This article was downloaded by: [Umeå University Library]On: 04 October 2013, At: 19:54Publisher: RoutledgeInforma Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: MortimerHouse, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK

Journal of Information Technology & PoliticsPublication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information:http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/witp20

Obama's Online Success and European PartyOrganizations: Adoption and Adaptation of U.S.Online Practices in the Norwegian Labor PartyRune Karlsen a ba Department of Political Science, University of Oslob Institute for Social ResearchAccepted author version posted online: 21 Nov 2012.Published online: 16 Apr 2013.

To cite this article: Rune Karlsen (2013) Obama's Online Success and European Party Organizations: Adoption andAdaptation of U.S. Online Practices in the Norwegian Labor Party, Journal of Information Technology & Politics, 10:2,158-170, DOI: 10.1080/19331681.2012.749822

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/19331681.2012.749822

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the “Content”) containedin the publications on our platform. However, Taylor & Francis, our agents, and our licensors make norepresentations or warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose ofthe Content. Any opinions and views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors,and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Content should not be reliedupon and should be independently verified with primary sources of information. Taylor and Francis shallnot be liable for any losses, actions, claims, proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and otherliabilities whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in relation to orarising out of the use of the Content.

This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematicreproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in anyform to anyone is expressly forbidden. Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions

Journal of Information Technology & Politics, 10:158–170, 2013Copyright © Taylor & Francis Group, LLCISSN: 1933-1681 print/1933-169X onlineDOI: 10.1080/19331681.2012.749822

Obama’s Online Success and European PartyOrganizations: Adoption and Adaptation of U.S. Online

Practices in the Norwegian Labor Party

Rune Karlsen

ABSTRACT. The article addresses the influence of U.S. online campaign practices on West-Europeanparty organizations. The empirical case is the Norwegian Labor Party: To what extent did Labor adoptthe online practices of the Obama campaign, and in what sense was the online strategy adapted to fitexisting campaign and organizational structures? Based on the diffusion of technology and a hybridiza-tion perspective on campaign change, it is suggested that the literature on political parties and thenetwork party model in particular is helpful to understand this process. The findings show that theNorwegian Labor Party was highly influenced by Obama’s online campaign and U.S. online prac-tices. However, the practices were adjusted to an existing campaign style and organizational structure.Moreover, an essential part of the online strategy was a thematic network structure that aimed to lowerthe threshold for participation and thereby engage and activate party members, as well as recruit newmembers. Hence, U.S. campaign practices diffuse to Norwegian electoral politics, and the adopted U.S.practices are implemented based on the ideals of the network party.

KEYWORDS. campaigning, hybridization perspective, internet, Norway, Obama, parties

The increasing inclusion of the Internet andthe new social media in election campaigninghas received widespread attention, and espe-cially so during the 2008 U.S. primaries andpresidential campaign. The apparent success ofBarack Obama’s online campaign created muchspeculation as to whether or not the successcould be transferred and replicated in the politi-cal systems of Western Europe. This is also thebackdrop for this article, and the approach is todiscuss and study how party organizations areinfluenced by the U.S. practices of the Obamaonline strategy, how adopted practices are

Rune Karlsen is a postdoctoral fellow at the Department of Political Science, University of Oslo, and asenior researcher at the Institute for Social Research, Oslo.

The author wishes to thank the JITP editors and anonymous reviewers for very helpful comments.Address correspondence to: Rune Karlsen, Department of Political Science, University of Oslo,

P.O. Box 1097, Blindern, Oslo N-0317, Norway (E-mail: rune.karlsen@stv.uio.no).

adjusted to existing practices, and what conse-quences this might have for political parties. Theempirical case is Norwegian electoral politicsand the online practices of the Norwegian LaborParty: To what extent did the Labor Party adoptthe U.S. online practices of the Obama cam-paign, and in what sense were they adapted to fitexisting campaign and organizational practices?

The diffusion of campaign practices fromone campaign context to the next has beendescribed by a “shopping model” (Farrell, 2002;Plasser, 2002). Political parties do not importa whole range of practices, but selectively

158

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Um

eå U

nive

rsity

Lib

rary

] at

19:

54 0

4 O

ctob

er 2

013

Karlsen 159

shop electoral innovations from mostly theAmerican market. However, due to institutionaland cultural differences, imported practices willbe shaped and fused with existing practices(Karlsen, 2010; Plasser, 2002). The differencebetween the candidate-centered U.S. style andthe party-centered West-European style of cam-paigning is essential in this respect (Plasser,2002). In the U.S., the campaign organization isbuilt by the individual candidate, almost fromscratch (Herrnson, 2008). In Western Europe,the party organization is the campaign organi-zation. Consequently, the entities that campaignin the U.S. and Western Europe are quite differ-ent organizations. Chadwick (2007) argues thatpolitical parties are experiencing a process ofhybridization based on the selective transplanta-tion and adaptation of so-called digital networkrepertoires once considered typical of socialmovements. However, his argument is based onthe implementation of such practices by U.S.campaign organizations, organizations that tosome extent resemble social movements morethan they resemble West-European political par-ties. In Western Europe, parties are relatively oldand stable organizations, with existing members,established hierarchies and lines of communica-tion (e.g., Lawson, 2010). Consequently, I willargue that the tools offered by the party liter-ature help to conceptualize the effect of newtechnology on political party organization andcommunication and expand Chadwick’s (2007)hybridization perspective.

The Norwegian Labor Party is an interest-ing case, as Internet penetration in Norway isvery high, and the campaign environment dif-fers from the U.S. situation and resembles theideal West European campaign style (cf. Plasser,2002). The political parties are strong and carrymany of the characteristics of the traditionalmass party (Duverger, 1954; Heidar & Saglie,2003). The Labor Party is the largest, mostresourceful party in Norway. Consequently, theparty had the resources, both regarding person-nel and financially, to invest heavily in its onlinepresence before the 2009 election.

The article proceeds with an account ofthe diffusion of campaign practices and thehybridization perspective on campaign change,a discussion of political parties and onlinecampaigning, and a section that discusses party

models and online practices. In the empiricalanalysis, the extent to which U.S. practices wereadopted by the Norwegian Labor Party and howthese practices were adapted to the campaignenvironment and the existing party organizationis scrutinized. In the final section of the article,I relate the findings to the framework sketchedout initially.

