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The Works of Picasso-s-vthe greatest

living artist of our time"-are on dis-

play in Trinity College. Miss Ann

Crookshank contributes an essay on the

man and his work and comments on the

artist's works we publish in full colour

and black and white.

Fianna Fail returns with a fresh, clear

electoral mandate to continue in

Government. Immediately some urgent

problems confront the new cabinet. Wediscuss these and how they might bedealt with.

The author of the "Just Society" and on

his own the only alternative to Fianna

Fail-discusses Irish political develop-

ment over the next few years and the

imperatives of co-operation between

Fine Gael and Labour.

Angela MacNamara, the well-known

columnist onpersonal problems, reviews

"Marriage Irish Style" by Dorine Rohan.

Pic a s s o E x h i b i t s in Trin i t y C o ll eg e

A unique exhibition of several of Picasso's works is currently

being held in the New Library of Trinity College until

August 31st. There are special admission rates for children,

students and groups. "Nusight" acknowledges the assistance

given to it by the organizers of the exhibition and, in par-

ticular, Professor Dawson, in allowing our photographer,

Walter Pfeiffer, to photograph some of the exhibits whichwe reproduce.

Cover photograph by Walter Newman.

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A N A L lE R NA liV E ?The General Election results have

been a disappointment in their emphaticre-affirmation of the status quo. FiannaFail has won a dubious vote of con-fidence as the government party andFine Gael has won an unequivocal vote

of confidence as the major opposition.The only indication of change is inthe Labour Party results where the die-hards element suffered a severe defeatin rural Ireland and the new radicalwing achieved notable success in Dublin.

There is widespread belief that thecountry wanted a change from FiannaFail which had been 12 years in officeand had grown tired and desultory.Many in the Fianna Fail party sensedthis desire and the party tacitlyadmitted it in their advertisementwhich read "Keep the Change". How-ever this desire-such as it was-wasfrustrated by the absence of a realalternative to the existing government.

Neither Fine Gael nor Labour on itsown could pose with any credibility asa potential government party-and theyrefused to co-operate in a joint assaulton Fianna Fail.

It is very probable that in 4 yearstime the government will be eventireder and more desultory than it isnow and that the desire for change willbe correspondingly greater. However,it seems equally certain that neitherFine Gael nor Labour will on their ownoffer a creditable alternative. So that,unless their attitude changes it will be

Fianna Fail again in 1973, irrespectiveof the electorates wishes.

Politicians have an obligation torepresent the feelings of the people-therefore when a popular demand isevident for a change of government thepoliticians are obliged to meet thatdemand realistically. Whatever validity

the arguments in favour of both FineGael and Labour going it alone in1969-the electorate's recent decisionhas robbed those arguments of anyvalidity for 1973.

All this would still be valid even ifFine Gael and Labour were politicallyincompatible. But when a large areaof compatability is discovered betweenthe two parties the argument is con-clusive. In both parties' publishedpolicy statements there was little sub-stantive difference. Both favoured aradical re-distribution of the country'swealth in favour of the deprived andboth sought to democratise Irish societyby decentralising governmental and

industrial power. While it is true thatin Fine Gael there was frequent retrac-tion from the demanding commitmentof "The Just Society" and in Labourthere was left-wing pressure for thenationalisation of all industries and theadoption of other traditional ultra-socialist policies-both parties probablynow recognise that diversions fromofficial policies were electorally dam-aging.

The opposition parties have fouryears now in which to reconcile theiroutstanding differences and propound

joint policies for radical, social andeconomic reform based on the principlesof real democracy and social justice.

They could broaden their base toadvantage by involving in their delibera-tions the radical elements in the TradeUnions, the Universities and especiallyrural Ireland. By doing so they wouldbe establishing the basis for a trulynational progressive movement whichwould bring the concepts of participa-tion, democracy and justice not just tothe corridors of power but to theshanties of the weak.

It would be well to remember thatcontrary to current legend coalitiongovernments are not inherently un-workable or disastrous. The State'scoalition Government from 1948-51was, as John O'Donovan says in aninterview with him in this issue of'NUSIGHT' "the best government thecountry ever had," In any event a pre-planned broadly based alliance betweenFine Gael and Labour would be quite

a different prospect to the hastilyassembled governments of 1948 and1954.

A bye-election is pending in DublinSouth West following the deeplyregretted death of Sean Dunne. Oneman who clearly exemplifies the ideaof democratic socialism and who isacceptable to both Fine Gael andLabour is Declan Costello If chosenas a joint-Labour-Fine Gael candidatefor this bye-election Costello couldbegin the movement towards a socially

just democratic Ireland.

VINCENT BROWNE who has been recently appointed Editor of"NUSIGHT" is aged 25 and comes from Broadford, Co. Limerick. Hewas educated at the local national school, Ring College, Waterford,St. Mary's Secondary School, Drumcollogher, Castleknock College andU.CD., where he graduated in 1966 with an Honours B.A. in economicsand politics.

For the past two years he has been with R.T.E. and was the onlyIrish journalist in Czechoslovakia during the Soviet invasion last August(which he reported for "The Irish Times").

J ACK DOWLlNG---'the former R.T.E. producer has joined"NUSIGHT" as Associate Editor. Born in Dublin and educated in Trimand Sydney, Australia-J ack spent 15 years in the Irish Army. On leavinghe joined a data processing company in London specialising in publishingschemes. When he returned to Ireland he became Editor of Shell Publi-cations and did secretarial work for Gills.

His involvement with R.T.E. began five years ago when he was aparticipant on the religious proramme "Horizon" which he later chaired.He became a producer in 1966 and was responsible for "Horizon","Insight" (an arts programme), "Home Truths" (which he left following"undue exercise of advertising pressure"), a programme on the Roseexhibition and many others. While with R.T.E. J ack acquired a uniquereputation for creativity and competence.

He resigned from R.T.E. in April last following the refusal of theauthorities to acknowledge the charges of the station's culturaldegeneracy, made by Bob Quinn, another producer who had also resigned.At present J ack is engaged in writing a book on culture and authoritywith special reference to R.T.E. in conjunction with another colleaguewho also resigned, Lelia Doolan. The book entitled "Sit down and beCounted" will be published in the Autumn.

Over the next number of months "NUSIGHT" will be expandingits staff and range of contributors. We will be announcing furtherdevelopments in our next issue.

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A M A N DA T E

FOR WHAT?

About the only constructive innova-tion among Mr. Lynch's Cabinet changes

was the promise to create a newdepartment for Housing and PhysicalDevelopment with Mr. Blaney to be incharge. This presumably will mean ahigher priority for one of the nation'smost pressing social needs as well asgreater prominence for a neglectedaspect of Irish economic affairs. Apartfrom that, the numerous promotions,demotions and "transmotions" effectedby Mr. Lynch seem only to be aimed atconcealing the absence of substantativechange by making a multiplicity ofminor alterations. The departures andarrivals from the Cabinet were per-fectly predictable and politically innoc-uous. Mr. Lenihan's movement to

Transport and Power was undoubtedlya demotion, but whether for him or theDepartment of Education is not clear.Dr. Hillery's movement to ExternalAffairs makes sense in the light of EECdevelopments but none at all when oneconsiders the problems remaining in theDepartment of Labour. And so on. Infact the most significant feature emerg-ing from the changes in the Cabinet isthat it confirms Mr. Haughey in hisstrategic position as Minister forFinance. From there he can continue toexercise his enormous, and generallyconservative, influence over the direc-tion of government policy. He is also,

needless to say, in a strong position tomove into Mr. Lynch's place should thelatter decide to move on to higherthings in 1973.

For this prosaic state of affairs thereare probably two important reasons.

The first is the simple fact that theFianna Fail party is chronically short oftalent. The second reason why Mr.Lynch's "new" Cabinet has an aura offamiliarity about it arises from FiannaFail's interpretation of the general elec-tion result as a mandate for continuityrather than change. For although theparty's percentage of the total poll didslip a couple of points its vote remained

constant absolutely and the party cap-tured enough seats to avoid having tobe unduly worried by elections in un-favourable constituencies. And all ofthis was accomplished, the Governmentcan claim, while holding with rare con-sistency to the past policies when thetwo opposition parties bombarded theelectorate with a wide variety of pro-posals of varying degrees of radicalism.

But although continuity rather thanchange is what last month's result sug-gests the people probably want, it doesseem unlikely that Mr. Lynch's newCabinet will, in fact, be able to avoid afairly considerable amount of re-organ-isation of the nation's social, economic

and political institutions. If a pragmaticconservatism under Mr. Lynch's genial

leadership is what the people werepromised last month, and what Fianna

Fail probably thinks they approved,then this at least, is one electionpromise, which the Government is un-likely to be able to deliver.

For one thing, there is the suddenre-emergence, after six years in a state

of suspended animation, of the possi-

J ACK L Y NCH"A promise of genial leadership"

bility of Irish entry into the EuropeanEconomic Community. This shouldprompt a wide-ranging re-appraisal ofhow much preparation still remains tobe carried through within the next fewyears. Although a fair amount of workwas begun eight to nine years ago whenthe first hint of free trade sent Govern-ment and industry into convulsions ofactivity, there still remains a vast num-ber of Irish firms not only incapable ofmeeting foreign competition but manywho are quite possibly lacking thehuman and material resources to accom-plish the necessary adaptations.

To push on with what remains to bedone, Mr. Colley may find himself im-pelled, in due course, to depart fromthe "free enterprise" philosophy of hisparty and to intervene a little moredirectly in the affairs of private indus-try.

