•  Objec&ve:Cra-adefenseU.S.strategyforEurasiawhoseprimarypurposeistopreventtheemergenceofahegemonicpower

•  Constraints:Thestrategymustbelimitedbyprojectedresourceconstraints

•  Focus:Notana&onalsecuritystrategy;rather,adefensestrategy

•  TimeFrame:10-20yearplanninghorizon

•  Detail:Fargreaterthanthe“classic”ColdWarstrategies,butnotadetailedposturestatement

2

Theregionalapproachremains,however,thebestwaytodealwithpoli7calproblems.ThequestforuniversalitythatcharacterizedtheLeagueofNa7onsonlyledtoweakness.TheScandinavianstateswerenotinterestedintheboundaryandpowerproblemsoftheLaPlataregion,andtheLa7nAmericanstateswerenotinterestedintheques7onsthatconfrontedeasternEurope.

NicholasSpykman

•  Returnofprotractedgreatpowercompe&&onandbalanceofpowerpoli&cs•  RevisionistpowersinthreekeyregionsalongtheEurasianlandmass—a

“strategicchoice”fortheUS

•  Chinaposesbyfarthegreatestchallenge,inboththenear(andlikely)longterm•  WorrisomeU.S.andallyfiscalposi&on•  AbsenceofconsensusonsecuritymaVerscreatestoughchoices•  U.S.shouldshi-toaforwarddefensepostureintheWesternPacificTheaterof

Opera&ons,evenattheexpenseoftheEuropeanandMiddleEastTheaters

•  A“One-and-half”warposturethatalsoaddressestheradicalIslamistthreat•  Long-termcompe&&onandrapidadvancesinmilitary-relatedtechnologies

suggestprioritymustbeaccordedto–  Socialdimensionofstrategy–  Crea&ngcapabilityop&ons–  Developingnewopera&onalconcepts–  Time-basedcompe&&on–  Recalibra&nghorizontalandver&calescala&on“ladders”

3

•  Anenduringna&onalinterestforacentury

•  TwomajorwarsinEurope—andoneColdWar

•  OnemajorwarinthePacific—andaColdWar

•  FillingthefinalgapintheMiddleEast

•  Underlyingreasonss&llobtain

•  Issue:IssuchastrategywithinU.S.means?

4

TheUnitedStatesmustrecognizeonceagain,andpermanently,thatthepowerconstella7oninEuropeandAsiaisofeverlas7ngconcerntoher,bothin7meofwarandin7meofpeace.

NicholasSpykman

AnyworldbalanceofpowermeansfirstandforemostabalanceontheEurasianlandmass.

GeorgeKennan

5

Sovietdomina7onofthepoten7alpowerofEurasia,whetherachievedbyarmedaggressionorby...subversivemeans,wouldbestrategicallyandpoli7callyunacceptabletotheUnitedStates.

NSC20/4

ThelossofWesternEuropeorofimportantpartsofAsiaortheMiddleEastwouldresultinatransferofpoten7alfromWesttoEastwhich...mighthavethegravestconsequencesinthelongrun.

DeanAcheson

IfWesternEuropeweretofalltoSovietRussiaitwoulddoubletheSovietsupplyofcoalandtripletheSovietsupplyofsteel.Ifthefreena7onsofAsiaandAfricashouldfalltoSovietRussia,wewouldlosethesourcesofmanyofourmostvitalrawmaterials....AndSovietcommandofthemanpowerofthefreena7onsofEuropeandAsiawouldconfrontuswithmilitaryforceswhichwecouldneverhopetoequal.

PresidentHarryTruman

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7

8

Legi&macy China Russia Iran

TheVote - - -

The“Vision” - - ?

Prosperity X - -

Na&onalism X X ?

PrincipalObjec&vesPreservingtheregime

Displacingthecurrentinterna&onalorder

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10

RivalPower Year PctofUSGDP

ImperialGermany 1917 35.6percent

NaziGermany 1943 26.2percent

ImperialJapan 1943 13.5percent

SovietRussia 1980 40.4percent

CommunistChina 2014 59.4percent

11

Country GDP(MillionsofU.S.$)

China $10,866,444

Russia $1,326,015

Iran $425,326

$12,617,785

UnitedStates $17,946,996

Japan $4,123,258

Germany $3,355,772

UnitedKingdom $2,848,755

France $2,421,682

$30,696,463

ItemofInterest:WhoisbeVerabletotranslatelatentmilitarypoten&alintomilitarycapability?

