us about vision?". 34 J. Piaget, Le langage et les operations intellectuelles, PUF, Paris, 1963, p.58. 35 J. Piaget, "Le langage et la pensee du point de vue genetique", in: Thinking and Speaking, North Holland Publications, Amsterdam, 1954, p.146. 36 H. Furth, Thought Without Language. Psychological Implications of Deafness, New-York, Collier-Mac Millan, London, 1976, p.12. 37 Cf. P. Oleron, Language and Mental Development, Laurence Erlbaum, Hillsdale, New Jersey, 1977. 38 Furth, Thought Without Language, p.228. 39 Quine, From a Logical Point of View, p.61. 40 Carnap, Meaning and Necessity, 1970, p.64. 41 N. Chomsky, "A Review ofB.F. Skinner's "Verbal Behavior'''', in: J.A. Fodor, J.J. Katz, The Structure of Language, Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1964, p~.547-549. 4 Ibidem, p.575. 43 Ibidem. 44 Chomsky, "Current Issues in Linguistic Theory", in: Fodor, Katz (eds.), The Structure of Language, p.79. 45 Ibidem, p.81. 46 Ibidem. 47 Cf. J. Lyon, Chomsky, Fontana, London, p.97. 48 Ibidem. 49 N. Chomsky, Aspects of the Theory of Syntax, MIT Press, Cambridge Massachusetts, 1965, p.206. 50 J.A. Fodor, "The Mind-Body Problem", Scientific American, 1981, Vol. 244, n. 1, p.114-123.

224 NOTES

51 J.A. Fodor, The Language of Thought, Harvard Univ. Press, Cambridge, Mas-sachusetts, 1979. 52 Ibidem, p.34 and 35. 53 Ibidem, p.52. 54 Ibidem, p.56. 55 Ibidem, p.77. 56 Ibidem, p.96. 57 Ibidem, p.96-97. 58 Ibidem, p.123. 59 Ibidem, p.125. 60 Ibidem, p.148. 61 Ibidem, p.149-150. 62 Ibidem, p.156. 63 Ibidem, p.I72. 64 Ibidem, p.20l. 65 G.D. Wassennann,Neurobiological Theory of Psychological Phenomena, Macmil-lan Press, London and Basingstoke, 1978, p.l. 66 Fodor, The Language of Thought, p.25. 67 Cf. J.L. Schnopf, D.A. Baylor, "How Photoreceptor Cells Respond to Light", Scientific American, April 1987, Vol. 256, Nr. 4, p.32-39. L. Stryer, "The Molecules of Visual Excitation", Scientific American, July 1987, vol. 257, Nr. 1, p.32-4l. M. S. Livingstone, "Art, lllusion and the Visual System", Scientific American, January 1988, Vol. 258, Nr. 1, p.68-75. 68 Wassermann, Neurobiological Theory of Psychological Phenomena, p.l. 69 Fodor, The Language of Thought, p.20l. 70 Changeux, L' Homme Neuronal, p.336. As most (up to 95 % or more) of the DNA is "useless" or "nonsense" DNA, itis possible, however, that an important part of the "useful" DNA of humans is different from the "useful" DNA of chimps. (This remark was made by Prof. D. Roggen, biologist, VUB, Brussels). 71 Ibidem, p.72: "Non seulement les categories de cellules pyramidales et etoilees sont les memes de la souris a I 'homme, mais Ie nombre total de ces cellules par echantillon de surface constante ne vane pas au cours de l'evolution des mammiferes. Les donnees de la microscopie quantitative du cortex s'accordent avec celles de l'anatomie comparee: I' evolution du cortex chez les mammiferes porte avant tout sur sa surface". 72 In many cases much more connections are made than necessary. Useless connections are unmade and wrongly connected neurons die. (Remark by D. Roggen, biologist, VUB, Brussels).

NOTES 225

73 F. Vester, Denken, Lernen, Vergessen, Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, Stuttgart, p.31-35. The research in the field of the influence of stimuli on the growth of nerve connections by N. Wiesel and D.H. Hubel is most famous. 74 W.R. Uttal, The Psychobiology o/Mind, Erlbaum Associates, Hillsdale, New Jersey, 1978, p.682. 75 Changeux, L' Homme Neuronal, p.219-227.

76 Changeux, L' Homme Neuronal, p.I72: "La comparaison avec l' ordinateur - machine cybernetique - aete utile pourintroduire la notion de "codage interne" du comportement. Elle presente toutefois I 'inconvenient de laisser implicitement supposer que Ie cerveau fonctionne comme un ordinateur. L'analogie est trompeuse. Un des traits characteristiques de la machine cerebrale est d'abord que Ie codage interne fait inter-venir, ala fois, nous l'avons vu, un codage topologique de connexions decrit par un graphe neuronique et un codage d'impulsions electriques ou de signaux chimiques. lei la distinction c1assique "hardware - software" ne tient pas. D'autre part il est evident que Ie cerveau de l'homme est capable de developper des strategies de maniere autonome". 77 Wassermann, Neurobiological theory 0/ Psychological Phenomena, p.209: "The possibility that many human cognitive performances of great complexity can actually or potentially be simulated by computers does not imply that brains, when performing similar tasks, operate like the machinery of digital computers. For instance, computers are far more sensitive than brains to the destructive results of sizeable circuit defects ( ... ). Above all, creative thinking has so far defied description in terms of Boolean Algebra ...... Cf. also W.R. Uttal, The Psychobiology o/Mind, p.274, F. Vester, Denken, Lernen, Vergessen, 1978, p.82. 78 Changeux, L' Homme Neuronal, p.188. 79 Uttal, The Psychobiology o/the Mind, p.672-674. 80 Ibidem, p.614. 81 Ibidem, p.618.

