NSI Space ViTTa Q2 Ally, Adversary, Partner Use of Space …

December 2017

Ally,Adversary,andPartnerUseofSpace

DeeperAnalysesClarifyingInsightsBetterDecisions

www.NSIteam.com

AVirtualThinkTank(ViTTa)®Report

ProducedinsupportoftheStrategicMultilayerAssessment(SMA)Office(JointStaff,J39)


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NSIRESEARCH ▪ INNOVATION ▪ EXCELLENCE

AuthorsWestonAviles NicolePetersonDr.BelindaBragg GeorgePopp

[email protected]

ViTTa®ProjectTeamDr.AllisonAstorino-CourtoisExecutiveVP

SarahCannaPrincipalAnalyst

NicolePetersonAssociateAnalyst

WestonAvilesAnalyst

Dr.LarryKuznarChiefCulturalSciencesOfficer

GeorgePoppSeniorAnalyst

Dr.BelindaBraggPrincipalResearchScientist

Dr.SabrinaPaganoPrincipalResearchScientist

Dr.JohnA.StevensonPrincipalResearchScientist

InterviewTeam*

WestonAvilesAnalyst

NicolePetersonAssociateAnalyst

SarahCannaPrincipalAnalyst

GeorgePoppSeniorAnalyst

WhatisViTTa®?NSI’sVirtualThinkTank(ViTTa®)providesrapidresponsetocriticalinformationneedsbypulsingourglobalnetworkofsubjectmatterexperts(SMEs)togenerateawiderangeofexpert insight.For this SMA Contested Space Operations project, ViTTa was used toaddress 23 unclassified questions submitted by the Joint Staff and US Air Force projectsponsors.TheViTTateamreceivedwrittenandverbalinputfromover111expertsfromNational Security Space, as well as civil, commercial, legal, think tank, and academiccommunities working space and space policy. Each Space ViTTa report contains twosections:1)asummaryresponsetothequestionasked(seeSummaryResponsesection)and2)thefullwrittenand/ortranscribedinterviewinputreceivedforthequestionaskedfrom each expert contributor organized alphabetically (see Subject Matter ExpertContributions Section).Biographies for all expert contributors have been collated in acompaniondocument.

* Foraccess to thecompletecorpusof interview transcriptsandwritten subjectmatterexpert responseshostedonourNSISharePointsite,[email protected]:https://www.nasa.gov/sites/default/files/bwhi1apicaaamlo.jpg_large.jpg


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QuestionofFocus[Q2]Howdoeseachentity inthefollowingcategoriesconceiveofspaceoperationsformilitaryandcommercialpurposes?Howdotheyapproachspaceoperationsandservices?Isthereanydifferenceinhowtheircommercialventures(ifany)considersecurityduringpeace,crisis,andconflict?

a. PRC,Russia,Iran,NorthKoreab. EuropeanSpaceAgency,Japan,India,SouthKorea,Israelc. Canada,Brazil,Australia,Singapore,Ukraine,others

ExpertContributorsMajor General (USAF ret.) James B. Armor, Jr.2 (Orbital ATK);Dr. Gawdat Bahgat (National DefenseUniversity); Marc Berkowitz (Lockheed Martin); Brett Biddington (Biddington Research Pty Ltd,Australia);Duncan Blake (International Aerospace Law and Policy Group, Australia);Caelus Partners,LLC; Dean Cheng (Heritage Foundation); Faulconer Consulting Group; Gilmour Space Technologies,Australia;Dr.NamrataGoswami(WikistratandAuburnUniversityFuturesLab);Dr.LauraGrego(Unionof Concerned Scientists); Harris Corporation, LLC.; Dr. Jason Held (Saber Astronautics, Australia);TheresaHitchens (Center for InternationalandSecurityStudiesatMaryland,UniversityofMaryland);JonathanHung(SingaporeSpaceandTechnologyAssociation,Singapore);JuanHurtado(UnitedStatesSouthernCommand);GroupCaptain(IndianAirForceret.)AjeyLele3(InstituteforDefenceStudiesandAnalyses, India);Dr.Martin Lindsey (United States Pacific Command);Agnieszka Lukaszczyk (Planet,Netherlands);SergeantFirstClassJerrittA.Lynn(UnitedStatesArmyCivilAffairs);ColonelDavidMiller(460th SpaceWing,United StatesAir Force);VeerleNouwens andAlexandra Stickings (RoyalUnitedServices Institute, UK); Dr. Deganit Paikowsky (Tel Aviv University, Israel); Kevin Pollpeter (CNA);VictoriaSamson(SecureWorldFoundation);BrentSherwood(NASAJetPropulsionLaboratory);ViaSat,Inc.;Dr.BrianWeeden(SecureWorldFoundation);CharityWeeden(SatelliteIndustryAssociation)

SummaryResponseGiven the complex nature of this question and the number of countries covered, the body of thissummaryresponsehasbeenorganizedbycountry.Lookingacrossallthesecountries,however,severalthemesandpatternsemerge,andthesearepresentedinTable1below.WhileIran,Russia,thePRC,andNorth Korea have historically seen space as integral to national security and defense, the expertresponses suggest this attitude is spreading. Motivated by the perception that regional instability isincreasing,manyotherstates,whichpreviouslyconceivedoftheirspaceoperationsasprimarilycivilinnature,arebeginningtoregardspaceasessential totheirnationalsecurityanddefense.This, inturn,hasledtoagreaterfocusondual-usetechnologies.Many,notjustRussia,China,Iran,andNorthKorea,also view space as a source of national pride and international prestige. Finally, while the specificorganizationof thespacesectors in thesecountriesmaydiffer,allhave fewer institutionalbarriers tomilitaryuseofcivil (governmentand/orcommercial) capabilities thanwesee in theUS.Furthermore,there are institutional and financial incentives for government and commercial entities to worktogether.ThesefindingsareconsistentwiththeanalysisoftheexpertswhocontributedtoQuestion7.4

2Thesubjectmatterexpert’spersonalviews,andnotthoseofhisorganization,arerepresentedinhiscontributions.3Thesubjectmatterexpert’spersonalviews,andnotthoseofhisorganization,arerepresentedinhiscontributions.4ToaccessthefullNSISpaceViTTaQ7report,pleasevisit:http://nsiteam.com/commercial-space-industry-for-military-purposes-by-non-western-states/


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Table1:SummaryTableofActors’SpaceOperationsandApproachtoSpaceActivities5

5NOTE:A“-“isusedwithinthetabletoindicatecharacteristicsthatarenotspecificallyaddressedintheexpertcontributions.6NOTE:CodinghererelatestoESAspecifically,thereforeitmaynotnecessarilybereflectiveofindividualmemberstates’nationalapproachtospace.

CharacteristicsofActor’sApproachtoSpaceActivitiesandCapabilities

Russia

PRC

Iran

NorthKo

rea

ESA6

Japa

n

India

ROK

Israel

Cana

da

Brazil

Australia

Sing

apore

Ukraine

Hasanincreasingfocusondual-usetechnology Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes - Yes - -

PerceivesUSdominanceinspaceasathreat Yes Yes Yes Yes - - - - - No - No - -RecognizesandmayexploitUSasymmetricdependenceonspaceintimesofcrisisorconflict Yes Yes Yes Yes - - - - - No - No No -

Spaceoperationsareasourceofnationalprideandinternationalprestige Yes Yes Yes Yes - Yes Yes Yes Yes - - - - -

Spaceoperationsareincreasinglyviewedasessentialtonationalsecurityanddefense Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes - Yes No -Uses,orseekstouse,civilspaceprogramforpeacefulexplorationandscientificresearch Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes - - -

MILITARYHasamilitaryspaceprogram Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes No Yes Yes Yes - No No -Usesspaceformilitarypurposes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No -Participatesinjointmilitaryspaceventures/receivesmilitaryassistancefromothernation(s) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes -

Militaryspaceactivitiesreliantonpartnernationcapabilities No No - - Yes - - Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes - -

CIVILHasacivilspaceprogram Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes - - -Usesspaceforcivilpurposes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes - - -

Participatesinjointcivilspaceventureswithothernation(s) Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes - - - -COMMERCIALHasacommercialspacesector - - No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes -Commercialspacesectorlargelyreliantongovernmentfunding Yes Yes - - - - Yes - - Yes Yes Yes No -Hasaquasi-commercialspacesectorthatisovertlyorcovertlycontrolledbythestate Yes Yes - - - No Yes - Yes No No No No -Engagesinjointcommercialventureswithinternationalpartners Yes Yes - - Yes Yes Yes - Yes Yes - Yes Yes -


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People’sRepublicofChina(PRC)

KevinPollpeterofCNAconsidersChina’sapproachtospacetobemotivatedbythedesireto“increasewhat[thePRC]callsitscomprehensivenationalpower…thebasketofeverythingthatmakesacountrypowerful: its military might, its economic power, its diplomatic power, its cultural power.” Thisassessment is consistent among the contributors who discussed China,7 although there was somedeviation regarding the scope of China’s ambitions relative to their military, commercial, andcivil/scientificpursuitsinthespacedomain.VeerleNouwensandAlexandraStickingsoftheRoyalUnitedServices Institute refer to Beijing’s “strategic vision as a global power,” whereas Dean Cheng of theHeritage Foundation frames such strategic vision as being more regional orientated and notexpeditionary in nature. These ambitions are grounded in the long-term “future-orientated,” multi-generational planning (Dr. Namrata Goswami, Wikistrat and Auburn University Futures Lab)characteristicofBeijing’scentralizedapproachtopolicydevelopment.

HowdoesthePRCapproachspaceoperations?

Multiple experts8 consider the PRC’s geopolitical priorities to be driving all aspects of its spaceoperationsandservices.EverycomponentofChina’sspaceoperationseffectivelyservesitsobjectiveofincreasingnationalpower.Thecivil,commercial,andmilitarycomponentsofthePRC’sspaceoperationshavevaryingoperationalgoalsandprograms,butallareambitiousandholisticinnature.Forexample,thePRC’scivilandcommercialefforts inspacepredominantly fallunder theyokeofBeijing’snationaldefense strategy in some form or another, but can still claim objectives independent of militaryambitions. Civil space ventures, in particular, are often consistent with the strategy of dual-usetechnology9thatNouwensandStickingsarguepresentsthepotentialfor“degradingUSassetsinspaceandonEarth.”Finally,asChengnotes,ChineseleadersregardUSdependenceonspaceinfrastructureasaweakness,andwillseektoavoidsuchrelianceasitadvancesitsownspacecapability.

HowdoesthePRCconceiveofspaceoperationsformilitarypurposes?

ThereisbroadconsensusamongcontributorsthatthePRC’smilitaryapproachtospaceoperationsare,asMarcBerkowitzofLockheedMartinwrites,“centraltodenyingtheUSitsabilitytosense,decide,andacteffectivelyandtherebydeter intervention.”10Theexperts’discussionsof thePRC’sstrategicvisionforspacesuggestthatthereisaconcertedeffortunderwaytodecreasetheUnitedStates’advantageinspace. Nouwens and Stickings note that the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) is seeking “informationdominancecapabilitiesinspace,whiledevelopingcapabilitiestodenyordegradethecapabilities[oftheUS].” Several of the experts11 discuss the recent successful test of the “unhackable” quantumentanglement as evidence of China’s aspiration for information dominance. Beijing’s development ofmilitary space capabilities goes beyond the information domain—the PRC is also developing directascentmissile hit-to-kill technologywhich couldbeused to target satellites or tohelp it improve thesurvivabilityofitsnuclear-capablemissiles(Grego).12

7SeethecontributionsfromHitchens,Sherwood,Goswami,NouwensandStickings,andGrego.8Berkowitz,Lindsey,andPollpeter.9Duringthefinalreviewofthisreport,Gregociteddebrisclean-upsatellites,suchasAolong,assuchanexample,whilenotingthatthePRChasalsomadesignificantandcostlycommitmentstonon-dual-use initiatives likehumanpresence inspaceandscientificexploration,whichprovidelittleutilitymilitarily.10ThisisalsosupportedbyArmor,Cheng,Grego,Miller,NouwensandStickings,andPollpeter.11Hitchens,andNouwensandStickings.12ForfurthercommentaryonthePRC’scapabilities,seethecontributionfromGrego.


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HowdoesthePRCconceiveofspaceoperationsforcommercialpurposes?

DespitethemilitaryfocusofthePRC’sspaceprograms,thereissignificantcommercialspaceactivityinChina.ThisactivityreflectsChina’sdesire“topositionitselfasagreatpowerthatisattheforefrontofhumanity’sexplorationofspace,"andscienceandtechnologymoregenerally(NouwensandStickings).NouwensandStickingsnotethatthePRC“hassoughttopromotegreaterinnovationinthecommercialdomain,”withentitiessuchasExPacedemonstratingBeijing’sresponsetothesuccessoftheAmericanSpaceX (Pollpeter).Tempering thegrowthof innovationandcooperation in thespacedomain iswhattheViaSat, Inc. teamcharacterizesasChina’s “lack [of] a cultureofopennessand trust that is key toprivatesectoractivityandinnovation.”

MajorGeneral(USAFret.)JamesArmor(OrbitalATK)andBerkowitzremarkthat,despitetheadvancesmadebythePRCincultivatingacommercialspaceindustry,suchventuresaresimply“extensionsoftheregime” andwill completely yield to functions of the state in the event of a crisis. Furthermore, Dr.Martin Lindsey (United States Pacific Command) and Cheng warn that the dual-use nature of manyspace technologies enables China to mask military ventures in space as civil-science operations.Consequently, commercial interests “will not deviate from PRC goals during conflicts” (Goswami).Commercial space assets may even be aggressively defended by the PRC during a crisis, and theircontinuedoperationviewedasastrategicnecessity.

Russia

Russia’s approach to space is primarily influenced by its resurgent rivalry with the US. ChengcharacterizesMoscow’sspaceoperationsandservicesas“oneofthevariousinstrumentalitiesavailabletoachievedeterrentobjectives.”Yet, as several contributors13note,Russia is fallingbehind theUS intermsofitsspacecapabilities.VictoriaSamsonoftheSecureWorldFoundationwritesofthevaguenessof therolespacehas incurrentRussianpolicy,whilenotingthatMoscow is,“just fearfulofbeing leftbehindandbeingperceivedasbeingweak.”Nevertheless,Moscow isactively resistingUShegemony,although its efforts are hampered by substantial resource constraints (Theresa Hitchens, Center forInternationalandSecurityStudiesatMaryland,UniversityofMaryland).

HowdoesRussiaapproachspaceoperationsandservices?

Despite its emphasis on space for defense and national security, Russia has made significantcontributions to internationalcivil spacebysupporting the InternationalSpaceStation (ISS)andothercivilspaceventures.Additionally,thedevelopmentofGLONASS14andothercommercialspaceservicesindicatesthatRussiaisinterestedinexploitingitsspacecapabilitiesforcommercialpurposes(Hitchens).IndianAirForceGroupCaptain(ret.)AjeyLeleofthe InstituteforDefenceStudiesandAnalysesnotesthatMoscowhas “succeeded in keeping their space agenda [i.e., ‘orbital cooperation’ andother civilpursuits]shieldedfromgeopoliticaltensions[withtheUS].”SupportedbyChina,theRussianFederationhas proposed a treaty15 banning space weaponry. Grego suggests Moscow recognizes that securingspace operations as orderly, safe, and secure in peacetime benefits both their national security and

13Grego,Sherwood,andB.Weeden.14 The Global Navigation Satellite System (GLONASS) is the Russian equivalent to the American GPS and is operated byROSCOSMOS.15TheTreatyonPreventionofthePlacementofWeaponsinOuterSpaceandoftheThreatorUseofForceAgainstOuterSpaceBodies (PPWT)was firstsubmittedtotheUNOffice forDisarmamentAffairs (UNODA)ConferenceonDisarmamentbyChinaandRussiain2008.


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commercialinterests,andcontendsthatif“acrisisunfoldsandthepossibilityofarmedconflictinspaceisentertained,[weshould]expectthatthey[will]alsopreferconstraintandpredictabilityandtobeableto manage the conflict.” These points of international collaboration speak to Moscow’s interest inlimitingUSdominanceinthespacedomainaswellasensuringfutureRussianspaceoperations.

HowdoesRussiaconceiveofspaceoperationsformilitarypurposes?

Russia is clearly capable of fielding different types of reversible, nondestructivemeans of interferingwithsatellites,andhassomecapabilitytofieldanti-satelliteweaponsandmissiledefensetechnologiesthataredestructive(Grego).Theescalatorypotentialofsuchspacetechnologyembodiesthe“Russia[n]concept of ‘escalate to deescalate’ … with its apparent emphasis on a quick resort to irreversibleweapons effects” (Berkowitz), and illustratesMoscow’s interest in offensive capabilities (Hitchens). AnecessaryadjuncttoRussia’smilitarycapabilitiesinspaceisspace-basedinformationcapability.Russia’sGLONASS PNT program embodies Moscow’s pursuit of an independent, state-controlled spaceinfrastructurethatcansupportinformationalizedwarfare.

HowdoesRussiaconceiveofspaceoperationsforcommercialpurposes?

Russia designates over 100 small-to-medium companies as commercial space ventures. However, incontrasttotheUS,each isadministeredby,andtoa largeextentunderthecontrolof,Russia’sspaceagency,ROSCOSMOS(Lele).Althoughprimarilyintendedforcommercialpurposes,thesecompaniesaresubjecttoMoscow’sagendaandneeds.Whilethisdegreeofcontrolsupportsdefense,theresultisthatRussia “lack[s] a culture of openness and trust that is key to private sector activity and innovation,”accordingtotheViaSat,Inc.team.GoswaminotesthatRussia’scommercialspaceeffortshaveincluded“build[ing]spaceinfrastructureincountrieslackingsuchexpertiseandsharingitsspacetechnology;”apractice which has become a means of revenue for the Russian military industrial complex (Lele;Samson). In addition to generating revenue,Moscow’s civil and commercial space capabilities bolsternationalpride,andhighlightRussia’sinternationalinfluenceandprestige.

Iran

ThereisoverallagreementamongthecontributorsthatIran’sspaceambitionsarecenteredonnationalsecurity and reflect its desire for both regional hegemony and national prestige. Iran’s antagonisticrelationships with neighboring Arab nations and Israel provides themotivation for Tehran to pursuesophisticatedinformationdominanceandmissiledefenseandoffense,whilealsogrowingitscivilspaceoperations. Goswami identifies Iran as “the most advanced ‘space-assets nation’ in theMiddle-East,especiallyinrelationtotheArabstatesintheregion.”Shesuggeststhat,astensionsinthePersian/ArabGulfcontinuetogrow,aspaceracemayoccurbetweenTehranandtheGulfnations.

HowdoesIranapproachspaceoperationsandservices?

Iranhasa“largeandsophisticatedmissileprogram”(Dr.GawdatBahgat,NationalDefenseUniversity)thatGregoobserveshas launchedasmallnumberof low-masssatellitesthathavelittledemonstratedcapability. In fact, discussion of Iranian space operations is often dominated by analysis of Tehran’smissiletechnologyandambitions,althoughseveralexperts16pointoutthatIranhasothercivilspaceandtechnological aspirations as well. Grego explains that Iran has long sought to jumpstart its spacescientificeffortsthroughcooperationwiththeEuropeanSpaceAgency(ESA)andItaly,andthefunding

16Goswami,Grego,andLele.


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ofacademicinitiativesforspaceexploration.Theseefforts,alongwiththeirmissileprogram,areseenbyTehran as a means of bolstering nationalistic sentiments and pride associated with such pursuits(Bahgat). The prospect of international prestige and the “dual-use nature of technology” (Lele) alsomake a sophisticated space program irresistible, perhaps even a necessity for achieving Tehran’saspirationofbecomingthedominantregionalactorintheMiddleEast(Grego).AssistancefromRussiaisvital to Iran’smissile program. China also has shown interest in cooperating with Iran on civil spaceprojects.17

HowdoesIranconceiveofspaceoperationsformilitarypurposes?Gregowritesthat,givenIran’ssecurityanddomesticconcerns,“goodintelligence,reconnaissance,andcommunicationswould seem essential for its national security aswell as for its economic and socialdevelopment.”GoswamiconsidersthesecapabilitiestobeparticularlyrelevanttoIran’sinvolvementinYemen,anditsfightagainstextremistgroupssuchasISIL.GregobelievesthatIranisinterestedinandcapableofanti-satellitetechniquessuchasjamming,dazzling,andcyberattacksthatcouldhelprepelanadversary’s attacks or intrusive uses of intelligence gathering, but thatmore sophisticated weapons,suchasdirect-ascentweapons,arenotintheirforeseeablefuture.HitchensviewsoffensivecapabilitiesinspaceasapriorityforTehranand,lookingforward,identifiescounterspacecapabilitiesasalong-termambition.

HowdoesIranconceiveofspaceoperationsforcommercialpurposes?

Again,thecontributorsarenotawareofanyIraniancommercialspaceindustry,18andindicatethattheIranianRevolutionaryGuardcontrolsallofitsspaceoperations.

NorthKorea

North Korea’s space activities aremotivated by the need to counterwhat its leaders perceive as theexistentialthreatposedbytheUSandSouthKorea.Moreover,todate,NorthKoreahasdemonstratedlittle to no interest in science and technology that does not serve its defense objectives (Samson).Hitchens refers to North Korea as an aspiring actor in the space domain, and despite its lack ofsignificant space capability, Pyongyang places tremendous value on the advancement of spaceoperations.ItislikelythatNorthKoreawillseektodevelopspacetechnologiesandcapabilitiesasfarasnecessarytosupportitsgrowingnucleararsenalandopposeregionaladversaries.

HowdoesNorthKoreaapproachspaceoperationsandservices?

Perhapsmorethananyothernation,NorthKorea’seconomyisfocusedonitsprimarynationalsecuritygoal of regime survival, and its space program is not an exception to this. Contributors characterizeNorth Korean space operations as either a means of perpetuating the regime or of countering USmilitarysuperiority,orboth.NorthKoreadoesnothaveacommercialspacesector;anyspaceoperationdeclaredascivilissimplyafacadeforamilitaryprogram(Cheng).

17ChengmentionsTehran’scooperationwithbothRussiaandChina,andGoswamiandLelewriteofcooperationwithRussiaandChinarespectively.18SeethecontributionsfromBahgat,Berkowitz,andGoswami.


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HowdoesNorthKoreaconceiveofspaceoperationsformilitarypurposes?

SeveralcontributorsdiscussmilitaryspaceprogramsthatthePyongyangregimeisactivelypursuing inadditiontoitsfocusonachievingplatformsfornuclearICBMcapability.Inparticular,NorthKoreaseekscounterintelligence technology capable of “jamming GPS signaling to defuse data on its internaldevelopmentsaswell as jamearlymissilewarning signals” (Goswami).However, strategic capabilitiessuchascommunication,counterspacetechnology,andotherforceenhancementpursuitsinspacearemanifested only by a nascent and unsophisticated satellite program. Ultimately, Pyongyang’s missileprogram transcends all other activity in space. Samson notes that North Korea’s military spaceoperationsaretemperedbyPyongyang’sawarenessthatthedevelopmentofcapabilitiessuchasanti-satelliteweaponsorEMPburstsareprobablyunattainableandwouldleadtoaregimeendingresponseiftheyareeverdeveloped.

HowdoesNorthKoreaconceiveofspaceoperationsforcommercialpurposes?GregoarguesthatNorthKorea“doesnothaveadevelopedcivilsocietythatitmustbeaccountabletoatsomelevel.NorthKorea’sbattleisforsurvival.So,…allitsspaceactivitieswillbetailoredverycarefullyto that aim.” Lele suggests that illegal trade inmissile parts or satellite components is theonly likelyavenueforNorthKoreatoengageincommercialspaceactivity.

EuropeanSpaceAgency(ESA)

The European Space Agency (ESA) is an international space agency, not a state space actor, so it isuniqueincomparisontotheotheractorspresentedinthissummary.However, likesomeoftheotherspace actors presented, ESA appears to be increasingly thinking about dual-use aspects of spacecapabilitiesandactivities(AgnieszkaLukaszczyk,Planet).

HowdoesESAapproachspaceoperations?

Hitchens and Lukaszczyk explain that ESA was initially established to focus purely on civilian andpeaceful uses of space, not on military uses. However, Lukaszczyk notes that Europe’s currentgeopoliticalclimateisincreasinglydrivingEuropeanintereststowardacloserfocusonsecurityconcerns.ShesuggeststhatthisisstartingtobereflectedinESA’sspaceinterestsandoperations,particularlywithrespect to its increasing acceptance of the use of space for security activities, capabilities, andtechnologies.Thisisarecentdevelopment,accordingtoLukaszczyk,whonotesthatjust3-5yearsagotherewasaclear,distinctseparationbetweencivilspaceandmilitaryspaceinEurope.

ESA is theworld’s only regional space agency and itsmembers are, inmany cases, involved in otherspace programs and agencies. Hitchens and Lukaszczyk detail three overlapping types of governmentspaceactorsinEurope:

• Thenationalspaceprograms,spaceagencies,andspaceofficesofindividualEuropeanstates.• ESA,whichiscomprisedof22Europeanmemberstates.• The EU, itself, which has its own space policies, space programs, and space operations that

coveritsmemberstates.

AsLukaszczykexplains,ESAandtheEUareindependentfromoneanotherandhavedifferentmemberstates,differentprocurementprocesses,anddifferentwaysofspendingmoney.Shecontendsthatthekey difference between ESA and EU space initiatives is that ESA focuses on activities such as space


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exploration, research, and the technical aspects of space operations (i.e., similar toNASA in theUS),whereastheEU ismorepolicy-orientedandfocusesonthestrategicaspectsofspaceoperations (i.e.,similar to theUSStateDepartmentandDepartmentofDefense).Moreover, theEUhassupranationalpowerthatrequiresmemberstatestoabidebyitsdirectives,anauthorityESAsimplydoesnothave.

While Lukaszczyk notes that there have been some instances of friction between ESA and the EU,particularlyoverissuesrelatingtoauthorityandjurisdiction,shesuggeststhatasignificantsteptowardimproved coordination and cooperation was made with the development of the European SpaceStrategyin2016,whichshedescribesasaspacestrategyforEuropeasawhole.Perhapsmostcritically,she asserts, the European Space Strategy was developed through a unified, collaborative effort thatincluded all three of the overlapping types of government space actors and programswithin the EU(memberstates,ESA,andtheEUitself).

HowdoesESAapproachspaceoperationsformilitarypurposes?

HistoricallytherehasbeenlittlecooperationorcollaborationbetweencivilandmilitaryspaceactorsinEurope,andeventheideaofdual-usewasasensitivetopicofdiscussion,accordingtoLukaszczyk.Shecontends,however,thataperceptionofincreasingregionalsecuritythreatshasopenedthedoortotheideaofstrengtheningEuropeandefensecapabilitybycapitalizingonexistingcivilandcommercialspacecapabilitiesandtechnologiesformilitarypurposesanddual-useapplications.

This change seems to be consistent with wider European perspectives on the role of space. As Lelepointsout,NATOhashistoricallyviewedspaceasa forceenablerandmultiplier.Heexplains that thespacedomainhasbeenofstrategicimportancetomanyEUstatesfordecades,particularlyasEUstateshave servedwith theUS in recentmilitaryoperations thatdependedheavilyon satellites. SupportingLele’spoint,theexpertshighlighttwoparticularlyrelevantEuropeanspaceinitiatives,bothofwhichESAisnow involvedwith:Galileo (theglobalnavigationsatellitesystem[GNSS]of theEU)andCopernicus(an Earth observation program). Lukaszczyk explains that both Galileo and Copernicus were initiallyestablished as purely civil and commercial space programs but the EU has adjusted each program’smandate to incorporate military and security objectives and operations. Major General (USAF ret.)James Armor (Orbital ATK) and Colonel David Miller (460th Space Wing, United States Air Force)highlight the strategic and operational value ofGalileo to the EU as the provision of an independentGNSS capability that increases European control over access to its own communications. This reflectswhatMillerseesasthecorereasonwhyactorsgetinvolvedinspaceinthefirstplace:thefundamentalneedtoseeandcommunicateoverthehorizon, forthebenefitofnationalsecurityobjectives,civilianobjectives,andcommercialobjectives.

HowdoesESAapproachspaceoperationsforcommercialpurposes?

AccordingtoLele,EuropeancommercialspaceactivitymorecommonlyoccursattheEUmemberstatelevel,ratherthanattheESAlevel.However,ingeneral,LukaszczyksuggeststhatEuropeanstendnottotrust the private sector asmuch asAmericans do, despite recognizing the obvious achievements andsuccesses of commercial space actors in the United States. Consequently, she explains, Europeangovernment andmilitary space actors are typically reluctant to turn over control of aspects of theirprogramstoprivatesectoractors.Toillustratethispoint,shepointstoacollaborative(ESA,EU,andEUmember state) Europeans space communications initiative, Government Satellite Communications(GOVSATCOM).As sheexplains,Europehasexcellent telecomoperators (e.g., SES,Eutelsat,etc.) thatcould, theoretically, meet the necessary security requirements and easily and effectively supportGOVSATCOM. Instead, she contends, the EU is planning to build its own, entirely separate satellite


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constellationinsupportofGOVSATCOMbecause,inlargepart,itdoesnotwanttoturnoveranycontrolto private hands—thus eliminating an opportunity for cooperation with commercial space actors.OngoingESA,EU,andEUmemberstateeffortstoattractcommercialspacestartupsintotheEuropeancommercial space marketplace does suggest that this reluctance is receding, however Lukaszczykcharacterizestheoverallprogressasquiteslow.

Japan

While Japan is an older player in the space domain, it is also a space actor transitioning the way itconceivesofitsspaceinterestsandoperationsforbothnationalsecurityanddefensepurposes,aswellasforcommercialpurposes(Dr.BrianWeeden,SecureWorldFoundation).Japanhashistoricallyviewedspaceasanon-militarydomain,accordingtoGoswami.However,severaloftheexperts19assertthatthisappears to be changing as a result ofmounting regional security challenges, particularly the growingthreatoffromNorthKorea.

HowdoesJapanapproachspaceoperations?

LeleexplainsthatJapanhasbothanestablishednationalspaceagency,theJapanAerospaceExplorationAgency(JAXA),whichisthemainforcebehindthecountry’sspaceprogram,aswellascommercialspaceentities that have significant international footprints (e.g., Mitsubishi Heavy Industries and IHICorporation).Moreover,HitchensbelievesthatJapan’seffortstoreviewandrevampitsnationalspacepolicies,plusitscontinuedcommitmenttoencouragingandenticingcommercialactorstogetinvolvedintheJapanesecommercialspacesector,havehelpedthecountrybecomeagrowingforceinthespacedomain.

Japanalsoappearstobetakingstepstoexpanditsownfootprintinthedomainofmilitaryspace.Thereappear to be two primary factors driving Japan’s expanding space interests and operations: securityconcernsandregionalcompetition.IncreasingregionalsecuritychallengeshavepushedJapantotakeamorenationalsecurityanddefensefocusedapproachto itsspace interestsandoperations (Goswami;Lele;B.Weeden).AsLelenotes,Japanlauncheditsfirstmilitarycommunicationssatellitein2017andisplanning to launch amilitary space force by 2019. These space operationswill increase both Japan’sdefense capacity (i.e., boosting the broadband capacity of Japanese Self-Defense Forces) and thesecurityofessentialcapabilities(i.e.,protectingJapanesesatellitesfromdangerousdebrisorbitingtheEarth)(Lele).

LindseyindicatesthatnationalismandnationalpridearealsoasignificantfactorinhowAsiancountries,includingJapan,approachspace interests,ambitions,andoperations. JapanandotherAsiancountrieswanttobeseenasthe“firstAsiancountrytodoXthinginspace.”Thisideaofan“AsianSpaceRace,”(Lindsey)likelyprovidessomeadditionalcontextandinsightintoJapan’sspaceinterestsandoperations.Illustrating this point, Goswami notes that JAXA is conducting futuristic space exploration researchrelating to asteroid exploration and thewireless transmission of electricity,which she suggests couldeventuallybeused for the transmissionofelectricity fromspace solar satellites. Thesekindsof spaceoperations,Goswamicontends,couldhaveamajorimpactonthefutureofspaceresourceexploration.Theywouldalsocertainlyrepresentaninteresting,noticeableachievementinthecontextofthe“AsianSpaceRace.”

19Goswami,Lele,andB.Weeden.


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HowdoesJapanapproachspaceoperationsformilitarypurposes?

Asdiscussed,theexpertssuggestJapanistransitioninghowitapproachesspaceoperations,increasinglyfocusingonnationalsecurityanddefense-relatedinterestsandobjectives.TheexpertshighlightseveralkeyeventsanddecisionsthatillustratethisevolutioninJapanesethinking.

• Thereinterpretationof“peacefuluseofspace”awayfrommeaning“non-military”(B.Weeden).• Theamendmentof itsnational spacepolicy topermit Japanesemilitary activities in space (B.

Weeden).• Thedecisiontoutilizesatellitesformilitarypurposes,includingreconnaissanceandinformation

gatheringeffortspertainingtotheseas(Goswami).• Theintroductionofballisticmissiledefenseintoitsnationalspacepolicy(Goswami).• ThereleaseofitsfourthSpaceBasicPlanin2016,puttingforwardanationalspacepolicyaspart

ofanoverallnationalsecuritystrategy(Lele).

Theseactions,together,seemtoillustrateanevolvingJapanesemindsetregardingspaceoperationsformilitary purposes; one that appears to be shiftingmore toward using space to protect and advanceJapan’snationalsecurityinterestsinatimeofescalatingregionalsecuritychallenges.

HowdoesJapanapproachspaceoperationsforcommercialpurposes?

According to Goswami, Japan has shown a clear commitment to encouraging the involvement ofcommercial entities in the spacedomain. She supports this argumentbypointing tobusiness-friendlyinitiativessuchasthesharingofstate-fundedresearchanddevelopmentfundswithprivatecommercialspaceentities,andalsothecreationofnationallegislationtoencouragecommercialspaceactivityandconstructamoreattractivemarketplace.BuildingonGoswami’sanalysis,Lelepointstotwoparticularlyrelevant legislativeaccomplishments from2016:1) thepassingof law thatmakes iteasier forprivatecompaniestoinvestinJapan’scommercialspacesectorand2)theestablishmentofaspaceactivitylawthat allows commercial companies to launch artificial satellites. Lele asserts that these actions havepavedthewayforseveralnew,notablecommercialentities toenter Japan’scommercialspacesector(e.g.,InterstellarTechnologies,Astroscale,PDAerospace,andCanonElectronics).

India

AlthoughIndiadoesnothaveacomprehensivenationalspacepolicy,theexpertsgenerallyagreethatitisworkingtoexpanditsfootprintinthespacedomain.20Thisisevidentthroughbothconcertedeffortsto develop its commercial space sector and an increasing interest in andwillingness to capitalize onspacecapabilitiestosupportnationalsecurityanddefense-relatedinterests.

TheexpertsnotethatIndiahashistoricallyconceivedofspaceoperationsprimarilyasamechanismtosupportitscivilandnationaldevelopmentinterestsandcapabilities,withthegoalofdevelopingspacetechnologies for thepurposeof societalbenefit.21However, they suggest thathow India conceivesofspace operations appears to be shifting. In particular, Goswami and Samson point to an increasingIndianconsiderationof securityanddefense-related factors in relation to spacedomain interestsandoperations.AsLeleexplains,thisshiftinthinkingseemslogicalgiventheuniqueassortmentofsecuritychallenges Indiafaces intoday’sgeopoliticalenvironment(e.g.,cross-borderterrorism, largedistances

20SeethecontributionsfromGoswami,Hitchens,andSamson.21SeethecontributionsfromLele,Samson,andB.Weeden.


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ofmaritimeborderstomonitor,andhavingtwonuclearweaponstateadversaries).Itisnotsurprising,therefore,thattheIndianmilitaryappearstobeincreasinglyrecognizingthatitisinitsinteresttoutilizespaceforsecuritypurposes.22

HowdoesIndiaapproachspaceoperations?

India’sapproachtospaceoperationsisdrivenbybothmilitaryandcommercialinterests.Onthemilitaryside,LelenotesthatIndia’s increasinginterest inexploitingspacecapabilitiesfornationalsecurityanddefensehasresultedinincreasedcoordinationbetweenIndia’snationalspaceagency,theIndianSpaceResearchOrganisation (ISRO), andcomponentsof the Indianmilitary.Commercially, LeleandSamsonexplainthatIndiahasdemonstratedclearandexpandinginterestinitscommercialspacesectorandhasstartedtotakestepstogrowanddevelopitscommercialspaceenvironment.However,asisthecaseinmost of the other states discussed in this summary, India’s commercial space sector is still largelydependentonstatesupport.

Asmentioned inthediscussionofJapan,nationalismandnationalpridearealsoasignificantfactor inhowAsiancountriesapproachspaceinterests,ambitions,andoperations(Lindsey).AsLindseyexplains,IndiaandotherAsiancountrieswanttobeseenasthe“firstAsiancountrytodoXthinginspace,”andthisideaofan“AsianSpaceRace”likelyprovidessomeadditionalcontextandinsightintoIndia’sspaceinterestsandoperations.Interestingly,despitetheinherentlevelofcompetitionthatnaturallyemergesfromthis“AsianSpaceRace,”GoswamiandLelenotethatIndiahasdemonstratedawillingnesstosharespaceserviceswithotherregionalspaceactors.Forinstance,Indiaisofferingitssatelliteservicestoitsneighborsthroughthe launchofthe“SouthAsiaSatellite”(Goswami),andhasalsodevelopeditsownregional navigation system (i.e., like that of GPS in the US), the Indian Regional Navigation SatelliteSystem(IRNSS),whichitislikelyinterestedinexpandingintoand/orsharingwithsurroundingcountries(Lele).

HowdoesIndiaapproachspaceoperationsformilitarypurposes?

ThoughIndia’snationalspaceagency(ISRO)ismostlyfocusedonspaceoperationsforcivilianpurposes,LeleandGoswaminotethatISROhasbeenexpandingitscoordinationwith,andsupportto,theIndianmilitary.Asseveraloftheexpertshighlight,23expandedISROcoordinationwithIndianmilitaryserviceshas includedactivities like launchingnational security-dedicatedsatellites,usingdual-usesatellites fornational defense activities, and providing augmented data on areas of concern (i.e., India’s disputedborderswithChinaandintheIndianOceanregion),andisexpectedtoexpandintoactivitiesrelatingtocounter space anti-satellite capabilities. Goswami also suggests that the establishment of an Indianmilitaryspaceagencymaybeforthcoming,astherehavebeendiscussionswithinIndiatoestablishanAerospaceCommandseparatefromtheAirForce.

HowdoesIndiaapproachspaceoperationsforcommercialpurposes?

WhiletheexpertsgenerallyagreethatIndiahasagrowingcommercialspacesector,Lelestressesthatcommercial space operations in India are in their infancy and India’s commercial space actors largelydependongovernmentassistance.ThereareseveralexamplesofstartupcommercialspaceactorsthathavebeenmakinginvestmentsintheIndiancommercialspacemarket,but,asLelenotes,atthispointthecountry’scommercialspaceactorsaremostlydependenton ISROfor jobsand/or fundingandaregenerallyexpectedtosimplybeserviceproviders.

22Goswami,Lele,andSamson.23SeethecontributionsfromGoswami,Hitchens,Lele,Samson,andB.Weeden.


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The expert contributors from ViaSat, Inc. suggest that there is significant interest from IndiancommercialentitiesindevelopingarobustcommercialspacesectormodeledonthoseachievingsuccessinWesternnations.ItappearsthatbothISROandtheIndiangovernmentaretakingstepsinsupportofthis.GoswamiandLelepresentthreeparticularlyrelevantexamplestoillustratethisinitiative:

• ISRO plans to engage the commercial space sector in launch activities by offering technologytransferagreements.

• The Indian government has shown a keen interest in developing ground infrastructure forprospectivecommercialspaceclients.

• The Indian government is working to establish national space legislation that will regulateprivatespaceactorsinaccordancewiththeinternationalobligationslaidoutintheOuterSpaceTreaty.

However,despitethesestepstowardcommercialsectordevelopment,severaloftheexperts24highlightconcernsaboutgovernmentownershipofcommercialspaceactivity,andthetruelevelofindependenceandopennessinIndia’scommercialspacesector.TheynotethatIndiaisnotknowntohaveacultureofopenness and trust, and underscore concern that this may limit India’s ability to attract private,commercial sector innovation in space operations.25 Goswami and Lele point out that governmentownershipofIndia’scommercialspaceactorsandactivitieslikelymeansthatifacrisisweretoarise,thecommercial actors would have just limited, if any, autonomous influence on security matters anddecisionswouldbemadebythegovernment.

SouthKorea26

South Korea’s regional security environment is challenging, particularly given the uncertainty andinstability stemming from North Korea. It is not surprising, therefore, that South Korea increasinglyconceivesof,andapproaches,spaceinterestsandoperationswithnationalsecurityanddefense-relatedobjectivesinmind(Lele).

HowdoesSouthKoreaapproachspaceoperations?

SouthKorea’sapproachtospaceoperationsappearstobedrivenlargelybynationalsecurity interestsand elements of national pride. Asmentioned in the discussions of Japan and India, nationalism andnationalprideareasignificant factor inhowAsiancountriesapproachspace interests,ambitions,andoperations,andthisiscertainlytrueforSouthKorea(Lindsey).Moreover,inwhatseemstoillustrateafusion of national security and national pride factors, Lele points out that South Korea’s evolutiontowardamoreheavilynational securityanddefense-relatedapproachtospacehasnotablycoincidedwithagrowingaspirationforspace-relatedcooperationwiththeUnitedStates,particularlycooperationconcerningmutually beneficial security objectives. Expanding space domain cooperationwith the UShelpstoincreaseSouthKorea’soperationalcapabilityandinternationalstanding.

HowdoesSouthKoreaapproachspaceoperationsformilitarypurposes?

Toillustratethisincreasingnationalsecurityanddefense-relatedfocusofSouthKoreanspaceinterestsand operations, Lele points to South Korea’s development and implementation of a new defense24Goswami;Hitchens;Samson;andViaSat,Inc.25SeethecontributionsfromHitchens;Samson;andViaSat,Inc.26PleasenotethatonlyoneSMEansweredallpartsofthisquestionfromSouthKorea’sperspective.AnyotherSMEscitedinthissectiononlybrieflymentionedSouthKoreaintheirsubmission.


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doctrine forouter space.Notably, thisnewouter spacedefensedoctrinehighlightsaparticularSouthKorean interest in incorporatingadvancedtechnologieswithmilitaryrelevance inspace,an interest inwhichhe indicatestheburgeoningUS-SouthKoreaspacepartnershiphasalsotakenstepstoadvance.Asheexplains,spacetechnologiesformanimportantelementofanymissiledefensesystem,somethingthatwillalmostcertainlyremainakeyfocusforboththeUSandSouthKoreaforthecomingyearsgivenescalatingtensionswithNorthKorea.

HowdoesSouthKoreaapproachspaceoperationsforcommercialpurposes?

LeleexpectsSouthKorea’scommercial spacesector toprogresssignificantly in thecomingyears.Thisexpectationdrivenby:

• The country’s standing as a technologically advanced state, and the belief that South Koreancommercial space operations will be well-positioned to capitalize on these technologicalcapabilities.

• Theincreasingavailabilityoffinancialresourcesasthenumberofventurecapitalfirmsinvolvedin South Korea’s commercial space sector is rapidly growing and the overall investment incommercialspaceoperationsisexpectedtocontinuetoincrease.

However,whileSouthKoreaseemspoisedtofurtherdevelopitscommercialspacesector,Lelebelievesthattheregionalsecuritysituationwilllikelydictateitsfuture.Accordingly,LelesuggeststhatthenatureofthethreatfromNorthKoreaandtheregionalsecurityenvironmentoverallmaybewhatdecidesthefutureofSouthKorea’scommercialspaceoperations,particularlyinatimeofcrisis.

Israel27

Israel is a sophisticated producer and user of space technologies and applications (Dr. DeganitPaikowsky,TelAvivUniversity),withspaceinterestsandoperationsthatappeartobelargelydrivenbynationalsecurityanddefense-relatedinterestsandobjectives.GivenhighlevelsofgovernmentcontrolandownershipwithinIsrael’scommercialspacesector(Hitchens),Israelicommercialspaceinterestsandoperationsarecertainlyinfluencedbynationalsecurityanddefense-relatedinterestsandobjectives.

PaikowskysuggeststhatthesignificanceofspaceinIsrael’sstrategicconceptshapesitsperspectiveonspacesecuritytoday.HercharacterizationofIsrael’sapproachtospacesuggestsafundamentaltensionbetweenpragmaticgoalsandbroaderideals.Israel,shecontends,viewsspaceasaglobalcommonsandaspires to contribute to a secure and sustainable space environment. Toward this end, Israel isinterestedingreater internationalcollaborationandcooperationinthespacedomainwiththegoalofmaintainingspaceasapeacefulenvironmentforthebenefitofall.However,PaikowskynotesthatIsraelalsoacknowledgesandaccepts theworldwideuseof spaceasamechanism for supporting terrestrialmilitary activity, as well as for defense and deterrence efforts against harmful activities in space—particularlywithrespecttotheprotectionofsatellitesandspacesystemsinitsowncase.

HowdoesIsraelapproachspaceoperations?

Israel’s approach to space operations and services appears to be largely driven by national securityinterests.Paikowskyexplainsthatasasmallcountry,Israelisabletoenhanceitsoverallnationalpower

27 Pleasenote thatonlyoneSMEansweredall partsof thisquestion from Israel’sperspective.Anyother SMEs cited in thissectiononlybrieflymentionedIsraelintheirsubmission.


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throughspaceinwaysthatmightotherwisenotbepossible.AccordingtoPaikowsky,Israelbothenjoysand suffers from a growing reliance on space systems for its critical national infrastructure. For thisreason,sheexplains,Israelhasconcernsaboutthegrowingglobaltrendofspacemilitarizationbecausethe resulting threats, if realized, could lead to Israel losing any relative advantages itmight currentlyhave in thespacedomain.Therefore,shemaintains that Israel is interested inachievingasustainablespaceenvironment,particularlyoneinwhichIsraelisatellitesarenotendangered

HowdoesIsraelapproachspaceoperationsformilitarypurposes?

LongstandingregionalsecurityconcernsandthreatshavedrivenIsraeltocommitsignificanteffortandresourcestowardsecuringandassuringitsoverallnationalsecurity.Israel’snarrowborders,Paikowskycontends,constitutea lackofstrategicdepthandposeanexistentialthreatthatnecessitatesasearchfor solutions to avoid strategic surprise and sudden attack. For these reasons, she explains, Israel’ssecuritydoctrinedemandsadvanced intelligence capabilities forearlywarning.Anorientation towardspace assists Israel in coping with the challenges presented by this aforementioned lack of strategicdepth, and Israel’s space program, therefore, is recognized as a critical component of its nationalsecuritystrategy,accordingtoPaikowsky.Morespecifically,sheassertsthatIsraelisparticularlyfocusedonspacecapabilitiesforidentifyingandaddressingthreatsfromanintelligenceandoperationalpointofview(i.e.,earlywarning;intelligence,surveillance,andreconnaissance;deterrence;andself-relianceinadvancedtechnologies).ShecontendsthatIsraelviewsthesetypesofinterestsandoperationsasforcemultipliers that boost national space capability and infrastructure in both the military and civilianrealms,thusstrengtheningIsrael’soverallnationalsecurityandregionalstatus.

Despite its space domain ambitions, Paikowsky notes that Israel’s space interests and operations arelimitedbyresourceconstraintsimposedbyitsrelativelysmallsize.ShearguesthatthisforcesIsraeltobe more selective in its space operations, necessitating a concentration on those most critical tonationalobjectives (e.g.,developing,operating,and launching satellites into space),aswellas severalspecificallytargetednicheareasthatpresentpotentiallyhighreturnoninvestmentopportunities(e.g.,Earth observation, low-Earth orbit launch capability, and communications). Another notable way inwhichIsraelattemptstoneutralizedomesticresourceconstraintsisbybuildingpartnershipswithotherspaceactors.PaikowskynotesthatIsraeldoesnotbuildallofitssystemsentirelyonitsown(e.g.,Israeldoes not have its own navigation system,weather system, ormannedmissions), but rather seeks tocooperate with international partners—particularly the United States—on mutually beneficial space-related projects. Therefore, it is important to recognize that while Israel’s size might present somelimitationswithrespecttoavailableresources,thestrongUS-Israelcooperativepartnershipdoesinparthelp to buffer Israel against domestic resource constraints. As Bahgat notes, the US provides asignificant amount of political and economic assistance in support of Israeli space interests andoperations.

HowdoesIsraelapproachspaceoperationsforcommercialpurposes?

Sincetheestablishmentofitscommercialspacesector,PaikowskycontendsthatIsraelhasdevelopedarobust commercial space industry and a strong scientific sector. Hitchens, however, notes thatwhileIsraeldoestechnicallyhaveacommercialspacesectorandcommercialspaceactors,thereisahighlevelofgovernmentcontrolandownershipinvolved.Therefore,theseIsraeli“commercialoperations”mightnotbeastrulyindependently“commercial”asonemightimagine(Hitchens).


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Canada

Canadahashadafewdecadesofexperiencewithbothmilitaryandcommercialspace(B.Weeden).Itisamongthegroupofspace-faringnationsthatutilizesspaceandhavebothastrongspacepolicyandagovernment space agency (Samson). Canada, like most countries discussed by the contributors,implementsadifferentmodel forcommercialspaceoperationsthandoestheUS(Hitchens).Canada’sspace sector lacksa cleardistinctionbetweencivil,military, andcommercialoperations. There is alsosignificant government investment in the commercial sector, which reflects the government’scommitmenttobuildingupthenation’scommercialspacesector.

HowdoesCanadaapproachspaceoperations?

Many of Canada’s commercial satellite companies still have broad government investment andtherefore cannot be deemed as entirely independent entities, unlike the United States’ commercialsatellite companies (Hitchens). For instance, Canadamakes frequent use of Synthetic Aperture Radar(SAR)28satellitesforbothmilitaryandcommercialuse,andisevenaheadoftheUSinitswidespreaduseof such satellites (Hitchens). This is one of Canada’s key areas of investment, and the dual-use(commercialandmilitary)natureofthesecapabilitiesisindicativeofthelackofsegmentationwithintheCanadianspacesector(civil,military,andcommercial)asawhole.

