Nuclear Weapons Surety Report to the President, 1989

8/3/2019 Nuclear Weapons Surety Report to the President, 1989

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N C A S S I F I E! f l o o t 7 S L } ~ @

Joint Report by the U.S. Department of Defenseand the U.S. Department of Energy

Nuclear Weapons SuretyAnnual Report to The President (U)

1989


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I ' IUN J ASIFIED

Joint Report by the U.S. Department of Defenseand the U.S. Department of Energy

Nuclear Weapons suretyAnnual Report to The President (U)

1989

, ..


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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT'SUBJECT: Joint DoD/DOE Nuclear Weapons Surety Report for 1989

Attached is the Joint Department of Defense/Department of Energy AnnualReport to the President on Nuclear Weapons Surety for 1989. It summarizesprogress made during 1989 and reports issues where appropriate. The Departmentof Defense and the Department of Energy will continue to emphasizeimprovements in safety, security, and control of nuclear weapons.

( {{!__ChenevSecretary of Defense

Date: 1,4 v /2 0/ lAttachmentAs stated

VM---) vJct rfL.__ames D. WatkinsAdmiral, U. S. Navy (Retired)Secretary or;;gfiDate: (}

~ .


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. . ~ S I F I E D EXECUTIVE SUMMARYJOINT DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE/DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

ANNUAL REPORT TO THE PRESIDENTON NUCLEAR WEAPONS SURETY FOR 1989 (U)( C ~ This report responds to tasking by National Security DecisionDirective 309, "Nuclear Weapon Safety, Security, and Control" dated June 27, 1988,and addresses nuclear weapon safety, security, control, emergency response,inspection and evaluation programs, and the impact of budget constraints onrequired improvement programs. ccfR.l?> The safety, security, control, and emergency preparedness posturecontinues to improve. There were no accidents involving nuclear weapons in1989. Surety improvements that took place in 1989 include:

a. ( S ~ ) Completion of the retirements from the stockpile ofseveral older weapon types that lacked modern safety features. Includedwere the B28FI strategic bombs, W31 Nike Hercules warheads, W44 ASROCwarheads, and the 854 Special Atomic Demolition Munition (SADM). TheNike Hercules and ASROC systems were retired because they were obsoleteand there was no longer an operational requirement for the 854. All 861-1strategic bombs have been retired from the stockpile and are beingretrofitted to the 861-7 configuration. WSS SU8ROC warheads are nolonger deployed and will be r ~ t i r e d The retirement of the W68 Poseidonwarhead was accelerated and is now scheduled to be completed in 1996.

b. ( S ~ ) Development of the 861-6,8,9 and 10 (which retrofit orreplace earlier 861s for enhanced safety and use control) and the B90Nuclear Depth/Strike Bomb (as a replacement for the B57) continued onschedule. Baseline Design and Cost Studies (Phase 2A) were initiated forthe W61 earth penetrating weapon and a common warhead for the FollowOn-To-LANCE (FOTL) and SRAM-T missiles.

c. ( S ~ ) Modernization of the stockpile continued with the production of the B61-3,4, the WB0-0, the W87, and the B83. The W88 warhead forthe Navy Trident II DS missile began production.( S ~ ) Other actions affecting surety included a one year extension of theW89 warhead development for the Short Range Attack Missile II (SRAM-IDbecause of unrelated delays in the overall schedule caused by delivery vehicleproblems and reduced funding for B-1B systems integration. Additionally, therewas a two year extension of the W82 Artillery Fired Atomic Projectile (AFAP)

development to incorporate a nuclear safety device to meet one-point safety


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, SIFIED 11(bJ (3l Efforts continue to a-ccelerate replacement of SRAM-

.A/W69 with the SRAM-Il/W89. However, operational, technical, andcongressional b u d g e t ~ . ~ ~ ~ ~ g 9 J ~ J l . . Q W - P . t : ~ 9 u d e complete replacement a!l_y__e a r H ~ r t h a l l _ l 9 . 9 . . 8 . .