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•  Demographictrendshaveimportantsecond-orderimplica&onsformilitarycompe&&onsandthemilitarybalance

•  AllthemajorpowerssavetheU.S.andIndiaarein“demographicdecline”

•  U.S.compe&&veposi&onisstrong;strongers&llifIndiaemergesasareliablepartner

•  U.S.hasanadvantageinquan&tyandquality(educa&on;techliteracy)overRussiaandIran;lackssamev.China

•  DespiteadvantageousU.S.profile,demographicweaknessofotherscouldbeasourceofsecurityproblems(China’ssexra&oimbalance;“RichMillions”and“PoorBillions”)

Itemsofinterest

•  Subs&tu&onof“capital”for“labor”(suchasrobo&csandAI)

•  Geographyandlogis&cswilllimitabilitytoprojectlargegroundforces

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14

TheU.S.militaryremainstheworld’sfinest—butitsadvantagesarediminishing

•  An&-Access/Area-DenialForces

•  AdvancedIrregular(akaGrayArea”)Warfare

•  BlurringofConven&onal,CyberandNuclearopera&ons

•  “New”WarfareDomains(space,cyberspace,theunderseainfrastructure)

•  Thepoten&alofemergingtechnologies(AI,BigData,Bio,DE,etc.)toalterthecompe&&on

ItemsofInterest

Whatisthe“newnormal?”

Any“newnormal”maynotlastlong...hencethesearchforthe“nextbigthing(s)”

Needtobalancemaintainingcapabilityintheneartermwithcrea&ngop&onsforthelongterm

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16

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•  U.S.financialposi&onhasdeclineddrama&callyoverthepast15years

•  U.S.fiscalwoesprimarilytheresult,notofimperialoverstretch,buten&tlementanddebtoverstretch

•  Projectedrapidandsustainedgrowthinen&tlementspendingandindebt

•  StateandLocalpensionsunfundedliabili&es:$5,000,000,000,000

•  SocialSecuritytrustfundprojectedexhaustedin2034;Medicarein2030

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2015 2026(CBOest.) Change

MandatorySpending

$2,299B $4,412B +92%

NetInterestPayments

$223B $830B +272%

•  Sequestra&ondoesn’taddresstheproblem,nordoesithelpU.S.defense

•  DoDfacespoten&al~$275billionprogram-fundingmismatchinFY2018-22

•  Defensespendingprojectedtodeclineto2.6percentofGDPbymid-2020s

ItemsofInterest

•  LiVlelikelihoodof“20-yearboost”—evenwithrisingthreats

•  Absentclearandpresentdanger,steadydownwardpressureonbudgets

•  Inmajorwar,U.S.maybefacedwithdefeatorundesirableescala&on

•  U.S.poten&allyonapathtowardsocialinstabilityaswell

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•  Demographyonlytellspartofthestory—mustconsidertheavailablemanpowerpool

•  AnyoneintheU.S.(andmostmajorally)manpowerpoolscanavoidservice

•  Manyinthemanpowerpoolareunfitforservice

•  Thusdespitelarge“raw”numbers,manpowerisdifficult/expensivetoaccess/retain

•  Small,eliteforcemaybesufficientfortheTalibans,al-QaedasandISISsoftheworld,butnotlikelyagainstChina,RussiaandIran

•  Longstandingmajoralliesareevenlesscapable

ItemsofInterest

•  Capablemanpowerrichalliesofincreasingvalue;Indiaapoten&allyaVrac&vepartner

•  TechnologiesthatreducerelianceonmanpowerincreasinglyaVrac&ve

•  Findawayoutofcost-imposingmanpowerintensiveconflicts—useofproxies?21

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GoodNews.TheU.S.is:•  Richinrawmaterials•  Possessesahighlyskilledlaborforce•  Producesmorerawmaterials/industrialproductsthanthe“ArsenalofDemocracy”

GoodNews.TheU.S.DefenseIndustrialBaseis:•  Abletoproducehighlysophis&catedsystemsinlargenumbers—givensufficient

lead&me•  Abletoproduceawidearrayofproducts—givensufficientlead&me•  Movingtosubs&tutecapitalforlabor(“smart”robots)fordecliningmanpower•  Exploringaddi&vemanufacturing

BadNews.Ontheotherhand,thereareareasofpoten&alweakness:•  Greatuncertaintyoverabilitytosurgeandsustainproduc&on•  Baseishighlyconcentrated•  Nostrategicmaterialsstockpile•  Declininglaborforce•  FARandenvironmentalregula&onscouldcompromiseindustrialbasemobiliza&on