HowdoesCanadaconceiveofspaceoperationsformilitarypurposes?

Charity Weeden of the Satellite Industry Association states that Canada’s recent defense policydocuments indicate a determination to incorporate space capabilities into critical national securityinfrastructure. This emphasizes Canada’s recognition of the importance of space for national securityanddefense.Inparticular,spaceisvitaltothescopeofCanada’sArcticoperationsandNORADmissionssince it requiresAutomatic Identification System (AIS) and radar satellites toprotect its coastlines (C.Weeden).

Canada has its own military space assets, including satellites intended for military use. However,Hitchens emphasizes that many of these assets are connected to US operations, and Canada oftenrequirestheUnitedStates’supportforitsmilitaryspaceventures.Thus,whileCanadaappearstohaveaninterestinutilizingspacecapabilitiesformilitaryoperations, itcurrentlyrequiresoutsideassistancetoachieveitsgoals.

Canada also closely collaborates with the rest of the Five Eyes community (Australia, Canada, NewZealand,UK,US),whosemembernationsarecurrentlyworkingtobuildspacerelationshipswitheachother (B. Weeden). B. Weeden notes that discussions have been occurring under the rubric of theCombinedSpaceOperationCenter(CSPOC)toorganizeFiveEyesnations’operationswithinanationalspaceintegrationcell.TheCSPOCwouldthenactasasetofconceptsofoperations(CONOPS)forhowthesenationalspaceintegrationcellswouldinteractwitheachother(B.Weeden).

HowdoesCanadaconceiveofspaceoperationsforcommercialpurposes?

Canada’s commercial space operations and services are tightly linked with its national security anddefenseefforts(C.Weeden).Furthermore,basedonCanada’sextensiveexperiencewithandownership

28SARsatellites implementaside-lookingradarsystemwhichutilizestheflightpathofthesatellitetosimulateanextremelylarge, electronic antenna.After compiling the storeddata, a high-resolution remote sensing imageof the terrain below theflightpathisgenerated.


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ofsatellites,theexpertssuggestthatthenation’scommercialsectorisfocusedonbuildingupthisfacetofitsspaceindustry.

Brazil29

JuanHurtadoofUnitedStatesSouthernCommandstressesthatBrazilhasmorespacecapabilitiesthanmany other countries in the region. However, it is still not on par with many other more advancedspace-faring nations due to its dependence on international support for launches, satellitemanufacturing, and orbital mechanics. Despite Brazil’s classification as an emerging space power,HitchensstressesthattheUSshouldkeepaneyeonBrazilbecauseitmaybecomealargerplayerinthespacedomaininthefuture.

HowdoesBrazilapproachspaceoperationsandservices?

BrazilhasitsowngovernmentSpaceAgency,theAgenciaEspacialBrasileira(AEB),whichfacilitatesthenation’s civilian and commercial space operations. In addition, there are various governmentorganizations that assist with space operations. The Instituto Nacional de Pesquisas Espaciais (INPE),which sits under the Brazilian government’s Ministry of Science and Technology, oversees mostgovernmental space research and development efforts (Hurtado). The Center for Space Operations,under the oversight of the Fuerza Aerea Brasileira (FAB), conductsmost of Brazil’s space operations(Hurtado). Combined, these government organizations are responsible for administering the nation’sspace program, research, education, and operations (Hurtado). While the INPE in particular worksclosely with Brazil’s military, military benefits are secondary to civilian interests and applications(Hurtado).

HowdoesBrazilconceiveofspaceoperationsformilitarypurposes?

Asstatedabove,INPEworkscloselywithBrazil’smilitary;however,itsprimaryfocusisoncivilianspaceoperations(Hurtado).This,combinedwiththeplacementofBrazil’sgovernmentspaceprogramswithintheciviliansector,suggeststhatBrazilisprimarilyfocusedoncommercialandcivilspaceventures.

HowdoesBrazilconceiveofspaceoperationsforcommercialpurposes?

Brazilisspecificallyinterestedinmakingadvancementsinthefieldofsmallsatellites,withasecondaryfocuson thedevelopmentof launch facilitiesand launchvehicles (Hurtado). In termsof research, thenation’sprimaryfocusisonspacephysicsandheliophysics30ratherthananyplanetaryresearch(BrentSherwood, NASA Jet Propulsion Laboratory). Both Brazil’s commercial sector and its universitiesaugment the activities of its government programs and operations (Hurtado). Brazil’s commercialventures are not overly active in the security and stability domains (Hurtado), and thus do not viewsecuritydifferentlyduringtimesofpeace,crisis,andconflict.

29Pleasenote thatonlyoneSMEansweredall partsof thisquestion fromBrazil’sperspective.Anyother SMEs cited in thissectiononlybrieflymentionedBrazilintheirsubmission.30HeliophysicsisthestudyoftheSun’seffectsonthesolarsystem.


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Australia

Since the 1940s, space has influenced Australia’s national strategy (Brett Biddington, BiddingtonResearchPtyLtd),andthecountryrecognizestheimportanceofdevelopingspacecapabilities.Samsonstates that Australia “use[s] space, recognize[s] space as being important, and [has its] own spaceinterestsandcapabilities;”however,thecountrystilllackssomeofthecapabilitiesthatmoreadvancedspacepowerspossess.

HowdoesAustraliaapproachspaceoperations?

DespiteAustralia’slonghistoryofinvolvementinspace,severaloftheexperts31notethatitstilllacksanationalspaceagencyandacentralcoordinationoffice.However,thegovernmentisdevelopinganewspacepolicy (B.Weeden) andhas recently announced intentions to establish a central space agency.Althoughsmall in termsofpopulationandGDP,Australia is responsible forapproximately15%of theEarth’s surface (Biddington). Earth observation satellites and communication satellites therefore havethepotentialtosignificantlyenhanceeffortstoregulate,govern,andmonitorAustralianterritories,andtheyareamajorcomponentofAustralia’sspaceinvestments(Biddington).

Despite itsdesiretohaveasuccessfulspaceprogram,thenation’s limitedmonetaryresourcesrestrictitsabilitytospendonspaceventures.32Nevertheless,Australiahasallocatedfundstorevitalizeitsspaceindustry (B. Weeden), further highlighting the nation’s interest in investing in satellite launchcapabilities.Australiapresentlyhasthecapabilitytopurchaseforeignsatellitesandoperatelaunchesinother nations (Gilmour Space Technologies) but lacks the capability to launch on its own soil. A $3-4billionprojectforspace-basedremotesensingwasoutlinedinarecentAustraliandefensewhitepaperand investment plan and, according to Biddington, the development of Australia’s own government-ownedEarthobservationsatellitesisonthehorizonaswell.

HowdoesAustraliaconceiveofspaceoperationsformilitarypurposes?

AustraliarecognizesandvaluesthebenefitsthatspaceservicesfromothercountriesprovideAustralianmilitaryforcesandisdeterminedtopreservethosebenefits(DuncanBlake,InternationalAerospaceLawandPolicyGroup).Australiahas longbeenapopular location for theUS, ESA, andother space-faringnations to place ground stations, and it is starting to build some of its own ground-based spacesurveillancecapabilities(Biddington).TheGilmourSpaceTechnologyteamcontendsthattheycouldalsosee the Australian government looking to domestic commercial space industries to launch militarysatelliteswithinthenext5-10years.

The US has helped advance Australian space operations significantly (Dr. Jason Held, SaberAstronautics),andthetwocountrieshaveworkedtogetherquitecloselyonspaceventuresfordecades(Biddington).TheUSpossessesthemoneyandresourcesthatAustralia lackstoconductthesemilitaryoperations(Biddington),andAustraliahasthegeographicpositionthatprovidestheUSwithextendedsatellite coverage. Much of Australia’s military assets are linked to United States operations, andAustraliadoesnotconductmanymilitaryactivitiesinspaceonitsown(Hitchens).

Australia also closely collaborates with the rest of the Five Eyes community (Australia, Canada, NewZealand, UK, US) on space technology development and national security-related space matters(Lindsey).B.Weedenexplains thatdiscussionshavebeenoccurringunder therubricof theCombined31Biddington,Samson,GilmourSpaceTechnologies,andB.Weeden.32SeethecontributionsfromBiddingtonandHeld.


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SpaceOperationCenter(CSPOC) inanefforttohavealloftheFiveEyesnationstooperateanationalspaceintegrationcell.ThisCSPOCwouldthenactasasetofconceptsofoperations(CONOPS)forhowthesenationalspaceintegrationcellswouldinteractwitheachother(B.Weeden).

HowdoesAustraliaconceiveofspaceoperationsforcommercialpurposes?

In terms of commercial space, Held suggests that Australian commercial activities drive the nation’sspaceindustry.Thenationhasavarietyofprivatecompaniesthatusespace,andthesecompanieshavediffering relationswith government, both in termsof control and funding (Hitchens). Thediminishingpriceofsatellitesisencouragingsmall,startupcompaniesinAustralia,aselsewhere,tostartbuyingandlaunching satellites without any government funding or assistance (Biddington; Held; Lindsey). Thislowers the barriers for entry for less-experienced companies (Biddington; Lindsey) and removes theneedtorelyonlarge-scalegovernmentinvestments.

Despite these developments, Australia’s commercial space sector currently lacks a cohesive identity(Biddington). As Biddington explains, some Australian companies utilize satellites as part of theirtelecommunicationsbusiness,buttheyviewthemselvesastelecommunicationsupplierswhohappentousesatellitestoconducttheirbusinessratherthanascommercialspacecompanies.Healsostressestheneedforthesecompaniestorecognizetheirroleascommercialspacecompaniesaswellastheextentoftheirdependenceonspace.

Singapore33

Singapore’sinvolvementinthespacedomainisrelativelyrecent(JonathanHung,SingaporeSpaceandTechnologyAssociation). Infact,Singapore’scommercialspaceactivitiesbeganabout5yearsago,andthenationstill lacksbothagovernmentspaceagencyandanational spacepolicy (Hung).Despite theabsence of these institutions, Singapore has identified space as an area of interest for economicdevelopment (Samson). Thenation recognizes the importanceof space, invests capital and resourcesinto space, and has its own space interests and capabilities; however, these capabilities still remainlimited(Samson).

HowdoesSingaporeapproachspaceoperations?

ThekeyambitionsandinterestsofSingapore’scommercialspaceentitiesareimprovinganddevelopingsatellite communication, strengthening its telecommunication and imaging services, improving Earthobservationon the ground, andproviding accuratedata (Hung). Singapore also aspires todevelop itsspacecapabilitiessothatitcanfurtherextenditscommercialservicestotherestoftheworld(Hung).Overall, Singapore’s main area of interest is small satellites, and the nation has chosen to focus onprovidingcommercialspaceservicesviasmallsatellitesratherthaninvestinginlargetelecommunicationsatellites(Hung).

HowdoesSingaporeconceiveofspaceoperationsformilitarypurposes?

AccordingtoHung,Singaporedoesnotconductspaceoperationsformilitarypurposes,norisitlookingtodoso.

33PleasenotethatonlyoneSMEansweredallpartsofthisquestionfromSingapore’sperspective.AnyotherSMEscitedinthissectiononlybrieflymentionedSingaporeintheirsubmission.


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HowdoesSingaporeconceiveofspaceoperationsforcommercialpurposes?

Singaporeviews spaceasa commercialbusinessopportunityaswell asanopportunity to create jobsandconductgroundbreakingresearch(Hung).Consequently,thenation’s interest inspaceisdrivenbyits commercial and economic interests, and it is predominantly focused on how it can improve andadvance in the realm of commercial space (Hung). Most of the commercial space research beingconductedinSingaporefocusesonsatelliteimagingandobservationactivitiesand,asthepriceofsmallsatellites continues to decline, Singapore is investing more in research and development of suchcapabilities(Hung).

Ukraine

According to Samson, in a ranking of national space capabilities,Ukraine belongs in the lower tier ofspace-faringnations.Ukraine falls into thiscategory it is interested inmakingadvancements inspace,recognizestheimportanceofspace,andhasitsownspaceinterestsandcapabilities,butdoesnothavethe advanced space capabilities and resources that other higher-tiered nations possess (Samson).Nevertheless, due its clear interest in space, further investment in Ukraine’s space operations isanticipated.

OtherActors

LuxembourgGoswamipredictsthatalongwiththeUnitedArabEmirates,Luxembourgwill“emergeasamajorspaceplayer in the futureof settingspacenormsandutilizing insightsdrawn fromspace-based informationservices.” She supports this argument by pointing out that Luxembourg has invested extensively inasteroidminingandhasestablishedlegislationthatallowsprivatecompaniestosettleinLuxembourgbypromisingownershipofouterspaceresources.Thus,Luxembourgisprimarilyfocusedonitscommercialspace ventures, recognizes theeconomicopportunities available in space, and supportsownershipofouterspaceresources.

TheMiddleEastFormostMiddle Eastern countries, there are twomajor barriers to becoming a space-faring nation:moneyandscientificinfrastructure(Bahgat).TheGulfStates,specificallySaudiArabia,theUnitedArabEmirates(UAE),Qatar,andKuwait,havetheeconomicresourcestoconductspaceactivities,butlackthenecessary technical infrastructure and scientific expertise (Bahgat). Despite these shortcomings,Goswami predicts that the UAE will “emerge as a major space player in the future of setting spacenormsandutilizinginsightsdrawnfromspace-basedinformationservices.”ThispredictionstemsfromtheUAE’seffortstopartnerwithmoreadvancedspace-faringnationstobuildexpertise,stimulatetheprocessofobtaining space-based capabilities, andgain access to thewealthof space knowledge thatthesenationspossess(Goswami).OtherMiddleEasternnations,includingEgypt,Jordan,andLebanon,donothave the required financial resources tobuilda spaceprogram (Bahgat).According toBahgat,thishelpsexplainwhytheonlyMiddleEasterncountrieswithspaceprogramsareIsraelandIran,bothofwhichhaveresourcesandinfrastructure.


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NewZealandNewZealanddoesnothaveanationalspaceagency(Biddington)and,accordingtoB.Weeden,itisnotengaging inmany spaceactivities at themoment.34However, it is amemberof the FiveEyes,whosemember nations are currently working to build space relationships with each other (B.Weeden). B.Weeden elaborates that discussions have been occurring under the rubric of the Combined SpaceOperation Center (CSPOC), and the goal of these effortswould be for all of the Five Eyes nations tooperateanationalspaceintegrationcell.TheCSPOCwouldthenactasasetofconceptsofoperations(CONOPS) forhowthesenational space integrationcellswould interactwitheachother (B.Weeden).Therefore,wecananticipateanincreaseinNewZealand’sinterestinspaceinthenearfuture.

34Duringthefinalreviewofthisreport,Lindseynotedthat,“[This]isnolongertrue.In2016,NewZealandestablishedaspaceagency. This was in large part due to the success of RocketLab, USA. As I understand it, they realized they needed a NewZealand government agency to engage with the FAA on getting RocketLab licensed to operate in New Zealand. There is agrowingsmallsatelliteresearchpresenceinacademiathere,aswell.Interestingly,NewZealand'sgrowingspacesectorspurredtheAustraliangovernmenttoannouncetheestablishmentoftheircivilspaceagencythispastSeptember[2017],whentheyhosted the International Astronautical Congress.” For additional information on this initiative, Lindsey pointed to:http://www.mbie.govt.nz/info-services/sectors-industries/space


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SubjectMatterExpertContributions

MajorGeneral(USAFret.)JamesB.Armor,Jr.35StaffVicePresident,WashingtonOperations(OrbitalATK)

7August2017WRITTENRESPONSEPRC, Russia, Iran, North Korea: commercial as an extension of military/political objectives. PRC allowscommercial,butthatincludesPLAengagement

European Space Agency, Japan, India, South Korea, Israel: commercial as support for economicwell-being ofregion (includingdefense). They assumeUS space (military) dominance in their calculus, so they can save thatexpense.Theyallconsidersystems“dualuse”,withsomeexceptions(sciencemostly)

Canada,Brazil,Australia, Singapore,Ukraine, others: mix-mash: eachhas economic, political and geo-politicalobjectivesfortheirinterests.TheytrytoemulatetheUSsectors,butdon’thavethebudgets.

Dr.GawdatBahgatProfessorofNationalSecurityAffairs

(NationalDefenseUniversity’sNearEastSouthAsiaCenterforStrategicStudy)7August2017

INTERVIEWTRANSCRIPTEXCERPT

Interviewer: [Q2]Okay.So,thefirstquestionIwantedtoaskyouisabouthowotheractors,particularlyIranin this case,perceiveof spaceoperations formilitary and commercial purposes. So, can talk alittleabouthowothernon-USactors,particularlyIraninthiscase,conceiveofspaceoperationsformilitaryandcommercialpurposes?

G.Bahgat: Okay. Iran has a large and sophisticatedmissile program—the space program and particularlylong-range missiles, as far as I understand, is part of the missile program. So, Iran has asophisticatedandlargemissileprogram.

Ifwe focuson space,most Iranianmissiles are short- andmedium- range. Theydohave long-rangemissiles,andjustfewdaysagotheytestedmissilesaspartoftheirnewlong-rangespacesystem.TheUnitedStateswasnothappyaboutthis.TheUS,alongwithGermany,France,andUKsubmittedalettertotheSecurityCouncil,complainingaboutthis.

So, Iran has the program. Iran denies that it is for military reasons, they claim it is civilian.Accordingtomostexperts,Irandoesnothavethecapabilitytolaunchmilitarylong-rangemissileyet,buttheyhavedevelopeddomesticexpertise,sothiscannotberuledout.Whatisnotclearbasedonopensources,isifthisIranianprogramiscivilianormilitary.

Interviewer: [Q2]Fromperspective,whatdoyouseeasIran’skeyambitionsandkeyinterestswithrespecttothespacedomain?YoumentionedIran’smissileprogramandthedevelopmentandinvestmentsthere,but,inadditiontothemissileprogram,whatotheractionshasIrantakeninpursuitofitskeyambitionsandkeyinterestsinthespacedomain?

35TheresponseshererepresentthesoleviewsofMajorGeneral(USAFret.)JamesArmor,andarenotintendedtorepresentthepositionofOrbitalATK.


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G.Bahgat: Ibelievetherearetwoimportantpointshere.

OneofthemainmotivesforIran,themainreasonandthemaindriveforthisspaceprogram,ispride.IranhasthenucleardealaccordingtotheIAEAandUnitedNations,and,sofar,Iranisnotinviolationof thenucleardeal,but theyhavegreatpride in theprogram.Theywant toprovethattheyhavethescientificknowledgetolaunchlong-rangemissilespaceprograms.

The other point I want to make is that the program is legal. During the negotiation for thenuclear deal, theUnited Stateswas trying very hard to includemissiles in the agreement andNuclearAccord,buttheIraniansfoughtveryhardandsucceeded.Accordingtothenucleardeal,from July 2015, there is nothing against Iran’s missile program, including the space program.There was a previous Security Council resolution that made this illegal, but according to thelatestresolution12331,theresolutioncallsonIrannottodevelopaspaceprogrambutitisnotillegal(i.e.,itissofterthanpreviousresolutions).

Interviewer: [Q2] Youmentioned the legality of the Iranian actions regarding its space program, so, alongthese lines, is Irancooperatingwithorworkingwithanyothercountries inpursuitof itsspaceinterests?And,ontheotherhand,do Iran’sspace interestsandambitionsopenlyconflictwithanyothercountry,despitethelegalityofwhattheyaredoing?

G.Bahgat: Someofwhat is going on is contentious. For example, Iran isworkingwithNorth Korea,withRussia,andwithChina.ThesearetheIran’sthreemainpartnershere.

Iran has also developed domestic infrastructure, they spend a lot ofmoney on education anddevelopingtheircapabilitytobeself-sufficient.But,accordingtomostexpertsonthesubject,sofar Iran still depends on foreign sources for some parts of the space program and themissileprograms.Iranisnot100%selfsufficient,buttheyhavemadegreatprogressinthisdirection.

Interviewer: [Q2] So, I imagine that Iran’s cooperationwithNorth Korea and Russia,maybe even China aswell,createssometensionsorpointofconflictwithsomeothercountries,particularlytheUS?

G.Bahgat: Sure.TheUShas imposedsanctionson Iransince1979,and theUShasbeengettingbetteratimposingandexecuting these sanctions.Also,on theother side, Iranhasbeenunder sanctionsince 1979, so they’ve learned how to avoid these sanctions. They have developed verysophisticatednetworks to get around these sanctions. So, itworksbothways.We, theUnitedStates,havebeenlearningwhatworksandwhatdoesnotwork,andthesamethingshavebeenlearned on the Iranian side since the 1970s. While under these sanctions, Iran has not beenallowed to import almost all kinds ofweapons, but they learned how to smuggle and how tocreatenetworkstoavoidthesesanctionsandtoworkaroundthesesanctions.

Probably another important point here was the nuclear deal. Most European sanctions havebeen lifted. We, the United States, still keep most of the sanctions, and under the Trumpadministration it looks likewewill imposeeventoughersanctions.But,sincethedeal, IranhashadaneasiertimewithEurope,withChina,withRussia,andbasicallywiththerestoftheworld.

Interviewer: [Q2]IsthereacommercialspaceindustryinIran?Ifso,whatdoesthecommercialspaceindustrylooklike?WhatistherelationshiplikebetweentheIraniangovernmentandIraniancommercialspaceandentities?

G.Bahgat: To thebest ofmy knowledge, there is noprivate or commercial spaceprogram. TheprogramtheyhaveisrunbytheRevolutionaryGuard,whichisthemainpowerinIran.TheRevolutionaryGuardwascreatedshortlyaftertherevolutiontoprotecttherevolution,anditisdifferentfromthe traditionalarmybut it is themostpowerful institution in Iran.Thespaceprogramand themissileprogramingeneralisrunbytheRevolutionaryGuard.

IfImayaddonepointhere,theUnitedStatesisconsideringdesignatingtheRevolutionaryGuardas terroristorganization.Wehavenotmade thisdecisionyet,butaccording to themedia, theTrumpadministrationisconsideringthisoption.


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Interviewer: So,whatwouldbeimpactofdoingthat(theUSdesignatingtheRevolutionaryGuardasterroristorganization)fromanIraniangovernmentperspective?IimaginethatwouldemboldenIran,butwhatdoyouthink?

G.Bahgat: Twopointshere.

One, there are some people here in the United States that believe that this will be illegalaccording toour lawsbecause theRevolutionaryGuard ispartof the Iraniangovernment.Wehavenotdesignatedanygovernmententityasaterroristorganizationyet,sothiswouldbethefirsttimeanditisnotclearifthiswillbelegalorillegalaccordingtoourlaws.

Second, for the Iranians, theyhave threatened to retaliate.As Imentioned, theRevolutionaryGuardisthestrongestinstitutioninIran.Basically,theyareinchargeandtheyarestrongerthanPresident Rouhani, the elected president, and they are threatening retaliation. They have notbeenspecificinexactlywhattheywilldo,butwhatcanbesaidisthatthiswouldbeabigsetbackforUS-Iranrelations.

Interviewer: [Q2indirectly]Okay.So,sortoftransitioningalittletoanotheroneofourquestions.Youspokeabout how Iranian pride is driving some of its activity and interest in the space domain. ThesecondquestionIwashopingtoaskyouisaboutthemotivationsofnation-stateandnon-stateactorstocontesttheuseofspace,sopleasefeelfreetoaddressthisquestionwithIranandtheMiddle East in mind. So, what are the motivations of nation states and non-state actors tocontest theuseof space in timesofpeace, instability, and conflict, andwhatare thepolitical,military,environmental,andsocialcostsassociatedwithactingonthosemotivations?

G.Bahgat: So,asImentioned,Ihavebeenworkingonweaponsofmassdestructionforaverylongtime.Atonepoint,nuclearweaponswereconsideredveryprestigiousandcountriesweretryingtomakethebombsotheycanjoinelitecountries.But,eventually,nuclearweapons lostthisattraction,butthisisdifferentfromspaceprogramsbecausespaceprogramsarenotonlyformilitaryuse.Aspaceprogramconsistofsatellitesandcommunicationsinfrastructure—ithasmanycivilianuses.Thisiswhyspaceprogramsareisstillprestigious.

The only two countries with space programs in the Middle East are Iran and Israel. It alsohappensthatthesetwocountriesaremorescientificallydevelopedthantherestoftheMiddleEastern countries. There is a lot of pride and prestige that comes with developing a spaceprogram.

In Israel, theprogram is fundedmainlyby theUnitedStates.Wecontributea lotofmoney todeveloping Israel’sspaceprogram. Irandoesnothavethesesamefinancial resources. Iranhadplanned to send human beings to space, but they cancelled this program because of lack offunding.So, theseare someof the recentdevelopmentsabout Iran’s spaceprogram.Probablyevenwithall thepride involved,oneof thebigchallenges for Iran is tosecure funding for thespaceprogram.Withthecurrentoilprices, Irandoesnothavemuchavailablefunding,sotheyaretryingtobalancethepridetheywanttogetbydevelopingthisprogramwiththeshortageoffundingtheyhave.

Interviewer: [Q2] Do any other Middle Eastern countries, beyond Iran and Israel, have interest in or areworkingtowardsfurtherdevelopmentoftheirspaceprogram?

G.Bahgat: FormostMiddleEasterncountries,therearetwomainrequirements:moneyandthescientificinfrastructure.TheGulfStates—SaudiArabia,UAE,Qatar,Kuwait—havethemoney,buttheydonothavethetechnicalinfrastructure(e.g.,scientists).Countrieswithmorehumanresourcesandbetter technical infrastructure—like Egypt, Jordan, and Lebanon—do not have the requiredfinancialresources.So,thisiswhytheonlytwoMiddleEasterncountries—basedonopensourceinformation—with spaceprogramsare Israel and Iran.Evenwith respect toTurkey, Ihavenotread anything that Turkey has developed a space program, and to the best ofmy knowledge,Turkeystilltodaydoesnothaveaspaceprogramanddoesnothaveplanstodevelopone.


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Interviewer: [Q2 indirectly] Okay. So, transitioning to one of our other questions, which has to do withinsights fromotherdomains thatmightbehelpfulandapplicable forproviding insights for thespacedomainand for spaceoperations. Fromyourperspective,what insighton current spaceoperations can be gained from understanding the approaches used for surveillance,reconnaissance, navigation, communication, timing synchronization, and indications andwarningsbeforetheadventofthespaceage?

G.Bahgat: Ibelieve thatmaybebesidesRussiaandChina, Iran is themostwatchedcountry in theworld.TheUSandIranhavebeenenemiessince1979,sotheUSwatcheseverythinghappeninginIran.Inmyresearch, Ioftenwonderhowmuchweknowabout them.Also, Iranpublicizes itsspaceprogram,and,asImentioned,theirofficialargumentisthatitiscivilianandnotformilitary.Theyclaimthattheyarenottryingtomakeanuclearbombaspartoftheirspaceprogram,butthatitisforcivilianuses.So,becauseofthis,theypublicizetheirprogram.Whentheytestedtheirlong-rangemissilespaceprogram,itwasinIranianmedia,theytalkedaboutit,theytookpictures,andtheywantedtotakecredittoshowpride,notonlytotheoutsideworldbuttotheirownpeople.The Iranian government, with low oil prices, is under pressure, and they try to take pride byscientific achievement given that they cannotmeet the economic expectations of the Iranianpeople.So,theywidelypublicizethesuccessestheyhaveregardingtheirspaceprogram.

Ibelievewehavegoodpictureofwhattheydo.Probablywhatisnotclear,andthereisnowaytoknow, iswhatexactly their intention is.Somethingabouthavingaspaceprogram, it iseasyonce youdevelop the capability to launch long-rangemissiles for civil use to then switch it tomilitaryuse—onceyoudeveloptheexpertisetomakespacevehicles,spaceprograms,etc.youcan put them onmissiles instead of just civilian satellites. So, these are concerns that at onepointiftheygetbetterindevelopingspaceprogram,theymightswitchtomilitaryuse.Thereisnowaytoknowwhattheirintentionsare.

[…]

Interviewer: [Q2 indirectly]Hi Gawdat. I think it’s very interesting that you spoke about nationalism as areason for the development of and contribution towards the Iranian space program. I alsothoughtitwasparticularlyinterestinghowyoutalkedabouthowtheGulfStateshavethemoneybut not the necessary technological infrastructure. So, I’m wondering if comparable levelnationalismcould serveas the samecatalyst foranyof theGulfnations tobegin todevelopaspaceprogramoftheirown?

G.Bahgat: Sure.I’mgladyoumentionedthisbecause,asIkeptsaying,onebigpointaboutspaceprogramsisthat itbringsa lotofprideforthecountry.GulfStateslackofthescientific infrastructure,sothebesttheycandoispaya lotofmoney. Ibelieve itwasSaudiArabiathatactually joineditsspace program with United States. But, the Saudis themselves, and the same thing for UAE,cannotbuild a spaceprogramof theirown inside their country to the levelofother countriesbecausetheylackthescientificinfrastructure.

Iranisundersanctions,yetSomeoftheIranianuniversitiesareamongthetopuniversitiesintheworld.SharifUniversity isoneof thetop100universities intheworld.Youcannotbuysciencewithmoney.

Also, it is a matter of national security. The United Arab Emirates has the money, but thechallenge they have is can they employ Jordanians, Egyptians, or Indians in these programs?Thereareconcernsaboutthisbecausethisisverysensitivework,soithastobeaUAEnational,butmostUAEnationalsjustdonothavethequalifications.UAEismuchmoreadvancedthantheotherGulfStates.TheywillbethefirstArabcountrytohaveanuclearreactor.Theyareoneofourclosestalliesintheregion.But,mostofthelaborforceinUAEisfromforeigncountries,sothesmallpopulationandthelackofthescientifictraditionofresearchislimitingtheircapability.


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Interviewer: [Q2 indirectly] That’s the very interesting that the pool of talent and lack education is acontributing factor. So, to add on a little bit to that, the UAE and other Gulf nations areexperiencing a historic détentewith Israel, it seems. You talked about cooperationwith otherregionalactors, socouldcooperationwith Israeland its spaceprogramandspaceexpertisebepossible?Couldweseeapossibleburgeoningrelationship inthatregardor isthat justanotherfar-fetchedreality?

G.Bahgat: Thisisanexcellentquestion.

First,andifImayaddressthepointabouteducation.IhavedonealotofworkwithGeorgetownUniversity inDoha,andGulf states likeQatar,UAE,SaudiArabia,andKuwait,have themoneybut after September 11 it becameharder for their students to comehere, somanyAmericanuniversitiesopenedcampusbranchesthere.The ideawastoeducateyoungpeople in theGulfsince they cannot come to United States for security reasons. It ended, though, as Americanuniversitiesdecidedtomaintaintheirhighstandardsandtheyrefusedto lowertheirstandardsto accommodate Emiratian, Qatari, and Kuwaitis. This is almost funny because GeorgetownUniversityinQatarwasopenedtoeducateQataripeoplebutthegreatmajorityofstudentsthereare foreigners basically because the university is striving to maintain its high standards. Thishighlightsthegapsineducation.

ForGulfStatestoworkwithIsrael,thisisinthemedianowandIbelieveitisverycredible.Thereis something, people call it Arab NATO, and basically it is one of the goals of TrumpadministrationtohaveArabcountriesworkwithIsraelagainstIran.Andtherearereportsinthemediaabouthigh levelmeetingsandexchangeofvisitsbetweenIsraeli leadersandSunniArabcountrieslikeEgypt,Jordan,andGulfstates.OnemainchallengeforthissocalledArabNATOiswhethertherewillbeasolutionfortheArab-Israeliconflict.Inthelastfewdays,thisconflictinJerusalemwiththeclosingofthemosquethere,hasshownthatitisveryhardforArabstoeithertocomeinpublicandmakepeacewith Israelorallywith IsraelwhiletherearedisputesaboutIslamicholysites in Jerusalem.TheUnitedStates,allAmericanadministrationsandpresidents,havebeenpushingforpeacebetweenArabsandIsrael.IbelieveiftheycanatleastcontaintheconflictbetweenPalestiniansandIsraeli,thiswouldhelp.WhatI’mtryingtosayisthatitisveryhard for the Saudi King and for the Emir of UAE to publically ally with Israel as long as thePalestinianshavebasicallyno rights in Israel.Toadvance thepeaceprocesswillhelp tocreatethisArabNATO.

[…]

Interviewer: [Q2indirectly]So,itseemslikethebarrierstoforcreatingaspaceprogramaredecreasingovertimeasthepricesofmaterialsaredecreasing.YounotedthatforsomeMiddleEasterncountriesthebarriertothedevelopmentofaspaceprogramisfunds,anditwouldseemthatsomeMiddleEastern countries would be hopeful and optimistic about eventually, within the not too farforeseeable future, being able to create a space program of their own, so which of thesecountriesdoyouseeasbeingmostmotivatedtogettothatpointwheretheycancreateaspaceprogram?

G.Bahgat: IfIhadtoputmoneyonit,IwouldsayprobablyTurkeyandEgypt,andmaybeSaudiArabia.Theyhavetheresources.SaudiArabiaisdifferentfromotherGulfStates—ithasapopulationabout30millionpeople,itisalargecountry,andithasthemoney.Though,thechallengeforSaudiArabiaisprobablyaboutsuccession.IftheyoungCrownPrincecanestablishhimself—theKingisabout81-years-oldandnobodyknowshowlonghewill live—thenSaudiArabiahasthepotentialandtheingredientstomakeadvancesinscience,economicdevelopment,andinotherareas,iftheycanavoidasuccessioncrisis—whichcouldhappenanytimenowbecausetheKingis81andhisson31.IftheKinglivesover5-6years,thenIbelievethiswillbeenoughtimefortheyoungCrowPrincetoestablishhimself,andhehasthepotentialtoleadthecountrytobecomerealpower.


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For Egypt, its challenge is its economic conditions. Egypt has about 90 million people, hasrelatively developed scientific infrastructure, has reasonably good universities, and has goodtalentsthere,butEgyptlacksthemoney.CanEgyptmakeupforthislackoffundingbyworkingwithSaudiArabia,withUAE,etc.?Theproblem is thatArabcountrieshavenever trustedeachother,andtherehavebeeneffortsbeforetocooperatebuttheseeventuallydidnotworkout.Egypthastheinfrastructure,butdoesnothavethemoney.

As forTurkey, inUnitedStatessometimeswewill considerTurkeypartof theMiddleEastandsometimeswewouldnot,but ifweconsiderTurkeytobeaMiddleEasterncountry, ithasthenecessarymoneyandthenecessaryhumanandtechnicalinfrastructure.IbelieveTurkeywouldbethebestcandidateheretodevelopaspaceprogram.OnelastpointaboutTurkey,TurkeyisNATOmember, so Turkeyprobablydoesnotneedamilitary spaceprogramandmost likely itwoulddevelopaspaceprogrammoretowardscivilianuses.

[…]

Interviewer: [Q2 indirectly] Great, thank you Gawdat. The last question we always ask folks is a generalquestion,butIwillaskyouaswell.IsthereanythingIhaven’taskedyouthatIshouldhave,oristhereanyfinalpointthatyou’dliketoconcludewith.

G.Bahgat: I think that the lastpoint that I’llmake is thatas faras Iunderstand, spaceprogramsareverymuchdualuse—theycanbeusedforbothmilitaryandcivilianuses.We,theUnitedStates,havethebesttechnology,andIbelieveifwecooperatewithothercountries,includingIran—andtheIraniansareopentoworkwithusinscience, ineconomicdevelopment,etc.—thenbeingtherewillhelpustoseethis.IfIwereadvisingtheAmericangovernment,theadministration,Iwouldsaywehavebasicallytwoapproaches:eithertocontainortoengage.Ibelieveengaging—beingthereandwatchingwhattheydo—willbebetterforus,andbetterforustomakesurethattheprogramstaysciviliananddoesnotswitchtomilitary.Forsure,theymighttrytocheat,butbeingthere,beingonthegroundtalking to themandwatching them, Ibelievewillbebetter for theUnitedStates.

MarcBerkowitzVicePresident,SpaceSecurity(LockheedMartin)

12June2017WRITTENRESPONSE

[Q2]Howdoeseachentity in the followingcategoriesconceiveofspaceoperations formilitaryandcommercialpurposes?

Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea have “commercial” space enterprises or front companies that arewholly-ownedbytheregimeandconduct“commercial”operationsascover toobtaincurrency, technology,andknow-howformilitarypurposes.

BothRussia’sandChina’sconceptsformilitaryspaceoperationsaredrivenbytheirmilitarystrategyanddoctrine.InRussia’s case, this isdifferent than theSovietUnion’s and reflects a greater relianceonnuclearweapons forintimidation and coercion as well as to offset perceived US/NATO technological advantages. Space controloperationsareseenascentraltodenyingtheUStheadvantagesof its“reconnaissance-strikecomplex,” i.e., theutilityofitsnonnuclearprecisionstrikecapabilities.

China is not a lesser included case of the SovietUnionor Russia. Its spaceoperations concept reflects China’sactivedefensestrategyfocusedon“informationalized”warfare.Spacecontroloperationsareseeninthecontext


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ofinformation-basedwarfightingtodenytheUSitsabilitytosense,decide,andacteffectivelyandtherebydeterintervention.

[Q2]Howdotheyapproachspaceoperationsandservices?

China’s recent establishment of its Space Support Forces (that include nuclear, electronic warfare, and spacecontrolassets)reflectsadifferentorganizationalapproachtospaceoperationsforinformationalizedwarfarethanRussia.Theirapproachesalsodifferwithrespecttotheirconceptsfordeterrenceandescalationcontrol.Indeed,Russia’s concept of “escalate to deescalate” is a dangerous idea that could lead to rapid and uncontrolledescalationwithitsapparentemphasisonquickresorttoirreversibleweaponseffects.Incontrast,itappearsthatChina’s is a graduated and controlled approach with a more deliberate shift from reversible to irreversibleweaponseffects.

[Q2] Is thereanydifference inhowtheir commercial ventures (ifany) consider securityduringpeace, crisisandconflict?

Theterm“commercial,”forthepurposesofUSspacepolicy,referstospacegoods,services,oractivitiesprovidedby private sector enterprises that bear a reasonable portion of the investment risk and responsibility for theactivity,operateinaccordancewithtypicalmarket-basedincentivesforcontrollingcostandoptimizingreturnoninvestment,andhavethelegalcapacitytoofferthesegoodsorservicestoexistingorpotentialnongovernmentalcustomers.(Note-thisdefinitionisactuallylessstringentthanthecommercialdefinitionsinpreviousPresidentialdirectives.) NeitherChina,Russia, Iran,norNorthKoreahavecommercial ventures thatmeet thisdefinition; infact, their “commercial” enterprises are merely extensions of their regimes and thus consider security in acomparablemanner.

Actual commercial ventures in Europe, Asia, Australia, and South America are concerned about security in thecontextoftheirprofitmotivetogeneraterevenuetoobtainareturnoninvestment,competeeffectivelyintheircommercial market segment(s), and extend and grow their sales, orders, and profits, and provide value toshareholders.Theyprovidesecurityandprotectionoftheirmissioncriticalemployees,information,infrastructure,and assets only to the extent required as part of their business plan to protect their investment and generatereturns. This typically entails cyber, information, and physical security practices primarily to protect againstnaturalhazardsinthespaceenvironment,unintentionalhuman-madethreats,andthelikeliestintentionalthreatsduringpeacetime.

Private sector enterprises, in general, do not see their assets as likely targets in crisis orwartime and have noincentivetoprovidepassiveoractivecountermeasuresforprotectionanddefenseagainstthespectrumofthreatsbeyondcyber,electronic,andlowintensityphysicalattacks. Totheextentcommercialventuresthinkaboutthesecurityof theirassets in crisisandwartime, theyexpect their governments toprovide for theirprotectionanddefense.

BrettBiddingtonFounder(BiddingtonResearchPtyLtd)

9August2017INTERVIEWTRANSCRIPTEXCERPT

Interviewer: [Q2indirectly]Okay.So,whataboutatermlike"space"itselforatermlike“outerspace?”ArethereanydifferencesinhowAustralianpolicyandUSpolicydefine“space”or“outerspace?”

B.Biddington: That’sareallygoodquestion,too.I’vetalkedquitealotaboutthis.AttheseniorpoliticallevelinAustralia,theword“space” isbasicallyadirtyword.Thereasonforthat isbecauseovermany,manyyears,theagendainthiscountryforspacehasbeenfundamentallysetintwoplaces.


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ThefirstplaceisintheclassifieddomainandtheDepartmentofDefense.Sincethe1940s,spacehasbeenattheheartofAustralia’snationalstrategy.Inthe1940sand1950sandintotheearly1960s, itwasbasically the relationshipbetweenAustralia and theUnitedKingdomaround theactivities of the Woomera test range. When the Brits withdrew, that’s when the Americansbasicallycameinandsaid,“Havewegotadealforyou,"andthathasledofcoursetothejointfacilitiesthataresoimportant.That’sreallythelongpollinthetentoftheAustralia-USalliance.AndIdon’tseethatchanging,actually,butit’ssomethingthatourgovernmentinAustraliafindsvery difficult to talk about because they don’t want to say anything that might in any waycompromisethecapabilitiesthataresupported.

The second place is the civil and commercial aspect where that agenda has been largely setbyscientists,andtheirviewhasbeentogotothegovernmentwiththeirhandsoutformoneyfor pet-projects that havenot necessarily been in the national interest but havebeen in theirownparticularresearchinterests.So,therehasbeenalackofcoherenceinthatapproachforalong,longtime.

There is someevidence that thismaybe changingquite rapidly,but thepast is stillwithus interms of thisover-emphasison science andunder-emphasison the economic importance ofspace to not just the national economy but the global economy, as well. That economicargument has not been well-articulated. If I lift this one level, this means that there is nocoherentnationalnarrativeinAustraliaaroundspace,andthat’swhatI’vecertainlybeentryingtocreateforthelastdecade.

Interviewer: [Q2]Okay.That’sveryinteresting.AndIthinkthatseguesnicelyintothefirstthatIwashopingtoaskyou,whichhastodowithhowotheractorsconceiveofspaceoperationsforbothmilitaryandcommercialpurposes.So,howdoesAustraliaconceiveofspaceoperationsforbothmilitaryandcommercialpurposes?

B.Biddington: Again,allofthequestionsthatyou'reaskingarethingsI’vebeenbattlingwithforadecade,sothey'regoodquestions.Firstly, IwouldsaythatIthinkthatwarisalreadyoninspace—it’sjustnot declared. Iwas at the space symposium in Colorado Springs in April andwent to the AGIstand and of course got the briefingabout the Russian satellite that cozied up against a NROasset, and this was all presented at the unclassified level. Equally, the Chinese satellite thatcoziedupagainstanOptuscommercialsatellite,whichisanAustraliancommunicationsatellite.

However, this is just not well-known. What’s happening in space is not in the publicconsciousness.There’sa littlebit,ofcourse,aboutdebris,whichhasbeenpopularizedbyfilmslikeGravity,butthis isstillaveryarcaneandprivateconversationamong,relativelyspeaking,averysmallgroupofpeople(i.e.,policymakers,lawyers,technicians,andengineers).This is justnot really something that the rest of the world has coherence and understanding about. So,that’sthefirstpointI’llmake.

The secondpoint isabout spaceoperations fromtheAustralianperspective.Australia isa tinynationwhenitcomestoinvestinginspace.Australiahas,Ibelieve,the14thlargesteconomyintheworld,butitisnotinvestingmuchinspaceinGDPterms—Australiaisaboutjustunder2%,Ithink,ofglobalGDP.Australiadoesn’tinvestanythinglikethatproportionofitstreasureinspaceactivities,soitunderperformsagainstthatverycrudemeasure.Butthen,becauseofAustralia’salliancerelationshipwiththeUnitedStates, iteffectivelyhad, ifnotafreeride,thenonethat’sbeenverygoodvalue froma taxpayer’sperspective.But, if I lift thatupa littlebit, theentireworldbenefitsfromGPS,which,ofcourse,isnowaglobalutilitycourtesyoftheUStaxpayer.So,Australia has to balance, I suppose, just howmuch it really should be investing as a small ormediumpower.

The Australian paradox is that we have two numbers that matter: a big number and a smallnumber.


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ThebignumberisthatAustraliaisresponsible,onewayoranother,forabout15%oftheEarth'ssurface. That’s our national territory, plus the oceans that wehavesearch and rescueresponsibility for, and plus Antarctica, of which Australia claims about two-thirds of thecontinent. To give you a picture ofwhat thatmeans, and this is whereMercator’s projectiondoesn’thelpus,butthinkofthemapyouhaveinyourmindsofAustralia.ThepieceofAntarcticathat Australia claims is the same size as the Australian continent but minus the state ofQueensland. So, that’s the big number: 15% of the Earth's surface. And, of course, Earthobservationsatellitesandcommunicationsatellitesareveryhelpfulinregulating,governing,andunderstandingwhat’sgoingon.

ThesmallnumberisAustralia’spopulation—about25millionpeopletryingtorunacontinentthesizeofthecontinentalUnitedStates.Sure,Australiadoesn’thavealloftheinfillcitiesliketheUSdoes,butitgivesyouasenseoftheparadoxthatthismassivesortofglobalresponsibilitywithataxbaseofaboutthesizeofNewYorkstate.So,askyourselfthequestion,“Howwouldyoualldo that in your country?” And the answer is, of course, “with a lot ofdifficulty." Therefore,Australia has had tomake some very big decisions aboutwhere it places its investments, andspacehasjustnotbeenoneofthose.AndabigreasonforthisisbecauseofAustralia’salliancerelationships.

So,movingtotheoperationspoint.Ifspacegoestohellinahandbasket,there’sverylittlethatAustralia candoabout itother than,of course,helping theUnitedStates, and theWestmoregenerally, and maybe the global community because, ultimately, all of us standto lose if wemuckupthespaceenvironmentmorethanwealreadyhave—itaffectsChinaandRussiajustasmuchasitaffectstheUnitedStatesintermsofsatellites.So,Australiahastothinkreallyhard,Ithink,becauseofitsstrategicgeographyabouthowitcancontributeto,andIhesitatetousethewordthe“orderofspace,”butatleasttotheregulationofspacetoensurethat’sit’sthereforalltouse.

Interviewer: [Q2 indirectly] So, you started off by saying that “war is already on in space—it’s just notdeclared.” That’s an interesting statement, and one that I would think would be somewhatcontroversial,right?

B.Biddington: Yes,thatisacontroversialstatement.Ofcourse,theeuphemismweuseisproximityoperations,onewayoranother.And,ofcourse,wedoproximityoperationseverytimewesupplytheSpaceStation.Theprofoundissuehereis,ofcourse,thatalmosteverythingwedoinspaceisdualuseorcanbebadgedasbeingdualuse.And,Ihavenodoubtatall—andIhavenoinsightintotheclassified world at the moment for these things—that there are nations, particularly the US,Russia,andChina, thatareessentiallydoingbad things toeachother.They’renotyetblowingthings up, because that’s to nobody’s interest, but, certainly, there’s very intense competitionwithinthespaceenvironment,Iwouldsuggest,simplyonthebasisoftheexamplesIgavetoyou.

Thebigthreenations(theUS,Russia,China)arereallytryingtounderstandvery,verycarefullywhateachof theothers isdoing,witha view tobeable to shut these thingsdownvery, veryquicklyintheeventofconflict.Ofcourse,thisiswhereyougettherelationship,then,betweenspaceoperationsandcyberoperations.

Interviewer: [Q2]Okay. You talkeda littlebit thisAustralianparadoxand someof the issues thatAustraliaencounterswithdeterminingwhereitinvestsitsmoney,so,I’mwondering,whatdoyousortofsee as Australia’s key ambition and interests with respect to space domain, andwhat sort ofactionhasthecountryhastakeninpursuitofthoseambitionanditsinterest?

B.Biddington: So,firstly,Australiaisaverylowandflatcountrywithlargeareasoflandthataremostlyemptyof people. This means that there are large areas of the landscape where radio frequencyinterferenceisminimal,andthat’swhy,forexample,wedoalotoftestingofreally interestingelectronicwarfare capabilities out of theWoomera test range,which is five timesbigger thanChinaLakejusttogiveyousomeperspective.


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SinceWorldWarII,Australiahasmadeacoupleofbigbetsinresearchnationally.Onehasbeenin immunology, and the other has been in astronomy, and especially in radio astronomy andradio astrophysics. Australia has used its landscape here, of course, because being quietelectronicallymakesAustraliaagreatplaceforradiotelescopes.So,Australiadoesthatverywell.AustraliacameoutofWorldWarIIwithalotofradarresearch,andthenoutofAustralia’sradioastronomycapabilities, cameWiFi,whichwasan invention15-20yearsagobut that’swhere itcamefrom.

Australia continues to invest, in particular, in radio astronomy and radio astrophysics at theresearchlevelandtheoperationallevel.

So, moving to the operations side of things. Australia, again, because of its geography, hostsimportantgroundstationsfortheUnitedStates,theEuropeanSpaceAgency,andothers.AndIthinkthatthatwillcontinue.Whilst itcertainly is thecasethat it isnowtechnicallypossibletosimplyhaveconstellationsofsatellitestalktoeachother,soyoudon’tnecessarilyneedgroundstationsinothercountries,Ithinkthatprudenceandredundancyandresiliencefornetworkswillgivesomeofthesegroundstation long lives.And,ofcourse, fortheverydeepspacemissions,like those that theNASAstationnearCanberra,Australiahelps tomanageyoustillneed threeground stations spreadaround theworld toensure that theprobe is always in viewofoneofthem.Becauseofthis,Australiawillcontinuetosupportgroundstations.

An interesting question for Australia and the United States is whether or notwewill start tosupportgroundstationsfromRussiaandChina.RussiaandChinaarecertainlyaskingiftheycanputgroundstationonAustralianterritory.Sofar, I thinkwehavesaid“no,”althoughthere isacommercial Swedishorganization, thathas a ground station inWesternAustralia, and there iscertainlyaChinesecommercial leaserunningthroughthatgroundstation.So,already,becauseofthewaytheworldworks,wehavecommunicationswithpeoplewhoarenotnecessarilyourbest friendsandallies—fromanational securityperspective—usingour territorycommercially,atleast.