(b) (3)

b. ( ~ ) A joint DoD/OOE study to determine the relative safety andsecurity risks inherent in the logistical transportation of nuclear weaponswas started. It is scheduled to be completed October 1990.c. ( C ~ ) Many older weapons lack nuclear detonation design safetyf e a t u ; ~ ~ t h a t provide a predictably safe response in credible abnormalaccident environments. Reviews of these weapons have been initiated todetermine the risk of unintended nuclear yield for such weapons.d. (U) A briefing was given to the Secretaries of Defense and Energy onJuly 13, 1989. A significant outcome of this briefing was the establishmentof a Nuclear Weapons Council safety committee. This was accomplishedwhen the Nuclear Weapons Council Weapons Safety Committee (NWCWSC)was chartered by the NWC in 1989 to serve as a dedicated body for considering nuclear weapons safety issues.e. ( C ~ ) Use Control measures continue to improve. There remains aneed for a broad overarching DoD policy to provide standards and criteriacovering issues which are common to all services.f. (U) The DoD and DOE have separate approaches to plutonium dispersalsafety.g. (U) For the foreseeable future, constrained funding, the increasedrequirement to expend funds in the areas of environment, safety, and health,and the pressing need to modernize the nuclear weapons productioncomplex will determine the pace at which nuclear surety enhancements aredeveloped and introduced into the stockpile. The rate at which thismodernization is achieved is a function of DOE industrial funding and plantcapability and not DoD system procurement.


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iiiTABLE OF CONTENTS

Executive Summary . . . . ....... . . . . . . . ........ . . . .... . . . . . . . i-iiTable of Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii1.0 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ............ . . . . ... . ....... 1

1.1 Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11.2 Roles and Responsibilities ... . . ... . . ..... . . . .... . . . . . . . 1

2.0 Stockpile Description . ... . . ..... . ..... . . .... . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13.0 Nuclear Weapon Safety ... . ...... . . . . ... . . .... . . ... . . . . . . . . 23.1 Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23.2 Policies, Standards and Criteria ....... ... . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . 23.3 Safety Process ... ....... . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

3.4 Safety Research and Development (R&D) . . . . . . . . . . . . .... . . . 33.5 Assessment of Stockpile Safety . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . .... 44.0 Nuclear Weapon Security . . . .... . . . . .... . . . . . ... .... . . . . . . . 5

4.1 Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54.2 Status of Security . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . .... . . . . . ... . . . . . . 54.3 Security Research and Development . . ... . . . . ........ . . . . . . 6

5.0 Nuclear Weapon Use Control ... .... ..... . . . . . . . . ..... . ..... 75.1 Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...... . ... 75.2 Policies, Standards, and Criteria . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75.3 Use Control Research and Development . . . . . . ... . ... . . . . . . . 75.4 Use Control Assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . ........ 8

6.0 Personnel Security, Reliability, and Assurance ..... . ... . .... . . . . . . . 87.0 Joint Emergency Preparedness and Response . . . . ...... . . . . ..... . . 88.0 Inspection and Evaluation Programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

8.1 Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98.2 DoD Programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98.3 DOE Programs ........ ... ..... . .... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

9.0 Impact of Budget Constraints ....... . . . . ..... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10Figure 1 . . . . . ..... ...... ... . . ... . ... . . . . . . ... ..... . . . ... 11Figure 2 . ..... . . . . . . . . . .... . ... . ....... . . . ...... . .... . . . 11Figure 3 . ... . . . ... . . . . ... ..... . . ... .... . . . . . . ... .... .... 11Figure 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . ... . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11


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SIFIED 11.0 INTRODUcrJON (U)1.1 Background. (U )

( ~ ) This report responds to tasking by National Security DecisionD i r e c t i v ~ - 309, 'Nuclear Weapon Safety, Security, and Control", dated June 27, 1988,and summarizes nuclear weapon safety, security, control, emergency response,inspection and evaluation programs, and assesses the impact of budget constraintson required improvement programs. This report has been reviewed by theNuclear Weapons Council.

( C ~ ) The _1988 Annual Surety_Report identified three major safety issues:(a) lsafety concerns regarding the SRAM/W69 on ~ l e r t ; (b) plutonium dispersal as aresult of an aircraft transportation accident; and (c) guidance actions concerningreissue of DOE nuclear safety orders. Progress on these issues is addressed indetail within this report.1.2 Roles and Responsibilities . (U)

(U) The Department of Defense (DoD) and the Department of Energy( IX)) are responsible for our Nation's nuclear weapons program. Various aspectsof this responsibility are addressed from both a joint and a departmental position,based on the details and requirements of each specific activity or operation.Paramount is the responsibility to protect public health and minimize danger tolife and property.