More radical still, however, are themeasures, needed of Mr. Gibbons whenhe moves to Agriculture, to deal withthe economy's most intractable problem-the persistent failure of agriculturalnet output to show any consistentexpansion. In the EEC context agricul-tural markets will, of course, provide

better opportunities than those cur-rently available to Irish farmers. But if

these markets are to be exploited thensubstantial improvements in the qualityand volume of agricultural output willbe required, necessitating in turn, sig-nificant alterations in the structure ofIrish farming and traditional techniques.Only substantial changes in the present

armoury of Government subsidies andprice supports will secure this.

But these are far from the only set ofradical changes in policy which theGovernment, however complacently itmay view the election result, seems un-likely to have forced on it. A muchmore immediate, and certainly moredelicate problem than preparing for theEEC is caused by the pressure ofrapidly rising incomes on the economy'snot-so-rapidly-rising productive incomespolicy. For one thing, the economy isnow operating close to capacity andeven the relatively bullish prognostica-tions of the Economic and Social

Research Institute quarterly survey ex-pect prices to rise 6.5% this year andthe deficit on the balance of paymentsto widen to 57 million.

Secondly, and obviously closely con-nected with the first, the results of lastFebruary's strikes may eventually un-leash a chain reaction of comparabledemands among the members of otherunions. Precisely, because the horrorsof a free for all scramble for wageincreases are fairly evenly distributedbetween both sides of industry, theGovernment, and Mr. Haughey in par-ticular, have an opportunity to inter-vene in a manner which could producesome order among forthcoming wageclaims - presumably by getting anagreement on a basic percentage in-crease for all industries.

But such action is essentially amatter of preventing a bad situationfrom getting worse. What is also re-quired is some institutional arrangementwhich will render less likely repetitionsof the Maintenance strike. To that endsomething on the lines of the BritishPrices and Incomes Board may beneeded, although here it might be ques-tioned whether Mr. Brennan, in Labour,is quite the man for the exceptionallydifficult task of setting up such anagency.

But, of course, these areas, sensitivethough they may be, are far from com-prising the complete list of fundamen-tally necessary reforms. Perhaps themost significant of all those not yetmentioned arise from the BuchananReport on physical planning. Followeda few days later by the announcementof a General Election, the BuchananReport barely entered the public con.sciousness. Yet dealing as it does withthe deployment of industry and urbandevelopment throughout the country,and calling for commitment of almost2l billion over the next twenty years,the report could hardly be more signi-ficant for the social and economicfuture of the country.

Unfortunately it is the lot of all plans

3

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for regional development that fewerareas are favoured than are excluded.In the statement which is issued withthe report's publication, the Govern-ment betrayed its fear that theBuchanan Report would lose it morevotes in the rest of the country than it

would gain in Cork or Limerick. More-over, the future appointment of Mr.Blaney, who hails from an area deliber-ately neglected by Buchanan, suggeststhat the Government is unlikely to fol-low all of its recommendations. How-

ever, any policy is better than none, andthe creation of a special Departmentsuggests that an active programme forurban development will now be pro-moted by the Government.

On the other hand the acquisition ofthe Department for Social Welfare byMr. Boland presumably means a lowerpriority for that section of our socialservices. Certainly, no one would con-sider Mr. Boland one of our morethoughtful and inventive Ministers. Heis, however, capable of carrying ontraditional Fianna Fail policies which inSocial Welfare have consisted in minoradjustments to existing benefits as andwhen a fairly parsimonious estimate ofthe health of the exchequer permits.

The trouble is that raising the levelof Social Welfare benefits is likely tomeet increasing difficulties for so longas Mr. Boland adheres to flat-rate insur-ance contributions from employers andemployees. Only a shift to the moreequitable system of graduated contribu-tions will allow the degree of buoyancyrequired to finance a modern system ofSocial Welfare benefits. In the healthservices, where the somewhat moreenterprising Mr. Childers now holdssway, the collision between the cost ofimproved services and the inadequacy

4

of a narrow and regressive revenuebase, has already occurred. There therising burden of health charges on the

rates has provoked Dublin City Councilinto refusing to strike an adequate rate.While part of the resentment againstrates stems from the speed with whichthey have risen, much is derived fromthe knowledge that the rateable valua-tions constitute an extremely archaictax-base with numerous anomalies andinjustices.

Unfortunately, the solution to thisproblem also lies in Mr. Boland's terri-tory where he continues to control theDepartment of Local Government.Moreover, an Interdepartmental Com-mittee on local finance recently arguedagainst any change in the use of ratesas a main source of local authorityfunds. And this despite the fact thatseveral different types of tax, enter-tainment taxes, turnover taxes, etc.,have been in use in other countries.Nevertheless, in respect of both Healthand Social Welfare, unless the Govern-ment succeeds in breaking away fromsystems of taxation laid out in the 19thcentury further development of the ser-vices will meet increasing popularopposition. Developing new sources offinance for the social services is one ofthe more urgent necessities facing thecountry and one of the Government'smost difficult political problems.

Very different are the difficulties

facing the Government in its educa-tional policy. Here the disaffected arenot the public at large, which probablyhas greater approval of Governmentpolicy in education than Governmentpolicy on any other department, butrather the teachers and, less noisily butno less determinedly, the staffs of thetwo universities.

The dispute with the teachers is asmuch a consequence of internal rivalriesin the profession as it is of ministerialhamhandedness - though of that therehas been a fair amount. So, althoughMr. Faulkner's tact, impartiality andability to secure the confidence of all

those involved with education, can helpto secure agreement on salaries amongthe teachers, the ultimate solution liesin the distant future. For it will only bewhen the training, social backgrounds,and promotional opportunities are thesame among the three branches of theteachers, that rivalry between them will

cease.The other acute problem awaiting the

Government's attention in the educa-tional field also arises out of disagree-ments between members of the educa-tional profession-if one can so describeall those who teach in primary, secon-dary and higher education. In this casethe disagreement lies in the failure of

the two universities in Dublin to findsome means of following through the

proposal of Mr. O'Malley that theyshould merge. Unless the Council onHigher Education can perform somevery remarkable feats of diplomacy theMinister for Education will be facedwith the unpleasant choice of ridingroughshod over the inclinations of all

the staffs concerned or retreating fromthe Government's stated objective be-hind a smoke screen of "co-operation,""joint operation," and the like.

In short, Mr. Lynch and his partywent into the General Election of 1969

prormsmg the public no more and noless than a continuation of the policieswhich they had followed since Mr.Lemass's accession to power. They werereturned with a handsome margin ofsuperiority and Mr. Lynch constructeda Cabinet, which, despite numeroussuperficial changes, accurately reflectsthe character of the party's electoralvictory. But whatever the peoplethought when they voted Fianna Failback into office, the reality of the situa-tion is that there is an urgent need fora wide range of reforms. Some of it,such as the need for an incomes policy,is obvious to the public. Other needs,such as that for a new source of financefor social services, is not so obvious.But taken altogether there is an over-whelming case, so far as the good of thecountry is concerned, for turning asidefrom the implications of the GeneralElection and launching into a period ofreform. Should Fianna Fail do just that,then the 19th Dail will see some of themost fundamental legislation since thefounding of the state. But should theGovernment party follow the quiescentpolicies implied by the shape of the newCabinet then the next five years shouldsee Fianna Fail continually surprised by

events, and increasingly certain ofbeing out of office in the 20th Dail.

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SPEAKING IN THE DAIL on theapproval of members of the Govern-ment, Ritchie Ryan said that thoseMinisters who are able are nothonest and those who are honest arenot able. If the Taoiseach chooseswhen he is re-shuffling the cabinet orappointing the Parliamentary Secre-

taries, he can have a man who ispalpably both able and honest-Michael O'Kennedy, the new FiannaFail T.D. for North Tipperary.

O'Kennedy, a good-looking blondsix-footer, was born 33 years ago inNenagh, Co. Tipperary. He attendedthe local National School, theChristian Brothers and later St.Flannan's, Ennis. When O'Kennedywas 15 his father-who was a shop-keeper-died, leaving six children ofwhom Michael was the eldest boy.

The subsequent years were ones ofsome hardship for the O'Kennedyfamily but ones which the newdeputy remembers with pride.

At 17 years of age O'Kennedywent to Maynooth to "give thepriesthood a try." He tried it for Hyears, found it didn't suit him andleft. While there he made friendswith another fellow-student now alsopolitically prominent, John Hume,Stormont M.P. for Foyle.

On leaving Maynooth O'Kennedywent to D.C.D., where he resumedhis studies of classics. He had wonfirst place in the County Councilscholarship. exam but had to supple-ment the 90 plus fees allowanceaccruing to him from that, by part-time teaching and grinding. He got

1st class honours in his B.A. andagain honours in his M.A. (also inclassics).

While his devotion to classics wasand remains profound - he felt theinkling to enter public life ever sincehe left Maynooth and with this inview he commenced legal studies inthe King's Inns. One year later, how-ever, feeling the itch to travel hewent to Switzerland for a year,where he taught in an internationalschool.

On his return he resumed his legalstudies while living off income de-rived from teaching in Ringsend

Technical School. He was called tothe Bar in 1963 and began the hardgrind on the Tipperary circuit-however, though lacking any legalcontacts initially - his likeabilitysoon won him goodwill amongsolicitors.