82 Ibidem, p.634: "Each synapse is but one of a myriad of similar structures contributing to the global response. In the realm of learning as in the realm of perception it is extremely difficult to understand how any individual synapse could be essential to any molar mental act. It seems far more likely that the relevance of the synapses is meaningful only in the statistical or probabilistic sense ( ... )". 83 Cf. Vester, Denken, Lernen und Vergessen, p.30-31. "Lauft nun eine elektrische Erregung durch das Axon bis in die Synapsen dann platzen die Blaschen und geben die Transmittersubstanz frei. Sie wandert in den Spalt und erhoht in der gegeniiberliegenden Wand der Nervenzelle oder einer ihrer Verzweigungen die Durchlassigkeit flir bestim-rnte lonen. Die Transmitterstoffe der erregten Synapse bewirken so zum Beispiel den Einstrom von Natrium-Ionen und den Ausstrom von Kalium-Ionen. So ensteht zwis-chen der Synapse und der angrenzenden Nervenzelle ein Strom der sich dort als elektrochemischer Impuls fortpflanzt. Der Kontakt wird geschlossen und die Informa-tion kan weiterlaufen. Bei hemmende Synapsen ist es umgekehrt ( ... ). Ein standiger Nachschub von Transmittersubstanz ist also erforderlich".

226 N01ES

84 Wassennann, Neurobiological Theory of Psychological Phenomena, p.148. 85 F. Basar, H. Flohr, H. Baken, A.J. Mandell, (eds.), Synergetics of the Brains, Springer, Berlin, 1983, p.6. 86 Changeux, L' Homme Neuronal, p.225-227. 87 Ibidem, p.5. 88 Ibidem, p.6. 89 Ibidem, p.6: "these cables or channels as I prefer to call them, are postulated to be actual message encoders and carriers, a message being encoded and transmitted along a channel in the fonn of an electrical excitation wave and each channel is chemospecific" . 90 Ibidem, p.24-25. 91 a. Ibidem, p.29. A method for testing the existence of those labels is to verify whether the cells that are supposed to be differentiated are "allergic" to one another and produce antigens when contacting each other. 92 G. Wassennann, Neurobiological Theory of Psychological Phenomena, p.101. 93 Ibidem, p.28. 94 Ibidem, p.93. 95 Ibidem, p.100. 96 Ibidem.

97 Ibidem, p.100-101. 98 Changeux, L' Homme Neuronal, p.156-162. 99 L.A. Cooper, R.N. Shepard, "Turning Something Over in the Mind", Scientific American, Dec. 1984, Vol. 251, Number 6, p.l06. 100 Wassennann, Neurobiological Theory of Psychological Phenomena, p.58-59. 101 Ibidem, p.6. 102 Ibidem, p.lO. 103 Ibidem.

104 Ibidem, p.12. 105 Ibidem, p.160. 106 Ibidem, p.7, fig. 1.1. 107 The biochemical details and experimental clues of the theory can be found in the second chapter of Wassermann's Neurobiological Theory of Psychological Phenomena, in casu, p.62. 108 Ibidem, p.1l8.

109 Frank R. Vellutino, "Dyslexia",ScientijicAmerican, March 1987, Vol. 256,Number 3,p.20. 110 Wassennann, Neurobiological Theory of Psychological Phenomena, p.171. 111 Ibidem, p.175. 112 Ibidem, p.176. 113 Ibidem, p.l77.

114 ibidem, p.178.

115 Ibidem, p.179. 116 Ibidem, p.l64.

N01ES 227

117 For example Changeux, in L' Homme Neuronal, sketches the outlines of a theory of "mental objects", cf. p.17l-228. 118 Wassermann, Neurobiological Theory of Psychological Phenomena, p.179.

CHAPTER 9

1 O. Leff, The Dissolution of the Medieval Outlook, Harper and Row, New York, London, 1976. 2 Ibidem, p.9.

3 Ibidem, p.ll, "From the time of Ockham, questions were treated less for their own immediate import than to exhibit their logical, epistemological and theological implica-tions. Understanding and knowledge were thus subordinated to, or more properly, subsumed under the formal requisites of meaning and evidence". 4 Ibidem, p.12.

5 Ibidem, p.12. 6 Ibidem, p.12 and 13 .. 7 Ibidem, p.14 and 15.

8 Ibidem, p.19.

9 L. Alanen, S. Knuuttila, "Modality in Descartes and his Predecessors", in: Modern Modalities, Kluwer, Dordrecht, 1988, p.30. 10 Ibidem, p.30. 11 Ibidem, p.34. 12 Ibidem, p.35. 13 Ibidem.

14 Weinberg, Abstraction, Relations and Induction, p.l06 "( ... ) Ockham's main con-tribution is that relational concepts signify many things (i.e. two or more) taken conjunctively. This seems to be sound or at least, a more correct view than the prevailing doctrine that relational concepts refer to peculiar referring accidents inhering in one term and depending in some way also upon the other term to which the accident inhering in the one term refers". 15 A summary of the most common accusations formulated against Ockham can be found in: F. Rapp, "Le proces du nominalisme", in: L' eglise et la vie religieuse en Occident a lafin du moyen age, Nouvelle Clio, 1971, p.332-345. 16 Cf. M. MCCord Adams, William Ockham, Vol. 1, p.588-594. 17 T.K. Scott, "Ockham on Evidence, Necessity and Intuition", Journal of the History of Philosophy, VII, 1969, 1, pp.27-49. 18 Ibidem, p.27.

228 NOTES

19 Ibidem, p.28. 20 Risible has to be understood as "can laugh". 21 Ibidem, p.34. 22 Ibidem, p.35.

23 a. Baudry, Lexiquephilosophique de Guillaume d'Ockham, p.189. 24 a. Leff, William ofOckham, p.305. 25 Ibidem, p.309.