DIFFUSION OF CAMPAIGNPRACTICES AND CAMPAIGN

CHANGE

Diffusion is the process by which an innova-tion is communicated through certain channelsover time among the members of a social system(Rogers, 1995, p. 5). In this article, we are inter-ested in the diffusion of innovations betweensystems. Numerous studies have explored thediffusion of policy innovations from one coun-try to the next (e.g., Dobbin, Simmons, &Garrett, 2007; Teigen, 2012; Weyland, 2005).Among other factors, these studies focus on howpolicies spread because countries copy poli-cies that work elsewhere, and governments canlearn from the successes and failures of oth-ers. Moreover, the perceptions of success willimpact the likelihood of adoption (Dobbin et al.,2007). As mentioned initially, in the literature onpolitical campaigning, such processes are oftenreferred to as a shopping model (Farrell, 2002;cf. Schmitt-Beck, 2007, p. 749). Parties in dif-ferent countries do not import a wide rangeof overseas campaign practices, but selectivelyshop on mostly the American market.

Hence the diffusion of campaign practicescan be related to the hybridization modelof campaign change (Karlsen, 2010; Plasser,2002).1 Plasser (2002) argues that campaignchange can be perceived as a process ofhybridization in which forms become separatedfrom existing practices and recombine with newforms in new practices (cf. Pieterse, 1997).2

In the same manner, different features of U.S.online practices might apply to different cam-paign environments, and when applied, they areshaped in relation to existing campaign practices(Karlsen, 2010; Plasser, 2002).3 As mentioned,Plasser (2002) distinguishes between a U.S. anda West European style of campaigning. In the

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Um

eå U

nive

rsity

Lib

rary

] at

19:

54 0

4 O

ctob

er 2

013

160 JOURNAL OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY & POLITICS

West-European model the party organization isthe campaign organization, and the individualcandidates are rather part of a greater party cam-paign organization, while the candidates buildtheir own organizations in the U.S. campaign.Moreover, the U.S. style is capital-intensive,money-driven, consultancy-based, highly pro-fessionalized, highly individualized, and region-alized in focus, with considerable emphasis onvoter targeting and TV ads. The European style,on the other hand, is party-centered, labor-intensive, publicly financed, managed by partystaff, moderately professionalized, and highlycentralized, with a nationwide focus and lit-tle use of microtargeting strategies and TV ads(Plasser, 2002). Important in our context is thefact that European political parties are more per-manent or at least enduring organizations withmultiple functions and tasks than the more adhoc U.S. campaign organizations.

POLITICAL PARTIES AND ONLINECAMPAIGNING

In the U.S. campaign context, the Internethas had the most influence concerning orga-nizing, financing, and mobilizing electorates.This was already obvious in Howard Dean’s bidto become the Democratic presidential candi-date in 2004 (Chadwick, 2007; Hindman, 2005,2009), which was widely considered—by schol-ars and commentators alike—as the final break-through of the Internet in electoral politics (seeGibson, 2004, p. 100). Hence, in 10 years’ time,some U.S. campaign organizations had movedbeyond thinking of the Web site as an elec-tronic brochure and viewed it as a type of elec-tronic headquarters (Foot & Schneider, 2006,p. 10). The potential and importance of infor-mation and communication technologies (ICTs)became even clearer during Obama’s 2008 pri-mary and presidential campaign (e.g., Lilleker& Jackson, 2011; Vaccari, 2010), and the onlinestrategy has been described as a cornerstone ofthe campaign (Panagopoulos & Francia, 2009,p. 317). Obama’s campaign manager, DavidPlouffe (2009), sums up the use of technology:

Technology played a key role in oursuccess. . . . We realized that a smart and

large Internet presence was the best wayto provide people with the opportunity andthe tools to get involved in the campaign.. . . Established tactics like press inter-views, TV ads, and mail pieces would ofcourse be an important part of our arse-nal. But we put a huge premium on directdigital communication, as well as on thepower of human beings’ talking to humanbeings, online, on the phone, and at thedoor. (p. 378)

Moreover, while the new media group (onlinecommunications, Web-page development andmaintenance, and texting) normally reports tothe communications department in U.S. cam-paign organizations, the head of the newmedia department in the Obama campaign, JoeRospars, reported directly to the campaign man-ager (Plouffe, 2009, p. 36).

The Obama campaign used their social net-working site, MyBarackObama (MyBO), aswell as Facebook, to organize local volunteerson their own initiative (e.g., Lilleker & Jackson,2011). Consequently, a local organization of vol-unteers was often up and running before theObama team was able to place a formal orga-nization in the state. The Obama campaign wassaid to work out of 770 field offices and included1.5 million active volunteers (Panagopoulos &Francia, 2009, p. 317). Moreover, the cam-paign used their mass rallies to collect e-mailaddresses and a large proportion of the atten-dants signed up as volunteers or contributedfinancially to the campaign (Plouffe, 2009,pp. 47–48). In addition to online discussionsand communication, the social networking sitewas especially important for organizing offlineactivities like volunteer groups, meetings, phonecalls, and canvassing efforts (Harfoush, 2009;Plouffe, 2009).4 The online practices of theObama campaign was perhaps not too innova-tive, but relied on practices that has developedover time and can now be considered fairlystandardized U.S. practices (cf. Hindman, 2005,2009, on the Dean campaign, etc.).

The U.S. experience concerning ICTs’influence on fundraising, organization, andmobilization is to some extent less relevantin a West-European context. Studies of ICTs

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Um

eå U

nive

rsity

Lib

rary

] at

19:

54 0

4 O

ctob

er 2

013

Karlsen 161

in electoral politics in Western Europe havefocused on both intraparty use and the externaluse on the electoral arena (cf. Gibson, 2004;Gibson & Ward, 2009). The studies of theparties’ use of the Internet on the electoralarena have mostly focused on the party Websites. In general, Gibson and Ward (2009,p. 93) argue that these studies have revealed twomain tendencies: First, standardization towardinformation dissemination on the party Websites and, second, conservatism when it comesto using the interactive possibilities offered bythe new media. Moreover, Lilleker and Jackson(2011) offer some evidence that parties inthe UK and Germany were influenced by theObama campaign and adopted some of the U.S.online practices, as the 2009 elections saw agreater focus on participatory online practicesin both countries.