In 1963O'Kennedy formally joinedFianna Fail-having been an activesupporter of the party since hisinfancy. His father had been afounder member of the party but hehad left it in 1947 to become Direc-tor of Elections for Clann na Pob-lachta in the Tipperary by-election of

that year. The senior O'Kennedynever re-joined Fianna Fail thoughhe left the Clann on the day afterthe first Coalition Government wasformed.

Fianna Fail traditionally had twoseats in North Tipperary. However,they lost one to Fine Gael in 1961.(Fine Gael had been represented inthe constituency by Dan Morrissey,former Minister for Industry andCommerce, until 1957-it then lostits seat to Labour-so that really itwas Labour which "held" the secondFianna Fail seat.) The Fianna Failbosses recognised that they needed

an attractive candidate to recapturethe seat and they turned to MichaelO'Kennedy-the dashing young bar-rister in the area (who had justmarried a very presentable youngAthlone girl). O'Kennedy put up amagnificent show but just failed towin the seat.

In the midst of his disappointmentit was suggested to him that he tryfor the Senate and he jumped at theprospect. O'Malley, Lenihan andHaughey pushed his nominationthrough the party for the Educa-tional and Cultural Panel and he wascomfortably elected along with Liamo Buachalla and J. Nash on the samepanel.

Immediately O'Kennedy was ap-pointed on the Senate front bench ofhis party and made a consistentlyfavourable impact on all members.Garrett Fitzgerald's admiration forhis qualities is very high "but I don'tknow what on earth he is doing inFianna Fail!"

On several occasions O'Kennedylead mini-party revolutions in theSenate-notably on the SuccessionBill-where his legal expertise stoodto him well. It was on this occasion

that Brian Lenihan, then Minister for[ustice, was heard to remark to hiscivil servant who was insistent onnot giving in "but what can I dowith our front bench in revolt?" Atthe end of the Committee stage onthat Bill Garrett Fitzgerald remarkedon how constructive and effective

opposition could be in the Senate (ithad forced through amendmentswhich had been rejected in the Dail),O'Kennedy irately shot to his feet toclaim that the opposition had comefrom his side of the house!

O'Kennedy enjoyed his four yearsin the Senate where he was verypopular. He became a good friend ofthe late Ben O'Quigley, the formerleader of Fine Gael in the Senate.He marvelled at his dedication onthe donkey work in Committee.From his experience, O'Kennedy re-

jects the idea of a purely vocationalSenate which, in his view, would betoo sectarian and divisive. He prefersthe present system, i.e., mix ofvocationalism and party politics,"what's wrong with party politics?"

While in the Senate O'Kennedyastutely "nursed" North Tipperaryin careful preparation for the nextelection. He held weekly "confes-sions" and took up residence againin Nenagh.

When the sitting Fianna Fail T.D.John Fanning announced his decisionto retire O'Kennedy was the obviousheir apparent, and in the recent elec-tions he topped the poll, winning onhis own, 30% of the first preferencevotes, bringing in with him one of

his running mates, Michael Smith ofRoscrea, thereby depriving Labourof its seat which was held by Sean

Tierney who had also retired.O'Kennedy's political outlook would

seem to reflect in an unusuallysophisticated manner the currentattitudes of Fianna Fail, i.e., slightlyright of centre. He defends theCriminal Justice Bill on the ground'sthat no rights are absolute and mustbe subjected, as in the constitutionto law and order. "Those who arethe most vociferous opponents of theBill become its most vociferous sup-porters-having been caught for two

hours in a traffic jam because ofsome demonstration." He favoursthe merger on the O'Malley groundsthat Dublin cannot afford two secondrate universities. In general he sup-ports the economic growth phil os-ophy-"for without more wealth wecannot relieve the hardship of theunderprivileged."

His classical background has givena dimension to his thought unusualin a politician.

We will be hearing much more ofMichael O'Kennedy in the next fouryears.

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THE CONVENT

C R U SAD EIT WAS certainly Jack Lynch's cam-paign. By car, aeroplane and helicopterhe crisscrossed the convents of the

country in one of the greatest crusadessince the holy wars of the Chief. Butas always nowadays it was CharlieHaughey's idea.

Six months ago Haughey made up hismind when the Taoiseach should callan election. He had felt the revival ofthe party's morale from the doldrums ofthe referendum defeat. Despite theinstant economic crisis of March heappreciated that the country's moodwas buoyant and optimistic-but, mostof all, he saw the opposition partiesmake a mess of it.

Haughey-who still thinks that hewould make a better Taoiseach thananybody else-realised that the bestthing Fianna Fail had going for themwas J ack Lynch-therefore the strategywas to expose Jack as much as possibleand he got his Tacateer friends DesMcGreevey and Eoin Kenny to plan

Jack's job of journeywork.When the budget began to shape up

well the final decision was made to goto the country in mid-June. Neil Blaneywas the most outspoken opponent ofa J une election-wanting to postponeit until the autumn-but Charlie hadmade up his mind. So when the budget,the Electorate Amendment Bill and theFine Gael Ard Fheis were out of theway--off they went.

Charlie with Desmond O'Kennedywrote and designed all the advertise-ments-wrote the T.V. scripts for allFianna Fail speeches and quite a fewother speeches for the Taoiseach as well.And all this was while he frequentlywas doubled in pain with a stone inhis kidney.

While Haughey proved himself as afirst rate backroom boy-Jack wasproving himself as an excellent frontman. Despite an inauspicions start tohis tour in Kilkenny, and minorincidents in the Gaeltacht and Dundalk-his country-wide. parade was a mag-nificent success. Charges of arrogance,

corruption and dishonesty just don'tstick to Lynch-the affable sportsman.He could talk knowledgably abouthurling and football to the old stalwartsand young aspirants at every cross-roads-and his ever-sure belt of thesliothar didn't do any harm either.

Jack's tour was not one of a compelling,exciting leader of the Kennedy mouldor of the awe-inspiring mystique of thede Valera-de Gaulle ilk, but rather ofthe hurling hero who exemplified thosequalities most beloved in rural Ireland-true sportsmanship, skill and quietdetermination. The times when onlyhe could clear the raging crowds fromThurles and Killarney pitches by a few

quiet words, "Come on now lads-getoff the field." And of the countless

6

hurling feats he accomplished withoutever deliberately fouling-were recalledagain and again even in the land of the

old foe-Tipperary. They seemed muchmore important than the third pro-gramme or the Buchanan report andmaybe rightly so.

Looking back now some Fianna Failpeople said that the convents wereoverworked-but Jack's rendering of"The Bould Thady Quill" to the nunsand two-stepping with the sisters-proved the goodness that was in himand "sure anyone that would be goingagain him must be a communist," andthe word went out the children werefather of the men.

"Let's back Jack" was the campaign'sbest slogan-for it got the messagethrough and the issue was very clearly"do we want to risk these commies orthese Fine Gael "do dahs" or bothtogether, when we can have honestdependable Jack-one of our own. HadCharlie left the backroom more oftenthe result might have been different-but he knew better.

Blaney stayed up in Donegal-heknew better too-and wouldn't evencome down to do the T.V. broadcast.Paddy Hillery filled in and Blaney didn'tgive a tupenny curse. Colley tried toangle in on the act by announcing anew dollop of factories. Charlie wasfurious and so was Jack and that wasthe end of the factories.

The "Fine Gael Will Win" bannerwas a sick joke from the outset and wasrivalled by the "Fine Gael are Ready toGovern" with the pinchy photograph ofa moth-eaten Cosgrave underneath.'Leave Liam Alone" might have beenmore apt-except for the fact that no-body needed to be told. Poor Liamwasn't up to the crusading lark andthere were few nights he didn't sleepin his own little bed at home-and fewmornings that saw him out before half-ten. But then Liam's idea of a full-timepolitician's week is 6 hours for threedays, 2 on one other day and the tele-phone off the hook after 7,00 p.m. every

evening.Liam didn't read too bad in thepapers when Michael Sweetman couldtake time out from his own campaignin Dublin North West-but on his ownwe had the "reports coming in from thecountry indicating a massive swing toFine Gael" and the like.

But Liam wasn't entirely to blame.Tom O'Higgins didn't move far beyondSouth County Dublin-and him thePresidential candidate and a greatreputation all over.

Gerry Sweetman-apart from beingeaten up by Haughey on T.V. laid lowand the party's whiz-kid Garret Fitz-gerald huffed in South East over the

treatment meted out to Maurice "TheLiberator" O'Connell. Declan Costello

went off to sulk in Spain leaving hisJust Society to rot on the lips of theRitchie Ryans and the Paddy Donegans.

Apart from Jack himself-"Brending"Corish made the best effort. He didhis stint in the country and if he leftthe New Republic in Earlsfort Terraceafter him-what matter. BrendanHalligan "the cleric in mufti" workedhard that his chausables and soutans areall hanging off him. And litttle help hegot from the new recruits. Thornleybeamed from behind his battered noseat the housewives of Glasnevin andBallymun and who cares about socialismwhen you've got sex appeal?

The Cruiser was the stickiest of themall-he went after the biggest fish inthe pool and stayed there nibbling athim and sure enough he got into theDail clinging on to Haughey's throat.

It was such a pity about all thosesmears really-wasn't it? It's such a

shame that in this day and age peopleshould be called "communists" and"queers".

Anyway-'twas quite an interestingcampaign in the good old style (andnone of your Marshall McLuwan T.V.guff). 'Twill be better next time aroundwhen Jack is in the Park and Charlie,Conor and Garret will be doing therounds.

