Afrasian Research Centre, Ryukoku University Phase 2
Working Paper SeriesStudies on Multicultural Societies No.17
Nuclear Ethics as Normative and Cultural Restraints in International Politics
Shiro Sato
Mission of the Afrasian Research Centre Today's globalised world has witnessed astonishing political and economic growth in the regions of Asia and Africa. Such progress has been accompanied, however, with a high frequency of various types of conflicts and disputes. The Afrasian Research Centre aims to build on the achievements of its predecessor, the Afrasian Centre for Peace and Development Studies (ACPDS), by applying its great tradition of research towards Asia with the goal of building a new foundation for interdisciplinary research into multicultural societies in the fields of Immigration Studies, International Relations and Communication Theory. In addition, we seek to clarify the processes through which conflicts are resolved, reconciliation is achieved and multicultural societies are established. Building on the expertise and networks that have been accumulated in Ryukoku University in the past (listed below), we will organise research projects to tackle new and emerging issues in the age of globalisation. We aim to disseminate the results of our research internationally, through academic publications and engagement in public discourse.
A Tradition of Religious and Cultural Studies Expertise in Participatory Research/ Inter-Civic Relation Studies Expertise in Asian and Africa Studies Expertise in Communication and Education Studies New Approaches to the Understanding of Other Cultures in Japan Domestic and International Networks with Major Research Institutes
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Afrasian Research Centre, Ryukoku University
Nuclear Ethics as Normative and Cultural Restraints in International Politics
Shiro Sato
Working Paper SeriesStudies on Multicultural Societies No.17
2013
978-4-904945-20-9
2013
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Nuclear Ethics as Normative and Cultural Restraints in International Politics
Shiro Sato*
Introduction This paper aims to examine the implication of ethics on the use and threat of use of nuclear weapons; ‘nuclear ethics.’ Nuclear ethics is an old and new issue, and has continuously had major impact on Japan’s stance on diplomacy for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. On 10 August 1945, the Government of the Empire of Japan submitted a letter of protest on the “new bomb” dropped on Hiroshima to the US Government via the Swiss Government. In the letter, the Government of the Empire of Japan states that the use of a nuclear bomb, “which has indiscriminate brutality” was “a new sin toward human culture” and “strictly demands the abandonment of the use of the inhuman weapons” (Asahi Shimbun (Tokyo edition), 11 August 1950). As the “only country to have suffered from atomic bombings,” Japan loudly proclaims even now that “Japan has made it its duty to communicate to the world that the tragedy caused by the use of nuclear weapons must never be repeated and they must be abolished” (Disarmament, Non-proliferation and Science Department, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan ed., 2011, 6). With respect to nuclear ethics, there is already an accumulation of many preceding studies. Especially in the 1980s, scholars and practitioners in the United States published many books on it (e.g. Lackey 1984; Blake and Pole eds. 1984; Davis ed. 1986; Kipnis and Meyers eds.
* Lecturer, Faculty of International Communication, Osaka International University.
Ever since the first bomb was dropped by the United States on Hiroshima, there was a lingering sense that nuclear weapons were immoral, that they went beyond the realm of what was acceptable in war. Though that normative restraint is hard to measure, it clearly suffused the debates over nuclear weapons and was one reason for the unwiliingness of states to use.