26 Scott, "Ockham on Evidence, Necessity and Intuition", p.38. 27 Cf. Willem van Ockham, Evidente kennis en theologische waarheden, vertaald en geannoteerd door Dr. E.P. Bos, Het Wereldvenster, Weesp, 1984, p.15.

R.C.Richards, "OckhamandScepticism",TheNewScholasticism, 1968,42,p.352-353. Leff, WilliamofOckham, p.21. MCCord Adams, William of Ockham, Vol. 1, p.594-601. Contains an interesting discussion of Ockham's view on Academic certainty. 28 Scott, "Ockham on Evidence, Necessity and Intuition", p.46. 29 Ibidem, p.47.

30 Leff, William of Ockham, p.14.

31 Richards, "Ockham and Scepticism", p.359. 32 Leff, William of Ockham, p.28-29. 33 Ibidem, p.29.

34 Ibidem, p.313-314. 35 Ibidem, p.314. 36 Ibidem, p.167. 37 Ibidem, p.167, footnote 192. 38 Ibidem, p.578. 39 Ibidem, p.583.

40 N. Goodman, Fact, Fiction and Forecast, p.61. 41 Ibidem, p.62.

42 Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, Vol. 1, p.26. 43 Ibidem, p.27.

44 Goodman, Fact, Fiction and Forecast, p.64. 45 Ibidem, p.64. 46 Ibidem, p.66. 47 Ibidem, p.68. 48 Ibidem, p.74.

49 Ibidem, p.85: "The fact is that whenever we set about determining the validity of a given projection from a given base, we have and use a good deal of other relevant knowledge". 50 Ibidem, p.94.

NOlES 229

51 W.V.O. Quine, J.S. Ullian, The Web of Belief, Random House, New York, 1970, p.54. 52 Ibidem, p.57. 53 Cf. Strawson,Individuals, p.168. 54 Cf. e.g. N. Tinbergen, Curious naturalists, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1958, part two. 55 Cf. Chapter 8 and G.A. Miller and P.M. Gildea, "How Children Learn Words", Scientific American, September, 1987, p.89. 56 The Illustrated Encyclopedia of Minerals and Rocks, Artia, Prague, 1977, p.272. 57 Ockham also uses the latter example of a causal predicate, in Latin "callefactibile". 58 N. Goodman, Fact, Fiction and Forecast, p.40. 59 D.M. Armstrong, A Theory of Universals, Cambridge University Press, London, 1978, p.57. 60 M. Blarney, R. Fitter, Wild Flowers, Collins Gem Guide, Collins, London and Glasgow, 1980. 61 Cf. E. Heimans, H.W. Heinsius, Jac. P. Thysse, GeiUustreerde Flora van Nederland, W. Versluys, Amsterdam, Djakarta, 1951. 62 J. Powers, Philosophy and the New Physics, Methuen, London & New York, 1982, p.165. 63 Ibidem. 64 J. De Witte, De Functie van de Taal in het Denken, Prisma, Aula, Utrecht, Antwerp, 1970, p.27. Cf. Also C. Pegis ed., Basic Writings of Saint Thomas Aquinas, Random House, 1945, London, The Summa Theologica, Part one, Question LXXXV, The Mode and Order of Understanding, Second Article. 65 M. Gosselin, "Science and Society. The Responsability of the Scientist", in: Science and Society, M. Gosselin, F. Demeyere (eds.), C.E.E. VUB, Brussels, 1987. 66 Jean Piaget, Le Structuralisme, PUF, 1968, Paris. 67 Ibidem, p.13. 68 Ibidem, p.15 .. 69 Ibidem, p.124. 70 I. Hacking, Representing and Intervening, Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science, Cambridge University Press, London, New York, 1983, p.17. 71 Ibidem, p.24. 72 Ibidem, p.26. 73 Ibidem, p.108. 74 Goodman, Of Mind and Other Matters, p.35. 75 I. Hacking, Representing and Intervening, p.108-l09. 76 Ibidem. 77 G. Rocci, Scienza e convenzionalismo, Bulzari Editore, Roma, 1978, p.263 and passim.

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INDEX

Abailard,6 Absolute power (of God), 1, 83, 184 -

186, 189 Abstraction, 7 - 8,14,23,40,43,47,56,

73, 80,98, 118, 140, 181, 183, 190, 193, 205; abstract elements, 116; abstract entity, 22, 36, 38; abstract object, 9; abstract singular, 119; the abstract, 61

Accident, 86, 109, 187 Act of the mind, 134, 140, 179 Alanen, L., 185 Albert The Great, 183 Aldrich, W.V., 64 Analyticity, 11, 18,43,53,115, 181 Animal, 60, 64, 70 - 71, 74, 125, 133,

136, 138 - 139,146,154,162, 176, 198,203,206,211; species, 69

Aquinas, Thomas, 12,79, 183 Aristotle, 1,5 - 7, 12 - 14, 16 - 18,21 -

22,30 - 31, 35, 40 - 41, 64 - 65, 79-86,94,182,184,186,192-194,207, 219

Armstrong, D.M., 202 Attribute, 187 - 189, 204; functional,

130; universal, 5 Autopsychological,9, 142 Avenarius, R., 142 Avicenna, 140 - 141 Axon, 143, 162 Ayer, A.J., 25, 107 Bacon, R., 65 Basic elements, 3, 18,22,36,95 Baudry, L., 48 Behaviourism, 4, 46, 53, 59, 61 - 62, 67,

70,77,113-114,133,141-142,144 - 146, 149 - 150, 152, 160, 175

Being,S - 6,12,15,80- 81, 86, 94,184, 193; as being, 13; of being, 12

Belief, 80; See also Faith Bergmann, G., 193 Berkeley, G., 7,113 Beth, E.W., 36 Blakemore, c., 143 Bloom, L., 129 - 131, 136, 148 Body, 113 - 114, 116, 118 - 119, 130 Boehner, Ph., 52 Boethius, 65 Bonaventura, 183 Brain(s), 21, 60 - 61, 72,140 - 145,147,