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By GA RRETT FITZGERAL D

A STRIKING FEATURE of the 1969General Election campaign was theevidence of a marked swing against theGovernment in the Dublin area. Yetalthough when the votes were countedthis swing was as evident as during thecampaign itself - the Government

party's share of the Dublin vote wasreduced by no less than 18% - FiannaFail nevertheless returned with an in-creased majority, securing 75 seats asagainst the- 72 they won in the 1965General Election. How did this happen?

There are two main reasons for thisout-turn. One is the fact that on thisoccasion, uncharacteristically, the coun-try did not follow Dublin at all; indeedoutside Dublin Fianna Fail's share ofthe poll was fraction tally higher than in1965-47.65% as against 47.5%. Theother reason was that Fianna Fail'svotes yielded a higher return in seatsthis time, partly, but not solely, because

of the way in which the constituencyrevision was carried out by the Govern-ment.

The Differential SwingWhile there is a clear contrast

between the drop in Fianna Fail's shareof the poll in Dublin, (from 48.2% to39.5%, a fall of almost one-fifth), andthe stability of its vote in the rest of thecountry taken as a whole, there aremarked regional differences in the vot-ing pattern. Comparisons with the 1965General Election are of course rendereddifficult by the extensive changes inconstituency boundaries, but it is pos-sible by grouping certain constituenciestogether - e.g. those of North Leinstertogether with Monaghan and Cavan; orDonegal together with much of Con-naught and Clare-to make valid com-parisons between the results of the twoelections.

The country may be divided into fivewell-defined geographical regions forthe purpose of this analysis. First of allin the cities of Dublin and Limerick,(but not Cork), there was a very largeswing to Labour, principally at the ex-pense of Fianna Fail but also, to a smalldegree, at the expense of Fine Gael.

In the east and south-east outsideDublin there was a clear-cut and almost

universal swing from Fianna Fail toFine Gael. Of the areas in this region inrespect of which valid comparisons canbe made, only Louth failed to show thispattern. There the three parties' sharesof the vote were almost completelystatic. It is possible that Fine Gael'sfailure to achieve gains at the expenseof Fianna Fail in Louth may have hadsomething to do with disagreementswithin the Fine Gael organisation overthe question of a candidate from Dun-dalk. Labour's position within thiseastern and south-eastern area variedsomewhat from place to place; it heldits own in Wicklow and in Louth, and

lost very little ground in the rest of the

"Overall majority a result

of gerrymandering"

northern part of this area, but it suf-fered set-backs in Carlow-Kilkenny, inWaterford, and, to a lesser degree, inWexford, Brendan Corish's own con-stitunecy. There the situation was com-plicated by the presence this time oftwo Independent candidates but iftheir votes are allocated to the parties

which benefited from their elimination,emerges that Labour's share of the partyvote fell slightly from 321,% in 1965 to31% this time.

The third area to be considered isCork and Kerry. There the two mainparties both gained votes at the expense

of Labour and Independents-Fine Gaelgaining a little more than Fianna Fail.

In the middle of the country, in thecounties of Laois, Offaly and Tipperary,Fianna Fail gained from both Labourand Fine Gael- principally from theformer party.

And finally in the West of Ireland,

from Clare to Donegal, Fianna Failgained ground slightly at the expense ofFine Gael almost everywhere, increasingits share of the poll on average by about3% or 4%. As Labour also securedmore votes than previously, partly as aresult of putting up candidates wherenone had stood for Labour in 1965,Fine Gael's share of the vote was cutby about 7t% on average in this region.

Thus Fine Gael gained ground in theeast and south, and lost some supportin Dublin and Limerick, and in themidlands and west. Fianna Fail lostheavily in the cities of Dublin and Lim-erick and also lost support throughout

the east and south-east, but gainedsome ground everywhere else. AndLabour gained ground in Dublin andLimerick, held its own in parts ofLeinster, and gained a little support inthe west, although this was somewhatillusory in character, reflecting ratherthe presence for the first time of Labourcandidates in some areas than a swingin votes. In the midlands, south-eastand south, Labour lost a lot of ground-and a number of seats.

One result of this very mixedgeographical voting system is that theregional disparities in the votingstrengths of the two principal partieshave been greatly reduced. In 1965 FineGael polled 35% less votes than FiannaFail in the east and south of thecountry; this time its vote was only2 5 % lower than that of Fianna Fail inthis area. By contrast in the rest ofIreland, where in 1965 Fine Gael's votewas only 18% below that of Fianna Fail,

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it is now running about 26% belowFianna Fail's. Thus the two principalparties are now similarly matchedthroughout the country as a whole.Labour, by contrast, which previouslyhad at least one-fifth of the votesthroughout the south-east and south,including Tipperary, now finds itself

with this proportion of the vote only inDublin, Wicklow, Wexford and Water-ford. It is now much more of a regionalparty than previously.

The Seat/Vote RatioSo much for the way the votes went.

What about the seats?Everyone knows that in this election

Fianna Fail's votes yielded them moreseats than previously. Although theGovernment party's share of the totalvote was reduced by over 4%, its shareof seats in the Dail was increased by4%. Only once before in its history hasFianna Fail secured such a large bonus

of seats, beyond the proportion towhich its share of the votes entitled it.In the exceptional circumstances of1943, when almost one-fifth of the elec-torate voted for candidates other thanthose nominated by the three main

parties, Fianna Fail's share of the seatswas almost 16% greater than its shareof the votes. On no other occasion has

there been a disproportion as great ason this occasion; Fianna Fail's share ofthe seats is now 14% greater than itsshare of the votes.

Of course the largest party alwayssecures some 'bonus' of this kind. Thusin 1965 Fianna Fail's share of seats was

just under 5% greater than its share ofvotes, and in the five elections between1951 and 1965 the 'bonus' averagedabout 6%. If in this election FiannaFail's bonus had been of average size,its reduced share of the vote wouldhave given it 70/69 seats. If its 'bonus'had been the same as in 1965 it wouldhave had 69 seats. Instead it has 75.

Why?To answer this question satisfactorily

it is necessary to look at the regionalresults in some detail. In this electionFianna Fail secured 39t% of theDublin vote, but secured 17 out of 38

Dublin seats - 45% of the seats, or 2more than its share.

This reflects the result of the revisionof constituency boundaries in Dublin,and the introduction of 4-seat constitu-encies in as many cases as possible,which certainly ensured a bonus of 2seats. It should be said that this bonusalready existed in the last Dail when the1961 distribution yielded 1 or 2 moreseats than Fianna Fail's share of thevote entitled it to. In other words the4-seat device in Dublin merely pre-served a bonus which Fianna Failalready had, and did not contribute tothe increased bonus it secured this timeAt the same time the Dublin redistribu-tion was extremely ingenious, and inconjunction with the fact that FiannaFail's share of the vote fell below 37t%-the critical figure to secure 2 out of4 seats-in only two of ten constituen-cies, it enabled Fianna Fail to hold anadvantage that might otherwise have

been lost.The areas where Fianna Fail secured

extra seats as a result of its additional'bonus' were Cork, Waterford, Laois-Offaly, and the west, where it securedtwo extra seats. It is arguable also that

NOTE: The areas dealt with above are those in respect of which reasonably valid comparisons are possible between the 1965 and1969 General Elections. There are minor differences in boundaries between three groups of areas, viz. betweenN. Leinster/Cavan/Monaghan and the area described as the Rest of the West; between Cork and Kerry; and between

West Galway and the area described as the Rest of the West; but these differences are too small to have any significanteffect upon the figures.

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its retention of 4 seats in Co. Limerick,despite a drop in its share of the votefrom 54% to 45% also represents anextra 'bonus', but as half its drop invotes in Limerick was due to the inter-

vention of Mrs. Hilda O'Malley, it isarguable whether a fairer distributionof seats within Limerick would in facthave led to the loss of a Fianna Failseat.

If one examines the five constituen-cies mentioned above, one finds that intwo cases the Fianna Fail gains werelargely fortuitous viz. in Laois-Offalyand in Waterford. In both cases theconstituency boundaries remained un-changed, and Fianna Fail gained seatsfrom Labour because the Labour shareof the poll dropped.

In the other three cases however, it isfair to credit the constituency redistri-

bution with the gains secured by FiannaFail. Of course in Cork the drop inthe Labour poll would in the normalway have led to the loss of one seat byLabour, which would have gone to FineGael. But owing to the redistribution ofthe Cork constituencies Labour lost notone seat but three-and Fianna Fail andFine Gael each gained one more seatthan their shares of the poll entitledthem to.

But the main gain from the constitu-ency redistribution was obtained in thewest, with its solid mass of 3-seat con-stituencies. In the last Dail Fianna Fail,with 50i% of the votes in this area,secured 54!% of the seats-18 out of33. This was one more than its share;with this proportion of the vote itshould have had 17seats.

To sum up then-Fianna Fail's shareof the vote entitled it to 66 seats in thisDail. The normal 'bonus' secured by thelargest party under PR, with constitu-encies ranging from three to five seats,would have raised this to 69 or 70, andit is possible that because of special cir-cumstances in this election-the declinein Labour support in certain rural areaswhere they had only a tenuous hold oncertain marginal seats - this figuremight have been raised to 71 or 72. Butthe fact that the Government has an

overall majority of 75 seats is the directresult of the gerrymandering of Corkand of the west, and the way in whichthe 4-seat constituencies in the Dublinarea preserved an abnormally large'bonus' secured, perhaps fortuitously,by Fianna Fail in the 1965 election.