Nye (2009, 148)
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1987; Shue ed. 1989; Nye 1986). Christian organizations as well as Christianity-related researcher groups also produced highly suggestive research results (e.g. Goodwin ed. 1982; National Conference of Catholic Bishops 1983; Dwyer ed. 1984). For example, the National Conference of Catholic Bishops (1983), which is famous for having created an argument in those days, mentions on the use of nuclear weapons that (1) it is unethical if the ‘objective’ is to destroy urban areas or kill many citizens; (2) the good ‘objective’ of protecting the safety and freedom of the home country does not justify the unethical ‘means’ of killing innocent people indiscriminately; and (3) the use of nuclear weapons as a retaliatory measure needs to satisfy the principle of proportionality to balance the objective and means as well as the principle of discrimination to distinguish combatants from non-combatants. On deterrence, it claims that (1) it is morally acceptable if strict conditions are met (for example, if the deterrence itself is the ‘objective,’ it is desirable to have adequate capacity in the deterrence effect from a strategic viewpoint), (2) it is however unacceptable to seek nuclear ‘superiority,’ and (3) military control or disarmament measures such as ban on experiments, production, and deployment of nuclear weapons have to be implemented.1 Nevertheless, these preceding studies do not seriously examine the implication of discussing nuclear ethics in the arena of international politics. A potential exception is Nuclear Ethics by Joseph S. Nye, Jr. (Nye 1986). Nye suggests five maxims of nuclear ethics: (1) on motives, “Self-defense is a just but limited cause”; (2) on means, “Never treat nuclear weapons as normal weapons”; (3) “Minimize harm to innocent people”; (4) on consequences, “Reduce risks of nuclear war in the near term”; and (5) “Reduce reliance on nuclear weapons over time” (Nye 1986, 99-131). The maxims on nuclear weapons are “not attempt to solve all nuclear dilemmas” but provide leaders and others with a basis for intuition to make proper judgment (Nye 1986, 132). These nuclear maxims propose realistic policies and countermeasures based on nuclear ethics and have contributed greatly to the development of research on nuclear ethics. They still do not, however, sufficiently clarify what dynamics nuclear ethics generates in international politics, or in other words, what positive and negative impact nuclear ethics has on international politics. This paper begins with the determination of whether there is room for discussing ethics in international politics in the first place. This examination aims to confirm the ‘size’ of the room for ethics through the views of realists such as Hans J. Morgenthau. Realists are covered here because they tend to be considered to place little emphasis on the role of ethics in international politics. Secondly, the frameworks of deontological and teleological theories are used to outline ethics on the use/threat of nuclear weapons to ask the question whether or 1 For detailed arguments for/against National Conference of Catholic Bishops (1983), see Dwyer ed. (1984, 9-12). In addition, O’Brien (1984) and Novak (1984) criticized National Conference of Catholic Bishops (1983) because they did not pay much attention to ‘consequences’ of using nuclear weapon.
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not the use/threat of nuclear weapons is ethically acceptable.2 Based on it, thirdly, the paper examines the politics of ethics on the use/threat of nuclear weapons. This section points out that the act of discussing nuclear ethics itself is developing a norm that the use of nuclear weapons is ethically unacceptable, or there is ‘nuclear taboo,’ and then examines the positive impact and negative impact that the taboo can have respectively. 1. Room for Ethics in International Politics 1.1. Three Perspectives for Ethics in International Politics Nye mentions that there are three stances to consider ethics in international politics. The first is ‘skeptics.’ This stance represents an idea that “moral categories have no meaning in international relations because no institutions exist to provide order,” and “therefore no moral rights and duties” (Nye 2009, 23). Nye criticizes this perspective, stating “international politics consists of more than mere survival. If choices exist in international relations, pretending choices do not exist is merely a disguised form of choice” (Nye 2009, 24). The second stance is ‘state moralists.’ This is a perspective to consider that “international politics rests on a society of states with certain rules, although those rules are not always perfectly obeyed” (Nye 2009, 26). This stance respects the principle of state sovereignty and objects to interference in the domestic affairs of other countries. However, taking the invasion of the Soviet Union into Afghanistan and other cases, Nye mentions that national sovereignty is often undermined (Nye 2009, 26-27). The third stance is ‘cosmopolitans.’ They “see international politics not just as a society of states, but as a society of individuals” (Nye 2009, 27). Therefore, cosmopolitans focus on the realization of justice between individuals beyond national borders. Nye criticizes this stance because of “the risk of fomenting enormous disorder by pursuing massive redistributive policies” (Nye 2009, 28). Concerning the three stances mentioned above, Nye points out that realists “often tend to be either skeptics or state moralists in their evaluative approach” and liberalists “tend toward the state moralists or cosmopolitan moral viewpoints” (Nye 2009, 23). Then, he states that we “must study events and make his or her own decisions about judgments and trade-offs” (Nye 2009, 29) among three stances. 1.2. Room for Ethics in International Politics from the Viewpoint of Realism According to the classification by Nye, state moralists and cosmopolitans recognize room for ethics in international politics. The difference in their recognition is only the ‘size’ of the 2 The ‘use’ of nuclear weapons means the ‘consequence’ that nuclear weapons have been used. On the other hand, the ‘threat’ of using nuclear weapons is only a ‘means’ that the use of nuclear weapons is threatened, but is not always associated with the ‘consequence’ of the use of them.