ItemsofInterest:•  Areaofconsiderableimportanceyetnotwellunderstood•  Lackofsurgeabilitymayseverelylimitstrategicop&ons

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Thelevelofhuman,materialandtechnicalresourcesdevotedtotheU.S.militaryul&matelydependsupontheAmericanpeopleandtheirwillingnesstosacrifice,bothinpeaceandwar

•  Intheabstract,mostAmericanswanttomaintainorincreasethecountry’smilitarystrength—butarefarlesswillingtopaytaxesorforegogovernmentbenefitstoachievethis

•  YetiftheU.S.istoaddressthegrowingchallengestothebalanceofpoweralongtheEurasianperiphery,itwillalmostcertainlyneedtoaugmentthesizeandcapabili&esofitsmilitary

ItemsofInterest

•  Absentstrongleadership,thepeopleoftheUnitedStatesandmost(andperhapsall)ofitsmajoralliesarenotinclinedtosupportasubstan&allygreaterdefenseeffort

•  NoristhereanyenthusiasmamongtheU.S.publicorthoseofitsalliesinsupportofcompulsorymilitaryservice

•  Acompellingstrategicnarra&veisneededtosupportthestrategy

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IfthemenandwomenofAmericafacethisissue[communism]assquarelyandbravelyastheirsoldiersfacedtheterrorsofbaLleinWorldWarII,wewouldhavenofearoftheoutcome....Iftheycanretainthemoralintegrity,theclarityofcomprehension,andthereadinesstosacrificethatfinallycrushedtheAxis,thenthefreeworldwillliveandprosper,andallpeoples,eventually,willreachalevelofculture,contentment,andsecuritythathasneverbeforebeenachieved.

DwightD.Eisenhower

HavinggoLentheissuewelldefinedinmymind,Itryinthenextsteptodeterminewhat...solu7onwecangetthatwillbestconformtothelongterminterestsofthecountryandatthesame7mecancommandasufficientapprovalinthiscountrysoastosecurethenecessaryCongressionalac7on.

DwightD.Eisenhower

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Defenseprograminthisstrategyisbasedontwoop&ons

•  President’sbudgetforFY2018-FY2022,projectedalongasecondFYDP(FY2023-2027)

•  “MiddleWay”budget;halfwaybetweentheFY2012defenseprojec&onandthePresident’sbudget

•  Bothseeadeclineindefensefundingto3percentofGDP—orless

FailuretoenactthePresident’s(PB17)budgetcreatessignificantnear/long-termrisk

Failuretotransi&ontothe“MiddleWay”budgetlikelyposesseverelong-termrisk

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BudgetOp&on FY2018-2022Pct.GDP

FY2023-2027Pct.GDP

FY2018-2027Pct.GDPAverage

PB17 2.75 2.44 2.57

“MiddleWay” 3.10 2.85 2.88

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Thegoalisnottoholdequallyeverywhere[butto]holdinenoughplaces,andinsufficientstrategicplaces,toaccomplishourgeneralpurpose.

GeorgeKennan

Wemustavoiddispersalofourforceswhenconcentra7onappearstobethewisestcause,especiallyinviewofourpresentlimita7ons.

GeorgeC.Marshall

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US

Leve

l of E

ffort

2017 2027 2037

Iran

China

Radical Islamism and Proxies

Russia

Post-Pu&nEra NuclearCapability

Threetheatersofopera&on:WesternPacific(WPTO);European(ETO);andMiddleEast(METO)

1.  Whatrevisionistpowerhasthegreatestmilitarypoten&alinthenearterm?Longterm?

2.  Inwhichtheaterofopera&onsdowelackstrategicdepth?Whereisitmostsevere?

3.  Inwhattheater(s)ofopera&onsaremajorpowerfrontlinealliesatrisk?

4.  Inwhattheater(s)ofopera&onsareU.S.alliesleastcapableofmoun&nganeffec&veindependentdefense?

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32

TheaterofRevisionistPowerGreatestMilitaryPoten&al

TheaterLackingStrategicDepth

GreatPowerFrontlineAllyatRisk

LocalAlliesLeastCapableofMoun&nganIndependentDefense

WesternPacific WesternPacific WesternPacific WesternPacific

European MiddleEast

MiddleEastEuropean

33

Country GDP(MillionsofU.S.$)

China $10,866,444

Japan $4,123,258

SouthKorea $1,377,873

Taiwan $529,600

Subtotal $6,030,731

India $2,073,542

Total $8,104,273

ItemofInterest:Thegapiswidening.CouldIndiaproveavaluablepartner?IsIndiaadefactopartner?HowtoexploitIndia’spoten&al?