At the same time the gerrymanderwould not have given Fianna Fail anoverall majority had it not been for thatparty's success in improving its poll inthe west and south, and part of themidlands, which went a long waytowards offsetting its loss of votes toLabour in Limerick and Dublin and toFine Gael in the rest of the east and

south-east.

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Sl A GNA l i ON OR

RENEWALFINE GAEL has greeted the electionresults with predictably diverse re-actions. On the one hand the conserva-tive wing gloat at the repudiation of

LI AM COSGRAVE

"May not lead the Party into anotherGeneral Election."

Labour and its own re-establishment "asthe only alternative to Fianna Fail,"while at the same time blaming Labourfor handing the election to the govern-ment by refusing to co-operate. On theother hand, the younger and moreradical elements view the results as adefeat of old fashioned Fine Gaelismas exemplified by Gerard Sweetman,and point to the hypocrisy of the

conservatives in blaming Labour for notco-operating when they themselvesopposed any form of co-operation what-soever. Fine Gael is still essentiallythe same.

One thing that seems reasonablycertain is that Liam Cosgrave will notlead the party into another GeneralElection. However, his departure willprobably be somewhat more dignifiedthan Dillon's following the 1965 GeneralElection. One cannot point to anysubstantial source of support forCosgrave within the party. He has longbeen discredited in the eyes of the left-wingers and his reputation among theother party members has consistentlysagged since the referendum. Even hismajor prop, Gerard Sweetman, cannotnow be relied upon, for Sweetman

undoubtedly sees the writing on thewall, and will now be concerned notso much to protect Cosgrave as toensure that an "undesirable" will notsucceed.

Surprisingly, there is no shortage ofcandidates for the leadership. PaddyDonegan has nursed secret ambitionsfor over a year now and a few monthsago held a top-secret meeting inAthlone to boost his candidature.Donegan was elected Vice-Chairman ofthe party by a large vote at the recentArd Fheis but in view of the blatantfiddling of the ballot this result is notof itself significant. If Donegan were tomake it , which is unlikely, Fine Gaelwould become a rural based taca-party,even more conservative than the FiannaFail urban based one, and, needless tosay the left-wingers would depart enbloc. Donegan would be a likelycandidate with Sweetman's support and

in the absence of another right-of-centrecandidate he could muster a few votesfrom the diminishing number of T.D'swho consider that Fine Gael has strayedtoo far from its traditional businessman and professional base.

Another contender would likely be

Tom Fitzpatrick, T.D. for Cavan, whowould probably run as a middle-of-theroad man but with a little moredynamism than Cosgrave. At themoment his campaign has just begunand one cannot really determine thestrength of his possible support. How-ever, his election would be alsoanathema to the left and he would beunlikely to contain the ambitions of theother aspirants. With Fitzpatrick asLeader, Fine Gael would change hardlyat all and would drift with the prevail-ing political tide.

Of course, the obvious successor to

Cosgrave is Tom O'Higgins, the formerPresidential candidate and currentlythe party's spokesman on Finance.O'Higgins, though stodgy, is consider-ably less so than either Donegan orFitzpatrick, and he is, perhaps, the only

one of the three, that could now keepthe party together. Whereas, underO'Higgins there would be few dramaticchanges, nevertheless, the influence ofprogressives, such as Garret Fitzgerald,would be more keenly felt than now,and the possibility of co-operation withLabour would be enhanced.

A long-term possibility is Garret Fitz-gerald. Currently, his popularity in theparty is at a rather low ebb, for he has,apparently, been seen to breach partydiscipline which, of course, is themortal sin in the Fine Gael book. Tomany of the backbenchers Fitzgerald isa little too clever and, of course, to theSweetman mob he is a dangerous leftie.

However, Garret's prestige in the party

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1

MICHAEL SWEETMAN

Tried hard in Dublin North-West

is likely to improve with his Dailperformances. For the party will seehim, for the first time, using consider-able powers of intellect and personalityin the daily battle with Fianna Fail,rather than in the party rooms againstthe Fine Gael establishment. Allpoliticians admire winners and Garretis likely to be a winner-at least in theDail. Of course, with Fitzgerald asLeader of Fine Gael the party would beentirely transformed and the overall

political stagnation arrested. For Fitz-gerald would move Fine Gael signifi-cantly leftwards towards the LabourParty and a coalition between the twowith Fitzgerald as Taoiseach would bean inevitability.

The chances of Fitzgerald becomingleader' would appear to be decidedlyremote at this stage, for the oppositionhewould encounter from the Sweetman/Donegan and possibly Fitzpatrick nexuswould beformidable. I n any event, thereare genuine misgivings, even amongGarret's most ardent admirers about hisleadership qualities. Indeed, those veryhuman qualities of unusual toleranceand fair-mindedness, which Fitzgerald

possesses in abundance, could well behis greatest defects as leader.

In the hearts of a few remainingstarry-eyed optimists in the party therestill lingers hope that Declan Costellowill come back and lead Fine Gael outof limbo. Costello, of course, had heremained in politics, would have beenthe obvious successor to Cosgrave.However, his refusal to stand in thiselection, whatever his disillusionmentwith Fine Gael as it was, is regarded asan act close to betrayal and many ofhis former friends won't quickly forgetit. However, stranger things have beenknown to happen in politics and the

Costellos have always been a law untothemselves.

The outcome of the Senate electionwill have a significant bearing on theemerging leadership contest. If people

like Alexis Fitzgerald and MichaelSweetman get elected, then TomO'Higgins would seem to be assured ofthe leadership if he wanted it, which is,of course, a moot point. Otherwise,Garret Fitzgerald's chances would beenormously enhanced.

One significant factor in the Fine Gaelequation now is the absence of JamesDillon. Dillon, through his prestige andpowers of persuasion, was a hugeconservatising influence within theparty, and one who always successfullysquashed any leadership crisis by hisrhetorical pleas for party unity against

the common enemy. His absence nowmeans that one of the great unifyingbonds of the party is no more and theconservative heavy weight has got offthe scales.

In a sense the country's entire

political development over the nextnumber of years is dependent on theoutcome of the Fine Gael leadershipcontest. If either Donegan or Fitz-patrick win or, by some fluke, Cosgraveremains, then we can expect stagnationand continued political apathy. How-ever, if either O'Higgins or Fitzgeraldmake it, and particularly the latter, thenwe would seem to be assured of aradical alliance between Fine Gael andLabour, and in the next election a realalternative to Fianna Fail.

Really, the choice is between stagna-tion or renewal.

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Declan Costello, age 42, married, with5 children-son of former Taoiseach

J ohn Costello, educated at Xavier'sCollege, Donnybrook, U.CD. (B.A. 1stClass Honours Economics) and theKing's Inns. Called to the Bar in 1948

and to the Inner Bar in 1965 where heis now one of the country's leading

senior counsels.He was first elected to the Dail in

1951 as Fine Gael TD. for DublinNorth West. It is widely believed thathe was omitted from the Cabinet of thesecond Inter-Party Government (1954-57) because his father was Taoiseach.Nevertheless, he remained very activeduring that period as an ardent advocateof progressive social and economicpolicies.

Following numerous unsuccessfulattempts from 1957-1964 to persuadeFine Gael to move lejtuiards he finallysucceeded in 1964, with the aid of a

Fianna Fail inspired press leak, to havethe draft of a new policy programmeadopted by the party. Then single-handed he pushed through the policy"Towards a J ust Society"-encounter-ing intransigent opposition from theentrenched conservative core-Dillon,Sweetman, O'Higgins (Michael)-suspi-cious apathy from the majority of theremainder and some support from hisfather, Paddy McGilligan, Pat Harte andDenis Farrelly.

Immediately following the 1965. General Election J ames Dillon resigned

as leader of Fine Gael and Cosgravewas manoeuvred into the leadership by

FINE GAEL AND

LABOUR NOW

By DECLAN COSTELLO

THE RIGHT back-lash is now to beanticipated in Irish politics - not,perhaps, demonstrating the startlingcharacteristics which are to be observedin other countries, but nonetheless

affecting powerfully the future of Irishpolitical development. It is likely toinfluence each of the political parties,but in different ways and in varying

degrees.In the case of Fianna Fail it would

be a mistake to talk in terms of apossible victory of the Right over theLeft. Like many conservative parties,Fianna Fail is divided into factions, notwings. Those who wistfully desire apolarisation of Irish politics and talkof the Left of Fianna Fail and Fine Gael

joining Labour usually have somedifficulty in naming names when theyare asked to particularise-particularlywhen examining Fianna Fail. Indeed it

is almost an impossible task, for itsfactions may start stirring again. But

12

an inner cabal consisting of Dillon,Sweetman and himself. Their mainpurpose was to "block" Costello whoduring the J ust Society "debates" hadshown an alarming amount of ambition.

In 1966 Costello announced hisdecision to retire from politics forhealth reasons-he had been physicallyand mentally exhausted by the endless

there will be no doctrinal disputes, withone wing triumphing over another. Inrelation to Fianna Fail, therefore, theRight back-lash will not influence thebalance of power within the Party, butit will certainly influence the policieswhich the Party will follow in govern-ment. Fianna Fail has always been aparty which carefully gauges the publicmood. Indeed this is one of its greatestweaknesses, for in spite of the greatpower which it has enjoyed over theyears it has frequently failed to exerciseit, because of its interpretation of whatis politically wise.