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room. That is, while state moralists consider that the room for ethics is small, cosmopolitans recognize that it is large. Here, the opinions of the realists who are close to state moralists are examined in more detail. The first realist is E. H. Carr. Carr states that “In the international order, the role of power is greater and that of morality less” (Carr 2001, 151). Nevertheless, he also points out that precisely because the role of moral principle is small, those who gain the largest benefit from the current order make concession to those who gain the smallest benefit in the current order to the extent that they can endure this order through the two factors of “self-sacrifice” and “give and take” (Carr 2001, 152). The next is Hans J. Morgenthau. Peace in the international society is maintained with “balance of power” in the form of a power struggle as well as “international laws, international morality, and world public opinions” that impose “normative limitations” on the power struggle (Morgenthau 2001, 26). Accordingly, he indicates that:
“A discussion of international morality must guard against the two extremes of either overrating the influence of ethics upon international politics or underestimating it by denying that statesmen and diplomats are moved by anything but considerations of material power” (Morgenthau 2001, 240).
However, Morgenthau also mentions that “political ethics judges action by its political consequences” (Morgenthau 2001, 12). The last realist is Stanley Hoffmann. He states that the examination of politics and ethics is to start “from what is and grouping toward the ‘ought’” (Hoffmann 1981, 2). Nevertheless, as with Carr, he claims that room for moral choice in international relations is “extremely narrow” (Hoffmann 1981, 16). The three realists above recognize the role of ethics in international politics, but consider that the role is minor. According to Nye, there are four reasons for the minor role of ethics in international politics (Nye 2009, 22-23). Firstly, due to the cultural and religious diversity of the international society, the consensus on value is weak. Secondly, ethics for nations and ethics for individuals are not always same. Thirdly, because the causal relationship is complicated in the international relations, it is impossible to precisely predict the consequences of things. In other words, the actions considered to be ethically good do not necessarily produce ethically good results. Lastly, since the power of systems is weaker in international politics than in domestic politics, there is large divergence between order and justice.
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2. Ethics on the Use/Threat of Nuclear Weapons The previous section has confirmed that there is small room for ethics in international politics from the viewpoint of realists. The next question we have to consider is to ask whether or not the use/threat of nuclear weapons is ethically right in eyes of realists. 2.1. Emergence of Nuclear Weapons and the Theory of Just War One of the arguments with respect to controversy over whether the exercise of force is right or not is the theory of just war, which originates from the European Middle Ages. This theory is an ethical standard established to constrain the use of force and has two criteria of jus ad bellum (to determine the cause of the start of the war) and jus in bello (to examine the hostile acts after the start of the war). In addition, jus in bello involves the ‘principle of discrimination’ that requires distinction of combatants from non-combatants and the ‘principle of proportionality’ that requires balance between the objective and means of the use of force. However, the emergence of nuclear weapons was beyond the theory of just war in terms of nature and effect. Nuclear weapons have nature to cause damage through the synergetic effect of blast, heat, and radiation, and have the effect that is serious enough to destroy a medium-sized city. Nuclear weapons are one of ‘weapons of mass destruction’ precisely because the use of nuclear weapons is difficult to meet the jus in bello criteria (specifically, the principle of discrimination) far beyond the level of conventional arms. Accordingly, Michael Walzer, who is famous for the theory of just war, argues that “nuclear weapons explode the theory of just war” (Walzer 2000, 282). The meaning of the emergence of nuclear weapons is also examined in the fields of International Politics and Security Studies. For example, Bernard Brodie states, “Thus far the chief purpose of our military establishment has been to win wars. From now on its chief purpose must be to avert them” (Brodie 1946, 76) which is a famous statement included in The Absolute Weapon edited in 1946. He means that the purpose of nuclear weapons is not to ‘use’ to beat the enemy in a real war but to ‘deter’ an attack from the enemy. The logic of ‘nuclear deterrence’ was thus born. As to this point, Hedley Bull expresses a similar opinion:
“What is novel about deterrence in the age of nuclear weapons is that states have been driven to elevate it to the status quo of a prime object of policy by their reluctance to use nuclear weapons in actual war” (Bull 2002, 146).
Thus, nuclear weapons dramatically changed the conventional idea of wars and the role of weapons. This is exactly why it is called ‘nuclear revolution’ (Jervis 1989).