PARTY MODELS AND ONLINEPRACTICES

The literature on Web campaigning and theparties’ use of new technology has arguablybeen too far removed from the literature onpolitical parties (see, e.g., Gibson & Ward,2009). However, some scholars have discussedparties and ICTs in relation to ideal partymodels.5 Margetts (2006) has suggested thecyber party model. Her main point is that ICTscould enhance parties at the grassroots levelby offering a looser definition of membership.Løfgren and Smith (2003) argue that ICTsenable both a model where parties use thetechnology solely for marketing purposes, aswell as a model where grassroots are mobilizedthrough the new media.

In a more recent contribution, Chadwick(2007, p. 284) argues that, based on the U.S.context, the Internet, which creates an environ-ment of rapid institutional adoption and exper-imentation, encourages organizational hybrids.For example, regarding political parties, thisimplies that parties are experiencing a process ofhybridization based on the selective transplan-tation and adaptation of digital network reper-toires once considered typical of social move-ments. Chadwick (2007) illustrates his argument

with examples from U.S. politics and especiallyHoward Dean’s 2004 primary campaign. Thepoint is that Dean’s campaign utilized digitalrepertoires like using the Net for mobiliza-tion and coordination developed particularly bythe antiglobalization movement in the 1990s(Chadwick, 2007, p. 286). Chadwick’s argu-ment is fruitful, as it highlights the organiza-tional change of adopting new online practices.However, as discussed above, the primary candi-date’s campaign organizations are not politicalparties in the West European sense, as they arebuilt almost from scratch; this is done not toolong before the primaries, and they are largelyad hoc organizations with the single aim ofgetting the candidate elected (Herrnson, 2008).Consequently, primary campaign organizations’use of new technology might tell us little ofthe organizational impact on established West-European political parties.

The network party model might be more use-ful in this regard (Heidar & Saglie, 2003),6 andexpand Chadwick’s hybridization model. Thepoint of departure for the network party model isnot how technology affects party organizations,but an aim to develop a model—an analyti-cal tool—that incorporates some new tendenciesconcerning the structure and functioning of par-ties. The network party is dominated by theparliamentary-based leadership, but it values itsmass membership as a source of ideas and leaderrecruitment, and aims to increase inclusivenessby lowering the barriers between members andnonmembers.7 Furthermore, the new technologyenables networks that cross existing geograph-ical membership branches, rendering a the-matic network structure possible. Empirically,Heidar and Saglie (2003) found, based on stud-ies of Norwegian political parties, that manyof the structures and practices of the massparty remain, but that network structures haveemerged as an alternative or a supplement. In thenetwork party model, online practices could beused for marketing the political leadership, aswell as to organize, activate, and recruit the partygrass roots (cf. Løfgren & Smith, 2003).

So in conclusion, before we turn to the empir-ical analysis, many of the campaign innova-tions used by the Obama campaign are likelyto be adopted in Europe. The hybridization

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Um

eå U

nive

rsity

Lib

rary

] at

19:

54 0

4 O

ctob

er 2

013

162 JOURNAL OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY & POLITICS

perspective of campaign change, Chadwick’sorganizational hybrid model, and the networkparty model offer tools for anticipating to someextent what is likely to be expected in WesternEurope. Due to differences in the campaignenvironment, and the different structure of WestEuropean political parties, political parties arelikely to adopt some aspects of the U.S. practicesand adapt them to their own campaign envi-ronment and to the existing party organization.In the next section, I explore to what extent theU.S. practices were adopted by the NorwegianLabor Party and how the campaign practiceswere adapted to campaign environment and theparty organization.

U.S. INFLUENCE: NORWEGIANLABOR’S ONLINE STRATEGIES

The Norwegian case is characterized by aparliamentary system, a multiparty system withstrong parties, and a party-centered campaignstyle (cf. Plasser, 2002). Norwegian politi-cal parties are democratic mass organizations.Power is legitimized bottom-up in hierarchicstructures by representative elections. Hence theparties carry many of the characteristics of themass party (Heidar & Saglie, 2003).8 The elec-tion is contested in 19 constituencies, whichhave from 17 (Oslo) to four (Aust-Agder) man-dates.

The Labor Party has been the largest party inNorway since the late 1920s.9 The state fundingof parties is allocated according to the parties’share of the popular vote, so the Labor Partyis also the most resourceful party. It obtained35.4 percent of the popular vote and 37.9 of theMPs at the 2009 election. They formed the so-called red-green government in a coalition withthe Socialist Left Party and the Centre Party in2005, and the three parties managed to main-tain their majority in parliament (the Storting)after the 2009 election, and the Labor PartyLeader Jens Stoltenberg could continue as PrimeMinister.

Data

The data encompass in-depth interviews withkey informants. In addition, I use information

retrieved from the Labor Party Web site. First,the Party Secretaries in all the seven parties inparliament were interviewed after the electionsof 2009, 2005, and 2001.10 The party secretarieswere singled out, as they are central to the cam-paign strategy in all the seven parties. I use thisdata in the general account of Norwegian Webcampaigning.

Second, I rely on in-depth interviews withthe Head of Information at the Labor Party dur-ing the campaign, Sindre Fossum-Beyer, andthe Assistant Party Secretary Odd Erik Stende.Both interviews were semistructured, as theyfollowed a predefined interview protocol, butthe protocols were not identical as I wantedsomewhat different information from the inter-views. The Head of Information was selected forhis central role in developing Labor’s Internetpresence, as he was responsible for the onlinestrategies. Consequently the interview with himdealt with the different aspects of the party’sonline practices and the influence of Obama’scampaign concerning these practices. The inter-view lasted about one hour and fifteen minutes.The Assistant Party Secretary was selected, ashe is central to most aspects of campaigningas well as organizational matters. The interviewdealt with the campaign in general and the roleof the Internet in relation to other aspects ofcampaign and organizational work, and lastedabout 45 minutes. I use this data to identify thecontact zones and the adoption of U.S. practicesas well as their adjustment to the needs of theNorwegian Labor Party.