(U) The NWC, in fulfilling its responsibilities, plays a significant role inassuring the safety of the nuclear weapons stockpile.2.0 Stockpile Description. {U)

(b) (3)

are-depicted in Table 1. The characteristics of the nuclear w--eapon stockpileSignificant stockpile changes in 1989 that affected suretywere:a. ( ~ ) Completion of the retirements from the stockpile of severalo l d e ~ - , ; , ~ p o n types that lacked modem safety features. Included were theB28FI strategic bombs, W31 Nike Hercules warheads, W44 ASROC warheads,and the B54 Special Atomic Demolition Munitions (SADM). The NikeHercules and ASROC systems were retired because they were obsolete andthere was no longer an operational requirement for the B54. All B61-1


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NCLASSIF lED3.0 Nuclear Weapon Safety (U)

(U) During 1989, the overall nuclear safety posture of the stockpilecontinued to improve.3.1 Background (U)

(U ) Nuclear weapon system safety studies are conducted by the DoDthroughout the stockpile life of the weapon. Nuclear explosive safety studies areconducted by OOE for nuclear explosives and nuclear weapons testing, production,transportation, and retirement. Safety studies make a determination as to whethersafety standards are met and provide the safety rules to be followed in operations.DoD weapon system safety rules must be approved by the Secretary of Defense(in coordination with the DOE) prior to their implementation. OOE nuclearexplosive safety rules are normally approved by the Manager OOE/AlbuquerqueOperations Office.

(C}Ro) A briefing was given to the Secretaries of Defense and Energy onJuly 13, 198. A significant outcome of this briefing was the establishment of aNuclear Weapons Council safety committee to initially address: safety criteria/standards, including plutonium dispersal; the Nuclear Weapon System SafetyGroup (NWSSG) process; SRAM-A/W69 nuclear safety; safety of air transportationof weapons lacking insensitive high explosive; and options for acceleratinginclusion of modem safety features in the stockpile . This was accomplished whenthe new flag/ general officer or civilian equivalent Nuclear Weapons CouncilWeapons Safety Committee (NWCWSC) was chartered by the NWC in 1989 toserve as a dedicated body for considering nuclear weapons safety issues.3.2 Policies, Standards and Criteria (U)

(U) The DoD and DOE have separate, but similar, nuclear weapon safetypolicies and standards that govern all operations associated with nuclear weaponsand nuclear explosives. These weapon system safety standards are qualitative.Military Characteristics (MCs) for each nuclear weapon, approved by the Secretaryof Defense and accepted by the Secretary of Energy, quantitatively specify thenuclear safety design criteria the weapon must meet.(U) The DoD and DOE have separate approaches to plutonium dispersal

safety. Since 1983, the DoD policy has been to include the requirement for IHE,the most important plutonium dispersal safety feature, in all new weapondevelopments unless its use would impose a significant degradation in militarycapability. This requirement is transmitted to the DOE in the MCs for eachweapon.


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3.3 Safety Process (U) (U) Each nuclear weapon system has a specific set of nuclear safety rules,

approved by the Secretary of Defense, that provides the procedures to maximizesafety consistent. with operational requirements. Together with design safety andsecurity features, technical procedures, and operational and administrative controls,these rules provide safeguards necessary to ensure compliance with the safetystandards.(U) In 1989, DOE, after conscious reassessment, determined it can no longerverify that certain weapon systems meet the 1984 DoD Nuclear Weapon System

Safety Standards, specifically the portions of the standards that state "there shall bepositive measures to prevent." At issue are weapons designed before modernnuclear detonation safety features were available and therefore lacking safetyelements that provide a predictably safe response in credible abnormal environments such as fire or severe impact (i.e., not meeting the 1968 detonation safetydesign criteria). DOE maintains that a nuclear weapon must be designed with apredictably safe response, whose effectiveness can be demonstrated, in order forDOE to verify that the standards are met. In general, positive measures such asoperational or procedural restrictions cannot fully compensate for the lack ofwarhead design safety features.