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2.2. Deontological and Teleological Theories The nature and effect of nuclear weapons ‘explode’ the theory of just war. For this very reason, for realists, the ethical questioning of the use of nuclear weapons is significant, because it poses a question: “The use of nuclear weapons is unethical. However, to prevent the enemy from using nuclear weapons, or in other words, to protect the fellow citizens from the threat of nuclear weapons, is not the use/threat of nuclear weapons ethically acceptable?” To provide an answer to this question, there are two approaches of deontological theory and teleological theory, which examine an act with focus on its (1) objectives, (2) means, and (3) consequences. The first approach is deontological theory (deontological thinking). This does not consider whether the consequences of the act are good or bad, but focuses on the objectives and means of the act to examine the ethical rightness. For the deontologicalists who take this approach, the means of the use/threat of nuclear weapons is nothing but an unethical act because the lives of people not only in the enemy but also in the home country are sacrificed or taken as hostages (Werner 1987). Even if nuclear deterrence works, as long as nuclear weapons are a means to kill innocent people, the use/threat of nuclear weapons is an unethical act. For the deontologicalists, nuclear weapons are an ‘absolute’ evil. The other approach is teleological theory (teleological ethics). This claims that as to the rightness of an act, the means and objectives must be determined based on consequences. In other words, the consequences justify the means and objectives. The teleologicalists who take this approach do not consider that the act of the use/threat of nuclear weapons is always unethical because the act of the use/threat of nuclear weapons can produce the consequence that the fellow people can be protected. For example, Bobbitt (1987) asserts based on the concept of the right of self-defense that the use/threat of nuclear weapons is ethically acceptable as long as it can protect US citizens. In the meantime, Hoffmann considers that it is a threat to innocent people and not good in itself in view of the means. However, he also mentions that because the ultimate objective is the deterrence of the use of nuclear weapons to the home country, as a consequence, nuclear “deterrence is commendable as long as it is credible (which is a big if), as long as it does succeed in maintaining peace” (Hoffmann 1981, 83), and even states that it is “morally commendable” because it reduces wars among nuclear powers (Hoffmann 1981, 83). Walzer can be also recognized as a teleologicalist. He states, “Nuclear war is and will remain morally unacceptable, and there is no case for its rehabilitation. Because it is unacceptable, we must seek out ways to prevent it, and because deterrence is a bad way, we must seek out others” (Walzer 2000, 283). It is because, as cited earlier, “nuclear weapons explore the theory of just war” and “they are the first of mankind’s technological innovations that are simply not encompassable within the familiar moral world” (Walzer 2000, 282). Nevertheless, he claims, “We threaten evil in order not to do it, and the doing of it would be so terrible that
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the threat seems in comparison to be morally defensible” (Walzer 2000, 274), and mentions that with respect to self-defense, “we move uneasily beyond the limits of justice for the sake of justice (and of peace)” (Walzer 2000, 282). Nuclear weapons are thus transformed from an absolutely evil into a ‘necessary’ evil. In short, from the viewpoint of the realists who take the teleological approach, the objective of the use/threat of nuclear weapons is not to kill innocent people without discrimination. The real objective is to ensure the security of the fellow people by using the necessary evil method of nuclear deterrence. The use/threat of nuclear weapons is therefore not necessarily unethical, in their views. Nevertheless, the realists may face ‘nuclear dilemma’ through the filter of ‘nuclear ethics’. In case that the enemy attempts the use/threat of nuclear weapons, it is necessary to sacrifice the people of the enemy or take them as hostages to protect fellow citizens. But is it ethically right? Nuclear ethics may raise this question. Thus, the “moral reasoning about nuclear weapons must involve a more subtle balancing of obligations to compatriots and obligations to foreigners” (Nye 1986, 41). 2.3. Limited Ethical Validity of the Use of Nuclear Weapons Ethics on the use/threat of nuclear weapons can be summarized as follows: Deontologicalists and teleologicalists share recognition that the use/threat of nuclear weapons is unethical (Amstutz 1999, 33). That is, nuclear weapons are an absolutely evil. However, precisely because they are an absolutely evil, nuclear weapons are also a necessary evil. It is because realists expect the consequences of not only the protection of fellow citizens but also deterrence of wars between nuclear powers through the use/threat of nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, it must be noted that the realists assert the ethical rightness of the use/threat of nuclear weapons based on the premise that nuclear deterrence works. And the realists consider that nuclear deterrence may work but also may not work. In this regard, Ruston (1984) denies the ethics of the use of nuclear weapons based on the premise that nuclear deterrence does not work. There is also a criticism that the argument of teleologicalists to justify nuclear deterrence is only “an interesting exercise in intellectual masturbation” (Werner 1987, 159). However, whether nuclear deterrence works or not can be determined only with the consequence. When there is no war, the deterrence may be working. But once a war breaks out, it is revealed that the deterrence did not work. It is uncertain whether nuclear deterrence works or not. Still, it is clear that, as Hoffmann says, nuclear deterrence may work but the reliability of nuclear deterrence has a limitation (Hoffmann 1981, 83). To quote Nye’s words, while nuclear deterrence has worked partly because nuclear weapons have the “crystal ball effect” of showing the future image of the nuclear threat, there is a possibility that this crystal ball can be “shattered by accident or miscalculation” (Nye 1986, 61).