The following analysis is divided into threeparts. I first give an introduction to the gen-eral state of Norwegian Web campaigning.Second, I give a short outline of the LaborParty’s 2009 online presence. This outline is fol-lowed by the main part, where I investigate theinfluence of Obama’s campaign on the Laborcampaign strategy, and study the manner inwhich the practices are adjusted to fit existingpractices.

Norwegian Parties and the Internet

Based on the interviews with key people inNorwegian parties from 2001, 2005, and 2009,it is evident that Gibson and Ward’s formulationof a relatively conservative form of adoption fits

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Um

eå U

nive

rsity

Lib

rary

] at

19:

54 0

4 O

ctob

er 2

013

Karlsen 163

the Norwegian parties’ use of the Internet. Whileall parties have been online since the latter halfof the 1990s, the general impression was thatthey were online because they did not dare to notbe. As the Internet gradually grew more influen-tial and became a part of people’s daily mediadiet, the parties saw more advantages to beingonline. So, in the 2005 campaign, all signifi-cant parties had integrated an online presenceas a natural part of their campaign strategy, butwere still uncertain of the effects (cf. Karlsen,2009) of doing so. However, while the LaborParty used a lot of resources on its online cam-paign, it did not stand out as particularly keen.The interviews with the party secretaries in rela-tion to the 2009 campaign revealed newfoundenthusiasm for the use of the Internet. The intro-duction of the social media was perceived as anessential new communication channel in all par-ties, and to get their candidates online was animportant aspect of the party strategy for most(cf. Kalnes, 2009). While the 2005 Web sites to agreat extent had the national campaign messageas their focus (Karlsen, 2009), in 2009 the partyWeb sites had a greater focus on participation,echoing the buzzword of the Obama campaign.

It is clear, both based on the interviews andclose observations of the online practices, thatin 2009 the Labor Party developed a moreambitious online strategy than before, and tosome extent, it was more ambitious than theother parties. Moreover, the obvious similarities

between Labor’s online practices before the2009 campaign and the Obama campaignactuated further investigations into this relation-ship. The influences of the U.S. and the adapta-tions of the adopted practices are the topics inwhat follows.

Labor’s Online Presence in 2009

The Internet and the social media havehad their final breakthrough in this cam-paign, both concerning reaching out tovoters directly and organizing campaignactivities.

The above quote is from the Labor Party’sWeb site,11 as it summarized the 2009 cam-paign. The point of departure for its onlinepresence was the party Web site, which wasredesigned prior to the campaign and, accord-ing to the Head of Information, was morecampaign-oriented than during previous elec-tions. Every time the site was entered, a pop-upwould appear with the picture of Prime Ministerand Party Leader Jens Stoltenberg asking foryour contribution to the Labor Campaign inthe form of leaving your e-mail address (seeFigure 1). This is a first indication of an increas-ing focus on getting people involved in thecampaign.

FIGURE 1. The Labor Party Web site and MyLaborParty.

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Um

eå U

nive

rsity

Lib

rary

] at

19:

54 0

4 O

ctob

er 2

013

164 JOURNAL OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY & POLITICS

Moreover, the party and the party candidatesutilized blogs, Twitter, Facebook, YouTube,Flickr, and perhaps the most innovative plat-form in a Norwegian context, MittArbeiderparti(MyLaborParty). The resemblance to MyBOis of course striking, and in many ways theplatform is similar to the U.S. counterpart.MyLaborParty is based on the external platformOrigo. The goal was to offer members and sym-pathizers a possibility to get involved when itsuited them. Anybody could participate in dif-ferent areas based on interest and/or place ofresidence.

In addition to the presence on these plat-forms, the Labor Party carried out an integrativecampaign initiative called, “What is importantfor you?” Voters were asked to make onlinecampaign posters stating their own importantissues for the election. This campaign integratedboth online and offline channels, as the posterswould later appear in online videos and as tra-ditional billboards, and was, according to theLabor Party, a success.

According to the Labor Party,12 there were308,682 visitors to its Web site (213,203 abso-lutely unique users). Keep in mind that Norwayis a relatively small country with about 3.5 mil-lion voters constituting the electorate. Moreover,there were 90,214 visitors to the above-described initiative “What is important foryou?”, and 17,000 campaign posters were madebased on that initiative. Fifty campaign videoswere posted by the party on its YouTube chan-nel and were shown a total of 61,000 times. itsads on Google were shown 13 million times andwere clicked on 57,000 times. Prime MinisterJens Stoltenberg’s Facebook profile increasedits followers by 8,912 to about 43,000 fol-lowers. The party sent out 290,000 e-mails to25,000 recipients and 100,000 text messages tomembers and the party organization. In addi-tion, almost 70 bloggers were organized underthe Labor Party umbrella or heading “RedBlogger” (red is the Labor Party’s color).

During the campaign, the Labor Party had,according to the informants, six to seven peoplewho were responsible for getting material out onsocial media networking sites and newsgroups,for making online videos, and for streamingevents online.

Adoption and Adaptation of the ObamaOnline Practices

The Labor 2009 Internet strategy washighly influenced by the Obama campaign.According to the Head of Information, around2005–2006 campaign organizers knew thatmuch was going to happen and that they wouldhave to do a great deal concerning online cam-paign practices before the 2009 election, butthey did not know what. Hence, according tothe party informants, the Obama campaign was amajor influence in this regard. The answer fromthe Head of Information to my opening ques-tion about how to characterize Labor’s use ofthe Internet and the new social media in therecent parliamentary campaign reveals some ofthe influence: “Much can be ascribed to beforeand after Obama.”