(U) The Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC) endorsed a new safety rulesapproval procedure for weapons not meeting the 1968 criteria. The Services havebeen tasked to implement this procedure by reviewing all weapon systems usingthese weapons and providing a qualitative assessment (along with rationale) ofeach system's compliance with the DoD standards. If a system cannot be verifiedto meet the standards, or be reasonably modified to do so , the safety risksassociated with continued deployment of the system with the weapon of concernare to be jointly evaluated by DoD and DOE. To the extent possible, the safetyrisks will be established quantitatively. The Services and the Joint Staff willprovide the national security benefits of continued fielding of the weapon system.This new procedure will provide a basis for Secretary of Defense action on safetyrules for these weapon systems. .

(U) The NWC continued to take an active interest in nuclear weapon safetyand was briefed on nuclear safety at each meeting.3.4 Safety Research and Development (tD

( C ~ ) Development of the B 6 1 ~ , 8 , 9 and 10, which retrofit or replaceearlier B 6 ~ "lor enhanced safety and use control, and the B90 Nuclear Depth/St-rike Bomb (replacement for the Navy B57) continued on schedule. The W82Artillery-Fired Atomic Projectile (AFAP) development was extended an additional


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(U) Advanced research and development to improve safety continues.Included are research on one-point/multi-point safety (inherent design features thatpreclude nuclear yield upon accidental detonation of the high explosive),plutonium dispersal safety features (e.g., energetic !HE and fire resistant featuresthat fully contain plutonium in fire environments), accident resistent containers fornon-IHE AFAPs, and improved safety components (e .g., advanced/opticaldetonation systems).3.5 Assessment of Stockpile Safety (U)

, A ~ The overall stockpile nuclear detonation safety posture continued toi m p r o t : ~ J J r i ~ g 1989 as new weapons with modem designs replaced olderweapons, selected older systems were modernized as part of the StockpileImprovement Program (SIP), and the r ~ t i r e m e n t of obsolete weapons continued.

(b) (3)


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security risks inherent in all practical logistical transportation modes. DOE iscurrently obtaining additional ground transportation capability to eliminatetransportation by air of all non-IHE, plutonium bearing weapons in DOE custody.This increased capability is scheduled to be in place by early 1993 .( 5 ~ ) Force generation exercises are conducted by the Air Force on aperiodic - b ~ to ensure their ability to meet assigned war plan taskings . Asecondary benefit of such exercises is personnel proficiency training. Thefrequency of such activities varies by weapon system and mission. In a few casessuch exercises may require a complete load-out of all aircraft tasked. Even thoughthe exercises are conducted under controlled and closely supervised circumstances(to minimize risk), the probability of exposure of the nuclear weapons involved in

the exercises to a variety of abnormal environments is increased. The responses offour of the weapon types (557-2, 661-0, 561-2, and W69) that could be involved insuch exercises is unpredictable if they are exposed to certain abnormalenvironments. The Air Force recognizes the susceptibility of these weapons to theenvironments identified and safety rules for weapon systems that include 557-2,861-0, and B61-2 weapons are being changed to minimize the use of such weaponsconsistent with operational requirements.(U) While progress has been made since stockpile safety deficiencies were

first identified, progress has not been as rapid as planned or d e ~ i r e d . TheNWCWSC has taken as its highest priority the development of a prioritized listingof safety concerns of weapons in the stockpile.4.0 Nuclear Weapon Security (U)

(U) During 1989, the overall security of the nuclear stockpile continued tobe improved.4.1 Background (U)

(U) Nuclear weapon security is composed of policies, procedures, people,security equipment, and facilities to protect nuclear weapons.4.2 Status of Security (U)

(b) (3)This reduction in sites, coupled with security systems .upgrades,reduces our exposure to a terrorist attack or any other peacetime incident. Thissame reduction, however, leads to increased wartime survivability concerns for theremaining sites.

(U) Significant security improvements include:


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WS3, will achieve initial operational status in 1990. WS3 will be fullydeployed in 1992.