150,153,162,164 - 166, 177, 179; processes, 139

Brown, R., 131 Calculus of classes, 36,99,103,105; of

individuals, 3,98, 103 Cantor, 23, 36,94 Carnap, R., 1- 2,8 -11,14- 15, 17 - 18,

20, 22 - 24, 26, 40, 46, 57, 90, 97 -99, 142 - 144, 149, 151 - 152, 157, 181

Cassirer, E., 149, 176 Categoremata, 49 Category, 5,12, 15, 17 - 18,27,32,48,

81, 116, 119, 157 Causality, 184, 193 - 195, 197, 203;

causal connection, 198,202 Cause; efficient, 193 - 194; final, 193 -

194; formal, 193; material, 193 Changeux, P., 168 Chomsky, A.N., 150 - 151, 155, 175,

208 Class, (collection), 17, 22, 31, 36, 38,

88,93 - 94, 96 - 97, 103,105; con-cept, 94; individual, 101, 103; logic, 100,105; mereological, 93

244 INDEX

Cognitive, 74, 147, 156; operations, 172; processes, 160; psychology, 158, 162

Cognitivism, 4, 39, 133, 141, 146, 154 Common sense, 16,21,27,39, 71, 75 -

76,81, 100, 105, 107, 119, 138 Communication, 127, 156 Complex, See Whole Computer, 152 - 154, 156, 158, 160,

165, 172 Concept, 4, 23, 25, 40, 42 - 43, 47 - 48,

50,56, 59, 68 - 70, 77, 79, 90 - 91, 125, 135, 137 - 140, 146, 164, 173, 178, 190, 192, 198 - 200, 205; "grandmother concept", 4; abstract, 176; central, 175, 178; conceptual content, 20; conceptual scheme, 21, 60,62 - 63, 66 - 67,70,74 -75,115, 210; general (universal), 7, 44, 46, 109,137; logical, 101; objective, 46; conceptual system, 155

Conceptualism, 5, 23, 112 Conceptualization, 68,76,83,210 Concrete, 88, 112 - 113, 207; general,

119 Conjunctive, 51 Connections, 163 Constant, 103, 107 Construction, 110 Constructivism, 1,3, 7, 19,21 - 22, 28,

40, 79, 81, 88,92, 116 - 117, 119, 142,144,181,206

constructivistic system, 40 nominalistic, 209 Context, 33 - 34, 93, 156 Contingency, 1, 6, 21, 84, 183 - 184,

186, 189, 191 - 193, 195 Continuity, 35, 102, 106, 114 Conventionalism, 4, 18 - 19,32 - 33, 38

- 39, 48 - 49,65,72 - 73, 76 - 77,82, 94, 107, 115, 134, 177, 181 - 182, 184, 190,205 - 208,210 - 211

Copula, 31,44 Culture, 39, 59 - 63, 65 - 66, 70 - 76,

133, 136, 150, 164, 205, 210; cul-

tural community, 19, 66, 77, 149, 176,179,200,205

Deaf-mute, 60, 147 - 148 Deflllition,33,82,84,89,92,107,157,

186, 188, 195, 199 - 200, 204 - 205; nominal, 52 - 53; real, 52

Demonstration, 6, 12 - 13,81, 186, 191 - 193

Dendrite, 162 Denotation, 24 Descartes, R., 141 - 142 Scientific description, 1,43 Determinism, 1, 80, 184, 189 Disjunction, 51 Displacement, 66 - 67 Disposition, 28, 187, 195; linguistic,

152 Division, 101-102, 105,107 -108,110;

indivisible, 9 Dogma, 1 Duhem, P., 19,37 Duns Scotus, 7, 12,80,83,85,96, 185

- 186, 189 Eco, U., 57, 64 - 65 Economy, 3,17 - 18,62,68 Einstein, A., 29, 75 Empiricism, 1,4,7,10-11,14-15,19,

23 - 25, 36, 38, 40, 46, 56, 58, 62 -64,79,82,90, 113, 118, 124, 133, 135 - 136, 140, 144, 150, 152, 163, 178, 181,205,209; empirical facts, 121, 124; logical, 1, 10 - 11

Empiriocriticism, 8, 10, 70 Encoding, 164, 167 Engram, 173 - 174,177 Entity, 45; abstract, 194; theoretical,

208 - 209 Entrenchment, 38 Epistemology, 1,5,7,19,39, 100, 112,

151, 181 - 183, 189, 191 - 192; nominalistic, 186

Erlebs, 11, 18, 40, 97 - 98; See also Experience (elementary)

Essence, 1 - 2, 6,12 - 13, 19,82,84 - 85, 186,189,193,203

INDEX 245

Essentialism, 1 Evidence, 27, 186 - 187, 189 - 191;

intuitive, 184; statement, 197 Evolutionism, 138 Evolutionist, 71, 73, 76 - 77 Existence, 23, 26, 28 - 29, 31, 34, 45, 49

- 50, 53, 56 - 57,74,80,84 - 85, 109, 113, 183, 191, 193,210; existential generalisation, 45; existential entry , 44; existential generalization, 95; existential implication, 52; existen-tial import, 51,52; existential presupposition, 26, 29 - 30, 43 - 45; of God, 12 - 13; of the value of a variable, 17; See also Ontology

Existents, 81; non-existents, 28 Experience, 4,7,9,34 - 35, 74,138,142,

160, 177 - 178, 196, 200, 205; elementary,9; pure, 206; sensorial, 179, 190;See also Erlebs

Experiment, 4, 29, 140,209 - 210; ex-perimental evidence, 4

Extension, 17, 20, 27, 56, 58, 84, 88, 90 - 93, 96, 103, 115, 118, 122, 149, 179,200, 205; extensional isomor-phism, 90 - 92; primary, 54; secon-dary, 54 - 55