The group that developed the Labor Partycampaign strategy visited the U.S. and met sev-eral people who were central to the Obama cam-paign. Consequently, there are physical contactzones between the Obama campaign organiza-tion and the Norwegian Labor Party. The visit-ing group had meetings with Blue State Digital,a company cofounded by Joe Rospars, who wasthe head of Obama’s New Media Department,and talked to, among others, Stephen Gear, whowas responsible for e-mail strategy in the Obamacampaign. What the visiting group was toldby the people who had been involved with theObama campaign, was that online campaigningwas not about technology, and not to even thinkabout using U.S. companies on its Norwegiancampaign. They rather said that it was abouta mentality and a philosophy: think less tech-nology and more organization. The Labor Partyadopted this approach as the main philoso-phy in its Internet-related work.13 The Head ofInformation was eager to emphasize this point:“We have learned that this is really not abouttechnology; it is about classic organizationalwork. It is about implementation in all organiza-tional levels, in different policy areas, and aboutintegration in the overall mentality.”

The party did not want to engage instrategy thinking with PR people about theInternet, because in their view, PR people arepreoccupied with online marketing and do not

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Um

eå U

nive

rsity

Lib

rary

] at

19:

54 0

4 O

ctob

er 2

013

Karlsen 165

understand the party’s organizational needs.What the party needed was, according to theinformants, an approach to new technology thatintegrated most aspects of party work, fromcampaign communication and marketing to day-to-day organizational work. The Labor teamrefers to this basic philosophy and mentality—think organization not technology—as the mainreason for its success. In addition, according tothe Head of Information, the philosophy wasalways to consider how to integrate the Internetand social media in most parts of its daily workand the organization as a whole.

The essential influence from the Obama cam-paign in regard to MyLaborParty was, accordingto the Head of Information, to create the possi-bility for volunteers to organize themselves, tocreate campaign events, and to invite more peo-ple to join in the campaign. One of the mainideas behind MyLaborParty was to increasegrassroots involvement in the party organiza-tion as such, and the most used aspect ofMyLaborParty was the section that providedthe grassroots activists with arguments aboutthe Labor policy on different issues, whichthey could use in their canvassing and othercampaigning efforts. Although it was influ-enced by how Obama used the technology,the Norwegian Labor Party adjusted it to usemostly within an existing party organization—to engage and integrate existing members in thecampaign.

The Labor Party integrated the U.S. prac-tices in accordance with its ambition for amore thematically structured party organization,which is also highlighted in the network partymodel. Although membership figures decrease,the party believes that people are still interestedin politics, but in order to get them involved,it is necessary to offer easier opportunities forparticipation as well as organizational units thatcorrespond to their interests. According to theparty strategist:

If you are really interested in the MiddleEast and you join the Labor Party, thechance for one of the first meetings in yourlocal party branch being about the situationin the Middle East is pretty slim. We canuse the Internet to organize members based

on policy interests not just based on theirplace of residence.

The similarities between these words and thethematic network structure of the “networkparty” are evident. The party wants to use thenew technology to address what it perceives asa problem with the geographically based organi-zation of the party.

As mentioned, the Labor Party also adoptedthe Obama campaign’s focus on lowering thethreshold for participation in the campaign, andthe ambition was to lower the threshold at alllevels—not just the grassroots, but they wantedto get candidates and leaders online as well.Consequently, more than trying to be sophis-ticated online, the party emphasized getting asmany people as possible to start using the onlinepossibilities. Hence, all candidates made theirown profiles on MyLaborParty, and were alsoencouraged by the central party organizationto use other platforms such as Facebook. TheHead of Information put it this way: “The mostimportant thing at this point in time is to getas many as possible to get to know the newpossibilities, or at least learn what they are:You don’t learn to swim if you’re not close towater.” Consequently, the party was not eagerto convert as many candidates as possible intobloggers, but rather to introduce as many as pos-sible to the new media. This applies to the wholeorganization, and the target is to create change:“To achieve change we need to make sure thatcandidates and other members are online andunderstand how to use the new media.”

The Labor Party also emphasized the inter-play between online and offline campaigning.The online channels were used to motivatemembers to campaign and go canvassing, andimportant in this regard is what seems tobe an increasing prominence of canvassing inNorwegian campaigning.14 The Oslo branch ofthe Labor Party carried out a canvassing effortaimed at households that represented poten-tial voters, sociologically and demographicallyspeaking.

In this canvassing campaign, the party used acomputer program that contained demographicdata at a household level and was used toidentify residential areas with a high percentage

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Um

eå U

nive

rsity

Lib

rary

] at

19:

54 0

4 O

ctob

er 2

013

166 JOURNAL OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY & POLITICS

of potential Labor voters.15 However, accord-ing to the Head of Information in the LaborParty, the most important aspect of the can-vassing initiative was to get its own people outcampaigning. Social media, both MyLaborPartyand different Facebook groups as well as e-mailand text messaging, were used to advertise andorganize the canvassing efforts. Social mediawere also used to say thank you for the effortso far, and to motivate people to contributefurther. However, according to the party cam-paign strategists, the online tools were not themost important factors regarding organizing thecanvassing effort.

This resonates well with the informants’general assessment of the online practices forcampaigning and organizational aspects. TheAssistant Party Secretary reflected on the impor-tance of the online tools for the mobilization ofthe party activists:

I do not know how important our onlineeffort was for the tens of thousands whowere out there doing a job for the party inthe campaign. They had a mission, and thatwas for us to win the election. I believewe would have done a good job mobiliz-ing the organization without online tools,but probably not to the same extent.

One aspect of online campaigning that does nottransfer well from the U.S. to West-Europeancampaigns is fundraising. In Norway and inWestern Europe in general, fundraising has (asmentioned) traditionally been less relevant thanin the U.S. When I asked the Labor strategistabout parts of the Obama campaign that did notfit with their campaign, he said:

The fundraising part is totally different.However, we did raise 300,000 NOK,small change really. We cannot highlightthis aspect. During the campaign, fundrais-ing dominated Obama’s online presence;it will never dominate our Web site in thesame manner.

The phrase “we cannot highlight” refers to howfundraising is not a part of the Norwegianpolitical culture, and that most people would

have reacted negatively if the party had usedthe online practices of the Obama campaign inthis regard; consequently this practice was tosome extent rejected. The Labor strategist ratheremphasized how Obama used the online tools tolower the threshold for participation—the waythat people could go online and just a couple ofhours later know how they could contribute tothe campaign: “That is what we have tried toachieve, and that is what we want to continuedeveloping, that part of it.”

