Number 05 Issue #4 - Part 2 of 2 January 2010 Vietnam War …4)-VIETN… · · 2012-03-13fitted...

VOLUNTARY GUIDES BACKGROUNDER Number 05 Issue #4 - Part 2 of 2 January 2010

Vietnam War 1962-1975

BACKGROUNDER 05 Issue #4 Part 2 of 2 should be combined with Part 1 of 2 of the same document that has been

distributed separately. Cover Pages for Parts 1 of Part 2 and 2 of 2, should be disgarded in favour of the attached Cover Page Parts 1& 2

See also BACKGROUNDERS: # 33 Issue # 1 May 2000- RAN in the Vietnam War # 62 Issue # 1 July 2000 - 1st Australian Task Force and the Vietnam War

# 53 Issue # 1 October 2001 Vietnam – Presentation to VGAWM by Libby Stewart # 80 Issue # 3 November 2007 - Roll of Honour Memories

# 88 Issue # 1 December 2007- The Royal Australian Navy at the AWM(Section17-Vietnam) #93 Issue # 1 March 2007 - Dien Bien Phu

#100 Issue #1 January 2008- HMAS BRISBANE - The Steel Cat PJH

PART 2 of 2

VOLUNTARY GUIDES BACKGROUNDER Number 05 Issue #4 - Parts 1 & 2 January 2010

Vietnam War 1962-1975

This BACKGROUNDER replaces BACKGROUNDER # 5 Issue # 3 January 2008 and is distributed as

Part 1 of 2 and Part 2 of 2 due to its overall size See also BACKGROUNDERS: # 33 Issue # 1 May 2000- RAN in the Vietnam War # 62 Issue # 1 July 2000 - 1st Australian Task Force and the Vietnam War

# 53 Issue # 1 October 2001 Vietnam – Presentation to VGAWM by Libby Stewart # 80 Issue # 3 November 2007 - Roll of Honour Memories

# 88 Issue # 1 December 2007- The Royal Australian Navy at the AWM(Section17-Vietnam) #93 Issue # 1 March 2007 - Dien Bien Phu

#100 Issue #1 January 2008- HMAS BRISBANE - The Steel Cat PJH

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BACKGROUNDER # 05

VIETNAM WAR 1962-1975

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Section 8

ARMOURED PERSONNEL CARRIER AND

BARRIER MINEFIELD

Contents

! Gallery Captions (as at October 2007) ! 3rd Cavalry Regiment.AWM website

! Death in the MINEFIELD(Operation Leeton Mar-May 1967). Ashley Ekins.WARTIME # 22

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$ The barrier minefield In 1967 the decision was made to construct an extensive minefield as a barrier to enemy movement across Phuoc Tuy province. The minefield ran from just north of the town of Dat Do to the coast. Approximately 11 kilometres long, it consisted of two parallel belts of barbed wire 2 metres high, 100 metres apart, with 20,000 M16 mines sown in between the fences. It was a complete failure, owing to inadequate security by Australian and South Vietnamese forces. The minefield was easily infiltrated by the Viet Cong who lifted thousands of the mines and then used them to devastating effect against Australian and allied soldiers. Members of 5RAR erecting part of the barrier minefield fence, which took several months to construct. P01353.014 Corporal Trent Grall (left) and Lance Corporal Barry O’Brien, 7RAR, prime M16A1 anti-personnel mines, laid as part of the barrier minefield, in May 1967. P01783.003 Armoured operations Ten Armoured Personnel Carriers (APCs), belonging to the 4th/19th Prince of Wales’s Light Horse, were sent to Vietnam in 1965. The number of armoured vehicles grew to squadron strength (approximately 65 vehicles), and they performed an important role as troop transport, re-supply, casualty evacuation, and combat support for soldiers on operations. Centurion tanks were used in Vietnam from early 1968. As the APCs were more vulnerable to mines, grenades, and machine-gun fire, the tanks proved invaluable in providing greater firepower to support troops involved in close contact with the enemy.

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Soldiers from 8RAR leave an A Squadron, 1st Armoured Regiment, tank during Operation Hammersley in the Long Hai hills in March 1970. Although 42 enemy were killed during this operation, 8RAR suffered heavily, with eight men killed and 16 injured from mines.EKN/70/0052Q/VN %

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(1736686 Sapper (Spr) Stephen Henry Armbrust (left) of Cairns, Qld, using headphones and a metal detector to locate mines, while 62025 Spr Darryel Binns (right) of Pyngana, Tas, is carefully using his bayonet to prod the loose surface of Route 2 (the main north south road in Phuoc Tuy Province). The men, from 1st Field Squadron, Royal Australian Engineers (RAE), are working in the north of the province and before the main engineering work can begin each day, these 'Mini Teams' sweep and clear the road and the work areas around RAE equipment and parked vehicles. At this particular spot, the team are clearing a section of road known as 'Mine Valley', so named, because of the large number of mines found in the area. Spr Binns is armed with a 5.56 mm M16A1 automatic rifle.} Sappers Darryl Binns (left) and Steve Armbrust, 1st Field Squadron, RAE, check the road for mines. The men formed “Splinter teams” who often travelled on APCs and tanks during operations to detect, defuse, and destroy mines and booby traps. PJE/71/0273/VN Sapper Neil Innes As I was the only one … who had no wife or girlfriend back home, I went in. On the morning of 2 May 1967, 22-year-old Australian Sapper Neil Innes entered the barrier minefield near the “Horseshoe” at Dat Do to rescue a badly wounded American soldier. Feeling for the mines with his hands and marking them with scraps of hessian sandbags, Innes cleared a path so that a medical officer could get to the wounded American. Sapper Neil Innes, 1st Field Squadron, was awarded the Military Medal for rescuing a wounded soldier from the barrier minefield. P05473.001 M113A1 Armoured Personnel Carrier Mines caused havoc in Vietnam. To minimise mine damage to APCs and injuries to crew, improvements were made to the vehicles, beginning in late 1969: Australian-developed sponson reinforcement plates, a collapsible driver’s footrest, and belly armour were fitted. This protection saved the crew, commander Robert “Bud” Abbott and the driver Danny Handley, from serious injury when it detonated a mine on 1 March 1971. The blast caused considerable damage to the vehicle. The appearance of this APC differs slightly from those generally seen in 1971, as it was not fitted with a purpose-built rack to carry the ammunition liners, these being tied directly to the roof. RELAWM40964.001 Claymore mines All sides used mines extensively during the war. Claymore mines were used by American and Australian forces in ambushes and defensive positions. They contained 700 steel pellets packed in C-4 explosive and were fired electronically. The mine is displayed with its detonator cord and carry bag. REL22958; REL22963; REL32441 Anti-personnel mines The Australians planted over 20,000 of the tin-shaped M16A1 anti-personnel fragmentation mines in the Australian-built barrier minefield. When tripped, the mine was propelled a metre into the air and then exploded. REL/14799; PROP04091

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Armoured Corps plaques Unofficial badge of 1 Troop, 3rd Cavalry Regiment. RELAWM41035.012 Formation Sign of A Squadron, 3rd Cavalry Regiment. REL/17036 Formation Sign of 1 Troop, 1st Armoured Regiment. RELAWM41035.007 Formation Sign of 2 Troop, 1st Armoured Regiment. RELAWM41035.008 Formation Sign of 3 Troop, 1st Armoured Regiment.RELAWM41035.009 Formation Sign of 4 Troop, 1st Armoured Regiment. RELAWM41035.010 Formation Sign of 5 Troop, 1st Armoured Regiment. RELAWM41035.011

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3rd Cavalry Regiment

The 3rd Cavalry Regiment had a squadron serving in South Vietnam for nearly six years. Between 1966 and 1972 the men from the regiment served in every major operation conducted by the 1st Australian Task Force (1ATF), including the Tet Offensive, the 1968 battles for Fire Support Bases Coral and Balmoral, and the battle of Binh Ba in 1969. Using Armoured Personal Carriers (APCs), the regiment’s squadron was a highly mobile force that served throughout Phuoc Tuy province.

Australian APCs had been serving in Vietnam since 1965: initially with the 1st Troop, A Squadron, 4th/19th Prince of Wales Light Horse Regiment, subsequently named the 1st APC Troop; and then with 1st APC Squadron. In January 1967 1st APC Squadron became A Squadron, 3rd Cavalry Regiment. The squadron’s strength in South Vietnam at the time was 117: ten officers, 14 warrant officers/sergeants, and 93 other ranks. The squadron’s strength increased over time and by August 1971 had grown to 169 men: 15 officers, 22 warrant officers/sergeants, and 132 other ranks.

While A Squadron was located with the Task Force at Nui Dat, the regiment’s B Squadron was initially based at Puckapunyal, Victoria, later moving to Holsworthy, New South Wales. The role of the squadron’s regiment in Australia was to provide support and relief for the squadron serving in Vietnam. The regiment operated a “man-for-man” replacement system – when a member of the squadron completed his tour in Vietnam, he was replaced by a man from the squadron in Australia.

Although it now belonged to a new regiment, the squadron continued to carry out the same type of work it had done previously: inserting, redeploying, and extracting troops, including patrols conducted by the Special Air Service; acting as an armoured ambulance for medical evacuations; serving as a ready deployment force; being used as mobile machine-gun and mortar platforms; protecting convoys and escorts; conducting reconnaissance; supporting cordon-and-search operations; and providing armoured command vehicles.

The squadron was involved in particularly heavy fighting on 16 February 1966, in support of the 6th Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment (6RAR), during Operation Bribie. At one point during the battle, B Company became pinned down in the middle of an arc of Viet Cong (VC) machine-guns. APCs had been on the edge of the battle but were called forward to assist B Company, having to almost “blindly” crash through thick scrub in an effort to find the infantry. Having located B Company, the wounded were evacuated in the back of the carriers. One APC was hit by two rounds from a 75 mm recoilless rifle, killing the driver and wounding the crew commander and several passengers.

A Squadron became B Squadron on 13 May 1969, coinciding with the arrival of new. B Squadron’s tour lasted until 6 January 1971, when it was relieved by A Squadron. In mid-1971 the squadron received six M113A1 Fire Support Vehicles (FSVs), carrier mounted with a Saladin turret and armed with a 76 mm gun. The majority of the FSVs crew were seconded from the 2nd Cavalry Regiment and posted on strength to the 3rd Cavalry Regiments. More heavily armed, the FSVs were still only lightly armoured and were not intended to replace Centurion tanks in offensive tasks. It was felt however, they could relive the Centurions from their role in protecting the fire support bases, thereby allowing the tanks a greater role in supporting 1ATF’s operations.

In August the Australian government announced it would withdrawal 1ATF from Vietnam. 1ATF was gradually reduced and in October the remaining Australian troops moved to the port city of Vung Tau; a company from the 4th Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment

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(4RAR), the squadron’s No. 1 Troop, and some support troops remained at Nui Dat. Most of the squadron returned to Australia in December, while No. 1 Troop moved to Vung Tau. The detachment returned to Australia in March 1972.

! Battle Honours: Vietnam (1965-72)

! Long Tan ! Bien-Hoa ! Coral-Balmoral ! Hat Dich ! Binh Ba ! Casualties:20 died.115 wounded

! References

! AWM95: 2/4/1-35 A Squadron, 3 Cavalry war diary ! AWM95: 2/5/1-22 B Squadron, 3 Cavalry war diary ! Anderson, Paul, When the scorpion stings : the history of the 3rd cavalry regiment,

South Vietnam 1965-72, (Crows Nest, N.S.W.: Allen & Unwin, 2002) ! Hopkins, Ronald Nicholas Lamond; Australian War Memorial, Australian armour : a

history of the Royal Australian Armoured Corps, 1927-1972, (Canberra: Australian War Memorial and Australian Government Publishing Service, 1978)

! McNeill, Ian G., 1933-, Official History, Vietnam Vol.II: To Long Tan : the Australian army and the Vietnam war 1950-1966, (St Leonards, N.S.W. : Allen & Unwin in association with the Australian War Memorial, 1993)

McNeill, Ian Graham, "Vietnam 1967: Operation Bribie"

ISSUE # 4 (January 2010)

BACKGROUNDER # 05


Section 9

OPERATION BRIBIE

Contents • Gallery Captions (as at November 2007)

• Vietnam 1967: Operation Bribie. Ian McNeill.WARTIME #1(1997) • Hot environment.Walter Kudrycz.WARTIME #35

• AWM Collection Record: REL/12323 Bell UH–1B Iroquois A2–1019.AWM Rocket Tour Notes

• UH-1B Iroquois Notes. Alastair Bridges VGAWM June 2008

HUEY A2-1019 The dramatisation of Operation Bribie features the helicopter flown by Bob Mackintosh. A2-1019 was issued to 9 Squadron in October 1964 and completed 489 missions in Vietnam. A2-1019 returned to Australia in October 1968 and was used in search-and-rescue operations until 1985, when it was presented to the Memorial. Dick Smith and his wife Pip donated $1,000,000 to fund the dramatization. The ‘Huey’ has become synonymous with the Vietnam War and its distinctive “thwock thwock” sound evokes instant memories amongst the Vietnam Veteran community. However it has served Australia faithfully both domestically and around the world in warlike conditions, peace keeping, disaster relief and humanitarian assistance since its introduction in 1962. The Iroquois was initially operated by the Royal Australian Air Force before the capability was handed over to the Army in 1989. The Royal Australian Navy also operated Iroquois from 1967, with the type being withdrawn from Navy service in 1989. The multi role helicopter MRH-90 that will replace the Huey is larger, more powerful and more versatile than the Iroquois, and will be entered into service with both Army and Navy. {Reference :WARTIME #35 and Defence Media release: CPA 325/07 dated 21.09.07}



Gallery Captions ( As at November 2007 )

No. 9 Squadron, RAAF Eight Iroquois helicopters of No. 9 Squadron were first sent to Vietnam in June 1966. Their initial role was to provide transport support to the army, but after the battle of Long Tan in August 1966 this was expanded to include tactical air support for 1ATF. They provided troop transport, resupply, casualty evacuations (also called “dust-offs”), and, from 1969, gunship support. The squadron had a close relationship with the SAS, inserting and extracting SAS patrols from often dangerous situations. A small number of naval pilots also flew with great distinction with No. 9 Squadron in Vietnam from February 1968 until April 1969.

No. 9 Squadron’s helicopter gunships were called “bushrangers”. With bullet casings from its miniguns falling to the ground, Bushranger A2-773 engages a target. P01960.001

During Operation Ulmarra in August 1967, troops from 7RAR unload rations and supplies from a No. 9 Squadron UH-1B Iroquois helicopter near the village of Long Dien. EKN/67/0136/VN

Corporal Bruce Clark (left) and Vietnamese mechanic Tran Van Do at work on the engine of a No. 9 Squadron Iroquois at Vung Tau in March 1968. VN/68/0025/10

Iroquois helicopter The Australian War Memorial’s Bell UH-1B Iroquois helicopter, A2-1019, was one of the first RAAF helicopters to arrive in Vietnam. It was used to evacuate the dead and wounded from the battle of Long Tan in August 1966, and flew 489 operational sorties during its 27 months “in country”. Used for troop movement and resupply, casualty evacuation, and SAS insertion and extraction, A2-1019 was badly damaged in April 1967. In the middle of an SAS extraction, it suffered a compressor failure and landed heavily, damaging its rear fuselage. Rather than retire the aircraft, RAAF technicians repaired it with spares from other damaged Iroquois helicopters, and five months later it was back in the air. REL/12323

Soldiers wounded in Phuoc Tuy province could be in hospital within half an hour. This soldier from 5RAR was injured from a mine explosion during Operation Beaumaris in February 1967.