6

b. ( S ~ n ) NATO continues to make progress toward completing theinstallation ~ f ~ e electronic Intrusion Detection System (IDS) at storage siteperimeters and within individual storage facilities. During 1989, 32 systemswere installed at bases which hold U.S. weapons.

c. ( ~ n ) The Army has completed exploratory development of theS u r v i v a b i l i ~ ; : ~ e r p a c k Container (SOC) for AFAPs. This Container ishardened against small anns and fragmentation projectiles and is compatible with most U.S. and NATO vehicles. The IOC is expected by theend of FY93.

d. ( ~ D SAC continues to install an improved sensor system foruse in and around ICBM launch facilities. The new sensors improvereliability and reduce false alarm rates. Installation has been completed atover 600 of the 1,000 facilities scheduled to receive it and will be completedin 1992.

(b) (3)

(b) (3)

4.3 Security Research and Development (U)(U) During 1989 the following research and development programs wereconducted to improve the security of nuclear weapons:

a. (CFRD) The Army initiated a program to enhance the security ofM a i n t e n a n c ~ - aftd Assembly (M&A) buildings at European storage sites. TheMaintenance an d Assembly Secure Storage (MASS) program will upgradethe security of the buildings to provide an access delay time equivalent tothe Weapon Access Delay System (WADS). Advanced development isplanned to begin in FY92 with fielding beginning in FY93.

b. ( ~ ) The-Army has a program in place for development andconstruction of underground storage facilities with initial occupancy atCONUS depots by end of FY95.

c. (Qum) Development of a Waterside Security System (WSS) to


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5.0 Nuclear Weapon Use Control (U)(U) During 1989 the use control posture continued to improve.

5.1 Background (U )( 5 ~ ) Use control measures are those that allow the authorized use but,given p h y ~ 1 a l access, prevent or delay unauthorized use of nuclear weapons.This is accomplished through a combination of weapon system design features,operational procedures, and system safety rules. Weapon use control features areshown in Tables 1 and 2, and trends are summarized in Figures 3 and 4. All weapons stored on foreign soil are secured by combination locks or PermissiveAction Links (PAL).

5.2 Policies, Standards, and Criteria (U)( ~ ) The requirements for nuclear weapon use control derive fromNational Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 281 and indirectly from DoDDirective 3150.2 and DOE Order 5610.3. NSDD 281 establishes the President asthe sole authority for the release for use of nuclear weapons and requires anintegrated system of positive measures to protect that authority. There remains a

need for a broad, overarching DoD policy to provide a use control policyfoundation covering issues that are common to all services. A draft DoD UseControl Policy, that articulates NSDD 281, is still in the review process andrequires renewed efforts throughout the DoD to expedite approval.( S ~ n ) DOE has established a policy, implementing a portion of NSDD281, that- ~ J " d r e s s e s the DOE's responsibilities regarding prevention of deliberateunauthorized use. It provides for the establishment and periodic assessment of asystem that integrates use control with security and other positive measures to

protect weapons in the DOE's custody. It also provides for control technologyR&D, and assistance to the DoD and other Federal agencies.( S ~ ) In September 1989, the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense(Atomic Energy) (ATSD(AE)) issued a memorandum which proposed andsupported the development of a nuclear weapons coding and verification systemthat embodied full end-to--end encryption capability and established the concept ofVerifiable Control Procedures (VCP). Under VCP, all nuclear weapon codingequipment would be brought into and maintained in a secure environment. The

Joint DoD/DOE Project Officers Group (POG) for Nuclear Weapon Use ControlSystems (Use Control -POG), chartered by the NWCSC, is currently reviewing theATSD(AE) proposal and determining what use control hardware would berequired i f it were implemented.5.3 Use Control Research and Development CU)

I


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A S S I F I E "this application, there is no requirement to e x t e ~ t i o n to otherweapon systems.5.4 Use Control Assessment (U )

(U) Use control measures continue to support the required balance betweenthe authorized use of nuclear weapons and protection against the deliberateunauthorized use. As stated previously, renewed efforts to complete a DoD UseControl Policy are needed. Additionally, there is a need for standards, criteria,and a generally accepted methodology for use control evaluation. ATSD(AE), DOEand the Use Control POG have irutiated efforts to identify evaluation approachesthat can systematically assess all types of use control measures.6.0 PERSONNEL SURETY, RELIABILITY, AND ASSURANCE CU)