ONLINE CAMPAIGN PRACTICES,HYBRIDIZATION, AND THE

NETWORK PARTY

Studies on transnational diffusion of policyshow that the perceived level of success influ-ences the likelihood of adoption (Dobbin et al.,2007). Although the Obama campaign utilizedwhat some may refer to as standard U.S. onlinepractices, the success of the Obama campaign,and the massive focus on the use of social mediaand other online practices, most likely increasedthe likelihood of parties in other systems import-ing the practices. This study, like a study ofthe German 2009 campaign (Schweitzer, 2011),suggests that this indeed is the case.

The empirical data established a physicalcontact zone as the Labor team met withthe people responsible for Obama’s campaign.Although it was also influenced by the actualcampaign practices, most importantly, the LaborParty adopted the Obama campaign philoso-phy of thinking less about technology and moreabout organization. In other words, technologyshould not be the focus per se; rather the orga-nizational challenges, and the manner in whichtechnology can be used to meet these challenges,must be the focus of attention.

According to the hybridization perspectiveof campaign change, imported practices willbe adapted to fit existing campaign prac-tices and the campaign environment. TheNorwegian Labor Party’s use of technology atthe 2009 election is a case in point regardinghow such a process can take place. Although theLabor Party adopted some of the ideas behindand the practices from the Obama campaign,

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Um

eå U

nive

rsity

Lib

rary

] at

19:

54 0

4 O

ctob

er 2

013

Karlsen 167

the ideas and practices had to be adjusted to beuseful for a large member-based political party.

The fundraising part, which is an essentialpart of U.S. online campaigning, was as couldbe expected based on previous research (cf.Anstead, 2008) mostly rejected, as it did notfit existing campaign practices and political cul-ture. The emphasis on lowering the thresholdfor participation was divided into two parts,first engaging existing members and activistsin the campaign through online tools, and sec-ond, getting the candidates for parliament andleaders online.16 For the central headquarters inEuropean political parties, getting the hundredsor sometimes thousands of candidates runningfor election involved in online campaigning isjust as important as mobilizing activists.

According to the party informants, the mostimportant thing they learned from the Obamacampaign was the focus on organization andnot technology. They emphasized that in elec-toral politics, dealing with the Internet is notabout technology but about traditional organi-zational work. However, as discussed initially,in organizational terms, West European Partiessuch as the Norwegian Labor Party differ fromthe U.S. campaign organizations. Consequently,the adopted emphasis on organization was trans-lated into implementation of online strategiesin all levels of party organizational work. Thisentailed integrating the technology in the man-ner the party operates as a whole: in all levels,all policy areas, and in the overall mentality ofthe organization.

The tools offered by the party literature andthe party models help us to conceptualize theeffect of new technology on parties and theparty organization. The imported practices andperspectives are not just used for campaigningpurposes, such as outward online communica-tion and campaign organization, but are alsointegrated in the party organization as such.Consequently, the Labor Party used the tech-nology to market the political leadership, butequally important was the way it used tech-nology to organize, activate, and recruit atthe grassroots level. As discussed, this is howwe expect the “network party” to utilize theInternet (Løfgren & Smith, 2003). Essential inthe network party model is also change toward a

more thematic network structure, and we haveseen that the Labor Party values online prac-tices when it comes to developing such thematicnetwork structures. It believes that today’s citi-zens have to be offered something more excit-ing than local branch meetings, which typicallydiscuss municipal politics, or may not discusspolitics at all but stick to organizational mat-ters. Hence, thematic network structures arebelieved to increase participation not only dur-ing campaigns, but in party politics as such.Moreover, this study also shows that the centralparty considers members essential for carryingout campaigning at the grassroots level. Theonline strategy during the 2009 campaign wasmostly about engaging existing members andparty sympathizers, but the aim in the long runwas, as we have seen, also to engage and recruitnew members and activists. Labor’s strategiesfor increased recruitment include making it lessof a burden and more attractive to join theparty through a thematic network structure, andto give new recruits instant possibilities forparticipation.

To be able to develop more intimate relation-ships between individuals who already have anaffinity with the party is considered an essen-tial aspect of using the Internet for campaigningpurposes (Lilleker & Jackson, 2011, p. 144).In this manner, the Internet and social mediaare indeed creating new opportunities for polit-ical organizations to diversify their repertoires(cf. Chadwick, 2007). The import of U.S. pres-idential campaign online practices expandedthe repertoires of the Norwegian Labor Party,not only in regard to campaign practices, butalso in relation to party organizational chal-lenges. And by integrating such online practicesin the organization, it will arguably be eas-ier to reap the benefits of online possibilitiesin future election campaigns. In this manner,the 2009 campaign can be perceived as another(or perhaps first) step in a process of devel-oping a new campaign infrastructure. Europeanparties are still large member-based parties,which, in times of elections, must transformtheir organizations into well-functioning cam-paign “machines.” The adoption and adaptationof U.S. online practices help political parties tocarry out this transformation.

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Um

eå U

nive

rsity

Lib

rary

] at

19:

54 0

4 O

ctob

er 2

013

168 JOURNAL OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY & POLITICS

The importance of members for grassrootscampaign contributions could be added as a thirdreason, in addition to policy input and leaderrecruitment, for the network party to value alarge member base, especially as grassroots par-ticipation seems an increasingly essential partof both U.S. and West-European campaigning.Campaign periods can be used by the par-ties to recruit members on a more permanentbasis—members who, in time, might becomeuseful for political parties, not just as a cam-paign resources, but for policy input and lead-ership recruitment as well. However, althoughthe Internet is useful for lowering the initialbarriers to participation, to what extent Internettools are good at building longer term partyactivism is another matter. People mobilizedonline might easily turn into passive memberswho drop out fairly quickly. Moreover, Internetcampaigns might meet resistance from long-term members who constitute the backbone ofparties (cf. Pedersen & Saglie, 2005). These areessential topics for future research.