COL/67/0140/VN

In 1968 No. 9 Squadron received new H Model Iroquois helicopters. The H Model had a more powerful engine and its cabin was larger than that of the B model, which meant it could carry four more passengers. VN/68/0011/03

UH-1H Iroquois helicopters were also flown by members of the RAN Helicopter Flight Vietnam as part of the US Army’s 135th Assault Helicopter Company. Some RAN pilots also flew with No. 9 Squadron, RAAF.P04658.462 A2-1019 – the Memorial’s Iroquois helicopter The Bell UH-1B Iroquois helicopter designated A2-1019 was presented to the Australian War Memorial by the RAAF in May 1985. The Iroquois is the most evocative and iconic aircraft of the Vietnam War. REL/12323 Operation Bribie On 17 February 1967, No. 9 Squadron, RAAF, joined forces with the US Army for a “heliborne” assault. Soldiers from 6RAR were flown into an area south-east of Dat Do with the intention of intercepting Viet Cong who had attacked nearby South Vietnamese forces. The Australians immediately came under enemy fire as they flew into the unsecured landing zone; the fighting continued all day and into the next morning. Throughout the battle RAAF Iroquois, including A2-1019, flew many missions bringing food, water, and ammunition and extracting casualties. The Iroquois display depicts a heliborne assault similar to that which took during Operation Bribie, as well as a casualty evacuation, or “dustoff”.

US Army Iroquois fly into a secured landing zone to uplift 6RAR after Operation Bribie on 18 February 1967. Eight Australians died and 27 were wounded during the operation. P02629.021


Troops from 6RAR disembarking from No. 9 Squadron Iroquois during Operation Bribie on 17 February 1967. Seven Australian and eight American Iroquois helicopters flew three infantry companies into the landing zone. P05655.035

“Wounded” boot Squadron Leader James Cox, No. 9 Squadron, RAAF, was hit by an enemy bullet during a “dust-off” evacuation of men wounded in the battle of Suoi Chau Pha, in August 1967. RELAWM40762 US flight helmet American flight helmet which belonged to Flying Officer Warren Bowen, a No. 9 Squadron pilot. REL34978 Nose door Several UH-1Hs were converted to Bushranger helicopter gunships. This door is from No. 9 Squadron’s damaged Bushranger UH-1H Iroquois A2-392. REL34979


AWM Collection Record: REL/12323

ID Number: REL/12323 Title: Bell UH-1B Iroquois Helicopter : A2-1019

Maker: Bell Helicopter Company Object type: Aircraft Place made: United States Date made: 15 July 1964

Physical description:

Metal; Rubber; Bakelite; The Bell UH-1B Iroquois medium utility helicopter is a turboshaft-powered machine with two-blade main rotor and tail rotor. The aircraft is built primarily from alloy. The original US serial number was 63-13587, and the aircraft was allotted RAAF serial number, A2-1019. The aircraft generally carried five fully armed troops or equivalent weight in cargo and was operated by a crew of up to four in Vietnam service. Armament was two M60 machine guns, with one positioned on a flexible mount on each side of the cabin.

Summary: This Bell UH-1B Iroquois Helicopter was issued to 9 Squadron (Sqn) at RAAF Fairbairn, Australian Capital Territory (ACT), in October 1964. In May 1966 the aircraft was flown from Fairbairn to RAAF Richmond, New South Wales and then transported via troopship HMAS Sydney to Vung Tau, Vietnam, arriving on 6 June 1966. It was used by 9 Squadron in operational duties and completed 489 operational missions (and a far larger number of sorties or flights) including medical evacuations, troop transport, liaison and other duties. While on operations on 13 April 1967 the aircraft crash landed following an engine failure and was airlifted by a United States Army Chinook helicopter to Vung Tau. On 22 September 1967 the aircraft returned to operations following extensive repairs which included the replacement of the tailboom. It returned to Australia in October 1968 and was issued to 5 Squadron at RAAF Fairbairn. From 1975-1979 the aircraft was used at RAAF Williamtown, NSW, and later issued to No 2 Flying Training School at RAAF Pearce, Western Australia (WA), where it was used in Search & Rescue Operations. On 21 May 1985 it was flown by Wing Commander Mick Haxell DFC to the Australian War Memorial and presented to the Memorial by Air Marshal Evans AC DSO AFC. This aircraft was stored at Fairbairn from 21 May 1985 until 18 May 1988 when it was transported to AWM Mitchell store.


Bell UH–1B Iroquois A2–1019

{Rocket Tour Notes} Manufacturer: Bell Helicopter Co. Theatre of war: Vietnam War Rotor Diameter: 14.63 m Length: 12.8 m Powerplant: Lycoming T53–L–5 Turboshaft Performance: Maximum speed 236 km/h, Range 416 km The Iroquois were first received by the RAAF in 1962. From 1966 to 1973 the type saw operational service in Vietnam with No. 9 Squadron RAAF. A2–1019 was attached to the unit in 1964 and moved with them to Vietnam, where it was used to support ground troops. In 1967 the machine suffered an engine failure and crash-landed. After a complex field repair, it remained in Vietnam until October 1968, when it was transferred to No. 5 Squadron in Malaya. Talking points:

The Iroquois series of helicopters (all US-built military helicopters are named after Native American groups) are best known for their service in Vietnam. Furthermore, this type of helicopter is the icon associated with that conflict. In Vietnam, the smaller ‘B’ and ‘C’ Iroquois were used in the gunship role because of their higher airspeed than the later, larger ‘D’ model. Prior to the arrival of the ‘D’ models, however, the earlier types were used for troop transport as well. In RAAF service, the early model Iroquois are most well known for their insertion and extraction of 5 man SAS patrols, which represented their maximum load limit.

A2-1019 is a hybrid as a result of its complex field rebuild. Although the airframe is a

UH-1B model, the engine and tail boom is from a UH-1C. The large air filter over the top of the engine distinguishes the ‘C’ model. After its rebuild, the aircraft was reported by its pilots to have a strange, untraceable vibration, apparently as a result of the floor being considerably stiffer than originally.

Of note is the armour plate on the side, back and base of the seats for the aircrew. This

was intended to provide some measure of protection against ground fire. The aircrew remained very vulnerable, however, as a result of the large perspex windows beneath the nose of the aircraft. These allowed the aircrew excellent downward visibility and enabled the aircraft to operate in very tight spaces indeed, one of the type’s virtues. The trade-off was that the aircrew could be disabled or killed by even small-arms fire from the frontal arc. Of the ten combat related deaths suffered by the RAAF in Vietnam, six were helicopter aircrew.

A2-1019 was last airworthy in May 1985. The RAAF returned the aircraft to its

Vietnam colour scheme and it was flown to Canberra, made a gift to the Australian War Memorial and wheeled into storage.



ISSUE # 2( December 2007)












ISSUE #4 (January 2010)


BACKGROUNDER # 05


Section 10

FIRE SUPPORT BASE CORAL

Contents • Gallery Captions ( as at November 2007)

• 102 CORAL Battery: First Army Honour Title Awarded. Defence Media Release CPA 130/08 14 May 2008

• Fire Support Base "Coral" AWM Encyclopedia October 2007 • M2A2 105mm HOWITZER.Rocket Tour and AWM EVS Highlight Talk Lecture Notes

December 2001 • Centurion Tank Mk V 169056

FIRE SUPPORT BASE CORAL, BIEN HOA PROVINCE, VIETNAM. 13 MAY 1968. A 105MM M2A2 HOWITZER, THE NO. 6 GUN OF 102 FIELD BATTERY, 12TH FIELD REGIMENT, ROYAL AUSTRALIAN ARTILLERY (RAA), ON THE MORNING AFTER THE FIRST SERIES OF ATTACKS ON FIRE SUPPORT BASE (FSB) CORAL BY TROOPS OF THE NORTH VIETNAMESE ARMY'S (NVA) 7TH DIVISION. THIS POSITION WAS TEMPORARILY OVERRUN BY THE NVA ON THE NIGHT OF THE 12/13 MAY 1968, BOTH THE TYRES WERE SHOT OUT AND THE GUN WAS SERIOUSLY DAMAGED BY A SATCHEL CHARGE AND WAS WITHDRAWN FOR REPAIR. STANDING AROUND BEHIND THE GUN ARE MEMBERS OF THE GUN CREW. FROM LEFT TO RIGHT: GUNNNER (GNR) WALKER; GNR J. E. SCHWARZE; UNKNOWN; SERGEANT MAX FRANKLIN, COMMANDER OF NO. 6 GUN; UNKNOWN. THE CREW'S PERSONAL WEAPONS WHICH INCLUDE M16'S, 7.62MM SELF-LOADING RIFLES (SLRS) AND AN F1 SUB-MACHINE GUN ARE LEANING AGAINST ONE WHEEL OF THE HOWITZER. (DONOR G. AYSON)

See the Official History On the Offensive Part II Chapter 12 for full account of the Battle at Fire Support Base Coral, April-May 1968



102 CORAL BATTERY: FIRST ARMY HONOUR TITLE AWARDED

{DEFENCE MEDIA RELEASE CPA 130/08 Wednesday, 14 May 2008} In a moving ceremony on Mount Pleasant in Canberra earlier today, His Excellency Major General Michael Jeffrey, AC, CVO, MC, Governor-General of the Commonwealth of Australia, presented Army s 102 Field Battery with the Australian Military s first ever Honour Title. The Honour Title Coral was awarded to 102 Field Battery, Royal Regiment of Australian Artillery, in recognition of its actions during the Vietnam War. Head of Regiment, Brigadier Phil Winter CSC, welcomed the award on behalf of the Army and gave credit to the outstanding actions of the unit during the long battle.

This is an important day for the Australian Defence Force, and brings deserved recognition to the Gunners who fought so valiantly to hold their position in Vietnam 40 years ago, Brigadier Winter said.

I welcome the title Coral on behalf of the Australian Army, and hope that the story of this battle provides inspiration to our current Diggers who are serving on operations today. Today s ceremony forms part of a series of activities to commemorate the 40th Anniversary of the battles of Coral and Balmoral, which took place in South Vietnam during May and June of 1968 and played a significant role in securing Saigon from further attack.

The battles were the largest and most sustained engagements of the Vietnam War involving Australian troops, and were the first Australian all arms brigade-sized operation since World War II, Brigadier Winter said.

Approximately 2,500 Australians participated in the battles and this is an opportunity to thank them for their service, and remember those who did not return home.


GALLERY CAPTIONS

(as at November 2007) Fire Support Bases Coral and Balmoral Between May and June 1968 the Australian forces fought some of their largest battles of the war. FSB Coral and Balmoral were established north of Saigon in order to intercept and disrupt enemy forces heading towards both Saigon and the American base at Long Binh. FSB Coral was barely established on 12 May when it came under a savage night attack by NVA forces. Further attacks followed on later nights, and Balmoral, another base, was also hit, but the infantry, aided by air support, tanks, and artillery fire, repelled each assault. Twenty-five Australians were killed with and 100 more were wounded, while over 300 NVA soldiers were killed. Gunners of the 12th Field Regiment defending part of the perimeter at FSB Coral. During the fighting on 12–13 May the gunners fired high explosive and splintex anti-personnel rounds over open sites into the attacking NVA, who almost overran the base. ERR/68/0515/VN This photograph was taken on 26 May 1968 from a Centurion tank. It shows the “killing area” in front of the tanks of 3 Troop, C Squadron, 1st Armoured Regiment, at FSB Balmoral, as contact with the enemy was breaking off. P01178.005 The Tet Offensive In February 1968, during the Tet (Lunar) New Year holiday, North Vietnam launched a series of attacks on nearly every town and city in South Vietnam. This major offensive was intended to spark an uprising among the local population, and turn them to the cause of the communists. Despite overrunning towns, such as the ancient capital of Hue, the offensive was a massive military defeat for the NVA and Viet Cong. It was, however, a huge propaganda win for the north. After Tet, influential commentators began to report that the war was not winnable and the tide of support for the war began to turn.


Major Gordon Brown (at rear) watches South Vietnamese women pray over the remains of clothing found in a mass grave near Hue, where North Vietnamese forces massacred many of the civilians. ERR/68/0515/VN Coral and Balmoral FSB Coral was attacked in the early hours of 13 May 1968, after it had only been occupied for a few hours. Several hundred North Vietnamese soldiers attempted to overrun the base, capturing a mortar platoon position and one of 102 Field Battery’s 105-millimetre howitzers. By dawn, with the help of extensive air support, the attack had been repelled. The base was attacked several more times before it was closed down in early June. FSB Balmoral, located just north of Coral, was attacked twice during May, but again the enemy was repulsed. Tanks were used effectively in the defence of both bases. The performance of C Squadron, 1st Armoured Regiment, proved the value of using tanks to support infantry operations. Centurions could destroy enemy bunkers and break up enemy attacks, and their armour was nearly impervious to most enemy weapons. ERR/68/0548/VN An Australian searches the bodies of several dead NVA soldiers, looking for documents. They were killed in front of No. 6 gun position, 102 Field Battery, at FSB Coral, during the previous night’s fighting.P01769.015


The morning after the battle, gunners from 102 Field Battery stand around No. 6 gun. During the night the position had been overrun in an NVA attack, but it was beaten off. P01769.009 The “Coral gun” The Memorial’s 105-millimetre M2A2 howitzer was the No. 6 gun of 102 Field Battery, 12th Field Regiment, during the battle at FSB Coral. The howitzer was overrun during the first attack, but was recovered the following morning. It had been damaged by enemy machine-gun fire. The Australian War Memorial acquired the howitzer from the army in 1998. Here it is depicted as it would have looked when it was first flown into the base by a US Army Chinook helicopter.REL26769 Water bottle Issued to Dave Cunningham, 1RAR, this water bottle was all that was left intact from his pack, which was hit by a rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) when the NVA attacked FSB Coral on 16 May 1968. REL35169 Mortar tail fin During the night of 28 May 1968 Coral came under a heavy mortar attack. One mortar round hit Lorne “Doc” Clarke’s pit, blowing him into the air. He was otherwise unhurt, and next day found this mortar tail fin in his old pit. REL35665 A lieutenant’s machete and entrenching tool When the NVA attacked FSB Coral on 16 May 1968, they reached the position commanded by Lieutenant Neil Weekes, hitting it with about 60 rockets and mortar bombs. Despite his platoon having suffered several casualties, Weekes reorganised it and repelled the attack. Twenty enemy dead were later found in and around the position. For his leadership and bravery, Weekes was awarded the Military Cross. REL63035; REL36036; GAR/70/0248/MC Splintex anti-personnel rounds The artillery fired splintex anti-personnel rounds point blank into the enemy. These contained thousands of small, steel, darts intended to kill and to maim. Lance Corporal Jack Parr, 1RAR, collected this splintex dart after the battle. REL35838 Bunker A member of 1 Ordnance Field Park (1OFP) manning an M60 machine gun in a sandbagged bunker in the 1OFP detachment area at Coral.P05738.001



Fire Support Base “Coral" {AWM Encyclopedia October 2007 }

“….Fire Support Bases Coral and Balmoral, located some 20 kilometres north of the town of Bien Hoa, straddled a route used by the enemy to approach and attack Saigon. The battles there, which involved troops from Australia, with support from New Zealand and United States troops, were the largest and most sustained engagement of the Vietnam War involving Australian troops and represented the first Australian all arms brigade-sized operation since World War II….” {DVA Media Release: VA 165 dated 27.09.07}

From January 30th to 31st 1968 the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army (NVA) had opened up the Tet Offensive, during the Tet (Vietnamese New Year) Holiday. It was a nation-wide assault that was intended to bring about a popular uprising. While it served considerable propaganda value, militarily it was a failure. However, in the following months the NVA moved south to assault Saigon and keep the pressure on South Vietnam and the Americans prior to the peace talks that were being convened in Paris. Positioned between the city and the assaulting forces, about 140km from Nui Dat, were three Surfers Area Operations, and their Fire Support Bases: Newport with Balmoral, Bondi with Coral and Manly with Coogee. They had been placed there not to stop and invader, but to sweep up a retreating enemy fleeing from Saigon as part of Operation Toan Thang (Total Victory).


Fire Support Bases were established throughout Vietnam, usually as short-term installations, to provide artillery support to operations in the field. These generally contained one or more batteries of field or medium guns (6-12 guns), with infantry and sometimes tank protection. During the "Mini-Tet" (Second Tet ) offensive mounted by Viet Cong and North Vietnamese forces in May 1968, the 1st Australian Task Force deployed two battalions to an area twenty kilometres north of Bien Hoa city to intercept and disrupt the approach of enemy forces towards the capital, Saigon, or the Bien Hoa-Long Binh base complex. Several fire support bases (FSBs) were established to provide defended firing points for artillery and mortars which would cover foot patrols to be sent out by the battalions (1 and 3 RAR). One of these FSBs was dubbed "Coral", situated seven kilometres north of the town of Tan Uyen.