34

Country GDP(MillionsofU.S.$)

Russia $1,326,015

FrontlineStates

Bal&cStates $90,969

Poland $474,783

Subtotal $565,752

Germany $3,355,772

UnitedKingdom $2,848,755

France $2,421,682

GrandTotal $9,191,961

ItemofInterest:“OldNATO”canprotectitself,butdoesn’tneedto;“NewNATO”needstoprotectitself,butcannot.

35

Country GDP(MillionsofU.S.$)

Iran $425,326

FrontlineStates

Egypt $330,778

Israel $296,075

SaudiArabia $646,001

UAE $370,292

GrandTotal $1,643,146

ItemofInterest:SeeETO.DoestheU.S.providethemortar—andthebricksaswell?

Oneforward-deployedforcecapableofwagingamajorregionalwaragainstagreatpower(WPTO)

Onetheater-size“Expedi&onaryForce”capableofdeployingtoETOortheMETOintheeventofwar;alterna&velycanreinforcetheWPTO

“Counter-OffensiveForce”capableofretakinglostgroundintheWPTOorexecu&ngforcibleentryop&onsintheMETO

“StrategicReserveForce”capableofopera&ngpromptlyatextendedrangesinanyofthethreetheaters;includesnuclear;globalprecisionstrike;cyberstrikeandair/missiledefenses

N.B.:Shi[willnotoccurovernight.

WPTOForwardDefense

ETODefenseinDepth

METOAdviseandAssist

MajorWarForce FirstPriorityForwardDeployed

PrincipalAir/NavalForce FirstPriorityForwardDeployed

TheaterExpedi&onaryForce FirstPriority SecondPriority

Counter-Offensive/ForcibleEntry FirstPriority ThirdPriority SecondPriority

StrategicReserve FirstPriority SecondPriority ThirdPriority

PrimaryMission:DefenseoftheFirstIslandChainemploying“AirSeaBa_le”and“ArchipelagicDefense”opera&onalconcepts

GeographicPriori&es•  Transi&ontoforwarddefenseoftheFirstIslandChain•  Japanprimaryresponsibilityinnorthernsector•  U.S.primaryresponsibilityinsouthernsector

Forces•  Cross-domaingroundforcesforwarddeployed•  AdvancedirregularforcesinPhilippinesandTaiwan(“ArcDef”and“HardROC2.0”)•  U.S.forcibleentryforces(USMC;Airborne;Ranger;SOF;AirAssault)•  Distantblockadeforce(primarilylandforces)•  Airandmari&meforcesserveasmobileopera&onalreserve(“counter-concentra&on”)•  Globalstrikeandcyberforcesactasstrategicreserve(“counter-concentra&on”)

InfrastructurePriori&es:basehardening;basedispersal

“Billpayers:”BCTs(KoreaWarPlan);largesurfacecombatants;non-stealthytac&calreconandstrikeaircra-

KeyProspec&vePartners:Australia;India;Indonesia;RepublicofKorea;Singapore;Vietnam

PrimaryMission:DefendNATO’sfrontlinestates

Posture(“DefenseinDepth”)(“Tripwire”)

GeographicPriori&es•  Bal&cStatesandPoland•  U.S./majorNATOalliestrain,adviseandassistfrontlinestatesindeterring/counteringRussian

grayareaaggression;developinginfrastructureforrapidreinforcement

Forces:U.S./majorNATOallies•  Advise/assistfrontlinestatestoestablishA2/AD“high-low”mix•  Advise/assistincrea&ngUW“G-RAMM”resistanceforces•  Supportfrontlinestateswithextended-rangeC4ISR/strikes•  Provideexpedi&onaryforcestoexecutecounter-offensiveopera&ons•  Provideglobalstrikeandcyberforcesasstrategicreserve

InfrastructurePriori&es:FrontlinestatePOMCUSfacili&es

“Billpayers:”BCTs(adaptto“NewModel”BCTs);non-stealthytac&calrecon/strikeaircra-

KeyAlliesandProspec&vePartners:FrontlineStates;France/Germany/UK;Finland/Sweden

39

PrimaryMissions•  AssistlocalstatesresistIranianproxyforceaggression/subversion•  Supportlocalstatesindefea&ngovertIranianaggression•  AssistlocalstatesagainstvariousformsofradicalSunniIslamistwarfare•  Defendenergyinfrastructureandtransitroutes