So,ifInowgotospaceregulationandspacecontrol,therearenowfacilitiesatNorthwestCape,whichisatthewesternextremityoftheAustraliancontinent.Thereiscurrentlyaspaceradar,aC-Band radar, that has been brought from Antigua downrange from Cape Canaveral (CapeKennedy) toNorthwestCape.Therewillalsosoonbeacoupleofoperational space telescopesthat are being relocated to Northwest Cape as well. So, Australia is starting to build someground-basedspacesurveillancecapability,andIthinkAustraliawillcontinuetodothat.Thereisalsoacooperativeresearchcenter,whichisajoiningtogetherofuniversitiesandcompaniesandother research organizations based in Canberra, that is looking at how we can improvespacesituationalawareness,tracking,andprediction,particularlyofspacedebris.Thiswillthenneedtobefedintoanationaland,ultimately,analliedandeveninternationalsystemsothatwecanmakesenseofitforthewholeworld.

So,thesearethesortsofthingsthatIthinkAustraliawilldo.

In terms of its own space activities, Australia has nogovernment-ownedEarth observationsatellites at the moment. The only satellites with an Australian flag on the sidethatareregisteredwith the United Nations,arecommunications satellites, which arefrom theOptus company and also from the National BroadbandNetwork company, which isagovernment-ownedbusinessenterprise. In the current Australian defense white paper andinvestmentplan,thereisa$3-4billionprojectforspace-basedremotesensing—now,justwhattranslates to, who knows? It could be a combination of commercial leases to buy data thatsomebody else has already got, but, almost certainly, I think there will be some Australiancapabilityaswell—inotherwords,AustraliawillstarttorunitsownEarthobservationsatellites.

Interviewer: [Q2]Okay. So,whatdoes theAustralian commercial space industry look like in comparison tomaybesomeothercountries’commercialspaceindustries?


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B.Biddington: So, the Australian commercial space sector is fragmented. There is no center of gravity ofcompaniesthatself-identifyasbeingspacecompanies.Whatthereare,aresomecompaniesthatrun satellites as part of their telecommunications business, and they see themselves astelecommunicationsupplierswhohappentousesatellitesforpartoftheirbusiness.OntheEarthobservation side, we have a number of companies that sell or re-sell data that come fromsatellitesownedbyforeignentities,buttheydon’tidentifythemselvesasspacecompanies,theyidentifythemselvesasdatacompanies.So,partofthechallengethatwehaveinAustralia istosay to these organizations, "Look, you do need to start to at least think a little bit about thedependenciesthatthebreadandbutterthatyouputonyourtableshasonsecureandassuredaccesstospaceandtosatelliteservices.Andyouneedto invest inthinkingabouthowtohelpgovernment,andhowtohelpyourselves,ensurethatwemakethenearspaceenvironmentassafeandsecureaspossible.”

So,again,thisbringsyoubacktothequestionof,“Sowhatshouldasmalltomediumpowerdothatisrealisticandhelpful,anddoesnotfallintothetrapofover-stakingyourowncapabilitiesinsenseofimportanceandinfluenceinthesematters?”

Interviewer: [Q2]Sure. So,what is the relationship likebetween theAustraliangovernmentandAustralia’scommercial space entities?Arethere any key noticeable hurdles in the relationship that weshouldbeawareof?

B.Biddington: So, civil and commercial space inAustralia is the responsibility of theDepartmentof Industry,Innovation, and Science, and responsibility is buried in thedepartment at the level ofmiddle-ranking bureaucrats. There is no space agency in Australia. There is no central sort ofcoordinationoffice.There’snoidentifiableleaderingovernmentofAustralianspaceactivitiesata level that is recognizedbothnationally and globally (i.e., you cannot simply say, "This is theperson who looks after space in Australia"). The responsibility for space in Australia beendissipatedandspreadaroundmanydepartmentsovermanyyears.

Now,inpart,that'sbecause,atthenationalstrategylevel,thebigquestionsofspacehavebeenansweredbyAustralia’salliancerelationships,soAustraliahasn’treallyhadtothinkaboutspaceissuestoohardbecausepeopleintheUKor,sincethe1960s,theUS,havereallylookedafterthebigquestionsforAustralia.And,as Isaidbefore, ifspacegoestohell inahandbasket, there’snotmuchthatAustraliacandotomitigatethatotherthanpotentiallyprovideitsrealestatetohelp the United States. This has made Australia massively dependent on its allies here,particularlytheUS—Imean,$1ofevery$2spentintheworldonspaceisspentbytheUS,sothemerefactofthesizeofthisUSinvestmentisagoodreasontostickcloselytotheUnitedStates.Itjustmakesgoodsenseeconomicallyandstrategically.

So,Australiahascivilandcommercialspaceburied,fromapolicyperspective,inthemiddleofarelatively small government department, which does not wield huge influence and whoseministerisnotamemberoftheNationalSecurityCommitteeofCabinet.ThedefaultpositionoftheAustraliagovernment fora long timehasbeen, “how little canwe invest,”not “howmuchcanweinvest.”

With that said, of course, technology is changing this world rapidly, and small startups inAustraliaandelsewherearestartingtosay,"Well,guesswhat?Wecannowaffordsatellites.Wecan launch satellites. We can make money in a way that previously we could not," sogovernmentis having to react to that. Australia even has a company that I think has a 50/50chance of setting up a successful launch business in northern Australia, looking specifically atequatoriallaunchesintolowerEarthorbitsinthefirstinstance,whichisofcoursesomethingofgreatinterestfromasecurityperspectivetoAustralia.

Interviewer: [Q2 indirectly]Okay.So, totransition intothenextquestion Iwashopingtoask,whatarethemotivationsofnation-stateandnon-stateactorstocontesttheuseofspace intimesofpeace,instability,andconflict?


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B.Biddington: My view on this is veryold-fashioned. I see space as the preserved still of nation states. Andthat’s because launch is sodifficult, and, therefore,relatively easy to regulate by the nationstate. So, where nation-stateshave lost control really of the Internet—I know that there areargumentsaboutorganizationoftheInternetbut,ultimately,theInternetwillgowhereitgoes;however,that’snotthesamewithspace.It’svery,verydifficulttolaunchanythinginspace,andthat allows governments to maintain a very close reign on whatgetslaunched and by whomwithintheirownjurisdictions.That,tome,plustheadvantagesthatsatellitesgivenationstates,Ithinkimpliesthehighgroundofpeaceandwar.AndIthinkthatwillremaineverthus.

What that means is that despite the record pace of civil and commercial entrants into thedomainandincreasinglycomplicatedlandscapethatisemerging,ultimatelygovernmentswillbein the position to call the shots and prevent launches if they're not perceived to be in theirnational interests.So, thatmeansthatsmallandmediumpowersthatdon't launchthemselveswill be dependent on others to launch for them, and, ofcourse, that means that thosedependencieswillleadtovulnerabilities.

Ireallyseethefutureinspaceasonethat'srunbynationstatesactingintheirowninterests,andbecause of what satellites can and can’t do, they will make a very important contribution tonational security. To me, the question is how you build sufficient consensus,especiallybetweenthebig 3 space actors (theUnited States,Russia, andChina), and sufficienttrust andunderstandingso that everyone actually works to keep the space environmentaccessibletoall,ratherthancompletelytrashingit—aswehavestartedtodointhelowerEarthorbits. As such, how you begin to clean space up, tome, iswhere this challenge immediatelycomestothefore.AsmuchasIapplaudthepeoplewhosay,“Let’sgochasethedebrisandcatchit," the engineers and the technologists who are runningthese conversationssimply strugglewiththeconceptthatyourgarbagetruckismyspaceweapon—theydon’treallyunderstandoracknowledge the policy consequences of what they are saying. So, my plea is for a lot morepeopletostartthinkingaboutspacepolicyandtheissuesaroundpolicyandlawthanisthecaseatpresent.

Interviewer: [Q2 indirectly]Okay. Great. Thank you for going through all of those questionswithme.Wealwaysconcludethese interviewswithageneralquestion,which Iwillaskyouaswell. Is thereanythingthat Ihaven’taskedyouthat Ishouldhave,or isthereanyfinalpointthatyouwouldliketoconcludewith?

B.Biddington: Idon’tthinkso.Though,wehaven’ttalkedaboutAustralia’sregionortheregion’saspirations,soIwilljustmakeaquickcommentonthat.InAustralia,certainly,wehavepeoplewhocriticizetheAustralian government for not having a spaceagency,and then they point to the fact thatIndonesia,Singapore,Malaysia,andNewZealandallhavespaceagencies,andthentheyusethatto say that Australia is so far behind because it doesn’t have a space agency.However, thesepeoplefailtounderstandtwocriticalpoints.First,theyfailtocomprehendhowdeeplyinvolvedinspaceAustraliaisandhasbeensincethe1940sthroughitsalliancerelationships.Second,theyfailtounderstandthatAustralia,throughcivilprograms,hasbeenusingspace-deriveddatasincethe1960s.Forexample,GeoscienceAustralia(whichisliketheGeologicalSurveyintheUS),theBureauofMeteorology(whichissortoflikeNOAAintheUS),andCSIRO(whichisAustralia’scivilresearchorganization)haveallbeenusingspace-deriveddatasincethe1960s—theyknowdata,theycontributetoit,etc.Australiadoesverygoodstuffinprocessing,butitjusthasn’thadtherequirements until relevantly recently to start to invest in its own satellites—though, there isnowmoney in the defense budget to begin to change that, and some of that money will beusedfordualuseactivities.

So,whatI’mtryingtosayisthatAustralianeedstohaveamoresophisticatedconversationthanwhatmanypeoplearepreparedtoconcede,andthisgetsbacktothepointImadeearlieraboutthechallengeofconstructingacoherentnarrativetoacountryfullofparadoxeswhenitcomestospaceactivities.


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DuncanBlakeLawandStrategyConsultant(InternationalAerospaceLawandPolicyGroup)

3July2017WRITTENRESPONSEIntroduction

Ihavebeenaskedtocontribute toaStrategicMulti-LayerAssessment (SMA)SpaceProject requestedbyUSAirForce Space Command and undertaken by Joint Staff of the US Department of Defense (DoD). I have beenspecificallyasked:

• HowdoesAustraliaconceiveofspaceoperationsformilitaryandcommercialpurposes?• HowdoesAustraliaapproachspaceoperationsandservices?• IsthereanydifferenceinhowAustraliancommercialventuresconsidersecurityduringpeace,crisisand

conflict?

Ihavealsobeeninvited,onthebasisofmyexpertise,toansweranyoftheotherkeyquestionsofinterest,aslistedinthedocumenttitled,“Open-sourceSMASpace:QuestionsforOutreachtoAcademia,IndustryandThinkTanks”,whichwasattachedtotheemailrequest.

Myanswersbelowarelimitedtotheareasofmyexpertise.Forthispurpose,Iwillincludeashortbiographyintheemailreplythatincludesthisdocument.Insummarythough,Ihavebeenalegalofficer(or‘JudgeAdvocate’inUSterms)intheRoyalAustralianAirForcefor22yearsuntilJanuarythisyear(2017)andhavepredominantlyfocusedon laws applicable tomilitary operations at the tactical, operational and strategic level (whole of Defence andwholeofgovernment)athomeandonmultipledeploymentstoareasofconflict.Since2009myfocushasbeenonthelawapplicabletomilitaryusesofspace.Ihavechairedaninter-departmentalworkinggrouponstrategicspacelawacrossAustraliangovernmentandIhavechairedaninternationalworkinggrouponstrategicspacelawamongallies in the Combined Space Operations (CSpO) initiative. In 2015 and 2016 I managed the development of afuturejointoperatingconceptformilitaryuseofspaceacrosstheAustralianDepartmentofDefence,lookingoutapproximately15years(anon-legalposition).GiventherelativelysmallsizeoftheAustralianDefenceForce,theAustralianeconomyandpopulation,anyfuturestrategyinAustraliaformilitaryuseofspacemustencompasstheneedsandcapacityofthenationasawhole inrespectofouterspaceandthereforetheresearch implicit inthedevelopmentofthisoperationalconceptinvolvedaconsiderableamountofliaisonwithindustry.Inrespectoflawapplicabletoouterspace,amongotherthings,relevantly,IinitiatedandamnowtheDeputyEditor-in-Chieffortheproject to draft a Manual on International Law Applicable to Military uses of Outer Space (‘MILAMOS’, seewww.mcgill.ca/milamos). This is a global, civil society effort to clarify the application of the laws ofwar to thespacedomainforthebenefitofallnations,priortotheoutbreakofanyhostilitiesinvolvingouterspace.Therefore,inshort,myareaofexpertisemaybedescribedasthefusionof lawandstrategyinrespectoftheuseofspace,especiallyinamilitarycontext.

Givenmyexpertise, I amwell placed to answer questions under theheading, “Space Law&Norms” and somequestionsunder theheading “National Security& Space”, aswell as the specifiedquestionsunder theheading“Ally,Partner&AdversaryUseofSpace”.Theemailrequestsought1to3pages inresponsetoeachquestion. Ihave set out my response to cover many of the questions under the headings that I’ve listed above and I’vehighlightedtext tomakethe link toparticularquestionsmoreobvious.While Iamwellplacedtoprovidebroadcommentsaboutthecommercialspacesector inAustralia,especiallyas itpertainstomilitaryuseofspace, Iamnotwell placed to provide in-depth comment on the sector. I can provide points of contact for this purpose ifnecessary.

Understanding“victory”inthespacedomain

The documents that were provided for this SMA Space Project allude to, but do not directly address, afoundational issue thatmust be considered before a coherent strategy for futuremilitary use of space can beconcluded.Thatfoundationalissueis:


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Why?

Whydoes theUSgovernmentneed to“regain the initiative in the spacedomaine.g.,byoutpacingadversaries’developmentanddeploymentofspacecapabilities;countering intentoreffortstodenyUSfreedomofaction inthisvitalarea.”?Thispreliminaryquestionisimpliedinthe5x8documentwhereitrequeststhatwriters“Identifytherewardsandrisksofapolicythatviewsspaceasajointwarfightingdomain.”

Therationaleforbeingpreparedtofightandwininthespacedomaincannotbeself-referential–itisnotanendinitself.Itbegsaquestion:WhatisitthatdominanceofthespacedomainofferstheUS(anditsallies)asawhole,that cannot be fully achieved by other means? At this point it is important to distinguish between the spacedomainandterrestrialdomainsandtoadaptourunderstandingofwin/lossorvictory/defeattothenatureofthedomain.Itisnotpossibletoseizeandholdgroundasamilitaryforcewouldonland.Intheforeseeablefarfuture,it is conceivable thatamilitary forcemaybe sentbeyondEarth to seizeandholdpartsof theMoonandothercelestial bodies (leaving aside, for the moment, the legal framework applicable to this scenario) – but that isseveraldecadesaway.Earthorbitsandbeyondareverydifferent tosea linesofcommunicationandair linesofcommunication – although there are similarities. In the near andmedium-term future, the benefit of space isdefinedbyreferencetotheindirectbenefitthatspaceservicesprovideonEarth,notbyreferencetospaceitself.Thatis,win/lossorvictory/defeatinrespectofthespacedomainshouldbedefinedbyreferencetothecapacitytoassureuninterruptedaccesstospaceservices,whilebeingabletodenythebenefitstoanadversary.Thechallengeis to pursue this objectivewithout actions or narrative thatwould compel potential adversaries to develop thecapabilitytocompetewithUSeffortstowardsassuredaccess.

This is reflected in theguidingprinciple forAustralianmilitaryuseofspace– that is, support forastable, rules-based, global order for outer space (see successive AustralianDefenceWhite Papers). Australia recognises andvaluesthebenefitsthatspaceservices(mostofthemfromUSsources)providetousasanationandtoourmilitaryforces. Our focus is on preserving those benefits and it would not make sense to develop the capability todominateouter spacebeyondwhat is necessary to assure a stable, rules-based, global order. Furthermore, theemphasisisonassuredaccess,inthefirstinstance,throughstabilityandthrough,ideally,anorderthatisbasedonrulesand rules thatareacceptedglobally.Thisappeal touniversally-accepted rules is intended toavoidactionsand narrative that would compel potential adversaries to develop the capability to compete with US effortstowardsassuredaccess.Anarmsraceinouterspaceismorelikelytobecounter-productivetoassuredaccesstospace,whereas preparing to ‘fight’ the strategic narrative (onwhich I expand below) is amore certain path to‘victory’.

Anappealtorulesshouldnotberegardedasnaïveandineffectual–theruleframeworkapplicabletoouterspaceincludes rules that allows a State, in appropriate circumstances, to respond to breaches of the rules by otherStates, to take action to defend itself (andothers) in outer space and to give effect toUnitedNations SecurityCouncil resolutions. Thus, preparing to ‘fight’ the strategic narrative implies developing and maintainingcapabilities thatwould allow theUS (with allies) to defend its assured access to space and to secure access tospace in supportofUnitedNations sanctionedoperations.Furthermore,anappeal touniversally-accepted ruleshastheeffectofcooptingalliestothecauseoftheUnitedStates(therebybeingabletoformpowerfulcoalitionsinthe event of hostilities) and the effect of alienating those who seek to define win/loss or victory/defeat byreferencetomorejingoistic,expansionistconcepts.Inadditiontothelinkstocapability,inadditiontothefightforthestrategicnarrativeandinadditiontotheformationofcoalitionswithalliesandthealienationofothers,theafavourable rules-basedorderhasotherbenefits that Idiscussbelowunder theheading, ‘’Winning’ thestrategicnarrative’.

The‘battleforlegitimacy’or‘fightforthestrategicnarrative’hasalreadybegun.FromanAustralianperspective,the continuing global leadership of the United States remains the bestmeans to ensure a stable, rules-based,globalorderforouterspace. It is imperativethattheUnitedStatesdoesnotcede leadership inthispreparatorybattle (for legitimacy) to seemingly positive initiatives by Russia and China such as the draft Prevention of thePlacementofWeaponsTreaty(PPWT)andNoFirstPlacement(NFP)resolution.Thefoundationsthataresetnow,in a time of apparent peace, will be the foundations onwhich the battle for legitimacy is fought at a time ofhostilities.


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The reference to spaceasa ‘warfightingdomain’ isuseful internallywithin themilitary forcesof theUSand itsallies tomark a paradigm-shift in thinking about the nature of the domain. It implies operationalization of thedomainincluding,forexample,SpaceOperationsCentresthatarepartoftheoverallweaponsystem,inthesameway that an Air Operations Centre is part of air weapons systems. The phrase is unhelpful externally though,because it implies a desire on the part of theUS (and its allies) for conquest over the space domain. A betterexternalmessagewouldbetoemphasiseUSacceptancethat,asasuperpower,itcanmakeagreatercontributionandbearsagreaterburdenthanothersinthesharedresponsibilityforastable,rules-based,globalorderforouterspace.

Characteristicsofstable,rules-based,globalorderforouterspace

What would a stable, rules-based, global order for outer space look like? In parallel with the alliteration thatdescribes the current strategic challenges in the space domain (congested, competitive and contested), analliterationdescribesthecharacteristicsofastable,rules-based,globalorderforouterspace:regulated,resilient,redundantandrepercussive.

Regulated

Therearefourkeyelementsofaregulatedspacedomain.

CLARITY.First,theremustbeclarityinthenormsofresponsiblebehaviour.

Thediscussionaboutthosenormstendstobeatarelatively‘macro’level.TheOuterSpaceTreaty(OST),inspiteofitsmanybenefits, isexpressed inbroadstatementsofprincipleandeventhe lawsofwararegeneric–becausethey apply in a broad range of circumstances. So,we talk about how ‘scale’ and ‘gravity’ and other things areimportant indiciaofan ‘armedattack’ for thepurposesof the lawsofwar…but theoperatorswantdetail. Forexample,whatarethedimensionsofazonearoundasatelliteandexactlywhataretheconsequencesifthelineiscrossed.Lawyersworkingwithoperatorswanttoprovidesuchclarity,butaunilateralandarbitrarypluckislikelytobedisruptiveofspacesecurity,notasteptowardsabetterregulatedspacedomain.

Rather than a unilateral and arbitrary pluck, there needs to be some global consensus around such norms.However, in a climate of heightened global strategic tensions, relative insularity, apprehension and paranoia,consensusseemsimpossible.TheMILAMOSProject(www.mcgill.ca/milamos)takestheconsensus-buildingoutofthatclimatebyinsistingthatexpertsparticipateinapersonalcapacity,notarepresentativecapacityandfocusonwhatthelawis,notonwhatoneorotherStatemightwantittobe.ButtheMILAMOSProjectisonlyasmallpartof the solution.Weneed todevelopmoredetailed technical solutionsand specific industry standards–aroundthingslikespacedebris,spacetrafficmanagementandelectromagneticinterference.

Technical standards can have a really positive strategic impact – even though the extent of their strategicsignificancemaynotbeimmediatelyapparent.Regulationcanbevaluableeveninrespectofdelinquentactorsinouterspace–becauseifmostactorscomplywiththeregulation,itbecomeseasiertofilteroutaberrantbehaviourandcallitoutforwhatitis.Bearinmindthatonlythemostovertaspectsofmilitaryactivitiesinvolveexplosions–the vast majority of military activities, even in the context of hostilities and build-up of tension leading tohostilities,arenotsoobvious.

Thusthereisasymbioticrelationshipbetweenlawsofwar,forexample,andthepotentialregulatoryoutcomesofthe COPUOS guidelines on the long-term sustainability of space. (Among other initiatives, I amworkingwith agroupofAustraliancompaniestodevelopmulti-disciplinary(technological,economicandregulatory)approachestoSpaceTrafficManagementandwewouldbekeentocontributetoefforts intheUSDoDorelsewhere inthisregard).

AWARENESS.Secondly, theremustalsobeawareness in respectof regulatory standards.COPUOSandnationalspaceagenciesandregulatorswouldplayalargepartinthat.Awarenessalsoextendstotheanticipatedeffectsofspaceactivities.Continuing research is essential, for example to improveorbital predictions, thereby facilitatingregulatorycompliance in situationsanalogous to the2009collisionofaKosmosandan Iridiumsatellite.Also, ifhostilitiesdospreadtothespacedomain,greaterunderstandingoforbitaldynamicshelpstominimisecollateraldamage.


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TRANSPARENCY.Thirdly,theconversationshouldgobothways–fromregulatorstoindustryandfromindustrytoregulators. Transparency is essential. It may seem at odds with a desire to maintain the technological edge,maximise profit from intellectual property and protect national security. Yet, it is often possible to providesufficientdetailtodemonstratethatacapability iswell-adaptedforabenignpurpose,but ill-adaptedforhostilepurposes.

ATTRIBUTION.Finally,weneedtoimprovetheabilitytoattributeactivitytoaspaceactor.Thisextendsnotonlytoidentifyingorpredictingwherethingswere,areorwillbeinouterspace,butalsowhattheyweredoing,includingwhatfrequencytheywereusing.Modellingofeffectsinouterspacealsoofferssignificantnationalsecurityvalueindistinguishingdeliberatefromnaturalsourcesofinterference.

Resilient

Resilience involves making space infrastructure more protected and more recoverable in the event of hostileinterferencewith it. (NB,myuseof theterm‘resilience’ Inotnecessarilycoincidentwiththeuseof theterm inOffice of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for HomelandDefense andGlobal Security, Space DomainMission

Assurance: A Resilience Taxonomy, White Paper (September 2015) online: Federation of American Scientists<https://fas.org/man/eprint/resilience.pdf>).Spaceinfrastructurewhichismoreprotectedandmorerecoverableisalessattractivetarget.Also,spaceinfrastructurethatiswell-protectedandhighlyrecoverableislesslikelytobeavalidtargetunderthelawsofwar.

PROTECTION.Many enterprises are already looking at new ways to protect space assets by ‘hardening’ themagainstkineticeffectsof largemasses,shieldingthemagainst radiationandsecuring themagainstcorruptionordisruption of data. Space assets can also be made more manoeuvrable, to avoid conjunctions. They couldconceivably be given on-board defensive capabilities, although theweight cost for an effective systemmay beprohibitive.Itismorelikelythatactivedefensivesystemswouldbeoff-board.Onegoodexample,isaproposalforactivedebrismanagement,usinga lasertomoveapieceofspacedebrisbeforeapredictedconjunctionoccurs.Therearemanylegalcomplexitieswithsuchacapability,butthebiggestpolicyandpotentiallegalissueisthatitraises the spectre of offensive capabilities and an arms race in outer space. This is also an example of wheretransparency could be a valuable commodity for the US and its allies, especially if it could be shown that thesystemiswell-adaptedforthebenignuseandill-adaptedforhostileuse.

Space objects, or elements of them, also gain some protection by being concealed. Declining to register spaceobjectsand launching them in secrecy isonemeans toachieve thisandenterprises could conceivably findnewways tomake satellitesmoredifficult to findand to track.However, this undermines spaceas awell-regulateddomain.Also,theuseandmodeofoperationofacomponent(eg,hostedpayload),satelliteorconstellationcouldbe obscured, by technical or other means. The advent of cubesats, that can be adapted to many differentpurposes, including functioning as a formation or constellation of satellites,makes this easier. A cubesat couldevenbedeployedasadecoy,toattractunwantedhostileattention,ratherthantherealcapability.Again,though,opacitydoeslittletobuildtrustandconfidenceandpromoteawell-regulateddomain.Inthecontextofhostilities,asatelliteusedformilitarypurposes,butposingasacommercialsatellite,isperfidiousinnatureandtheoperatorsmaybeculpableofawarcrime.

Dualuseinfrastructure(usedforbothmilitaryandnon-militarypurposes)iscommonplaceterrestrially,asit is inouterspaceandthereisnothingunlawfulaboutthat.However,oneadvantageofintegratingmilitarypayloadsorspaceserviceswithincommercialspaceinfrastructure,thatissometimesproffered,isthatitcreatescomplexity–ambiguitythatmakesattributionandtargetingmoredifficult(becausetargetingrisksinvolvingotherwiseneutralthird-parties). As amatter of policy and reputation, hiding behind the coat-tails of commercial and civil spaceenterprisesdemotesthemilitarytothelevelofinsurgentsthathideamongthecivilianpopulationanddeliberatelyusingthemasashieldinthecontextofhostilitiescouldconceivablybeawarcrime.

Protection also links to awareness and attribution. Understandingwhat is happening in the space domain andbeing able to attribute action to hostile or natural causes increases the protection of the system. This can beamplifiedifawarenessandattributionisshared.


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RECOVERABILITY. There aremanyways of improving the recoverability of satellites and constellations and thesystemsofwhich theyare apart, andmanyenterprises are already contributing to these.Developing satellitescapable of self-diagnosis and repair is a good example. Another good example is satellites with ‘plug n play’componentsandcomponentsthatcanbeflexiblyre-usedandre-purposed,especially inconjunctionwithanon-orbitservicingcapability.On-orbitservicingcapabilitiescouldbeused,though,forhostilepurposes–tointerferewithanon-cooperatingsatellites.

Asopposedtobig,multi-purposesatellites,small,single-purposesatellitescouldbepositionedmuchmorerapidlyand in response tooperational needs. The storageof small satellites capableofmultiplepurposeswith a slightconfigurationchangeandthepossibilityofpositioningofmultiplesatelliteswiththesamepurposealloffergreatoptions for recoverability.Some launchserviceprovidersarenowforeshadowingaregularscheduleof launches(asoftenasweekly)toprovideflexibilityandcertainty.Amanoeuvrable,re-usespacevehicle,liketheUSAFX-37Boffersthepossibilityofrapidpositioningofmultiple,smallsatellites.However,duetoopacityarounditsmission,itmayhavedonemoretoaddtothestrategicchallengesinthespacedomain,ratherthanreducethem,duetofearsofitshostilepurpose.

Constellationsofsatellitesalsoofferrecoverability ina limitedsense–theconstellationasawholecontinuestooperate in spiteof the lossof a single satellite and suffersonly continuing ‘graceful degradation’ in the faceoffurtherlosses.

A decision to rely on the space infrastructure of others is very recoverable, as long as other providers of theservicescanbefullyaccessedintheeventthattheoriginalproviderisnolongerabletoprovidetheservices,andso longasthecustomer iswillingtoacceptthisdependenceonacapabilityoutside itscontrol.Brokersofspaceservicesthereforefacilitatetheresilienceofthespacedomain.

Redundant

In the event of the failure of protection and recoverability of space infrastructure in response to interference,ideally there would be alternative systems to supplement the space infrastructure, and/or means of rapidreconstitutionof the space infrastructure. This involves not only technological development, but also economicdevelopment–thatis,aglobalspaceindustryinwhichthereisquick,easy,competitiveaccesstoalternativespaceservices. Redundancy reduces strategic challenges in the space domain by reducing the criticality of any onecomponent. In the context of hostilities, this reduces the justification for States to respond with force to adeliberateattack.

In some cases, an alternative service could be provided terrestrially. A good example is the development ofterrestrially-based navigation systems that may one day be fully viable alternatives to the Global PositioningSystem. There is nothing about the development of terrestrial alternatives that necessarily contributes to theexistingstrategicchallenges.

Thesame isnot trueofnear spacealternatives.Near spaceplatforms to facilitatecommunications,positioning,navigationandremotesensinghaveallbeendeveloped,at leastexperimentally.Ontheonehand, theyprovideredundancyforspaceinfrastructureandreducethestrategicimpetustotargetspaceinfrastructure.Ontheotherhand, their development is potentially disruptive to stability because they represent a more direct threat tonationalsecurityofothernations.Whiletherearenonationalbordersinouterspace,thereareinairspace.Alegaldelimitationbetweenairspaceandouterspacestilldoesnotexist.Intheory,anearspaceobjectcouldbe‘flown’overtheterritoryofanotherStatewithoutviolatingthesovereigntyoftheotherState.Thedevelopmentofnearspace capabilities could motivate States to finally settle this question of delimitation, which would be a goodoutcomeintermsofabetterregulatedspacedomain.Intheinterim,though,uncertaintyaboutthelegalstatusofnear space would be likely to contribute to strategic challenges. On balance, the development of near spacealternatives to space-based systemswould offer the space domainmore redundancy andmay galvanise Statesbehindoneaspectofabetterregulatoryregimeforouterspace.

Repercussive

Thestrategicchallengesinthespacedomainwillremainiftherearenoconsequencesforirresponsiblebehaviourin outer space. Consequences for such behaviour by a non-State actor can be imposed domestically, by legal


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process within the courts (for breaches of the domestic regulatory framework), and by policy decisions (for abroader range of behaviour).Where the breach is committed by a State itself, orwith the tacit support of theState,whatarethemeanstoimposeconsequencesontheState?

A proper understanding of the idea of imposing repercussions on a State that acts irresponsibly in outer spaceneedstostartwithanunderstandingof thestrategic interestsofaState. ‘Strategy’ refers todecisionsaimedatoptimising the capabilities, structure and preparedness of a State in order to pursue national objectives andprotect itsnational interests. Inthemilitarycontext, ‘strategy’focusesonthecapacitytouseofforcetoprotectnational interestsandpursuenationalobjectives,althoughthis isoftena ‘blunt instrument’andotherwaysandmeans(suchasdiplomacy,economicsandthecontrolofinformation)aregenerallypreferred.

ControlofresourcesinvariablyliesattheheartofStates’nationalinterestsandobjectives.However,especiallyasmanyglobalresourcesapproachdepletionthiscentury,itdoesnotseempossibleforoneStatetoaccommodateanother State’s interests in control of the same resources. Their interests are indivisible. Consider the currentdisputesofoil-richmaritimeareasintheEastChinaSeaandSouthChinaSea.

InternationalrelationsscholarscitetwodominantfactorsthatunderminetheabilityofStatestoreachadétenteinsuch situations. First,withoutgood informationabout the capabilities,preparedness, interestsand strategiesofoneanother,Statesarepronetostrategicmiscalculation.Thatis,relationsbetweentheStatesarecharacterisedby‘informationasymmetry’.Secondly,intheabsenceofaneffectivesetofprinciplesornorms,neitherStatecanmake ‘credible commitments’ to hold to such principles or norms. In the space domain, these factors areexacerbated,becausespace is somuch ‘outof sight,outofmind’.That is, it isdifficult togetgood informationaboutwhatishappeningupthere,andwithoutgoodinformationandsomeconsciousnessofthepotentialimpactonoureverydaylives,itisdifficulttoestablishaneffectivesetofprinciplesandnorms.Thesituationisparticularlyunstableincircumstancesofapotentialpowertransition,whentheriseofoneStatethreatensthedominanceofanother(suchastheriseofChina,relativetotheUS).

“Winning”thestrategicnarrative

An effective normative framework (stable, rules-based, global order) for outer space influences States’assessments of whether the use of force and certain capabilities are the bestmeans to protect their nationalinterests and pursue their national objectives. An effective normative framework reduces the informationasymmetry between States and facilitates credible commitments. To be effective, though, a victim Statewouldneedtobeputinthesituationwhereitcanassertastrategicnarrativeintermssimilartowhatfollows.

1. Weknowyoudidit(attribution)2. Wecandemonstratetothesatisfactionoftheinternationalcommunitythatyoudidit(verifiability)3. Thereisanormativeframeworkcoveringirresponsiblebehaviourinouterspace(normativeframework)4. Thenormativeframeworkiswidelyacceptedthroughouttheworld(legitimacy)5. It clearly applies to you in these circumstances and you clearly breached the normative framework

(clarity)6. Wehavethecapabilitytoimposeconsequences(capability)7. Theconsequenceswillhaveasubstantialeffectonyou(effectiveness)8. Imposingthoseconsequenceswillnothaveanunacceptableadverseeffectonus(minimumrecoil)

ATTRIBUTION. Has already been discussed above. Australia is keen to contribute to attribution throughterrestrially-basedsensorsinAustraliaforSpaceSituationalAwareness.ThisisanicheareawhereAustraliaseesanopportunitytocontributegeography,skills,internationalrelationsandotherthingsasahigh-valuetradeforaccesstootherthings.

VERIFIABILITY. The step beyond attribution is verifiability. Even if one, or a small number of States, haveinformationattributingirresponsiblebehaviourtoanotherState,thatotherStatecouldstillactwithimpunityifitthoughtthattherewasnoprospectthatthefirstState(s)couldusethatinformationtogalvanisetheinternationalcommunityagainstit.Addvaluetodomainawarenessbydevelopingforensicprocessestoverifiablyestablishthenature and authorship of deliberate actions in outer space. The Satellite Sentinel project is an example of anorganisation thinking this way in respect of actions observed terrestrially (potential war crimes) from remote


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sensing satellites.Evidencederived fromsatelliteshasalreadybeenused in supportofenvironmental litigation.The same thinking needs to be applied, looking upwards (for ground-based sensors) and outwards (for space-basedsensors).Asthoseexamplesdemonstrate,thechallengeliesnotsomuchinthemeansofverification(therearemanysensorsthatcouldbeusedforverificationpurposes),butintheacceptanceofthemeansofverification.This is closely linked to Clarity and Awareness above, especially the role of technical standards as ameans offiltering or ‘parsing’ the space domain to distinguish normal behaviour from aberrant behaviour. That is, thedevelopmentof industrytechnicalstandardsshouldbestronglyencouragedbecauseitwillhelpwithverificationandleadtomoreacceptanceofthemeansofverification.

NORMATIVEFRAMEWORK.TheOSTandotherspace-specifictreatiescontainfewrulesthatovertlycovermilitaryusesofspace.Thishasledsomecommentators, includingofficialsatthehighestlevelsofgovernmentintheUS,China,Russiaandelsewhere,tocommentthatthespacedomainisrelativelyunder-regulated–comparingouterspacetotheWildWest.Onthecontrary,thereisacomprehensivelegalframeworkapplicabletomilitaryusesofouterspaceeveninthecontextofhostilitiesandthebuild-upoftensionleadingtohostilities.EventhoughtheOSTandother space-specific instrumentsareexpressed inbroadstatementsofprinciple, theyarenot theonly lawsapplicabletothespacedomain.AtfirstglanceitmaynotbeapparentwhythedraftersoftheOST,morethan50yearsago,feltitnecessarytoexpresslyincludeastatementconfirmingthattheuseandexplorationofouterspaceis subject to the broad body of international law, not just the treaty itself. The drafters covered somemilitaryactivities,buttheyanticipatedthattheycouldnotforeseeeveryfutureaspectoftheexplorationanduseofouterspace–thusthespecific‘drawing-in’ofthebroadbodyofinternationallaw.

Thelawsapplicabletohostilitiesandthebuild-upoftensionleadingtohostilitieshavecontinuedtodevelopoverthelast50years, includingthroughprojectsinotherdomains,similartotheMILAMOSProject–suchastheSanRemoManualonInternationalLawApplicabletoArmedConflictatSea,theHarvardManualonInternationalLaw

Applicable toAirandMissileWarfare and theTallinnManualon International LawApplicable toCyberWarfare(versions1.0and2.0).Thosemanualshavehadasignificantimpactinthetargetaudience–militarycommandersandtheirlegaladvisors–aswellasintribunals,policycircles,themediaandinacademiccommentary.Thelawsofwar enjoy broad acceptance globally and breaches of those laws undermines the legitimacy of the responsibleState or non-State actor and tends to galvanisethe international community against them.Consider,forexample,theinternationalreactiontotheallegeduseofchemicalweaponsbySyria.Condemnation of the use of chemical weaponsbyanyonehasbeennearuniversal,eventhoughattributiontoSyriaoranon-Stateactorremainsachallenge,asitisinthespacedomain.

Inadditiontothechallengeofattribution,thereis also the challenge of clarity. The laws ofwarundoubtedly do apply to the space domain –althoughthisspecifictopicwillbecoveredintheMILAMOS Manual. However, it is not yet clearjusthowthecomprehensive frameworkof rulesontheconductofhostilitiesandthebuild-upoftensionleadingtohostilities,appliestospace.

Theapparentlackofclarityaboutthelegalframeworkapplicabletomilitaryusesofouterspacehasledtosomestrategicparalysisamongleaders inwargamessuchastheSchrieverseries. Intheabsenceofclarity, leadersareleftwithout thenormal levelof guidanceaboutwhat ispermissibleandwhat isnot–or fromamore strategicperspective,whatcourseofactionaremorelikelytogalvaniseacoalitionandalienatetheenemy,asopposedtocourseofactionthataremorelikelytosplitacoalitionandprovidetheadversarywiththeopportunitytocreateafavourablestrategicnarrative.Theissue,though,isnotalackofclarityaboutwhatlawapplies,butabouthowitapplies. Thus, the legal concepts that apply in the spectrum from peace to armed conflict can be clearlyrepresentedgraphicallyasitisbelow.Howthoseconcepts‘map’toouterspaceiswherethedifficultyarises.


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TheMILAMOSProjectinvolvesmorethan40globally-acknowledgedlegalexperts,withassistancefromtechnicalexperts of a similar calibre, drafting succinct rule statements of the application of the law ofwar to the spacedomain,withcommentariesaccompanyingeach rule,explaining thebasis for the ruleandgivingexamples.Theexpertscomefromallovertheworld, includingChina,Russia,theUnitedStates,Japan,Germany,India,Canada,Australiaandmanymore.Eventhoughsomecomefromgovernmentbackgrounds,asIdo,weallparticipateinapersonalcapacityandweexpressourpersonalopinionsonwhatwebelievethelawactuallyis,asopposedtowhatanyparticularStatemightlikeittobe.ThiswillgivethemanualauniversalityamongitstargetaudienceandhelptheUSanditsalliesinanapproachtospacestrategythatemphasisesastable,rules-based,globalorder.

NotwithstandingthattheOST‘draws-in’otherbodiesoflaw,suchasthelawsofwar,theremaystillbeaneedtosupplementtheOST.Thisispartlybecausetherearestill‘gaps’inthelegalframeworknotcoveredbyeitherthebroadprinciplesintheOSTandotherspace-specifictreatiesorthelawsofwarandpartlybecausetheUSanditsalliesmaywishtomodifyhowthelawsofwarapplytospace.Examplesinclude:

• thetreatmentofdual-useobjectsinouterspace• theestablishmentofprotectivezonesaroundsatellites(byanalogytothesafetyzonesestablishedaround

offshoreplatformsundermaritimelaws,orAirDefenceIdentificationZonesunderairlaw)• thestatusofmilitaryastronautsintimesofhostilities• protectionofspecificcategoriesofspaceobjects(suchassatellitesusedindisasterrelieforas‘National

TechnicalMeansofVerificationorformissilewarning)• protectionofspaceobjectandsitesontheMoonandothercelestialbodiesofculturalheritage• dutiesofneutralStateswithrespecttoaccesstotheirspaceobjectsintimesofconflict

The International Astronautical Congress (IAC) in late September this year will occur just before the 50thanniversaryoftheentryintoforceoftheOST.ThreedayspriortotheIACtheSpaceGenerationCongress(SGC)–initiatedontherequestofStatesthroughCOPUOStorepresenttheinterestsofthenextgenerationinouterspace– will conduct a Working Group of young delegates from across the globe, to develop and propose a set ofsupplementaryprotocolstotheOST,toadaptglobalspacegovernancetotheneedsofthenext50years.Whereasa State may have difficulty in gathering support from the international community through official lines toundertakesuchaneffort,theSGC,representingthenextgeneration,hasamoralmandatetoinitiateandproposesuchasetofsupplementaryprotocolsandthese,inturn,couldformthegenesisofformal,internationalefforts.IsetupthisinitiativeandammentoringthegroupofyoungprofessionalswhoorganisingandleadingtheWorkingGroup.WewouldbekeentoworkwithofficialsintheUSDoDorelsewhereinrespectofthisinitiativeandfuture,relatedsteps.

LEGITIMACY. There is often cynicism aboutwhether there are any effective consequences in international law.DomesticcourtscanexertjurisdictionoverotherStatesonlyinverylimitedandindirectways.Ittakesalongtimeforamattertoberesolved inthe InternationalCourtofJusticeandother internationalcivil tribunals,andoftenoneormoreoftheStatesatfaultdonotaccepttheoutcome,foravarietyofreasons.TheInternationalCriminalCourtwouldhavelimitedjurisdictionoveractivitiessolelywitheffectsinouterspace,because‘satelliteshavenomothers’–therearefewhumanbeingsinouterspaceandthereforemostofthewarcrimesoverwhichtheICChas jurisdiction arenot applicable (although somewar crimes are conceivable). For these reasons, disputes areusuallysettleddiplomaticallyorpolitically.

Nevertheless,itiseasytounderstatetheimpactthatsimpleshamingcanhave.Itcanaffectdomesticsupportandstart a ground-swell of oppositiononTwitter. It canundermineefforts to achievea certainoutcome in theUNSecurityCouncil(suchasafavourableresolution),orundermineeffortstogarnersupportforyourproposalsinavarietyofother fora. It couldalienateaStateasapariah,making itdifficult to formamilitarycoalition.SuchaStatecouldfindforeignStatesclosed–unwillingtohostmilitaryforcesontheirterritoryandunwillingtobuyorsellmilitaryequipment.

Incontrast,thevictimStatesandotherStatesseekingtopreventtheirresponsiblebehaviourmayfinditeasytomaintain domestic support on Twitter and elsewhere; theymight find that other Stateswelcome themwarmlywhentheyseekhostbases;otherStateswillbewillingto jointheircoalitionandprovidethemwithequipment;


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andtheywillhavemoresuccessseekingtheUN(orother)resolutionthattheyseek.Thereissignificantpowerinlegitimacy.

Inthiscontext,legitimacyreferstowideacceptanceofthenormativeframework.Thispartlydependsoneffectiveawareness-raising.Acceptanceismorethanjustawareness,though.Itrequiresconsultationandadvocacyandanadequateforumforconsultation,advocacyandawareness-raising.TheprocessfordevelopmentoftheMILAMOSManualandprocessesthatmightbeassociatedwiththedevelopmentofsupplementtotheOSTarebothhelpfulin this regard.TheUSand itsalliesshouldconsidersponsoringa rangeofother international initiatives thatarelikelytogenerateawarenessandacceptanceofthelawsapplicabletomilitaryusesofouterspace.

CLARITY.Goodtechnicalfoundationstothenormativeframeworkensurethatitisclearandmanifestlyapplicableto a comprehensive range of foreseeable, irresponsible behaviour. Technical Experts are integral to thedevelopmentoftheMILAMOSProjectandshouldalsobeanintegralpartofanyotherinitiatives.

CAPABILITY.TheCharteroftheUnitedNationsandgeneralinternationalnormsrequirethatStatesshouldattempttosettledisputesbypeacefulmeansinthefirst instance.However,diplomatic,economicandothernon-forcefulmeansofimposingconsequencesonanoffenderStateareindirectandoftentaketimeto‘bite’–totakeeffect–ifatall.This isespeciallythecasewhentheirresponsiblebehaviourconcerned, involvesauseofforce.Acounter-attack,todestroy,degradeordisruptthecapabilitythatisthesourceoftheirresponsiblebehaviourismuchmoredirect and more immediately effective. International law establishes legitimate responses by victim States toirresponsiblebehaviour.Inotherwords,abreachsendsaclearstrategicsignaltotheinternationalcommunitythatthevictimStatemaynowauthoritativelyimposeconsequencesontheoffenderthatdefinitivelypreventsitfromre-offending.

The ideal would be the ability to impose a consequence that immediately stops the offending behaviour, thatdeterstheoffendingStatefromrepeatingthebehaviouranddetersotherStatesfromconsideringthebehaviour–yetalsomakesescalationunlikely.Furthermore,inspiteofpossessingsuchacapability,theStateshouldbeabletomanifestlydemonstratenocurrentintentorpreparednesstouseit.Thatisachallengingideal.

TheoffendingStatewillneed tomakea strategicassessmentaboutwhetherescalationwill serve toprotect itsnationalinterestsandisthebestmeanstopursueitsnationalobjectives–anditwillmakethisassessmentinanenvironment of information asymmetry. Four factorswill have a big impact on its strategic assessment. Firstly,wherethevictimStatehasthecapabilitytoimposefurtherconsequences(escalationwouldbetoocostly),butnocurrent intent to use it (escalation is unnecessary). Secondly,where the victim State has a limited objective ofstopping theoffendingbehaviour,butotherwisesupports thenormalparticipationof theoffendingState in theinternationalcommunity(escalationisunnecessary).Thirdly,wherethevictimStatecontinuestoenjoylegitimacyinrespectofitsactionsandtherefore,internationalsupport(escalationrisksfurthergalvanisingtheinternationalcommunityagainsttheoffendingState).Finally,wherethevictimStateistransparentaboutalloftheabove(itismanifesttotheoffendingStatethatescalationisnotthemeanstoprotectitsnationalinterests,nortopursueitsnationalobjectives).

Whilethiscomponentischallenging,it isimportantnottoconsiderthiscomponentinisolation.Coupledwithalltheothercomponents,theUSanditsalliesshouldbeabletomakecrediblecommitmentsnottouseacounter-spacecapabilityexceptinaccordancewiththestable,rules-based,globalorderofwhichtheyarechampions.

EFFECTIVE.Inlightofthechallengesdiscussedabove,thefocusofdevelopmentshouldbeoncapabilitiesthatcanbeusedinaverytargetedway–tostopoffendingbehaviour,withoutunintendedoutcomes.Thecapabilityshouldalsoberepeatable–aone-shotcapabilitydoesnotdeterfurtheroffendingbehaviourbytheoffendingStatesorbyothers.

MINIMUMRECOIL. The victim State,when imposing consequences,will notwant to lose the international anddomesticsupportthatitenjoys.Itwouldlosesupportifittookactionthatisconsideredexcessivebyitsdomesticconstituency and by the international community. It could also lose support, as well as undermine its owncapabilities,byimposingconsequenceswithwidecollateraleffects–onsatellitesofotherStates,onitsownspaceinfrastructureandontheunrelatedspaceinfrastructureoftheoffendingState.


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The challenge, for the purposes of this attribute, is disambiguation. However, as discussed above, there is animpetustocomplicatethespacedomainbyintegratingwithcivilandcommercialspaceinfrastructure,andtherebyusethecivilandcommercialspaceinfrastructureasashield.Yet,activelydeceivinganadversarythatthereisnomilitary use of civilian objects is perfidious, if used as a cover for hostile activities, andwould be awar crime.Actively concealingmilitaryuse isnotperfidious, although it still undermines theprotectionafforded to civilianobjectsunderthelawofarmedconflict.Itputsone’sowncivilianspaceinfrastructureatriskofbeingtargeted.Forthis reason, State’s should opt for transparency aboutmilitary use of civilian space infrastructure. It is then aneasier case tomake that responsibility lieson theattacker todistinguishbetweencivilian satellitesandmilitarysatellites,andtominimisecollateraldamagetociviliancomponentsofasatelliteusedpartlyformilitarypurposes.

ThegoalhereistodevelopcapabilitiesthatStatescouldusetoimposeconsequencesonirresponsiblebehaviourthat,eitherseparatelyoraspartofasystem,areabletodistinguishadversarymilitaryobjectsorcomponentsfromallothersandconfine theeffectsofanattackon theadversarymilitaryobjectsorcomponentsonly.Again, thiswouldbetheidealandthedifficultyofdevelopingsuchacapabilityisconceded.

Operationalisation

Finally, the ideas expressed here can be usefully ‘operationalised’ in themilitary context. Just as the CollateralDamageEstimationMethodologyisastaffprocessheavilybasedonlegalandstrategicpolicyconceptsbutusedinOperations Centres and headquarters across the joint services to help achieve operational effects, similarly astable,rules-based,globalorderforouterspacecouldbeoperationalisedforuseinSpaceOperationsCentresandheadquarters throughouttheUSand itsallies.AnefficientandeffectivestaffprocesswouldhelptheUSand itsalliesto‘get insidetheOODAloop’ofanadversary inthebattlefor legitimacy. Ihavebegunworkinthisregardandagain,wouldbekeentoworkwiththeUSDoDandothersintheUS,inaconsultantcapacity,tooperationalisesuchastrategicapproach.