Occupation of Coral was begun on 12 May, but the defences remained unfinished when, at about 3.30 am on 13 May, it was attacked following a brief but intense rocket and mortar barrage. The 1RAR mortar platoon position was over-run, along with one of the 102 Field Battery's six 105 mm M2A2 howitzers in the base. With the aid of extensive air support (By Ed:Cobra Helicopter Gunships and Spooky or “Puff the Magic Dragon” - a C47 aircraft decked out with flares and heavy weapons), the attack was beaten off by 6.30 am and the captured gun-pit was retaken - still with the gun in it (this howitzer is now in the Memorial's collection). Eleven Australians were killed and 28 wounded, while the attackers lost more than the 52 bodies they left behind. A further three Australians died in patrol clashes on the 14 May. At 2.15 am on 16 May Coral again came under attack, this time from a North Vietnamese Army (NVA) force estimated at three battalions strong. The base was now defended by armoured personnel carriers of A Squadron, 3rd Cavalry Regiment, and 1RAR's rifle companies, all of which were heavily engaged; part of the A Company position was occupied for a period, but the enemy was forced to withdraw. The attack was repelled after four hours of fighting, with the Australians having suffered five men killed and nineteen wounded. Two members of an American battery which had reinforced the base were also wounded. Only 34 enemy bodies were recovered, but blood trails and drag marks indicated that many more casualties had been removed.

On 22 May Coral was subjected to yet another rocket and mortar barrage, but this time the NVA troops were dispersed by return fire from 1RAR's mortars as they formed up to attack. Although there were further bombardments on 26 and 28 May, and patrols sent out from the base came into contact with the enemy, Coral was not seriously threatened again. During fighting on 26 May the base's defenders even turned the tables on the NVA by sending a troop of Centurion tanks from C Squadron, 1st Armoured Regiment (which had arrived as reinforcements three days earlier), outside the perimeter wire with infantry support; these engaged and destroyed most of a NVA bunker system that had been discovered.

By Ed: Although mistakes were made, the Australians pulled through and held off a numerically superior enemy through the effective combination and cooperation between Infantry, Artillery: M2A2, Armour: Centurion, and Air Force: UH-1B Iroquois.


M2A2 105mm HOWITZER

{References:Rocket Tour and AWM EVS Highlight Talk Lecture Notes December 2001}

In the late 1950s the Australian government, along with those of the USA, Britain and Canada, determined to standardise on 105mm as the calibre for close support field artillery. This necessitated the replacement of the venerable 25-pdr, which had served so well during the Second World War. The chosen replacement was the M2A2 105mm howitzer of US manufacture. The first of three batches of these guns arrived in Australia in 1959. Although its design origins lay in the 1920s, the M2A2 could fire at higher elevations than the 25-pdr, up to 65°, without the need to dig a pit for the rear of the trail or use a cranked trail, as had been the case with the 25-pdr. The M2A2 is heavier (2030kg), however, and fires to a shorter maximum range than the 25-pdr (11,000 metres as opposed to 12,250 metres), although its shell is heavier (15 kilograms as opposed to 11.3 kilograms). The M2A2 is probably one of the most widespread guns in service, having been supplied to almost 50 countries.It was introduced to the Australian forces in Vietnam after the battle of Long Tan in 1966, when the Italian L5 Mountain Guns were evaluated to be not rugged enough. The M2A2 in the Vietnam Gallery, although in modern camouflage, served in Vietnam with 102nd Field Battery of the 12th Field Regiment. On 12 May 1968, 102nd Field Battery, along with 1 Battalion RAR, occupied Fire Support Base Coral. Only three of the guns had been bunded in, and these were the very guns that were facing the enemy. Although all six had been trained away from the enemy, three had turned around to carry out a fire mission a short time before the attack, and had been left in this position in case further support was required. So it was that when the NVA battalions assaulted the Australian position, they were running straight into the bunded guns, facing them head on. The Guns of 102 Battery were fired over open sights at the enemy attempting to overrun the base. Firing over open sights means that the gun is level and that the rounds are being fired through the bunds directly at the enemy. Splintex ammunition had been provided for just such an eventuality, although the crews had not been allowed to practise with this ammunition. Splintex is the modern equivalent of grapeshot, releasing 7,200 steel arrowhead-like projectiles, and can be quite devastating. The timers on the rounds were originally set at between 0.5 and 0.02 seconds, but even this was too long, since the shells were exploding well behind the attacking NVA. Remember that the gun has a muzzle velocity of 472 m/sec. The guns were therefore set at zero, or muzzle action, the shells exploding immediately as they left the barrel. Gunnery Sergeant Stephen's No 4 gun, being in the best position to fire on the enemy, fired 90 rounds during the engagement, including splintex, high explosive rounds, and one accidental firing of an illumination round. This was less than popular at the time with the crews of the other guns trying to remain in protective cover.


During the fighting, the M2A2 on display was overrun and it was not recaptured until dawn as the enemy withdrew. It had to be replaced due to NVA sabotage. Gunnery Sergeant Humphry, on No 2 Gun, had a bad couple of nights at Coral. During the first battle, as the guns were brought to bear on the enemy, Humphry's gun was always last to report "ready". Lieutenant Ian Ahearn came out of his dugout and berated the poor gunnery sergeant who kept silent during the tirade, and then went back to working on the gun. Next morning Ahearn learnt that the tires had been knocked out by Rocket Propelled Grenades early in the action, and the gun crew had been man handling the 2 tonne weapon into position by hand each time that a new fire position was called for. Needless to say Ian Ahearn apologised profusely. New tires were flown out, and the crew spent long hours replacing them. On the 15th May, during the next battle, one of the first mortar rounds to land in the firebase struck No 2 gun again and again knocked out the tyres.


Centurion Tank Mk V # 169056

ARN 169056 served in Vietnam in operation OVERLORD in 1971 with the call sign 5 Bravo, it was commanded by National Serviceman Lance Corporal Tony Dickinson. On June 7 1971 ARN 169056 was involved in fierce fighting while attacking a bunker system in the Long Khanh Province. The bunkers were being held by 3 Battalion 33 North Vietnamese Army (NVA) Regiment and together with tanks from 3 and 5 Troops C Squadron 1st Armoured Regiment in cooperation with 1st Australian Task Force the bunker system was overrun. Just a few weeks later on June 25 ARN 169056 ,during Operation HERMIT PARK ,again came under fire while attacking another bunker system, this time in the Phuoc Tuy province. Just before the assault the tank commanded by the Troop Leader, 5 Troop, Second Lieutenant Bruce Cameron, broke down and he was forced to take command of call sign 5 Bravo. This bunker system was occupied by 1 Battalion 274 NVA Regiment and during the fight ARN 169056 took a hit from a rocket propelled grenade badly injuring the driver Trooper Peter Cadge. Other tanks in 3 troop were also hit by RPGs, the wounded were dusted off, replacements brought forward and the tanks and infantry went on to capture the position. Centurion Tank # 169056 is on display in the grounds of the AWM as it is too large to go

in the galleries. The Centurion Tank The British made Centurion tank has been used as a main battle tank since 1949, and served with the Australian Army from 1952 to 1977. 1st Armoured Regiment was equipped with MkV Centurions while serving in Vietnam from 1968. Although it had been thought that tanks would be less than useful in Vietnam, the Australians proved this wrong. Because of the width of the tracks, the Centurion has a ground pressure of only about a kilo per square centimetre (or twice that of an adult). The tank weighs about 53 tonnes, and is powered by a Rover Meteor motor of 650 bhp. This motor was based upon the Rolls Royce Merlin aero engine, and therein lay the only real weakness with the tank. Being a high rewing low power petrol engine meant that the tank was slow (37kmh), thirsty (with a normal range of only l90km, using 6 gallons to the mile, or 17 litres per km) and tended to burn out clutches. Petrol is also a dangerous fuel, and not as flexible as dieseline. The tank operated with a crew of 4: Commander, Gunner, Loader and Driver. Armament consisted of one 20 pounder; 83.4mm bore; one .50 calibre ranging machine gun and two .30 calibre Browning machine guns, one co-axial with the main gun, and one on the commander's cupola.

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BACKGROUNDER # 05


%

Section 11

ROYAL AUSTRALIAN NAVY

Contents ! Gallery Captions ( as at November 2007)

! Purple Heart in the Vietnam Gallery.PJH Guide Post April 2008 ! HMAS HOBART - attacked by US Airforce June 1968 Vietnam.www.gunplot.net

SEE :BACKGROUNDER # 88 NAVY at the Memorial Section 17 VIETNAM

HMAS BRISBANE (II). AWM website November 2006 Naval Operations in Vietnam. SEAPOWER Centre Australia November 2006 Royal Australian Navy Detachment, 9 Squadron RAAF – Vietnam. SEAPOWER

Centre Australia November 2006 Royal Australian Navy Helicopter Flight Vietnam. SEAPOWER Centre Australia

November 2006 See Also BACKGROUNDER #100 - HMAS BRISBANE -The Steel Cat

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%HMAS HOBART - attacked by US Airforce June 1968 Vietnam{www.gunplot.net} Hobart returned to 'The Gunline' on 20th May 1968 for her 2nd Deployment. Straight into heavy action in 1 Corps around the Da Nang vicinity saw her heading for Subic in early June for a barrel replacement for her two 5" Guns.

Hobart returned to Sea Dragon operations on June 11th, relieving USS St Paul with Captain Shands taking command of Task Unit 77.1.2. USS Theodore Chandler (DD 717) was the support ship of the TU, which carried out its first firing on two truck parks 12 miles North of Dung Hoi.

On 13th & 14th June both ships carried out successful firing operations around Mui Ong and Cap Lay, where both ships came under fire from coastal defence batteries, 13 rounds landing as close as 50 yards from Hobart before she knocked out one gun and US 7th Airfoce Phantoms accounted for the remainder. Shrapnel was later collected from Hobart's upperdeck. This was the third time Hobart had come under enemy fire.

The Destroyer USS Edson had been detached from the NGFS Unit and now joined Hobart and Chandler to carry out surveillance around Tiger Island, 13 miles east of Cap Lay where an enemy radar installation was monitoring Operation Sea Dragon. With only one extended TU in the area it was found that the garrison was being resupplied at night by sea.

Early on the morning of June 17th Hobart detected an aircraft approaching her from the vicinity of Cap Lay and evaluated it as 'friendly'. In the meantime whilst Hobart had been trying to establish the identity of the aircraft it launched a missile which hit her amidships on the starboard side, immediately aft of the boat davit. The warhead passed through 01 Deck and penetrated the Chief Petty Officers Pantry, Radar Room 3, the Missile Director Control Room and severely damaging the Emergency Conning Platform. The body of the missile then passed through the outer skin of the after funnel, damaging its uptakes, and finished up in the forward funnel. In its passage it killed Ordinary Seaman R. J. Butterworth and wounded AB Parker and OrdSmn Davidson.

Hobart's crew clambered to Action Stations, and 3 and a half minutes later another two missiles fired from close range slammed into her. Again, on the starboard side. The 2nd missile entered her transom just below 1 Deck wrecking the Gunner's Store and Engineers Workshop, luckily the warhead did not explode. The 80 Man Aft Seamen's Mess wore a large part of this missile! The 3rd missile hit her very near the site of the first and the warhead

passed through the Fan Space, Missile Director Equipment Room and No 2 Missile Director. Chief Electrician Hunt was killed and several sailors wounded by part of the missile WARHEAD. THE IKARA MISSILE MAGAZINE WAS ALSO SERIOUSLY DAMAGED.ABOVE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT SUBIC BAY PI

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As Hobart tuned away from the threat direction the aircraft was seen to be a swept wing jet fighter. Hobart got away 5 rounds of 5" and no further attack was made.

The TU joined USS Boston. And with USS Blandy DD943 formed an anti aircraft screen around USS Enterprise CVAN 65. A helo from Enterprise provided a medivac and delivered AB Parker, Mech Holmes, and AB Laity to hospital in Da Nang.

Edson relieved Hobart as leader of the TU and Hobart steamed for Subic Bay. On passage the crew cleared the debris and collected pieces of missile for identification. It was only then it was realised that the missiles had been fired from US Aircraft.

Actually Hobart had been one of only several ships attacked by 7th Airforce jets on the nights of the 16th & 17th June. On the 16th USS PCF19 was sunk near the DMZ with 5 killed and on the 17th Hobart, Boston and Edson were attacked. Edson 15 minutes after Hobart as were 'Market Time' vessels USCGC Point Dume WPB82325 and PCF12, a US Navy Patrol Craft. Boston and Hobart both took hits but only Hobart suffered fatalities.

Webmasters Note: - The above is the Official US and Australian Navy's version about the attacks on the US Navy Patrol Vessels PCF 12 and PCF 19, however I suggest you go HERE and read an account by James Steffes, a crew member of PCF12 that fateful night. Whilst it is clear that Hobart was indeed fired upon with Sea Sparrow missiles from fixed wing, jet aircraft, what is not clear from James' and others eyewitness accounts is why it all happened.

Hobart arrived at Subic Bay on the 19th June where CINCPAFLT, Admiral J.J. Hyland USN inspected the damage (above) and addressed the Ship's Comapny. On the 20th June all ships in Subic Half Masted their Colours in honour of Chief Hunt and OrdSmn Butterworth.

Hobart completed 3 Gunline deployments to Vietnam and decommissioned in May 2000.

DAMAGE ASSESSMENT IN SUBIC BAY BY ADMIRAL ULYSSES S. GRANT SHARP,USN,

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE UNITED STATES FORCES IN THE PACIFIC

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BACKGROUNDER # 05


%

Section 12

HOMEFRONT AND OPPOSITION

Contents

! Gallery Captions (as at September 2007) ! A Nation at War. Peter Edwards. Official History cover

! Australia’s VIETNAM WAR. Peter Edwards.WARTIME #10 ! Moratorium to End the War in Vietnam.Wikipedia October 2007

! First Australian KIA in Vietnam returned to Australia

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Moratorium to End the War in Vietnam From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia The Moratorium to End the War in Vietnam was a large demonstration against the United States involvement in the Vietnam War that took place across the United States on October 15, 1969.[1] The Moratorium developed from Jerome Grossman's April 20, 1969 call for a general strike if the war had not concluded by October. David Hawk and Sam Brown, who had previously worked on the unsuccessful 1968 presidential campaign of Eugene McCarthy, changed the concept to a less radical moratorium and began to organize the event as the Vietnam Moratorium Committee. By the standards of previous anti-war demonstrations, the event was a clear success, with millions participating throughout the world. Boston was the site of the largest turnout; about 100,000 attended a speech by anti-war Senator George McGovern. Bill Clinton, while a Rhodes Scholar at Oxford, organized and participated in the demonstration in England; this later became an issue in his Presidential campaign. The first nationwide Moratorium was followed a month later, on November 15, 1969, by a massive Moratorium march on Washington, D.C. which attracted over 500,000 demonstrators against the war, including many performers and activists on stage at a rally across from the White House. Activists at some universities continued to hold monthly "Moratoria" on the 15th of each month[2][3].