Posture(“LightFootprint”)

GeographicPriori&es:PersianGulfand“IranianCrescent”

Forces•  U.S./allied/partnerforcestrain,equip,adviseandassistlocalforces•  U.S./allied/partnerforcesprovidereconandstrike/directac&oncapabili&es•  ReducedU.S.airandnavalforcesserveasopera&onalreserve•  U.S.providesexpedi&onaryandforcibleentryforces•  U.S.globalstrikeandcyberforcesactasstrategicreserve

InfrastructurePriori&es:Encouragelocaleffortstohardenenergyproduc&onandtransporta&oninfrastructure

“Billpayers:”Reducedairandmari&mepresence

KeyProspec&vePartners:Israel;“Conserva&ve”ArabStates;France/UK

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41

Geopoli&cal/Geostrategic•  Engageexis&ngallies/partnerswith&me-phased,adap&veapproachto

establishingtheregionaldefensepostures(execu&ngstrategyconfersadvantage)

•  Cul&vateAllies/Partners:India,Indonesia;Vietnam,alongwithFinlandandSweden(mi&gatemanpowerweakness;recoverscaleadvantage;gainposi&onaladvantage)

•  DivestINFTreaty(Eliminatenega&veasymmetry;imposecosts)

•  “Flip”Russia(Enabledincreasedfocus/op&miza&ononWPTO;gainposi&onaladvantage)

Opera&onal•  PlanningagainstacontemporarysetofColor/RainbowPlans(orientandop&mize

around“newnormals”—thecorrect“diagnosis”)

•  Intensivefieldexercises/experimenta&ontooperateinthe“newnormal”environmentandsearchforthe“nextbigthing”(enhanceeffec&veness;increaseprobabilityofiden&fyingthe“nextbigthing”)

42

Ins&tu&onal

•  Analysisonnewhorizontal/ver&calescala&onladders;compe&torviews/calcula&onsonwarfare;innova&veopera&onalconcepts;persistentwargaming

(IDsourcesofcompe&&veadvantage/weakness;strengthendeterrence)

•  Protec&ngS&TandR&D“seedcorn”todevelopop&onsthatcanbeexercisedasthelongtermcomesintofocus(reducesuncertainty/enhance&me-based

competency;imposecostsoncompe&tors)•  Developacorecompetencyin&me-basedcompe&&on(createop&onsforU.S.;

createuncertaintyamongrivals;imposecosts)

•  Iden&fycurrentability(andwhatisneeded)towagesuccessfullyaprotractedwarwithChina(transformaweaknessintoastrength)

Social

•  Mustdevelopacompellingstrategicnarra&veonmul&plelevels—fortheAmericanpeople;alliesand(prospec&ve)partners;andadversarypublics(stemerosionof

USeconomicfounda&on;generatesupportfornecessarydefenseexpenditures;

underminerevisionistpowerabilitytotranslatemilitarypoten&alintomilitary

capability)43

•  Strategyisaboutmakingchoices,sezngpriori&es,decidingwhattodoandwhatnottodo

•  Strategyisalsoaboutappor&oningrisk;mustunderstandwhenriskissuchthatthestrategyis“astrategyofbluff”

•  If“diagnosis”iscorrect,thisstrategyrequiresincreasedresourcesover&me

•  Failingthat,objec&ves/commitmentswilllikelyneedtobedivested,ininverseorderofpriority

44

Thedefensestrategypresentedhere:

•  AddressesanenduringstrategicinterestoftheUnitedStatesbyprovidingastrategydesignedtominimizetheoverallrisktothisinterestandtomaintainriskatanacceptablelevel

•  Explicitlyaddressestherela&onshipbetweenendsandmeans;insodoingitallocatesriskamongthethreetheatersofopera&on

•  Tailorsthedefensepostureandresourcesinlinewithstrategicpriori&es•  Issupportedbyaforceposturethatissufficientlyflexibletoaddress

unan&cipatedthreatsto(oropportuni&estoadvance)U.S.interestsinanyofthethreetheaters

•  CallsfortheUnitedStatestodevelopacorecompetencyin&me-basedcompe&&on,buyingcapabilityop&onsandiden&fyingpromisingnewopera&onalconcepts

•  Placesheavyemphasisonthesocialdimensionofstrategy,accordinghighprioritytodevelopingstrategicnarra&ves

•  Explicitlyiden&fiesthosetheaterswhereU.S.interestswillhavetobedivestediftheresourcesrequiredtoexecutethestrategyarenotmadeavailable 45

46