(U) The requirements for personnel security, reliability, and assurancederive from NSDD 281, OOE Orders, and DoD Directives.(U) Every individual assigned to a nuclear duty position who has access to,

or controls access to, nuclear weapons, nuclear components, or sealedauthenticators must be formally certified and continually evaluated and observedin accordance with established departmental standards and procedures. Suchcertification is granted only after completing a required security investigation, afavorable review of personnel and medical records, and a personal interview.(U) New, more stringent, requirements are mandated by NSDD 281 forcritical nuclear command and control personnel; however, no national criteria hasbeen established to designate personnel as "critical". DOE has established a policythat designates certain critical nuclear command and control positions and requiresthe personnel volunteering for those positions to undergo special background

investigations, counterintelligence polygraph testing, and drug testing.(U) Service technical inspection programs and DoD and DOE oversightvisits continue to meet established standards.

7.0 IOINT EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE (U)(U) In 1989 there were no nuclear weapon accidents.( 5 ~ ) In the event that a nuclear weapon is involved in an accident, theFederal ~ g ~ c y with custody of the weapon involved will respond, in conjunctionwith other Federal Agencies, in accordance with the Federal RadiologicalEmergency Response Plan. DoD will respond in accordance with DoD Directive5100.52 and the Nuclear Weapon Accident Response Procedures (NARP) manual.DoD and DOE work together in the safmg of the weapon(s) and the removal of


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t I

UNC .LASSIFIED9

procedures. There were five exercises in 1989, two of them in conjunction withthe United Kingdom. The exercises with the U.K. reviewed the coordinationprocedures established by the Third Tier Arrangement. In 1989, exercises wereconducted to test multi-agency command and control structures, deployment of thenewly formed Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center, the DefenseSenior Representative (DSR) concept and effectiveness of the NEST TechnicalOperations Center (TOC).(b) (3)

8.0 INSPECTION AND EVALUATION PROGRAMS (U)(U) During 1989 the inspection and evaluation programs remainedsatisfactory.

8.1 Background (U )(U) Both the OOE and the DoD conduct various inspection and evaluationactivities to assure that an adequate level of oversight is provided for the safety,security and control of the U.S. nuclear weapon stockpile. Many of these activities

are conducted jointly.8.2 DoD Programs (U)

(U) The DOD Nuclear Weapons Technical Inspection (NWTI) programrequires both Service and DNA inspections of designated nuclear-capable units.The Services conduct these inspections at least once every 18 months and DNAevaluates each unit once every 4 to 5 years. Both types of inspections evaluatethe safety, security, and reliability of the weapons systems, as well as specialinterest items as tasked by OSD or Joint Staff.

(U) The Anny, Air Force, and Navy continued their minimum-notice NWTIprograms in calendar year 1989. The Army continued to conduct nuclear suretyinspections of both custodial and noncustodial units. There were no specialinterest items during this period.( C ~ ) DoD continues to experience a reduction in the number ofn u c l e a r ~ ~ p ~ l e units, from 488 in 1988 to 394 by the end of 1989. This past year,DNA inspected 75 of those units, 92 percent of which received a SATISFACTORYrating, which is consistent with previous years.

8.3 DOE Programs (U)(U) DOE conducts annual appraisals of all its operations and organizations


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S S I F Iweapon systems; 3} Conducts an Evaluation and Inspection (E&l) program of thesafeguards and security of the major nuclear facilities in the DOE complex.

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(U) During 1989, the overall appraisal results indicated that DOE activitieswere in compliance with established criteria.9.0 IMPACf OF BUDGET CONSTRAINTS (U)

(U) The Presidentially approved 1989-1994 Nuclear Weapons StockpileMemorandum (NWSM) reflects tradeoffs made between new builds, modifications,and/or replacements of "older weapons that lack modern detonation safety features.To assure continued progress in this area, priority funding must be provided toaddress the environmental, health, and safety issues associated with the DOEproduction facilities as well as to support DOD production requirements. Twospecific DOE facilities are particularly critical to achieving the projected stockpilemodernization: the pit production facility at Rocky f1ats, Colorado, and the newWaste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) in New Mexico.(U) Both the DoD and DOE remain committed to supporting enhancednuclear surety in the stockpile. This will be accomplished after considering therelative benefits of new warhead builds versus modernizing older warheads, in

recognition of the fiscal resources available versus the relative costs of the options.The rate that modernization can proceed is a function of DOE industrial plantcapability, not DoD system procurement. For the foreseeable future, zero growthfunding, increased requirement to expend funds in the areas of environment,safety, and health, and the pressing need to modernize the nuclear weaponsproduction complex will determine the pace which nuclear surety enhancementsare developed and introduced into the stockpile.