Australia

Following the success of the November 1969 Moratorium in the United States, a series of citizen groups opposed to the war in Vietnam decided to band together to put on a Moratorium in Australia. Late in 1969 they formed the Vietnam Moratorium Campaign or VMC, which had its own executive, a permanent secretary and a are number of affiliated organisations. The group that claims credit for mooting the idea is the Congress for International Co-operation and Disarmament (or CICD), a pacifist organisation formed out of the Melbourne Peace Congress of 1959. The VMC and CICD certainly shared a number of members, among them Jim Cairns, who was made Chairman, and John Lloyd, secretary of both organisations. The VMC was, however, a much more representative body, including a wide variety of pre-existing Australian groups: Church groups, Trade Unions, radical and moderate student organisations, pacifist groups and anti-war groups. The VMC inherited the CICD's interstate connections with the Association for International Co-operation and Disarmament (its NSW equivalent), the Campaign for Peace in Vietnam (SA) and the Queensland Peace Council for International Co-Operation and Disarmament, giving it a truly national character. The structure of the Moratorium, in Victoria at least, was conflicted - the VMC executive vied for control with the Richmond Town Hall mass public meetings, which could involve up to

!""#$%&%'%()*+,*-.%/0102%

600 members and usually went late into the evening, full of arguments over slogans and policies. Work began quickly to organise the Moratorium. The original date was set for April 1969, but changed soon after to May 8th, 9th and 10th, to coincide with protests in the USA, just days after the killings of four students at Kent State. The demonstration in Melbourne, led by member of Parliament Jim Cairns, had over 100,000 people taking to the streets in Melbourne alone. Across Australia, it was estimated that 200,000 people were involved.[4][5] A second Moratorium, attracting smaller crowds, was held in September 1970, an a third in June 1971. The name 'Moratorium' went on to be applied to an Aboriginal rights campaign (the 'Black Moratorium'), and marches for Vietnam went on under the Moratorium sunburst until 1975 in Melbourne. Other reading

One insider's view: Marching Nowhere by Ken Hurwitz (ISBN 0-393-07462-5).

References

! ^ 1969: Millions march in US Vietnam Moratorium BBC On This Day 15 October. Accessed May 05, 2007

! ^ http://beckerexhibits.wustl.edu/oral/transcripts/kennell.html

! ^ http://www.udel.edu/PR/munroe/chapter12.html

! ^ The Australian, 9 May 1970, estimated the crowd as 100,000. Also Strangio, Paul. "Farewell to a conscience of the nation", The Age, 2003-10-13. Retrieved on 2006-07-01.

! ^ Silence kills; events leading up to the Vietnam Moratorium on 8 May by J. F. Cairns, M.P., Vietnam Moratorium Committee, 1970

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First Australian KIA in Vietnam returned to Australia

Scott, Ronald Allan

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BACKGROUNDER # 05


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Section 13

REPORTING THE WAR

Contents

! Gallery Captions (as at September 2007) ! Myths of the Vietnam War.Lex McAulay.WARTIME #20

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$ Reporting the war Television brought war into Australian homes for the first time during the Vietnam conflict. Not only were images and stories of soldiers fighting and dying broadcast daily, newspapers and magazines often reported the war in graphic detail. Reports on the war were largely uncensored, as war correspondents and photographers could move almost anywhere in South Vietnam with little restriction. The war became a magnet for ambitious, young reporters and photographers, many of whom later became household names in Australia: Pat Burgess, Tim Bowden, Mike Carlton, Alan Ramsey, Tim Page.

This iconic image of the Australian war in Vietnam was taken by Sergeant Michael Coleridge, an army public relations photographer. It shows soldiers from 7RAR on the road to Dat Do, waiting to be airlifted by incoming US Army Iroquois helicopters during Operation Ulmarra in August 1967.EKN/67/0130/VN

Sergeant “Mad Mike” Coleridge. MISC/67/1032/VN

Major Harry Smith briefing foreign press representatives on the battle of Long Tan, August 1966. Australian and foreign journalists also regularly attended daily press briefings in Saigon, delivered by American military officials. Known as the “Five O’clock Follies”, these briefings often spoke only of body counts and at times bore little resemblance to what was actually happening on the ground.CUN/66/0709/VN How reporters worked It has given me moments of excitement – it has brought me face to face with fear. Reporters often faced dangerous conditions in Vietnam. Armed with little more than their passport and a non-combatant’s certificate, reporters would accompany soldiers into the field. Some had only limited experience as journalists, and most had no military training. Many reporters used “black humour” to deal with the horrors they were reporting. Three Australian journalists were killed in Vietnam, shot by Viet Cong in Saigon in May 1968.

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Men from 7 Platoon, C Company, 4RAR/NZ ANZAC Battalion, take cover during Operation Federal, in Bien Hoa province, March 1969. Federal was one of the many operations that brought freelance journalist and photographer Denis Gibbons close to the action. P04655.014 Photographer Tim Page covered the Vietnam War from 1965 to 1969, for United Press International, Associated Press, Paris Match, and Time-Life; he was wounded five times. Among his most impressive photographs are those depicting gunners at Nui Dat. P04959.067

Members of 101 Field Battery, Nui Dat, 1966. P04959.046 Stories that shaped public perception? It is popularly believed that certain iconic images of the war – South Vietnam’s police chief General Nguyen Ngoc Loan shooting the Viet Cong leader of an assassination squad during the Tet Offensive in 1968, or nine-year-old Kim Phuc running naked from her village after it was bombed with napalm in June 1972 – turned the public’s opinion against the war. However, rising casualty figures and the seeming stagnation of the war by the late 1960s had a greater impact on government policy and public opposition to the war.

Front page of the Melbourne Herald, 9 June 1972.

Front page of the Sydney Morning Herald, 3 February 1968.

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Neil Davis’s passport Combat cameraman Neil Davis spent 11 years covering the war in Vietnam and Cambodia. Davis spent most of his time with South Vietnamese troops, often putting himself in danger. He remained in Vietnam until the end of the war, and filmed a North Vietnamese tank smashing through the gates of the Presidential Palace in Saigon in April 1975. Davis was later killed while filming an attempted coup in Thailand in 1985. RC05016 Denis Gibbons’s press pass Journalist and photographer Denis Gibbons worked in Vietnam for six years, from 1965 to 1970, based with 1ATF at Nui Dat. He photographed the tours of nine Australia infantry battalions. Gibbons was evacuated after being wounded for the sixth and final time when the APC he was travelling in hit a mine. After the war, Gibbons lobbied for the recognition of Australian war correspondents in Vietnam. RC04398 !!

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BACKGROUNDER # 05


Section 14

WITHDRAWAL

Contents

• Gallery Captions (as at September 2007)


Gallery Captions (as at September 2007)

Withdrawal begins In December 1969 Prime Minister John Gorton announced sketchy plans for a phased withdrawal of Australian troops from Vietnam. He made those plans definite in April 1970 after US President Richard Nixon announced the further withdrawal of American troops during that year. Gorton’s plans reduced the size of the task force from three to two infantry battalions. Consequently when 8RAR completed its tour in November 1970, it was not replaced. After five years at Nui Dat, in October 1971 the headquarters of 1ATF, and several other units, moved to Vung Tau by road transport and RAAF Iroquois. Here a convoy, about to pass an APC, travels towards Vung Tau. FOD/71/0512/VN

Having completed their tour, soldiers from 8RAR alight from a US Army Chinook helicopter on board HMAS Sydney off Vung Tau, in November 1970. FAI/70/0772/VN

Vehicles from 3RAR loaded bumper-to-bumper aboard lighters being transported to HMAS Sydney, anchored off Vung Tau in October 1971. FOD/71/0507/VN Final operations Although the withdrawal of Australian troops from Vietnam had begun by the end of 1970,

those remaining had plenty to do. The task force had been largely successful in pushing the Viet Cong out of Phuoc Tuy province, but the NVA remained in and around the borders of the province. Australian troops were involved in some large and costly operations in the last months, made more difficult as troop numbers dwindled and important resources, such as the Centurion tanks, were withdrawn.


In June 1970 3RAR and 4RAR/NZ combined with C Squadron, 1st Armoured Regiment, for Operation Overlord on the border of Phuoc Tuy and Long Khanh provinces. Private Frank Jelen from 3RAR scans the jungle from atop a Centurion tank. FOD/71/0304/VN

A 105-millimetre M2A2 howitzer of 104 Field Battery firing during the last Australian artillery mission in Vietnam, which involved covering the move of 1ATF from Nui Dat to Vung Tau in November 1971. CUN/71/0534/VN

A section of soldiers from C Company, 2RAR/NZ, take part in the battalion’s final operation, in May 1971. Carrying the section’s M60

machine-gun is Private Ray Beattie (left), while other members of the section fan out to his left. FOD/71/0258A/VN Vietnamisation In late 1969 US President Nixon announced a process of “Vietnamisation” as part of the American withdrawal. The idea was to teach the South Vietnamese to take over the fighting of the war for themselves. Part of the Australian contribution to Vietnamisation was the establishment of Mobile Advisory and Training Teams (MATT). These were run by members of the AATTV in an attempt to improve their military capabilities. Brought home in haste when the Whitlam government was elected in December 1972, the men of the Team were by then the only Australian combat troops left in Vietnam.

Members of MATT4 settle in to the South Vietnamese Regional Force compound at An Ngai, Phuoc Tuy province, August 1970. From left: Bombardier Phil Harding, Corporal Ian Kuring, Warrant Officer Class 2 Don Palmer, Corporal Ray Maclaine, Corporal “Mick” Schneider, Warrant Officer 2 Lee McIntosh. P01011.060 Cambodians at the Long Hai training centre in Phuoc Tuy province being trained by members of the Team in February 1972. Members of the team conducted a 12-week course at the centre to help train the Cambodian battalions. CUN/72/0019/VN


The Australians also carried out civic action programs by providing medical and dental aid, building projects, fostering orphanages, and building schools. Here Lance Corporal Phillip Gifford, 1st Australian Civil Affairs Unit, buttons a shirt for a Vietnamese boy.COM/69/0289/VN

Farewell to Nui Dat The task force base at Nui Dat was finally abandoned on 7 November 1971. The operation to close the base, Operation South Ward, involved the last battalion out, 4RAR/NZ, and the movement of all stores, equipment, and men to the logistics base at Vung Tau. It was carried out successfully, unchallenged by either Viet Cong or NVA soldiers. The last men from 4RAR/NZ left Vietnam in March 1972. Most soldiers were glad to be going home, but some felt they were abandoning the South Vietnamese and leaving with their work unfinished. In November 1971 the Australian, 4RAR/NZ, and Royal New Zealand Regiment flags were lowered for the last time at Nui Dat. It was a simple ceremony, marking the end of the Australian and New Zealand occupation of the task force base. CUN/71/0536/VN

Troops from C Company, 4RAR/NZ, board an RAAF Caribou at Nui Dat, for the flight to Vung Tau, November 1971. Vung Tau became the main area where units made their final preparations for their return to Australia. CUN/71/0537/VN The end of the war In early 1975 the NVA began a major offensive, which cut rapidly through the northern and central provinces of South Vietnam, reaching the outskirts of Saigon by April. The South Vietnamese army was powerless to halt the progress of NVA troops. Thousands of citizens fled before the approaching army, creating a flood of refugees. In Saigon Australian Ambassador Geoffrey Price began evacuating his staff. He faced the agonising task of leaving loyal South Vietnamese staff behind when he closed the embassy doors for the final time on 25 April. On 30 April a North Vietnamese tank entered the grounds of the presidential palace, effectively ending the war.


On 29 April 1975 South Vietnam civilians vainly try to board an Air America helicopter a top the CIA building in Saigon. Sergeant Bernie Bom, Australian Army Assistance Group, lowered the Australian flag for the last time at the Free World Military Assistance Building at 5 pm on 17 December 1972, signifying the end of Australia’s ten-year involvement in Vietnam. P01011.062 Bravery under fire This Military Cross was awarded to national servicemen Gary McKay, a platoon commander with 4RAR/NZ. On 21 September 1971, during the battle of Nui Le, in the far north of Phuoc Tuy province, McKay’s platoon came under heavy fire from a NVA regiment, which was dug into bunkers. Hard fighting took place and late in the day McKay recovered a machine-gun under fire, allowing his platoon to withdraw. He and his sergeant were wounded and four members of the platoon were killed. This was the last battle fought by the Australians and the last Military Cross awarded during the war. OL00556.001 Second Lieutenant Gary McKay, aged 23, in Vietnam in 1971. P05492.001 Damaged Centurion tank barrel This tank barrel came from a Centurion tank of C Squadron, 1st Armoured Regiment. It was participating in Operation Hermit Park in the north-eastern sector of Phuoc Tuy province on 25 June 1971 when the muzzle of the barrel was struck by a RPG. The bore was obstructed by the hit, but it was cleared when the tank commander, Sergeant Stanislaw Hanuszewicz, fired a solid anti-armour round, which blasted the muzzle off. The tank then continued to engage the enemy. RELAWM40871


Book with embedded bullet This book saved Second Lieutenant Graham David Spinkston from serious injury during the battle of Nui Le in September 1971. The book, in a pouch just behind Spinkston’s hip, was pierced by an AK-47 round. RELAWM40961 AATTV plaque When the last units of 1ALSG left Vietnam on 5 March 1972, they were presented with this plaque by the AATTV. RELAWM40920 Unofficial MATT1 badge The three “B” letters stands for the “Binh Ba Bastards”, a reference to the men’s base in the rubber plantation at Binh Ba. REL29711 Unofficial AAAGV badge By March 1972 only members of the Australian Army Assistance Group Vietnam (AAAGV) remained in Vietnam. The AAAGV stayed until December, when it and the last of the AATTV left the country. RELAWM41035.001


BACKGROUNDER # 05


Section 15

POST WAR ISSUES

Contents

• Gallery Captions (as at October 2007) • Dilemas of a Long War: The Australian Army in Vietnam.Presentation to Voluntary

Guides . Ashely Ekins 03Sseptember 2003 • Vietnam Casualties .Note by Ed

• Australian MIAs of the Vietnam War – "missing in action" or "no known grave"? Ashley Ekins

• Vietnam Veterans Association of Australia. Website.Home page October 2007 • Last Australian Vietnam MIA return. BBC News October 2009


Gallery Captions (as at October 2007)

After the war Vietnam veterans have reacted in different ways to their war service. Regular soldiers who continued their military careers benefited from a supportive network that helped them adjust. Although each returning infantry battalion was given a welcome home march, many national servicemen were quickly repatriated into civilian life, giving them little if any time to re-adjust to civilian life. For many of these men, post-war life was difficult. Many veterans felt alienated on their return from Vietnam, which led to widespread problems among the veteran community. Belated recognition of their efforts in the 1980s enabled some veterans to come to terms with their Vietnam service; however, for many the damage had been done. Major units, such as infantry battalions, took part in welcome home marches soon after their return from Vietnam. Having completed its second tour of Vietnam, 5RAR marched through Sydney to Martin Place in March 1970. P05609.148

Vietnamese refugee boats moored in Darwin Harbour in November 1977. After the fall of Saigon, thousands of Vietnamese fleeing the new regime, political repression, and war left their country. Between 1975 and 1985 about 95,000 refugees from Indochina were resettled in Australia.National Library of Australia vn3209918 Agent Orange Both the United States and Australia used defoliants in Vietnam to destroy the jungle which sheltered the Viet Cong. Agent Orange, containing the poisonous substance dioxin, was the most widely used of several defoliants. After the war thousands of veterans became convinced they had been poisoned by these chemicals, and agitated for government recognition of their case. The Vietnam Veterans Association of Australia formed as a lobby group to press for recognition of the damage caused by defoliants. The Evatt Royal Commission reported in 1985 that Agent Orange was “not guilty”; but veterans remain unconvinced, and continue to argue for just recognition and compensation from the effects of chemical spraying.