In Norway, like the U.S., the Internet andICTs have not really changed the fundamen-tals of campaign organization and strategy (Foot& Schneider, 2006). For example, accordingto Obama’s New Media Department, its strat-egy was to make old techniques, like callcenters, more efficient (Thomas, 2009). ChrisHughes, the leader of the social networkingpart of the New Media Department, stated,“When computer applications really take off,they make something people have always doneand make it easier for them to do it. Andmaybe bigger.”17 The director of Obama’s NewMedia Department, Joe Rospars, elaborated:“We didn’t invent the idea of our supporters call-ing one another. We just made it a lot easier.”18

In a similar manner, the imported U.S. practicesare adjusted to fit and expand existing aspectsof campaigning in Norway. Almost ironically,it seems that the success of the Obama cam-paign’s use of digital technology also led theLabor Party to put greater emphasis on an olderU.S. campaign practice—canvassing.

As we have seen, the Labor Party consid-ered its online strategies in the 2009 campaigna success. Still, the informants did not hide thefact that the party had a long way to go. After all,

concerning the lowered threshold, 25,000 e-mailrecipients are not a lot, considering the num-ber only constitutes half of its existing members.The strategy did not match the success of theObama campaign. This is partly because theLabor Party had to adapt the strategy to fitthe existing member organization with exist-ing (offline) lines of communication, and partlybecause the kind of movement the Obama cam-paign created is not really about online practices.What Gibson and Ward (2009) label a relativelyconservative form of adoption is a valid charac-terization of utilization of campaign practices.

This study shows that in the Norwegian LaborParty, adopted U.S. online practices are adaptedbased on the ideals of the network party. In thissense, technology, and the influence of U.S.online practices, to some extent increases pro-cesses already in motion—such as the thematicstructure discussed above. Such processes willnot take on the same pattern of adoption andadaptation in all West European party orga-nizations. However, the literature on politicalparties and party models helps us conceptualizeand understand the adoption and the consequentadaptation of U.S. online campaign practices ina West-European context.

NOTES

1. Campaign change and the influence of technologyhave most commonly been studied from a modernizationperspective. New innovations in media technology enjoya prominent position as a factor for change (e.g., Blumler& Kavanagh, 1999; Farrell & Webb, 2000; Norris, 2000;see Schmitt-Beck, 2007, for an overview).

2. In general, the influence of new technology is con-strained by countervailing forces that restrain and shapethe effects (e.g., Heilbronner, 1967; Neuman, 1991; Pool,1983)

3. See Hallin and Mancini (2004) for a similar per-spective on the globalization of political communication.

4. According to Nielsen (2009), the use of social net-working sites in the primary campaign also encounteredsome severe problems.

5. See Krouwel (2006) for an overview of partymodels.

6. The network party is based on Koole’s (1994)“modern cadre party” model.

7. See Heidar and Saglie (2003, pp. 221–222) for theseven characteristics of the “network party.”

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Um

eå U

nive

rsity

Lib

rary

] at

19:

54 0

4 O

ctob

er 2

013

Karlsen 169

8. See Heidar (2005) for an account of NorwegianParties and the Norwegian Party system.

9. The Labor Party (Ap) has traditionally been thedominant party, and constitutes the left on the left–rightaxis with the Socialist Left Party (SV). The Progress Partyand the Conservatives constitute the right. The LiberalParty (V), The Centre Party (the agrarian party) (Sp),and the Christian Democratic Party (KrF) are the threeso-called center parties.

10. The 2005 interviews were carried out by theauthor; the 2001 interviews were carried out by AnneKrogstad, Hanne Marthe Narud, Henry Valen, and theauthor.

11. http://arbeiderpartiet.no/Presse/Pressemeldinger/Bakgrunnsinformasjon-om-Arbeiderpartiets-kampanje/(language)/nor-NO

12. This information was provided by the infor-mants, but was also available at the Labor Party Website: http://arbeiderpartiet.no/Presse/Pressemeldinger/Bakgrunnsinformasjon-om-Arbeiderpartiets-kampanje/(language)/nor-NO

13. The Labor Party team was also approached byU.S. companies trying to sell their programs and appli-cations for use on the Norwegian campaign, but weredeclined.

14. Although the Labor Party to some extent hastraditionally utilized canvassing, it is not a traditionalideal of Norwegian political campaigning as it is inthe U.S. Indeed, studies from the 1950s showed howConservatives in the Stavanger area shunned this typeof “Americanized campaigning” (Valen & Katz, 1964).However, other types of grassroots campaigning are idealsin Norway as well.

15. In the U.S., database technology and what it offersconcerning voter targeting is a valued asset (Howard,2006). The use of individual-level data is prohibited inNorway, and database technology cannot be used fortargeting purposes in the same manner (Karlsen, 2011b).

16. The Labor candidates utilized Facebook andTwitter to a great extent (Karlsen, 2011a), and the appar-ent success of this strategy emphasize the differencebetween a Norwegian party centered campaign and theU.S. candidate-centered campaign.

17. Quoted in Thomas (2009, p. 108).18. Quoted in Thomas (2009, p. 108).

REFERENCES

Anstead, N. (2008). The Internet and campaign financein the U.S. and the UK: An institutional compari-son. Journal of Information Technology & Politics, 5,285–302.

Blumler, J. G., &. Kavanagh, D. (1999). The third ageof political communication: Influences and features.Political Communication, 16, 209–230.

Chadwick, A. (2007). Digital network repertoires andorganizational hybridity. Political Communication, 24,283–301.

Dobbin, F., Simmons, B., & Garrett, G. (2007). Theglobal diffusion of public policies: Social construction,coercion, competition or learning? Annual Review ofSociology, 33, 449–472.

Duverger, M. (1954). Political parties: Their organizationand activity in the modern state. London: Methuen.

Farrell, D. (2002). Campaign modernization and polit-ical parties. In K. R. Luther & F. Müller-Rommel(Eds.), Political parties in the new Europe: Political andanalytical challenges (pp. 63–84). Oxford, England:Oxford University Press.

Farrell, D., & Webb, P. (2000). Political parties as cam-paign organizations. In R. J. Dalton & M. P. Wattenberg(Eds.), Parties without partisans (pp. 102–128).Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.