Fianna Fail will have taken carefulpolitical soundings in recent weeks. Toits ears these will almost certainly havecontained a simple message. Anythingsmacking of Left-wing policies shouldbe out. To play safe is to be safe.Eschew adventure, in economics, poli-tics, social welfare-at home as wellas abroad. And so the progress anddirection of the government will remainthe same as it has been for years past.No dramatic changes in legislation areto be expected; modest minor improve-ments here and there from time to timeis all that will be thought necessary.

The rule of cautious unimaginativeuninspiring expediency will continue.

and often frustrating committee workon the J ust Society policy.

In November 1968 following appealsmainly from Garret Fitzgerald and theYoung Tiger element in Fine Gael-heoffered to re-consider his decision toretire. But the party hierarchy showedlittle inclination to have him back andeven less inclination to share his ideals-so he stayed out.

Brendan Corish and Brendan Halliganof the Labour Party made incessantefforts at this stage to persuade him to

join their party or to form a new party(the Social Democratic) or even toremain in F ine Gael. Costello, thoughsympathetic to Labour policies believedthat it was futile to operate from sucha meagre base as the Labour Party-impractical to form a new party andpointless remaining on in Fine Gaelwhen Labour refused to join a coalition.

Both Corish and Halligan, while re-

affirming their determination to stayout of a coalition after the 1969election-nevertheless argued that theirdecision was valid only for the imme-diate future and was open to recon-sideration thereafter. Costello wasunimpressed.

With the return of Fianna Fail topower-new political re-alignments willhave to be considered. Declan Costellothough not a member of the 19th Dailwill inevitably be a focal point of anynegotiations or talks on this question.His contribution below begins a debatewhich is likely to dominate politicaldiscussion in the next few years.

It is on the two opposition partiesthat the Right back lash is most likelyto be more directly felt. At first sightit might appear that the Labour partymight suffer the most. After all, it isnow a widely held view that the Labourpolicy documents adopted by the 1969Convention were responsible forLabour's defeat, and it is argued thatthe opponents of the Party's newsocialist image will seek their revenge.But such an argument is a gross over-simplification of a complicated situation.

The concept of the Labour Party,

divided between the decent cloth-capped conservative trade-unionists onthe one-hand, and long-haired intellec-tuals on the other was a caricature (butone which, incidentally Fianna Failsuccessfully paraded in speech andcanvass). Even, however, if it is truethat the conservative element in theParty comprised in the main the mem-bers of the Oireachtas Party electedfrom outside Dublin (and even to thatgenerality there would have to bereservations), a simple counting ofheads will show that there are not somany of them around now. ObviouslyLabour is going to have to do a great

deal of re-thinking, but amongst thedeputies in the Labour party who will

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do the most of H there is a goodmajority of those who supported theNew Republic.

It seems highly probable that theparty must run into serious controversywithin its ranks, but it is equalIyimprobable that decisions wUI be made

which do not have the backing of themajority of the Oireachtas Party. Ifcontroversy erupts into disputes, it isdifficult to see victory going to thosewho are identified with the Right ofthe party. A further factor has also tobe considered.

It is a notorious fact that minorityparties in opposition, unburdened byprospect of immediate governmentalresponsibility, are likely to be moreextreme in their statements and criti-cisms than those who believe them-selves close to achieving power. Thisnatural tendency is, in the case of theLabour Party, likely to be accentuated

by the frustrations and annoyanceswhich the Fianna Fail government willcertainly engender in the months andyears ahead. It would be very surprisingif the Labour voice in the Dail was inany way a muffled one, or if the Labourstance is altered to any significantextent.

Fine Gael finds itself once again inits, by now, accustomed place on theOpposition benches. There is a con-siderable danger that instead of exam-ining itself for possible shortcomings itmay use Labour as a convenient scape-goat. The theory goes this way. Labourstrategy in the election (by refusingcoalition or even support) and/or

Labour policies ("cuban," "foreign" or"maoist" socialism) are responsible forthe fact that Fine Gael is not in power,because the people were given noalternative to Fianna Fail and/orbecause they were frightened intovoting for Fianna Fail.

Before examining the effects of thistheory, a few comments on it shouldbe made A strong case can be madethat the results of this election mighthave been very different if there hadbeen a pre-election programme agreedbetween Labour and Fine Gael and afirm alternative to Fianna Fail offeredto the electorate. The causes of the

failure to achieve such a developmentgo back many years, and to put alI theblame on Mr. Corish is again a grossover-simplification.

But many of those who now blameLabour's strategy were in the past moststrongly opposed to any rapprochementwith Labour, which opposition in turnhad its reactions on Labour thinking.

The suggestion that Fine Gael's failuresare to be blamed on Labour's policies(as distinct from its strategy) alsorequires some analysis. Labour, it issaid, went too far; faced with theprospect of a doctrinaire socialism theelectorate was stampeded into voting

back Fianna Fail into power. But thisis not what happened in Dublin City

(where Labour gained seats) and Labourparty policies are obviously not anadequate excuse for Fine Gael's unsatis-

factory result in the capital. Nor doesit explain Fine Gael's failure to pick upmore seats outside Dublin.

The theory breaks down before theresults in East Mayo, Cavan andMonaghan. Why did these constituenciesgive Fine Gael two seats out of three?Was the electorate in these areasimmune to threats of cuban socialismwhilst people elsewhere were not? Andsurely, if Labour's policies alienated oneof the Opposition parties would it notbe reasonable to expect that this wouldhave been to the benefit of the other.

True or false, the Labour scape-goattheory may gain strength and could

have serious consequences. Most ob-viously, it would deflect attention froman examination of Fine Gael's role inIrish politics and possible explanationsfor its failure seriously to challengeFianna Fail to-date. But furthermorethe adherents of the policy could use itto stultify the efforts of those in theparty who might seek some sort ofunderstanding with Labour in thefuture. Again, now that the challengehas been warded off, the old beguilingidea that Fine Gael alone could beatFianna Fail could gain new recruitsPolicy-making could also be dis-couraged.

There are always those in everypolitical party who are opposed toworking out policies on the groundthat they only divide the party,antagonise support, and give weaponsto the opposition. And those whooppose policy - making because theyusualIy find the results unpalatable willpoint to any streak of pink that mayappear in any Fine Gael statement orspeech and warn of the electoral'dangers of such a line. Fine Gael'smove to the Left might not only grindto a halt-it could also be discreetlyreversed.

These developments could materiallyeffect Fine Gael's relations with the

Labour Party. They could also signifi-cantly affect the long-term prospects ofthe Party itself. It is welI known thatwithin the ranks of Fine Gael there area number of excelIent young intelligentpeople who without hesitation wouldcalI themselves socialists. Their con-tinued presence in the Party is far fromguaranteed, nor is there any firmprospect that there will continue to bean influx of new people with progressivesympathies. Labour supporters find ithard to understand how people withprogressive views either join or stay inthe Fine Gael party. The explanationis not hard to find. Their initial memo

bership may have been the result ofheredity, or friendships or even chance.

But their continued membership dependson a conscious exercise of judgment.Power is what politics is about. Toachieve power to realise certain aimsand ideals is what politicians shouldwork for. Fine Gael with 50 seats isobviously much closer to power than

Labour is. As long, therefore, as thereis a reasonable prospect that Fine Gaelin power would implement the ideaswhich the progressives hold then theattractions of membership of Fine Gaelare clear.

There is, of course, no immediateprospect that the status quo antebelIum will be altered. Decisionstaken in the next few months, however,could have important long-term effects.

There are those in both Fine Gael andLabour who see how disastrous it wouldbe if the 1973 election was fought onthe same terms as the elections of 1969and 1965-disastrous not merely in

terms of electoral support but for thepolitical and economic development ofthe country. To gain support for theirpoint of view is not simply a questionof prevailing over the extreme wings ofthe two parties. The powerful force ofparty loyalties will be encountered.

It is hard for those outside activepolitics to appreciate what this means.

The outside cynic does not realise thatthe great majority of party supportersgive their time and energy out ofgenuine idealism, from no selfishmotive, and with an enthusiasm thatcan sometimes border on fanatacism.Without this dedicated loyalty democra-

tic politics as we know them wouldnot work. If, however, the ultimateloyalty is to the organisation which isto implement the ideas, and not to theideas themselves (as can frequently bethe case) the common good can suffer.Co-operation between parties merely forthe sake of power and to share out the

jobs would be a form of treason. Butto refuse co-operation which couldresult in a government genuinely com-mitted to a programme of social reformcould also be treasonable The best isthe enemy of the good. Both Fine Gaeland Labour could welI believe that agovernment of their own party wouldbe the best for the country. But cir-

cumstances might not permit this.Human nature being what it is, a refusalto compromise may in certain conditionsstem from intelIectual arrogance, orunwillingness to accept responsibility,as welI as from principle.

It is easy enough to sketch a courseof action. It is more difficult toget it accepted as desirable. It ismore difficult still to ascertain thecircumstances in which it should befolIowed. In present circumstances,however, it seems to at least oneobserver of Irish politics that theproblems facing the opposition partiescan only be resolved, and the reforms

required in Irish society assured, byfolIowing the way here indicated.

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IT HAS BEEN a disappointing, embit-tering, but also an enriching andmaturing election for the Labour Party.Disappointing because of its loss of fourseats; embittering because of the cam-

paign of smear and vilification; enrich-ing because of the influx of new"quality" deputies; and maturing for itsnew socialist policies have been elector-ally seasoned.