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3. International Politics of Ethics on the Use/Threat of Nuclear Weapons Based on ethics upon the use/threat of nuclear weapons, this section attempts to examine each of its positive and negative impact in international politics. 3.1. Puzzle of the Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons First of all, how do the readers of this paper answer to the following question? Question: Why have nuclear weapons not been used since Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945? One of the answers to these questions is the ‘nuclear deterrence’ that is based on the argument of realists. In this logic, the threat that “if you use nuclear weapons, we will also use them” stops the enemy from using nuclear weapons. For example, John L. Gaddis, a historian, indicates that the confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War did not escalate into a ‘hot war’ because nuclear deterrence was working, and calls the situation ‘long peace’ in his book The Long Peace (Gaddis 1987). Needless to say, this ‘long peace’ involves a crucial issue of how to treat the regional proxy wars such as the Vietnam War. Still, as a notable point in context of this paper, he also considers that nuclear weapons were not used during the Cold War for the ethical reason that nuclear weapons must not be used, in addition to nuclear deterrence. 3 Gaddis calls this ethical aspect ‘self-deterrence.’ The argument of self-deterrence by Gaddis is outlined below. Gaddis examines the reason why the United States did not use nuclear weapons from 1945 to 1958 in detail in Chapter 5 “The Origins of Self-Deterrence.” He focuses on the period from 1945 to 1958 because it was the era when the Soviet Union had no secure second-strike capability and the process where the United States, which had used nuclear weapons for the first time, established a custom of not using them (Gaddis 1987, 105). In other words, the period from 1945 to 1958 was the era when the United States did not use nuclear weapons although the country alone was able to use them unilaterally (Gaddis 1987, 105). Therefore, the argument that nuclear weapons were not used because of nuclear deterrence is not applicable to this period. Gaddis focuses on this point and examines other reasons for the non-use of nuclear weapons than nuclear deterrence. As a result, indicating the cases of the Korean War, the Indo-China War, and bombardment of Quemoy and Matsu Islands, he identifies other reasons for the self-restraint including (1) unclear targets of attack (military reason), (2) risk of intervention by the Soviet Union (military reason), (3) possibility of losing trust from Western Europe in case of using nuclear weapons, which were regarded by the UN, etc. as a tool for racial discrimination (political reason), and (4) potential aversion to the US
3 Thomas C. Schelling also mentioned the existence of norm on non-use of nuclear weapons (Schelling 1994), but did not examine it from the viewpoint of the history of the Cold War.
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among Asians, who are colored races, generated by the use of nuclear weapons and “moral responsibility” of the use (moral reason) (Gaddis 1987, 141-142). Thus, to the question why nuclear weapons have not been used since Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945, realists note that there is also a non-material factor that the use of nuclear weapons is unethical, in addition to the material factor of nuclear deterrence. 3.2. Nuclear Taboo as Norm and Culture Restraints As one of the reasons why they were not used after 1945, the ethical aspect that nuclear weapons must not be used has been long identified. This ethical aspect is seriously studied from the perspective of International Politics by Nina Tannenwald in Nuclear Taboo (Tannenwald 2007). In addition to the Korean War, which is also examined by Gaddis, Tannenwald conducts the case studies of the Vietnam War and the Gulf War. Nevertheless, it is fair to say that the feature of her research is the proposal of the concept of a ‘nuclear taboo.’ Tannenwald limits the “use” of nuclear weapons to the “dropping or launching of nuclear weapons” other than nuclear tests (Tannenwald 2007, 2. n. 4) and defines the “nuclear taboo” as “powerful de facto prohibition against the first use of nuclear weapons” (Tannenwald 2007, 10).4 This nuclear taboo is “not the behavior (of non-use) itself but rather the normative belief about the behavior” (Tannenwald 2007, 10), and does not only restrain the behavior of nuclear nations but also constitutes the identity and interests of civilized nations (Tannenwald 2007, 19).5 According to Tannenwald, the norm of the nuclear taboo, which originates from Hiroshima, is widespread but not universal, and has not become a sufficiently strong norm (Tannenwald 2007, 59). Furthermore, while the nuclear taboo is gradually being shared among American citizens and leaders, it is not accepted by the military as a system, says Tannenwald (Tannenwald 2007, 59). Then, it should be noted that Tannenwald does not deny the existence of nuclear deterrence as a factor of the non-use of nuclear weapons. That is, she claims that nuclear deterrence on the basis of realism is not enough for the explanation of the non-use of nuclear weapons but the norm of taboo on the basis of social constructivism (which pays much attention to immaterial factors such as norm and identity) has to be also considered (Tannenwald 2007, 4-5). Behind the non-use of nuclear weapons by the United States after 1945, there was the taboo that nuclear weapons must not be used in addition to nuclear deterrence, in the opinion of Tannenwald. However, her claim focuses on the point that the
4 Barry Buzan uses the term of “strategic cultural prohibition” to explain the contents of ‘nuclear taboo’ (Buzan and Herring eds. 1998, 165). 5 It is ‘social constructivism’ that focuses much on non-material factors such as norm and identity in the field of International Politics. For example, Katzenstein ed. (1996) studies security issues from the perspective of social constructivism. On ‘chemical taboo,’ see Price and Tannenwald (1996).