Extensionalism, 20, 38,46,56,59,61, 88 - 89, 94,146

External, 23; question, 17 Faith, 13; See also Belief Feyerabend, K., 27 Fictum,69,140 First Cause, 13, 184 First philosophy, 16, 18,21,81 First science, 27 Fodor, J.A., 152 - 153, 155 - 157, 159,

161 - 163, 175 Fogel, A., 128 Form, 83 - 85,97, 193; abstract, 193;

formal distinction, 96 - 97; formal system, 11

Free will, 184 Free will, freedom (of God), 1,83

Frege, G., 22, 25, 36, 42 - 46, 49 - 50, 52,89

French conventialists, 70 Functionalism, 4, 152,159 Furth, H., 147 Galen of Pergamon, 140 - 141 Gardner, A. and B., 66 Genealogy, 40; of knowledge, 9,18 - 19,

36, 181 The General, 1,3,6 - 7, 9, 12, 14,23,

26,30,35 - 36, 46, 61, 79, 84 - 85, 97, 109, 118 - 119, 123, 125, 140, 163,186,194,198,206;generalob-jects, 8 - 9

Generalization, 15, 130, 178, 194-195, 197 - 199,206; existential, 45

Generation of entities, 89,96 Genus, 5, 12,81,83,87, 188,192 Gestaltpsychology, 9, 73, 171, 189, 199 Gibson, J.J., 72, 125, 211,218 Gilson, E., 12 God, 1, 12 - 13,83, 138, 183, 185, 189,

191 - 192 Goodman, N., 1 - 4, 7 - 8, 10 - 12, 14,

18 - 24, 26 - 29, 34 - 38, 46, 53 - 54, 56,72-73,78,88 - 89,91-101,104, 107, 109 - 112,119 - 120, 123 - 124, 146, 181 - 182, 194 - 197, 199,202 - 203, 206 - 207, 209 - 211

Grammar, 43, 95,117,119,127 Habit, 69, 190, 194,206; of the mind,

195 Hacking, 1, 4, 209 - 210 Haken, H., 168 Hardware, 160, 165, 171 Hebb, D.O., 166 Hegel, G.W.F., 56 Heidegger, M., 15 Hempel, C.G., 196 Henry of Ghent, 183, 185 Hintikka, J., 26 - 30 Hologram, 165 Homogeneous, 102 Hubel, D.H., 225

246 INDEX

Hume, D., 7 - 8, 82, 113, 124, 135, 139, 163, 194 - 195

HusserI, E., 43, 203, 215 Hyden, H., 167 Hypostasis, 14,30,61, 118, 139 - 140,

185 Hypothesis, 197,201; lawlike, 196 Platonic idea, 5,16,22,53,80,94,109,

111 Idealism, 5, 11,24,45,76,210; objec-

tive, 203 Identification, 110 - 112, 121 - 124; of

the individual, 29 Identity,44, 107, 114, 139 Ideology, 3, 79,81,107 Imposition; first, 49; second, 49 Indentity, 87 Individual(s), 3, 9, 20, 26, 28 - 30, 32,

34 - 36,40,46 - 47, 50 - 51, 56,73, 79 - 80, 82 - 83, 85 - 86, 89,93,96, 98, 100, 102, 105 - 106, 108, 111 -113, 117, 121, 137, 183 - 186, 189, 193 - 194, 206 - 207, 210; calculus of, 94; epistemological primacy of the, 79; general, 110; individual thing(s), 1,8,13; logical, 38; non-in-dividual, 207; primacy of the, 206

Individuation, 3, 7, 32, 35, 84,106,111 - 112, 115, 117, 123, 129,206; in-dividuative force, 114

Indivisible, 5 Induction, 38, 194 - 195, 197 - 199 Infinity, 17,22 - 23, 40,107,149 -150;

infinite regress, 13, 16 Ingredient, 105, 107; sole, 105 Innate, 137 - 138, 146 Instantiation, 85 - 86, 111 - 112, 187,

193, 196 - 197,206; particular, 130 Instinct, 62, 70, 74,125,127,146 Instrumentalism, 207 Intellect, 85, 134 Intension, 4, 20, 26 - 27, 46, 49, 53, 55

- 58, 61, 66 - 68, 84, 88,90 - 91, 94, 118, 122, 140, 149, 151 - 152, 161, 179

Intensionalism, 4, 20, 59, 89 Intention, 48 - 49, 61, 65, 67, 92, 133,

156 - 157; first, 49; second,49 Internal, 23; question, 17 Intervention, 209 - 211 Introspection, 67 Intuition, 2,6,12,17,23,47,69,73,80,

83, 151, 190, 192; intuitive cogni-tion, 191; philosophical, 36,40,44; speculative, 21

Invariant, 72, 102 Johanson, Don, 29 John of Salisbury, 6 Kant, I., 21, 57, 75 Katz, IJ., 175 Kind(s), 20, 45 - 46, 188; natural, 210-

211; of entity, 31; of individuals, 26; of things, 14 -16,18,27 - 28, 73,85, 199 - 200, 203

Knuuttila, S., 185 Kuhn, Th., 27 Lamettrie, J.O., 141 Language, 5,16,44,47,59,62 - 64, 66,

68-69,71,74-77,82,113,123,132 - 133, 135, 145 - 146, 150 - 151, 162 - 163, 174 - 177, 183 - 184, 199; animal, 65; artificial, 133; body, 64; constructivistic, 20; daily, 81; everyday, 21; formal, 27; gesture, 66; ideal, 109; internal, 155; learn-ing of, 113, 115, 118,119, 126, 129, 132, 136, 148, 155, 164, 174, 178; logical, 34; mental, 163; natural, 49, 62, 155, 157; of thought, 154, 156 -157, 162 - 163; ordinary, 3, 34, 40-43,76,95,100,102,109,116,154, 203; pre-linguistic, 61; production, 152; sign, 148; symbolic, 66; use (common of), 197; verbal, 61, 147; word,64