Of course the Labour Party had beenfoolish to expect to win up to 30 seatsin the election, for while it could reason-ably expect to gain four or five seats inDublin, it should have foreseen thatthese gains would be offset, at leastsomewhat, by losses in the country, not-ably Laois/Offaly, Clare and Kildare.Furthermore, it should have beenrecognised that as the party's new poli-cies were so explicitly urban orientated

this would necessarily occasion a back-lash in the country which could havelost a few seats. Had these rational pre-dictions been made (though it is easy tosay so now with hindsight) by theLabour Party prior to the election,then the euphoria which had so envel-oped the party would not have beenreplaced by such deep depression amongthe rank and file now.

The election has instilled a roaringrancour in the Labour soul which hasunfortunately sometimes exhibited itselfas petty pique. However, the anger isunderstandable when one remembersthe charges of communism, Trinity

queers, etc., and more particularly thecovert rumours. But politics is largelya matter of communication and in fail-ing to dispel the communist and othercharges the Labour men failed as poli-ticians.

But the significant outcome of theelection for Labour is, of course, theradical transformation in the characterof its Dail representatives. During theperiod of the last DaH, the LabourParty contingent was demonstrably un-representative of the new thinkingwithin the Party as exemplified in suc-cessive conferences. The only deputieswho gave any expression to the NewRepublic ideas were Michael O'Learyand, to a lesser extent, Brendan Corish,Frank Cluskey and, perhaps, EileenDesmond. The vast majority of theircolleagues were, at best, unsympatheticto the new trend. Thus, the Labourmovement was, to a large extent, in-cohesive and divided.

The replacement of the hard core ofdie-hards (within Labour terms) includ-ing Tom Kyne, Henry Byrne and PatMcAuliffe, though excluding Mrs. Des-mond, by such articulate spokesmen ofthe new policies as Conor CruiseO'Brien, David Thornley, Justin Keatingand Noel Browne, necessarily re-estab-lishes a unity and cohesion to the Party,

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and, most significantly, gives itsthoughtful policies the mouth-piecesthey demand.

On the question of Labour and ruralIreland it was disastrous of Brendan

Corish to suggest that the countrypeople were not sufficiently sophisti-cated to understand Labour policies.For, apart from the implied insult in-volved, it missed the point. The Labour

CONOR CRUISE O'BRIEN

"An obvious choice as leader ... but not yet."

Party's failure in rural Ireland is

attributable to two factors: the first isthat there was never much hard coreLabour support in rural areas anyway,and where Labour held seats it wasattributable to the personality of thecandidates more than a solid Labourvote. Therefore, as happened in four ofthe constituencies where Labour lost aseat, where the "personality" was notstanding again-it was discovered thatthere was simply no substantial Labourvote in these constituencies wherethey lost out. In one case (Waterford-where Kyne would have got in had hestood on his own) the loss was due tobad tactics, and in the other two, Mid-Cork and North East Cork, the re-

arrangement of constituency boundarieswas an important factor.

The second point is that the newLabour policies were never clearlyexplained in a rural or agricultural con-text. Socialism has traditionally been anurban phenomenon and has rarely beenadapted to rural conditions. It is easyto identify the Labour Party with theurban worker - a good deal less easywith the rural worker and small farmer.

Rural Ireland is beset with discontentand despair due to the decay of societythere. This is fundamentally a socialconcern and the Labour Party mustnow analyse the rural problem and

offer remedies consistent with its wideraims.

The influx of the new radicals intothe Party and Dail group paradoxicallywill make the Party less radical and

image-wise, more responsible. Thepower within the Party will now trans-fer to the Dail from the conference-for while the conference will theoretic-ally and perhaps in fact remain thecentre of decision-making it will now beled by the Dail members whose experi-ence of the daily political battle willmature their judgment and refine theirgeneral political approach. This does notmean that the new policies will beabandoned or diluted but rather pre-sented in a more practical, less extrava-gant manner.

The Party cannot for long postponethe leadership question. While BrendanCorish was ideally suited to hold theParty together during its regeneration-it is now clear that the new LabourParty demands a new figurehead andchief spokesman. Fortunately Corish isneither vain nor ungenerous and prob-ably is fully aware of the need forchange himself. Conor Cruise O'Brien isof such remarkably outstanding quali-ties that he is an obvious choice-butnot yet. His own image as a politicianmust mature and he must prove hisdurability and dedication. There will bedemanding tests on one of such diversecompetences and of impatient energies.He must also, of course, prove hisability to get on with lesser mortals. In

two years' time if O'Brien can disciplinehimself to the drudgery of the Dail andavoid Cubanesque blunders-then theLabour Party could be offering thecountry the leader of the century.

And finally to Coalition. Already itis obvious that the Party's attitude ischanged somewhat. The chief proponentof the no coalition idea-MichaelO'Leary-speaking in the Dail on thefirst day of its assembly said that Labourwould not join with any party which didnot sincerely share its beliefs. Gone wasthe "no coalition under any circum-stances" attitude. This change of men-tality is somewhat augmented by the

new deep hatred Labour now share withFine Gael of Fianna Fail. Whereas thisis an inauspicious incentive to cometogether-it could act as a valuablecatalyst. Furthermore, O'Brien, Thorn-ley and Keating cannot be expected toconsign themseves to the oppositionbenches indefinitely. Then, of course,there is Noel Browne who has alwaysbeen sympathetic to the coalition idea.

Despite this obvious thaw in Labour'sattitude to coalition-if Fine Gael re-mains or becomes more conservative-then Labour cannot but refuse analliance and then presumably it isFianna Fail yet again. So it's up to FineGael.

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DR. J OHN O'DONOVAN RETURNS TO POL ITICS

IT IS A SODRCE of some amuse.ment to many of Dr. O'Donovan'sformer students of Economics atU.CD. that "[ohnno" has ended upon the Labour benches of the Dailbesides such unlikely comrades asDr. Noel Browne and Dr. ConorCruise O'Brien.

Dr. O'Donovan has revealed him-

self in his well-attended classes as aneconomist of strikingly orthodoxviews and, potentially, at least, apolitician of decidedly conservativetendencies. Will the professor whoambled so aimably through D.C.D.'sacademic cloisters now prowl thecorridors of power brandishing thethoughts of Chairman Mao? In short,has the genial don become "J ohnnothe Red?" Alas, no ... Dr. O'Don-ovan is not a political transvestite;no incredible change has taken placebeneath the benign exterior and theimpish grin; "Iohnno's" allegiancemay have changed, but his convic-tions have not. His past is chequered,but his record is consistent.

Educated at C.D.S., D.CD., Oxfordand a number of American universi-ties (which include Harvard and theUniversity of Chicago), he holds aDoctorate in Economic Science fromN.D.I., and a B.Litt. from Oxford.He was a Principal Officer in theDepartment of Finance from 1943until he joined the staff of D.C.D. asLecturer in Economic Theory in1951.

O'Donovan's entry into politicshappened in an intriguing manner.Paddy Lynch, now Chairman of AerLingus and a colleague of Dr.

O'Donovan's in the D.C.D. Depart-ment of Economics was during thefirst Coalition Government privatesecretary to John A. Costello, the

Taoiseach. Mr. Costello and his son-in-law Alexis Fitzgerald, (who withLynch was the power behind thethrone) endeavoured to persuadePaddy Lynch to quit the Civil Ser-vice and stand with Mr. Costello asFine Gael candidate for DublinSouth East in the 1954 election. Pro-fessor Lynch, having considered theoffer at some length decided againstbut recommended a colleague andfriend of his at the time, JohnO'Donovan.

Dr. O'Donovan was approachedand accepted because he felt that"the McEntee budget of 1st April,1952 represented a deplorable ap-proach to the finances of the countrywhich was directly intended to provethat McGilligan's system of financewas not genuine." He said that withthe abolition of food subsidieswages rose and the effects of thiswere not really felt for some time.This created difficulties for thesecond Inter-party Government.

O'Donovan stood with Costello inDublin South East in 1954, stating

explicitly at the time that his objectwas to "drive Dr. Noel Browne (whowas standing in that constituencywith McEntee as a Fianna Fail can-didate) out of public life for ever."He achieved his objective, at leasttemporarily by defeating Browne by100 votes and joining Costello andMcEntee in the Dail.

Costello appointed him Parliamen-tary Secretary to the Government.

The appointment proved unfortunatefor O'Donovan and the Minister forFinance, Mr. Sweetman, never goton. The former's undoubted talentswere, to a large extent, frustrated.Dr. O'Donovan commenting on thesecond Coalition Government "wereit not for the influence of Dillon andSweetman there would have been nodifficulties. Dillon wouldn't give

away money to the farmers to com-pensate for the decrease in cattleprices. The difficulty with Sweetmanwas that one couldn't really objectto his first lot of import levies buthe insisted on a second lot in July1956 and in conjunction with thecommercial banks he engineered acredit squeeze behind the govern-ment's back.

Then in autumn in 1956 he in-sisted on a 6 million cut in thegovernment capital programme. Helost 6 million in current revenue-an amount exactly coinciding withthe cut in capital expenditure.

In the 1957 election (following thebreak-up of the second CoalitionGovernment) Browne, who nowstood as an Independent had hisrevenge by defeating Dr. O'Donovanand putting him out of the Dail. Dr.O'Donovan then ran for and gotelected to the Senate where he wasLeas Cathaoirleach, 1959-1961.

In 1960, on his own, he challengedthe constitutionality of the ElectoralAct of 1959 and was successful.

In the 1961 election he again ranfor the Dail for Fine Gael in DublinSouth East but was again defeated.