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nuclear taboo is more important than nuclear deterrence as a factor of the non-use of nuclear weapons. 3.3. Criticism of the Nuclear Taboo Toward the nuclear taboo proposed by Tannenwald, there are three types of criticism: (1) the existence of the discourses that deny the nuclear taboo, (2) lack of conviction in the nuclear taboo, and (3) weakness of the degree of the nuclear taboo. The first criticism is the existence of the discourses that deny the nuclear taboo. Walker (2010) indicates that there are discourses that do not deny the existence of a nuclear taboo but deny the nuclear taboo at the same time. As an example, pointing out that the proponents of nuclear deterrence assume the use of nuclear weapons and the proponents of nuclear disarmament claim nuclear disarmament due to recognition of the risk of using nuclear weapons, Walker argues that both of the proponents of nuclear deterrence and the proponents of nuclear deterrence deny the existence of a nuclear taboo. There are also disclosures denying the existence of a nuclear taboo itself. This criticism is offered by skeptics, who claim that nuclear weapons are not used on non-nuclear nations not because of the existence of a nuclear taboo but because (1) other nuclear nations (that are allied with the non-nuclear nations) may conduct reprisal attacks with nuclear weapons and (2) conventional arms are enough, among various other reasons. 6 As to this criticism, however, there is counterargument that actual documents such as diplomatic papers demonstrate that the norm that nuclear weapons must not be used had major impact on the decision making process for the use of nuclear weapons (Paul 2009, 18). The second criticism is lack of conviction in the nuclear taboo. This criticism recognizes the existence of a nuclear taboo, but asserts that the concept of the nuclear taboo explains only half of the fact. Review of International Studies recently featured the nuclear taboo (Vol. 36, No. 4, October 2010). Farrell (2010) examines the 2002 Nuclear Posture Review, which specifies the use of nuclear weapons against rogue states, among others and points out that the nuclear taboo explains only half of the fact. Meanwhile, Eden (2010) claims that the Single Integrated Operational Plan represents the existence of a plan to use nuclear weapons that is incompatible with the nuclear taboo. Then, Atkinson (2010) indicates that in the Gulf War in 1991, nuclear weapons were not used to explode but used to prevent Iraq from using weapons of mass destruction, or they were used for nuclear deterrence.7 The last criticism is weakness of the degree of the nuclear taboo (Paul 2010, 854). In his book The Tradition of Non-use of Nuclear Weapons, T. V. Paul criticizes that the norm of the
6 See Paul (2009, 16) for a full account of the reasons. 7 Tannenwald does not deny the fact that “states have obviously relied on nuclear weapons in other ways, including for deterrence, threatmaking, and alliance relations” (Tannenwald 2007, 2. n. 4). However, for her, nuclear ‘dependence’ does not mean the ‘use’ of nuclear weapons.