CaelusPartners,LLCJoseOcasio-ChristianChiefExecutiveOfficer

24August2017WRITTENRESPONSECaelus Partners has analyzed all these nations space industry programs, and is willing to provide analysisgeneralitiesabouthowthesecountriesseespaceatthistime.(Notethatthesemaychangeatanytimeanditisasnapshotintime):

• Nation-statesdonot see theworldaspeace, crisis and conflict. Theyall thinkof spaceas vital tonationalinterests and their security apparatus. They all need to be prepared to at aminimumdefend themselves,containaggression,andcompetefornaturalresources.

• Technologiesarealignedtoaneconomicbenefitaswellasasecuritybenefit.Thinkof“dualuse”andmulti-taskingoftechnology.Thisallowsforthegreatestchanceforatechnologytobesuccessfulinspace.

• Generally, countrieswith fewer regulatorymeasures for operating in spacewill have non-state actors thatattempt to employ technologies in space. Higher regulatory or centralized forms of governmentwillworkdiligentlytodevelopandemploytechnologywithoutthehelpofcommercialcompanies.


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DeanChengSeniorResearchFellow

(TheHeritageFoundation;AsianStudiesCenter,DavisInstituteforNationalSecurityandForeignPolicy)2August2017


Interviewer: [Q2]Okay.That’shelpful,andIthinkseguesnicelyintothesecondquestionIwashopingtoaskyou,whichhastodowithhowUSallies,partners,andadversariesconceiveofspaceoperationsfor military and commercial purposes. mentioned these three categories. So, from yourperspective,howdootheractorsconceiveofspaceoperationsforbothmilitaryandcommercialpurposes?And,givenyourexpertise,pleasefeelfreetofocusonChinahereifyou’dlike.

D.Cheng: Sure. So, Iwill talkmostly about China. Iwould say that China uses space holistically becausethey’veusedspaceasapartofthebroaderinformationnetworks—so,inChina,spaceindustryispart of information industry, space dominance and space superiority is part of informationdominance and information superiority, and space business is part of the larger portfolio ofinformationbusinessandservices.

Thus, the Chinese are looking at commercial space as more than just either manufacturingsatellitesorlaunchingsatellites—theyarelookingatitasthingslikegettingpeopletouseBeiDouinsteadofinsteadofGPS.Inalllikelihood,inthefutureaswewatchtheChineseestablishquasi-private companies that do space things, they are going to try andblur the linebetween stateenterprisesandprivateenterprisesbecause those“privateenterprises”arealwaysgoing toberesponsivetomandatesfromthestate.

Interviewer: [Q2]Okay. That is an interesting point about how the Chinese sort of blur the lines betweencommercialenterprisesandthegovernment,particularlyinthesenseofgovernmentownershipincommercialentities.So,I’mwondering,aretheChineseworkingwithorcooperatingwithanyofother stateswith respect to spaceoperationsor space interests,whether itbegovernmentdrivenorcommerciallydriven?

D.Cheng: Absolutely.We can see that the Chinese, for example, have signedmemoranda to access theBrazilian, French,andSwedish spaceobservationnetworks. That’sone thing.Wealso see thatthe Chinese are trying to—and successfully doing so—export satellites to Bolivia, Pakistan,Venezuela,Bangladesh,andNigeria.Andwhen theChineseexporta satellite, theyalsoexporttheentiregroundinfrastructure,sotheybuildmissioncontrolfacilitiesandtrackingfacilities,andtheytrainthepeopletooperatethosefacilities.

Now,aninterestingquestion—andthisgoesbacktowhatIsaidearlieraboutspaceweapons—iswhatwedon’t know, for example, iswhetheror notboth that ground infrastructureor thosesatelliteshavebackdoorsbuiltintothemthattheChinesecanexploitintimeofcrisis,andinalllikelihoodtheydoindeed.

OneoftheotherthingsthattheChinesearedoingisthattheyhaveexplicitlysaidthattheywanttheirspacesystemslikeBeiDou,whichisPNT,tobepartofthegroundinfrastructureofthe“OneBelt, One Road” project into Central Asia. Meaning, that when you think about things likepipelines,howdoyoucoordinatepumpingstationswithrespecttobatchwavesandthingslikethat? You have to sequence the pumping, and that requires a timing signal. And what theChinesewantistouseBeiDouasthetimingsignal,notGPS.Andthatkindofeffortthencreatesacaptivelong-termconsumerbasethatwillhavetorelyontheChinese.

Interviewer: [Q2] Okay. So, on the other side of the spectrum, do you see Chinese space interests andactivitiesasbeing,orbecoming,potentiallyconflictualwiththoseofanotherinternationalactor?


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D.Cheng: Well,thewholepurposeofthisistomuteorpreventthosesortsofcontradictions.TheChineseuse space diplomatically. They have forged relationships with the European Space AgencyknowingthatthiswouldthenbeyetanotherinroadinseparatingEuropefromtheUnitedStates.AndEurope,beingthepeoplethattheyare,forexample,rightafterthe2007ASATtest,theheadoftheEuropeanSpaceAgencypubliclysaidthattheywanttocooperatewithChina.Imean,talkaboutconflict,thatisEuropeconflictingwiththeUS,notEuropeconflictingwithChina.

Now, arguably, as Chinamake further inroads into Central Asia terrestrially via the “OneBelt,One Road,” you’re going to see increasing friction between China and Russia because both ofthose countries have terrestrial interests in Central Asia. So, China is using its space piecesalongside all of the other DIME or PMESII pieces to basically achieve terrestrial strategicobjectives—whether it is forgingnewrelations,whether it ispreventing relationswithTaiwan,whether it’sneutralizingUnitedStates,whether it’s competingwithRussia.ForChina, space isonepieceontheboard,probablyabishop,possiblyaknight.

[…]

Interviewer: [Q2 indirectly] So, what about the argument that heavier investment and increasedinfrastructureinspacemightdisincentivespaceactorsfromaggressionandconflict?Theideais,Iguess,thatbyputtingmoreoftheirownthingsintospaceandadvancingtheirinterestsinspace,actorswould be disincentivized from creating a conflict because they havemore andmore tolose.

D.Cheng: Well, first off, let’s go overwho exactly is doing all of the “investment” in outer space?Whoexactlyisdependentonspace,asidefromtheUnitedStatesandtheWest?

Ihaveasneakysuspicionthatpartofthisargumentiscomingfrom…becausesomefolkstherekeepinsistingthat,forexample,ChinawillbecomeasdependentonspaceastheUSis.Ifyouaskthem why that is, the answer seems to be that apparently there’s some unidentified law ofphysicsthatsaysthiswillbetrue.However,therealityisthatwhenyoulookatRussiaandyoulook at China, both of their primary strategic interests are offshore or in their near abroad—meaning, theycancovercommunications, ISR,PNT,etc.byusingnon-space-basedcapabilities.The US, though, is expeditionary. The US needs those space-based capabilities in order tocommunicateontheothersideoftheplanet.Now,maybewe’regoingtoseeRussiabecomingSoviet Union againwith interests in the Indian Ocean and South America, but that’s going torequireawholelotofotherchanges.WemightseeChinabecomenotstrategicallycommittedtoDjibouti, but, again, where is the evidence of this?What we seewith “One Belt, One Road,”which isprobably thesinglemostmassiveChinese investment, is that it isprimarily focused inCentralAsia,and,toa lesserextent,portfacilities intheIndianOcean—notdefensivefacilities.No one that I know of really seriously thinks that the Chinese are going to start doingexpeditionary operations in western hemisphere, or even in Africa, and even that is differentthanfightingawaragainstanadversarywhocanaccessspaceandwhereChinawouldneedthespacecapability.

So,thenwegetto,“Yes,butyouwouldfoulthenest.”WhywouldChinagotowar?Theansweralmostalwayscomesbackto issuesofregimesurvival.Andifyouhavearegimesurvival issue,areyouwillingtofoulthenest?Absolutely.

Interviewer: [Q2 indirectly] Okay. How would the Chinese define “space security” or “a secure spacedomain?”DoestheChinesedefinitionandperspectiveonthisdifferfrom,say,thatoftheUSoftheEU?

D.Cheng: Well,tobeginwith,theChinesearenotthatinterestedinspacesecurity.Thisispartofwhatwearegettingathere.TheChinesefocusisonnationalsecurity,whichisdefinedbycoreinterest,which begins with territorial integrity and sovereignty, the preservation of the ChineseCommunistParty’srule,andthepreservationofeconomicdevelopment.Spaceisatooltoobtain


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that,but there isnot“spacesecurity,”perse,anymorethanthere is“oil security.”Whenyoutalkabout “oil security,”youarenot talkingaboutpreservingoil rigs in Libya—youare saying,“Can I, country X, get enough oil to keepmy economy running?” So, the Chinese, if they aregoingtodefine“spacesecurity,”aregoingtosay,“Firstoff,whatdoIneedspacefor?”(notethatthose requirements forChinaareverydifferent that those requirements for theUS)and then,“WhatdoIneedtodotomakesurethatthosemissionsarefulfilled,whichmaynothavetobebyspace?”

So,considerthatChinadoesnotatthepresenttimehaveanyspace-basedmissileearlywarningcapability.ThatwasoneofthefirstthingstheUnitedStatesdeveloped.Thatwasoneofthefirstthings theSovietUniondeveloped.But theChinese,47yearsaftergoing tospace,haveyet todeploy space-based missile early warning. That should tell us that the Chinese has a verydifferentviewofthestrategicroleofspace,and,therefore,howtheythinkaboutsomethinglike“spacesecurity.”

[…]

Interviewer: [Q2 indirectly]Okay. So, let’s shift gears a little bit in to the deterrence side of things. HowshouldspacefeatureinUSdeterrencestrategy,andwhatchangestoUSdeterrencethinkingarerequiredtoincorporatetherapidlyevolvingspacedomain?

D.Cheng: So,thefirstthingweneedtodoistostopthinkingaboutdeterrenceinspace(i.e.,howdoIdeteranadversaryfromoperatingagainstacertainsatelliteorfromdevelopingcertaincapabilities?).Because:1)youarenotgoingtostopsomebodyfromdevelopingacapabilitythattheythinkisnecessary and 2) you are not going to stop them from attacking something of yours if it’ssufficientlyvitaltoyou.

Bytheway,thisgoesbacktothequestion,“areothercountriesgoingtoendupasdependentaswe are on space?” Other countries have all us as an example—they will not replicate ourinfrastructure. So, if we are dependent on space, two things happen: 1) we invite attacks,essentially,againstourspacesystemsandtheentirespaceenterpriseand2)wemakesurethatotherpeopledon’tbecomeasdependentonspace.

So,what is it thatwecando? Iwouldsay that theChineseandtheRussiansactuallyhavetherightideaonthis,whichis“deterrencethroughspace”—notjust“deterrenceinspace.”Spaceisone of the various instrumentalities available to achieve deterrent objectives. During the ColdWar, therewasa jokewhere twoSoviet tankcommanders satunder theEifelTower,andoneturnstotheotherandsays,“Whowontheairwar?”Thepointhereis,ifyousuccessfully“deter”actioninspaceandyouloseTaiwanoryoulosePoland,isthatreallyasuccess?

So, we should be thinking about what can we do in space to raise the price of terrestrialaggression, and, conversely, what is it that we are doing on the ground that reduces thevulnerabilityofourspacecapabilities?Forexample,whentheChinesebuzzanEP-3oraP-8asthey just done yet again in the past couple of weeks, I would say that that would’ve been aperfect timeforus tohavedoneaGSATcloseapproachtowardsahighvalueChinesesatellitesystemthatweknowof.Thepointis:youbuzzus,webuzzyou—itdoesn’thavetobeterrestrial.

The adversaries, if they are limited in their reliance on the space, then in that casewe reallyaren’tgoingtobeabletodetermuch.But,ontheotherhand, iftheydorequirespace,andasthe Chinese seem tomore andmore identify targets in the Central Pacific, then we want todemonstratearangeofabilitiestocounterthat.Bytheway,thosedon’thavetobekinetic.Forexample, passive denial of information can still be useful. If we can demonstrate, as we didduringtheColdWar,thatevenwithoverheadpersistentcoverage,IcansailacarriergroupoffofPetropavlovsk (the main Soviet submarine facility at that time), then that is a very powerfuldeterrentmessage.Thatdoes touchonspace?Well, to someextentbecausewewereable toevadetheirspacecapabilities.


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So,goingbacktoyourlastquestion,theproblemthereisgoingtobe,“Well,youhaveubiquitouspersistent overhead coverage, howdo you avoid beingdetected and tracked?” I think it’s stillpossible,butthat’salotofenergyinthatsense.

[…]

Interviewer: [Q2indirectly]So,howwouldthatdifferfromwhatyouthinkaChinesepolicymakerneedstobethinkingabout?

D.Cheng: I mean, Chinese “policymakers” who go to Geneva, etc. are irrelevant to actual Chinesepolicymaking,sotheycansayalmostanythingtheywant.Theyaregiveninstructionstodothingslike promote convention proposals, but they aren’t the ones who are actually making any ofthesepolicies. There areno “international spacepolicymakers” inChina. InChina, the ForeignMinistryisirrelevant.Oneofourcommonbigmistakesisgivinganycredencetospeechesmadeby the Chinese ForeignMinister in Geneva, because I couldmake a speech in Geneva and itwouldhaveasmuch impact.TheChineseForeignMinisterhasnotbeenonthepolitburosince1999,andthepolitburosetspolicy.

So,oneof thebigproblemswehavewhenyouuse terms like “internationalpolicymakers,” isthatyouactuallyare talkingaboutaconglomerationofdifferentgroupsandentitieswithverydifferent perspectives. You have space technical policy people. You have space policy peoplefromdifferentcountries.Youhaveexpertsoncountries,someofwhomhavesomeknowledgeofthosecountries’spacepolicies.So,youwindupwithpeoplewho,forexample—Ihatetosaythis,but—therearen’tthatmanyAmericanfolkswho lookatChina’sspacepolicy.Wehavea lotoffolkswho lookatChinaandvariouspiecesofChina (e.g., themilitary, the foreignpolicy,etc.),butwedon’thavemanypeoplelookatChinesespacepolicy.Conversely,youhavepeoplewholookatspacepolicyandtheytalktothevariousChinese,buttheyoftendon’tunderstandChina.AndthenyouhavethetechnicalfolkswhocanyoutellyouallabouttheLongMarch5,andthat’sawholedifferent aspectof China and space.And I have abad feeling thatwehave the sameproblemswithRussia,andtoalesserextentwiththeWest.WecertainlyhavethisproblemwithJapan.IwilltellyourightnowthatwithrespecttothewaytheJapaneseareapproachingspacesecuritypolicy,a lotofourspacepeopledon’tunderstandthatand it’snotclearhowmanyofour Japan experts understand that, becausewhat is needed are people that are familiarwithbothJapanandspecificallyJapanesespacepolicy.

But, when you talk about, “what will be various countries’ response options in the realm ofprinciplesandcodes,etc.,”forwhatyou’retalkingabout,inChinaforexample,it’snotgoingtobetheForeignMinistrythatmakesthatdecision—itisgoingtobethepolitburo,whichisgoingtobeheavilyinfluencedbythemilitary,andbyaworldviewthatisonlymarginallyinformedbythe ForeignMinistry. Russia, for example, is going to be completely different. Though, Iwon’tspeaktoRussiabecauseI’mnotaRussiaexpert.ButIhavedonealittleworkonJapan,andIwilltell you that the Japanese, for example, are looking at space increasingly through a NationalSecuritySpacePolicySecretariat,whichiswithintheirnewNationalSecurityCouncil,whichisfarsmaller than theUSNSC, but it’s really the PrimeMinister, the PrimeMinister’sOffice, and acouple of other people. That increasingly is going to define Japan’s national security spaceapproach, again, withmore limited input from the ForeignMinistry, although it will bemoresubstantialthanintheChinesecase.

[…]

Interviewer: [Q2indirectly]Okay.So,giventhese levelsofambiguityanduncertaintyaroundwho’sactuallymakingspacepolicyinternationally,andthenalsotheambiguitysurroundingsomeofthelaws,treaties, and agreements that currently govern space, plus some of the ambiguity that isnaturallyinherentinactualspaceactivityandoperationitself,itwouldseemthatdevelopingandsolidifyingnorms isespecially important in thespacedomain.So, I’mwondering,whatcanthe


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US do to best facilitate the development of verifiable norms that maintain a peaceful spacedomain?

D.Cheng: Well, firstofall, I fundamentallychallengeyourassumption thatweneedmorenorms.Normsaregreatamongpeoplewhoalreadythinkalike.Thatisanicelubricanttominimizefriction.But,…[speaksinMandarinChinese]…norm.So,didyouunderstandanyofwhatIjustsaid?

Interviewer: No.

D.Cheng: Right.BecausewhatIjustsaidinChineseis,“ifIonlyspeaktoyouinChinese,howexactlyarewegoingtoestablishnorms?”

So,mypointhere isthatwetalkaboutcreatingnormsbecausewelive inaruleof lawsocietygoverning through mediation, and we believe that the law itself has value, separate fromwhoevercomesbeforeit. If IamtheChinese, lawsandnormsandprinciplesandtreatiesexist,likespaceandother things, formetoachievepoliticalends—thoseends takeprecedence,notyournorms.So,youcangoaheadandcreateasmanynormsaspossibleandyoucanmakethemasrestrictiveaspossible,andIwillsignontothemandIwilltrytoholdyoutoothem.Iwillmakeyoulivebyyourrules;youwillnotmakemelivebythem.Andthemorerestrictivetheyare,thebettertheyarebecauseyouareself-straightjacketing.

So, to begin with, I fundamentally question this constant American reiteration that we needmorenorms.Now, after that, thequestionbecomes,what is thepurposeof thesenormsandwhenarethesenormssupposedtooperate?I’mwillingtoacceptthatthere’scertainnormsthatmight be useful in peace time, because they help establish a baseline and channels ofcommunicationthatmaybeabletoavoidacrisis.Butthefartheryougodowntheroadofcrisisandconflict,thelesspositiverolenormsplay.

Imean,asoneof foreigndiplomatobservedabout theChinese: for theChinese,hotlinesonlyworkwhenthey’recold.Wehavelotsofevidenceinthisinotherdomains,butnotinspace—butit doesn’t reallymatter because, as I keep coming back to, we keep sort of saying it’s aboutspace,but it’snot.Chinesebehaviorat seawith its region,on landwith India,onmany issueswiththeJapanese,etc.demonstratesthatinacrisis,Chinadoesn’tpickupthephone.Chinajustdoes not abide by norms. For example, “though shall not send troops out 20miles into yournuclear-armed neighbor’s borders,” but China doesn’t abide by those kinds of norms eventhoughitexpectsyoutoabidebythem.

So,again, inapeacetime,canyoucreatenorms?Wonderful.Chinawillsitdownandnegotiateandhaveachancetohaveaconversation.However,theminuteacrisishits,Chinawon’tpickupthephone,andtheydon’tcallyou,sowhatexactlyarethesenormscreating?

Interviewer: [Q2indirectly]Okay.So,itsoundslikeyoubelievethattheestablishmentofthesenormsduringpeacetime then just puts the US at a disadvantage during periods of conflict because on onehand,theUSwillbesittingthereobeyingthenormsandfollowingthenormsandplayingbytherules of thenorms,while on theotherhand, an actor likeChina could fully go alongwith thenorms during the peacetime but then just totally disregarding them once things start gettingtense?

D.Cheng: Exactly. So, creatingnormswithFrance,withBritain,with Japan, thatallmakesperfect sense.WithChina?No,notsomuch.

Certainfolksfromboththearmscontrolcommunityandthe…willinevitablysay,“Well,lookatwhat happened after the 2007 ASAT test when China was demarched.” Butmy question hasalwaysbeen, “Well,whatdidhappen?”Well, soChinahasn’t conducted a test like that since.Okay,so,whatdoesthatprove?TheargumentisthatwebyprotestingsomehowdemonstratedtoChina andpersuaded themnot to conduct adestructiveASAT test like the2007 test.Well,guesswhat,Ipersonally,DeanCheng,havenotconductedadestructiveASATtestlikethatsince


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2007, either. Is that evidence that those demarches have made a difference to me? Theassumptionis,andthisistranslatedintopolicyrecommendation,thatChinadoesnotdoXafterwe do Y. So, we have drawn a causal-effect relationship by people who themselves havedemonstrated a lack of understanding and knowledgeof howChina is evenly governed in thebroadname.IfItalktoyouabouttheRepublicofGreatBritainanditspresidents,whywouldyoupay any attention tomy recommendations about Anglo American security? And yet,we havemadetheequivalentargumentsaboutChinaandthenwesay,“See,thisprovesthatdemarchesandnormswork.”Thatisproblematic.

[…]

Interviewer: [Q2indirectly] Ialsothinkitisveryinterestinghowyou’rechallengingthepremisesforalotofthesequestions.So,Ijustwantedtoclarifyapointwithyouandthenfollowupwithaquestion.Pleasecorrectmeif I’mwrong,but I thinkyouchallengedthenotionthatChina isdeadsetonbecomingaleaderinspace.Isthatcorrect?

D.Cheng: No.Chinawantstodevelopspacecapabilities,butthat isverydifferentfromsayingthatChinawillbecomedependentonspacecapabilities.

Interviewer: [Q2 indirectly] So, is this because the proliferation of innovation and technology in the spacedomainisallowingChinatoavoiddependency?Or,isitacalculatedmoveonChina’spart?

D.Cheng: ItisacombinationofthegeostrategicrealitythatChina’sinterestsareprimarilywithinareasthatdonotrequirespacetoaccess,tosupport,etc.,coupledwithspecificstrategicdecisionsnottobecome that dependent. So, the first thing to recognize is that China views space as part of“comprehensive national power (CNP).” Comprehensive national power is basically how theChinese rack and stack all countries, including themselves. Comprehensive national powerencompassesmilitary capabilities, economic power, political unity, diplomatic respect, scienceandtechnologycapacity,culturalsecurity,etc.FromtheChineseview,spacetouchesjustaboutevery piece of comprehensive natural power—so, you benefit your overall comprehensivenationalpowerasamultipliereffectwhenyouimproveyourspacecapabilities.But,thisworksinboth directions: by improving your overall comprehensive national power, you also garnerbenefitsforscienceandtechnology,includingspace.So,that’sonepieceofthis.

Developing space capabilities will develop human capital that is familiar with, for example,systems integration and systems engineering. That’s something the Chinese themselves keepsaying, “Why dowe need to go into space?Well, in order to create aworkforce that is highquality, used to precisionmanufacturing, and that will be able to do systems integration andsystems engineering.” But, that’s not just for space.We have seen the Chinese transfer costmanagement out of aerospace to things like the Commercial Aircraft Corporation (COMAC) tofacilitate the development of China’s first domestic wide-bodied airliner. I suspect that if wecouldgettheworkforce laidoutforthenewChineseindigenousaircraftcarrier,wewouldfindpeoplewhohaveworkedintheaerospaceindustries,forthesamereasons—theaircraftcarrierisalargecomplexuseofsystemsintegrationandsystemsengineering.

Ultimately, Chinawants to promote innovation throughout the economy. All of these sorts ofthingsbenefitbyhavingessentiallyanincubatorintheformofaerospace.But,atthesametime,wealsoseetheChineselayingdownlotsoffiberoptics,developingnearspacecapabilities,etc.that alleviate the requirement to rely on space for communications, ISR, etc. off of China’sshores.That,Iwouldsuggest,ispartlyastrategicdecisionnottobecomeasreliantonspace.

Interviewer: [Q2indirectly]Okay.So,dependencyisobviouslyveryimportant,notjustfortheUSbutforallofinternational security in space. So, are there any opportunities for the US to foster or createdependencyinspaceforChina,oristhisjustastrategicdecisionatthepartylevelthatwehavelittlebearingon?


50


D.Cheng: Itisastrategicleveldecisionatthepartylevel.Frankly,Ithinkwearemorethanalittlearrogantandoverblownontheideathatwecancreatedependenciesinotherpeople.Again,goingbackto that earlier heroin example, unless you’re going to tieme down and inject heroin intomyveins,IbecomedependentonheroinbecauseIchosetotakethatfirstbite.So,maybecountrieswill become that dependent, but I’m not sure we can make them dependent. And in fact,bizarrely,evenat thebusiness level,weseepeopleavoidingdependency.GPSsignalsare free.It’sreallyhardtobeatafreeservice,andyetweseeChinaandEuropebothdevelopingtheirownGPS-type capabilities, and India has talked about it as well. And the goal of that is to avoiddependencyonanoutsideplayer.

FaulconerConsultingGroupWaltFaulconer

President

MikeBowkerAssociate

MarkBittermanAssociate

DanDumbacherAssociate

15August2017WRITTENRESPONSEThere are country specific nuances, however, it is important to recognize that the fundamental need for self-defensedrivestheapproach.Thisquestionrequiressignificantcountryspecificresearchwouldbeagoodtopicforaspecificstudythatwecouldprovidebybuildingataxonomytoincludeeachcountrywiththeirapproachtospaceoperationsandservicesformilitaryversuscommercialuseversuspeacetimeorcrisisandconflict.�

GilmourSpaceTechnologiesAdamGilmour

ChiefExecutiveOfficer

JamesGilmourDirector

13July2017


Interviewer: [Q2 indirectly]Okay.Movingon,we’ll jumpright intothecommercialuseofspace.We’llstartwiththefirstquestionoffthatlist.Howdocommercialventuresthinkaboutthesecurityoftheirspaceassetsduringpeacetime,crisisandconflict?Doindustryleadersthinkaboutwarfareinorthroughspacedifferentlythanmilitaryleaders?Whataretheirmainconcerns?Howreliantaretheyongovernmentsforwarningorprotectionofspace?Whataretheirthreatpriorities?Feelfreetoteeofffromanyofthose.

A.Gilmour: Yeah,wedon’treallythinktoomuchaboutsecurityofourspaceassetsduringpeacetimecrisisorconflictbecausewegotlaunchpeoplewhospendalotoftimeinspace.IguessI’dbealittle


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bitconcernediftheChineseortheRussiansstartedknockingdownanythingthat’sstartingtofly,but,Ithink,we’dhavebiggerfishtofryifthathappened.

Ithink,welookatwarfareverysimilarlytomilitaryleaders,mainlybecausewebringinalotofdiscussionswiththem.Wethinkourviewsaresimilartowhatwehearthesedefensepeoplesayinaboutwhataretherisks inspace,whathappens ifGPSsatellitesgetknockedoutandothercommunicationsatellitesgetknockedout.ThatiswhatIthinkistheirmainconcern.Themilitary,I think it’s communicationandPNT,whenweaponsareguided fromGPS. If that gets knockedout,we’reinaworldofhurt.

It’sonethingtoconductwarfareoncountriesthatcan’tshootyoursatellitedownatthesky,butverydifferentwhenyoudogoagainstthecountrythatcan.

J.Gilmour: Yeah,andwe’retalkingfromacommercialperspective.Obviously,thedifferentlandscapes,we’dbeintimatelyinvolvedwithdefense.But, intermsofanAustralianperspective,webelievethatthereisaneedforaccessorspacecapabilitywithinthedecade.Itworkstohavethatopportunityofprovidingtheleadersofthosecapabilities.

A.Gilmour: Wewillbeveryreliantongovernmentforwarningorprotectioninspace.But,rightnow,Idon’tseeabigstretch.Idon’tthinkit’sgoingtobeaspacewarinahurry.

Interviewer: [Q2 indirectly]Considering commercial perspective and the business calculus, there’s not toomuchthoughtgivento,“Okay.Doweneedtoprotectanythingwe’resendingupinthespaceorlossassets?”

A.Gilmour: No.

Interviewer: Space,Ithinkatthistime,isrelativelysecure,right?

J.Gilmour: Yeah.

A.Gilmour: Yes.Iwillconcurwiththat.

[…]

Interviewer: [Q2indirectly]Okay,good.Okay,Ithinkthatcoversthatquestion.Movingon.Areothernationsoutside the West or it has happened to their own commercial space industry for militarypurposes inthenextfivetotenyears?Obviously, IwanttogettheAustralianpointofviewonthis. But, if you feel knowledgeable on the other Asian-Pacific nations or elsewhere, I’dappreciatethatinputaswell.

A.Gilmour: Yeah, we think our government’s pretty behind the apron on looking at space capability, butthey’re getting there and we’ve had some decent conversation this year with people in theDefense Department. I’m pretty confident in the next five to ten years, the Australiangovernmentwilllookatdomesticcommercialspaceindustryforlaunchingmilitarysatellitesandstufflikethat.

WeoperateinSingaporeandAustralia.We’vehaddiscussionswiththeSingaporemilitaryabouttechnical satellite launches and they’re interested.Again, very similar toAustralia, taking theirtimetodevelopamandateorrequestforcapability.

I’m not aware of any significant desire from the rest of the ASEAN countries, like Malaysia,Thailand, Philippines, Vietnam, to do any domestic space launches or space industry for themilitary.I’mnotawareofthat.

Interviewer: [Q2]Okay.Thiswill segue into thenextquestion.Now,youmentionedSingapore;howrobustwouldyousaythecooperationisbetweencommercialsectorsonanationalleveloutsideoftheUS?Inotherwords,thecommercialindustryinAustralia,isit…Iimagineit’sdeeplyinvestedwiththeUS,butdoesitalsohaveaburgeoningrelationshipwithChinaorotherAsian-Pacificnations?


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A.Gilmour: Well,really, it’sstill, Ithink,theAmericansarethebest intheworldat linkinguptheirmilitaryandtheirspaceindustry.TherestofthewesternalliescanlearnalotfromtheUS.We’realongwayfromthat.Onascaleofonetoten,IgiveUnitedStatesaboutanineouttenforcooperationbetweenmilitaryandindustry,andAustraliaaboutatwo.

Interviewer: Wow.

A.Gilmour: IgiveSingaporeaboutaone.

Interviewer: That’sinteresting,Okay.

J.Gilmour: Intermsofthose,Ithinkwe’reverymuchtiedwiththeUS.

A.Gilmour: Yeah.

Interviewer: [Q2indirectly]Okay,great.Allright.Okay,I’llcomebacktothatinasecond.Now,howarethecomponentsofthecommercialspaceindustryallocatedoutsideoftheUS?IknowGilmourSpaceCorporationisinthelaunchindustry,right?

A.Gilmour: Yeah.

Interviewer: [Q2indirectly]IsthataparticularforteoftheAustraliancommercialspacesector?

A.Gilmour: No,we’re not really… It’s not a big industry here. There’s a couple of satellite, small satellitemanufactureshere,thatarelookingforthelaunch.Wegotfundedfromventurecapitalthatalsofundedanother small site company thatwas lookingat internetandbasic connectivity. I thinkwe’re the only legitimate launch company here, so it’s a very small industry in Australia rightnow.

Interviewer: [Q2indirectly]Isee.Okay.Now,thelastquestiononthecommercialsectionheregoes,whatarethebiggerhindrancestosuccessfulrelationshipbetweentheprivateandthegovernmentspacesectorsandhowcan thisbeminimized? I knowyou justmentionedAustralia, your rateabouttwooutof a tenon that. Could you speakon it,maybea fewdifferentpoints, as towhy youwouldrateitsolow?

A.Gilmour: Well,wedon’thavealaunchrangehere.Wedon’tevenhavethe—

J.Gilmour: Aspaceagency.

A.Gilmour: Wedon’thaveaspaceagency.Wedon’thave…thepeoplethatarein,space-relateddivisiontothemilitary,isaboutthreepeople;oneintheAirForcekindofthing,oneinthearmyandIdon’tthinkanyinthenavy.There’snotevenaspacecommandorspacewingandanydefensethat’sreallysignificant.Youhaveonepersonkindofkickingaroundandthat’sall.

J.Gilmour: That’stieditwithanotherdepartment.Forexample,formetheDepartmentofInnovation,ifanyreal game-changing capabilities are present, it takes a long time for that to speed up to aministeriallevelor,Iguess,allocationofresources.

A.Gilmour: I’mgoingtokeepgoing.There’snospaceagency.There’snocontracts thataredonebetweenthe space industry and the government for any kind of space asset. The policy that governslaunching activities in Australia is incredibly prohibitive and requiresmassive insurances, tonsand tons of paperwork, and there’s no expertise in the approval of space launch here.We’refinding it quite daunting to go through that process to try to launch here and we’re actuallythinkingwe’ll probably launch fromKennedySpace in the first intoorbit. The infrastructure inAustralia is basically non-existent compared to the United States or interacting with thegovernment.

Interviewer: [Q2indirectly] Isee.Now,lookingforward,asfarasworkingwithNASA,whatifany,obstaclesexistforyouatthispointintimeordoyouanticipate,beinganissue,afewyearsdowntheroad,thatyoufeeltheUScouldimproveon?


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A.Gilmour: Not really. We have a good understanding of what it takes to do business with the USgovernment.It’sbeenwell-explainedtous.WehavetheUnitedStatedsubsidiarybasedinTexasthatwewill intend tocompete, theUSgovernmentbusinesswith.Weunderstandwehave tomake 50% of the launch vehicle, the right value in the United States that compete withgovernmentbusiness.Wehaveaprettygoodunderstandingofwhatwehavetodo.Idon’tseeanyroadblocksaheadofus.It’sjustanexecutionissue.

Interviewer: [Q2indirectly]Okaythat’sveryinteresting.Now,wecanmoveonabit.Ifyouseethequestionunderalliedpartnerandadversaryuseofspace,howeachentityinallcategoriescompetewithspaceoperations formilitaryandcommercialpurposes. Ifwecould justskipdowntothethirdbulletpointforAustralia,Iwaswonderingifyoucangivemeacommercialperspectiveonthatquestion.How do they approach space operations and services? Are there any differences inhowcommercialventures,ifany,considersecurityduringpeace,crisisandconflict?

A.Gilmour: I know.Look, I’mstrugglingwith thequestionbecausewedon’thaveaspace industryhereatthemoment.

It’sverynascent.As Isaid,wedon’thaveaspaceagency.Wedon’tevenhavea launchrange.Whatwe’re looking todo is tohavea launch rangehere,discussingofhavinga launch range,discussing of having a space agency. Therewas a press release yesterday saying that bringingcommunityforumtodiscussaspaceagencyinthegovernment.So,howdoesAustraliacurrentlyapproachbaseoperations?We’rebasicallybuyingforeignsatellitesandlaunchthemonforeignlaunches.That’swhatAustraliadoesrightnow.Thatislookingtochangeinthefuture.

[…]

Interviewer: [Q2indirectly]Wow.Thatisamazing.Okay.Asfarasdisruptiveinnovations,andparticularlythelaunchcomponentofthespacedomain,howhasthatweighedinonadevelopingcompanylikeGilmourSpaceCorporation?Isthissomethingthatis,notnecessarilyaworry,butisthis…isR&D,inotherwords,aconstantconcerntoanupcomingcompany?

A.Gilmour: Yes, absolutely. All the launch companies keep their technology very close to the chest. Youalmost have to start everything from scratch. We are hiring some people that have someexperience in the space industry, butwe thinkwe’re kind of pioneers in terms ofwhatwe’redoinginourhybridrocketmotors.ThenextthreeandahalfyearsofthatcompanyisallR&D.Now,we’vegotplentyoftechnologytroublestoovercome.

Interviewer: [Q2indirectly]Thatisnowthebiggestbarrierentryforanewcompanyinthislandscape.Wouldyouagreewiththat?

A.Gilmour: Ithinkso.

J.Gilmour: Yes,Iwouldagreewiththat.

[…]

Interviewer: [Q2 indirectly]Okay, great.Well, thank you both, gentlemen. This was a great interview. It’salways really amazingwhenweget anice commercial perspective that’s international. Letmejustend the interviewbyaskingonemorequestion that Iwillaskeveryone. Is thereanything,anyquestion, you feel youwould’ve liked tohaveanswered that you think is important that Ididn’task?Anythingingeneralyouwouldjustliketocommentonfurther?

A.Gilmour: Well,IjustwanttosaythatwespendplentyoftimetalkingtotheUSmilitaryabouttherisksofattackon space assets, andwe agreewith them, and thatwe think they’re already looking atcommercialpartnerstofulfill,thede-riskingofthat. I’mtalkingspecificallyaboutpasttechnicallaunches of communication satellite.We think that’s a very smartway to go and I encouragethemtokeepgoinginthatformat.We’renottheonlycommercialcompanythatcanprovidetheservice and they shouldn’t onlyhaveone commercial company toprovide the service. But it’s


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definitely something that is a bit of a mind change from 20 years ago to use commercialoperatorswithquick launching,small techsatellites. I thinkthat’ssomething IdefinitelywouldwanttosaythatIagreewithalotofthepeopleinthedefenseforce,ontheneedtodevelopthatcapability.

Dr.NamrataGoswamiSeniorAnalyst(Wikistrat)

SubjectMatterExpert(AuburnUniversityFuturesLab)15August2017

WRITTENRESPONSE

PRC

ThePRChasalonghistoryofconsciouslycreatingtheinstitutional,politicalandsocietalculturetowardsbuildingspaceassets.Whilemostofitsspacescienceisgearedtowardsachievingciviliantechnologicalcapabilityinspace,the utilization of space formilitary reconnaissance, surveillance aswell as battlefield advantage is a part of itsoverall defense strategy. Unlike countries like India where space is under a civilian authority, China’s People’sLiberation Army (PLA) has a major influence in China’s space policy as well as forms an integral part of theinstitutionaldecision-makingprocess.Theimportanceofspaceoperationsforthemilitarycanbegaugedfromthefactthatin2007,Chinacarriedoutitsfirstanti-satellitemissiletest.On30October2015,ChinatestedtheDongNeng-3exoatmosphericvehiclecapableoframmingintoU.S.satellitesanddestroyingthem.AddedtothisspacecapabilityaretheTiangong1andTiangong2spacelabs,andtheindigenouslybuiltTianzhoucargoshipcapableofon-orbit refueling thatextendsaccessand logistics lines.Autonomouscargodeliveryandon-orbit refuelingarecriticalbuildingblocksofanend-to-endsupplychainforspacepresenceandspaceresources,ortheconstructionofon-orbitpowerstations.ChinesesecurityexpertsbelievethatChinaneedstoinvestinBallisticMissileDefense(BMD),aswellascreatespacebasedcapacitytocreatevulnerabilityforU.S.spaceassetsthatareusedformilitaryoperations.

InconnectiontothisgoalistherecentreorganizationofthePLAwiththeestablishmentoftheStrategicSupportForce(SSF) indicatingChina’sgoaltoestablishcuttingedge‘jointness’ in itsspace,cyber,andelectronicwarfarecapabilities. These are designated as ‘new type’ of forces indicating China’s future direction regardingmilitaryinnovation. These innovations are aimed at achieving critical advantage regarding space and cyber-space. Thatsaid, the key unknown iswhether China has the capacity and the technical knowhow to achieve these precisegoals. Consequently, it may aim to achieve technological superiority by ‘stealth’ from other countries. China’sthrust on space is ‘future-oriented’ based on long term planning (2049), and the process of adaptation tobecomingtheleadinouter-space,hasstarted.

Regardingcommercializationofspace,Chinaisencouragingcommercialentities likeOneSpaceandLandspacetodeveloptechnologyandenterthelucrativemarketofsatellitelaunchesandspacetourism.Itsspacepolicymakersarealsodiscussingtheneedfor‘nationallegislation’likethe2015U.S.CommercialSpaceLaunchCompetitiveActto create an enabling environment for its own private actors. However, the private actors are dominated byChina’sstatedrivenspaceagenciesandwillnotdeviatefromPRCgoalsduringconflicts.

Russia

Russia’sspacegoalshavesufferedwiththebreakupoftheSovietUnion.However,thecountrycontinuestoenjoyexpertise and has its unique history of being the first to launch a satellite into space. The role of Russia inaugmentingthespaceambitionsofAsiannationscannotbeemphasizedenough.ChinabenefitedimmenselyfromRussiaopeningitsspacesectorforcommercialpurposes,especiallywithitspurchaseofRussianspaceshuttlesandRussianhelpwithitsheavyliftboostertechnology.ItwasonRussianrocketsthatVietnam,Japan,India,Malaysia,senttheirfirstastronautsintospace.Morerecently,RussiaiscollaboratingwiththeEuropeanSpaceAgency(ESA)


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toexploreMARS.Russiaalsocontinuestoenjoyhigh-endknow-howofmilitarysatellitetechnology.Asaresult,Russia is viewed by countries lacking space expertise favorably, as a country that is willing to provide thisknowledge for the utilization of space for intelligence gathering and shoring upmilitary capacity. For instance,countrieslikeEthiopiaandSouthAfricaarelookingtowardsRussiaforspacebasedcollaborationandtechnologytransfers.Egypt,withtheaidofRussia,hasinvestedinamilitarysatellite.

Russian thrust for commercialization appears to be lacking in resolve and state backing thoughwith the recentspurt of global interest in space based resources, Russia may join the fray. Key insight regarding Russia is itsrelevancetobuildspace infrastructure incountries lackingsuchexpertiseandsharing itsspacetechnology foraprice.Russiaalsoremainstheonlycountryonearththatcanlaunchhumansregularlyintospace.

Iran

Iran’sspaceambitionsreceivedamajorboostthisyearwiththesuccessfullaunchofitsSimorghrocketplausiblycarrying an intelligence satellite. If proven true, the satellite is a boost to Iran’s situation awareness capacityespeciallyincountrieslikeSyria,YemenandIraq.Withthislaunchcapacity,Irancouldhaveacquiredthecapacitytolaunchinter-continentalballisticmissiles.Giventhe‘geo-politicsoffear’connectedtoregimechangeinIranbyexternal forces, itspolitythrustmaybetoutilizethistestasa ‘globalsignaling’ofcapacity.The impactof Iran’ssuccessfulrockettestaswellasitssuccessfullaunchesofitsRassadsatellitesestablishesIran’sstatusasthemostadvanced ‘space-assets nation’ in theMiddle-East, especially in relation to the Arab states in the region. Iran’ssuccessmayhavemotivatedtheUAEtoestablishitsspaceagencyin2014andfinanceitsMarsmission,claimingthat if it succeeds by 2021, UAEwill become a hub for space activities in the Islamicworld. Iranwill utilize itsgrowingcapacityinspaceformilitaryreconnaissance,satellitejammingandintelligencegathering,toincludedatagatheringinitsfightagainstterroristgroupslikeISISandinYemen.RussiancooperationinaugmentingIran’sspaceprogramiscritical.In2014,RussiaandIransignedadealthatfosteredRussiancooperationregardingsatelliteandlaunchtechnology.Iran’sspaceprogramisstatedrivenandaimedatscientifictemperamongstitscitizens.Asofnow,therearenoprivateIranianouter-spaceentities.

NorthKorea

North Korea aspires to project an image of developing advanced space technology that could be utilized forlaunching inter-continental ballistic missiles. To achieve this aim,the National Aerospace DevelopmentAdministrationannounceditsaimstolaunchsatellites intoorbitby2020aswellasplantaflagonthemoon.Asper its five-year plan in 2015, the North is investing in Earth observation satellites and its first geostationarycommunications satelliteby 2020. The February 2016 launch of the Kwangmyongsong 4 demonstrated NorthKorea’sgrowingspacecapacitysince its2012 launchof its firstsatellite. With improvedspacecapacities,NorthKoreawould aim to jamGPS signaling to defuse data on its internal developments aswell as jamearlymissilewarning signals. This has direct impact on the response mechanisms of target countries. North Korea has noprivateentitiesinspace.

Japan

Japan is an old player in space like China. The Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA), formed in 2003 bymerging the Institute of Space and Astronautical Science, theNational Aerospace Laboratory, and theNationalSpaceDevelopmentAgency,isconductingfuturisticspaceexplorationresearch.Thisincludesinvestinginwirelesstransmissionofelectricity,onceproven,couldbeusedfortransmissionofelectricity fromSpaceSolarSatellites.Japan’sHayabusaandHayabusa2areaimedatasteroidexploration.Suchspaceactivitieswillhaveamajorimpactonfutureexploitationofspaceforresources.WhileJapanhistoricallyviewedspaceasanon-militaryentity,2003provedaturningpointinJapan’sspacepolicywiththeintroductionofBMDespeciallyduetothegrowingthreatfromNorthKorea.Itwasalsodecidedtoutilizesatellitesformilitarypurposetoincludeinformationgatheringandreconnaissance especially pertaining to the seas. Japan has a commitment to encourage commercial entities inspace and share state funded R and D with private entities. Japan is working on its national legislation toencourage private actors and meet its international obligations. In times of conflict, private actors will actaccordingtoJapan’sstatedpolicy.


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India

India’s space activities are mostly aimed at satellite launches, as well as conduct interplanetary explorationmissions.IndiaisthefirstAsiancountrytosuccessfullylaunchaMARSorbiter.ItsspaceprogramisexpandingtoincludeaVenusmissionby2020-2021.Itisalsoofferingitssatelliteservicestoitsneighborswiththelaunchofthe‘SouthAsia’satellite.WhiletheIndianSpaceResearchOrganisation(ISRO)ismostlyaimedatcivilianspace,therehasbeenarecentshifttowardsprovidingtheIndianmilitarywithaugmenteddataonareasofconcernregardingits disputed borders with China and the Indian Ocean region, where there has been a tremendous leap insubmarineactivity.TherearediscussionswithinIndiatoestablishanaerospacecommand,separatefromtheair-force.This strategicdevelopmentcouldbe in response toChina’schange in itsmilitaryorganizational structure.WhileISROremainsthemainstatefundedactorinIndia,privateindustryhasstartedtomakeitselffeltwithTeam

Indus, the Indianprivate space company, competing for theGoogle LunarXPRIZE. Otherprivate actors includeBellatrix, Astrome, R-Beam, etc. The Indian private space actors are however tied to ISRO and hencewill havelimitedautonomousimpactwithmattersregardingsecurity. India isworkingtowardsestablishingnationalspacelegislation thatwill regulate private space actors, aswell asmeet its international obligations under theOuterSpaceTreaty.

Dr.LauraGregoSeniorScientist(UnionofConcernedScientists;GlobalSecurityProgram)

2July2017WRITTENRESPONSE

IranandNorthKorea

Iranhasputasmallnumberoflow-masssatellitesonorbit.Itspaceoflaunchattemptsisslow,possiblyduetotheeffectofsanctionsonitsabilitytomakeprogress,perhapsbecausetheyaresensitivetointernationalreactiontolaunchesbecauseof the similarity toballisticmissile launch.Nodata, as far as I’maware,havebeenpublishedfromtheirsatellites,soeithertheydidn’tworkasanticipatedortheyworkedbuttheresultswerenotimpressiveandjudgednottoimprovethereputationoftheprogram.

While somewouldargue that its space launchprogram is solely toprovide legitimacyor cover to its pursuit oflong-rangeballisticmissiletechnology,Irandoesseemtohaveasincereinterestinspace,bothforspaceservicesitwouldderiveaswellasfortheprestigethataccrueswithmasteryofsophisticatedtechnology.Iranhassoughttopartnerwithothercountries togetaccess tospace.Forexample, in the late1990s, Iranpartneredwith Italy tobuild a small satellite. It has recently been discussing cooperation on space ventureswith European and Asianspace agencies. Iran also seems to be funding the construction of small satellites at a number of domesticacademicandindustrialinstitutions,ratherthanonlybuildingsatellitesviaitsmilitary.Italsohasusedresourcestosupportasuborbitalprogramtolaunchlivingcreatures.

Itmakes sense tome that Iran would seek space-based imaging and communications capabilities. It is a largecountrywithbigdesertsandmountainousgeographythatdividesthepopulation. It ispronetonaturaldisasterssuch as droughts and earthquakes. It has adversarial near neighbors. Good intelligence, reconnaissance, andcommunicationswouldseemessentialforitsnationalsecurityaswellasforitseconomicandsocialdevelopment.

Additionally,Iranhasastrongsenseofhistoryandculture,ithasalongpastandwantsalongfuture,andwantstobeseenasthedominantpowerinitssphere.Beingdominanttechnologicallywouldseemtobeanimportantpartof that picture, away that it can demonstrate its superiority.While Iran is somedistance away fromprovidingrobustlaunchcapabilityforitself,muchlessforcommercialcustomers,IcouldimagineinthecomingdecadesthatIrancould focusonbuildingoroperatingsatellitesandsellingservices to itsneighbors. In thatvein, I think thatwhileit’sundoubtedlyaremotepossibility,thereisachancethatIranwouldforegodevelopmentofanindigenous


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satellite launch capability (and intercontinental range ballistic missile technology) for assured access to spacelaunchbysomeothercountrywithwhichitcoulddevelopthiskindofcommercialcapability.

I think Iranwould (and almost certainly does) avail itself of relatively low-tech anti-satellite techniques such asjamming,dazzling/blindingofsensors,orcyberattack insituationsthat it felt threatened.However, Idon’t thinkthatevenin20yearsthatIranwouldhavedirect-ascentoron-orbitcapabilitiesforinterferingwithanadversary’ssatelliteinadestructiveway.Iwouldthinkthatinacrisissituation,itsfocuswouldbeondisruptingspace-basedforcemultiplyingcapabilities,ratherthanattackingstrategicsystems,forexample.

There’srelativelylittletosayaboutNorthKorea.Ithasdemonstratedanabilitytoputlow-masssatellitesonorbit.Withoutanypublisheddata,it’snotclearthattheyprovidedanyusefulcapability.Inmynonexpertobservations,NorthKoreadiffersfromIraninthat itdoesnothaveadevelopedcivilsocietythat itmustbeaccountabletoatsomelevel.NorthKorea’sbattleisforsurvival.Somyimpressionisthatallitsspaceactivitieswillbetailoredverycarefullytothataim;spaceisnotforimpressingneighborswithhowscientificallyadvancedtheyare.

NorthKorea is focusedonsurvivaland Irandesires tobearegionalpower,neitherhascrediblecapability tobeglobalpowers.Theydonotneedthetypesofspace infrastructurethattheUnitedStatesdoestosupportglobalaction.

RussiaandChina

Space capability, of course, plays a large role in the Russian identity. This has long been one of their mostsuccessfultechnicalareas,anditcontinuestolaunchsuccessfulcivilandmilitaryspaceprograms.AndspacehaslongbeenabrightspotofUS-Soviet/Russianrelations,evenwhenthingswereotherwisegoingpoorly.

