Nuclear Arsenals

Table 1. Estimated global nuclear weapons inventories, 2014.

Hans M. Kristensen, and Robert S. Norris Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 2014;70:96-108

Copyright © by Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists

Status of World Nuclear Forces, 2015

All this info is from the Federation of American Scientists (FAS)

http://fas.org/issues/nuclear-weapons/status-world-nuclear-forces/

•  a This number is higher than the aggregate data under the New START treaty because this table also counts bomber weapons at bomber bases as deployed.

•  b All are declared to be in central storage. Several thousand retired non-strategic warheads are awaiting dismantlement.

•  c Includes all non-strategic warheads, strategic warheads assigned to delivery systems in overhaul, and most bomber weapons.

• d In addition to the 4,500 in the military stockpile, an estimated 3,000 retired warheads are estimated to be awaiting dismantlement. Details are scarce, but we estimate that Russia is dismantling 500-1,000 retired warheads per year.  

• e This number is higher than the aggregate data released under the New START data because this table also counts bomber weapons on bomber bases as deployed. See 2015 overview of U.S. forces here.

•  f Approximately 180 B61 bombs are deployed in Europe at six bases in five countries (Belgium, Germany, Italy, Netherlands and Turkey). For details, see here and here.

•  g Non-deployed reserve includes an estimated 2,320 strategic and 300 non-strategic warheads in central storage.

•  h The U.S. government declared in April 2015 that its stockpile included 4,717 warheads as of September 2014. Since then, a small number of warheads are thought to have been retired.

•  i In addition to the roughly 4,700 warheads in the military stockpile, the U.S. government in April 2015 announced that approximately 2,500 retired warheads are awaiting dismantlement. In addition, close to 20,000 plutonium cores (pits) and some 5,000 Canned Assemblies (secondaries) from dismantled warheads are in storage at the Pantex Plant in Texas and Y-12 plant in Tennessee. For detailed overview of U.S. forces as of 2015, see here.

•  j Only weapons for France’s single aircraft carrier are not considered deployed, although it is possible that warhead loadings on some submarines missiles have been reduced. For a review of the French arsenal, see this article.

•  k China is thought to have “several hundred warheads,” far less than the 1,600-3,000 that have been suggested by some. None of the warheads are thought to be fully deployed but kept in storage under central control. The exstence of a Chinese non-strategic nuclear arsenal is uncertain. The Chinese arsenal is increasing with production of new warheads for DF-31/31A and JL-2 missiles. Detailed overview of Chinese forces as of 2013 is here.

•  l The number of warheads on each submarine is being lowered from 48 to 40, and may already have been completed. This will lower the number of “operationally available” warheads from 160 to 120. By the mid-2020s, the stockpile will be reduced to “not more than 180.” Detailed overview of British forces is here.

•  m Although Israel has produced enough plutonium for 100-200 warheads, the number of delivery platforms and estimates made by the U.S. intelligence community suggest that the stockpile might include approximately 80 warheads. Detailed 2014 overview of Israeli forces is here.

•  n None of Pakistan’s warheads are thought to be deployed but kept in central storage, most in the southern parts of the country. More warheads are in production. Detailed overview here.

•  o Indian nuclear warheads are not deployed but in central storage. More warheads are in production. Detailed overview of Indian forces is here.

•  p Despite three North Korean nuclear tests, there is no publicly available evidence that North Korea has miniaturized and operationalized its nuclear weapons capability. A 2013 world survey by the U.S. Air Force National Air and Space Intelligence Center (NASIC) does not credit any of North Korea’s ballistic missiles with any nuclear capability.

•  q Numbers may not add up due to rounding and uncertainty about the operational status of the four lesser nuclear weapons states and the uncertainty about the size of the total inventories of three of the five initial nuclear powers.

 

NewSTART Treaty: US and RussiaAggregate limits:• 1,550 warheads. Warheads on deployed ICBMs and deployed SLBMs

count toward this limit and each deployed heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments counts as one warhead toward this limit.

• This limit is 74% lower than the limit of the 1991 START Treaty and 30% lower than the deployed strategic warhead limit of the 2002 Moscow Treaty. 

• A combined limit of 800 deployed and non-deployed ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers, and heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments.

• A separate limit of 700 deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments.

• This limit is less than half the corresponding strategic nuclear delivery vehicle limit of the START Treaty.

– White House explanation

In other words, …• New START provides the parties with 7 years to reduce their forces,

and will remain in force for a total of 10 years. • It limits each side to no more than 800 deployed and nondeployed

land-based intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) and submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) launchers and deployed and nondeployed heavy bombers equipped to carry nuclear armaments.

• Within that total, each side can retain no more than 700 deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers equipped to carry nuclear armaments.

• The treaty also limits each side to no more than 1,550 deployed warheads; those are the actual number of warheads on deployed ICBMs and SLBMs, and one warhead for each deployed heavy bomber.

- Congressional Research Service explanation

An important technicality

• Notice that each bomber is counted as one warhead although the bombers actually carry more than one gravity bomb or air launched cruise missile (ALCM).

Hans M. Kristensen, and Robert S. Norris Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 2014;70:96-108

Copyright © by Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists

Hans M. Kristensen, and Robert S. Norris Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 2014;70:96-108

Copyright © by Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists

Hans M. Kristensen, and Robert S. Norris Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 2014;70:96-108

Copyright © by Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists

Hans M. Kristensen, and Robert S. Norris Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 2014;70:96-108

Copyright © by Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists

Hans M. Kristensen, and Robert S. Norris Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 2014;70:96-108

Copyright © by Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists

Hans M. Kristensen, and Robert S. Norris Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 2014;70:96-108

Copyright © by Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists

Hans M. Kristensen, and Robert S. Norris Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 2014;70:96-108

Copyright © by Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists

General Eugene E. Habiger• General Eugene E. Habiger (U.S. Air Force, Retired) has more than 35 years

of experience in national security and nuclear operations.• In his previous assignment as the commander in chief of United States

Strategic Command, he was responsible for all U.S. Air Force and U.S. Navy strategic nuclear forces supporting the national security strategy of strategic deterrence.

• In this position, he established an unprecedented military-to-military relationship with his Russian counterparts, which resulted in extraordinary confidence building and openness. This initiative was the centerpiece of a 60 Minutes II segment in February 2000 and a CNN special in October 2000.

• Habiger is a distinguished fellow and policy adviser with the University of Georgia’s Center for International Trade and Security, where he assists with the Center’s international programs aimed at preventing weapons proliferation and reducing nuclear dangers.

General Eugene Habiger

Showed me the video about nuclear terrorism that we will be seeing later in the course: Last Best Chance