US Air Force aircraft spray defoliants over jungle in South Vietnam in 1969. 1998103000018803065 Reconciliation Several major events in recent years have helped Vietnam veterans to feel accepted by the Australian public. The most important was the Welcome Home Parade for Vietnam veterans, which took place in Sydney in 1987. Thousands of veterans marched in front of huge, cheering crowds and attended a concert in the Domain. It brought many veterans together for the first time since their service. The dedication of the National Vietnam Forces Memorial on ANZAC Parade, Canberra, in October 1992, was an equally important milestone for veterans. Since 1990 many veterans have made pilgrimages back to Vietnam, in order to come to terms with the past. During the Welcome Home Parade in Sydney, army Land Rovers carrying veterans unable to walk, were greeted by an enthusiastic crowd that lined the route several rows deep. PAIU1987/263.33

The Vietnam-era Iroquois helicopters that flew down ANZAC Parade, Canberra, during the dedication of the Vietnam Forces Memorial in October 1992 sent chills down the spines of many Vietnam veterans.PAIU1992/269.10 Danh Duc Tran Danh Duc Tran was just 20 when he joined the South Vietnamese army in 1968. After the fall of the South in 1975, he was imprisoned for several years in “re-education” labour camps. In 1981 Danh and his family escaped Vietnam on a small, over-crowded fishing boat. Avoiding pirates and the Vietnamese navy, they reached Indonesia and from there flew to Australia. Since the 1990s Danh has worked as a lawyer for Vietnamese families in Melbourne. Danh Duc Tran in his ARVN uniform with his wife Giao in 1972. Giao had worked as a translator for the Australians at the logistics base in Vung Tau. P05488.004


Facsimile of Danh Duc Tran’s ARVN ID card. Danh served in Phuoc Tuy province and the Mekong Delta region.P05488.006 Wounded mate; The price; Last man These sculptures were maquettes completed for the National Vietnam Memorial competition, held in Canberra in 1989. Flag from Welcome Home Parade During the Welcome Home Parade the next-of-kin of the 520 soldiers, sailors, and airmen who were killed or died of wounds carried flags with the names of the fallen engraved on the flagstaffs. This flag is in memory of Private George Nagle, 9RAR, killed in action on 6 January 1969. REL30218.001 Commemorative brew This beer can was produced to commemorate the opening of the Australian Vietnam Forces National Memorial in Canberra in October 1992. REL31321 Commemorative coin A souvenir coin was struck to commemorate the opening of the Australian Vietnam Forces National Memorial. The image shown is based on a photograph of a commemorative service held at Long Tan on 18 August 1969, the third anniversary of the battle. REL31707 Commemorative medallion On Saturday 3 October 1992 the Australian Vietnam Forces National Memorial was dedicated in Canberra. About 15,000 veterans, including many from New Zealand, America, and South Vietnam, attended the dedication. Family members of those Australians killed during the war were there as honoured guests. REL/22107 VVAA stickers The Vietnam Veterans Association of Australia (VVAA) was established in 1979 to lobby on behalf of, and provide support to, Vietnam veterans and their families. Its activities focused on healthcare and welfare issues, and led to the establishment of the Vietnam Veterans Counselling Service and the Post Traumatic Stress Disorder Clinic. These stickers are typical of the type of promotional material produced by the VVAA. RC04744–46


Dilemmas of a Long War: The Australian Army in Vietnam

Presentation to Voluntary Guides

By Ashley Ekins

O3 September 2003 {Originally issued as BACKGROUNDER # 70 Issue #1 October 2003}

{Photographs from On the Offensive inserted by Ed}

Today, the third of September, is an appropriate day to consider the Vietnam War. This day was long commemorated in Vietnam as the day on which Ho Chi Minh died in Hanoi in 1969 – thirty four years ago. At least, this was the popular myth. Like many things pertaining to the Vietnam War, the reality of Ho Chi Minh’s date of death is not so straightforward. Ho actually died on the previous day, the second of September. But that date unfortunately coincided with celebrations of the twenty-fourth anniversary of Ho’s declaration of Vietnamese national independence in 1945. Party officials in Hanoi, ever alert to negative propaganda possibilities, announced Ho’s death on 3 September. This was to remain the official date of Ho’s death for over two decades. The duplicity did not end there. The venerated 79-year old president and founder of the Democratic Republic of North Vietnam was the symbolic embodiment of the Vietnamese communists’ cause in their ‘people’s war of national liberation’. The collective leadership which replaced Ho failed to honour his final testament for the people of Vietnam. In this document, Ho Chi Minh expressed the desire that, after reunification and the restoration of peace, all agricultural taxes should be cancelled for one year in recognition and compensation for the hardship and suffering borne by the Vietnamese people during the long and costly war.

Not until the late 1980s was it revealed in Vietnam that Ho’s successor, Le Duan, and his Party colleagues had tampered with Ho’s testament and deleted this request from the version published after his death in 1969. The new leadership also quietly renounced Ho’s promises to make all the

Vietnamese people landholders: after the communist victory in 1975 they cynically introduced wholesale collectivisation - with disastrous long-term economic consequences.

My subject today, however, is the experience of the Australian Army in Vietnam. This is related to the release of the latest volume of the Australian official history of the Vietnam War, On the Offensive: The Australian Army in the Vietnam War 1967-1968. This volume,

PRESIDENT HO CHI MINH WITH GENERAL NYGEN GIAP (RIGHT) AT THE AWARDS PRESENTATION IN HANOI IN 1964.

IN 1956 HO CHI MINH DECLARED THAT HE WAS DETERMINED TO ‘RESOUTELY FIGHT UNTIL TOTAL

VICTORY’, EVEN IF IT TOOK TWENTY YEARS OR LONGER ( FOREIGN LANGUAGES PRESS,PEPEKING)


co-authored by myself and my late colleague and friend, Dr Ian McNeill, was launched two weeks ago by the Minister for Veterans Affairs, Danna Vale. Many of you will be aware of the controversy over the volume that has occupied the pages of the Canberra Times since last Saturday – this concerns a single issue and a perceived slur on one particular unit in the history. It is part of just one small section in a book of over 200,000 words - and needless to say, it has been misread, out of context. No slur was intended. I would like to comment, in passing, that in recording soldiers’ endeavours and sacrifice for the national memory the official historian has a duty to recount the soldiers’ story with balance, fairness and empathy. This task also demands a due measure of humility. While we cannot share soldiers’ experiences, historians must aim to understand their actions and decisions as they did at the time and within their context. But the official historian cannot tell the story simply in the soldiers’ own terms. As a consequence, this history may not always be palatable reading to soldiers, their commanders, or political leaders, as it attempts to relate and explain both successes and failures, the best and the worst, the greatest and the meanest aspects of the story of Australian soldiers in the Vietnam War. On the Offensive, is volume eight of the The Official History of Australian Involvement in Southeast Asian Conflicts 1948-1975. It is the second volume in the series dealing with Australian Army operations in Vietnam. A ninth and final volume, covering Army operations until the withdrawal of Australian combat forces in late 1971 will be released late next year, thereby completing the trilogy on the Army in Vietnam and the nine-volume official history. On the Offensive covers the Army’s involvement in Vietnam from the beginning of 1967 to the middle of 1968. It recounts the story of Australia’s soldiers through eighteen months of intensive operations during the most turbulent period of Australia’s longest and most controversial war. It covers the problems confronting the under-strength Australian Task Force in 1967 as it pursued an elusive and aggressive enemy which outnumbered the Australians in Phuoc Tuy province, their main area of operations. It deals with the expansion of Australian ground forces and their area of influence through the eventual addition of a third infantry battalion, armour and other combat support elements – after a costly delay of eighteen months. And it covers the communist Tet Offensive in early 1968 and the test of combat when Australian soldiers fought their most sustained and intensive battles of the Vietnam War in actions around Fire Support Bases Coral and Balmoral. In On the Offensive we recount and explain both the successes and the failures of the Australian Army experience in Vietnam. We have endeavoured to show how soldiers dealt with their difficulties, what succeeded, what was done well, what failed and where there were shortcomings. Over thirty years ago, in January 1973 (just over three years after the death of Ho Chi Minh) the Australian governor general proclaimed the end of hostilities in Vietnam by Australian forces. This formally ended the longest and most divisive war in Australia’s history.


At this distance in time, many of the issues of that controversial war, paradoxically, have become clearer. The process of researching and writing the official history of the Australian Army’s involvement in Vietnam has forced me to confront many problematic issues and myths – ranging across the difficulties encountered at all levels of command to those of the soldiers on the ground ‘in country’. This period also confronted Australian strategists and military planners, commanders and soldiers in the field with a number of dilemmas which characterised our army’s experience in Vietnam. These dilemmas are my theme today. The dictionary definition of a dilemma is: ‘a position in which one is forced to chose between alternatives which are equally unfavourable’. In the short time available here, I intend to focus on a number of the principle dilemmas in turn. I will outline their origins and their implications for the Australian Army in Vietnam. 1. Firstly, the strategic dilemma At the outset, it has to be said that the most obvious dilemma affecting the Australian commitment of combat forces to Vietnam was the absence of a clearly articulated strategic aim –what might be termed today, an ‘exit strategy’. How did this come about and what were the consequences? An understanding of this is essential for an understanding of what followed. The war - some background to the commitment In 1959/1960, North Vietnam began infiltrating cadres and weapons into South Vietnam via the clandestine land route which the western news media soon dubbed the Ho Chi Minh Trail. The north also underwrote the formation of the National Liberation Front for South Vietnam (NLF) in December 1960 and began an insurgency war against the South Vietnamese government and people. The terrain of Vietnam offered considerable advantages to the communists: long inland borders; and sanctuary, base and supply areas over the borders in ‘neutral’ countries. The communist forces’ relatively direct routes also lent advantages over the much longer land routes forced upon the RVN and allied forces. The strategic significance of those borders was to become increasingly crucial to the outcome of the conflict. By early 1965 Australia already had a team of 100 military advisers deployed in training centres all over South Vietnam (the first contingent was sent in 1962). They assisted in training army elements of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) and soon extended to a combat advisory role. The Australian Army Training Team Vietnam became the longest serving and most highly decorated Australian unit in the war By 1965, however, the Viet Cong were continuing to grow in support and strength and the tide of the war was turning against the South. In March the US began to escalate American military involvement through the commitment of combat troops and the aerial bombardment of North Vietnam. The strategic situation - part of a global Cold War


By the mid 1960s, as Cold War tensions escalated, the conflict in Vietnam had assumed a disproportionate strategic significance. It became the focal point for a supreme struggle between the communist bloc and American and allied forces. The Hanoi leadership and their communist allies proclaimed the struggle as part of an inevitable global transition from capitalism to communism – it was a test case for the global solidarity of ‘true communism’. Policy makers in Washington viewed the war as a test case in the struggle against communist ‘wars of national liberation’ and as part of America’s wider mission of ‘containment of communism’. Australian involvement in the conflict was a gradual process of escalating commitment against the backdrop of Cold War concerns with regional security and communist expansion. The cornerstone of Australian defence planning in the 1960s was ‘forward defence’. Successive Australian governments pursued economies in the nation’s defence forces through regional alignments with powerful allies - first Britain, and then America. But as a minor partner in those alliances, and any coalition forces, Australia exerted little influence on military objectives or strategic planning. The basis of the Australian military commitment to Vietnam rested on two pillars. Firstly, the government sent forces to help support the emergence of an independent state in South Vietnam as a barrier to Communist expansion by aggression and subversion in Southeast Asia. The ‘domino theory’ was invoked although the tenet that the survival of an independent Vietnam was crucial to Australia’s strategic security was soon challenged. A second objective, arising from the first, was to remove the threat of oppression and terror which was believed would be the lot of the fifteen million people of South Vietnam if they fell under communist domination from the north. These aims were consistent with Australia’s forward defence strategy in Southeast Asia, which merged in Vietnam with the American strategy of the ‘containment’ of communism. By supporting the United States in Vietnam, Australia sought both to maintain an American presence in Asia and to secure American assistance in the event of Australia’s own security being in jeopardy. The request On 29 April 1965 Prime Minister Robert Menzies announced his government’s decision to commit Australian combat troops to South Vietnam. In announcing the commitment, Menzies stated that it was at the request of the South Vietnamese government. The ‘request’ was to become the subject of endless debate and speculation. This ‘request’ was of course more complicated than his statement indicated – in diplomacy things generally are. More accurately, it was the response to an offer by Australia – and the offer was initially made to the US not to South Vietnam. Under SEATO articles Australia could not send combat forces except at the invitation or consent of the South Vietnamese government. Australia and the US negotiated with the South Vietnamese government to ‘manufacture’ the necessary formal request. Because of Vietnamese sensitivities it was necessary to include references to prior consultations between the Republic of South Vietnam, the US and Australia.


The South Vietnamese prime minister, Dr Phan Huy Quat, actually stated a preference for more military trainers and logistic support rather than foreign combat troops; and he had to be persuaded to accept the offer. The request was not initiated by Saigon but it gave its assent. Unfortunately, the timings went awry. South Vietnam despatched its formal request by letter on 29 April (a cable was actually sent on 28 April from the Australian ambassador confirming it – but it was lost and a repeat cable was sent on 29 April). Menzies made the announcement on 29 April, at 8 pm, one hour before the announcement was made in Saigon at 9 pm Canberra time. But the essential point is that the Australian military commitment was made with South Vietnamese government consent. But the commitment was less credibly a response to SEATO undertakings – although the Australian government justified it at the time under the ‘umbrella’ of SEATO obligations (Southeast Asia Defence Treaty Organisation – signed by US, UK, Australia, France, New Zealand, Pakistan, Thailand and the Philippines, 1954). The South Vietnamese government never appealed to SEATO collective treaty protocols and Australian troops were not sent to Vietnam as part of a SEATO operation and had no authority under SEATO. The announcement In making the announcement Menzies also stated that 'the takeover of South Vietnam would be a direct military threat to Australia and all the countries of South and South East Asia’. He added: ‘It must be seen as part of a thrust by Communist China between the Indian and Pacific Oceans'. These emphasised passages were inserted by the Secretary of the Department of External Affairs (now DFAT), James Plimsoll. Official Historian Professor Peter Edwards has termed this interpolation, with masterful understatement, as: ‘an inaccurate and unfortunate distortion’. (The interpolation into Menzies’ announcement has parallels with the recently claimed ‘doctoring’ of British intelligence reports prior to the commitment of British forces to the Iraq war.) Leader of the Labor Opposition, Arthur Calwell, in possibly his finest parliamentary speech, argued that the commitment was based on three false assumptions: a mistaken view of the war in Vietnam; failure to understand the nature of the communist challenge; and a false notion as to the interests of America and its allies. Time would prove Calwell right to greater or lesser degrees in all his criticisms. The decision Controversy over the nature of the South Vietnamese government’s request for forces has tended to obscure the more important issue of the Australian government’s decision to commit ground combat forces. This decision was the result of deliberations made in camera by a handful of men (of the Defence Committee and Foreign Affairs & Defence Committee of Cabinet), with no reference to the electorates they represented. This decision was based on the recommendation of Australia’s most senior military officer, the flamboyant ‘politician in uniform’, Air Chief Marshal Sir Frederick Scherger, Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee. At this stage a number of Australian senior soldiers in the field (including those with long experience of Vietnam like Brigadier Jackson, Commander AATTV, and later COMAAFV and Commander 1ATF) advised that the situation in Vietnam was beyond recovery and the war was all but lost.


One month before the decision, Scherger had led a delegation to military staff talks with senior American leaders in Honolulu. He had been given a cautious brief by the military Joint Planning Committee to seek answers to a number of vital questions, before any commitment of forces could be considered: he was to obtain detailed information on the Americans’ military objectives in Vietnam, the size and type of forces required and their roles. In fact, the Americans don’t appear to have thought through these issues themselves – former US Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara has recently noted five questions he believes he should have asked regarding the intervention of combat troops before the US committed forces. They are very similar to the questions Scherger was pressed to pursue in 1965. At the meeting in Honolulu, Scherger ignored the terms of his cautious brief and virtually offered an Australian battalion on the spot. (Interpretations vary on whether Scherger had a ‘secret brief’ from Menzies or whether he simply suffered a sudden ‘rush of blood to the head’ before the assembled gathering of distinguished top brass.) On his return to Australia Scherger’s report gave only vague answers, if any, to most of the questions raised in his brief. Nevertheless, the Australian government agreed to the provision of a battalion on the grounds that it was, ‘vital to Australia’s strategic interest to have a strong United States military presence in South East Asia’ and ‘to show a willingness to assist the United States to achieve her aims in South Vietnam’. In making such an unqualified commitment of combat forces, the Australian government and its advisers forfeited their opportunity to negotiate wider war aims with the higher managers of the war in the United States. They failed to seek an agreed notion of what would constitute success; and they failed to contribute significantly towards the creation of a coherent military strategy. These were grave lapses. Their consequences persisted throughout Australia’s involvement in the conflict. It must be emphasised, however, that this failure to secure an unambiguous strategic aim, did not mean – as some have inferred - that Australian military forces in Vietnam lacked a clear aim. Commanders of the Australian task force received formal written directives from both the Australian high command in Canberra and the US operational commanders in Vietnam. The terms were necessarily broad to allow them to get on with the tasks in their own way. As an aside, we should ask, have we learnt anything since that experience? The answer is, apparently so. Talking about the Australian commitment to the US led ‘war on terror’ coalition in late 2001, Defence Minister Robert Hill stated: ‘The Australian military became engaged at a planning level . . . that was unprecedented. We were given access to American military thinking and planning and we were able to comment, provide ideas and contribute critical judgements at a level that had never occurred previously.’ (Hill, quoted in The Bulletin, 8 April 2003, p. 32) If this is the case, then it is a timely and prudent development which we perhaps owe to the Vietnam experience. 2. The dilemma of Australian Army force capabilities In May 1965, the single battalion dispatched to Vietnam represented Australia’s entire military capacity for overseas operations. This limited its operational role and special care also had to be taken in its handling as a high casualty rate would have been politically unacceptable at home.