However,Russia’spreeminenceiswaning.Russiaisexperimentingwithcommercializingitsspacecapabilities,butitsusually-reliablelaunchershavehadastringoffailureswhichcannotbehelpingthateffort.

TheUShasbeenfaraheadofRussiainspaceforquitesometime;currentlytheUShasmorethanfourtimesasmany satellites activelyworking as Russia does and has a thriving commercialmarket. That part is no surprise.Whatismoresurprisingtothosewhohaven’tbeenpayingattentionisthatRussiaisnotthesecondplacespacepower,itisthird,andnotreallyeveninthesameclassasChina.Chinahasmanymoresatellites,andisexpandingandinnovating,andhasambitiousgoals.

Inthe1980s,Chinawasveryconcernedaboutfallingbehindtechnologically,particularlybehindtheUnitedStatesandwanted toensure its technological self-sufficiency.36 Itmade significant investments and created long-termplans to keep abreast of international developments in science and technology and to identify potentialbreakthroughs that could help solve urgent problems in China’s socioeconomic development and its nationalsecurity.TheseplansarecomingtofruitionasChinadevelopsandlaunchesitsownprecisionnavigationandtimingconstellation, builds a variety of earth observation and communications satellites, and creates an independentspacescienceandexplorationprogram.Chinahasalsosoughtopportunitieswhereitmightberecognizedfor itsuniquecontributionstospacescienceandtoimprovethehumancondition.ThismaybeseenintheChineseMoonand Mars exploration programs, and in its recent launches of astrophysics and greenhouse gas monitoringsatellites.

China is a large and populous country with enormous a challenge to provide a good standard of living in asustainableway.Italsowantstobeseenasadominantpowerinitsregion,andbeingthepossessorandproviderofsophisticatedtechnologyisimportant.Spacelaunchandsatelliteservicesareimportantpartsofthesesolutions.

Asforthemilitaryattitudestowardspace, itwasnot lostonChinanorRussiawhattheUSmilitarycandowhensupported by space-based services. Neither China nor Russia appear to have near-term ambitions to be globalpowers,butverymuchwanttobethedominantregionalpowers.Sointhatsense,nationalsecurityspaceplaysan

36Kulacki,G.StrategicOptionsforChineseSpaceScienceandTechnologyATranslationandAnalysisofthe2013ReportfromtheChineseAcademyofSciences.November2013.http://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/legacy/assets/documents/nwgs/strategic-options-for-chinese-space-science-and-technology-11-13.pdf


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importantroleforbothcountries,forexample,intelligence,surveillance,andreconnaissance;precisionnavigationandtiming;andsecurecommunications.BecauseChinadoesnothavealaunchonwarningposture,itisbelievedthatitdoesnothavesatellitestoprovideearlywarningofballisticmissiles.Ithasanascentballisticmissiledefensecapability,and for it tobea robustdefenseagainst long-rangemissiles,Chinawould likelywant tohavesuchasatellite. On the other hand, China may be working on ballistic missile defense in order to understand thetechnology sufficiently to improve its ability to penetrate it. Russia has early warning satellites, but has notprioritizedkeepingthiscapabilityintiptopshape.

Much has beenmade of the idea that China is planning an asymmetric attack against theUnited States spacecapabilities.Certainlysomeofthisconcernstemsfromtheinherentvulnerabilityofindividualsatellites,aswellastheir critical importance tomanymissions. It is not at all clear that this is really thewayChina approaches theissue,37orthattheideamakessenseinastrategiccontext.

IwouldassumethatbothChinaandRussiahaveinvestedinradiofrequency/jammingandopticaldazzling/blindingantisatellite and cyber attack technologies.Botharedevelopingon-orbit capabilities to autonomously approachnon-cooperativesatellites,ananti-satelliteenablingtechnology,whichisalsousefulfor“benign”purposes.Chinahasdemonstrateddirectascenthit-to-kill technologyagainstasatelliteaswellassuborbitalobjects, inamissiledefensemode.Russia’smissiledefensesystemusesanuclear-armedinterceptor,whichrelaxestherequirementsfor targeting, but is reportedly developing conventional hit-to-kill technology, which would be useful both formissiledefenseandanti-satellitemissions,inthesamewaythattheUSandChina’sprogramsare.SobothChinaandRussiahavesomecapability to interferewithother satellites in reversible,nondestructivemeansaswellasdestructive,debris-producingmeans.

That said, China and Russia have joined together to promote a set of constraints on space weaponry in thePreventingthePlacementofWeaponsinSpaceTreaty.TheyhaveparticipatedconstructivelyinthedevelopmentoftheUNCommitteeonthePeacefulUsesofOuterSpace’sLongTermSustainabilityGuidelines.Ithinkthatitisclear that certainly inpeacetime, they are invested inhaving spaceoperationsbeorderly, safe, and secure, forboth national security missions as well as for their commercial and civil pursuits. As a crisis unfolds and thepossibilityofarmedconflictinspaceisentertained,Iexpectthattheyalsopreferconstraintandpredictabilityandtobeabletomanagetheconflict.Becauseit’sanewmediumforconflict,thepotentialformisunderstandingandmiscalculationisgreat.

HarrisCorporation,LLCBrigadierGeneral(USAFret.)ThomasF.Gould

VicePresident,BusinessDevelopment,AirForcePrograms

Colonel(USAFret.)JenniferL.MooreSeniorManager,StrategyandBusinessDevelopment,SpaceSuperiority

GilKlingerVicePresident,SeniorExecutiveAccountManagerforNationalSecurityFutureArchitectures

15September2017WRITTENRESPONSE

PRC,Russia,Iran,NorthKorea:EachclearlyrecognizesthattheU.S.abilitytousespacetosupportmilitaryandintelligenceoperations is amassive asymmetric advantage forU.S. forces.Unfortunately, each is equally awarethat the high and still increasing level of dependence on space by U.S. military forces is also an asymmetricvulnerability.Inacrisisthatescalatestoauseofcyberorkineticattacks,anyadversarywiththecapabilitytodoso

37Kulacki,G.AnAuthoritativeSourceonChina'sMilitarySpaceStrategy,March2014.http://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/legacy/assets/documents/nwgs/China-s-Military-Space-Strategy.pdf


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is almost obliged to attackU.S. space capabilities early in a conflict...andmost likely even before, the onset ofcombat operations in other domains; with the goal of disrupting or denying U.S. forces’ the use of space.AdditionalinformationabouttheindividualorcollectiveviewsoftheabovenationsintermsofmilitaryorstrategicimportanceisavailablefromtheIntelligenceCommunity.

EuropeanSpaceAgency,Japan,India,SouthKorea,Israel&Canada,Brazil,Australia,Singapore,Ukraine,others:

Thecountries listedabove,andothernationsthathaveorarebuildingan indigenousspace industrialbase,onethatincludesdesignandmanufacturingcapabilitiesforeither/bothsatelliteandlaunch,view“space”asanengineforeconomicdevelopmentandtechnologyadvancement.Manyofthesecountries,e.g.,France,India,Japan,etc.also view their acquisition of satellite and launch capabilities as symbols of national power and stature in theinternational community. As one example, as early as themid-1960s, France decided to embark on a nationalspacecapabilitybecauseitcametoviewpossessionofspacecapabilitiesasapre-requisitetosuperpowerstatus(inmuchthesamewaythatFrancesoughtitsownnuclearweaponscapabilityinpartforthesamereason).


Interviewer: [Q2]Okay.Inthesecondparagraphhere,Ithoughtthiswasaveryinterestingpointabouthowsome of these space programs have a nationalistic element to them. I’mwondering if in thisnationalisticpursuit,howmuchofanopportunitydoestheUS(commercialsectororotherwise)havetocementtheirroleinthedevelopmentoftheseprograms,Ifany?OrinthecaseofFrench,IndiaandJapanasapursuitofthesecapabilities,strictlydomesticintheirownrightsordoestheUShaveanopportunitytoplayarolethere.

T.Gould: [Q2]Iguesstherearetwopartstothatissue.Oneishowmuchdotheywant.Thefactthattheywant to develop this capability indigenously would seem to indicate that they want to do itwithoutbeingreliantontheUSforallthereasonsthatwestateinouranswer,prestige,nationalpride, etc., what it means to their technological base, and how they can leverage thosetechnologiesinotherareas.Butthesecondpartoftheequation,isfranklyhowwillingarewe,astheUSgovernment,tosharetechnology,especiallyinspecialmissionareaswithourallies.Asanexample, we were just at a trade show and were talking about sharing electronic warfarecapabilitieswithanally.Ofcourse,inordertoshareelectronicwarfarecapabilitiesandintegratethem onto another nation’s aircraft, both parties need to share sensitive information. Theplatformproviderwill need to share some informationon its sensors,processors, andmissioncapabilitiestoensureourelectronicwarfaretechniquesdonotinterferewiththeirsystems;andwe would need to provide some pretty sensitive information on our system to the platformprovider to ensure their cyber security and information assurance requirements aremet. Forthese reasons, there are times when we are unable to assist or leverage foreign capabilitiesbecauseofproprietaryand/ornationalsecurityconcerns.

Idon’tknowifthatansweredyourquestion,butit’spartrelease-ability issueandpartnationalsecurity issue.Whenwetalkabout indigenousspacecapabilities,wearenottalkingabout justsatellite communication...that’s relatively simple. But the ability to dowhat I’ll call the criticalfunctions of getting to space and maintaining the domain; these are sensitive issues. I’d beinterested inyour team's thoughtsonwhether theythought therewereanynationalconcernseither way with the US contributing to a foreign nation’s space program that was beingdevelopedindigenously.


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Dr.JasonHeldChiefExecutiveOfficer(SaberAstronautics)

17August2017WRITTENRESPONSE

AustraliaSpace

• Australiahasitsowninertiainthespacedomainthatisdifferentfromtherestofworld.• China has been seen as a commercial partner in the past. (Australia avoided the last recession due to

China’s purchase of minerals). Commercial factors are driving the Australian Space industry, ChinesemoneyisrunningoutandsoapivottotheUScouldbefostered.

o TheTrumpadministrationisdeterringthisburgeoningofthepotentialrelationshipwiththeUS.“ChinaisamajortradepartnerforAustraliaintheminingsectorbutnotspace.Theyhavelimitedinroadstospace(althoughtheyhavemadesomeinvestmentsinAustralianUAVs).TheUSAremainstheprimaryspacepartneronthegovernmentside. Airbus(France)hasbeenaggressivewithchasingandsupportingspacestartups. BAEhasalwaysbeenapresenceforUAVs.”

• Australiangovernmentisconservativewiththespaceindustry,buttheywanttofundasuccess.• Currentstartupshavebegunwithoutanygovernmentfundingorassistance,butnowiscurrentlycatching

on.• Australiaisinchargeof1/6thoftheearthandonlyhas25millionpeoplecurrently,andisgoodatspace

control, SatCom is a particular strength. Australia will not compete very well against America but thiscouldchange.

TheresaHitchensSeniorResearchAssociate

(CenterforInternationalandSecurityStudiesatMaryland[CISSM],UniversityofMaryland)

19July2017(writtensubmission)30June2017(interviewsubmission)

WRITTENRESPONSEEXCERPT

Thisisareallybroadandmixedupsetofquestions.Itwouldtakesometimeandanalysistoanswerthoroughly.Roughly, PRC, Russia, France, Italy, Germany, India, and Israel have independent andwell thought outmilitaryplanningforuseofsats.Russia,PRC,IsraelandIndiahaveinterestinoffensiveusesofspace;andhaverelativelyhigh levelsof state controlof industry.Canada,UK,Australiahaveassets thatprimarily link intoUSoperations;have private companies butwith different levels of relationship than in the US. ESA operations are strictly forpeacefulpurposesanddonotincludemilsatoperations.Japanisstillworkingoutitsmilitaryspaceconceptsandoperations. I’mnotsosurereBrazil/SouthKoreaandSingapore–wouldneedtodosomeresearchtocatchup.Brazilbuildsitsownsats,Ithinktheothersdotoo.NKisanaspiringspaceactor,notreallyafactoryet.


Interviewer: [Q2] Now let’smove into question two, which focuses on ally, partner, and adversary use of

space.Asyoucansee fromthisquestion inour list, itpresentsanumberofcountries to thinkabout. So, before we jump into the question, I just want to check with you and see which


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countriesfromthatlistthatyoufeelmostwell-suitedtotalkaboutand/orfeelmostcomfortableaddressing.

T.Hitchens: I will start by caveating that I am not an expert on any one of these countries listed in thequestion.With that said, I do believe I have enough information in general on some of thesecountriestobehelpful. I’mnotacountryareaexperttobehonest,butIcantalkaboutmodusoperandiingenericterms.

Formorecountry-specificexperts,IwouldencourageyoutoreachouttoDeanChengforaChinaperspective,PavelPodvig foraRussiaperspective, JeffreyLewis foraNorthKoreaperspective,andsomebodyfromtheMansfieldInstituteforaJapanperspective.

Icanprovideamorehigh-level,overviewperspectivetosomeofthesequestions.

Interviewer: [Q2]Okay,thankyou,that isreallyhelpful.So,asIaskyouthesequestions,pleasefeelfreetojustpickandchoosewhichevercountryyoufeelmostcomfortablewithtalkingaboutatamoregenerallevel.

Firstquestion:Whatarethekey,essential,andmajorthingsthatweshouldknowaboutthesecountries’ space programs, space interests, and space ambitions, both with respect to thegovernmentandcommercialrealms?

T.Hitchens: Well,let’sstartbybracketingthesecountriestoputthemincategories.

Roughly,fromsortofabirds-eyeview,China,Russia,France,Italy,Germany,India,andIsraelallhave fairly independent andwell thought out satellite programs, including formilitary usages.These countries have actual military satellites and military programs where they integratesatelliteoperations into their forces toagreateror lesserextent.Butallof thosecountriesdohaveamilitaryaspecttotheirspaceprograms.

If youmovedown the list and lookatCanada, theUK, andAustralia, andyouwant to lookattheirmilitaryassets,thoseareprimarilylinkedintoUSoperations—thesecountriesdon’tdoalotontheirownmilitarily,thingsarelinkedintoUSprogramsandoperations,etc.

WithrespecttoSouthKorea,Idon’tknowallthatmuchaboutthem.SouthKoreaisarelativelynewplayerinthesatellitefamily.

IthinkBrazilactuallybuildsitsownsatellites,butI’mnotsure.

Certainly, North Korea is an aspiring space actor, but I wouldn’t say they have any realcapabilitiesyet tospeakof.NorthKorea iskindofbehind thepowercurvea lot.That’swhat Iwouldsay.

Theother thing thatyouneed tounderstand is thatallof thesecountries,every singleoneofthem,hasaverydifferentapproachtocommercialsatellitecompaniesinoperationthanthatofthe US. None of these countries have wholly, really wholly independent satellite companies,except from maybe Canada and the UK, but even Canada and the UK have fairly broadgovernmentinvestmentsintheircommercialspacecompanies.InplaceslikeIsrael,forexample,orevenFrance,thegovernmenttendstoholdamajorityshareinallofthecountry’scommercialcompanies—orifnotamajorityshare,thenat leastanevenshare.So,thesecountries’modelsforcommercialspaceoperationsaretotallydifferentthantheUS.Indiahasaburgeoningkindofnichespacecommercialsector,butthosepeoplearereallyfrustratedbecausetheyfeelthattheIndiangovernment,becausemostofIndia’ssatellitedevelopmentisdonethroughacivilagency,isactuallycompetingwiththemandisintheirway,sothat’saprobleminIndia.

Theother interestingthingIwouldsay is, ifyouare lookingattheEuropeanSpaceAgency,weshould remember that they don’t operate anymilitary satellite programs.While France, Italy,Germany, and the UK do so individually, the European Space Agency doesn’t. The EuropeanSpaceAgencyisagroup,aninter-governmentalorganizationthatfocusesonpeacefulusesand


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doesn’t really have a commercial relationship so to speak. The European Space Agency iscompletelydifferentfromnationalagencies—itisfundedbytheEUandmemberstates.

So,themodelsaredifferent.WhatIamtryingtogetatisthatitishardtolookatthecommercialmarketplacebecauseyou can’t lookat it in the samewayacross theseother countriesas youprobablycanintheUnitedStates.

Interviewer: [Q2]Thatfirstbracketofcountriesyoumentioned,howyouaresortofbracketingthem,seemtohaveprettyrobustspaceprograms,atleastonthegovernmentandmilitaryside.

T.Hitchens: Yes.

Interviewer: [Q2]So,withrespecttothespaceprogramsofthecountriesinthatfirstbracketyoupresent,ingeneral are there any particular areas of focus within those space programs that the variouscountries aremost focused on (i.e., is one countrymore focused on satellites, exploration, orsomethingelse,oristhefocusmoreevenlydistributedacrossallareasofthespaceprogram)?

T.Hitchens: Itisreallyacase-by-casesituation.IfyoulookatFranceandItalyforexample,theyhavemilitarysatellites. They also have, I believe, a radar satellite system that is a Franco-Italian satellitesystem. The Germans have a SAR satellite system. India is really focused at the moment oncommunicationandEarthobservationsatellites. IsraelhashadafocusoncommunicationsandEarth observation as well. China has, as probably everyone knows, a fairly robust interest inbuilding a number of different kinds of satellites, both for commercial and civil purposes, andRussiaaswell,kindofacrosstheboard.

If you are going to look at these countries and think about who is interested in perhapswarfightinginspaceoranti-satellitecapabilities,you’dbelookingatRussiaandChinaandIndiaand Israel. France andGermany and Italy, as themost active European space countries, haveexpressednointerestin—infactoppositionto—theissueofanti-satelliteweapons.

Interviewer: [Q2]Youmentionedearlierthatoneofthekeydifferentiatorsforsomeofthesespaceprograms,compared to the US, is the clear government ownership of commercial entities within thecommercialsector.

T.Hitchens: Yeah.

Interviewer: [Q2] So, beyond that particular differentiator, are there any other glaring differentiators ordifferencesthatweshouldbeawareofbetweenthesecountries’spaceprogramsandhowtheyoperate?

T.Hitchens: Youmeanamongstthosecountriesordoyoumeanthemversusus?

Interviewer: [Q2]Between each other, lesswith respect to United States but between each other. So, forexample, are thereanyglaringdifferentiatorsordifferencesbetween theRussianandChinesespaceprogramsandhowtheyoperate?

T.Hitchens: Okay. So, certainly in Russia and China everything is government owned. Everything isgovernmentownedand/orit’stiedtogovernmentcontrol.Indiaislargelygovernmentcontrolledbutnottotally.

The European countries have more commercial-specific interests and even though they havegovernmentinterests,theyhavecommercialcompaniesandcompaniesthatexportstuffanddopartnershipsandthingslikethat.Soyoufindthatthere’slessgovernmentinterference,ornoneatall,inthosecommercialoperationsinEuropethanthereisinRussiaandChina.

So, ultimately, the commercial models are different across all of these countries that yourquestion lists, especially in China since China doesn’t have a commercial model. China has“commercial companies”—I’m putting that in quotes—and Russia has “commercialcompanies”—I’m putting that in quotes as well—while in reality they are not commercial


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companies at all. Do you know what I mean? That’s kind of the differences amongst thosecountriesifyouwill.

Interviewer: [Q2]Okay.So,thisfirstbracketofcountriesyoupresentseemtobethedominantspaceplayersfromourlist.

T.Hitchens: Yeah,theydo.

Interviewer: [Q2]So,projectingintothefutureIguessifyoucould,doyouseeanyofthecountriesfromourlistthatyoudon’tconsidertocurrentlybe inthatfirstbracketeventuallygetting intothatfirstbracket?

T.Hitchens: Okaysoothercountriesmovingintothatfirstbracket.WellcertainlyIndiaistryingtoexpanditsfootprint. The other country trying to expand its footprint is Japan, although it is not entirelyclear Japan really knowswhat it is doing. Japanhas a lotof thoughtprocesses, and is doingahuge review of all their policies and what they should do in space. Japan has been trying toformulateaplanforhowtomoveforwardinthespacedomain.WhileJapanhasn’tquitegottenthereyet,asthingsmoveforward,Iseethembecomingamuchbiggerforceinspacethantheyhavebeeninthepast.

Ialsothinkweshouldkeepaneyeonsomeoftheemergingspacepowers.SingaporeandBrazilin particular are really interesting. Australia has been struggling to figure outwhere to put itsassetsaswell.Idon’treallyseeAustraliabecomingamajorplayer,butI’dkeepaneyeonBrazilandSingaporeandSouthKoreaaspotentiallargerplayersinthespacedomainasthingsgoon.

Interviewer: [Q2]Okay,so lookingat this topbracketofcountries thatyoupresent, Iguess includingJapanandIndiaaswell,howdothesecountriessortofcomparetotheUSintermsofspacepowerandspacecapability? Is it thecasethat theUS is just leapsandboundsaheadofallof theseothercountriesinthespacedomain?

T.Hitchens: TheUSis leapsandboundsaheadofallcountries,everysinglecountry,whether itbeChinaorRussiawhoarenextinline.TheUSis10to20yearsaheadintheintegrationofspaceoperationboth into its economic network and its military network depending on country. India, forexample, is just moving into satellite communications for banking, for Internet and wirelessbankingforexample,whichitishavingallsortsoftroublewithcurrently.

Technologywise,IwouldsaythatIdisagreewiththeideathattheUSissomehowstartingtolosethespacerace—Idon’tthinkthat’strueatall.Iwouldsaythatinthemilitaryarena,bothRussiaandChinaareattemptingtocatchupwiththeUnitedStates,buttheyarenotthereyet.Chinahasalotofambitions,buttheystillhaven’treallyintegratedspaceintotheiroperations.Russiahas problems, they have money problems. Russia has had money problems since the 1990s.Russiahadaveryrobustspaceprogramupuntilthe1990sandthenthingsstartedbreaking,andtheyhaven’treallybeenreplacingthingsandit’sonlynowthattheyhavereallystartedtoinvestin trying to reinvigorate their different systems, and, as such, Russia has been focusing onmilitaryspaceasthekindofwaytobegintocompetewiththeUS.

Interestingly,whileintheUSweoftenreadaboutChinaasapotentialadversaryinspace,ChinaIthink is less concentrated on creating systems that would create problems for US spaceoperationsthantheRussiansare.Chinaactuallyhasmuchbroaderspaceambitions, fromtheirastronautsandtheirhumanspaceprogramstobeingabletobringcommunicationinfrastructuretotheirwholecountry,etc.So,ultimately,China’sportfolioismuchbroader,butit’salsomuchlessfocused.

Interviewer: [Q2]SoitsoundslikethegapbetweentheUSandeveryoneelseinthespacearenaisprettybigorprettystrong.

T.Hitchens: It’s pretty big. Though, in certain kinds of technologies, when we look at certain kinds oftechnologies,thatalsoisnotnecessarilytrue.Forexample,theUSisbehindevenCanadawhenit


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comes to theuseofSyntheticApertureRadar (SAR) satellitesbecause theUSGdidn’twantUScommercial providers to operate in this area for a long time, so the US didn’t really have acommercialmarketforSARsatellites.So,othercountriesareaheadoftheUSinsomethinglikeSAR.

Additionally, Chinahas recentlymadea verymajorbreakthrough inquantumcommunicationsfromsatellites,whichisaprettybigdeal.Chinahasnowdemonstratedquantumentanglementfromasatellitetotheground,whichiskindofthefirststepindevelopingaquantumencryptionkey for secure communication between satellites or just in general for ground to Earthcommunication.That’sabigdeal,thatwasareallyhuge,ginormousdeal.

So,incertaintechnologies,theUnitedStatesisbehind,butacrosstheboardtheUnitedStatesisaheadinthespacedomain.

Interviewer: [Q2]Andyouthinkthatoverallgapingeneralisprettystrong?

T.Hitchens: Ithinktheoverallgapingeneral isprettystrong.Ithinkthegapis lesseningbutIstillthinkit’sprettystrong.ImeanitusedtobethattheUSwaslike30yearsaheadofeverybody,butsomecountriesareprobablyonly10yearsbehindnow.

I am going to say that other countries are working very hard to close that gap—a lot ofcountries—andthat’sonlynaturalbecausetechnologynow,certaintechnologythat it tooktheUnitedStatesalongtimetodevelop,arenowavailableandsotheyareoutthereandoncethesetechnologiesgetoutinthefreeworld,peopledon’thavetoinvestalltheupfrontcapitalandtheresearch,theycanjustbuystuff.

So,thegapisprobablymorenarrowthanithasbeenintherecentpast,butIstillthinkthere’saprettysignificantgap.

Interviewer: [Q2]Okay.Oneotherquestion.Areanyoftheseofthesecountriesthatwelistedcollaboratingand/orcooperatingwitheachothertoadvancetheir interests inthespacerealm?And,ontheotherendofthespectrum,areanyofthesecountriessortofopenlyhostiletowardseachotherwithrespecttotheirspaceinterestsandactivity?

T.Hitchens: Well of course the Europeans all workwith each other and are all prettywell aware of eachother’s interestsandactivities. InEurope, you’vegot theEuropeanSpaceAgency,andeven inthe military realm—although they are little more secretively—the Europeans are workingtogetheronvariousaspectsofvarioussatelliteprograms(e.g.,Galileo),variousgroundsystems,etc.

TheChineseareveryinterestedinsatellitecooperation.Theyseetheirsatellitecapabilitiesasaformofsoftpower,andthereforetheyaredoingalotofmarketinginplaceslikeAfricaandLatinAmerica,andhelpingothercountriesownandoperate their firstsatelliteor their firstsatellitesystemsprimarily in theEarthobservationarena. TheChineseare very interested inmarket—they have a capitalist-hybrid communist economy, so they have a lot of interest in playing abiggerroleintheworldmarket.ChinaisalsoworkingveryhardtodevelopcooperationwiththeEuropeansinspace.

The Russians, I don’t know. The Russians are just in such a bad space right now across thegeopolitical spectrum, so theyare kindof currentlynot really cooperatingwith anybodyotherthanalittlebitofcooperationwithIndiaandChinaoverall.

Putting North Korea, which is an outlier problem set here, to this side, I don’t think there’sactuallyhostilityinspacethatI’mawareofbetweenthesecountries.Imean,indeed,Iwouldsayat least based off of my interactions internationally, there is a lot of concern amongst othercountries, who are not Russia, China, and the United States, about growing hostility betweenChina, Russia, and the United States because they see those geopolitical hostilities and thepotentialrisksofconflictasbeingdetrimentaltotheirownambitionsinspace.


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[…]

Interviewer: [Q2 indirectly]So,Theresa,wealwaysask thisquestionat theendofour interviews: Is thereanythingthatIhaven’taskedyouthatIshouldhave,oristhereanyfinalpointyouwouldliketoconcludewith?

T.Hitchens: Okay, interesting. Ihavea lotofthoughtsonsomeoftheotherquestionsfromyourfull listofquestions. I wanted to just briefly address Q3 from your list of questions because I think theframingofthisquestionisreallyimportant.

So,whatarethemotivationsofnation-stateandnon-stateactors(e.g.,violentextremists,etc.)to

contestuseofspace intimesofpeace, instability,andconflict?Whatarethepolitical,military,

environmental,orsocialcostsassociatedwithactingonthosemotivations?

I mean, again, this is a state-by-state question—you have to look at each state individually,differentstateshavedifferentmotivations,andthat’sgoingtobeprettyclear.Therearesomecountries that have motivations for counter-space operations against the United States, andmaybethere’smore.That’snotasurprise.ThenmaybeIndiaandIsraelhaveshownaninterestincounter-spacecapabilitiesbecausetheyfeelthreatenedbytheirneighborsandinsomewaysjustwanttokeepupingeneral.

Iwanttoaddresstheissueofthenon-stateactors.Ipersonallydon’tseenon-stateactorshavinganyinterestinmessingwithspace,sotospeak.Ijustdon’tseeit.Idon’tthinknon-stateactorshaveanymotivation todo so, I don’t think theywouldwant to spend themoney, and I don’tthinkithelpsthemachievetheirgoals.Ithinkthiswouldbekindofsilly.

I actually think this question is kindof amoot question. I don’t see anymotivations there fornon-stateactorstocontestspace.

Ialsoseenomotivations,perhapswiththeexceptionofNorthKoreawho isanoutlier,onthepartofanyotherstatestomessupspaceingeneral.Inotherwords,theymightcontesttheuseofspaceinaconflict,particularlyinaconflictwiththeUnitedStates.ButIdon’tseethemhavingmotivation to do something stupid like launching an EMP. This is because of the fact thesecountriesareinvestingmoneyinimprovingtheiruseofspace,sothere’snothinginitforthem,at least in peace timeand even crisis stability. In times of conflict, they havemotivations andthey might have motivation even to do things like creating space debris or creating spaceweapons if they feel as though theyare losingawar. Theymighthavemotivations todo thatbecausetheyhavethosecapabilities,andcouldseehowitwouldhelpthemwinaconflict.

Indeed,withtheUnitedStatesunderTrump,thisalsomightnotactuallybeofflimitsfortheUSifwewereinaconflict.We’vesaidthatwedon’twishtousespacedebriscreatingweapons,thatwehavenodesiretoseethosekindsofweaponsdeployedanddeveloped,andthatwehavenointentionofproducingthosekindsofweapons.Butwe’veneveroutlinedinanydoctrinalpaperor any policy papers that we have instituted that self-imposed ban on these kinds oftechnologies—we’venotdonethat.Inotherwords,wehavenolegalorpolicycommitmentstoourpledges.

So,allI’msayingisthatIdon’tseeanymotivationforanyone,withNorthKoreabeinganoutlierbecausewho knowswhat theirmotivations are, in actually harming space as an environmentbecause there’s too much social and economic and military benefit coming from space foranyone to really want to contemplate ruining space for everybody else. I think it’s reallyimportantthatthisunderstandingunderliesthisquestionaboutmotivationstocontestspace.

Interviewer: [Q2 indirectly] So you think that the huge investments that actors are making in the spacedomainandintheirownspaceprogramsandcapabilitiesisthekeyfactordeterringcontestationandaggressioninspace?


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T.Hitchens: Yeah, I do. I reallydo. Forme, thisquestionofproliferationof technology is sortof adouble-edged sword. In someways, yes it shrinks the gapbetweenUS technical capabilities andnewtechnicalcapabilitiesofothercountries,right?Butontheotherhand,themorestatesthatareactuallyinvestedintheuseofspaceandwhoseeeconomicdevelopmentfromitandwhohaveputmonetaryinvestmentsinusingspace,thebetterbecausethoseactorshavefewerandfewermotivationstodoanythingreallydisruptive inspace.Theseotheractorsarebeginningtogrowtheirowndependenciesontheuseofspacefortheirowneconomicdevelopment,sothey’dbeshootingthemselvesinthefootbycausingchaosinspace.Ultimately,themoreinvestedyouareinspace,thelessmotivationyouhavetodosomethingreallyawfulinthespacedomain.It’sjustcommonsense.

JonathanHungPresident(SingaporeSpaceandTechnologyAssociation)

23August2017INTERVIEWTRANSCRIPTEXCERPT

J.Hung: [Q2]Sure.But,justtonoteupfront,Singaporedoesnothaveaverysignificantspaceprogram.Imean, Singapore does a lot of regional work but it is mostly for satellites and observationactivities.So,I’mnotquitesurewhatkindofresponsesyouarelookingfortoday,but,honestlyspeaking,werarelyhavethesekindsofdiscussionsinourregion,anddefinitelynotintermsofthedifferencebetweencommercialventuresandIguessspaceoperationsformilitarypurposes.With that said, I’mnotquite surewhatkindof responsesyouare looking forbut Iwill trymybest.

[…]

J.Hung: [Q2] I am lookingat thismore fromaSingaporeperspective,and inSingaporewe thinkaboutspacemorefromapureeconomicpointofview…

[…]

Interviewer: [Q2]Okay. Let’smove on to themain question that I was hopingwe could address,which isabouthowotheractorsconceiveofspaceoperationsformilitaryandcommercialpurposes.So,howdoesSingapore,andmaybesomeothercountriesandSingapore’sregion,conceiveofspaceoperationsforbothmilitarilyandcommercialpurposes?

J.Hung: Well,Singaporeisfairlynewtospace.Commercialspaceactivityhasreallyonlybeenhappeningnow for about 5 years in Singapore. We have a company in Singapore that manufacturescommercial satellites for imaging and observation, and this data is sent to other commercialaudiences. Ultimately, Singapore looks at space as an opportunity for the country to exploreanothercommercialarena—spaceisanotherindustryforus.ThespacearenaprovidesSingaporewithanopportunitytocreateandprovidejobsandresearch,andSingaporeistryingtofinditsnichesandsometopsystemapplications.

Singaporeisnotvyingtocreatethebiggestspaceagencyintheworld.Singaporedoesnotevenhaveaspaceagencyornationalspacepolicy.So,again,Singapore’sinterestinspacearepurelydrivenbycommercialandeconomicinterests.CompaniesfromtheUS,fromEurope,andfromallover theworldare starting to setup shop in Singapore, and therearea lotof innovators andstartups that are venturing to Singapore as well. Also, given the region, there are increasingobservationandcommunicationsatelliterequirementsforSingapore—notthebigtraditional2-tonne kind of satellites, but now smaller, smarter, and cheaper satellites. There is a lot of


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research going on in Singapore currently about what types of things can be done with smallsatellites.

MostofSingapore’sinterestswithrespecttospacearetargetedatcommercialmeans,disastermanagement, and research. So, I think this is Singapore conceives of space operations andplanning—commercial and economic interests are really thedriver, and its got to standon itsowntwofeet.AnotherreasonwhySingaporeisinnohurrytohaveaspaceagencyisbecause,likeallourotherindustriesinSingapore,thebasisoftheindustrysurvivinganddoingwellandisthatithastobecommerciallysustainable,whichisthenumberoneprincipleinSingapore—theindustry cannot be dependent on government funding, etc. There’s the possibility thatSingapore’sgovernmentcouldcutfunding,sothecommercialbackbonehastobeverysolid,andthishowwearebuildingupourspacesatelliteindustryinSingapore.

Interviewer: [Q2]So,itsoundslikeSingaporeisprimarilyacommercialspaceactor.Giventhis,plusthefactthatitseemsasthoughSingaporehasnospaceagencyornationalspacepolicy,doesSingapore’sgovernmentdoanyactivityregardingspace?

J.Hung: Singaporedoesnothaveaspaceagencynoranationalspacepolicy.Myorganization isanon-profittradeassociation,sowehavecorporatemembersandallthat,andwedon’tdefinepolicybutofcourseweworkatalllevelsofthegovernment.Forsomeofthegovernmentagencies,myorganization is the conduit to research partners, academic institutions, and commercialcompanies—wecutacrosseverything.ThingsinSingaporeareverycommercialtradedrivenandresearchdriven.

Interviewer: [Q2]So,whatistherelationshiplikebetweenthegovernmentandcommercialspaceentitiesinSingapore?

J.Hung: TherearevariousgovernmentagenciesinSingaporethatarelookingatspaceintheirownway.For example, the primary go-to government contact is the Singapore Economic DevelopmentBoard.So,ourprimaryspaceofficeisundertheSingaporeEconomicDevelopmentBoard,whichisourmaininboundinvestmentagency.Thisisclearlyverytelling—Singaporehasputitsprimaryspace office as a subset under its main economic office. This office is looking to attractcompanies to come to Singapore and leverage the pool of assets, talents, resources, etc. inSingaporeandintheregion.

So,therelationshipbetweengovernmentandcommercialinSingaporeisverygood.Ifsomebodywants to setup some kind of a presence or open up offices in Singapore, the government ishappy to talk to them about how it can support their growth. The government supportscommercialgrowththroughincentive,talentdevelopment,businessmatching,assistancetoaidgrowth in the region, finding additional business opportunities, etc. The government does itsbest to help commercial companies grow because the internationalmarket formost of thesecompaniesisverysignificant.

So, ultimately, I think the arrangement between commercial and government in Singapore isexcellent.

Interviewer: [Q2]Okay.Thatisrefreshingtohear.So,whatdoyouseeasthekeyambitionsandinterestsofsomeofSingapore’scommercialspaceentities?YouhavementionedthatSingaporeviewsthespacedomainasanopportunitytoexploreandextendintonewareasinpursuiteconomicandtradeinterests,soarethosetheonlyambitionsorarethereanyothersinadditiontothat?

J.Hung: I think that’sprimarily it. Andthat’salsodue insomepart to the fact thatSingapore isprettysmall,sotheresourcesthatareavailablehavetobeusedproperly.Singaporeneedstomoveupthevaluechain—thelabor-intensivemanufacturingisgoneandnoweverybodyisgoingtoIOT,soIthinkwehaveidentifiedspaceasanareaofinterestfornecessarydevelopment.Singaporeistrying to tackle its challengesatall levels, and tapping into the spacedomainopensupanewmarketandnewindustry.


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Again,Singaporedoesnothaveaspaceprogramperse,but,theoretically,everyspaceprogramneeds good industry (i.e., a good aerospace industry, a good electronics industry, a goodprecisionengineering industry,agoodinformationandcommunications industry,etc.). Inmostcases,thecountry’sspaceprogramhelpsdevelopandgrowalloftheseindustries.However, inSingapore,itissortoftheotherwayaround—Singaporehasaverystrongaerospaceindustry,averystrongelectronicsector,agoodICTsector,anditsprecisionengineeringstrengthisnotbad.So, Singapore has all of the ingredients, so the commercial sector decided to try space. So, inSingapore,theprocesswassortofflippedtheotherwayaround.Ithasbeenaground-upeffortwerethecommercialsidehasdriventheprogress,notthegovernment.

So, the companies in Singapore see this as the next stage of growth. Can you do better incommunication? Can you do satellite communications? Can you help improve ourtelecommunication strength in region? Do you have expertise in imaging and providing gooddata? These are the types of things that Singapore’s commercial sector is interested in. Dataanalyticstodayissoftwaredrivenandalgorithmdriven,andthesearethingsthatSingaporecanplayasignificantrolein.Andforsomethinglikesatellitemanufacturing,Singapore’scompaniesarenotgoingtojustquicklybelikeBoeingorAirbusorNASA,butthecountrycanworktoenrichitsadvancedcomputingskillssothat itcanbuildbetteronboardsystemsandsub-systemsthataremorepowerful, smarter, smaller, andmoreefficient. So, Singapore is trying todevelop itscapabilities so that it canextend itsportfolioof commercial services for the restof theworld.And some of these are indigenously growth capabilities, while some have been grown inpartnership with other audiences, but, ultimately, growing its capabilities is Singapore’s maininterest.

Singaporeisalsodevelopingthenecessaryecosystemforanationalspaceprogrambyworkingtobuildmoretalentaswell.Themessageisthattobeaspaceexpertorenthusiast,youdon’tjusthavetostudyastronautics—aspaceprogramtakesinpeoplefromallsortsofengineeringfields,and fromotherbackgroundsaswell. So, first and foremost,wewant to getmorepeople intoSTEM, which is a worldwide problem right now. There is a big gap between the currentgenerationandpastgenerations—therearenotenoughmiddlemanagersandalotofstudentsthataremorefocusedonworkingatbanksbecausetheypaybetter.So,SingaporeisworkingtopushSTEMandgetmorepeopleinterestedinengineeringandsciences.Satelliteengineeringandoperations is a different field, but it excites the youth and there’s a lot of good engineeringprograms in this regard,which gives Singapore something to look forward to. So, Singapore isinvestingintalentdevelopment,andalotofinternationalspaceacademicresearchprogramsarebecomingmoreglobalsoSingapore isencouraging itsstudentstoget intotheseprogramsandinteractwiththerestoftheworld,andSingaporehasalotofpartnershipstoaidinthiseffort.

So,thereisclearbuildupinthesenseofgettingmorepeopletogointoS&T.Nobodyisgoingtobeanastronaut tomorrow,and if somepeopledonotendup in satellitemanufacturing, thenthat’sfine,butatleasttherewillbeabunchofengineersthatarewelltrainedincertainpartsofthisprogram,whichwillonlyhelpthecountryasawhole.

So,thesearereallytheprimarydriversofwhySingaporeisinterestedinspace.

Interviewer: [Q2]Okay.You’vepresenteda robustportfolioof spaceservicesandambitions thatSingaporeseems to be driving towards, so, I’m wondering, are there any areas in particular in whichSingapore is investingmostheavily, in termsof total investment, incomparisontoothers?Arethere any specific areas where Singapore’s commercial space entities are most focused oninvesting,orisinvestmentgenerallyevenacrosstheboard?

J.Hung: So, the investment is broad, but it is aimed at small satellites at the point in time. Again,Singapore isn’t investing in the big 1-2-tonne telecommunications satellites—if anything, thefocus is more on services. But, I think we are investing in areas of analytics—the big data


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analytics across all levels, whether it is the space-borne operations in space or the groundsegments.Singaporeistryingtodomorewithless.But,overall,thedriveisinthatdirection.

In termsofwhatparticular servicesSingaporedoesnothave,well, Idon’t think I coulddefinethatbecausetheentiresector inSingaporeiscontinuingtoevolve.Wearecurrently lookingatEarth observation to get better, faster, and more efficient imagery services, we are workingtowards better image cleaning solutions, andwe are working at getting better at this on theground.Thisisdefinitelyinlinewithsmallersatellites,particularlydevelopingbettersub-systemsandworkingtoprovideamoreholisticsolutiontopotentialcustomersandforourselvesinthecurrentspaceecosystem.

Interviewer: [Q2]Okay.So,ifyoulookatthelistofcountriesthatarepresentedinQ2onourlist,itseemslikethatSingaporeisaprettyuniqueexamplebecauseit isaprimarilycommercial-drivenemergingspacepower.

J.Hung: And that is verymuch in linewith theentire country. Imean,weareultimatelya financeandcommercialhub,soIguessthatisallinSingapore’sDNA,right?Singaporeisasmallcountrywithasmallamountofresources,butitisaveryfocusedcountry.

Therearemanyaspectsofspace.Andtheeducationcomponentupfront is important,andwerecognizethis inSingaporesowetalktostudentsaboutallkindsof lunarprojects,commercialspacetransportation,spacetourism,etc.Wearequiteopentoallofthesekindsofthings.

ForSingapore,attheendoftheday,regardlessofthespacesectorof interestorareaoffocusregarding space, there has to be some sort of commercial angle in order for Singapore to beseriously invested. Because, otherwise, you never know what might happen tomorrow withgovernment funding, which the government is even very selective with in the first place. Ifindustrycanstandonitsowntwofeetandcompaniescandrivecommercialsectorgrowth,thenthiswillonlyhelptojustifyandprovidemerittotheseefforts.

Interviewer: [Q2]Okay.So,givenSingapore’sclearcommercialandeconomicinterestsinthespacedomain,IimagineSingaporeisalsointerestedinregionalcooperation.ArethereanycountriesinparticularthatSingapore iscooperatingwithinanefforttoadvance its largelycommercialandeconomicspaceinterests?And,ontheothersideofthespectrum,arethereanycaseswhereSingapore’sspaceinterestsmightbesortofinconflictorcontestwithanothercountry?

J.Hung: Iwillanswerthesecondpartofthatquestionfirst.Ibelievewearethesmallestofthecountriesthatyouhavelistedinyourquestion,andSingaporedoesnothaveanationalspaceprogram,soSingapore’s space interestsareprobablynot likely to conflictwithanyother country—there isjustnotverymuchtocontest.

As for the first part of yourquestion, and cooperationwithother countries, tomy knowledgeSingaporedoesnothaveanyspacecooperationwithcountriessuchasNorthKoreaandIran,butif you disregard some of themore sensitive countries, then I think Singapore is very open tocooperationacross theboard. Singaporehasexcellent relationshipswith theUSandall of thevariousEuropeanSpaceAgency(ESA)memberstates.Singaporedoesa lotofworkwithJapan.India launches Singapore’s satellites. South Korea worked with Singapore on Singapore’s firstexperimental satellite,andSingaporehasa lotof commercial interactionswithSouthKoreaaswell.Asfortheothercountriesonyourlist,IdonotthinkSingaporehasalotofinteractionwithBrazil, Ukraine, or Canada, per se—though Canadamay be investing a bit. Singapore talks toAustralia a lot as well. On the research side, I think the Universities in Singapore talk toeverybody else that is also doing research. So, I think Singapore is quite open—our doors areopenas longas it is interestingfromanacademicorcommercialpointofview.Singaporedoesnotreallydiscountanycountry,perse.

[…]


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Interviewer: [Q2indirectly]So,wealwaysendtheseinterviewswithageneralquestion.IsthereanythingthatIhaven’taskedyouthatIshouldhave,oristhereanyfinalpointthatyouwouldliketoconcludewith?

J.Hung: I thinkyouprettymuchcoveredeverything.But, justtoconclude,Singapore isprettyagnostic.Thespaceindustryiscommerciallydriven,soalloftheprogramsandprojectsthatweweighandconsider,areconsideredbasedonitsowncommercialandeconomicmerit.AndisgenerallyhowSingaporeoperatesingeneral—ifyouweretoparallelalotofthesespace-focusedquestionstosomeofSingapore’sother industries,you’dgeta lotofthesamefeedback.Singapore’sgrowthoverallhasall largelybeencommercially-drivenfromtheground-up,andthespacesectorisnodifferent.

Singapore has a fairly strong oil, gas, and chemical sector and it ranks pretty high globally inmaritimetrade,sowehopethatsomedaythespacesectorinSingaporecanalsoreachthesamelevel,andthecountryisfollowingthesamepathtodoso.

Singapore isopentoworkingwithprettymucheveryone,as longas there issomecommercialinterestonbothsides—Singapore is interested in fosteringwin-winpartnerships, for sure,andwillcontinuetoinvestalongthatpath.

JuanHurtadoScienceandTechnologyAdvisor(UnitedStatesSouthernCommand)

26June2017WRITTENRESPONSE

Brazil

Brazil’s main interest in space is to support the national development--civilian/commercial purposes. Militarybenefits are derived and subordinate. Even within the military, support to the development of civilian /commercialcapabilitiesisakeyobjective.

Small spacecraft (microsatellite,nanosatelliteandpicosatellite)haveaprominentplace in their25-yearplan forspacemodernization.Launchfacilitiestoincludetheinfrastructure(i.e.,Alcantaralaunchsite)andlaunchvehicleshaveasecondaryinterest.

They’reorganizedinawaytoexecutetheabovestrategyforspaceoperationsandservices.TheBrazilianSpaceAgency (AEBAgenciaEspacialBrasileira,HQ inBrasilia) is responsible for thespaceprogram in thenation.Theydevelopstrategy,vision,policy,roadmaps,budgets,etc.TheNationalInstituteforSpaceResearch(INPEInstitutoNacionaldePesquisasEspaciais)conducts thebulkofgovernmental spaceresearchanddevelopmentunder theMinistryofScienceandTechnology.Theirprimaryinterestiscivilianapplicationsalthoughtheycollaboratecloselywith themilitary,particularly in the researchcenter (DCTA -DepartmentofAerospaceScienceandTechnology)locatedinSaoJosedosCampos,nearSaoPaolo.Atthis location,theTechnological InstituteofAeronautics(ITAInstitutoTecnologicodeAeronautica)apseudomilitaryacademicorganizationrunbytheBrazilianAirForce(FABFuerza Aerea Brasileira) is key for related education and development. Another important governmentalorganization is the Center for Space Operations (COPE-P) located in Brasilia under oversight of the FAB. TheyconductthespaceoperationsforBrazil.

These governmental organizations responsible for the space program, research, education and operations areaugmented by the commercial sector and universities. Industry partners includes Visiona Space Technology(satellitemanufacturing),Embraer(defense),Telebras(telecommunications),andseveralstart-upswhicharebeing


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incubated by the innovation hub in San Jose Dos Campos. Universities with space programs to develop theworkforceincludetheUniversityofSaoPaolo,RiodeJaneiroandotherschoolsthroughoutthecountry.

HowdoesBrazilapproachspaceoperationsandservices?

Theirapproachconsistsofnationalandinternationalactivities.Organicfunctionsarethosethatpreservecapacitybuilding and safeguard national interests. Brazil is largely dependent on the international support for launch,satellite manufacturing (Brazil has competent capabilities in this area but more development is needed), andorbitalmechanics.Asanillustrativeexampleoftheirspacecapacityconsidertheyonlyhaveoneastronautinthehistoryoftheirspaceprogram.AllthistosayBrazilhascapacityinspace,certainlymorethanothernationsintheregion;however,theirprogramisstillindevelopment.

Intheareaofforeignsupport,welosta lotofgroundinbuildinganenduringpartnershipwithBrazilduetoourspacepolicyguidelines.Wewerenotresponsivetotheirrequestsforspacesupportduringaspanofthelast15-years (country-tocountrybilaterals,workinggroups,officialvisits,etc.).Brazilwas forced tobuildallianceswithotherssuchasFrance,andChina.Infact,wewouldhavetomakeaconcertedandsustainedefforttocatch-upandnot leave this flank completely uncontested. TheChinesehave agreements andpresence in keyBrazilian spacefacilitieswhilewe’renotoriouslyabsent.Atthisstage,onecosteffectiveoptiontocounterthecompetitorswouldbe to use / hope industry offers a better choice to the Brazilians. For instance, the American company Planet(PlanetLabs)iswellpositionedandalreadyactiveinBraziltoprovidespace-basedimagingforamyriadofcivilianandmilitaryapplicationssuchaswatersecurity (e.g.planningsupport fordroughts),climatechange (NASAdataindicatesglobalwarmingwouldaffectBrazilworsethanmanyregions intheworld),powergenerationfromthevastriverinebasinfoundintheAmazonregion(topographymaps,3Dterrainmapping),agriculture,militarybasingandsecurityoperations(forwardbases,specialoperations,counterdrugoperationsthattakeplaceinremoteareasinBrazilspacebasedcommunicationsandsurveillanceareveryimportant).

Is thereanydifference inhowBrazil’s commercialventures (ifany) consider securityduringpeace, crisis,and

conflict?

Brazildoesnotseenordefinesecurity inourterms.Theydon’tseemoverlyconcernednor investheavily in“USsecurity issues” around the world. Brazil is concerned with national development, and issues that affect suchdevelopment.Forourpurposes,weshouldconsiderhowBrazilexportssecuritytoourbenefit.TheseareasincludemilitarysupporttotheUNpeacekeepingoperations,humanitarianassistance,disasterresponse,andcounterdrugoperations.Inthissecurityandstabilitycontext,thecommercialventuresarenotoverlyactiveorshownamajordifferenceintheirapproach.