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non-use of nuclear weapons is not a taboo but just a “tradition” although he positively recognizes the existence of the norm. According to Paul, while “taboos” are very prohibitive, “traditions” do not include the norm of strict prohibition (Paul 2009, 5). In other words, taboos will not be broken but traditions may be, according to him. In view of the fact that nuclear nations still have the option of using nuclear weapons, Paul indicates that nuclear weapons have not been used since Hiroshima and Nagasaki not due to the taboo/norm, but due to the tradition, which is an informal social norm. He also calls the tradition of the non-use of nuclear weapons “self-deterrence” as Gaddis does (Paul 2009, 31). Paul also discusses the tradition of the non-use of nuclear weapons in Review of International Studies in 2010 mentioned above. He asserts that if nuclear nations used nuclear weapons on non-nuclear nations, they and their leaders would have to pay the price in the form of damage to their reputation in the international society, and this price has solidified the tradition that nuclear weapons must not be used.8 Tannenwald has not made a counterargument directly to Paul. On the other hand, she argues against the assertion of Scott D. Sagan (Sagan 2004), who proposed the concept of the tradition of the non-use of nuclear weapons before Paul, on grounds that national leaders and publics recognize it not as a tradition but a taboo and that all violations would not always break the nuclear taboo (Tannenwald 2007, 14). Tannenwald also mentions that although the nuclear taboo may be more fragile than other taboos (Tannenwald 2007, 16), the use of nuclear weapons has an aspect of enhancing the nuclear taboo (Tannenwald 2007, 17). 3.4. Positive Impact of the Nuclear Taboo: Nuclear ‘Moral’ Deterrence The criticisms of the nuclear taboo are all convincing. Tannenwald will need to examine the meaning of the concurrent presence of the nuclear taboo and the discourses that deny the existence of a nuclear taboo, in particular. However, this paper pays attention to the fact that the existence of the social norm (whether it is a taboo or tradition) that nuclear weapons must not be used because the use is unethical has not been criticized much. In light of this fact, nuclear deterrence is not the sole reason for the non-use of nuclear weapons since Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945. As realists indicate, the norm of the non-use of nuclear weapons restrains the use of nuclear weapons in addition to nuclear deterrence. Then, it will be the studies of Tannenwald and Paul that have enhanced the logic. This paper defines that the deterrence of the use of nuclear weapons with the norm of the non-use of them is not “self-deterrence” but nuclear moral deterrence. It is because the core that regulates the self in self-deterrence is the ethics that nuclear weapons must not be used.
8 For further details of this reason, see Paul (2010, 856-863).
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This concept of nuclear moral deterrence may make it possible to view Hiroshima and Nagasaki from a slightly different angle. The voices and prayers of Hiroshima and Nagasaki to call for the world without nuclear weapons are regarded as being ‘idealistic’ because they do not consider security matters. Still, the voices and prayers of Hiroshima and Nagasaki cannot be laughed off because, according to Tannenwald, Hiroshima and Nagasaki are transmitting the nuclear taboo that the use of nuclear weapons is unethical and have consequently created a situation that it is difficult to use nuclear weapons. Therefore, if realists consider that the main objective of security with nuclear weapons is to deter the enemy from using its nuclear weapons, then it might be possible to say that the voices and prayers of Hiroshima and Nagasaki have a realistic aspect for security as long as they offer moral deterrence. 3.5. Crisis of the Nuclear Taboo The nuclear taboo triggers nuclear moral deterrence and resultantly makes it difficult to use nuclear weapons in the international society. Nevertheless, since the nuclear taboo origins from Hiroshima and Nagasaki, it may get weaker as the memories of Hiroshima and Nagasaki fade (Tannenwald 2007, 388-389). In the meantime, mini-nukes can break the norm of the nuclear taboo. The US and the UK claimed against the International Court of Justice (ICJ) advisory opinion in 1996 that the mini-nukes that would cause little damage to civilians should be distinguished from general nuclear weapons (ICJ 1996, para. 91). But the ICJ did not distinguish between mini-nukes and general nuclear weapons because there was no standard that proved that the damage was little and neither country guaranteed that it would not escalate (ICJ 1996, para. 94). Tannenwald severely criticizes mini-nukes. She warns that the act of talking about the potential of using nuclear weapons itself will undermine the nuclear taboo even if the US eventually gives up the development of mini-nukes (Tannenwald 2007, 383). In addition, Paul, who argues the ‘tradition’ of the non-use of nuclear weapons instead of the nuclear taboo, also identifies the following negative impact of not maintaining the norm that nuclear weapons must not be used:
“In the worst-case scenario, many states that had given up their nuclear options could reconsider their policies, as national nuclear capabilities would become essential to deter possible future use of such weapons against them. Terrorist groups would justify their killings of innocents by claiming reprisals against the U.S. use of nuclear weapons” (Paul 2009, 211-212).