For a few years Dr. O'Donovan

laid politically low except of course,for his early morning economicsclasses in D.CD. where the storiesof the first and second CoalitionGovernments and Sweetman's diab-olisms were told and retold.

"What brought me back was whenI saw the very strong movementtowards American type capitalism

here in the 60's. I felt a junction offorces had been made in Dublin: thetwo big parties, the directors of thecommercial banks, higher civil ser-vants, a few innocent bishops andindustrialists. This was why I joinedthe Labour Party."

His joining Labour was precipi-tated by attacks on decisions of theE.S.B., Manual Workers Tribunal ofwhich he was chairman, by FiannaFail and Fine Gael.

He never actually resigned fromFine Gael. He quietly withdrew."Actually, I should have left theparty the day James Dillon was made

Leader, but I didn't like to makethings awkward for a new leaderabout whose election there weregrave doubts in the Party."

How does he feel about currentLabour policies? "The great successof the original state enterprises(E.S.B. and the Irish Sugar Company)and more recent enterprises such asNitrigin Eireann Teo., proves con-clusively the case for further devel-opment of carefully chosen stateenterprises. I believe that an indus-trial group merits nationalisationbecause of its extremely badbehaviour over a number of years-the flour millers. Otherwise I

wouldn't dream of nationalising afirm like Guinness or Jacobs. Idisagree completely with anyone whowould want to do so."

"Industrial democracy is givingworkers a say in the conduct of thebusinesses on which their livelihooddepends. It's all nonsense to talk ofindustrial democracy as an objec-tively alien idea. In fact it has beenfound to work for many years inboth France and Germany."

He stood as a Labour candidate inDublin South West in the 1965General Election with Dr. JohnO'Connell, but lost his deposit. Many

of his friends tried to persuade himnot to go forward this time, but hewas adamant and, much to every-one's surprise, including his own, hewon the seat which was expected togo to his running-mate, the youthfulVice-Chairman of the Labour Party,Dermot O'Rourke. "I was acceptedcompletely by Labour branches thistime, unlike the last, when I wasfresh from Fine Gael."

At 61, "Iohnno" begins his secondpolitical life. To many it seems in-congruous that he should beginagain at all, but with Labour-impossible.

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The life and toork of Picasso

PABLO PICASSO was born in Malaga

in 1881. He came of an ancient familyand his immediate relatives werepriests, doctors, or were employed inbusiness. His father was the only artisticmember of the family; he was an artistwho taught in the local art school andran the local museum. Later in Picasso'schildhood they spent four years inCorunna and finally settled in Barcelonawhen he was fourteen. His father wasof course his first master and apparentlyhe was a very precocious child, whotook no interest in his school work atall and only thought about drawing.He asserts that he learnt absolutelynothing at school though this is clearlysomething of an exaggeration as he cancertainly read and write. He was a

student first in the School of Art inBarcelona and later in Madrid. But he

seems to have learnt more from lookingat pictures and reproductions, and fromhis father and friends than from therather dry tuition at the Schools of Art.He was a fantastically accomplisheddraughtsman from his teens and hisacademic prowess was considerable. Hewon many prizes. His stay in Madridwhen he was for the first time isolatedfrom his family, brought him intocontact with poverty and his acutesympathy for the outcasts of societywhich becomes the theme of so muchof his painting must have been arousedthen. He returned to Barcelona aftereighteen months in Madrid and estab-

lished himself among the most radicalartists there.

Picasso visited Paris for the first time

in 1900 and finally he settled there in1904. He has lived in France ever sincethough latterly not in Paris but in theMediterranean area near Cannes. In hisfirst years in Paris he was extremelypoor but survived through the kindnessof a few far sighted patrons and friends.He became a leading figure in avantgarde circles, both literary and artistic,and was a friend among others ofMax Jacob, Gertrude Stein, GuillaumeApollinare, and of course of Matisse,Braque, Derain and the DouanierRousseau.

Picasso said that when he first settledin Paris he was more influenced by VanGogh than anyone else but like all

great artists he has drawn his inspiration

from very widely varying sources whichhe has later transformed into his own

personal statements. Roughly speakinghis pictures about 1900 are akin to

Toulouse Lautrec, Bonnard, Munch andVan Gogh and develop soon into whatis now known as his Blue Period, atime when his subject matter was takenfrom circus life and from the poor, thedepressed, the desperate and the lonely.Frequently his subjects have a strongsocial flavour, as in his AbsintheDrinkers, but always they are haunt-ingly sad. A rather more cheerful periodfollows on about 1905 with a markedlyclassical feeling in his figures. This isknown as his Pink or Rose Period.By 1907 his style was simplifying

markedly and in that year he paintedone of the vitally important pictures of

his career "Les Desmoiselles d'Avignon",This large picture is often claimed asthe first cubist work of art though itpredates this style by some two years.When it was first seen it caused greatdisgust and distress even among hismost devoted admirers though withinmonths it was influential in creating anentirely new trend in art and indeedheralds the break through of twentiethcentury painting. It shows five nudewomen against a blue curtain with astill life of fruit in the foreground. Thethree figures on the left follow directlyon from his earlier work showing hisinterest in the simple planes of earlyIberian sculpture such as had beenrecently discovered in North Spain and

exhibited in The Louvre. But the heads

The MIN 0TAU ROM A CHI A isPicasso's most famous etching. It datesfrom 1935 and is an outstandingexample of the numerous drawings,engravings and pictures in which heuses the symbolism of the ancient mythof the Minotaur, half-bull, halj-manwith figures taken from bull-fighting.In this strange subject the Minotaur, afigure of colossal power and menaceadvances with a drawn sword over agroup of a disembowelled horse and a

dead female matador. This evil figureis stopped by the simplicity of a littlegirl holding a light who is protectingthe man fleeing up a ladder. Twowomen, again symbols of peace, areleaning out of a window with two doveson a ledge. The close connections ofthis print with GUERNICA and itsimplications for the politics of its timeneed no elaboration. It is a tremend-ously impressive design with a superblybalanced use of lights and darks.

of the two figures on the right have asavage vigour which horrified everyone.

Picasso had (rather later than many ofhis friends) discovered the negro markand been overwhelmed by the mag-nificence and directness of this art form.For the first time in "Les Desmoiselles"we find Picasso building his picture intoa solid faceted plane with the back-ground invading the foreground, afeature of his later Cubist work.

The next two years are usuallydescribed as the "Negro period" butthis is rather misleading as the influenceof both Iberian sculpture and Cezanneare also very prominent and all isleading up to the Cubist works of 1909.In fact it was a landscape by Braquewhich was first called Cubist andMatisse Wh0 noticed that it was com-

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posed of 'little Cubes'. In the yearsfrom 1909 to 1914 which are the greatyears of Cubism, Picasso and Braqueworked side by side. It would be

. impossible to say who introduced anyparticular motif or technique into theirpaintings, and frequently it is evenmore difficult to tell their work apart,for they were so deeply involved in thisnew style that they really did create ittogether. It was immediately enor-mously influential and was taken upby Italian, Russian and English paintersusually with a flourish of manifestos

and great references to modern environ-

ment, industry etc. But with Picassoand Braque iti was a new discoverywhich grew naturally out of their earlierwork and was not a manifestation ofany particular point of view. In theirCubist pictures one sees all the facetsof an object simultaneously. Forinstance in a still life one sees thebottom of the bottle as well as the labeland the whole at the top and all arewelded together in series of simpleshapes which are intensely satisfying.

The artist was no longer copying naturebut creating an object with its own lifethrough this new vision where ordinarythings are a starting point and not anend. Naturally this led many to

abstraction but not Picasso whoseinterest in humanity is so deeply seated.

18

He has always remained a figurativepainter.

One of the strange facts aboutPicasso's cubism is its elegance. Hewas so absorbed with his interest inform that the colours of his pictures atthis time are monochrome. This addsa curious sophistication to these mag-nificent, still canvasses. His portraitswhich remain identifiable and his figureshave an intensity which arises fromtheir simplicity. By 1914 these cubistpictures had become much more com-plex frequently incorporating actual

materials like newspaper or wallpaper,

and colour and movement werereturning.During the 1914/18 war his friends

were all dispersed. Throughout thewar his work remained cubist butcolour was once again important andcircus subject matter returned. Hemade a number of incisive line drawingsof his friends, including Stravinsky, andit was at this time he made designs forballets produced by Diaghilev includingParade and The Three Cornered Hat.

The twenties found him working intwo quite separate styles, one veryinfluenced by Greek Art shows a returnto realism with a series of monumentalstudies of women, great statuesque

creations. This largeness of form over-flowed into his Cubist works which

include the Three Musicians (Museumof Modern Art, New York) and the

Three Dancers (the Tate Gallery). Heremovement is all important in creatingthe atmosphere of gaiety and life.

The Surrealist movement was perhapsthe most important artistic event of thetwenties and though Picasso can neverbe regarded as a surrealist painter inthe full sense of the word, he wasassociated with it and his liberation ofthe artist from academic trammels wasof course vital for surrealism as for allother artistic movements till the mid-

THE WEEPING WOMAN etching and aquatint of 1937 isone of the many versions of this theme which include an oilpainting. All of these are ultimately derived from the female

figures in the great mural GUERNICA. In this epic workPicasso conveys the stark tragedy of the women by theconvulsive movement of their heads which fall backwardbut here the emotion is to some extent controlled to suitthe size of the work. The extreme distortion of the eyes andnose is coupled with the almost domestic touch of the hand-kerchief so that the WEEPING WOMAN is changed fromthe archetype of despair in Guernica to something w