This was to be a recurring problem throughout the Australian commitment. The Australian government’s policy of defence ‘on the cheap’ came at cost to the soldiers on the ground. After years of neglect, the Australian Army was plagued by shortages; it lacked flexibility and, in the words of the Chief of the General Staff, General Thomas Daly, was ‘stretched tight as a bow-string . . . everything was under-established’. As a result the soldiers of the Australian Task Force faced many difficulties and dangers in operating with two infantry battalions and limited combat resources against aggressive communist forces - who outnumbered them in Phuoc Tuy. Despite the obvious and pressing need for tanks and a third infantry battalion, it took over fifteen months before the government decided to commit the required forces – and then the decision was made, not on the basis of military necessity, but with a view to its effect upon the American alliance. It took a further three to five months before the third battalion and tanks finally arrived in Vietnam and joined the task force. In the meantime, the Australian force struggled to operate with its limited strength and resources. For the want of tanks, Australian soldiers were killed and wounded on assaults against enemy bunkers and on operations around the Viet Cong stronghold of the Long Hai hills. The deficiencies in the task force were clearly demonstrated by an encounter in February 1967. In Operation Bribie, a sizeable enemy force surprised an Australian reaction force by standing an fighting a pitched battle. The five-hour-long engagement ended inconclusively only when the Australians withdrew with heavy casualties. Senior commanders interpreted the battle as a victory; but soldiers at the sharp end believed they had been soundly defeated. This intensive and costly action demonstrated the need for tanks to attack enemy bunkers in close country, as well as the pressing need for a third manoeuvre battalion to give the task force the greater flexibility and security it clearly lacked. The battle of Bribie also epitomised the difficulties and cost to the task force in trying to destroy enemy main force units by conventional warfare. Australian casualties amounted to the equivalent of the operational strength of a platoon; in return, the enemy appeared to have lost the equivalent of, at the most, half a company. This was the pattern of attritional warfare in Vietnam which US Commander General William Westmoreland kept pressing the Australians to adopt. But at this rate of attrition the Viet Cong would surely win the war. In early 1968 the task force increased in size and effectiveness with the addition of a third manoeuvre battalion and a tank squadron, becoming in the process a more balanced, brigade-sized force with enhanced flexibility and firepower. These additions were timely, coming just prior to the communist Tet Offensive. The tanks proved to be the decisive factor in several heavy enemy engagements. The task force’s lack of a third manoeuvre battalion and tanks mirrored wider weaknesses in the Australian force structure in Vietnam. The continuing limitations of the task force, even at its peak with three infantry battalions, armour and other support elements - made it extremely difficult for commanders to mount


protracted operations in depth into remote enemy-held base areas without substantial support from US Army armour, artillery, air and logistical support. 3. The dilemma of the barrier minefield

The minefield in fact arose from the dilemma of force shortages and in turn created another dilemma - and a dismal legacy of casualties. In 1967 second task force commander, Brigadier Graham, was hampered severely by the limitations of his two-battalion task force. When the task force

concentrated around Nui Dat or operated in the north of the province, the enemy probed towards the population centres in the southeast. When the task force operated in the southeast, the enemy threatened the Nui Dat base. Hamstrung by the limitations of his force, Graham was obliged to react to the enemy’s design and surrender the initiative to them. Graham complained that the Viet Cong were using the same ‘wet hen tactics’ which Montgomery used successfully against Rommel’s Africa Korps at Alamein in 1942. By continually changing the axis of his attacks, Montgomery forced Rommel to rush his reserves ‘hither and thither’ and expend his resources. In this case, Graham said the Viet Cong were making him the ‘wet hen’. The construction of the fence and the minefield ‘was almost a necessity under the circumstances’, he later said - the concept was ‘forced upon’ him. Graham attempted an innovative approach. In mid 1967 the task force laid an eleven-kilometre-long barrier minefield to deny the Viet Cong access to the populated area in the southeast of the province and to separate the guerrillas from their popular bases in the villages. The minefield contained some 23,000 anti-personnel mines, over half of them fitted with anti-lift devices; but it was not properly covered or patrolled by South Vietnamese and Australian forces - contrary to the popular myth, the responsibility must be equally shared as the task force had undertaken to secure the eastern side of the fence. For a period of less than six months the minefield was effective. Then the Viet Cong – displaying great ingenuity and bravery - soon began to remove large numbers of the mines. They re-laid them with disastrous effect on Australian patrols.

PHUOC TUY PROVINCE, VIETNAM, C. 1967-05. CORPORAL TRENT GRALL (LEFT) AND LANCE CORPORAL BARRY O'BRIEN, BOTH OF THE ASSAULT PIONEER PLATOON, SUPPORT COMPANY, THE 7TH BATTALION, THE ROYAL AUSTRALIAN REGIMENT (7RAR), PRIMING M16 ANTI-PERSONNEL ("JUMPING JACK") MINES. THEY ARE LAYING THE MINES IN THE 11 KILOMETRE-LONG MINEFIELD THAT THE 1ST AUSTRALIAN TASK FORCE (ATF) WAS CONSTRUCTING FROM DAT DO TO THE COAST. (DONOR T. GRALL)


By mid 1969, the enemy’s mine campaign had produced the heaviest Australian casualties of the war. Considerable numbers of Australian soldiers were killed and maimed by mines originally laid by their own side. The barrier minefield became widely viewed as the Australian Army’s biggest blunder of the war. The enemy-laid mines inflicted an average of six Australian casualties per mine with peaks of up to eighteen casualties from a single mine incident. Often so many soldiers of a platoon were killed or wounded that the entire platoon became ineffective, forcing the curtailing of operations. The minefield became an enduring liability for the task force. Once the decision was made to destroy or clear it, it took three attempts under two subsequent task force commanders before the minefield was finally declared cleared in mid 1970 - three years after it was originally laid. In any fair assessment of the minefield, responsibility for the later debacle must be borne partly by those military and government planners in Australia who committed an under-strength task force to operate independently in Vietnam. 4. Operational dilemmas and tension between allies A further dilemma emerged soon after the Australians began operations in Vietnam. Australian and American forces took diverging approaches to the war, leading occasionally to tensions between the allies who were not always ‘in locked step’ with each other. The Australians soon found themselves at odds with the very different American doctrine and tactical principles. The Australians had come to Vietnam through their experience in Malaya and training in counter-insurgency warfare techniques. Their methods involved pacification, the restoration of government control, separating insurgents from the population, searching, patrolling and ambush, all concepts emphasising patience and stealth. The Americans had come to Vietnam to fight a very different war. They had come to Vietnam through NATO preparations for land warfare in Europe and their experience in Korea. They favoured the ‘direct approach’ in which they could bring their numbers, mobility and firepower to bear in order to kill large numbers of the enemy. ‘Body counts’ became the measure of success and the ‘search-and-destroy’ operation evolved as the principal tactic of American ground forces. In 1965 this approach was probably the only way in which an impending communist victory could be thwarted in Vietnam. Between 1965 and 1966 the rapid build of American forces in Vietnam to over 385,000 personnel slowed the communist advances and stabilised the situation. The US forces stemmed the communist advance and ‘halted the losing trend’ in General Westmoreland’s phrase. But the American operational approach also involved a willingness to sustain high casualties which was concerning to the Australians. Australian criticisms of the American approach to operations highlighted the further operational dilemma confronting successive task force commanders: namely, their need to carry out two roles often simultaneously.


Task force commanders evolved their own concepts of operations and approaches to the war. But all faced the same operational dilemma. The requirement to conduct conventional operations in depth to destroy the enemy’s main forces involved the task force in operations in the remote enemy-dominated areas of the province. At least one task force commander took the view that this was the most effective use of the task force. At the same time, the task force was required to conduct pacification and reconstruction operations to eliminate the influence of communist local forces, cadres and infrastructure in the towns and villages. Others believed this war in the villages was the main role for the task force and of much greater importance than operations to pursue the enemy main forces. But the task force lacked the manpower and resources to maintain a continuous presence in the pacified areas – once it moved on, the Viet Cong quickly returned and the infrastructure remained intact. Task force commanders were forced to attempt both roles simultaneously but the combination of both roles demanded a much larger force. In addition to these two main roles, the task force was also responsible for security of the Nui Dat base and its access routes. This involved constant patrolling in security operations. To some degree this operational dilemma – whether to pursue main forces or pacification – was resolved by the experiences in May 1968 during the second communist offensive. Australian soldiers fought their most sustained and hazardous battles of the Vietnam War in the engagements around Fire Support Bases Coral and Balmoral.

Vietnam. 1967-08. General William C. Westmoreland Commander of the US Forces (left), is met by Brigadier Stuart Graham, 1st Australian Task Force Commander at Nui Dat. General Westmoreland was making a short visit to the

Task Force. {Westmoreland became increasingly dissatisfied with the Australian modus operandi}


Sited squarely on the enemy’s line of approach, Australian forces induced NVA commanders to launch against the defended bases repeated attacks which were repelled with heavy enemy losses. Combined Australian infantry/tank reconnaissance-in-force operations resulted in further enemy casualties and the destruction of many enemy bases. Australian units lost a total of 25 dead and almost one hundred wounded; in return the task force claimed a total of over 300 enemy killed and probably killed. This was the first time Australian troops had engaged in deliberate set-piece battles in what could almost be termed conventional warfare. Combined infantry and tank actions with enemy attacks penetrating to the gun areas and battalion defensive positions were not the stuff of Australian counter-insurgency theoretical doctrine or practice in Vietnam. The actions at Fire Support Bases Coral and Balmoral, with the task force operating against enemy regular regiments almost in the role of a ‘mobile reserve’, was coming close to the situation which General Wilton, Chairman Chiefs of Staff Committee, had tried to avoid when establishing the task force. In arguing for a change in the Australian commitment to Vietnam from a battalion to a task force, Wilton had sought a command structure that gave a degree of independence to the Australian formation. Australian commanders had not been satisfied with their single battalion serving in a mobile role under direct American command. For the same reasons, Wilton had wanted to avoid the task force becoming part of an American division. This, he believed, would put it at risk of being drawn into ‘a succession

VIETNAM. 1967-07. TROOPS FROM 108 FIELD BATTERY, ROYAL AUSTRALIAN ARTILLERY (RAA), WORK FEVERISHLY TO FREE THEIR 105MM HOWITZER FROM THE MUD DURING OPERATION PADDINGTON, THE MASSIVE ALLIED OFFENSIVE BEING HELD IN VIETNAM'S PHUOC TUY PROVINCE. THE BIG GUN STARTED

TO SINK AFTER A SERIES OF MONSOON DOWNPOURS. OPERATION PADDINGTON, INVOLVING AUSTRALIAN, NEW ZEALAND AND AMERICAN TROOPS, IS THE LARGEST OPERATION YET CONDUCTED

AGAINST THE VIET CONG IN PHUOC TUY PROVINCE.


of hazardous operations’ in what Wilton termed American ‘meat- grinder tactics’, in which they aimed to inflict heavy casualties on the enemy, but often at the cost of high casualties amongst their own troops. Wilton achieved this degree of independence with a defined regional role for the relatively self-contained task force in Phuoc Tuy province. Nevertheless in participating in operations in depth in Bien Hoa, the task force had been allocated what was virtually a mobile role and the Australians had performed with distinction. The actions in Bien Hoa province during these major battles served to confirm the views of those who argued to employ the allied forces in a mobile role against enemy regular formations and to leave the indigenous forces to pacify the population. These arguments were now given new emphasis by the changing composition and tactics of enemy forces. The central question emerged as to whether the primary role originally given to the task force - that of restoring government control in Phuoc Tuy province - had now been overtaken by the massive intervention of North Vietnamese forces. In time that trend would be overturned by the switch to pacification operations. The renewed emphasis on pacification, the progressive handing of responsibility to local South Vietnamese forces, and the phased withdrawal of Australian forces, are all important themes to be covered in the final volume in the official history series. 5. Tactical dilemmas There were numerous dilemmas and problems for the Australian soldiers fighting their war at the tactical level. Among them was the difficulty of fighting an enemy waging a people’s war without seemingly counting the human cost - and involving all levels of society sometimes including old people, women and children. Added to this was the difficulty of eliminating the Viet Cong infrastructure - that network of underground cells engaged in terror, recruitment, and proselytising in the local villages. The nature and intensity of operations in Vietnam placed Australian soldiers into longer periods of contact, or imminent contact, with the enemy than perhaps at any time since the Gallipoli campaign. The nature of operations put a tremendous strain on soldiers: Up to 30 days on patrol in difficult terrain followed by 3-4 days' rest was the norm But operations could vary in duration from several days to two months or longer. In seeking out the enemy, operations were conducted almost invariably in difficult country and trying climatic conditions. While out on operations Australian infantrymen patrolled on foot through terrain that varied from primary and secondary jungle to open grasslands, rice paddy fields, rocky mountains, rubber plantations and forests.


Each soldier carried an individual load of around 50 kilograms including, in the dry season, up to eight litres of water per man. They lived on combat rations for lengthy periods, receiving re-supplies of fresh food and water on average only once every five days. Movement on operations was generally continuous but often painstakingly slow for an average of seven and a half hours each day and frequently accompanied by the threat of enemy action or detonating enemy mines and booby traps. The resulting physical and mental fatigue was exacerbated by the need for continuous alertness and the manning of ambush positions by night. In these conditions the fitness of soldiers was no guarantee against illness and injury: skin disorders, heat rashes, infected cuts and abrasions, insect and reptile bites were frequent, along with sprains and strains, heat

exhaustion and physical exhaustion. Task force operations were conducted at a driving pace. Always at least one battalion, usually two in the three-battalion task force, were outside the base at Nui Dat. This was

VIETNAM. 1967-09. MEMBERS OF A COMPANY, 2RAR /NZ (ANZAC) (THE ANZAC BATTALION COMPRISING 2ND BATTALION, THE ROYAL AUSTRALIAN REGIMENT AND A COMPONENT FROM THE 1ST BATTALION,

ROYAL NEW ZEALAND INFANTRY REGIMENT), WADE THROUGH DEEP WATER TO CROSS A PADDY FIELD SOUTH-EAST OF THE AUSTRALIAN TASK FORCE BASE AT NUI DAT. THE PATROL, ALONG THE

COASTAL STRIP OF PHUOC TUY PROVINCE, WAS PART OF A MOVE BY THE BATTALION TO PREVENT VIET CONG REINFORCEMENTS, SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT ENTERING THE PROVINCE BY SEA.