3.6. First Negative Impact of the Nuclear Taboo: Nuclear Irony As the implication of the nuclear taboo in international politics, this paper also looks at the following two negative impacts in addition to the positive impact of nuclear moral deterrence.
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The first negative impact is nuclear irony. As mentioned in the second section, the fact that nuclear weapons, which kill innocent people in an indiscriminate manner, are an absolute evil from an ethical viewpoint leads to a heavier reliance on nuclear deterrence for the protection of citizens. This transforms nuclear weapons into a necessary evil. In other words, we develop the social norm that the use of nuclear weapons is unethical through the filter of nuclear ethics, and at the same time, attempt the ethical justification of nuclear deterrence under the name of security. This is nothing but the ironical result of the nuclear taboo. An example is the nuclear test by Pakistan in 1998. Nawaz Sharif, then Prime Minister of Pakistan, commented that the nuclear test was conducted to avoid repeat of Hiroshima and Nagasaki (Chugoku Shimbun, 1 June 1998).9 Tannenwald also states that the nuclear taboo is encouraging major powers to “stabilize and legitimate the practice of nuclear deterrence” (Tannenwald 2007, 18). The negative impact of the nuclear irony is assumed to potentially occur when more emphasis is placed on security than the nuclear taboo. 3.7. Second Negative Impact of the Nuclear Taboo: Nuclear Paradox The second negative impact is the nuclear paradox that the nuclear taboo causes further proliferation of nuclear weapons. For example, Hoffmann mentions that declaration of the non-first-use of nuclear weapons “sounds like a perfectly moral” but may result in nuclear proliferation. It is because as long as super powers have intention to threat or imply that they can use nuclear weapons first if their allies are attacked, non-nuclear nations could have a sense of security that they are protected by super powers, but the declaration of non-first-use would ruin it (Hoffmann 1981, 54). That is, if nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation measures are promoted without consideration of security issues, the allies of nuclear nations face a security concern. Then, there may a risk that they become interested in the option of nuclear armament as a measure to remove the concern. This means that the negative impact of the nuclear paradox can occur when security is not considered. Therefore, “Most specific issues relating to nuclear weapons will turn upon empirical, strategic, and prudential arguments rather than solely on moral principles” (Nye 1986, 92). Conclusion This paper examined the positive impact and negative impact of nuclear ethics in international politics mainly from the perspective of realism. The results are presented in the figure below. First of all, the ‘nuclear ethics’ that questions the ethics of the use/threat of nuclear weapons provides the recognition that the use of nuclear weapons is unethical and accordingly develops the social norm of ‘nuclear taboo.’ Then, this nuclear taboo has the positive impact of ‘nuclear moral deterrence’ because it makes it difficult to use nuclear weapons for the
9 http://www.chugoku-np.co.jp/abom/98abom/Pakistan/pa9806011.html (Accessed on 31 August 2011).
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ethical reason. At the same time, however, the nuclear taboo can have negative impact. The first negative impact is ‘nuclear irony.’ Because the use/threat of nuclear weapons is unethical, the use/threat of nuclear weapons is ethically accepted to protect the safety of fellow people, which is an ironical result. The nuclear irony can occur when more emphasis is placed on security than the nuclear taboo. Nevertheless, the nuclear irony faces ‘nuclear dilemma.’ When the enemy attempts the use/threat of nuclear weapons, we must sacrifice its people or take them as hostages to protect our people. But is it ethically acceptable to sacrifice the enemy’s people or take them as hostages? The nuclear taboo generated from nuclear ethics asks us this question afresh. The second negative impact of the nuclear taboo is ‘nuclear paradox.’ If nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation measures are promoted with too much emphasis on the unethicality of the use/threat of nuclear weapons without consideration of security issues, the countries whose security depends on the nuclear weapons of nuclear nations may consider the option of nuclear armament. This negative impact of nuclear paradox can occur when security is not taken into consideration. We cannot realize the world with no nuclear weapons without consideration of security issues. On the other hand, it is not true either that the world with no nuclear weapons can be realized only by considering security issues. To realize the world with no nuclear weapons, we need to consider ethics upon the use/threat of nuclear weapons in addition to security issues. In that sense, the voices and prayers of Hiroshima and Nagasaki must not be lost in the dry trend that the world with no nuclear weapons cannot be realized without the guarantee of security.
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