Largeault, J., 24 Lashly, K., 150 Lateral information, 63, 66 Latin A verroists, 182, 184 Laudan, L., 27

INDEX 247

Law, 30, 189; laws of logic, 1,45,83; laws of nature, 1; of the U nifonnity of Nature, 194 - 195, 198

Learning, 114, 116 - 117, 125 - 126, 164; concept, 154; perceptual, 154; process, 77,146

Leff. 0 .. 47. 69. 86. J82 - 183. J89 - 193 Leibniz, G.W., 97 Leonard, H.S., 93 - 94, 99 - 100 Leonardo da Vinci, 140 Lesniewski, S., 93 - 94, 96, 100 - 101,

103 - 105, 107,219 Levi-Strauss, Cl., 77 Lewis, c.1., 111, 149 Locke, J., 135 - 139, 163 Logic, 6, 8, 11,22,32 - 34, 40 - 41, 43,

56,64,81,83,94-95,100,116,138, 146, 151, 157, 183 - 184, 191, 195, 200, 206; dialectical, 34; formal, 36, 41; logical abstraction, 91; logical type, 99 - 100; modal, 26; nominalis-tic, 41; of "Principia Mathematica", 14, 17, 22, 26, 36; of classes, 36; of wholes and parts, 36; paraconsistent, 34; See also Logical language

Logical empiricism, 19, 21 - 22, 181, 207,209

Lorenz, K., 71 - 76,206 Loux, MJ., 48 Luschei, E.C., 93, 95, 100 Mach, E., 142 Malpighi, M., 141 Map, 39, 110, 123 - 124, 173 - 174 Marr, D., 218 Materialism, 142 Materiality, 121, 141 Mathematics, 24, 36, 45, 116;

philosophy of mathematics, 23 Matter, 82, 84, 129, 193; masses, 114;

stuff,116 Meaning, 19 - 20, 22, 24 - 25, 33, 41 -

42,44,48 - 49, 53 - 57, 59, 61 - 64, 67,77,92,132,136,150,157,173, 175 -176,178-179, 183; dictionary

theory of, 156, 177; postulates, 157; stimulus, 151

Mental, 50, 139, 141, 144, 146, 152, 174; act, 69; entity, 53, 159; object, 168; process, 152, 161; quality, 69; states, 145, 149, 153, 164

Mentalism. J 13 Mereology, 93, 101; mereological set,

96 Metaphysics, 10 - 15,21,83, 142, 183 Methodology of science, 40 Miller, J.G., 75 Modality, 52, 184 - 187 Mode; formal, 10 - 11; material, 10 Munitz, K., 80 Name, 25,42,45,90 - 91,137; general,

17, 46, 50, 87, 95 - 96, 136; logical, 42 - 44, 49; of person, 130; par-ticular, 50, 136; proper, 17, 20, 25, 33,42 - 46, 49, 51, 95,117

Nature, 2, 12 - 13, 87,206 Necessity, 1, 84, 183 - 189, 191 - 192,

194 - 195; logical, 186, 192, 201; natural, 192; necessary connection, 206

Nervous System, 72, 142, 150,169 Neurobiology, 152, 157 - 158, 160 -

161,164,175; neurobiological map-ping, 169; neurobiological model, 159, 161, 168; See also Neuropsy-chology

Neuron, 4, 143 - 145, 153, 161, 163 -164,166; grandmother, 161

Neutrality; ontological, 10, 12 Nominalism, 1,4 - 8, 11- 12, 14, 19,22

- 24, 26, 28, 34, 36, 39 - 40, 53, 82, 88,93 - 94, 96 - 97, 112, 124, 133, 139, 173, 181 - 182, 195,207,210; constructivistic, 1; contemporary, 1, 61,77,85,181,194,205; medieval, 59, 79; nominalistic system, 3, 11; nominalistic tradition, 10; tradition-al, 1,4,7,19 - 20, 24, 27,39,61,77, 181,205 - 206, 210; transcendental, 210

248 INDEX

Numerically one, 5,86 - 87, 97, 134 Object, 23, 25, 40, 44, 48, 129, 139 -

140; abstract, 88; defmite, 45 - 46; indefinite, 45, 46; of the mind, 69; physical, 116, 119

Observation, 4,6, 10,29,63, 114, 149, 181,209 - 211; of the individual, 29

Ockham's razor, 61 Ockham, William of, 1,4,7,10,12 -14,

35,47,49 - 52, 61, 68 - 69,73,80, 83 - 85, 87 - 88,95 - 97, 101, 104, 109, 124, 134 - 137, 140,156, 179, 182 - 194, 196,201 - 202, 206, 212 - 213, 216 - 217, 227, 229

Oleron, P., 148 Omnipotence, 80 TheOne, 5 Ontology, 1,3 - 6, 12, 14 - 18,21,27 -

28, 40 - 41, 45, 53, 71, 75 - 76, 81, 83,94,97,100,110,115 - 116, 119, 192, 194, 207; minimal, 35; on-tological assumptions, 8, 10; on-tological commitment, 11, 14 - 15, 23, 25, 31 - 32, 95; ontological criterion, 15,23, 31 - 32, 85; on-tological implications, 15, 17, 20, 24,79; ontological import, 13,43,44; ontological neutrality, 8,11,21,24; ontological presupposition, 4, 16,28

Operationalism, 207 Ordained power (of God), 185 Ostension, 58, 114; ostensive defini-

tion,9 Paradox, 18,22,36, 117 Parmenides, 80 Pan, 35 - 36, 88, 94,101,103,105 -106,