GroupCaptain(IndianAirForceret.)AjeyLele38SeniorFellow(InstituteforDefenceStudiesandAnalyses,CentreonStrategicTechnologies)

25June2017

WRITTENRESPONSE

Amongstthementionedstatesfordiscussion,IhavevisitedPRC,fewEUstates,SouthKoreaandIsrael.Atnoneof

theseplaces I have visitedany specific space related facilities.However, I haddiscussed space issueswith some

officials, scientists, defence personal and academicians from these states.With the experts from the rest of the

statestoo(exceptNorthKorea)Ihavediscussedspaceissues(eitherinIndiaoratsomeinternationalforums).All

these discussions have beenmore at an informal level. Hence, the answers given below are based onmy own

perceptionsandinformationavailableinopensourceliterature.TheseanswersdonotreflectopinionoftheIndia

AirForce,IndianSpaceResearchOrganizationorGovernmentofIndia.

38TheresponseshererepresentthesoleviewsofAjeyLele,andarenot intendedtorepresentthepositionoftheIndianAirForce,IndianSpaceResearchOrganization,orGovernmentofIndia.


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PRC

As it is known,ChinaGreatWall IndustryCorporation (CGWIC) is themainagency inChinawhich is theofficialorganofthegovernmenttodealinvariouscommercialactivities.

TherearevariousreportsinregardstoassessmentofChina’sspaceindustry.OnefromIndiacouldbeviewedat:http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/china-space-industry-development-analysis-270292311.html

IthasbeenobservedthatChina ismainlyengagingAfricanandLatinAmericanstates inthespacedomain.Also,some small states within South East Asia are engaged by China. Their various arrangements in regards todeveloping and launching of satellites clearly indicate that the focus is more of a bilateral engagement thanimmediatecommercialgains.Thisdoesnotmeanthattheydonothaveanycommercialexpectationsfromtheirspace program however; at least at present the focus appears to be to use their space expertise more forgeopoliticalandgeostrategicpurposes.

Recently,IndonesiahassignedacontractwithChinaforPALAPA-N1communicationsatelliteproject.

ThemostrecentfocusofChinahasbeenonitspoliticalpetprojectcalledOneBeltMoreRoad(OBOR)imitative.The ‘Road’ to Success for the “Silk Road Initiative” is via Aerospace. Please refer to:http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/silk-road-initiative-via-aerospace_alele_211015

Space is directly under PLA and hence military relevance is obvious. Their space operations and services aredirectly controlled bymilitary. At the same time it could be possible to collaboratewith the CGWIC and otheragenciesafterdueprocedures.

TheBeiDouSatellitenavigationsystemisgeneratingaturnoverofmorethan30billionUSDperannumformajorcompanies such as CGWIC, China Aerospace Science & Industry Corp and AutoNavi Holdings Ltd. The BeidousatellitenavigationsystemwillbeabletoprovideservicesforcountriesparticipatingintheBeltandRoadInitiativeby2018.Presently, thisnavigational signal isavailable for somestatesoutsiderChina too.However, there isnoclarityinregardstoavailabilityofthissignaltothemduringcrisisand/orconflictsituation.

In respect of military usages of space it needs to be understood that China has shown interest towardsweaponnising the space. They have successfully conducted the ASAT test during 2007 and are known to havecapabilitiesforjammingofsatellites.Someoftheiractivitiesdoneinspaceduringlastfewyearsdoindicatethatsomepassiveanti-satellitetestsbeingconducted.

Russia

TheRussian Federal SpaceAgency (Roscosmos, RKA), is the government agency responsible for variousRussianspace related activities. They probably, have more than 100 small and medium companies dealing in space.However, all these companies are state owned. There are major agencies like Russia’s state-controlled NPOEnergomashwithmajorstakesinspace.Atthesametimefewstartupsarebeingestablishedinthespacearena.

RussiadidfaceproblemsinspacesectoralmostforadecadeafterthedisintegrationoftheUSSR.ForastatelikeRussiait isobviousthatspaceoperationsareanintegralmilitaryoperations. It is importanttonotethattilldatetheUSandRussiahavesucceeded inkeepingtheirspaceagendashieldedfromgeopolitical tensions. Inspiteofterrestrial confrontation they have succeeded in maintaining orbital cooperation. (refer to: http://www.e-ir.info/2015/04/25/international-space-station-terrestrial-confrontation-to-orbital-cooperation/). TheUSagencieswouldhaveabetterideainregardstoRussianspaceoperationsandservicesparticularlythecontractsofRD-181engineswith the USwould offermore clarity about how their commercial ventureswould respond during theperiodofcrisis.Also,theircontractswithotherstatesinregardstoGlonessnavigationalrightswouldindicatethenatureoffacilitiesofferedduringwartime.Russianeconomylargelydependsontheirmilitaryindustrialcomplexhenceforthemspacesectoralsohavelargercommercialsignificance.

ItisimportanttokeepinmindtheoverallRussia-Chinarelationship.InspacesectortheyarefoundworkingjointlyonsomeimportantprojectsindeepspaceandalsotryingtopushPPWT.Thereisapossibilitythatintimesofcrisisboththesestatescouldcometogetherandmanipulatetheactivitiesintheouterspace.


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Iran

To my mind Iran space program should not be viewed only with a missile bias. In the arena of science andtechnologyIranismakinggoodprogress.Theyarekeentoestablishtheirspaceprograminarespectablefashion.Anyspaceprogramwouldhavemilitaryrelevanceowingtodual-usenatureoftechnologyandsamecouldbetruewithIrantoo.However,theirspacebudgetislimitedandIdonotexpecttheirprogramtoleap-froginnearfuturebut,stillcouldshowasteadygrowth.TheycouldreceivesomeassistancefromChinainthefutureinspacearena.

NorthKorea

The country is brazen about their investments inmissile and space sector. They are conducted variousmissilelaunches and hence do not require to hide behind satellite launches to demonstrate their missile launchingcapabilities. In this country every activity is state controlled and there is no specific information about anydomestic space industry. It isobvious that satellite technologywouldbenefit theirballisticmissileagenda.Also,theyareexpectedtoinvesttowardsdevelopmentofvariouslaunchvehicles(sometestingofenginesinunderway)todemonstratetheirtechnologicalcapabilitiestotheoutsideworld.

Inregardstocommercialactivities:therehasbeenaconcernaboutNorthKoreaengagedintheillegalmarketofpurchase/sell ofmissile parts and it is possible thatmost of the satellite related components could have beenprocuredillegally.

ESA

ForNATO,spaceisaforceenabler/forcemultiplier.Theyhave“AlliedJointDoctrineforAirandSpaceOperations”inplace.TherearesomedocumentsprovidingassessmentoftheroleandtheabilityofsystemsinspaceinsupportofEuropeansecurity.AsapartofthealliedforcesalongwiththeUSinvariousrecentmilitaryoperationslikeIraq,Afghanistan,Kosovoetc.variousarmedforcesofvariousEuropeanstateshavedependedonsatellitessignificantly.SpacehasimportanceforEUformanydecadesforstrategicpurposes.TherearetwoEUstateswhicharenuclearweaponstatesand it isbutobvious that therewouldbeconsiderableamountofdependenceonspace tokeeptheseforcesoperational.

Commercial activity related to space in the EU is found happeningmore as a state based activity than as ESAactivity.PrivateagenciesinFrance,UK,Germany,Italy,Canadaetcareinbusinessofspaceformanyyears.Variousagenciesformthesestatesareexpectedtotakestate/EUcentricpositionsifthegeopoliticsdemandsso.Manyoftheagenciesinthesestatesarebasicallyinvolvedtowardsdesigningandmanufacturingsatellitesaswellastradingin satellite data.Many of these agencies arewell-established and customers are queuing up for their services.ArianSpaceofFrancecouldbeacaseinpoint.ItislikelythatthefocusofESAismoretowardsinvestinginspaceforthecommercialpurposes.

Japan

Japan’sspaceagencycalledJAXA is themain forcebehindtheirspaceprogram.Theyalsohaveprivateagencieslike Mitsubishi Heavy Industries and IHI Corp which have a global footprint. During November 2016, Japan'sparliamenthasenactedtwoimportantbillsconcerningspace.Ithasmadeiteasierforprivatecompaniestoinvestinspace.Theestablishmentofthespaceactivitylaw,specificallyallowscompaniestolaunchartificialsatellitesiftheymeetcertaincriteria.AmongthenewmarketentrantsareInterstellarTechnologies,Astroscale,PDAerospaceand Canon Electronics. (refer to: http://asia.nikkei.com/Business/Trends/Japan-s-space-industry-gets-some-new-life).

On01April 2016, Japanhas released its fourthSpaceBasicPlan (BasicPlan4)whichputs inplace spacepolicymore as a security policy. This indicates that Japan is increasingly becoming concerned about the securitychallengesintheregionandmoreandmoreinvestinginspacetechnologiesforthispurpose.Infact,understatingtheneed formonitoring the activities of theunpredictable state likeNorth Korea in its close vicinity Japanhasbeenlaunchingspysatellitessince1999.Japanhaslauncheditsfirstmilitarycommunicationssatellitetoboostthebroadbandcapacityof its SelfDefenceForcesduring January2017. Japan isplanning to launchamilitary spaceforceby2019 thatwould initiallybe taskedwithprotecting satellites fromdangerousdebrisorbiting theEarth.Also,asignificantamountofUS involvement isexpected invariousstrategicactivitiesundertakenbyJapanwithrespectofspacetechnologies.


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Japans investments in spaceappear tobeboth formilitary and commercial purposes. Japan’s security interestsandnatureoftheirstrategicestablishmentsindicatethattheyareunlikelytosharetheirspaceassetswithanyoneexpecttheUS.Hence,theirmilitaryandcommercialactivitieswouldgoinparallel.

India

Forvariousspace-faringstatesthedevelopmentofthesatellitelaunchvehiclehasbeenanoffshoottheirmissileagendahowever,thiswasnotthecasewithIndia.Theybegantheirspaceprogramwithanaimtodevelopspacetechnologies for thepurposesofsocietalbenefitsandthisagendacontinuestoremainsameeventoday.At thesametimewiththeliberalizationtheeconomicpolicies(1991)andrapidtechnologicaldevelopmentsIndiaisnowalso found exploiting its space capability for commercial purposes. Indian space agency, ISRO has its owncommercialarmcalledAntrixwhichundertakevariousbusinesses relatedactivities form launchservices todatasharing.Presently,Indiahasestablisheditselfinareaofprovidinglaunchservicesforsmallsatellitesingeneralandnano-satellites in particular. Private space industry is still in the phase of infancy in India and would requirehandholding by the state. Some startup companies have startedmaking investments in the space domain buttheseareearlydays.Therearesomesmall industriesalreadywellestablishedand inbusiness for lastcoupleofyears,however they specialize in specific jobs for ISROand theirexistence isbasedentirelyon theorders fromISRO.A public sector agency calledHindustanAeronautics Limited (HAL) also undertake structure development(for satellites)work for ISRO. ISROhasplans for engagingprivate industry toundertake launchactivitieswith atechnology transfer agreement with them. India is also keen to develop ground infrastructure for prospectiveclients(havealreadydoneitforVietnam).

Indiafacesveryuniquesecuritychallengesfromcross-borderterrorismtohavingboththeadversariesasnuclearweaponstates.Also,beingapeninsularstate,Indiahaslargemaritimebordertomonitor.Hence,understatingtheimportance of satellites technologies for the strategic purposes on 29 Sep 13 India's first dedicated defencesatellite GSAT-7was launched for Indian navy. India also has a network of remote sensing satelliteswhich areexpectedtobedual-use.

AtthebackdropofaboveitcouldbesaidthatIndiahasreasonablecommercialandlimitedstrategic interests inthespace.InregardstospaceoperationsthereisnoseparateagencyforthemilitaryandhencetheirdependenceonISROisobvious.India’scommercialventuresareexpectedtobemoreasaserviceprovidingactivityandduringcrisis and conflict situation it is expected that depending on the ground situation the decisions could be takenmoreoncasebycasebasis.Indiahasdevelopeditsownregionalnavigationalsystemandisexpectedtosharethisfacilitywiththeneighbors.Incaseofcrisisisdoesn’tlookcriticalforIndiatoswitchoffsuchfacilitiesforthenon-militaryusers.

SouthKorea

ROKhaslargerambitionsinspaceandisdoingandproposingsignificantfinancialinvestmentstoo.However,theyhavenotachievedmuchsuccesstilldateapartfromestablishingthemselvesasaspace-faringnation.Interestingly,theUSwhichhasbeenreluctanttocooperatewithROKfearingthattheywoulduseanytransferoftechnologyorknowledge for their missile program has now collaborated with ROK in outer space domain. With the USengagement now, ROK is keen to incorporate advanced technologies ofmilitary relevance in space. These areexpected to bemore of reconnaissance and communications related technologies. They have also developed anew defence doctrine in outer space. Space technologies form an important element in regards any missiledefencesystemandforcomingfewyearsthiswouldremainakeyfocusbothfortheUSandROK.

ROKisatechnologicallyadvancedstateandexpectsthatthespaceindustrywouldgainsignificantimportanceincoming years. Number of venture capital firms in space area is showing rapid growth. In coming years thisinvestmentisexpectedtoincreasehowever,typicalsecuritysituationintheregionwoulddictatethesituationonground.ThenatureofthreatfromNorthKoreaandcharacteristicgeographyoftheregionmaydecideofthefutureofindustryintimesofcrisis.

Israel

Theyhavea limitedprogramanddonot lookmuchambitious in thisdepartment.The focusof theirprogram ismilitaryinnatureapartfromsomecivilianusages.


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Dr.MartinLindseyPrincipalAerospaceEngineer(UnitedStatesPacificCommand)

7July2017


Interviewer: [Q2] Okay, great. That’s really helpful. So, now let’s move into themain question that I washoping we could focus on, which has to dowith the use of space by US allies, partners, andadversaries.Asyoucanseeinthespecificquestion,wehavebeenpresentedwithanumberofcountriestolookat.So,beforesortofjumpingintothisquestion,Ijustwanttoaskyouwhichofthecountriesfromthelistyoufeelmostcomfortablewithorwell-suitedtotalkabout?

M.Lindsey: That isagreatquestion. Inmy interactions, IprimarilyworkwithEuropeancountriesandwithAustralia and Canada, and specifically through an international group called the ResponsiveSpaceCapabilitiesResearch,Development,Test,andEvaluationMOU,whichisanMOUthattheAirForceInternationalAffairsadministersonbehalfofDoD.Thisgroupincludes10countries(7European,theUS,Canada,andAustralia).So,that’sbeenmyprimaryinteraction,andIthinkthisiswhereIammostcomfortablespeakinginregards.IdoalsohavealittlebitofengagementwithAsia Pacific countries, primarily, in addition to Australia, these include New Zealand andSingapore.Ihaven’tengagedmuchpersonallywithKoreaorJapan,eventhoughwehaveafairlyrobustspaceengagementwiththosecountries, I justdon’tpersonallyworkthere. IdoknowagoodbitaboutChinesespaceactivities,butthatwouldbeaconversationforanotherforum.

Interviewer: [Q2]Okay.Gotit.So,feelfreetoguideyourresponsestowardsthosecountriesyoumentioned.So, what are themajor, essential things that we should know about each of those countries’space programs and their space interests and their ambitions both with respect to thegovernmentandcommercialrealms?

M.Lindsey: Okay.That’sagreatquestion,andone thatobviouslyhasa lotof facets to it.Mybiasandmypersonalengagementsaretowardsthedesignofwhatthesecountriesaredoingandinterestedindoingwithrespecttosmallsatelliteprograms.And,it’stellingthatinthepastifyoulookedattheUS investing in large satellites, particularly for things like satellite communication systems,manyofthesecountries’governments,oratleasttheirMinistriesofDefense,justdidn’thavethebudgettoreallymeaningfullycontribute.So,otherthanahandfulofcountriesandpartnerships(liketheWidebandGlobalSATCOM[WGS]system),wejustdidn’thavealotofengagementwithour allied countriesbecause theydidn’t alwayshave the capital and themeans toparticipate.But,now,particularlywiththesmallerEuropeancountriesandwithAustralia,wehaveseenthatthey’verealizedthatthebarrierstogetmeaningfulspacecapabilitiesaredropping,sotheycannowgotospaceandusesmall satellites.That’s interestingtousat theCombatantCommandsbecausewe’reverymuchinpursuitoftheresilience inspaceandensuringthatwehavespacecapabilitiesinhand,andthepersistencethatyougetfromsmallsatellitesissomethingthatweseeasaneasypartnershipopportunitywithothercountries.

So, Iwouldsay that’sprobablybeen thebiggestchange thatwehaveseenwitha lotof thesecountriesthatarenowparticipatinginsatellite-basedsolutionsoutsideofthecommercialworld.Today,alotofthesecountriescanactuallygetintothegamewiththeirpartners.

MyperspectiveinthatsenseismostlydrivenbymyinteractionswithEuropeancountries.Withrespect to some of the Asian countries, I’d recommend talking to Clay Moltz at the NavalPostgraduateSchool,he’soneoftheauthoritiesonspacepolicyandwhat’sgoingonintheAsiaPacific region. I talk tohim from time to timeandwhat really strikesme, andhe’s followed itprettyclosely, iskindof the termthe“AsianSpaceRace.” Imean,a lotof timeswethink thatcountries like China are just focused on the United States, but when it comes to space, theChineseand [other]Asiancountriesareverymuch tiedup into thenationalism factor—so, it’s


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Chinaversus India,Chinaversus Japan, Indiaversus Japan,etc. Forexample, SouthKorea seesaccesstospacecapabilitiesaspartofitsnationalpride.And,now,thisiskindofspreadingintoSoutheastAsiaalso.So,weareseeingalotofthese“spaceraces”goingoninthatregionnowascountriesarecompetingtobethe“firstAsiancountrytodoXinspace.”

Interviewer: [Q2]Okay. So,with the barriers to entry for the space domain sort of declining, at leastwithrespecttosmallsatellites,thereareclearlymoreandmoreactorsnowgettinginvolved.So,ifweweretothinkaboutspaceactorsonaspectrumofspacecapabilities,IwouldthinkthattheUSwouldstillbeoutinfrontofeveryoneelse,isthegapclosing?And,ifso,whichcountriesaresortofleadingthechargeofthatsecondwaveorsecondgroupingofcountriesbelowtheUSintermsofcapacityandcapabilityinthespacedomain?

M.Lindsey: I think the gap is closing but this isn’t unique to space. The gap is closing because the sameglobalizationandadvances inelectronics that giveuseverythingwehave seenwith consumerelectronicsarealsonowfindingtheirwaytospace.

So,Ithinkit’sreallymoreofableedoverfromjustthebroadertechnologyrevolutionthatwe’vebeen for the last decadeor so, that’s now finding itsway into space. Imean, this is primarilybeing seen now through the commercial sector—it used to be that government drove thedirection of space technology, but increasingly it’s the commercial sector that’s driving spacetechnology and the governments are having to become consumers of commercial spacetechnology. I think that is especially true with countries outside the US where there’s a longhistoryofthepursuitofnationalagenciesdrivingthedirectionofspacetechnology.So,ifyou’rethe Philippines or you’re Malaysia, most likely the space industry you have is commercialfocused,andthenthegovernmentistryingtofigureouthowitcantakeadvantageofthat.

Interviewer: [Q2] Okay. So, the commercial entities are the ones that are pushing the development andprogressinthespacedomainforalotofthesecountries,moresothanthegovernments?

M.Lindsey: Yeah,Ithinkso,orit’sverycloselycoupled.Ifyoulookatsomeofthesecountries,manyoftheirindustriesaredrivenby thecommercial sectors,andyoureallyseethatonthespaceside.Forexample,Singaporehasanelectro-optical imagerysmallsatelliteuprightnow,andit isputtingupafewmoreandalsodevelopingasmallsatellitesyntheticapertureradar,andthisisallbeingdoneinapublic-privatepartnership.So,itwillbegrowingcommerciallyandit’sbeingdevelopedinapublic-privatepartnershipwithstronggovernmentparticipation.

So,youcanseeavarietyofmodels—it’skindofwhateverthecountrychoosestodo—butIthinkthe realmessage is that the barriers to get into space are really falling fast, so countries andentitiesthatjustcouldn’tcontemplategettinginvolved10yearsagoarenowstartingtoseethattheycangetinthegame.

Interviewer: [Q2]Okay.So,whatarethekeydifferencesanddifferentiatorsbetweenthespaceprogramsandspace interests of some of these countries that we should be aware, both with respect togovernmentandcommercialrealms?

M.Lindsey: Sure. So, I can’t speak terribly well to the civil side of space, but I will speak to the nationalsecuritysideandthecommercialsideofspace.

So,youhavesomeofyourmoretraditionalplayers likeChinawheretheirspace industriesaretightly coupledwith theirmilitary. So, everyChinese launch you see, it’s never portrayed as amilitary launch, right?39 It’s somesortof scienceand technology launchorcommercial launch.But,belowthehood,that’sprobablynotactuallythecase.So,youhavethatmodel.

39Followingthe interview,Lindseyprovidedthefollowingcomment(10October2017):“China launched3satellites2weeksago,andIbelieveinafirstforthem,announcedatlaunchthattheywereRFsignalsgatheringsatellitesforthemilitaryandnofurtherinformationwouldbereleased.”


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Then, again, you have a lot of countries that are just getting started like New Zealand or thePhilippines, and theyare relyinga lotonacademic contributions toget themstarted,which iskindofthesamepaththatwestarteddownabout30yearsagowithsmallsatellites—itstartedin academia and took about 20 years to start the transition over to what I’d call real-worldapplication,whethercommercialorgovernment.So,thesecountriesarekindofgoingdownthatsamepaththattheUSwent,butIthinkthey’regoingtomovedownthatpathmorequicklythanwedidjustbecausetheynowhaveourlessonslearned.

Interviewer: [Q2]Okay.So,youmentionedsomecollaborationeffortsbetweenEuropeancountries,theUS,Canada, andAustralia, but, beyond some of that collaboration, are any of these big countriesworkingtogetherbilaterallyinclosecollaborationwhenitcomestothespacedomain?And,ontheotherhand,dothespaceinterestsandspace-relatedactionsofanyofthesecountriesopenlyconflictwiththoseofanyothercountries?

M.Lindsey: I would argue that there’s a lot more cooperation going on in the space domain thancompetition. Idon’tknowhowyouwanttodefine“conflict,”butthere’sreallynotanykindofovertorevencovertconflictthatI’mawareofrightnowinspace—though,thereiscompetition.But,overall,Ithinkthere’salotmorecooperationgoingoninspace.Again,alotofthatisdonemultilaterallyonthecommercialsideorbilaterally.

SomeexamplesofmultilateralcooperationwouldbetheUShasaFiveEyesrelationship,right?Thatrelationshipspillsoverintocooperationontechnologydevelopment,andspacetechnologydevelopment,betweenthefivecountriesinthatpartnership.

InAsia,theAsiannatureistobemorebilateralthanmultilateralacrosstheboardineverything.So, a lot of the relationships in Asia are bilateral in nature—so, you see a lot of timeswherecountries will go to Japan or go to China, or increasingly they’re going to India or Europeancountries,togettheirfirstexposuretodevelopmentinspace.So,youseelike,forexample,theChinese will fly country X’s satellite for very low prices, and in return they’ll work out someagreementmaybeforgroundstationaccess inthatcountry.Therearesomemultilateralspaceinstitutions in the Asia Pacific. These are mostly on the civil side of the house or thecivil/commercial side. I’m not really aware of, other than the Five Eyes partnership, any realnational security-related relationships between countries in the region—though, with the oneexception being that USSTRATCOM is working a series of a space situational awarenessagreements throughout the world, and these are bilateral agreements with countries thatincludeseveralcountriesintheAsiaPacific(e.g.,Australia,Japan,Korea).

Interviewer: [Q2]Okay. So, froma longer-termperspectivewith respect to someof these countries’ spaceinterests and where they see themselves going, while you think things seem to be mostlycollaborative at the moment, do you foresee any sort of situation in which some of thesecountries’interestsmightdrivethingstobecomemorecompetitiveorpossiblyevenconflictual?And, if so, what types of things in particular do you think might be the leading drivers ofincreasedcompetitionandconflict?

M.Lindsey: [Q2]Sure.So,as Imentionedearlier, therearevariousspaceracesgoingon intheAsiaPacificregion—thebigonesbeingbetweenChinaandIndia,andthentoalesserdegreebetweenChinaandJapan,andthesearemoretiedupinnationalismandglobalprestige—they’renothead-to-headcompetitionsfortheirownsake.But,havingsaidthat,ofcoursetherearecountriesintheregionthatdohavemilitaryspacecapabilitiesandmilitarycounter-spacecapabilities,soIthinkitisalogicalextensiontosaythataconflictonthegroundcaneasilyextendintothespacedomainifitinvolvesthosecountries,and,arguably,aconflictcouldbegininthespacedomainandthenspillovertotheterrestrialside.Imean,certainlyleadersinourowncountryoverthepastcoupleofyearshavebeenexpressingconcernswiththeriskofthathappeningandtheneedtobereadytodealwiththat.


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So, I think that’s a real concern, and I think it’s a concern for countries throughout theworldbecausethere’sarecognitionthatanytypeofkineticconflictinspacedoesn’tgetlimitedtothepartiesthataredirectlyinvolved;itspillsovertoeverybodythatusesthatregionofspace.So,Ithink countries are concerned about it, and I think a lot of countries are still in a position ofknowingthattheycan’treallydomuchaboutitdirectly.

So, is the risk increasingordecreasing?Well, I think it’sdouble-edged. It’s increasing fromthestandpointthatthetechnologyisimprovingandmakingiteasiertogetintospaceanddothingsin spacewhereyoucoulddoactions thatwouldconstituteconflict.On theotherhand, I thinkthere’sagrowingrealizationthatthethingsthathappeninspaceaffecteverybodyandtherisksofescalatingaterrestrialconflictgoupexponentiallybecauseoftheincreasingdependenceonspace. So, I think it’s double-edged, and, at this point, I’m not sure which direction a lot ofcountriesaregoingtogoin.Fromobservation,again,weseethingsthatdisturbuswithcertaincountries,butwe’dhavetotalksomewhereelseaboutthat.

AgnieszkaLukaszczykDirectorforEUPolicy(Planet)

18August2017


Interviewer: [Q2]Okay.Great.So, let’smove intothemainquestionthat Isentovertoyou,which isabouthowotheractorsconceiveof spaceoperations forbothmilitaryandcommercialpurposes.So,howdootheractorsconceiveof spaceoperations formilitaryandcommercialpurposes?And,givenyourexpertise,pleasefeelfreetofocusonEuropeanactors.

A.Lukaszczyk: Well,thisisactuallyquiteaninterestingquestionatthemoment.Forinstance,ifyouhadaskedthat question just a few years ago—Iwould say 3-5 years ago—youwould have seen a clearseparationbetweencivilspaceandmilitaryspaceinEurope.Tothepointwheretherewouldbenokindofcooperationandnocollaborationbetweenthetwosides.Forinstance,5yearsago,amajorityofspaceagenciesinEurope—notall,butthemajority—werepurelycivil,andthenanysort of space security was dealt with by themilitary. Also, when you’d look at the EuropeanSpace Agency (ESA), it was very clearly stated that the ESA was to be used only for civilianpurposes,andtheEUSpaceProgramwasalsoforcivilianpurposes.And,backthen,theideaofdualusewouldneverreallybementioned,andwasaverysensitivetopictodiscuss.Thatwasalllike5yearsago,andmaybeevenjust3yearsagoaswell.

Today, though, the geopolitical situation has changed a lot in Europe, as you know, with thevarious terrorist attacks—Imean, we just had one yesterday in Barcelona—and alsowith therefugeecrisisandthesituationUkraine,whichrightnexttothebordersoftheEuropeanUnion.So, thingsaregettinga littlebituncomfortable.And,allof the sudden,people in thememberstatesoftheEuropeanUnionstarteddiscussingthatweshouldnotonlystrengthenourdefensecapabilities, but we should use the capabilities that we already have for commercial, civilpurposesandusethemformilitarypurposes.So,allofthesudden,everybodyintheEUstartedtobeinterestedindualuseapplications.

So,therearetwoflagshipEUspaceprograms:GalileoandCopernicusbutbeforeIgettothose,do you know the difference between the European Union Space Program and the EuropeanSpaceAgency(ESA)?Iknowthiscanbekindofconfusingforforeigners,sodoyouwantmetoexplain?


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Interviewer: [Q2]Yeah,ifyouwanttotalkaboutthedifferencesbetweentheEuropeanUnionSpaceProgramandtheEuropeanSpaceAgency(ESA),thatwouldbereallyhelpful.

A.Lukaszczyk: Okay.Iknowthiscanbereallyconfusing,anditisalsoconfusingforpeopleinEuropeifthey’renotreallyinvolved,so,letmebrieflyexplain.

Europe isquitecomplicated,andwhenyou lookatthespaceprogramsandwhodoesspace inEurope,youhavekindofthreedifferentbranches:theindividualmemberstates,theEU,andtheEuropeanSpaceAgency(ESA).

Thefirstbranchisjusttheindividualmemberstates,right?So,youhaveGermany,theUK,etc.,and theywillallhavesomesortof spaceprogramora spaceagency,ora spaceoffice if it’sasmallercountry.But,theyhavetheirnationalprogramsorinitiatives.

The second branch is the European Space Agency (ESA), which is an intergovernmentalorganization,andESAisactuallytheonlyspaceagencyintheworldthatisaninternationalspaceagency. ESA was set up, I think, around 50 years ago, and it was first set up for just kind ofscientificresearchpurposesandthenitkindofmovedintofunctioningasanoperationalspaceagency,butfocusedonlyoncivilianaspects.

ThethirdbranchistheEuropeanUnion,andtheEUSpacePrograms.In2009,theEUpassedtheLisbonTreaty,whichkindofregulatedalotofdifferentaspectsoftheEuropeanUnion.AndpartoftheLisbonTreatywasanArticle—Ithink it’s186,but Iwouldhavetocheckthat—thatgavetheEuropeanUnionthecompetenceinspace.

Justtomake itmoreconfusing,theEuropeanUnionandtheEuropeanSpaceAgency(ESA)arecompletely independent fromeachother—just because it’s called the European SpaceAgencydoesn’tmeanthatitbelongstotheEU.So,ESAissuperindependent.ESAhasitsownmembers,andtheEUandESAdifferintheirprocurementprocesses,differinthewaytheyspendmoney,anddifferwithrespecttoanumberoffactors.ESAisaveryseparateentity.So,we’restilltryingtofullyfigureouthowthekindofdivisionofstuffworksbetweenthetwo(theEUandESA),but,just in a nutshell prettymuch, ESA is focusingon space exploration, research, and the kindoftechnicalstuff,whereastheEUismoreofapoliticalbody,morepolicyoriented,andmorekindofstrategic.ThedifferenceisalsothattheEUistheonlykindofinternationalorganizationintheworldthathassupranationalpower,right?Thatmeansthat iftheEUpassesadirective(i.e.,apiece of legislation), then all of the member states need to abide by it—so, the EU can tellmemberstateswhattodo,whereasESAdoesn’thavethatsortofpower.

So,since2009,theEU,withthatsupranationalpower,hasdecidedtodevelopSpacePrograms,and theyhavedeveloped two flagshipprograms:1)Galileo,which is theGNSSprogramof theEuropean Union, and 2) Copernicus, which is an Earth observation program. The reason I’mtalking about this is because originally those two programs were set up as purely civilian,commercial kind of programs, but now, given the geopolitical situation in Europe, the EU hasactuallyadjustedtheirmandateoftheseprograms.

So, now, Galileo has a huge security and classified component called PRS, and those signalscoming through the classified components are solely for the use of the European military.Though, there are also ongoing negotiations between EU with this program and the UnitedStateswithGPSonhowtocollaborateandcooperate.AsforCopernicus,theEarthobservationprogram,beforeitwasmostlyfocusedonkindoftheenvironmentalaspectofEarthobservation,but now it has thiswhole separate security service for Earth observation. So, as you can see,therehasbeenashift.Therehasbeenachangeinthemindsetandthewaypeoplearesortofthinking.

Inaddition,theEuropeanUnionisdevelopingtwonewinitiatives.They’recurrentlybeingcalledframeworks,notprogramsyet,because theydon’thave theirownbudget lineyet.One is justspacesurveillanceandtracking(i.e.,SSA),andtheotheroneisGovSatcomandMilSatcom,which


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isprettymuchtelecomforgovernmentalpurposes.So,asevidentwiththoseprograms,theEUislookingatthedualuseoftheprograms,whichisquiteuniqueandquitenew.Because,likeIsaid,fewyearsagothatwouldn’thaveevenbeaquestion,butnowtheyseethisasanecessarything.

Interviewer: [Q2]Okay. That’s reallyhelpful. So, it seems like security isoneof theEU’s key interestswithrespecttodevelopingitsspaceprograms.But,beyondsecurity,whatdoyouseeastheEU’sandESA’skeyinterestsandambitionswithrespecttospace?

A.Lukaszczyk: Well,forsurethenewspaceaspect.Thisisreallyinteresting.Europekindofseesthattheyarebehind the United States—the US is producing these “new space companies” that are doingreallywell,thatindustryisreallyflourishingintheUS,and,morethanthat,theUSgovernmentisactuallyoutsourcingalotofitsactivitiestotheprivatesector.This,however,isnothappeninginEuropeyet.Europeisveryprotectionist,theydon’treallytrusttheprivatesector,andanysortofgovernmental programs or military programs are done in-house—Europe would be veryreluctanttogivethatawaytoaprivatesector.

Oneexample is theGovSatcomandMilSatcominitiative. InEurope,wehaveexcellenttelecomoperators,soanythingfromSES,Eutelsat,etc.,mostofthemoriginatedorarebasedinEurope,so in theory they could just meet those security requirements and do the job for Europeangovernments, but yet the EU is still very seriously considering actually having its ownconstellationbecauseitdoesn’treallywantthistobeinprivatehands.

So, I think Europe is not quite as open and ready to collaborate with the private sector andindustryastheUSis.Now,thisischanging,ofcourse,butveryslowly.Icantellyou,forinstance,nowIworkforPlanetandwe’regettingquitealotofgovernmentcontracts.Wejustgotahugecontract with NGA in the US and it’s great, and yet something like that in Europe would bealmostimpossiblerightnow.Nevertheless,theyareatleaststartingtotalkaboutit—theywanttoattract startupsand scaleup inEurope tomake sure that those startups in Europeactuallygrow.

There’saninterestingstatisticthatIjustdiscoveredrecently:thenumberofspacestartupsthatkindofpopupinEuropeandtheUSisquitesimilar.So,itisnotthattherearemorestartupsintheUS,butthedifferenceisthatintheUSthere’squiteabignumberofstartupsthatsurviveandthen there’s quite a big number of startups that actually grow into something substantial.Whereas inEuropemostof the startupsactuallydon’t surviveafter their first3 years, and forthosethatdo,themajorityofthemstayastheyneed,sotheystaysmallandmediuminsize(i.e.,uptotenpeople,verysmallcompanies),andtheydon’treallyhavethekindofboosttobecomea big company. One of the reasons for this is because you don’t have the venture capitalistapproachinEuropethatyouwouldintheUS.

Interviewer: [Q2] Okay. So, you mentioned some of the collaborations between the US and Europeancommercial entities, but sort of beyond that European-US collaboration, are any of theseEuropeanactors,bothcommercialandgovernment,workingwithanyotherinternationalactorstocooperateinanefforttoadvancetheirinterests?And,ontheothersideofthespectrum,doyouseeanyoftheseEuropeaninterestsasbeingopenlyconflictualwithanyotherinternationalcompaniesorgovernmentactors?

A.Lukaszczyk: IthinktheEuropeancompaniesandnationalgovernments,andeventheEUandESA,partakeinquite a lot of international cooperation. Obviously, there has been cooperation with the bigplayers (i.e., Russia, China, India, Japan, etc.). Actually, for a while, the EU has halted itscooperation with Russia due to sanctions. Though, that is interesting because while EUcooperationwith Russia is kind of on hold, the EU is actually still launchingwith the Russianseveryonceinawhile.

So,thereisthatsortofcooperation.Especiallywhenitcomestolaunching,Ithink,there’salotof cooperationwithRussiaandwith India inparticular. There’s a lotof researchand semantic


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programs done with Japan and India (especially on space applications with India), some withSouthKorea,andwithCanadaofcourse.TheEUhasalsobeencooperatingwithSouthAfricaandBrazil.

There’s also been increasing cooperation with Latin America by doing things like exchangingdifferentEarthobservationdataorthatsortofthing,andthiskindofcooperationishappeningonallthreelevels—theEUlevel,theESAlevel,andthenationallevel.So,thereisquiteabitofthat.Alotoftime,thecooperationisnotreallyintheexchangeoffundsofanysort,butratherexchanginginformationandgivingaccesstodataorcertainproductsorservicesandthatsortofthing.

Interviewer: [Q2]Okay.So, IthinktheEUandtheESAaresortofauniqueincomparisontotherestofthecountries listed in our question because they represent, as youmentioned,multiple countriesratherthanjustone.So, I’mwondering, ifyoulookwithintheEUandtheESAatthecountriestheyrepresent,areallofthecountriesalignedandinagreementabouttheorganization’sstatedinterestsandwhereinvestmentsarebeingmadeandthedirectiontheorganizationisheaded,oraretheresomepointsofcontentionbetweenanyofthespecificcountriesrepresented?

A.Lukaszczyk: It’sactuallyaverygoodquestionbecauseyouwouldhavehopedandyouwouldhavethoughtthat they shouldkindofbealigned sincemostof themembersare the same inbothof theseentities.But,actually,there’squiteabitofafrictionbetweentheEUandtheESAovertheturfprettymuchbecauseESAthinks,“We’vebeentherefor50years.Weknowspace.Youguysarejustabunchofbureaucratsandyoudon’tknowwhatyou’redoing,”while theEUthinks,“Wehave the money. We have the power, and you’re just going to have to deal with us beingaround.”

So,alotoftimes,actually,thegoalandkindofapproachisnotthesameornotideal;however,oneofthegoodstepsmadeintherightdirectionwasthedevelopmentoftheEuropeanSpaceStrategy.TheEuropeanSpaceStrategywasreleasedinlastNovemberanditiskindofabigdealbecauseEuropeasawholehasn’thadanactualstrategyonspaceorpolicyoranythinglikethatforaverylongtime,andtheyhavemanagedtoactuallyreleaseastrategythatisastrategyforEuropeasawhole—theEuropeanUnion,ESA,andthememberstatesdraftedittogether.So,ifyouhaven’tseenthat, Iwoulddefinitelyencourageyouto lookatthatbecauseitgiveskindofthedirectionEuropewants to take in spaceand itspriorities.And thoseareagreedonby thethreeplayers—theEU,memberstates,andESA.Sothat’saverygooddocumentthatgivesabitofanideaofwherethisisgoing.

Now,whenyou lookatthedifferencealsobetweentheEUandESA, like IsaidtheEU ismuchmore of a political beast, right? So, just the counterpartswill be different, too. For instance,givingyouanexampleofcollaborationwiththeUS,ESAwillworkwithNASA,right?NASAwillbeESA’s counterpart in theUS.Whereas, the EUwillworkwith the StateDepartment. The StateDepartmentwouldbetheEU’scounterpartintheUS.So,itisjustalittlebitofadifferentlevelofactivities.

Interviewer: [Q2 indirectly]Okay. That’s really helpful. So, thank you so much for running through thosequestions with me. I have just one last general question that we always conclude theseinterviewswith.IsthereanythingthatIhaven’taskedyouthatIshouldhave,oristhereanyfinalpointthatyouwouldliketoconcludewith?

A.Lukaszczyk: Idon’t think there isaspecificquestion thatyouhaven’tasked,but Iguess I’ll justoffersomeconcludingpoints.Europeisdefinitelylookingatthesecurityquestionsmuchmorecarefullynowthan it has in thepast given thegeopolitical situation.And, also, thedualuseaspectof spaceaccessisdefinitelysomethingthatEuropeisnowrealizing.So,Europehasseenaclearshiftwithrespect to its space interests and activities. And, of course, Europe is a unique actor here—keepinginmindthatthemultipleplayershere,whichmakesthingsalittlebitcomplicated.It’sa


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bitcomplex,butitwouldbeworthwhiletolookattheEuropeanSpaceStrategybecauseIthinkthatwouldgiveyouagoodideaofwhereEuropeisgoingwithitsspaceambitions.

SergeantFirstClassJerrittA.LynnCivilAffairSpecialist(UnitedStatesArmyCivilAffairs)


NorthKorea

OneofthegreatestsecurityimplicationsfortheUnitedStatesstemsfromthepoliticalposturingofstateswithininternational organizations. The inability of space leaders (U.S., Russia, and China) to do more than createcommitteesprovideslegitimatecauseforstatestodevelopmilitarizedspacepolicies.Ifinternationalorganizationscannot create a status quo, states will ultimately seek to promote their own interests (i.e. nuclear arms racebetweenU.SandtheSovietUnion).Forexample,India(amemberofCOPUS)citedChina'santi-satellitetest(ASAT)in 2007 as a reason to develop their own counter-ASAT capability (Vasani 2016). Russian “kamikaze” and“kidnapper”satellitesandinstancessuchasIndia’sASATprogramhaveunderstandablygeneratedagrowingfearof another space race, albeitwithmore participants involved. UNOOSA provides the venue for states to cometogetherandregulatethedomainofspaceforall,but italsoprovidesconvenientpoliticalcovertocontinuethemilitarizationofspace.Statescanproclaimanactivecontributionthroughmembershipandresolutionsubmittalwhilepursuingself-servingpoliciesdomestically.EventhoughtheUNandEUareorganizationsthatpromotethepeacefuluseofspace,theymaybeutilizedandmanipulatedtodiminishU.S.nationalsecurity.Therefore,theU.S.wouldbebettersuitedifUNsecuritygoalsweremadetomatchU.S.securitygoals.

North Korea’s manipulation of the United Nations international space mandate is an excellent example ofsuccessfulpoliticalmaneuvering.In2006,NorthKoreaconductedanucleartestwithouttheauthorizationoftheUnitedNations.ThisledtointernationalcondemnationandthepassingofUNResolution1718,whichprohibitedthemfromconductinganyfurthernuclearorballisticmissiletesting(UNSecurityCouncil2006).Threeyearslaterin2009,theDPRKannouncedtheywereplanningtolaunchasatelliteintoorbit.Althoughthiswaslegalundertheinternationalspaceframework,itwasperceivedbymanyasameansforNorthKoreatocontinueballisticmissiletesting under the guise of a space program. Due to military and space applications utilizing the same missiletechnology,itwasnearlyimpossibletoproveanysuspicions.

Despite pushback from the international community, North Korea technically complied with all space launchrequirementsandattemptedanunsuccessful launchin2009.AnewconcernwasrevealedastherocketusedbytheNorth Koreans had the capability of reaching theU.S.OnDecember 12th, 2012,North Korea succeeded inplacinga satellite intoorbit. International security concernsgrewas theNorthKoreanswereable tohone theirballistic capabilities. InFebruary2016,NorthKoreaagain successfully launcheda satellite intoorbitutilizing thespace versionof the Taepodong-2multi-stagemissile, knownas theUnha-Korean forGalaxy (BBC2017). ThesemissileshaveamaximumestimatedrangeofAustraliaandpartsoftheU.S(Alaska).Morerecently,NorthKoreasuccessfully launched an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), 2,200 miles into space (Sang-Hun & Sanger,2017).Althoughtheirabilitytousethetechnologytoaccuratelystrike isunknown,theyaredemonstratingtheyaremovingclosertobeingabletostrikeasfarastheMidwesternUnitedStates.TheNorthKorean’shavetheguiseoftheirspaceprogramtothankfortheircontinuedsuccess.

Another concern with North Korea is that they have very little at stake in space and have reduced militarycapabilities. This combination gives the DPRK a marked advantage in which they could create rudimentaryweapons(i.e.bombsintendedtocreateorbitaldebris)foruseinspacethathasagreatimpactontheiradversary’sspace assets with little worry for repercussions to their non-existent space assets (Faith 2017). Internationalcondemnationwouldsurelyfollow,butthishasnotproventothwarttheDPRKuptothispoint.BecausetheDPRKhasanunhingedleaderatthehelmandtheyhavejustenoughtechnologicalcapabilitytobedangerous,theyarea


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keyexample.Thediffusionoftechnologyhasloweredthecostofspaceactivitiesandhasincreasedthenumberofactorswith the capability to provide space launch and other space services on the openmarket. This, in turn,providestheadversariesoftheU.S.withaccesstoapreviouslyinaccessibledomain.

Iran

In July 2017, Iran successfully launched a satellite into orbit upon a Simorgh rocket, also known as the Safir-2(Moore, 2017). The launch is of not for several different reasons. First, this launch is a reminder that space isbecomingmorecrowdedandisnotthesoledomainofafewprestigiousstates.AsIrancontinuestobroadenandimprove their space capabilities, so to grow the legitimate concern of neighboring states. State sponsoredcondemnationandovertcallsforthecompletedestructionofIsraelandtheUnitedStatestakeonadifferenttoneasIran’smissileandspacecapabilitiesmarchtowardsparitywithtop-tierstates.Second,ifIranissmart,theywilltakealessonfromNorthKoreaandusetheirspaceprogramasameanstodeveloptheirmissilecapabilities.NorthKoreawasabletoimproveupontheirICBMtechnologyundertheguiseoffurtheringtheirspaceprogramandIranhastheabilitytodothesame.Honingtheabilitytolauncharocketcarryingasatelliteisonestepclosertotowardsdevelopinglong-rangemissilescarryingwarheads.

India

India, the world's most populous democracy is another State that has begun to develop a significant spaceprogramthathasmilitarycapabilities.Asnotedpreviously,ChinasuccessfullytestedanASATmissilein2007,andthenagainin2013,promptingconcernsintheUnitedStates.TheseapprehensionswerenotonlyfoundintheU.S.Sharinga3,323-kmborderwithChina,IndiaalsohasavalidgeopoliticalconcernforChina'sactionswithinspace(MinistryofHomeAffairs2016).FollowingChina’s2007successfulASATtest,IndianIntegratedDefenseStaffChiefLt.GeneralH.S. Lidder stated, “with time,wewill get sucked into themilitary race toprotect space assets andinevitabletherewillbeamilitarycontestinspace…..spacewillprovidetheadvantage“(Vasani2016).

Since 2007, the Indian space program has made great strides in their attempt to develop their own ASATcapabilities to contendwith the primary spacefaring states, the U.S., Russia, and China. There has yet to be asuccessfultestingoftheirASATprogram,leavingChinaandotherstatestoquestionitsprogressoritsexistence.InadditiontotheirASATdevelopment,Indiacurrentlyhasoneoftheworld’slargestspacebudgets;theDepartmentofSpaceResearcharmhadannouncedabudgetof67billionrupees(US$1.3billion)forthe2012-2013fiscalyear(in comparison FY13 Space budget for Russia $5.2 billion, U.S. $17 billion) (Anderson, Conrad, and Gamberini2014).Also,theIndiaSpaceResearchOrganization(ISRO)developedalow-earthorbitsatelliteexpresslydesignedformilitaryuse,toincludeimagerydataretrievalontheGovernmentofPakistan’smilitaryforcesandmovements,which increases tensions between the nuclear states. This further illustrates the importance of space-basedactivitiesandhowtheyinfluenceinternationalrelations(Sen2007).

References

Anderson,D.J.,Conrad,D.W.,&Gamberini,S.(2014).SpaceandDefense.SpaceandDefense,7(1),6–25.Chin,J.(2016,August20).China’sLatestLeapForwardIsn’tJustGreat—It’sQuantum.TheWallStreetJournal.Retrievedfromhttp://www.wsj.com/articles/chinas-latest-leap-forward-isnt-just-greatits-quantum-1471269555

BBC. (2017, January 20). North Korea’s missile programme. Retrieved February 4, 2017, fromhttp://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-17399847

Faith,G.R.(2017,February21).ProliferationofSpaceActivitiesandU.S.Policy.

Ministry of Home Affairs. (n.d.). India’s Ministry of Home Affairs (Department of Border Management).GovernmentofIndia.Retrievedfromhttp://mha.nic.in/

Moore,J.(2017,July27).IraninSpace:Tehran“SuccessfullyLaunches”RocketCarryingSatellite.RetrievedAugust4, 2017, from http://www.newsweek.com/iran-space-tehran-successfully-launches-rocket-carrying-satellite-orbit-642812


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Sang-Hun,C.,&Sanger,D.(2017,July29).AfterNorthKoreaTest,SouthKoreaPushestoBuildUpItsOwnMissiles.Retrieved August 4, 2017, from https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/29/world/asia/us-south-korea-north-korea-missile-test.html

Sen,G.(2007).ConceptualizingSecurityforIndiainthe21stCentury.NewDelhi:Atlantic.

UNSecurityCouncil.(2006,October14).UNResolution1718S-RES-1718.

Vasani, H. (2016, June 14). India’s Anti-Satellite Weapons. Retrieved November 22, 2016, fromhttp://thediplomat.com/2016/06/indias-anti-satellite-weapons/

ColonelDavidMillerCommander,460thSpaceWing(UnitedStatesAirForce)

7July2017


Interviewer: [Q2]Okay,great.SonowI’mhopingwecanshifttothesecondquestionfromourlist,whichisthequestion I amhopingwe can focusour discussionon today. This question is aboutuseofspacebyUSallies,partners,andadversaries.Asyoucansee fromthequestion,wehavebeenpresentedwithanumberofcountriestofocuson.

So,beforewejumpintothequestion,whichofthesecountriesdoyoufeelmostwell-suitedandcomfortabletalkingabouttoday?