PHUOC TUY PROVINCE, SOUTH VIETNAM. JULY 1970. ARMED WITH A US ROCKET LAUNCHER 66MM M72 LIGHT ANTI TANK WEAPON (LAW) AND AN L1A1 SELF-LOADING RIFLE, PRIVATE NICHOLAS ANDROPOF OF RESERVOIR, VIC, PATROLS SILENTLY THROUGH A RUBBER PLANTATION DURING A COMBINED INFANTRY-TANK OPERATION AGAINST VIET CONG BUNKER SYSTEMS IN OPERATION PETRIE. HE IS A MEMBER OF 8TH BATTALION, THE ROYAL AUSTRALIAN REGIMENT (8RAR).


made necessary by the special circumstances of having to defend a fixed base and at the same time subdue trouble spots and seek out the enemy in his bases. The helicopter enabled the rapid transfer of units between areas, from one kind of operation to another, from defence to offence, from village to rainforest. The ability of units to respond to such pressures had much to do with the health and fitness of the men, and the relatively short tours of duty combined with the high quality and availability of medical backup. But a year of this was more than enough; troops were simply worn out. However by that time infantry, artillery and SAS units were due for relief while the rest of the force was due for individual replacement. In the debilitating conditions in Vietnam, the level of operational activity was always much higher in the allied forces than it was in the Viet Cong or North Vietnamese, or the South Vietnamese forces. 6. Political dimension of the war – the unresolvable dilemma Any discussion of the dilemmas of the Vietnam War would be incomplete without consideration of the political factor. Military strategists and historians have long argued over the mistakes and lessons of the Vietnam War. One American analyst has commented that the only lesson to be learned from Vietnam was that ‘there were no lessons’. But one lesson is glaringly obvious - the centrality of the political dimension of the war. The key to the American and allied defeat in Vietnam, lay in the failure of the political aims of the war, rather than the military struggle. From March 1965 when the first American combat forces arrived in Vietnam, until the collapse of South Vietnam in April 1975, the South Vietnamese government could claim little real legitimacy to rule Vietnam. As former North Vietnamese Army Colonel Bui Tin argued, American military involvement managed to delay the communist defeat of South Vietnam but the Americans and their allies were never able to establish the national consensus they had hoped to create: ‘Rather they eroded it’, he wrote. The venerated Ho Chi Minh could always make a more convincing claim to represent the abiding aspirations of all the Vietnamese people. Ho’s promises of social and economic reform and national unification would always have a greater appeal to the people of the south than the remote and shifting juntas in Saigon (see Ian McNeill, The Team, p. 482). By the most optimistic estimates, the intervention in Vietnam can only be viewed as a ‘holding action’ which bought time for neighbouring emergent nations in southeast Asia to achieve political and economic security. The impact of Australia’s involvement is still being played out. Certainly the Australian government never achieved its larger strategic aims. After ten years of combat and the loss of 500 lives, Australia came out of the Vietnam War as awkwardly as it went in - still striving to gain access to American intentions and policy decisions and vainly trying to influence the US to retain a strong military presence in the region.


The aftermath and veterans Vietnam was the most controversial war in Australia’s history and the controversy has continued over the past three decades. It caused divisions across politics and at every level of society. The justification for the commitment of Australian military forces, the strategic objectives sought, and the eventual outcome are still debated passionately today. Many, regrettably, seem to still hold to the partisan views they held at the time.

This is generally no longer the case with our earlier Cold War conflict, the Korean War. Time has now shown that the Korea War was a worthwhile fight that the free world had to win. It will be interesting to see if perceptions of the Vietnam War shift over time. Already in Vietnam, as British historian John Keegan has observed, a new generation has begun ‘to question whether a conflict that killed two hundred thousand of their young men [and women] each year between 1966 and 1972 was really worth fighting’. Regrettably, controversy over the war often overshadowed the contribution and sacrifice of those servicemen and women who served. During the Vietnam conflict, Australian veterans returned to an increasingly divided nation. Many felt they received little recognition or acclaim for their service from a nation which they perceived as either ungrateful or indifferent. Many painful lessons from previous wars had to be re-learned about the repatriation of veterans and their rehabilitation into society. Largely as a result of the Vietnam experience, today we more properly show recognition to our service men and women for their contribution and assist them better with their return to civilian life. Ashley Ekins Senior Historian Military History Section

MEMBERS OF 5 PLATOON, B COMPANY, 7TH BATTALION, THE ROYAL AUSTRALIAN REGIMENT (7RAR), JUST NORTH OF THE VILLAGE OF PHUOC HAI, BESIDE THE ROAD LEADING TO DAT DO. UNITED STATES ARMY IROQUOIS HELICOPTERS

ARE LANDING TO TAKE THEM BACK TO NUI DAT AFTER COMPLETION OF OPERATION ULMARRA, THE CORDON AND SEARCH BY 7RAR OF THE VILLAGE OF PHUOC HAI. OPERATION ULMARRA WAS PART OF OPERATION ATHERTON,

CONDUCTED BY 2RAR /NZ (ANZAC) (THE ANZAC BATTALION COMPRISING 2ND BATTALION, THE ROYAL AUSTRALIAN REGIMENT AND A COMPONENT FROM THE 1ST BATTALION, ROYAL NEW ZEALAND INFANTRY REGIMENT) AND 7RAR. LEFT TO RIGHT: PRIVATE (PTE) PETER CAPP (KNEELING); PTE BOB FENNELL (CROUCHING, FACING CAMERA); CORPORAL BOB DARCY (LEFT OF FENNELL); PTE NEAL HASTED (CENTRE FRONT); PTE IAN JURY (CENTRE, BACK, HOLDING RIFLE); PTE COLIN BARNETT (FRONT, RIGHT); LANCE CORPORAL STAN WHITFORD (LEFT OF BARNETT); HELICOPTER MARKER AT RIGHT IS PTE JOHN RAYMOND GOULD. THE UNITED STATES ARMY IROQUOIS UH-1D HELICOPTER IS OPERATED BY 2

PLATOON, 162ND ASSAULT HELICOPTER COMPANY, 11TH COMBAT AVIATION BATTALION. (HAVING ACHIEVED ALMOST THE STATUS OF AN ICON, THIS IMAGE WAS CHOSEN FOR, AND IS ETCHED ON, THE VIETNAM MEMORIAL ON ANZAC

PARADE, CANBERRA, ACT, DEDICATED IN OCTOBER 1992)


VIETNAM CASUALTIES The AWM Encyclopedia under “casualties” indicates that 520 were killed in Vietnam and almost 2400 wounded. The Official History of the Vietnam War, On the Offensive at Annex F gives the respective figures as 500 and 3129. In the above matter it is understood that:

• the Official History figure of 500 is the total number of service personnel who actually

died during the Vietnam War. • the AWM Roll of Honour and the Vietnam War Memorial on ANZAC Parade have the

number killed at 520 which includes including those who died of war related causes after the cessation of hostilities by Australian military forces in January 1973.

• In addition to the Official History figure of 500 killed there were seven civilians killed. Four journalists, two female welfare workers and an entertainer who died in Vietnam.

• It is not known how the variation in wounded figures was determined. As usual Guides should be wary of quoting specific casualty figures for any conflict and if in doubt use the AWM figures.

PJH



AUSTRALIAN MIAS OF THE VIETNAM WAR – "MISSING IN ACTION" OR "NO KNOWN GRAVE"?

by Ashley Ekins{Photograph added by Editor}

The term "missing in action" has long brought anguish to the families of servicemen lost in war. Of the 60,000 Australians who died in the First World War, over one-third were recorded as "missing". Almost half the Australians who died on Gallipoli have no known grave. Many bereaved families were haunted for a generation by the memories of sons, brothers, fathers and husbands who had disappeared without trace. The scale of the loss made this a shared national experience, starkly recalled today in scores of overseas war cemeteries with headstones inscribed with Kipling's simple words: "An Australian Soldier of the Great War . . . Known unto God".

There was no such solace for the next of kin of servicemen listed as missing in action during the Vietnam War. Over 500 Australians died in Vietnam. Among them were six Australian servicemen – four Army soldiers and two RAAF airmen – who were initially recorded as "missing in action" (MIA) in four separate incidents. In all six cases their classification was subsequently amended to either "killed in action" or "missing in action - presumed dead". All six servicemen are perhaps more correctly described as having no known graves. These are their stories.

The first Australian combat unit to fight in Vietnam, 1st Battalion, The Royal Australian Regiment (1RAR), was also the first to have soldiers recorded as missing in action. In November 1965 1RAR joined an American battalion of the US 173d Airborne Brigade on Operation Hump, a five-day search-and-destroy operation into the enemy dominated territory of War Zone D, about forty kilometres northeast of Saigon.

This area was known to contain a Viet Cong stronghold and the base for an enemy regiment as well as enemy supply routes linking the communist war zones to the Ho Chi Minh Trail. For the first two days the rifle companies of 1RAR had sporadic enemy contacts as platoons patrolled through swamp and thick jungle. Then, on the afternoon of 8 November, while the soldiers of A Company were pushing through dense rainforest near the top of the Gang Toi hills, they struck a strongly-defended Viet Cong bunker system.

As they crested a ridge, the leading Australian platoon suddenly came under a hail of fire from machine-guns in well-sited bunkers, supported by rifles and grenades. Five men were hit almost immediately at close range. The rest of the platoon quickly went to ground and began returning fire as the wounded men withdrew or were dragged back - all except for Lance Corporal Richard "Tiny" Parker, who had been commanding the point section. Parker had fallen directly in front of the enemy bunkers. He was lying face down and was not moving. He could not be reached and he did not respond to shouts from his comrades.

This was the first time the Australians had encountered a Viet Cong main force unit who fought and stood their ground. They could tell from the sounds of heavy firing that the American battalion across the river from them had also run into trouble. 1/503 Battalion had assaulted an enemy bunker system and was now engaged in fierce close-quarters fighting with a Viet Cong regiment.

With his forward platoon pinned down, Major John Healy, commanding A Company, ordered another of his platoons to assault the enemy bunkers from the flank. As they advanced, this platoon was also caught in a heavy cross-fire from enemy machine-guns concealed in bunkers. Private Peter Gillson, a machine-gunner with the forward section, was hit by a burst of automatic fire as he stepped around the twisted roots of a tree. He fell just fifteen metres


from the enemy position, propped against the roots.

Gillson's platoon sergeant, Sergeant Colin Fawcett, crawled forward under fire to help the wounded soldier. Fawcett reached for Gillson's arm but could feel no pulse at the wrist. He saw that Gillson had been hit several times. He attempted several times to drag Gillson's body out of the line of fire but both the soldier and his machine-gun were wedged tightly among the tree roots. He was forced to move back. Fawcett was later awarded the Military Medal for his brave actions.

The assaulting platoon was now at risk of being encircled by the enemy and was compelled to withdraw under enemy fire. Dusk was approaching and Major Healy was forced to order his company to break off contact and withdraw, reluctantly leaving the bodies of Parker and Gillson behind. He had no choice. His company had struck a determined enemy force of equal strength; the Viet Cong were well-armed and their bunkers dominated all approaches. In the judgement of official historian Ian McNeill,

it would have been foolhardy for him to have pressed the attack ... Healy had done all he could and his company had performed creditably [but] the men were depressed at leaving two soldiers behind.

The Australians wanted to return to the Gang Toi hills. A full battalion attack operation was planned later in the month but it was never conducted. Over two years later Australian soldiers returned to the old battleground of Operation Hump when units of the 1st Australian Task Force conducted Operation Coburg during the communist Tet Offensive. But no trace of the missing soldiers was ever found.

Peter Gillson's wife later wrote to his platoon commander with stoic resignation:

I am really proud to be called a soldier's wife, even though it is heart breaking at times, but I suppose we all must expect these things and when it does happen we must be as brave as our men were - but in a way I am very lucky because I have a son which Peter never saw. He is only four months old but he'll never know just how much strength he has given me to go on. I only hope that his son will grow up to be as fine a man as Peter was.

A court of inquiry conducted by 1RAR shortly after the action recommended that Private Gillson be recorded as" killed in action"; and Lance Corporal Parker be recorded as "missing in action, presumed dead". Both soldiers were officially listed as missing in action, however, because their bodies were not recovered.

In 1969 Private David Fisher, a national serviceman serving with 3 Squadron SAS, became the next soldier declared missing in action. In September 1969 Fisher was second-in-command of a five-man, long range SAS patrol searching for signs of enemy activity near the Nui May Tao massif in south-eastern Long Khanh province.

After patrolling for seven days in persistent rain, on 27 September the Australians had a series of sharp contacts with strong groups of Viet Cong. Outnumbered and pursued through the jungle, they called for a helicopter extraction. The helicopters arrived within half an hour, just as the enemy were closing in on the SAS soldiers.

During the hectic moments of the "hot" extraction, while under fire and surrounded by the enemy, the members of the patrol clipped on their karabiners and attached themselves to ropes dangling from a helicopter and were lifted clear of the jungle. As the helicopter gathered speed and helicopter gunships moved in to fire on the enemy on the ground, the patrol members suddenly noticed that Private Fisher was missing. He had fallen from his rope


from a height of about 30 metres above the tree canopy. It was later suggested that, under pressure, Fisher may have attached his karabiner to the wrong loop on the rope.

An air search began within ten minutes of the incident and a ground search began within five hours. A ten-man SAS patrol searched the jungle around the site, joined the following day by rifle companies who searched for the next six days. Fisher's body was never found, and he was declared missing in action, presumed dead. He had only two months remaining of his tour of duty.

P01009.004Summary: Phan Rang, Ninh Thuan province, Vietnam, 1970-01. In formal outdoors group portrait of o f ficers o f No. 2 Squadron RAAF gathered on the tarmac at Phan Rang Air Base for a 'hose-down' celebration for the crew of one of the squadron's Canberra B20 light bombers who have just completed their last bombing mission in Vietnam. In the celebration, which became something o f a tradition with No. 2 Squadron at Phan Rang, a fire tender met the crew on their arrival back at base a fter completing their final mission and hosed their aircraft down. The men are (left to right): Flying Of ficer (FO) Allan Clancy, pilot and Squadron Operations Of ficer, who is wearing the standard form o f undress for a rest day o f casual shirt, shorts and long socks; unknown Pilot Of ficer (PO), pilot; PO John Bennett, navigator; unknown PO, navigator; PO Robert Cuttriss, navigator; PO Allan Curr, navigator; FO Brian Hammond, pilot; PO Richard O'Farrell, pilot; PO Robert Moloney, navigator; Flight Lieutenant Anthony Taylor, navigator and Squadron Bombing Leader; unknown United States Air Force (USAF) o f ficer from the sta f f o f the 36th Tactical Fighter Wing at Phan Rang; Squadron Leader (Sqn Ldr) Brian Sweeney, pilot and Flight Commander, No. 2 Squadron; PO John Kennedy, pilot, who is one of the two crewmen who are receiving the 'hose-down'; Wing Commander Jack Boast, CO o f No. 2 Squadron, who is wearing the traditional 'non-flying' uniform o f short-sleeved shirt, shorts and long socks; PO Robert Carver, navigator, who was soon to be posted as missing, presumed killed in action (KIA); FO David Palmer, navigator and the other recipient o f the 'hose-down', who is holding a bottle o f champagne; Sqn Ldr Frank Lonie, navigator and Navigation and Bombing Of ficer, No. 2 Squadron; FO Michael Herbert, pilot, who was soon to be posted as missing, presumed killed in action (KIA); Sqn Ldr Arthur Barnes, DFC, AFC, pilot and Flight Commander, No. 2 Squadron, who is wearing a fl ying scarf; PO Harold Bradford, pilot; PO Barry Carpenter, pilot. Most o f the o f ficers are wearing flying suits, mainly o f the older cotton variety, and are not drinking as they expect that they will soon leave on a fl ying mission. FO Palmer is wearing one o f the newer fire-resistant Nomex fly ing suits. FO Hammond and PO Kennedy are wearing so-called 'bowyangs' around their legs, items o f equipment that attached their legs to the ejection seats o f their aircra ft, such that their legs would not be severed by the aircra ft's instrument panel in the event o f an ejection. The Canberra B20 light bomber flown by Kennedy and Palmer stands at the rear of the group. (Donor F. Lonie) (Formerly 200254)

In 1970 two RAAF airmen were declared missing in action in Vietnam. Flying Officer Michael Herbert and Pilot Officer Robert Carver, both of 2 Squadron, RAAF, were believed killed when their Canberra bomber disappeared while flying a night bombing mission in the northern 1 Corps region of South Vietnam.