Foot, K. A., & Schneider, S. M. (2006). Web campaigning.Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Gibson, R. (2004). Web-campaigning from a global per-spective. Asia-Pacific Review, 11, 95–126.

Gibson, R., &. Ward, S. (2009). Parties in the digital age—areview article. Representation, 45, 87–100.

Hallin, D. C., & Mancini, P. (2004). Americanization, glob-alization, and secularization: Understanding the conver-gence of media systems and political communication.In F. Esser & B. Pfetsch (Eds.), Comparing politi-cal communication (pp. 25–44). Cambridge, England:Cambridge University Press.

Harfoush, R. (2009). Yes we did: An inside look at howsocial media built the Obama brand. Berkeley, CA:New Riders.

Heidar, K. (2005). Norwegian parties and the party sys-tem: Steadfast and changing. West European Politics,28, 807–833.

Heidar, K., & Saglie, J. (2003). Predestined parties?Organizational change in Norwegian political parties.Party Politics, 9, 219–239.

Heilbroner, R. L. (1967). Do machines make history?Technology and Culture, 8, 335–345.

Herrnson, P. S. (2008). Congressional elections:Campaigning at home and in Washington. Washington,DC: CQ Press.

Hindman, M. (2005). The real lessons of Howard Dean:Reflections on the first digital campaign. Perspectiveson Politics, 3, 121–128.

Hindman, M. (2009). The myth of digital democracy.Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Howard, P. N. (2006). New media campaigns and themanaged citizen. Cambridge, England: CambridgeUniversity Press.

Kalnes, Ø. (2009). Norwegian parties and Web 2.0.Journal of Information Technology and Politics, 6,251–266.

Karlsen, R. (2009). Campaign communication and theInternet: Party strategy in the 2005 Norwegian election

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Um

eå U

nive

rsity

Lib

rary

] at

19:

54 0

4 O

ctob

er 2

013

170 JOURNAL OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY & POLITICS

campaign. Journal of Elections, Public Opinion &Parties, 19, 183–202.

Karlsen, R. (2010). Does new media technology driveelection campaign change? Information Polity, 15,215–225.

Karlsen, R. (2011a). A platform for individualized cam-paigning? Social media and parliamentary candidatesin the party-centered Norwegian campaign. Policy andInternet, 3, article 4.

Karlsen, R. (2011b). Still broadcasting the campaign: Onthe Internet and the fragmentation of political com-munication with evidence from Norwegian electoralpolitics. Journal of Information Technology & Politics,8, 146–162.

Koole, R. (1994). The vulnerability of the modern cadreparty in the Netherlands. In R. Katz & P. Mair(Eds.), How parties organize (pp. 278–303). London:Sage.

Krouwel, A. (2006). Party models. In R. Katz &W. J. Crotty (Eds.), Handbook of party politics(pp. 249–269). London: Sage.

Lawson, K. (Ed.). (2010). Political parties and democracy:Europe. Westport, CT: Praeger.

Lilleker, D., & Jackson, N. A. (2011). Politial campaign-ing: Elections and the Internet: Comparing the US, UK,France and Germany. London: Routledge.

Løfgren, K., & Smith, C. (2003). Political parties anddemocracy in the Information Age. In R. Gibson, P.Nixon, & S. Ward (Eds.), Net gain? Political partiesand the Internet (pp. 39–52). London: Routledge.

Margetts, H. (2006). The cyber party. In R. Katz &W. J. Crotty (Eds.), Handbook of party politics(pp. 528–535). London: Sage.

Neuman, W. R. (1991). The future of the mass audi-ence. Cambridge, England: Cambridge UniversityPress.

Nielsen, R. (2009). The labors of Internet-assistedactivism: Overcommunication, miscommunication,and communicative overload. Journal of InformationTechnology & Politics, 6, 267–280.

Norris, P. (2000). A virtuous circle: Political communica-tion in postindustrial societies. Cambridge, England:Cambridge University Press.

Panagopoulos, C., & Francia, P. I. (2009). Grassroots mobi-lization in the 2008 presidential campaign. Journal ofPolitical Marketing, 8, 315–333.

Pedersen, K., & Saglie, J. (2005). New technology in agingparties: Internet use in Danish and Norwegian parties.Party Politics, 11, 359–377.

Pieterse, J. N. (1997). Globalization as hybridization. In M.Featherstone, S. Lash, & R. Robertson (Eds.), Globalmodernities (pp. 45–68). London: Sage.

Plasser, F., with Plasser, G. (2002). Global political cam-paigning. London: Praeger.

Plouffe, D. (2009). The audacity to win: The insidestory and lessons of Barack Obama’s historic victory.London: Viking.

Pool, I. S. (1983). Technologies of freedom. Cambridge,MA: Harvard University Press.

Rogers, E. M. (1995). Diffusion of innovations (5th ed.).New York: Free Press.

Schmitt-Beck, R. (2007). New modes in campaigning.In R. Dalton & H. D. Klingemann (Eds.), Handbookin political behavior (pp. 744–764). Oxford, England:Oxford University Press.

Schweitzer, E. J. (2011). Controlled interactivity: Parties’online campaigns in the 2009 German national elec-tions. In D. Lilleker & N. A. Jackson (Eds.), Politialcampaigning. Elections and the Internet: Comparingthe US, UK, France and Germany (pp. 99–120).London: Routledge.

Teigen, M. (2012). Gender quotas on corporate boards:On the diffusion of a distinct national policy reform.Comparative Social Research, 29, 185–209.

Thomas, E. (2009). “A long time coming”. The inspiring,combative 2008 campaign and the historic election ofBarack Obama. London: Public Affairs.

Vaccari, C. (2010). “Technology is a commodity”: TheInternet in the 2008 United States presidential elec-tion. Journal of Information Technology & Politics, 7,318–339.

Valen, H., & Katz, D. (1964). Political parties in Norway.Oslo: Universitetsforlaget.

Weyland, K. G. (2005). Theories of policy diffusion:Lessons from Latin American pension reform. WorldPolitics, 57, 262–295.

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Um

eå U

nive

rsity

Lib

rary

] at

19:

54 0

4 O

ctob

er 2

013