ColD.Miller: IcantalkattheunclassifiedlevelaboutsometrendswehaveseenwithrespecttoChina,Russia,North Korea, and somewhat Iran. There’s relationships we have with allies I can talk to. AndwhenIsayallies,Itendtofocusmoretowardsourtreatyallies.Socertainly,Ithinkwecantalkalittle bit about the unclassified level of cooperationwith some European allies,maybewithinNATO,Japan,SouthKorea,andsoon.

IhavesomeleveloffamiliaritywithrespecttoSingapore,Ukraine,andBrazil,butI’mnotasuptodateonwhat thesecountries’vectorsor trendsarewithrespect tomilitaryspaceoruseofspaceoverallfromanationalsecurityperspective,soIwilllikelynotfocusonthem.ButIcangiveyouoveralltrendsandifthatleadstofurtherdiscussionorinsights,Iwillfollowthroughonthosediscussionthreads.

Interviewer: [Q2]Perfect. So,my first question iswhat are themajor, central things thatwe should knowabout these countries’ space programs, their space interests, and their space ambitions bothwithrespecttogovernmentandcommercial realms?Though,asyounoted,pleasefeel freetofocusonthegovernmentandmilitaryrealmshere.

ColD.Miller: Let’sstartbythinkingofthisfromabig-pictureperspective.Thereasonswhyvariousnationsgoto space are not fundamentally different necessarily. The wherewithal these nations have topursueactuallygoingtospaceand,asaresult,theareasthattheyfocusonwillbedifferent.Butthebasicreasonsforgoingtospacehaven’tchanged,andthisiscertainlythecasefortheUnitedStatesinthe60+yearswe’vebeeninterestedinspace.

Wecantraceback—particularlyintheAirForcetothefirstmonthsoftheAirForcebecomingaseparateservice—adedicatedfocusongoingtospace,andthereasonforthisdedicatedfocushastodowiththephysicsoftheEarth. Ifyouwanttosee,shoot,move,orcommunicateoverthe horizon, there’s only somuch you can do line of sightwith terrestrial-based systems. So,fromamilitary perspective and a national security perspective, particularly backwhen theUSwaspost-WorldWar II,with theColdWar rampingup, and concernedaboutmissile gaps andthings like that,weneeded—in the caseofoneof the first reasonswewent to space—to see


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over the horizon. And when you’re talking about potential adversaries or potential hostilestates—at that timetheSovietUnion—youhavea lotofdeniedareas.Youhavea lotofareaswhereyou’renotgoingtobeabletoflyanaircraftorplacearadar.Youhavealotofareaswhereyou’renotgoingtobeabletodothesurveillanceandverificationyou’dneedtoassurebothyourowncivilianorpoliticalpopulation, aswell asallies,what the levelof securitywas. So, Idon’tthinkthatthatisfundamentallyanydifferentthanwhy,say,theUKorAustraliaorCanadaoranyotherverystrongpartnersofoursisinterestedinspace,becausetheyrecognizethatadversariesor potential adversaries or just nations in general don’twant you flyingover their territory orbasingterrestrial-basedsurveillancesystems.Ifyouwanttoprovidesomelevelofsecurityastothe intent and capability sets of potential security challenges on the horizon, you’re going toneedawaytogetthat information—spaceprovidesawaytodothatandhashistoricallybeenrelativelysecurefromadversaryinfluenceordenial.

Asyoucansee,themostvisiblemanifestationnow,certainlycommercially,isinremotesensingand navigation to communicate and navigate over the horizon. The Europeans obviously havetheirownglobalpositioningorpositionnavigationandtimingeffortsthatthey’repursuing.TheRussianshavetheirs.TheChinesehavetheirs.Theneedtoprovidetheabilityfornotjustpeoplein their Armed Forces, but for everybody for commercial civil use aswell as national securitymissions.Hence,therequirementtobeabletonavigateandmoveoverthehorizondrivesyouintocertainareasofoperationornewdomains,andthosetendtobe,likeIsaid,remotesensingand satellite communications. You’renot going tobeable to string fiber andwireeverywhereacross theglobe—there’s,numberone, security reasonswhypeoplewouldn’t let youdo that,butalso it justdoesn’tmakesensemonetarily.Therefore,actorstendtogotospacetoensureglobalcommunicationsaswell.So,asyoucansee,Idon’tthinkthatthosespacemissionsetswehavepursuedoverthepast60+yearshavefundamentallychangedreally.

In the Defense Department, we typically lump those mission sets from a national securityperspective under the term “force enhancement.” That those capability sets (intelligence,surveillance and reconnaissance; positon navigation and timing for GPS; military satellitecommunications; etc.) allow our military forces, our national security forces, to fight better.WhatdoImeanwhenIsayfightbetter?Well,rightnow,andthismaybeuptodebatetosome,butfrommyexperience it’snot, theUnitedStates inparticular isabletoseemore, fightmoreaccurately, fight quicker, and fight with fewer causalities than we ever have been—meaningfewer causalities for us as well as fewer casualties from collateral damage. And the principlereasonswe’reable todo this soeffectivelyare thecapabilities I justdescribed toyou thatwederivefromspace.Weknowwheretheadversariesare.Wecanmassquicklyifneeded.Wecancommunicateoverthehorizonandfightinlargeformationsonascalethat,frankly,nobodyhaseverseenbefore.Wecandoallofthissoefficientlythatourdecisionloopfortargetingisofteninsideapotentialadversary’sdecisionloop,andwecanassesshowwe’vedoneandensureweminimizeciviliancausalitiesaswellasthreatstoUSforcesoralliedforcesonalevelthatwehaveneverbeenonbefore.That’swhythefocusinrecentyearshasbeensomuchonprotectingourspacecapabilitiesintheUnitedStates.

Over thepast 25 years sinceDesert Storm,whenwe first really started to see this in earnest,adversarieshavestartedtoseektheabilityto1)obtaintheirowncapabilitytodowhattheUSisdoing and 2) look to deny that competitive advantage that the US or allies have if a securitychallengearises.

So,ifyoulookatanyofthosenationstatesthatyouhavelistedinyourquestion,Ibetyoutheywanttobeabletocommunicateoverthehorizon.Ibetyouthey’dwanttohave,fromasecuritystandpoint,indicationsandwarningofthreatedtotheirstatebecause,ultimately,theyhavealotof security concerns. Maybe they have adversaries or potential adversaries in their regioncontesting,oratleastconcernedabout,airspaceintheoceanareasofftheircost.Thoseareallthingsthatthey’reinterestedin,soIimaginethethingsthattheywanttoderivefromspaceare


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thosesamecapabilitysetsthatanybodydoes.Fromamilitarystandpoint,yousaytheywantto:see,shoot,move,andcommunicateoverthehorizon.Butifyou’reacivilian,obviously, it’snotnecessary to shoot over the horizon, instead those other capability steps are fundamentalreasonsfortheirinterestinspace,andcertainthingshavedevelopedcertainlevelsofexpertise.Ithinkyoucan see that theseotheractorsareable to invest in certainaspectsof that toallowthemtobepre-eminent,insomesense,oratleastgloballycompetitive.

Forexample,someBritishfirmsarereallygoodatbuildingsmallsatellites.Astechnologieshaveimproved,andastheneedforbiggersensorand/orcommunicationspackageshasbeenreducedto smaller requirements, you start to see things like Surrey Satellite Technology, which is anexample of a whole lot of capability in a very small satellite. Different states or differentcompanieshavedifferentstrengthsthatcertainlyplaytothebasethattheyhave,typicallywithintheirowngovernment,butonaninternationalscaletheycancertainlysellthosetoanybody.

Interviewer: [Q2]Atamorecountry-specific level,howdothesecountries’space interestsand investmentsdiffer incomparison toeachother?Whatare thekeydifferentiatorsbetween thesecountries’interestsandinvestmentsinthespacerealm?

ColD.Miller: Idon’tknowthatI’mcapableofansweringthatquestionforanyothercountry.Though,Ithink,obviously, a lot goes into that—each of these countries has to make its own very specificcalculations. Undoubtedly, factors like geography, the environment, and the country’s specificneighbors are important. Certainly, the country’s historymatters aswell—what has happenedandthecountry’sperspectiveonthingsisdrivenbythathistory.

Ultimately,acountry’sinterestswilldrivewhatitincentivizeswithinitsowncommercialorcivilindustriesinordertosupportitsspecificdevelopmentefforts.Idon’tthinkthisgeneralprocessisdifferent for any particular nation, but it certainly explains maybe why a given nation or aconsortiumofnationswouldinvestincertainthingsversusothers.

Interviewer: [Q2] Okay. So, are there any glaringly obvious differences in the types of things, materials,and/oractivitiesthatsomeofthesecountrieshavebeeninvestinginorfocusingoninthespacedomain?

ColD.Miller: Oflate,Ithinkthere’sprettygooddocumentedunclassifiedevidence—andyoucouldlookatthereports of the Defense Intelligence Agency or the Department of Defense releases for moredetails—that the Russians and the Chinese have invested heavily in all of those forceenhancementcapabilitiesthatIdescribedtoyouearlier.Whetherit’sremotesensing,navigationandtiming,communications,etc.,bothRussiaandChinahavebeeninvestingheavilyinordertoimprovetheirmilitarycapabilities.RussiaandChinaaredoingsofordifferentreasons,becausethey’reatdifferentstagesintheirdevelopment,butthey’veinvestedcertainlyheavilyinthose.

China and Russia have also invested heavily, particularly lately in the last decade or so, incounter-spacecapabilities.So,ChinaandRussiaare investing inthecapability todeny,disrupt,defeat,degradeUSoralliedspacecapabilities,inparticular,inanefforttodenyustheadvantagethatwewouldhaveifweevergot intoasecuritychallengeorsecurityproblem.There’sprettygood documented evidence to support this—in particular, there’s a recent Russian militarypowerreportthateithertheDIAortheDoDproducedinthelastcouplemonths,andthere’sanannualreportwedoonthePRC.AlotofRussia’sandChina’scapabilitysetsarelinkedbetweenbothspaceandcyber,soyou’llseecommonalitiesintheirinvestmentportfolios.

In terms of our allies, it’s no secret that we have partnered with allies to invest in certaincapabilitysets.We’vepartneredwithsomealliesforinvestmentsinsatellitecommunications,forexample. Australians have made investments in things like wide-band global satellitecommunications.

We,astheUnitedStatesmilitary,looktoensureinteroperabilityofourmilitaryweaponssystemswithourallies.So,it’snotaverygoodcoalitionforceiftheequipmentandcapabilitiescan’ttalk


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toeachother.So,aswemoveforwardwithourNATOalliesorothers,weliketoensurethatourcapabilities are interoperable (i.e., the capability to process and receive remote sensinginformation, the capability to leverage different navigation and timing communications, etc.).Makingsurethatweareinteroperablebetweenourselvesandouralliesisapriorityforus—it’sobviouslyonadifferentscalewithdifferentallies,butthat’ssomethingthatyou’dwanttodotobringalotofcredibilitytothecoalitionorthealliedmilitaryforceyou’retryingtogenerate.

These are the types of investments that I’ve seen. But, like I said, I’m not super qualified tocommentonsomething likewhereJapan’scommercialspace industry isgoing. Ireallycan’tdothat.Whatyoucanseeisalotofnationsthathavethecapabilitytolaunchsatellitecapabilities—theJapanesehavethecapability,theIndianshavethecapability,theFrenchhavethecapability,etc.Likewise,theRussiansandChineseobviouslyhavethatcapabilityaswell.That’snotacheapenterprise—it depends on what you’re trying to launch, but in general that is not a cheapenterprise—but having the capability to do your own launch and reconstitution if needed, orcertainlygenerationofcapability,ispartoftheconsiderationforclassificationasa“spacefaringnation”fromanationalsecurityperspective.

Why does thatmatter?Well, in order to do that, you’vemade investments in launch vehicledeliverytoorbit,typicallyballisticmissiletechnologyormissiletechnologyoverallwhetherliquidorsolidfuel;you’vemadeinvestmentsinnavigation;andyou’vemadeinvestmentsintechnologyforoperationsinorbit,batteries,etc.,andyou’vemadeinvestmentsingroundinfrastructureandlaunchrangecapability.

So, there’s industries thatall supportnations thatoperate in, through,and fromspace,and inorder to sustain yourself as a credible nation state doing that, you’d need investments in allthoseindustries.

Interviewer: [Q2]So,beyondtheUScooperationwithitspartnersandalliesinthespacedomain,areanyoftheseothercountriesworkingtogetherwitheachother,ormaybenotdirectlyworkingtogetherbut sort of cooperating indirectly, to expand capabilities and capacity in pursuit of spaceinterests?

ColD.Miller: Well, it sure seemswidely reported that theEuropeanUnionand theEuropeanSpaceAgencyobviouslyconsolidate investmentsfromWesternEuropeannations,right?Theireffortsfocusedontheirversionoftheglobalpositioningsystemorweathersatellitesandthingslikethat.Thisisobviously anexampleof cooperation thatwe’ve seen, and this cooperation is over andabovewhatever other cooperation the EU and European Space Agency have had individually withdifferentalliednations—inparticular,USalliednations.

In termsof othernation states, I’mnot sure towhat extent they’re cooperating froma spaceperspective.Therearecertainlyrecent indicatorsofmilitarycooperation.Whether it’sarecentreportingoftheRussianandChineseexercisesorothersthatwouldmakeyouassumethatthereissomelevelofcooperation if fornothingelsefromacommunicationsperspective.But Idon’thave any evidence of that and I certainly couldn’t speak to it. You’d have to assume thatthough—ifyoudon’thavecooperationorthecapabilitytotalkoverthehorizon,you’reaforcethat’slimitedto12milesincontact.So,you’vegottoassumethatthere’ssomewayforthemtocommunicate. Right now, we take advantage of and almost take for granted the wideproliferation of civil and commercial capability that can be leveraged for some of thosecommunications.Butstill,they’restillspacecommunicationsandwestillneedthem.

Interviewer: [Q2] Ifyouweretoenvisionaspectrumofstatespacecapabilityandcapacity,howdoyouseevariousspace-faringcountriesbeingpositionedonthespectrum?TheUSisclearlyatthetopofthis spectrum, but how would other countries be broken down across the spectrum?Additionally, with the advances in technology seemingly lowering the barriers to entry andbarrierstocompete inthespacedomain, is thegapbetweentheUSandeveryoneelseonthe


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spectrumbeginning todecrease? If so,what countriesdoyou seeasbeingat the forefrontofthatsecondwaveleadingthechargeinclosingthegapbetweentheUSandeveryoneelse?

ColD.Miller: Well, I don’t have specific numbers or figures on investment trends to say which nations arerampingupornot.

Iguessmyperspectiveonthisquestion—andit’sjustmyperspective—isthatitcertainlyseemslike,basedoffofwhatweareseeing,thatthereissubstantialinvestmentbeingmadeonthepartof some nations, the Russians and Chinese in particular, to advance their military spaceprograms.Thisadvancementisevidentgivenincreasedinvestmentlevels,butalsogiveneffortsto reorganize their military forces. The development of technology is not just a forceenhancement, but also an enhancement to the capabilities required for countering US spacecapabilities.Thosearetwoareasthatseemtobereceivingsubstantialinvestmentsthatweknowaboutandhavebeenwell-reportedattheunclassifiedleveloverthepast4or5years.

Ican’treallyspeaktotrendsofotherallies.Ithinkweseemtorelyonandincorporateouralliedpartnersinbothdevelopmentaswellasoperationofspacecapabilities,andifitwereuptomethiswouldbestrengthened.Forexample,I’dlikemorealliedAirForcepersonneloperatingspacebased infrared systems, etc. I’d like more coordination with Australia, the United Kingdom,Canada,andotherallies.AndIthinkthosediscussionswillbeunderway, if they’renotalready,aboutwhatthatforceneedstolooklikeforthefuture.Thisisanaturalpartofouralliance.

Idon’tforeseeanysignificantdrop,ifthat’sthequestion,inalliedparticipation.Idon’tseeanyevidence of that. In fact, I would see that actually to be growing. If you look at the spacesituational awareness data-sharing relationships that the USSTRATCOM has made betweenFrance and Germany and so on, I think you’d seen that they are trying to expand thosepartnerships with like-minded nations to ensure that we have a responsible use of space foreverybody and that we minimize any risk of conflict where possible through strengthenedalliancesandcooperation.

Interviewer: [Q2indirectly]Okaygreat.Ipromisedyouthatthisdiscussionwouldonlybe30-minutesandweare approaching that half-hourmark right now. So, I justwant to conclude by asking one lastgeneralquestion. Isthereanythingthat Ihaven’taskedyouthatyouthinkIshouldhave?Or isthereanyfinalpointthatyou’dliketoconcludewithasclosingremarks?

ColD.Miller: IguesstheonlypointIwouldaddisonetohelpprovidesomeadditionalcontext.There’sbeenalotofinterestlatelyinhavingdiscussionsabout1)whattrendswe’reseeingintermsofspace,2)theimplicationsofthosetrendstoUSnationalsecurity,and3)whattheUSneedstodoinordertoensurethatitmaintainacompetitiveadvantagefortheAmericanmenandwomenwhoareinuniform.

Severalyearsagotherewasa lotofhesitationtotalkaboutspaceasawarfightingdomain. Infact, I think you’dprobablyhear fromsome leaders that theyprobably couldn’t evenuse thatterminology some years ago. And I don’t think at all that theDepartment or theAir Force, inparticular, is lookingforconflict inspace,butmyconcernafterdoingthisbusinessnowfor24-yearsisthatIdon’tknowthattheAmericanpeopleorevensomeinthemilitaryappreciatetheunique advantage that they derive from space. This advantage simply cannot be provided byterrestrial means—there’s no aircraft that’s going to replace space because there are deniedareas and there’s no radar or suite of radars that’s going to be close enough to replace thecapabilitiesyouhave fromspace,particularly in termsofgeospatialaccuracyover thehorizon.Allofthesesystemsneedtobedevelopedtobecomplementary….allarenecessaryandneitheraloneissufficient.

So,ifyouvaluethespeed,precision,andforceprotection,aswellasthelimitationincasualtiesthatwederivefromspace,thenyouneedtomakeinvestmentsinordertoprotectanddefendit.I think the soonerwe start to have that discussion aboutwhat that needs to be and towhat


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extentwewant todo that,which I thinkneeds tobeanationaldiscussion,not just amilitarydiscussion,Ithinkthebetteroffwewillbe.Thereisonlysomuchthatwe’regoingtobeabletoprotectanddefendwiththecurrentarchitectureandenvironmentthatwehaverightnow.Alotof thesesystemsareyears toacquisitioncycles. Ithasbeen20-yearssince I firstcameheretoBuckleyAirForceBaseasaCaptain,but it’s thesameweaponssystemthatwewereacquiringthenthatisbeingfieldednow.Itiscapableandneedsupgrades,butit’sbasicallythesamething.Theassumptionsabouttheneedtoprotectanddefendatthattimewereminimaltonone.Itwaslargelya“benignenvironment.”

So,asyougettoyourreportandstartfocusingonthosequestions,IthinkthatthereneedstobeasortofstrategicleveldiscussiononwhatistheadvantagethattheUSderivesfromspace?Andhowmuchdoyouvaluethat?Let’sendtheconfusionandhaveadiscussiononwhetheritcanbereplacedorwhatothermitigationstrategiescanbeputinplace,andthenmakeadeterminationofwhereweneed togo in the future.Butwecan’t keep studying this anddebating it for thereasons I tried todescribe toyou todayat theunclassified level. Thepaceofdevelopment forcounter-space activity is significant and if we don’t get our act together quick enough, myconcern isthat if itdoescometimeforaconflict—frankly,we’realready in levelsofsmall,butpersistentconflicteverywhere—thensomeofthethingsthatIdescribedtoyoubeforejustmaynotbethereonascalethattheyaretoday.Andtheultimateendstatecostofnothavingthatadvantagewederivefromspace is, toput itplainly…casualties,period.That’swhat it is.Eithercivilian casualties or US forces. So, I think that we really need to start having that discussionaboutwhattheadvantageyouderivefromspaceisandhowmuchwewanttoprotectitinthefuture.

VeerleNouwens&AlexandraStickingsVeerleNouwens

ResearchAnalyst(RoyalUnitedServicesInstitute[RUSI])

AlexandraStickingsResearchAnalyst(RoyalUnitedServicesInstitute[RUSI])


TheMilitary/CommercialNexusoftheChineseSpaceProgramme

Abstract

Thescopeofthispaperislimited.ItwillexplorehowChina’sspaceoperationsareconceived,outlinesomecivilianandmilitary activities, and examinewhether there are differences in these programmes during peacetime andconflict.TheauthorsbelievethatChina’sspaceagenciesandstrategicambitioncannotbereducedtothoseofthePeople’sLiberationArmy(PLA),andthatachievingscientific‘firsts’ispartandparcelofChina’sstrategicvisionasaglobal power. However, Chinese activities carry challenges for the United States (US), chiefly in technologicaladvancementsthatcanbeutilisedtowardC4ISRdominance.Despitethisrealchallenge,Chinaalsohaslegitimateresearch and scientific interests in space, for which it has found international partners who are ready tocollaborate.

KeyPoints

• TheUSmustunderstandandmonitorChinesespacepolicy through theprismofwiderPLAreformandmodernisation.

• Greaterunderstandingisneededofnon-kineticthreatsinspace,whichChinacontinuestodevelop.


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• TheUSshouldtakenotethatChinesespacepolicyisnotsingularlypremisedonPLAambitions,butalsohaslegitimatescientificinterests.ThesewillhavesecondaryeffectsonChina’ssoft-power(e.g.replacingGPSwithBDS).

• Chinawillcontinuetoworkwithinternationalpartners.TheUSmaydowelltoconsiderre-examiningthecurrentbanoncollaborationwithChina,orriskexclusionfromfutureinitiatives.

• TheUSshouldfocusonleadingthediscussiononOuterSpaceTreatyreform,reclaimingitsleadingroleininternationalspacecooperation.

Introduction

The publication in December 2016 of China’s Space White Paper40 by the State Council, the country’s chiefadministrativeauthority,shedlightonBeijing’sspacepolicies.ItoutlinedChina’sachievementsandofferedafive-yearoutlookonfutureactivities. Indoingso, italsoraisedkeyquestionsregarding its roleasaspacepower,aswellashowitviewedpeacefulspaceexplorationversusitssecuritisation.

Thescopeof thispaper is limited. Itwillexplorehowspaceoperationsareconceived,outlinesomecivilianandmilitaryactivities,andexaminewhethertherearedifferencesintheseprogrammesduringpeacetimeandconflict.TheauthorsbelievethatChina’sspaceagenciesandstrategicambitioncannotbereducedtothoseofthePeople’sLiberationArmy(PLA),andthatachievingscientific‘firsts’ispartandparcelofChina’sstrategicvisionasaglobalpower. However, Chinese activities carry challenges for the United States (US), chiefly in technologicaladvancementsthatcanbeutilisedtowardC4ISRdominance.

HowSpaceOperationsareConceived

Since its first satellite launch in 1970, China has become a major player in the space domain and significantresourceshavebeenallocatedtonarrowingthecapabilitygapbetweenChinaandtheUS.China’sactionsareoftenrooted in a long-term strategic vision that requires programmatic planning and a supporting organisationalstructure.

SpacePolicy

ThereislikelyaLeadingSmallGroup(LSG)onSpacethatprovidesaconsultativeframeworkforthedevelopmentofspacepolicy.41LSGshelpstreamlinethinkingacrossParty,GovernmentandMilitaryleadership.42ThemembersoftheSLGare likelytobeseniorofficialsoftheCCP,thePLA,andthegovernment, includingrelevantministries(e.g. Foreign Affairs; Industry and Information Technology; Finance). 43 The State Council (hereafter SC), hasultimateauthoritygivenitsfundingportfolioandalsoissuesthe5-yearspaceplan(SpaceWhitePaper).

SpaceAgencies:Industry,InternationalCooperation

Thestructureofactorsquicklydescendsintoamazeoforganisations.WithintheSC,theStateAdministrationonScience,TechnologyandIndustryforNationalDefence(SASTIND),whichissubordinatetotheMinistryofIndustryand Information Technology (MIIT), coordinates and manages China’s space activities (defence and aerospaceindustry)throughdevelopment,procurementandsupply.Italsoissuesspaceanddefenceindustryregulationsandmonitorstheirimplementation,andischargedwithR&Dfundingallocation.

Within SASTIND lies the China National Space Administration (CNSA), which formally defines national spacepolicies, administers the civilian space programmes and manages the development of national space science,technology and industry. It also serves as the international face of China’s space programme and works withforeignspaceagencies.TheChinaAerospaceScienceandTechnologyCorporation (CASC),composedofmultipleresearch institutes and their subsidiaries, focuses on the “research, design, manufacture and launch of spacesystems suchas launchvehicles, satellitesandmanned spaceshipsaswell as strategic and tacticalmissiles, and

40http://english.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2016/12/28/content_281475527159496.htm41Aliberti,M.(2015).WhenChinaGoestotheMoon...SpringerInternationalPublishing.42JessicaBatkeandMatthiasStepan,“Party,StateandIndividualLeaders:TheWho’sWhoofChina’sLeadingSmallGroups”,MERICS,https://www.merics.org/en/merics-analysis/china-mapping/the-whos-who-of-chinas-leading-small-groups/43Aliberti,M.(2015).WhenChinaGoestotheMoon...SpringerInternationalPublishing.p.9


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alsoprovidesinternationalcommercialsatellitelaunchservice”.44In1999,theChinaAerospaceScienceIndustryCorporation (CASIC) was created as an off-shoot of CASC. CASIC is a state-owned and state-funded entitycomposedoffiveresearch institutes,tworesearchandproductionbases,sixpublicly listedcompanies,andover620 enterprises.45 It focuses on missile development and aerospace products, which include the design andbuildingofsatellitesandguidancesystems.46

ThePLAandSpace

SpaceformsavitalpartofthePLA’sholisticapproachtooffensiveanddefensivemilitarystrategy.ThisisreflectedinXi Jinping’sorganisationalreformofthePLA,aprocessthatwasendorsed in2013atthe18thPartyCongress,andkicked-offin2015withanaimtobecompletedby2020.

The 2015 Defence White Paper termed outer space a “commanding height for international strategiccompetition”,forwhichChinaseekstodevelopwhatPresidentXiJinpingcalled”anew-typecombatforce”.47Theobjective is to transform the PLA into amodern force capable of information dominance through fighting andwinning “informationised local wars”, or “regional conflicts defined by real-time, data-networked command”.48TheCentralMilitaryCommission(CMC)reorganisationincludedthecreationoftheStrategicSupportForce(SSF),bringingtogetherspace,cyberandelectronicwarfare(EW)capabilitiesbyunifyingunitsformerlyscatteredacrosstheformerGeneralArmamentsDepartment(GAD)andtheGeneralStaffDepartment(GSD).

Theorganisationalstreamliningofspace,cyberandEWcommandsreflectsthenexusuponwhichmodernChinesewarfarewill rely; namely, C4ISR (Command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, andreconnaissance).Herein liesChina’sgreatest strategicassetandweakness.ThePLA therefore seeks informationdominancecapabilitiesinspace,whiledevelopingcapabilitiestodenyordegradethecapabilitiesofothers.

ExamplesofChineseSpaceOperationsandServices

Military

The PLA has been testing numerousmilitary space-based and land-based space technologies. In January 2007,Chinasuccessfully testedaground-launcheddirectascentanti-satellite (ASAT)weaponsystemagainstadefunctFY-1Cweathersatelliteinhigh-orbit.Thetestwasunprecedentedanddrewwidespreadcriticismforitscreationofspace debris. Nevertheless, this ASAT test indicated that Beijing sought and tested technology that inwartimecouldbeusedagainstsatellitesofadversaries.

Other ASAT technology includes co-orbital systems that are prepositioned in space and could manoeuvre toneutraliseothersatellitesystems.InJuly2013,Chinalaunchedarocketcarryingthreesatellites(CX-3,Shiyan-7(SY7), SJ-15), one of which is equipped with a robotic arm. As Anthony Cordesman notes, non-kinetic co-orbitalsatelliteshavetheadvantageofbeinglesslikelytoentailuncontrolledescalationanddebriscreation,andcanpassasdual-usevehicles.49Microsatsareinthissenseequallyanareatowatch.

Further technological advancements are beingmade in the areaof ‘soft-kill’ neutralising technology in a bid toadvanceanddefenditsownC4ISRcapabilities,whilediminishingthatofothers.USDepartmentofDefencereportshave noted that China has been developing directed-energy weapons, such as lasers and high-poweredmicrowaves, as well as radio-frequency weapons that could be used to jam communications systems. Thesesystemscouldbeemployedonmissiles,ground-basedandspace-basedassets.

44http://english.spacechina.com/n16421/n17138/n17229/c127066/content.html45http://english.casic.cn/n189298/n189314/index.html46http://www.nti.org/learn/facilities/63/47http://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-military-idUSKCN0V714B48 Office of the Secretary of Defence (2017), ‘Annual Report to Congress:Military and Security Developments Involving the

People’sRepublicofChina’.49 Anthony H,. Cordesman, “Chinese Space Strategy and Developments”, CSIS Working Draft Paper (2016), p. 25. See:https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/160819_Chinese_Space_Strategy_Developments.pdf


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Another areawhichwarrants further consideration is the possibility of intercepting satellites through the openmicrowaveantenna,therebypotentiallyseizingcommandandcontrol,aswellasaccessingtheirinformation(suchasimagery).50

Civilian/Commercial

Chinadesirestopositionitselfasagreatpowerthatisattheforefrontofhumanity’sexplorationofspace.Indeed,future activities listed in the Space White Paper included missions to the Moon and Mars, asteroidexploration/exploitation,andavarietyofscientificmissions,thecreationoftheglobalBeiDouNavigationSatelliteSystem(BDS)torivalGPS51,aswellasassessingtheimplicationsofspacedebrisandutilisingtheincreasingrangeofsatelliteapplications.

Akeydevelopmentwas the June2016 inaugurationofanew launch siteonHainan Island.TheWenchang site,China’s‘CapeCanaveral’,wastheoriginofthedebutsofboththeLongMarch7andLongMarch5rockets.ClosertotheEquator,itismoresuitableforreachinggeostationaryorbitandisalsoaccessibleforseatransportationofrocketstagesandpayloads.However,thislocationisalsorepresentativeofChina’snon-militaryspaceoperationsandincludesplanstoincreasetourism,whichsuggeststhatChinaisactivelyattemptingtoopenupitscommercialspaceactivities.

Akeystonescientificexperimentisthe2016Miciussatellite52,aChineseandAustrianjointendeavour,totesttheuseofquantumkeydistributionbyusing thepropertiesofentangledphotons to transmitakey that cannotbecracked.On10August2017,theMiciussentthefirstever‘hack-proof’messagestoEarth53,pavingthewayforanun-hackablecommunicationsnetwork.Thesesamepropertiesalsomeanthatanyattempttointerceptordecodeatransmissionwillbenoticed.WhiletheChineseleadresearchernotedthatthemissionhad“startedaworldwidequantumspacerace”54,thefutureapplicationofthistechnologyextendsbeyondnationalsecurityandincludesaglobalquantuminternetwithcommercialbenefitstoarangeofstakeholders.

LikeonMicius,China continues to collaboratewith foreign countries.A recentexperimentdesigned to test theeffectsofspaceradiationonDNAreachedtheInternationalSpaceStation(ISS)inJune2017aboardaDragoncargospacecraft,andisthefirstChineseexperimenttodoso.OperatingthroughtheprivatecompanyNanoRacks,ratherthan NASA, ensured sanctions compliance as no technology was transferred between NASA and China. TheseexperimentspotentiallyopenthedoortofurthercooperationwiththeUSandothersinareasofmutualbenefit.They also point to the blurred lines that result from the increased partnerships between national spaceprogrammesandcommercialspacesatellitemanufacturersandlaunchproviders.

Transformationoftechnologicalassetsfrompeacetimetoconflict:ImplicationsfortheUS

TherateofdevelopmentofChinainitsusesofspacepointstowardtheaccelerationinitscapabilities,withcivilianandmilitary implications. Indeed, as a 2015 report by theUS-China Economic and Security ReviewCommissionstated,“Chineseanalystsassessthattheemploymentofspace-basedC4ISRcapabilitiesbypotentialadversaries,especiallytheUnitedStates,requirethePLAtodevelopcapabilitiestoattackspacesystems”.55China’sincreasingpresenceinspacewillimpacthowtheUSutilisesthespacedomain,however,thisscenariocarriesbothchallengesandpotentialopportunitiesforUSspacepolicy.

Opportunities

Firstly, forallofChina’sadvances it still lagsbehindUScapabilities;case inpoint is the July2017LongMarch5rocket launch failure, and the potential knock-on effects to the Chang’e lunar mission and overall launch

50https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/160819_Chinese_Space_Strategy_Developments.pdf51http://english.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2016/06/17/content_281475373666770.htm52See:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-china-3709183353http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-4088572354http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/science-environment-4029479555US-ChinaEconomicandSecurityReviewCommission(2015),‘ChinaDream,SpaceDream:China’sProgressinSpaceTechnologiesandImplicationsfortheUnitedStates’,p.8.See:https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/China%20Dream%20Space%20Dream_Report.pdf


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programme. Moreover, while China has made strides in manned spaceflight, its practical experience remainslimited.

This capabilitygap, coupledwithdeclarationsby thenewUSAdministrationovergreaterprioritisationof spacepolicy,56offersthegovernment(NASAandthemilitary)andcommercial(particularlythoseprivateenterprisesthathold government contracts) sector the opportunity to take advantage of a favourable policy and regulatoryenvironmentandcontinuetoplayaleadingroleinspace.

Secondly,whileChinahassoughttopromotegreaterinnovationinthecommercialdomain,itremainstobeseentowhatextentitwillattempttobreakintothismarket,bothintermsofprovidinglaunchfacilitiesanditsownuseof commercial technologies. Companies around the world, including in China, are seeking to capitalise on theglobalspaceindustry’spredictedworthofUS$640billionby203057.Decreasingproductioncostsof,forexample,CubeSats allow for more actors to access space. Nevertheless, the US remains at the forefront for launchdevelopments for these satellites andmore traditional heavy payloads, aswas exemplified through the SpaceXbreakthroughs in reusable launch capabilitieswhich lower the cost of launches (highlightedby its new contractwiththeUSAirForcetolaunchtheX-37Bspaceplane).Domestically,indigenousUScompaniesarestillbestplacedtobecontractedbytheUSmilitary,andcountrieslackinglaunchcapabilitieswillcontinuetoseetheUSasakeylaunchserviceprovideralongwithChina, IndiaandRussia.Russiahas longbeenamajor launchserviceproviderandthereislittleevidenceitdoesnotintendtocarryoninthisguise,ashighlightedbyitslaunchinJuly2017of73satellitesonasinglerocket58,anditsrecentlaunchofaUSsatellite59.However,2016wasthefirstyearsince2004thatRussiadidnotholdthetopspot innumberof launchesglobally, fallingbehindboththeUSandChina,whojointlyledthestandings60.Similarly,despitebeingtheonlycountrythatregularlylauncheshumansintospace,theRussiannationalspaceprogrammehasincreasinglybeenmetwithtrouble.61

Finally,theUSmustcapitaliseonitshistoryofinternationalspacecooperation,andpotentiallyre-examineitsbanoncooperationwithChina.ThegrowingcollaborationbetweenChinaandotherspaceactorsthroughpoliticalandscientific partnerships will be essential for the development of policies and technologies that address sharedchallenges,suchasorbitaldebris,thatarecurrentlynotaddressedininternationalregulations.

ThiscreatesanopportunityfortheUStotakealeadershiproleinfuturenegotiationsoninternationalregulatoryframeworksonspace.IncludingChinainsuchworknotonlypositionstheUSattheforefrontofnegotiations,butcanalsohelpensurethatanyChinesedevelopmentsdonotadverselyaffectUSspaceassets.

Challenges

China’stechnologicaladvancementsthatcarrydual-usecapabilitiesposeapotentialthreat.Theutilityofasatelliteequippedwithagrapplingarmtoremovespacedebris,undertheauspicesofChinaactingasaresponsibleglobalpower isobvious.But theability toremoveanadversary’sassets inspaceduringtimesof tensionwouldnotbeunimaginable. Such a scenario canbe likened to the caseof China, acting ‘for the sakeof international safety’,capturingaUSUAV/underwaterdrone in theSouthChinaSea.62 Suchanevent, if seen in space,would lead toquestions over attribution and intent. For example, if a Chinese satellite were to remove another state’sfunctioning satellite from orbit as the result of an outward attempt to clear a potentially dangerous piece ofequipment, this couldbe seenasanactof aggression.Withoutaproper regulatory frameworkover conduct inspace,boththesecuritisationofspaceandthedestabilisationofnations’C4ISRcapabilitiesonEarthisagrowingreality.

China’sinternationalcooperationwithinthespacesectorposesasecondchallenge.AsChinamovesforwardinanumber of key technological areas, this could have implications on preferential partnerships being made with

56http://www.cbsnews.com/news/pence-vows-to-make-space-great-again/57JamieReed,presentationtotheUKSpace2017Conference,Manchester,30May201758http://spacenews.com/soyuz-launches-73-satellites/59http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-06/08/c_136350780.htm60http://spaceflight101.com/2016-space-launch-statistics/61http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/2017/03/russia_s_space_program_is_in_trouble.html62http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/12/china-negotiations-seized-underwater-drone-161217135305893.html


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Chinaover theUS.Similarly, the refusalof theUS toworkwithChinacouldpotentially lead to futureexclusionfrom international partnerships thatwork towards confronting global challenges faced by all parties. This is asmuchachallengetoUSpublicdiplomacyandsoftpowerasaleaderinscienceandtechnology,asit istotheUSbenefittingfromtheresultingtechnologies.Furthermore,withapotentialdecommissioningoftheISS,thefutureofasingleChinese-builtspacestationmaynecessitateinternationalcooperationwithBeijinginspace.

Finally, Chinese leadership in technological advancements (quantum communication) and rival technology (BDSversusGPS), are cornerstonesofChinesepublic diplomacyand soft power.While theUShashistorically held aleadingpositionas the international frontrunner in scienceand space, it is clear thatChina is capitalisingon itsspaceprogrammeaspartofitsnarrativeofaglobalpower.

FinalAssessment

The ambitious nature of China’s space programme, both in military and commercial terms, should not beunderestimated. The challenge to US supremacy in the space domain is growing. While China certainly haslegitimateobjectives inspacethatareunrelatedtodefence, thepotential fordual-use technologyposesaclearchallenge for theUS.However, caution isneededwhenassessing theextent towhich thiswill inhibitUSuseofspace. Intimesofpeace,China isseentobedeveloping itscivilianandmilitarytechnology.AlthoughASATtestsanddual-usetechnologycouldbeaimedatdegradingUSassets inspaceandonEarth, theiroutrightusewouldcausesevereharmtothesoftpowerthatChinacurrentlyseeks toamassasa risingglobalpeacefulpower.Themostlikelythreatthereforecomesthroughsoft-killtechnologiesandthecyberdomain,whichseektodegradeUSC4ISRcapabilitiesonEarth.

Furthermore, it shouldnotbe forgotten thatChina’s spaceassets face thesamethreats, suchasextremespaceweatheranddebris,asallotherspaceusers.Manyofthesehazardscanonlybemitigatedthroughinternationalcooperationandtheagreedneedtoprotectspaceasaglobalcommons,aviewthatChinalikelyshares.Workingwith China on regulating space beyond the existing Outer Space Treaty will be essential to shaping the futureleadershiproleoftheUSinspace.

Thisyearmarksthe50thanniversaryof theOuterSpaceTreaty, leadingmanyof itssignatories,andotherspaceactors, to question its efficacy and relevance. Since its establishment, the number of space actors and industrysectorshashugelyincreased,deepeningthelevelofrelianceonspaceactivities.ThishasintroducedawidersetofquestionsregardingspaceusagethatwerenotapplicablewhenonlytheUSandRussiawereactiveparticipants,includingaspectsoflawrelatingtotechnologyandtheexploitationofspace(e.g.asteroidmining).It isvitalthatany update to the Treaty ensures these issues are taken into account and continues to guarantee that allsignatoriesupholditsprinciplestopreventconflictandpromotepeacefulspaceexploration.Giventhatanyfutureconflict between great powers will likely include a space element, the US can prepare and should continue tomonitorthespacepolicyofChinaandplaceemphasisonitsowntechnologicalcapabilities.However,ultimately,itmust not lose sight of the importance of its leadership position in the international political arena. RetainingAmericansoftpowerandleadershipinspacewillbeasessentialasitstechnologicalcapabilitiesinmeetingChina’sgrowingroleinspace.

Dr.DeganitPaikowskyLecturer(TelAvivUniversity)

11September2017WRITTENRESPONSE

Israel

Israelhasa longtraditionofspaceactivitydeveloping,operatingand launchingsatellites intospace.Asasmallcountry, Israel enhances its power through space in ways otherwise not possible. This opportunity isaccompaniedbysignificantchallenges,especiallyinmaintainingthequalitativegapandpreservingIsrael’sposition


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at the forefront of technology, aswell as securing the space environment. The significance of space in Israel’sstrategicconceptionshapesIsrael’sperspectiveonspacesecurity.

HavinganindigenousnationalspacecapabilityispartofIsrael’snationalsecuritystrategy.Asatraditionalspace-faringnationandasophisticatedproduceranduserofspacetechnologiesandapplications,Israelattributesgreatimportancetosecuringthespaceenvironmentforpeacefulusesforallnations.

Lookingbackthirtyyears,theoverallspaceactivityofIsraelismuchbroaderthannationalsecurityactivity.Inthe1990s Israel commercialized its space activity. It has a robust commercial space industry, alongside a strongscientificsector.

Israel’sapproachtowardsspaceandspacesecurityemergesprimarilyfromitspositionintheregionalandglobalsystems. As a small and threatened country, Israel strives to secure and assure its national security, aswell asachievealoftyposition,especiallyinitsregion.

Israel's need to relate to a broad circle of states which surround it, beyond its immediate neighbors, and itsnational and security interestsdemandanorientation towards space.As a small country, Israel suffers fromanacutelackofresources.Forthesereasons,thecountrymanifestsapragmaticapproachtospacepower,aimedto

satisfy national security needs. Generally, these consist of the capability to reach distant threats from anintelligenceandoperationalpointofview.Thismainly involvesearlywarning, intelligence,deterrence,andself-relianceinadvancedtechnologies.

Nationalspacecapabilitiesandinfrastructureformilitaryandcivilianapplicationsareperceivedasforcemultipliersboosting Israel’s technologicaladvantage,whichallows it toenhancemilitarycapabilities.Thesecapabilitiesalsocontribute to anumberofnon-military fields. This, in turn, enables the country to increase its level of nationalsecurityandstrengthenitsstatusintheregion.Hence,astrongstate-of-the-artspaceprogramishighlyimportantto Israel’s national security. Nonetheless, Israel’s limited resources dictate that it must concentrate on those

fieldsthatarecritical.Therefore,Israelseeksapresenceinspaceandregionaldominanceinspaceinnicheareas:EarthObservation(i.e. lightweightsatellites,highresolutionelectro-opticandSAR), low-Earthorbit (LEO) launchcapability, and Communications. Israel does not undertake to build all systems entirely on its own. It has, forexample,nonavigationorweathersystems,andhasnomannedmission,etc.However,Israelseekstocooperatewithinternationalpartnersonprojectsofthisnature,aswellasscientificprojects.

Israel’snarrowbordersconstitutealackofstrategicdepth,andhaveposedexistentialthreatswhichnecessitateda search for solutions to avoid theelementsof strategic surprise and suddenattack. For these reasons, Israel’ssecuritydoctrinedemandsadvancedintelligencecapabilitiesforearlywarning;aswellascombatcapabilitiesforarapidtransferofbattleawayfromIsrael’spopulationcenterstoenemyterritory.TheorientationtowardsspaceassistsIsraelincopingwiththechallengespresentedbythelackofstrategicdepth.

Satellite-derived intelligence information is considered to be a great equalizer in strategic terms, because itincreasestransparencyamongstatesanddiminishesthesenseofuncertainty,thusreducingtheriskofsurprise.InIsrael’s strategic thinking the Israeli space program is recognized as a critical component of its independentintelligence capability. The issueof Israel'sself sufficiency is a complexone. Israel is far frombeing totally self-reliant; it depends onAmerican political support in international forum and economic aid.Nevertheless, in thefieldofintelligence,Israelhasagreatdealofautonomy.

Israel perceives space as a global commons and therefore aspires to contribute to a secure and sustainable

spaceenvironment.Israelacknowledgestheworldwideuseofspaceforsupportingterrestrialmilitaryactivity,aswell as defending, and deterring harmful actions, against space systems. Nevertheless, it seeks greaterinternational collaboration and cooperation, especially among democratic space-faring nations, in maintainingspaceasapeacefulenvironmentforthebenefitofall.

Israelenjoysandsuffersfromagrowingrelianceonspacesystemsfor itscriticalnational infrastructure.Forthisreason,itisconcernedaboutthegrowingglobaltrendofspacemilitarization.Suchthreats,ifrealized,couldleadtoIsraellosingitscurrentrelativeadvantagesintherealmofspace.Therefore,Israelislookingforwaystoprotectitssatellitesandachieveasustainablespaceenvironment.


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References

BenIsrael,I.,andPaikowsky,D.,"TheIronWallLogicofIsrael'sSpaceProgramme"Survival,Vol.59,No.4,August-September2017,pp.151-166.

Paikowsky, D., Azoulay, T., and Ben Israel, I., "Israeli Perspective on Space Security", in: Schrogl KU, Hays PL,RobinsonJ,MouraD,GiannopapaC(Eds)HandbookofSpaceSecurity-Policies,ApplicationsandPrograms,2014,(NewYorkHeidelbergDordrechtLondon:Springer,2015),Vol2,493-505.

KevinPollpeterResearchScientist(CNA)

8August2017


Interviewer: [Q2]Okay.Great.So, let’smoveontothemainquestionthat Iwashopingwecouldfocuson,whichisabouthowotheractorsconceiveofspaceoperationsforbothmilitaryandcommercialpurposes.So,howdoyouseeotheractors,likeChina,asconceivingoftheirspaceoperationsformilitaryandcommercialpurposes?And,asyoucansee,thequestionlistsanumberofcountriesto address but, given your expertise, please feel free to focus on China andmaybe any othercountryyou’recomfortablewithspeakingto.

K.Pollpeter: Sure.MycommentsherewillbelimitedtoChina.So,Ithink,broadlyspeaking,Chinahasaspaceprogramtoincreasewhatitcallsitscomprehensivenationalpower.So,thisissortofthebasketof everything that makes a country powerful: its military might, its economic power, itsdiplomaticpower,itsculturalpower.TheChinesearereallybigonassigningnumberstoeachofthesecategoriesandinrankingcountriesandthingslikethat,andthisisaverysortofsubjectivewayofapproachingthingsbutgenerallywhentheChineselookattheirspaceprogram,theytryand justify a certain spaceprogram—whether it’s their satellite navigation system (BeiDou) orhuman space flight or lunar exploration, what have you—by trying to check the boxes for allaspectsofcomprehensivenationalpower.

So,inthatsense,theChinesetrytohavetheirspaceprogramhitonallcylinders—theywanttosortofwork towards something so that it’snot justapurelymilitaryeffortand it’snotpurelycommercialeffort,butyou’ll seea lotof things combined toachievemultipleobjectives.Hereyou’llgettoonebigdifferencebetweenUSandChina,whichisthattheChinesespaceprogramisinherentlydualuse.It’samilitaryandcivilianprograminone.Theydon’thaveaNASAthatisapurelycivilianorganization.Thereisnoseparation.

So,whentheChinesegotobuildsomesortofspacesystem,it’swithinthemindthatitwillservemultipleuses(i.e.,militaryandcivilian), ifpossible.Ofcourse,there’salwaysgoingtobesomeoutliers (i.e.Mars exploration will probably have lessmilitary use than another satellite), butgoingintoit,it’salwaysthoughtofassortofthisdualuseprogramwhereonesatellitewillservemultipleapplications.WhereintheUS,wemayhavecertainsatellitesthatarecivilian-focusedorcommercial-focused,inChinait’sverymuchcenteredonthisdualusesystem,andIthinkpartofthat is because in a world of limited resources and technological know-how and engineeringtalent,itmakessensenottodivideupyourR&Dcapabilitieslikethatbecausethenyou’regoingtoendupshortingeither theciviliansideor themilitaryside—keeping it togethermakesa lotmoresensefortheChinese.

Interviewer: [Q2]Okay.So,youmentionedanoverridingChineseambitiontoincreasenationalpower,anditseems like the focus and action of anything China does regarding space is focused aroundincreasing Chinese national power. So, I’mwondering, what sort of specific actions has China


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taken regarding in relation to the space domain and space capability that have been mosteffectiveinsortofachievingthisobjectiveofincreasingChinesenationalpower?

K.Pollpeter: Oh,wow.It’shardtopindownanysingleonethathasbeenthemostdramatic.Imean,China’sspaceprogramsince2000hasjustbasicallyhitonallcylinders.Theonlytypeofsatellitethatitdoesn’thaveisaballisticmissileearlywarningsatellite—though,thereissomespeculationintheWesternpressthattheyalreadyhavesomebuteverytimeItryandtrackdownwheretheygotthatfrom,itendsupatadeadend.

So,it’shardtopickoutanyoneexample.Certainlyhumanspaceflightcatchesalotofattention.It’s a big engineering feat that the Chinese are able to send humans up into space, and theyhaven’tlostanybodyupinspaceyet.So,thatgoestosortofthepoliticalaspectofit—theprideandprestigepartofspacepower.

Inthemid-1990s,Chinawasreallytheposterboyforhownottodospacelaunches,astheylostanumberoflaunchersandsatellitesandnobodywouldplacetheirsatellitesonaChineserocket.Ithinkatonepoint,Chinawasdoingonelaunchayear.However,Chinahasreallyturnedaroundits launch capability—theChinesearenowdoing15-20 launchesa year, theyhavea reliabilityratingnowthat isat internationalstandards,andtheyhavegonefromjusthavingahandfulofsatellitesupinspacetohavingIthinkclosetoaround200satellitesinspace.