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NCLASSIFIEDMfl.

(b) (3) (b) (3)

(b) {3) {b) (3)


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Cateqor:-v WeaponStockpi leS t r a t eg i c Bomb 828-0,1AFAP W33Tac t i c a l Bomb 843AFAP W48Pershing lA wsoSt ra teg ic Bomb B53-lMinuteman II W56-4Tac t i c a l Bomb 851-1Tac t i c a l Bomb 851-2Tac t i ca l Bomb 861-0Tac t i ca l Bomb 861-2Tac t i c a l Bomb 861-3Tac t i c a l Bomb B61-4Tac t i c a l Bomb 861-5St ra teg ic Bomb B61-7Minutelftan I I I W62Poseidon W68SAAM A W69Lance W"I0-1Lance W"I0-3Spar tan wn (IRIPoseidon /Tr iden t I W76Minuteman I U W78AFAP W79Cruise Missi le wao-oCruise Missi le weo-1St ra teg ic Bomb 88 3

tj Cruise Miss i le W84Persh ing I I wasPeacekeeper W87-0Trident II W88

On-Aler t /Ship / Allowed/OCO_H!l_S Prohib i ted

No 00 pShip A0 p0 A)No 0No 0Ship AShip /0 A0 AShip/0 A0 A0 A0 ANo 0No 0Ship 0No 00 pNo pNo pShip 0No 00 pShip ANo 0No 00 A0 ANo 0Ship A

TABLE: 1Weapons in Stockpi le (Ul

E ~ m s l HE

Conv.NoneConv.Conv.Conv.Conv.Conv.ConvConv.Conv.Conv.InsenInsenConv.Ins enConv.Conv.ConvConv.Conv.Conv.Conv.Conv.Conv.Ins enIns enInsen/FRPInsen/F'RPIns enInsen/FRPConv.

Us e Cont ro lDesign F'eature

Cat DCombLockCat BCombLock

Cat ANoneNoneNoneCat 8Cat BCat Ddat FCat FCat DCat DNoneNoneNoneCat DCat DNoneNoneNoneCat DCat DCat DCat DCat FCat FNoneNone

1 Enhanced Nuclear Detonation Safe ty2 FY89-94 ~ S M Change 3A

c;:

Retirement2 Conwnents

19931991

199119941998199919931994

1998

19961998199819991991

19911991

O ff Aler t 1990

Replacement - W61Rplacmt-890Rp1acmt-B90,B61-4Modif ied to 861-8Modif ied to 861-8

Modif ied to 861-8

ReplacementReplacement

W89FOTL

.Q'fg

t3tj


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CategoryDevelopmentTac t i ca l BombTac t i ca l BombTac t i ca l BombTac t i ca l BombSt ra t eg ic 8ombAFAPSICBMSRAH I ITac t i ca l BombFollow on to LanceSRAM T

I.,! . -\ '

Weapon

B61-6B61-8B61-9B61-10W61W82W81-1W89B90WFOTLWTASH

ENOS

!'!!Q!e 2Weapons Under Deve!Qp_ment-JQL

Use Cont r o lHE: Design Fea tu re

In sen Cat 0Ins en Cat DInsen Cat FI n : ~ en Cat DI n : ~ en Cat DConv. Cat 0l n : ~ e n / F R P NoneI n : ~ e n / F R P Cat DI n : ~ e n / F R P Cat 0I n : ~ e n / F R P Cat Fl n : ~ e n / F R P Cat F

I n i t i a l Opera t i ona lCapab i l i t y

19911993199219901993199219971993199319941993

I..

Corrments

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Date post:	07-Apr-2018
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Nuclear Weapons Surety Report to the President, 1989

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