206; individual, 105 Particular(s), singular(s), 3, 5 - 9, 13 -

14,23,26,30,35 - 36, 84 - 86,109, 118 - 126, 136, 163, 195,206 - 207; bare, 84; (epistemological) primacy of the particular, 14,26,46; pre-par-ticular, 120

Particularistic, 112 Pavlow, I.P., 62

Pears, D., 25 Perception, 4, 6, 34, 39, 72 - 74, 80, 83,

85, 124 - 125, 129, 132, 134 - 135, 137 - 138, 158, 173, 190 - 191,211; pure, 196

Phenomenalism, 3, 109 Physicalism, 3, 152 Piaget,1., 146 - 147,208 Pike, K.L., 63 Place, 3, 28, 35, 106, 110 - 112, 123 -

124, 206; place-time, 3 Plato, 5,14,16,79,109,111,207 Platonism, 89, 112, 184 Porphyry, 6 - 7, 56 Port Royal logicians, 90 Positivism, 36, 39; See also Neo-

positivism Possible, 28, 52 - 53, 90,149,187 - 188,

195; divine possibility, 185; logical possibility, 185; natural possibility, 185; non-possibles, 28; possible en-titity,28,30; possibles, 28; world, 185

Potentiality, 83, 184, 187,202 Powers, J., 205 Pre-conceptual, 70, 73, 76 Pre-cultural,70 Pre-linguistic, 4, 60,68,70 - 71, 74, 76

- 77,113,127,129, 132, 137, 146, 154 - 155, 173, 176, 198 - 199

Predicate, 3, 5, 26, 31, 38,44 - 45, 48 -50, 81, 88,95, 120, 188, 197, 199, 203; accidental, 187 - 188; attribu-tive, 186 - 188; causal, 201 - 203; collective, 94; distributive, 94; es-sential, 186,201; impure, 106,112; of existence, 185;

Prediction, 30, 38, 194, 197, 199,201 -202

Premiss, 6, 191 - 192 Pribram, K., 165 Principle of the identity of indiscer-

nables, 96,97,104,111; of the pri-macy of the particular/individual, 2, 186, 192; of verifiability, 10

INDEX 249

Probability, 195 Product of the mind, 83,109,135,194,

206 Projection, 197 - 199,201 Property, 22 - 23, 25, 28, 34 - 35, 48,85

- 87,91,96 - 97, 104 Proposition, 10, 19, 48, 50 - 51, 120;

causal, 194, 199 Putnam, H., 210 Qualia, 3, 38, 107 - 108, 110 - 112, 119,

123,181,206 Quality, 18,25,34 - 36, 58, 73,86 - 87,

90, 98, 118, 199, 206; accidental, 189,199 - 201, 203; essential, 6,186 - 189, 193, 199 - 200, 203 - 204; general, 206; necessary, 200 - 201, 204

Quantification, 14, 17,25,29, 38,45, 49, 116 - 117; objectual, 117 - 118; substitutional, 38, 117 - 118

Quantity, 103, 105 - 106 Quasi; analysis, 9,97 - 98; constituents,

9 object, 8 - 9, 20;

Quidditas, 6, 81 - 82, 84 Quine, W.V.O., 1 - 4, 7 - 8, 10 - 12, 14

- 24, 26 - 32, 34 - 37, 43 - 46, 49, 53, 61 - 64, 67 - 69, 71, 74 - 79, 83, 88, 94 - 95, 97,100 - 101,112 - 114, 116 - 121, 123, 126, 129 - 130, 132, 145, 149 - 151, 161, 176, 181- 182, 188, 196,198 - 199,202- 203, 206 - 207, 209 - 210

Radical translation, 63, 67, 151, 176, 210

Ramuz, G.-F., 161 Ratiomorph, 72 - 73, 125, 206 Rational, 73 - 74 Rationalism, 5,132, 139, 196 Realism, 4, 11,24, 76, 112, 181 - 182,

186,202,209 Reality, 5, 109 - 110,210 Reason, 80, 146 Reductionism, 152, 156, 159

Reference, 17,23,26,31,33,42 - 43, 48 - 49, 51 - 52, 55, 63, 92, 113, 115, 117, 155; objective, 119

Regularity, 38 Relation, 7, 25,42, 89,98, 185 - 186;

multigrade, 99 Relative clause, 117 Relativism, 38 - 39, 107, 109 - 110,208 Repeatable, 34 - 36, 111, 120, 140, 181,

206 Representation, 158 -159,165,174,178

- 179,209 - 211; internal, 158; men-tal, 172; pictorial, 158

Richards, R.C., 190 RNAt,167 Rocci, G., 211 Roggen, D., 224 Roscelinus of Compiegne, 6, 61 Russell, B., 2, 14, 17,22 - 26, 32, 34 -

35,43 - 44,95,117,214 Saint Anselm, 6 Saint Augustine, 79, 183, 191 Saint Thomas, 80, 83, 85 Scepticism, 4, 17,39,82, 144, 181 - 184,

186 - 187, 189 - 192,206 Schlesinger, I.M., 132 Schopenhauer, A., 74, 203 Science, 9 - 10, 12 - 13, 15,27,29 - 30,

32 - 33,40,42,49,71,75 - 76, 82-84, 110, 142 - 143, 159, 187 - 189, 191, 196, 199,203,205,207 - 209, 211; actual, 83; first, 6, 12; scientific theory, 16, 116, 146, 151,205

Scientist, 28 Scott, T.K., 187 - 190 Semantics, 19 - 20, 41, 43, 47,50,64,

67,146,151,175,178; linguistic, 3; logical, 3, 42, 49, 53

Sensation, 7, 138 - 140; sense organ, 137 Sense, 42,49, 56, 85, 190 Sentence; observation, 63 - 64, 67; oc-

casion, 67; standing, 63; stimulus analytic, 64

Severens, R.H., 30 - 31 Siger of Brabant, 12, 184

250 INDEX

Sign, 20, 42, 44, 47,49,65; convention-al, 47, 64; linguistic, 50; mental, 50; natural, 49 - 50, 64, 69; pictorial, 65; verbal, 50