TheChinesewentfromhavingaverylimitedremote-sensingcapability,tonowhaving5typesofremote-sensingsatellitesanywherefromIthinkabout.72meterresolutionallthewayupto250meter resolutions and they can do hyperspectral, electro-optical, multi-spectral, syntheticapertureradar,electronicintelligence,etc.

TheChinesealsonowhavecounter-spaceweaponstodenyanadversary’suseofspace.

So,therearealotofthingsthatyoucanpointto.I’mnotsurethere’sanyonerealindicator—itgoesalmostacrosstheboard.

Pleaseletmeknowifyouwantmetostop.Ifnot,Icankeepgoing.

Interviewer: [Q2]Pleasegoaheadandcontinue.

K.Pollpeter: Okay. In a military sense, since the late 1990s China has been studying what we termed“network-centricwarfare,”whichwasaconceptputoutby theOfficeofForceTransformationunder Admiral Cebrowski back in the late 1990s. So, the Chinese did a lot of research on“network-centric warfare” and finally in 2015 it came out in their Defense white paper as“system-versus-systemoperations.”So,“system-versus-systemoperations”isatakeonwarfarewheremodernwarfare like that foughtby theUnitedStates isnot foughtonplatform-versus-platform—rather, it’s really a contest of systems versus the other guy’s systems. And reallywhat’sdrivingthis isthePLA,ortheChineseCommunistParty Ishouldsay,haveobservedthiscomingonforsometimeandhaverealizedthatagroundwar isno longertheirmainconcern.They’renolongerreallyconcernedwiththeRussianscomingovertotheboarder.Whattheyaremoreconcernedabout iswhat’shappeningout intheoceanwiththeUS,andtheystatedthattheirmainthreatsnowarecomingfromthemaritimedomain.

So,inordertodothat—inordertodefendyourselffromthosemaritimethreats—youneedtheabilitytoconductlong-rangestrikesagainstanopponent’sshipsoragainsttheirbases.Andifyouneed to do that, then you need some sort of C4ISR architecture to support those types ofoperations.So,ifyoulookat,whatdoesittakeforChinatolocate,track,andtargetaUSaircraftcarrier? There aremany different ways you can do this (e.g., over-the-horizon radar, aircraft,etc.),butyoucancertainlythinkofspaceasbeinguseful inthatregards.So, forexample, let’ssay China was thinking about conducting missile strikes against Guam. You’d want to knowwherethingsareafteryouconductthestrikes,youwanttodobattledamageassessments,etc.


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So, ineffect, thePLAhasrealizedwhattheUSmilitaryhasrealized:thatthefartherfromyourshoresyougo,themoreimportantspacebecomes.

Then,theothersideofsystem-versus-systemoperationsisthatyouneedtobeabletotakeouttheotherperson’seyesandears.So,thisgetsintoasymmetricwarfareaspects(i.e.,areadenial,anti-accessareadenial, etc.), but if you look inChinesewritings, they say thateven if system-versus-systemwarfareisinherentlyasymmetricinthatevenifyouhavetwocountriesthatareofequalcapability,thebattleisnotsomuchdeterminedbythestrengthsofeitherside—rather,it’sdeterminedby theirweaknesses and the ability to exploit thoseweaknesses. So, that’swherethingslikecounter-spaceweaponscomeintoplay.

Interviewer: [Q2]Okay.YoumentionedthatChina issortof firingonallcylinderswithrespecttothespacedomain,withmaybe justaslightdeficiencywith respect ICBMdefenseandwarning.So, ifyouweretolookatChina’soverallinvestmentwithregardtothespacedomainandspaceactivities,andifyouweretothinkaboutthistotalinvestmentbrokendownintoapiechart,wouldyouseeany sort of noticeable areaswhere they’re investing significantlymore or significant less thanother areas, or is Chinese investment generally pretty even across the board of space-relatedinvestmentareas?

K.Pollpeter: Sure. So, theChinese budget is tremendously opaque. Estimates on the budget run anywherefrom$2billiontoabout$8billionayear.Anywayyoucutitup,they’renotspendingasmuchastheUS,soit’sreallyhardinbudgetarytermstodeterminewhatmaybeapriority.

Policy-wise, what I’ve seen is that C4ISR satellites, remote-sensing communication, and thesetypesofthingsarethepriority.Somethinglikehumanspaceflightandlunarexplorationwillranksecond,andthenthirdwillbesortofmorescience-relatedassets(i.e.,spaceweather,lookingattheSun,missionstoMars,etc.).Andcounter-spaceisn’tevenmentioned.

Interviewer: [Q2]Okay.So,I’mwonderingwhattherelationshipislikebetweenthecommercialspacesectorandgovernmentspacesector inChina.Younoted theChinese interest indualusesystems, sowhat kind of relationship does the Chinese government havewithwhatwewould technicallyclassifyascommercialspaceentitiesinChina?And,aretheChinesespacecompanies,whichwemight consider to be commercial entities in the US, independent actors, or are they allgovernment-ownedorpartiallygovernment-owned?

K.Pollpeter: Yeah,sothisistricky.ThetrickythingisthatallthemajorplayersinChina’sspaceprogramaregovernment-owned. There are twomain state-owned enterprises that are involved in China’sspaceprogram,andthey’redoingmostofthework.

Therearesomeothers,though.There’sthisnewExPacecompany—who’snameseemstobeaplayonSpaceX—thathasbeenpromotedasChina’scommerciallaunchcompany,butwhenyoustartscratchingatthesurfaceitseemstobethecasethatit’sreallygovernment-owned.

So,alotofwhatI’veseeninChinaisnotreallycommercialinthesenseofthewaythatwethinkofcommercialspace—thecompaniesarereallygovernment-ownedorat leastheavily investedin by the government. There is one company—the name is escaping me right now—that isassociatedwiththeJilinseriesofsatellites,whichmaybecommerciallyoperatedbutI’dhavetotake a closer look at that. But, regardless, by and large once you start scratching the surface,mostoftheseChinesecompaniesareeitherownedbystate-levelcorporationsorprovincial-levelcorporations.

There’s this talk about leveraging—doing like the US has done to leverage commercialcapabilities—butIhaveyettoseethathappeninChinainthewaythatwethinkofithereintheUS.

Interviewer: [Q2] Yeah. That’s sort of what we’ve been hearing. So, is China cooperating with any othercountriesinsupportofitsspaceinterest?And,Iguessontheothersideofthespectrumaswell,


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doanyofChina’sspaceinterestsandambitionsopenlyconflictwithanyotherspecificcountriesthatyoucanthinkof?

K.Pollpeter: So,ChinahashadalongstandingrelationshipwithRussia.Though,tryingtofindoutexactlywhatthey’redoingismoredifficult,maybeinpartbecauseIdon’tknowRussian.ButcertainlyintheChinesepress,you’llseethatthey’llsignmemorandumsofunderstandinginspacecooperationbutthenit’sneverreallyfullyrevealedwhatthey’redoing.

ChinahasalsogonetoUkraine. IknowChinahasbeenworkingon launchvehicletechnologieswithUkraine.

China also has what seems like a growing cooperation with countries in Europe. Their spaceroboticarmhasbeendevelopedinconjunctionwithGermany.TheUniversityofStrathclydehasbeen hosting Chinese researchers on space technologies. German astronauts are learningChinese.FrancehasbeendoingsomeworkwithChinaonspaceweather.

So,asChinabecomesmorecapable, theseothercountries inEurope—though,ChinahasbeencooperatingwithRussiaandUkraineforsometime—arefindingthattheywouldliketodomorecooperation with China. But, then also, it’s also a way to curry favor with China—if certaincountriesarecooperatingwiththemonsortofhighprestigespacetechnologies, itmightopenup theway for China to thinkmorepositively about certain countries anddomore trade andinvestmentwiththem.

Whatwasthelastpartofyourquestionaboutcompetition?

Interviewer: [Q2]Ontheothersideofthespectrum,doanyofChina’sspaceinterestsandambitionsopenlyconflictwithanyotherspecificcountriesthatyoucanthinkof?

K.Pollpeter: I don’t know if it’s openly conflictual, except in the counter-space realm, which is obviouslysomewhat conflictual with the United States. But, in other areas, it’smore about like Europesays,“HeyUS,westillloveyou.We’restillgoingtocooperatewithyouinspace,butChina’supandcomingsowewanttocooperatewiththeChinesetoo.”So,atwhatpointdoesthatbecomeazero-sumgame?Isitgoingtobewin-win-winforeverybody,ordoestherecomeapointwherecountriesonlyhavesomuchmoneytospend,sotheyhavetofigureoutwho’sthebestpartner.And,ifmaybesomeofthatmoneywillbegoingtowardsChinainsteadoftheUS,thenhowdoestheUSreact?So,inthatsortofsense,itcouldeventuallycreateconflictsoratleasttroublefortheUnitedStates.

Interviewer: [Q2] Okay. Great. So, I have just one last general question that we always conclude theseinterviewswith.IsthereanythingthatIhaven’taskedyouthatIshouldhave,oristhereanyfinalpointthatyouwouldliketoconcludewith?

K.Pollpeter: IthinkthatI’vehitmostofthemainpoints.China’scomingonstrong.

Though,one lastthing, Iguess, is thatonethingthat I’mnotseeing isasChinabecomesmoreinvestedinspace,whatI’mnotseeinginChinesewritings—now,maybethey’retalkingaboutitinBeijingandwejustdon’tseeit—isthatitseemsthatthey’renottalkingaboutsomethinglike,“Hey,aswebecomemore invested in space,we’re takingonsomeof thesamevulnerabilitiesthattheUShas.”So,inChinesewriting,wedoseediscussionsabout,“Hey,theUSusesspacefor80% of its communications and 70-90% of its remote-sensing for intelligence gathering. So,obviouslyfortheUSthis isagreatstrength,but it’salsoavulnerability,so ifaconflictweretoarise,itwouldbegreatifwecouldtakeitout.”Whatyoudon’tseethenistheflipside,suchas,“Hey, if we’re building all these satellites and we’re becoming more dependent on space,shouldn’twebethinkingaboutdoingthingsdifferently?Whathappenstous if there’saspacewar?”

There’sjustsortofthisnaturalassumptionthatwarwilleventuallygoupintospace,thatthingswill just happen, and China will just fight through it. There’s no talk about, “Hey, maybe we


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shouldreconsidersomeofthesethings.”There’snobodyinthearmscontrolcommunitysaying,“Hey,we’retakingonthesamesortofvulnerabilities,maybeweshouldtalkaboutsomesortofcodeofconductorsomethingsimilarinspace.”

And, in fact, both Russia and China have been really sort of opposed to a code of conduct inspace.So,thisreallyseemstobeatoddswiththeirself-interest,anditssortofinterestingfromthewayIlookatitthatyoudon’tseethisdiscussionhappeninginChinesewritings.

Interviewer: [Q2] How do you think an increased recognition of that vulnerability would impact Chineseaction?

K.Pollpeter: Well,Iwouldthinkthatifyoulookattheircounter-spacecapabilities,theylooktobedevelopingcapabilitiesthatgofromthegroundallthewayuptoyourgeosynchronousorbit.Thetestingofacapability that couldknockout satellitesup inGEO, thatdebriswillbeup there forever. So, itreally seems to have gone past the deterrence aspect into sort of more of a war-fightingcapability.

So,youwouldthinkthattheywouldbegindialingbacksomeofthatbut itdoesn’tseemtobehappening. Youwould think that theywouldn’t need to develop all these capabilities—maybethat they’dbe goingmore after the soft sort of kills, ormaybe that theywouldbe concernedabout,again,developingsomesortofcodeofconductratherthanstickingtothisarmscontroltreatythatthey’vebeencosponsoringwithRussia,whichhasgonenowhere.So,thisisallreallyinterestingtome.

VictoriaSamsonWashingtonOfficeDirector(SecureWorldFoundation)

22August2017


Interviewer: [Q2] That’s interesting. I didn’t know that a country like India doesn’t have a national spacepolicy.So,thisactuallyseguesnicelyintothenextquestionIwashopingtoaskyou.Thisquestionhas a lot of parts, but it’s about how US allies, partners, and adversaries conceive of spaceoperationsformilitaryandcommercialpurposes.So,I’mwonderingifyoucouldtalkaboutthis,howdootheractorsconceiveoftheirspaceoperationsbothwithrespecttothemilitaryrealmandthecommercialrealm?And,asyoucansee,thisquestionlistsoutanumberofcountriestoaddress,butfeelfreetofocusinonwhichevercountriesfromthatlistyoufeelmostwell-suitedandcomfortablewithspeakingto.

V.Samson: Sure.LetmejuststartwithIndiasinceIjustbroughtitup.Indiawenttospacefordevelopmentalpurposes. It was peaceful, or, I should say, non-military—peaceful use of space is anotherexampleofacontentiousspace term,because there isn’ta lotofagreementaboutwhether itmeans non-aggressive or non-military. Either way, India was basically using space for civil,nationaldevelopmentcapabilitiesfordecades.

But over thepast decadeor so, therehavebeen a coupleof changes. First, I think the Indianmilitary has recognized that there are definite interests for them to utilize space, particularlysincetheyhaveareasofconflictinmountainousregionswhereit’sdifficulttocommunicateanddo imageryotherwise. Space isprettyhelpful for that.Butalso, likea lotof countries, India isveryworriedaboutChina,andwhenChinahadits2007ASATtest, itwaskindofawakeupcallformany actors, and India immediately thought, “okay,maybewe should have something aswell.”


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As an aside, India and China are really interesting. India is super interested in China,whereasChinaseemstobebarelyinterestedinIndia.That’sabitofanexaggeration,butIthinkintermsofsecurityandspaceissues,IndiaisnotreallyonChina’sradar.

Anyways,India’sspaceprogramistypicallyrunthroughtheIndianSpaceResearchOrganization(ISRO),which isacivilianentity,butmoreandmoretheirMinistryofDefence(MoD)hasbeengetting involved in space and satellites, and they actually have two national security satellitesnowoutofabout24-26totalIndiansatellites.Andthey’restartingtohavealotofdualpurposetypecapabilities(e.g.,anISROsatelliteprovidesservicesthattheIndianmilitaryuses).

Aswell, India traditionally has not had a solid independent commercial space sector. They dohaveacommercialwingofISROthatiscalledAntrix,andthey’retheonesthatdevelopalotofthecommercial capabilities in India.ButAntrix is fundedby the Indiangovernment, so it’snottruly,Iwouldargue,acommercialsector.Antrixjustrecentlyannouncedthattheyweregoingtostartseekingsubcontractorscompletelyindependentofthegovernment,soIthinkIndiaisslowlygetting an independent commercial sector. India has a huge small satellite community and isreallyinterestedinthenewspace-typestuff—thereisalotofinterestingtechnologicalresearchcomingoutofIndiathesedays.

And,likeIsaid,Indiaisfinallygearinguptothefactthattherearenationalsecurityintereststhatthey can have in space, so they need to figure out what sort of space capability they need.Additionally, Indiahasamissiledefenseprogramthat they’vebeenworkingon forsometime,and they’re using it as a way in which to develop an anti-satellite capability without actuallytestingananti-satelliteweapon.Currently,therearetonsofquotesfromIndianofficials—Ithinkmorefor thedomesticaudiencethananythingelse—saying,“look, Indiawantspeace inspace.India doesn’t want a conflict in space, but if anything should happen, thenwe have an ASATcapabilitydoneanddusted.”I’darguethatthisisprobablyoptimisticontheirpart,butitiswhatitis.

So,it’sinterestingtoseekindofhowIndia’sspaceoperationshaveevolvedoverthepastcoupleofyears.But, like Isaidbefore, Indiadoesn’thaveanationalspacepolicy.Supposedly, they’vebeenworkingononethat’sindraftform,butit’shardtogetitthroughtheirgovernment.India’sParliamentdoesn’treallyhavecommittees likewehavehere inCongress. IndianParliamentaryeffortsdependuponindividualmemberstopushthingsthrough,andIdon’tknowthattheyhaveanystrongsupportersofgettinganationalspacepolicyout.AndI’vebeentoldbysomemilitarypeoplethatIndiaactuallylikesnothavinganationalspacepolicybecauseitgivesthemalotofroomandflexibilitytomaneuver—ifyouhaven’tbeentoldwhattodo,youcoulddowhateveryouwant,right?

Interviewer: [Q2]Great.Canyoutalkaboutanyoftheothercountriesthatarelistedinthisquestion?

V.Samson: Sure.Russiaisinterestingbecause,goingbacktotheColdWar,theSovietUniondidnotwanttoacknowledgeanykindofcommercialactivity—theydidn’twantspacetobeusedforcommercialactivities.IthinkthiswaslargelybecausetheyfeltthattheUnitedStateswouldhavealeguponthem because the United States could have US national space activities and then commercialactivities,andthatwouldkindofgiveusalegup.WhenyoulookbacktowhentheOuterSpaceTreatywaswritten, therewere a lot of arguments over whether or not commercial activitiesshouldevenbeallowedinspace.TheUnitedStateswasabletoprevailonthatissue,sothatwasavictory inour time.But thathaschangedbecause I think theRussiansare lookingatcurrentcircumstances and realizing that oil prices aren’t what they used to be, so they need otheroutside sources of funding, and they’ve also had a few restrictions elsewhere due to otheractivities,sothey’relookingfornewwaystousethespacedomainasatoolformakingmoney.

ROSCOSMOSisweirdbecauseitwastheRussianSpaceAgency,butthentheyshutitdownandrenamedit,andtheyalsomadeacommercialsectoralsonamedROSCOSMOS.Honestly,it’sveryhard to understandwhat the difference is, as well. I don’t think the Russians actually have a


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nationalspacepolicyeither.Theyhaveacouplecompetingdocuments,andI’mnotsurewhichoneisuppermost—afewyearsago,ItriedtoactuallytrackdownwhatexactlyRussia’snationalspacepolicyis,andIhadnosuccess.Ithinkthat’skindofindicativeoftheirconfusionregardingwheretheywanttogoinspaceandwheretheywanttogoasacountry.IalwayssaythatNASAkindofhasacrisisbecausetheydon’t reallyknowwhatthey’resupposedtobedoingorwhatthe raisond'être is, butRussia’s spaceprogram truly doesnot knowwhat it’s supposed tobedoing—they’re justkindofhangingon,hopefullynotexplodingtoomanyrocketswhilethey’redoingit.

TheonepositivethingRussiahasrightnowwithrespect to itsspaceoperations is that they’retheonestakingpeopleuptotheInternationalSpaceStation,andtheyhavealockonthis.But,Russia is lookingatother things regardingspaceoperations.TherehasbeenariseofPrecisionNavigationandTiming(PNT)satelliteconstellationsaroundtheworld,andRussiaisinterestedinthis. Of course, the US has GPS; the Chinese have Beidou, which is doing pretty well; theEuropeanshavetheirownversioncalledGalileo;andRussiahasGLONASS.RussiaisreallytryingtomakeGLONASSathingthatpeopleuse,butit’shardbecausetheydon’thaveexactlytherightcoverage,thesatellitestendtomalfunction,anditjustdoesn’thavethebroadusethatGPShas.This is changing, though—a lot of the newer cellphones now have chips for both GPS andGLONASSwhenyoubuythem,butGLONASSisclearlynotaswidespread.

So,IthinkRussiaistryingtofollowtheUS’slead,actually,intermsofhowwe'vediversifiedourspacecapabilities,butthey’rehavingahardtimedoingitbecauseIjustdon’tthinkthere’salotofleadership.ItseemsthatRussiaisjustfearfulofbeingleftbehindandbeingperceivedasbeingweak.

IknowRussiadoeshavesomenewspaceactors,but,tobehonest,ourorganizationhashadaverydifficulttimereachingouttotheRussianspacecommunity.WeknowthatpeoplethatshowupatCOPUOS—acoupleofthemareverygoodtechniciansandexpertsontheissues—butit’shardtogetabeatonwhattheRussianspacepolicymakersarethinkingjustbecauseoflanguagedifferences,visas,andjustgeneraldifficultiesbetweenourtwocountries’relationships.

Interviewer: [Q2]Okay.WhataboutNorthKorea?

V.Samson: Well,thisisobvious,butNorthKoreadoesn’treallyhaveacommercialsector.I’msureyouguyshaveheardalotaboutNorthKorealately.SupposedlyNorthKoreahaslaunchedsomesatellites,butthesedon’treallyseemtodomuchmorethanmaybebroadcastatune,iftheycanactuallybroadcastit.

However,NorthKoreaisabsolutelyusingitsspacelaunchcapabilitiestofurtheritsmissilelaunchcapabilities. I don’t know thatNorthKoreawouldnecessarily sell those capabilities, so it’snotlike they’redoing this in the senseof commercialoperationsor interests. I think they’remoreusing these capabilities and operations to further their interests regarding security concernsmorethananythingelse.

Interviewer: So,howwouldyoudefineNorthKorea’skeyambitionsand interestswithrespecttothespacedomain?

V.Samson: IthinkNorthKorea’sambitionsandinterestsareportrayedbythewayinwhichithasdevelopeditsmissilecapabilities.NorthKorea isn’t likeothercountrieswhereeconomiesarereliantuponspace—North Korea isn’t reliant on space. I think the leadership’s interests revolve aroundregimecontinuity,andI’dimaginethatdriveswhateverpolicytheydecidetodo.So,Ithinkthatany research into theNorthKoreanspaceprogramhas to lookat theunderlying issues.NorthKorea isn’t going to do space for science’s sake or for development’s sake or for STEMpromotion’ssake—theyaren’tgoingtodoanythinglikethat.They’regoingtofocusonnationalsecurityconcerns,andtherearealwaysnationalsecurityinterests.


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Having said that, because North Korea doesn’t have space assets at the level of prettymuchanyoneelse,IknowalotofpeopleoftenpointtoNorthKoreaasbeingtheactormostlikelytolaunchanukeordoanEMPorwipeoutalotofsatellites.However,Idon’tseethemdoingthat,largely because I think it would be so hugely escalatory—it would require a regime-endingresponse,andtheyareawareofthat.Idon’tthinktheywouldbeabletotargetmissilesbydoinganASAToperation,andIdon’tthinktheyhavetheguidanceorsituationalawarenessstrengthtobeabletodothateither.Theyhavenotmentionedcounterspaceinpublicdocuments.Butthatdoesn't mean there aren't other things they could try and do, though, to make peopleconcerned. I just think that they’re focused too heavily on their nuclear program andmissileprogramtoreallydevelopanASATcapabilitybecause it isrocketscienceand it iscomplicated,and they’re doing a lot of work there that depends upon getting access to other people’stechnology. So, I think North Korea is limited in terms of what their indigenous science andtechnologycanaccomplish.

Interviewer: [Q2]So,forthesakeoftime,I’lljustaskyouonemorequestionaboutthisparticularquestion.Ifyouweretolookatthesecountriesonaspectrumofspacepower,howwouldyourankorgroupthesecountriesacrossthatspectrum?PresumablytheUSisatthetop,butwherewouldtheseothercountriesfall?

V.Samson: So,Iwouldapproachthisbyusinggroupings.

I think the first group would pretty clearly be the US, Russia, and China. With respect tosomethingliketotalnumberofsatellites,IthinktheUSandRussiaareprettyclose.TheChineseare not quite on the exact same level as the US and Russia—China is probably a few yearsbehind—but given what China has been able to accomplish and how much money they’reputtingintotheirspaceprogram,they’reprettyclose.So,IwouldranktheUS,Russia,andChinatogetherinonegrouping.

Then,thenext leveldown, Iwouldclassify intermsofcountriesthatutilizespacea lot,haveaspacelaunchcapability,andhaveastrongspacepolicy.So,inthisgrouping,Iamthinkingofthecountriesof theEuropeanSpaceAgency (ESA), Japan, India, andCanada. Though I don’t thinkCanadacanlaunchitsownsatellites,IdothinkthattheyarekindofonparwiththeUSfriendsandfamilies.

Then,thethirdleveldown,Iwouldclassifycountriesthatarekindofone-offs.Inthisgrouping,Iam thinkingof Israel andSouthKorea,bothofwhich can launch theirown satellites. Israel, inparticular,hasaprettystrongspaceprogram,andit’sbeenmilitarized.TheSouthKoreans,notsomuch,sothey'remaybeatierbelowthat.BrazilisalsoprobablyonpartwithSouthKorea.

Then,belowallofthoseI justmentioned, I thinkwouldbemostoftheothercountries inyourlist. So, you’d have Australia, Singapore, and Ukraine. They’re each different, but they’recountries that use space, recognize space as being important, and each have their own spaceinterestsandcapabilities;however,they’redefinitelyinthefourthlevel.

BrentSherwoodProgramManager(NASAJetPropulsionLaboratory,SolarSystemMissionFormulation)

13July2017


Interviewer: [Q2]Youmentionedearlierthatwithrespecttotheplanetaryexplorationsector,therearenot

really any perceived threats because the barrier to entry is so high and no one else is reallyoperatinginthisdomain.


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B.Sherwood: Well,letmeinterjecthere.It'snotthatnobodyisoperatingintheplanetaryexplorationdomainbesidestheUS;therearemultipleplayersinthisdomain.Europe,India,Russia,China,andJapanareallplayersintheplanetaryexplorationdomain,butthenumberofplayersinthisdomainisrelativelysmall,andbecauseofscientificexplorationandtheOuterSpaceTreaty,it'sacollegialgroup. For example, nobody is going to land next to the Curiosity Rover onMars and try todamage it. So, it's not just theUS in this domain; but the focus of the domain is really aboutsciencesoit'snotthesametypeofenvironmentasIthinkweconsiderlowerEarthorbittobe.

Interviewer: [Q2]Okay.So,ifyouweretolookattheactorsoperatingintheplanetaryexplorationsectoronaspectrum,you’dthinkthattheUSisprettyfaraheadofeverybodyelse,right?

B.Sherwood: Well,technologicallytheUSisfurtheraheadanddoesmoremissionsthananybodyelse,sobothofthosethingsarefactuallytrue.

Interviewer: [Q2]Okay. So,whoare theotherkeyactors in theplanetaryexplorationandmissiondomain,andwouldtheyfallalongthisspectrumincomparisontotheUS?

B.Sherwood: So,there istheUS,withNASA.There isEurope,whichpredominantlyconsistsoftheEuropeanSpaceAgency,although therearemultiplenational spaceagencies inEuropeaswell.As farasplanetary missions, there is also Russia, although not so much anymore because Russia hasencounteredanumberof failures anddoesn’thave asmuchas in thepast to spendon theseactivities. There is also China,which has already been operating on the surface of theMoon.TherearealsoIndiaandJapan.Japanhasdonemultipledeepspacemissions.IndiahasalreadygottenanorbitertoMars.

So,thenextcountriesupwillbeSouthKorea,whichisactuallyworkingon2lunarmissions,andtheUnitedArabEmirates,whichhasaMarsorbitermissionthat'sindevelopment.Brazilalsohasa Space Agency and a Scientific Agency. Brazil hasmostly been focused on space physics andheliophysicsmissions,andthat isabouttheextentofwhatBrazildoeshere,whichisnotreallyplanetary.

ThecountriesthathavebeentotheMoon,forexample, includetheUS,Russia,Europe,Japan,China,andIndia.ThecountriesthathavebeentoMarsincludetheUS,Russia(thoughRussiahasneveractuallyhadasuccessatMars),Europe,andIndia.ThecountriesthathavebeentoVenusaretheUS,Russia(whichwasactuallythefirsttoVenus),Europe,andJapan.

Interviewer: [Q2]Okay. So, you mentioned that Russia is sort of dropping off because of some resourceconstraintsandalsosomefailures,butdoyouseeasituationwheremaybesomeofthebiggeractorsthatyoumentioned,likemaybeChinaorIndia,starttosortofclosethegapwiththeUSinterms of planetarymission capabilities? And, if so, as this gap starts closing, could there be asituationwheresomepointsofconflictoraggressionbegin toarisebetweentheUSandsayamoreempoweredChinaintheplanetarymissionsandexplorationdomain?

B.Sherwood: Well,Ithinkthat'sastretch.Idon'twanttobenaïve,butthat'skindofastretch.

I'lltellyouwhatIthinkismaybeamorereasonablewaytoviewthreatintheplanetarymissionsandexplorationsector. It'snotsomebodygoinguptoyourspacecraftandcompromisingit. It'snot somebody trying to interferewith your process to conduct amission.What could happenthough,forexample,isanaccidentaldamagingofthepotentialforscientificresearch.ThecaseinpointwouldbeMarsortheoceanworldsoftheoutersolarsystem,likeEuropaorEnceladus.Anaptanalogyhere isLakeVostok inAntarctica.LakeVostok is the largest subglacial lake, it’sundera4,000-yearrecordofice,andthewaterinitisthoughttohavebeenisolatedfromEarth’sbiosphereforbetween5and20millionyears.So,biologically,that'sanextremelyinterestingandimportantplacetodoscientificresearch.Well,theRussianswerethefirsttodrillintoit,andtheypenetrated it in 2012 and did some biological work in which one of the findings was anannouncement of a new organism that had never been seen before. But, there is a problem,which isalso in thewater that they sampled, that their samplewasclearly contaminatedwith


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drilling fluids from the drilling operation. Because of this, Russia has takenmultiplemeasuressincethen,buttothisdaythereisascientificargumentaboutthevalidityoftheirresults.

So, the analogy for Mars exploration, is what we call forward contamination—bringingsomething with you and then making a discovery, but you don't know if you’ve discoveredsomethingyoubroughtwithyouor ifyou’vediscoveredsomethingthatwasactuallythere.So,theway that frames up as conflict is if somebody's urgency outstrips their care, and then byrushing in they compromise the ability for genuine science to be done. It's not intentionallymeanttoscrewupthescienceofothers;it’smoremeanttobeadesiretogettherefirstandinsuchahurrythatanactor iswillingtotakeshortcutsthatmaybemaketheirscience lessvalid.And in the case of forward contamination ofMars, if there are potential habitats in the deepsubsurface for example, and we contaminate them with Earth life, then that has moreconsequences than just complicating scientific research, which is why forward contaminationplanetaryprotectionisgovernedbytreaty.

[…]

Interviewer: [Q2 indirectly] Hi Brent. I have a quick, more policy focused question for you regarding therelationshipbetweenthecommercialspacesectorandthecivilspacesector.Canyoutalkalittleaboutsomeofthekeyimpedimentsorhindrancestocooperationbetweenvariouscommercialspace sectors and the military or defensive space sectors? Are there any particular areas ofcontentionthatyouareawareof?

B.Sherwood: Well,nothingreallycomestomindbecauseIdon'tknowanythingaboutmilitaryspace,soIdon'tknowwhatkindofimpedimentstheremightbethatwouldbeamenabletosolutionsthatweusein thecivil sector.Youknow,certainlywehaveall theusual contractual stuff,which is kindofonerousbutjustsomethingthathastobedealtwith.

Though,I'mabigfanofcollaborativepartnerships,likepublic-privatepartnershipkindofthings.Collaborativepartnershipsworkverywell in Japan,bytheway,and it'sbeingdemonstratedtoworkinlotsofsectorshereintheUS.But,it'skindofanewthingforcivilspace,andIdon'tknowifthereisapossibilityforthosekindsofthingsinmilitaryspaceornot.It'sjustnotmyfield,soIdon'tknow.

ViaSat,Inc.RichardA.VanderMeulen

VicePresidentofSpaceandSatelliteBroadband

KenPetermanPresident-GovernmentSystems

ShannonO’MearaSmithExecutiveDirectorofStrategicInitiatives

FredTaylorVicePresident-SpaceandCyberApplications-GovernmentSystems

BruceCathellVicePresident-GovernmentOperations


Manyof theentities identified, forexample thePeople’sRepublicofChina,Russia, Iran,NorthKorea, Indiaandothers, are not known to have a culture of openness and trust and as such may find it difficult to enable


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commercialorprivatesectorinnovationinspaceoperationstoservemilitaryandcommercialpurposes.Inthecaseofsignificantcommercialorprivatesectorinvestmentsacultureofopennessandtrustisparamounttoincreasingtherateoftechnologyandcapabilityinnovationanddevelopment.

Exponential technology growth can only be gained by enabling and leveraging innovation, not directing it, orattemptingtomanageandcontrolit.ThisisafundamentaltraitofAmericanbusinessesandtheAmericanwayoflife.Clearlythereisgreatriskinopennessandaneedfortrusttoaffirmalignedpurposes,thereforeitisimportantthat leadership approaches these efforts with an “Eyes-on, Hands- off” approach, creating andmaintaining anoperationalecosystembutallowingindividualorganizationstooperateindependently.

Dr.BrianWeedenDirectorofProgramPlanning(SecureWorldFoundation)

31July2017INTERVIEWTRANSCRIPTEXCERPT

Interviewer: [Q2]Okay.Great. So, now let’smove beyond the definition questions into some of the other

questionsIwashopingwecouldaddress.Q2fromourlistisabouthowotheractorsconceiveofspaceoperationsformilitaryandcommercialpurposes.So,Iamwonderingifyoucantalkabitabouthow, fromyourperspective,otheractors conceiveof spaceoperations forbothmilitaryandcommercialpurposes.Thisquestion,aspresented inour listofquestions, laysout severalcountries to address, but please feel free to talk about whichever countries you are mostcomfortablewithspeakingto.

B.Weeden: Sure.So,backingupalittle,firstI’lltalkaboutthetiersandcategoriesofspace-faringstatesandusers.This is something that Ihaveactuallywrittenaboutbefore.Toput itbroadly,weat theSecureWorld Foundation had a line of scholarly research over the last several years trying toinform the approaches we take towards space governance and space sustainability, and webasicallystartedoffbydrawingfromotherdomains.Asmuchaspeople liketothinkthespacedomainisspecial,itisn’treallyinmostcases.So,partofwhatwedidwas,welookedattheworkof Elinor Ostrom,whowon the Nobel Prize in Economics in 2009. In particular, we looked atOstrom’sworkonsustainablemanagementofcommonpoolresources(CPRs).

So, what are common pool resources. Well, everyone is familiar with the tragedy of thecommons,whichsaysbasically,ifnobodyownsaparticularthing,thereisatendencytooveruseit,whichmeans,itgetsdestroyed.WhatOstrompointsoutisthatthetraditionaltragedythereistheonlywaytopreservethatthing,istoeitherprivatizeit(i.e.,breakitupintolittlechunksandfenceitoff)ortobringinaleviathanthatissomegovernmentoradministratortodictatehowtouseit.However,eitheroneofthoseoptionsdestroysthecommonnessofit.

So, Ostrom looked at common pool resources. For example, if you call the ocean a globalcommons,thencommonpoolresourcesarethingslikefishinggroundsoroilreservesundertheocean—thesortsofthingsthataresubsetsofthisbroadercommonsthatyoucankindofusetoextractresources.Ostromfoundthattherearedozensofcaseswherepeoplehavefoundawaytousecommonpoolresourcessustainably,andshecreatedalistofprinciplesthatoccuracrossthosecases.

So,aspartofourresearchattheSecureWorldFoundation,wehavetriedtolookatthethingsthatworkacrossallothercommonpoolresourcesaroundtheworld—whethertheyarefisheries,watersheds,oilpatches,forests,etc.—andthinkabouthowtheymightapplytospace.

So, in relation toyourquestion,wehave tried to identifydifferent tiersof stakeholders in thespaceworld.Our first cutwas thatwe identified3 levels:1) space-faring states (i.e., countries


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thatcandoitall),2)space-capablestates(i.e.,countriesthatcansomethingsinspacebutnoteverything), and 3) space users (i.e., basically anyone that uses space data, services, orapplications in theirdaily life,whether itbecountries,companies, individualcitizens,etc.).Wethen went into a lower level of analysis where we broke these 3 levels down according to 4different variables: 1) level of engagement (i.e., are they directly involved—actually flying asatellite—orare they indirectly involved—justusing thedata froma satellite?),2) spectrumofengagement(i.e.,arethey justoperating inonespacesector,oraretheyoperating inmultiplespacesectors?),3)dependenceonspace(i.e.,dothey justusespacebecausethey like it,or isspace actually a core interest?), 4) prioritization (i.e., how do they prioritize space relative totheirpeersandrelativetootherissues?).Weputtogetherafullpaperonthis,andIwillsendittoyou.

Asfarasthespecificcountriesyouhavelistedinyourquestion,mysenseisthattherewassomesortofacategorizationbetweenthethreebulletedgroupingsofcountriesthatarepresentedinthequestion.Inthefirstgroup,youhaveChina,Russia,Iran,andNorthKorea,whichallseemtofitintotheadversarycategory.Inthesecondgroup,youhaveEurope,Japan,India,SouthKorea,andIsrael;andinthethirdgroup,youhaveCanada,Brazil,Australia,Singapore,andUkraine.Myguessisthatforthesecondandthirdgroupings,onegroupingismeanttobethealliescategoryandtheothergroupingismeanttobethepartnerscategory;however,Icouldn’treallytellwhichgroupingwasmeanttobewhichcategory.

PartoftheissueanddifferencehereisthattheUShasdifferentrelationshipswithcountriesinspacethantheymighthavewiththosesamecountriesoutsideofspace.Let’stakeSouthKoreaforexample.Obviously,theUShasatreatyalliancewithSouthKoreastemmingfromtheKoreanconflicts,butinthespaceworld,thereisnotreallythatbigofarelationshiptherebetweentheUSandSouthKorea.Viceversa,wehaveAustraliaandCanada.TheUShasstrongrelationshipswith Australia and Canada in other domains (e.g., in Afghanistan where the US, Canada, andAustraliahavebeenfightingside-by-side),butit’sonlyveryrecentlythattheUShashadastrongspacerelationship,orastrongerspacerelationship,withAustraliaandCanada.Then,youhaveacountrylikeIndia,whichtheUSiskindofforgingnewrelationshipswithonbothfronts.

So,ingeneral,thewayIwouldrecommendapproachingthisisbystartingfirststartingwiththeUS,andthenbuildingcirclesof trustoutwards fromtheUS.So, in that firstcircleof trust,youprobablywouldincludetheFiveEyes(Canada,Australia,theUK,andNewZealand),thoughNewZealandisnotreallydoingawholelotinspace.Overthelast5or6years,therehavebeenalotofdiscussionsaboutbuildingaFiveEyesspacerelationship—thesediscussionsstartedoutundertherubricoftheCombinedSpaceOperationCenter(CSPOC),whichwasexercisedatoneofthefrequent war games around 2010, but are now under the rubric of the Combined SpaceOperationsConcept(CSPO).TheideathereisthateachoftheFiveEyescountriesisgoingtohaveanationalspaceintegrationcell(i.e.,JSPOC,CANSPOC,AUSSPOC,etc.),andtheCSPOisasetofCONOPS for how those national operations interact with each other, recording aerospaceoperations.So,youhavetheUSwiththeFiveEyes,andthatconceptofoperationsisunderway.There have also been discussions about expanding space operations and space situationalawareness(SSA)datasharingoutwardstothenextcircleoftrust,whichwouldprobablyincludeGermany,France,andJapan.Afterthat,thenextcircleoftrustoutwardwouldlikelyincludeallofthecountriesthattheUShassignedaspacesituationalawareness(SSA)datasharingagreementwith,sothiswouldincludeSouthKorea,India,UAE,andseveralothers.

So,goingbacktoyourquestionregardinghowthesecountriesconceiveofspaceoperations.

Therearea coupleof countries, suchasAustralia, Canada, and theUK, that theUShas a fewdecadesofhistorywithinspace.CanadawasoriginallypartofspacebecauseofNORAD,anditwasabigpartoftheNORADearlywarningnetwork,whichwasnotonlyforaircraftsbutalsoforsatellites. Eventually, though, that US-Canada space-centric relationship went away—in largepartbecauseCanadasaidnotoStrategicDefenseInitiative(SDI)missiledefenseandCanadakind


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ofsaidnototheIraqwaraswell,whichledtoCanadakindofbeingkickedoutoftheUSspaceworldforadecentamountoftime.AustraliahashistoricallybeenhometoalotofgroundassetsinsupportoftheNRO’smission,butthatwasacloselyheldnationalsecretuntilfairlyrecently—Australia’spublicwascertainlynotawareofthis.Ingeneral,though,Australiahasn’treallyhadabigroleinspace.GoingbacktoCanadaforasecond,Canada’sentirespacebudgetissomethingaround$400million—that’sminisculecomparedtotheUS.

So, in lookingatalloftheothercountriesonyour list,byand largetheyhavedonesomethingsmallinspace—mostlywithalliesorpartners—andarenowstartingtorealizethattheyneedtoexpandwhattheyaredoing.So,Canadahasbeenworkingonanationalspacepolicyforthelastcoupleof years, andnowhasa satellitenamedSapphire inorbit,which contributes to theUSspace surveillance network. Australia is dumping awhole bunch ofmoney into revitalizing itsspaceindustryandisdevelopinganewspacepolicy.SouthKoreaistryingtofigureoutitwhatitwants to do in space. Japan has recently gone from interpreting “peaceful use of space” asmeaning non-military, to changing its constitution so now Japan can have military spaceactivities, so Japan is trying to figure outwhat all of thatmeans. Japan’s actions are probablybeingdrivenlargelybywhatitisobservingfromChinaandNorthKorea.

So, all of these countries have had some sort of role in space but are now going through thetransitionwheretheyaretryingtoexpandwhattheyaredoinginspaceandsortofredefinestuffinlargeparttoaddamilitaryandnationalsecuritycomponentintotheirspaceinterests.Though,someofthesecountriesarefurtheralongthanothersinfiguringoutwhatthatallmeans.

Interviewer: [Q2]Great. So, I thinkwecould talk forhoursabout thisquestionbecause thereare somanycomponents,butI’dliketoaskyoujustonequickfollowup.Youmentionedtheworkyouhavedone to categorize stakeholders in the space world into 3 different tiers: space-faring states,space-capable states, and space users. So, I’m wondering, if you take a look at the specificcountriespresentedinQ2fromourlist,howwouldyouclassifyeachcountrywithinyour3tiers?

B.Weeden: Sure.So,forthespace-faringstatestier,theobviousonesthatIwouldincludearetheUS,Russia,andChina.

Then, also in that first tier, I would put the EuropeanUnion. Though, that depends on if youconsidertheEuropeanUniontobeaunitaryactorornot.IfyoudoconsidertheEuropeanUniontobeaunitaryactor,thenIthinkyouput it inthatfirsttier(space-faringstates)aswell,but ifyoudonot,andyouarelookingatFrance,Germany,andItalyasallseparateactors,thenIwouldprobably classifyeachof these individuallyas in the second tier (space-capable states). So, forexample,Francehassomedecentmilitaryspacecapabilitieshereandthere,butnothingglobal,nothingsustained,anditdoesn’treallydoawholelotonhumanspaceflight.

I would say that Iran and North Korea are clearly in the second tier (space-capable states)becausetheydosomestuffinspace.Clearly,NorthKoreaandIranbothhavelaunchedsatellites,theyhave activeballisticmissile programs and space launchprograms, and theyhavenascentsatellitedevelopmentprogramsthataregoodbutnotthebest.Overall,though,IranandNorthreally don’t have a huge robust presence in space. Iran has is a little bit more robust spacepresence thanNorthKorea. Iran,before the revolution,washeavily active in the internationalspace community and heavily active in the scientific space community, but that has beencurtailedsomewhatpost-revolution.

Then,I’dsayyouhaveabunchofcountriesthatarekindofonthebubbleandlookingtothinkabout transitioning from kind of a tier 2 (space-capable states) actor or tier 1 (space-faringstates)actor.Indiaisoneofthesecountries.Indiahasbeeninvolvedinspacefordecades,andithas some very good capabilities, but historically India has said that the purpose of the Indianspaceprogramistoprovidesocio-economicbenefitstoIndia’spublic.So,historically,themajorfocusofIndia’sspaceprogramhasbeenonremotesensingandmonitoringofEarth’sresources(e.g., agriculture, land use, forest use, etc.) and some other scientific- and application-driven


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things.But,now,overthelasttenyears,Indiahasstartedtoshifttootherthings.Indiaisnowactively lookingatprestigeprograms, sendingprobes to theMoonand looking to go toMars,human space flight, and national security applications—India has launched its first nationalsecurity satellite, is using dual-use satellites for national activities, and is even thinking aboutthingslikecounterspaceanti-satellitecapabilities.So,Indiaisdefinitelyonthatbubblebetweentier2(space-capablestates)andtier1(space-faringstates).

So, most of the countries listed in your question are in that tier 2 (space-capable states)classification.

Asfortier3(spaceusers)actors,there’salotofcountriesthatcouldbeconsideredaspaceuser.Prettymucheverycountryusesspacetosomedegree.Though,whatisinterestingisthatmoreandmoreofthosespaceusersarestartingtobecomeactivemembersinspace.It’smucheasierforactorstogetasatelliteupintospacethanitusedtobe.Today,upwardsofabout60ormorecountrieshaveatleastonesatelliteinorbitorhavelaunchedasatellitethathasorbited.

So,overtime,Iwouldsaythateveryoneiskindofmovingupthetiers,butasfarasthattoptieroffullyspace-faringstatesthatcandoeverythinginspace, Iwouldsayrightnowthelist istheUS,RussiaandChina.

Notably,Russiawaskindofonthebubbleofslippingintotier2,andChinaiskindofinthemiddleof that transition from tier 2 to tier 1—China is in the process of building out itsmilitary andnationalsecurityspaceapplications.

CharityWeedenSeniorDirectorofPolicy(SatelliteIndustryAssociation)

24July2017


Interviewer: [Q2]Okayyeahthatisveryhelpful,somovingrightalongtoquestiontwo.Howdoeseachentityinthefollowingcategoriesconceiveofspaceoperationsformilitaryandcommercialpurposes?How do they approach space operations and services? Is there any difference in how theircommercialventures(ifany)considersecurityduringpeace,crisisandconflict?WeselectedthethirdorthesecondoptionIbelieveandIsupposeyoucanspeakmoreexclusivelyonCanada.Isthatright?

C.Weeden: ThefirstthingIwouldstateassomeonewhowasintheCanadianMilitaryandworkedwiththeUSonspaceissues,theFiveEyescommunityisveryclose.Itiswhatweunderstandandbelieveiskind of the closest allied community in space, especiallywith Canada’s history of being in theNorthAmericanAerospaceDefenseCommandandbeingoneof the first close-knit bi-nationalcommandstotracksatellites,Canadahasbeenaverycloseallyformanydecadesandprovidingspacesituationalawarenessservicesbackthenaswell,and today.Those fivenationshavekeyspacerelationshipsplusGermany,Japan,France,andothers.

When I was working inside CheyenneMountain tracking satellites, I was the deputy sensormanager under Air Force Space Command but in the NORAD billet. So that’s how close-knitCanada and theUS have become in space. Today, Canadians are serving in the JSpOC on theWatchCenterandothermissionsofcourse for themissilewarningmissiondue to theNORADrelationship.

Asacloseally,Canadafromthe1990sactuallyhasevolvedwhenitcomestotheuseofspacefordefensepurposes.The1990s iswhenthe lastdefensespacepolicywas released. Ithadavery


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ardentno-militaryuseofspacekindofvibetoit.Thatwasthecultureinthattimeframe.Sincethen I believe Canada has done a 180, in how they rely and use space for critical nationalsecurity.There’sarecognitioneveninthemostrecentCanadiandefensepolicy,whichI’mhappytosendeveryone,tobringspaceintonationalsecurityaspectsforCanada.

Those specific itemswhere space is themost important is in supportof theArcticoperations.CanadahasoneofthelongestcoastlinesintheworldandhighlyreliesonradarsatellitedataandAIS(AutomaticIdentificationSystem),andalsocommunications.

Canadahasalso,Itoldyou,alegacyinNORADforspacesituationalawareness.CanadahadthreeBaker-Nunn telescopes across the country from the 1960s to the 1980s. Today the CanadianArmedForceshasadedicatedsatelliteorbitingtoprovidespacesituationalawareness intotheNORAD and JSpoC missions, through to the Space Situational Network. For communications,increasingly narrow and wideband communications are critical to support Arctic operations.That’sinanutshellfrommytimeintheCanadianmilitaryhowspacehasevolvedandwhatkindofcapabilitiestheCanadiangovernmentislookingtomoveforwardon.

[…]

Interviewer: [Q2indirectly]Okay.Okay,we’llkeepitmovingalongagain.Iwanttorephrasethisquestionjustalittlebit.NowweknowmostofthecommercialsatelliteindustryisbasedintheUS,butlookingoutsideofNorthAmerica,whatwouldyousayare thenations thatarepoisedtoexpandtheirowncommercialsatelliteindustryformilitarypurposes?

C.Weeden: I think in the SatCom-satellite communications environment, Latin America is utilizingcommercialSatCom,Iunderstand,fordefensepurposes.TheMiddleEast,potentiallyitcouldbeaplacethatislookingtoleveragemorecommercialorencouragecommercialsatelliteSatComtobe launchedandthereforeopeningthedoorstowardsutilizing it.Oh,onethingaboutCanada,going back there, Canada is well equipped to do public-private partnerships in creatingcommercialsatellitecapabilities.That’ssomethingthattherestoftheworldmaybeengagedinaswell.

Interviewer: [Q2 indirectly]Okay.Okay, great. How are the components of the commercial space industryallocatedoutsideoftheUS?Now,speakingspecificallyinthesatelliteindustry,InotedfromtheSIAreportthatthere’sapagetalkingaboutmanufacturingbrokendownbycountryandregion.Couldyouexpandonthatalittlebit?

C.Weeden: Sure.Letmegettothemanufacturingpage(p.19),letmebringthatup.

As you can tell, it’s primarily the US and Europe for manufacturing of commercial satellites.Obviously,Chinahastheirowncapabilitytobuild.Thosethathaveinvestedinglobalnavigationare usually the nations that have a keen interest in it. It’s an expensive program that doesn’tnecessarilyhaveabusinesscase.Japan,India,China,Russia,andEurope,theyallhavetheirownnationalglobalnavigationsystemsorregionalnavigationssystemsasitmaybe.

Startups can be associated mainly to Earth observation, but we’re seeing more Internetcommunicationsservices/broadbandaswell. It’snotnecessarilywhichcountrieshavetypesofmarket interest, it’swhere thenew startups aremaking their homes and looking to serve theglobalcommunity.

Date post:	23-Nov-2021
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NSI Space ViTTa Q2 Ally, Adversary, Partner Use of Space …

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