On 3 November 1970 Herbert (the pilot and aircraft captain) and Carver (the navigator and bomb aimer) had taken off from Phan Rang at 7.00 p.m., heading for their target in Quang Nam province 65 kilometres south-west of Da Nang. The weather was relatively clear and the flight to the target was without incident. The Australians carried out their bombing run and released their bombs over the target area at 8.22 p.m. After acknowledging a radio message, they switched frequency for the return flight to Phan Rang. Shortly afterwards, the aircraft disappeared from the radar screen which was tracking it.

American and Australian air units mounted an aerial search the next morning. The extensive search involved 67 sorties over an area of over 16,000 square kilometres but it was hampered by poor weather conditions. The search failed to find any trace of the aircraft or crew and was called off after three days.

Pilot Officer Carver had served for only eight weeks in Vietnam. Flying Officer Herbert, who had qualified as a pilot at the age of 16, had only two months to go to finish his tour.

The cause of the disappearance was never determined. Their aging Canberra bomber was flying well above the maximum range of enemy anti-aircraft artillery and there were no known North Vietnamese surface-to-air missile (SAM) launch sites near the flight path. Although discounted by a RAAF court of inquiry, the most likely explanation of the aircraft's sudden disappearance without trace remains the possibility of a catastrophic mid-air explosion caused by one or more bombs becoming hung up in the rack after release.

For the parents of those lost, the term "missing in action" became increasingly difficult to live with. After years of uncertainty Robert Carver's parents eventually gave up hope that he would be found alive. Mr Sydney Carver had his son's name placed on the Toowoomba War Memorial. Every day he passed the memorial and never failed to look at the inscription.

Mrs Joan Herbert continued to dream that her son Michael was alive and roaming the jungles of Vietnam, dreams that eventually became nightmares. Over the next decade she wrote more than 600 letters to Vietnamese and other political leaders enquiring about his fate. The families of both RAAF officers said they could not rest until the truth was known.

The last Australian soldier to be listed as missing in action was Lance Corporal John Francis Gillespie of 8 Field Ambulance. On 17 April 1971 Gillespie was serving as a helicopter medic during a 'dustoff' (helicopter medical evacuation) operation in the Long Hai hills in Phuoc Tuy province.

Four South Vietnamese Regional Force soldiers had been injured by a mine explosion and the difficult terrain demanded a helicopter evacuation. But the Long Hai hills were an insecure landing zone. The caves and dense timber of the Long Hais had long harboured a major Viet Cong base area and the dustoff operation required the protection of helicopter gunships. As the first wounded soldier was being winched up, the hovering helicopter was hit by enemy machine-gun fire. It crashed to the ground and burst into flames. Although the crew escaped, Lance Corporal Gillespie and three other soldiers were engulfed in the fireball. A helicopter crewman, Corporal Robert Stephens, repeatedly entered the burning aircraft and tried in vain to rescue Gillespie, until being forced back by the flames. Stephens was later awarded the British Empire Medal for his courage.

Gillespie's body could not be recovered from the burning wreckage which was reduced to slag by the fire. Private Gillespie was listed as missing in action, apparently on a technicality because his remains could not be found. The classification was subsequently altered to killed in action.


The last Australian combat troops were withdrawn from South Vietnam at the end of 1971. For the next decade the question of Australian servicemen missing in Vietnam received little official attention. Then in May 1984, a joint Foreign Affairs and Defence mission travelled to Vietnam to investigate the Australian missing in action cases with the assistance of Vietnamese government officials. The five-member team visited Quang Nam – Da Nang and Dong Nai provinces and walked to the sites of two of the incidents. They were prevented from reaching the other two sites due to uncleared minefields.

The team's investigations were hampered by the time lapse since the incidents, the uncertain nature of much of the information available, and the movement of civilian populations and Vietnamese military units during and since the war. Unfounded media claims that the team had "solved the mystery" of the missing also aroused false hopes and angered some next of kin. Regretably, the team members discovered no further information or traces of the remains of the Australians. They concluded that it was most unlikely that any further information on the whereabouts of the remains of the six Australians would become available in the future.

This article was published (with colour photographs and map) as "No known grave", in Wartime: the official magazine of the Australian War Memorial (No. 23, 2003), pages 14–18.

19/01/10 6:55 AMVietnam Veterans Association of Australia

Page 1 of 2http://www.vvaa.org.au/

Vietnam Veterans Association of Australia

The "Vietnam Veterans' Association of Australia" website hasbeen designed with two purposes in mind. The first, to provideinformation of special or current interest to Australian Vietnamveterans. The second, to provide for students of all ages,historical context, information about Australia's involvement in thewar, Australian units, servicemen and servicewomen.

For questions / queries about our site, contact ourwebmaster

This website was last updated 18.11.2009

Commanders Diaries for SE Asia (including Vietnam) nowavailable hereSite Search:

GO

The Vietnam Veterans Association of Australia (VVAA) had itsadvent in the Vietnam Veterans Action Association formed in thelate 1979 as a result of the perceptions of Vietnam veterans thatexposure to chemicals was causing problems with their healthand the health of their children. The chemicals, known by thegeneric name of Agent Orange included 2,4,5,T and 2,4,D, a by product of which is the extremelypoisonous substance TCDD or dioxin. The problems ranged from minor irritation to lethal, withsymptoms such as skin blisters, itching, flushes, nasal problems, blurred vision, respiratory,cardiovascular, gastrointestinal, gastro-urinary muscular and nervous system disorders, cancers andtumours. This was often exacerbated by psychological disorders caused by what was later diagnosedas post traumatic stress disorder.

The Association fought an uphill battle against government indifference, including the bitterdisappointment of the now discredited 1983 Evatt Royal Commission on the Use and Effects ofChemical Agents on Australian Personnel in Vietnam. At the same time there was a very real feelingthat the RSL had not accepted the Vietnam veterans, and nor would it pursue the concerns of thisgroup with the vigour they believed that those concerns warranted. This feeling was never strongerthan during this period, when the VVAA and the RSL were absolutely opposed.

The gradual successes of the VVAA in the following years came as a result of much hard work andlobbying. The Vietnam Veterans Counselling Service was established as a direct result of the actionof the VVAA, and it is now an integral part of treatment regimes, not only for veterans, but also forthe survivors of traumatic events such as the Port Arthur Massacre.

This was followed by the establishment of the Post Traumatic Stress Disorder Clinic in Heidelburg,which now extended its treatment to St John of God Hospital in Sydney, together with visitingservices to various rural locations. Lifestyle courses permit veterans to contribute to their own well-being, learning how to cope with problems and adapt their lifestyle to best suit themselves.

The bitterness engendered by the political response to veterans’ concerns about their health and the

19/01/10 6:55 AMVietnam Veterans Association of Australia

Page 2 of 2http://www.vvaa.org.au/

health of their children coloured the attitude of the Vietnam Veterans Association of Australia formany years. It is only lately that positive action by both the Department of Veterans Affairs and theVVAA has resulted in a relationship where the concerns of veterans are being addressed. The VVAAis represented on a large number of Government committees as a respected part of the Ex-Servicecommunity and is a major contributor to debate, legislation and administration involving veterans.

The VVAA remains a wholly volunteer body, whose sole interest is the welfare of veterans and thefamilies of veterans. It has strong representation in every State and Territory, and very close ties withequivalent organisations in the United States and New Zealand. The relationship between the nowR&SL and the Association has matured into one of mutual respect, and many members of theAssociation also enjoy membership of the R&SL.

Current issues involving the Association include the recently released results of the VietnamVeterans’ Mortality Study, (commissioned by the Department of Veterans Affairs) and followingthrough on the self-reported issues revealed in the long-delayed Vietnam Veterans’ Health Study,including spouses and children. The Mortality Study revealed that Vietnam veterans have a deathrate 7% higher than the general male population, with deaths from cancer 21% higher, prostatecancer 53% higher, lung cancer 29%, ischaemic heart disease 10% and suicides 21% above thegeneral male population. This is a cause for grave concern, and work continues to ensure that theresults of this study are reflected in Repatriation Medical Authority and Departmental documents. Thenominal roll of Vietnam veterans was released in 1997, although it should be noted that the value ofthis work is in its contribution towards the Mortality and Health Studies. In addition to this, the End ofWar List for this war has just been compiled, and this will result in a review of awards which wererecommended at the time but which were not awarded due to the imposition of medal quotas. All ofthese things contribute to addressing the issues of concern to veterans. The results of the HealthStudy were released in April 1998, and sadly, confirmed the worst fears of veterans in relation theirhealth, and the health of their children. The VVAA is committed to accomplishing, quickly, accuratelyand completely, the validation which the government requires. It will then move to achieve theAssociation's stated aims in regard to the Health Study outcomes.

Over the years there has been a persistent media presentation of Vietnam veterans as ‘victims’. TheAssociation believes that this is counter-productive. This is not an image that the VVAA wishes toperpetuate either for itself or for its members. Rather, it sees Vietnam veterans as achievers. Vietnamveterans have reached the highest level of business, professional and political ranks within Australia,and every one of them who has overcome psychological or health problems in order to raise a familyand live a relatively normal life has overcome adversity in order to achieve. Vietnam veterans aren’tvictims, they are achievers.

Copyright reserved by Vietnam Veterans Association of Australia


Last Australia Vietnam MIA return By Nick Bryant BBC News, Sydney The remains of the last two Australian servicemen missing in action from the war in Vietnam have been returned to their homeland.

The remains of Flying Officer Michael Herbert and Pilot Officer Robert Carver were found last month.

They were found at a remote jungle site near the border with Laos where their bomber crashed 39 years ago.

They were honoured with a military ceremony at an airfield on the outskirts of Sydney.

Night raid

A military band was on hand, and so, too, an honour guard, as the remains of the two airmen were carried from the plane in flag-draped coffins.

With this brief ceremony a chapter in Australian military history came to a close.

Flying Officer Michael Herbert and Pilot Officer Robert Carver were both aged 24 when their Canberra bomber went missing after a night-time raid over central Vietnam in November 1970.

Last April, the wreckage of the bomber was found in remote jungle near the border with Laos, after a search conducted by an Australian army history unit.

Three months later the remains of the airmen were found, and then identified by Australian and Vietnamese forensic specialists.

Official interest in finding and repatriating Australia's missing war dead was revived in 2007 after a veterans' organisation found the bodies of two soldiers.

Another soldier was found that year, with a fourth found last year.

Now all the bodies have been retrieved and repatriated.

The United States still has nearly 1,800 servicemen unaccounted for throughout Southeast Asia, with some 1,300 in Vietnam alone.

Story from BBC NEWS: http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/asia-pacific/8230023.stm Published: 2009/08/31 10:59:07 GMT

© BBC MMX

ISSUE #4 (January 2010)


Enclosure # 1 to BACKGROUNDER # 05

Reading list Australians in the Vietnam War {AWM website December 2007}

The major reference is the Official history of Australia's involvement in Southeast Asian conflicts 1948-1975 [Series of nine volumes. Individual volumes cover medical services, operations of the Army, the RAN, the RAAF and politics, society and diplomacy.]

Joan Beaumont, Australian defence: sources and statistics. Australian centenary history of defence vol. 6 (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 2001). [Tables, statistics and literature reviews.]

Terry Burstall, Vietnam: the Australian dilemma (St Lucia, Qld.: University of Queensland Press, 1993). [Review and analysis of the Australian Government's rationale in entering the Vietnam War, the impact on the civilian populations and the Australia-United States relationship.]

Casula Powerhouse Arts Centre, Viet Nam voices: Australians & the Vietnam War (Casula, N.S.W.: The Arts Centre, 2000). [Includes a diverse collection of artwork, paintings, photographs and posters created during and after the war. Also contains essays on a range of Vietnam related topics.]

John Coates, An atlas of Australia's wars. Australian centenary history of defence vol. 7 (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 2001). [General maps, situation maps and maps of individual actions with explanatory text.]

Department of Veterans' Affairs, The nominal roll of Vietnam veterans (Canberra: Commonwealth Dept. of Veterans' Affairs, 1996). [Nominal roll of Vietnam Veterans. Originally constructed to assist in a mortality study the more recent reprints have some names or details withheld at the request of those Veterans. Organized alphabetically.]

Steve Eather, Get the bloody job done: the Royal Australian Navy Helicopter Flight-Vietnam and the 135th Assault Helicopter Company 1967-1971 (St. Leonards, N.S.W.: Allen & Unwin, 1998). [Account of the service of the Royal Australian Navy Helicopter Flight. Although initially sent in as support for the Australian ground forces in Phouc Tuy, these sailors joined with members of the US Army and RNZAF to create the 135 Assault Helicopter Company which also serviced the Americans and ARVN. Includes roll of honour, short explanation of the Royal Australian Navy Detachment 9 Squadron, Unit Awards, Awards to members of the RANHFV and Nominal Roll.]

Steve Eather, Target Charlie (Weston Creek, ACT: Aerospace Publications, 1993). [Focusing on Australia's air war in Vietnam, includes a chronology of main events, account of each unit's operations, information about aircraft, honours and awards.]

Denis Fairfax, Navy in Vietnam: A record of the Royal Australian Navy in the Vietnam War, 1965-1972 (Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1980). [Includes nominal roll, detailed chronology of the RAN at war in Vietnam, Roll of Honour, honours, decorations and awards.]

Frank Frost, Australia's war in Vietnam (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1987). [A detailed account of strategy, policies and experiences of the Defence forces.]


Jeffrey Grey and Jeff Doyle, Vietnam: war, myth and memory: comparative perspectives on Australia's war in Vietnam (St. Leonards, N.S.W.: Allen & Unwin, 1992). [Includes chapters on the Australian Government's commitment to Vietnam, the New Zealand stance, Vietnam in historical writing, monuments and public memory and the anti war movement.]

Peter Haran and Robert Kearney, Crossfire: an Australian reconnaissance unit in Vietnam (Frenchs Forest, N.S.W.: New Holland Publishers 2001). [Personal narrative. Includes recollections of service in Vietnam juxtaposed with a more recent excursion to the Flinders' Ranges with a group of Veterans affected by Post Traumatic Stress Disorder.]

Brian Hennessy, The sharp end: the trauma of a war in Vietnam (St. Leonards, N.S.W.: Allen & Unwin, 1997). [Hennessy's personal account of his war service and experience with Post Traumatic Stress Disorder.]

David Horner, Australian higher command in the Vietnam War (Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Research School of Pacific Studies, Australian National University, 1986). [Discusses the command and control of Australian forces.]

S. McHugh, Minefields and miniskirts: Australian women and the Vietnam War (Sydney: Doubleday, 1993). [The impact of the war on women who worked in Vietnam as nurses, secretaries, entertainers or consular staff, Vietnamese women, women who were victims of violence or who were involved in the protest movement.]

Gary McKay and Elizabeth Stewart, Vietnam shots: a photographic account of Australians at war (St. Leonards, NSW: Allen & Unwin, 2002). [An illustrated history highlighting the wide range of tasks undertaken by Australians and the conditions under which they lived and operated.]

Ian McNeill, The Team: Australian Army advisors in Vietnam, 1962-1972. (Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1984). [The authoritative study of the AATV written with full access to Department of Defence records as well as personal interviews. Appendices include a chronology, lists of awards, Roll of Honour and nominal roll.]

Alexander M. Palmer, Vietnam veterans: a record of service (Perth: A.M. Palmer, 1995). [Vietnam order of battle, information and statistics on awards, casualties, participation of various groups, chronology and previous operational history of those who fought in the Vietnam War.]

Alexander M. Palmer, Vietnam veterans: honours and awards, Army (Mosman Park, W.A.: Military Minded, 1995). [Alphabetically arranged listing of awards, includes citation.]

Gregory Pemberton, All the way: Australia's road to Vietnam (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1987). [Analysis of the Australia-America relationship and its culmination in the Australian participation in the Vietnam War.]

John Rowe, Vietnam, the Australian experience (North Sydney, NSW: Time-Life Books, Australia in association with John Ferguson, 1987). [Many large photographs and a thorough text. Good for background reading and school-aged researchers.]

Gerald L. Stone, War without honour (Brisbane: Jacaranda, 1966). [A journalist's account of the build-up to war in Vietnam, critical of Australian involvement. Written before the height of Australia's commitment to the conflict.]

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