Signal, 67 Signification, 33, 48, 50 - 53, 55, 65, 87 Similarity, 138 - 139, 198,200 Skinner, B.P., 144, 150 Software, 160, 165, 171 Space, 103, 120 Speaker, native, 32, 50,62, 68, 149; Species, 5, 12, 14,30, 74, 83, 85, 188;

genera of, 96; infima, 84; specialis-sima, 83, 85, 87,96, 192;

Spike-train, 167 Spiritualism, 142 Stem, D., 128 Strawson, P.P., 3, 21, 32 - 33, 48, 92,

111, 120 - 124 Stuff, 206; See also matter Subject, 44, 48 - 50,81 Substance, 2, 16,35,52,81 - 83, 187 -

188, 193; first, 35, 86 - 87; primary, 81; second, 86, 88; secondary, 81, 121

Sums, 57, 94 - 95, 99, 105, 108, 119, 122, 206; of classes, 103; of in-dividuals, 1; of qualities, 36; of their parts, 97,101 - 104, 120

Supposition, 33, 50, 86; common, 52; confused, 51 - 52; determinate, 51 -52; discrete, 52; distributive, 51 - 52; general, 51; material, 50, 53, 135; particular, 51; personal, 50 - 53,135; simple, 50, 135

Syllogism, 191 Symptom, 65, 67 Synaps, 166; theory, 166 Syncategoremata, 49 Synergetics, 168 Syntax, 157, 175, 178 Synthetic, 11, 18,43,53 Term, 19, 33, 47, 50; absolute, 52;

abstract, 92,116; categorematic, 24, 55; characterizing, 3; common, 51;

connotative, 52; conventional, 47 -48,69; discrete, 51, 86; disposition, 202; general, 3,17,20,24,42,44-45, 51, 56, 87,91, 112, 115 - 117, 120, 123, 129, 134, 140; individua-tive, 116; linguistic, 44; mass, 3,116 -117,126; mental, 48, 69, 205; mid-dle, 192,201; natural, 47; particular, 3,24,42,45,51,56 - 57,91, 112, 115, 117, 120, 123, 134 - 135; rela-tional, 3; singular, 26, 29, 49, 116, 118; sortal, 3; univocal, 48; vocal, 69

Terminist,7 Theology, 12 - 13,80,83,182, 184, 190 Theory, 181, 209; linguistic, 64; of

description, 17,23,25; oflanguage learning, 3; of quantification, 23, 25 - 26, 28, 30, 32; of signification, 24, 48 - 49; of supposition, 24, 48 - 49, 68; of the double truth, 182; of the name relation, 22, 46; of types, 18

Thing, 80 - 81, 102, 178; concrete, 206; individual, 199

Thought, 5 - 6, 47, 60, 69, 74 -75,135, 139, 144, 147 - 148, 153, 158, 163 -164; levels of, 71

Time, 3, 28, 35, 103, 106, 110 - 112, 120, 123 - 124,206; place-time, 120

Transcendence, 10, 14,80 Tricot, J., 82 - 83 Tronick, E., 127 Truth value, 53 - 54 Ullian, J.S., 198,202 Universal(s), 3, 6 -7,19,23 - 24, 35, 61,

82 - 83, 86, 94, 115, 123 - 124, 134 - 135, 139 - 140, 183 - 184, 193 -194, 206; characterizing, 88, 120 -121, 199, 206; feature, 120 - 122; sortal, 88, 120 - 122, 199,206

Uttal, W.R., 164, 167 Van Leeuwenhoek, A., 141 Variable, 14, 17 - 18, 31, 36, 85, 88, 108,

116, 118; bound, 31 - 32; free, 49; quantifiable, 28; value of, 3, 14,45, 88,95

INDEX 251

Verbum; mentis, 4, 47, 49, 53, 69, 77, 134,140,154,179;oris,4,47,134-135, 140, 179

Verifiability, 145, 151,207,209 - 210 Verification, 4; See also Theory of Vesalius, 140 Vester, E, 163 Vicious circle, 6, 31,144, 190, 195 von Neurath, 0., 19 Wallace, G., 77 Wasserman, G.D., 159, 164, 168 - 169,

171 - 173, 175 - 178 Weinberg, J.R., 2, 7, 87 Whitehead, A.N., 14,23

Whole, totality, 35 - 36,100,102 - 103, 105, 107, 114

Whorf, B.L., 149, 176 Wiener Kreis, 8 Wiesel, N., 225 Willis, Th., 141 Word, 73, 178; first, 129; general, 126;

spoken, 65 World, 39, 43, 60, 110, 181 Worldview, 38,71, 183 Wren, ehr., 141

SYNTHESE LffiRARY

41. Y. Bar-Hillel (ed.), Pragmatics of Natural Languages. 1971 ISBN 90-277-0194-6; Pb 90-277-0599-2

42. S. Stenlund, Combinators, 'A.-Terms and Proof Theory. 1972 ISBN 90-277-0305-1 43. M. Strauss, Modern Physics and Its Philosophy. Selected Paper in the Logic,

History, and Philosophy of Science. 1972 ISBN 90-277-0230-6 44. M. Bunge, Method, Model and Matter. 1973 ISBN 90-277-0252-7 45. M. Bunge, Philosophy of Physics. 1973 ISBN 90-277-0253-5 46. A. A. Zihov'ev, Foundations of the Logical Theory of Scientific Knowledge

(Complex Logic). Revised and enlarged English edition with an appendix by G. A. Smimov, E. A. Sidorenka, A. M. Fedina and L. A. Bobrova. [Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. IX] 1973 ISBN