Observation of the 1998 Venezuelan Elections (PDF)

OBSERVATION OF THE 1998 VENEZUELAN ELECTIONSBY HAROLD TRINKUNAS AND JENNIFER MCCOY

SPECIAL REPORT SERIES

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OBSERVATION OF THE

1998 VENEZUELAN ELECTIONS

A REPORT OF THECOUNCIL OF FREELY ELECTED HEADS

OF GOVERNMENT

WRITTEN BY

HAROLD TRINKUNAS

JENNIFER McCOY

FEBRUARY, 1999

LATIN AMERICAN AND CARIBBEAN PROGRAM

THE CARTER CENTER

ONE COPENHILL

453 FREEDOM PARKWAY

ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30307(404) 420-5175

FAX (404) 420-5196WWW.CARTERCENTER.ORG

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OBSERVATION OF THE 1998 VENEZUELAN ELECTIONS

Members of The Carter Center’s 42-person delegation.

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1) Nicholas Brady 2) Jimmy Carter 3) Jennifer McCoy 4) Ken Abdalla 5) Becky Castle 6) Ari Swiller 7) Bronwen Morrison 8) Pablo Galarce 9) Jonathan Hartlyn10) Ron Burkle11) Ed Casey12) Neil Gaudry13) Mary Ann Chalker14) John Burkle15) Esther Low16) Terrance Adamson17) Rosalynn Carter18) Kent Spicer19) Beatriz Fuentes20) Virginia López-Glass21) Annamari Laaksonen22) Tanya Mújica23) Vanessa Marti

24) Debbie Palmer25) Jason Calder26) Shelley McConnell27) Harold Trinkunas28) Rodrigo Chávez Palacios29) Jaime Areizaga30) George Jones31) Harry Vanden32) Horace Sibley33) Rafael Toribio34) John Hardman35) Chuck Costello36) John Newcomb37) Ken Roberts38) Deanna Congileo

Not PicturedPatricio AylwinFidel Chávez MenaCurtis KohlhaasNancy KonigsmarkGonzalo Sánchez de LozadaJesus OrtegaAndrew Shue

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COUNCIL OF FREELY ELECTED HEADS OF GOVERNMENT

ELECTION OBSERVATION DELEGATION

VENEZUELA

Dec. 3-7, 1998

DELEGATION LEADERS

The Honorable Jimmy Carter, 39th President of the United States and Council Chair, UNITEDSTATES

The Honorable Patricio Aylwin Azocar, former President of Chile, CHILEThe Honorable Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada, former President of Bolivia, BOLIVIAMr. Nicholas Brady, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, Darby Overseas Investments, Ltd., and

former Secretary of the U.S. Department of the Treasury, UNITED STATESMrs. Rosalynn Carter, Vice Chair of The Carter Center and former First Lady of the United States,

UNITED STATESDr. Jennifer McCoy, Director, Latin American and Caribbean Program, The Carter Center, UNITED

STATES

DELEGATION

Mr. Ken Abdalla, President, Jerry’s Famous Delis, and Managing Director, Waterton Management, LLCMr. Terrance Adamson, Senior Vice President for Law, Business, and Government Affairs, National

Geographic Society, and Member, The Carter Center Board of TrusteesMr. Jaime Areizaga, Associate, Hogan & HartsonMr. Ron Burkle, Chairman and Partner, The Yucaipa CompaniesMr. John Burkle, Student, Los Angeles, CaliforniaMr. Jason Calder, Program Coordinator, Global Development Initiative, The Carter CenterMr. Ed Casey, Managing Director, Hills & Company, and former State Department Deputy Assistant

Secretary for Inter-American AffairsMs. Becky Castle, Program Coordinator, Latin American and Caribbean Program, The Carter CenterMs. Mary Anne Chalker, President, LFC InsuranceDr. Fidel Chávez Mena, Advisor to the President, Grupo Taca, and former Deputy to Salvadoran

Legislative AssemblyMr. Rodrigo Chávez Palacios, Student, Bachelor of Arts in Business Administration, El SalvadorMs. Deanna Congileo, Senior Associate Director, Public Information, The Carter CenterMr. Chuck Costello, Director, Democracy Program, The Carter Center

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Mr. Pablo Galarce, Program Assistant, Americas Division, International Foundation for ElectionSystems

Mr. Neil Gaudry, Representative, Legislative Assembly, Manitoba, CanadaDr. John Hardman, Executive Director, The Carter CenterDr. Jonathan Hartlyn, Professor, Political Science, University of North Carolina at Chapel HillAmb. George Jones, Director, Americas Division, International Foundation for Election SystemsMr. Curtis Kohlhaas, Events Coordinator, The Carter CenterMs. Nancy Konigsmark, Scheduling Director for President Carter, The Carter CenterMs. Annamari Laaksonen, Finnish Fulbright Fellow, Latin American and Caribbean Program, The

Carter CenterMs. Esther Low, Assistant to the Associate Executive Director, The Carter CenterMs. Vanessa Marti, Intern, Latin American and Caribbean Program, The Carter CenterDr. Shelley McConnell, Associate Director, Latin American and Caribbean Program, The Carter CenterMs. Tanya Mújica, Program Assistant, Latin American and Caribbean Program, The Carter CenterMr. John Newcomb, Instructor, Geography, University of Victoria, British ColumbiaDr. Jesús Ortega, Secretary-General, Partido Revolucionario Democrático (PRD), MexicoMs. Debbie Palmer, Bobby Jones Scholar, Emory University, and Intern, Latin American and Caribbean

Program, The Carter CenterDr. Ken Roberts, Professor, Political Science, University of New MexicoMr. Horace Sibley, Partner, King & SpaldingMr. Ari Swiller, Vice President, External Affairs, Ralph’s Grocery CompanyMr. Andrew Shue, ActorMr. Kent Spicer, Financial Analyst, The Carter CenterDr. Rafael Toribio, Rector, INTEC (Technical Institute of Santo Domingo), Member of Participación

Ciudadana, and Executive Committee Member of Action Group for DemocracyDr. Harold Trinkunas, Carter Center Field Representative, Caracas, VenezuelaDr. Harry Vanden, Professor, Political Science and International Relations, University of South Florida,

Tampa

LOCAL STAFF

Ms. Beatríz Fuentes, Carter Center Logistics Assistant, Caracas, VenezuelaMs. Virginia López-Glass, Carter Center Logistics Coordinator, Caracas, Venezuela

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Foreword by Jimmy Carter 8

Preface and Acknowledgments by Jennifer McCoy 9

Key Election Terms and Abbreviations 11

Executive Summary 14

Historical Background 16

Pre-Election Period 18Pre-Election Assessment Visit, Oct. 6-10 18Automating the Voting Process in Venezuela 20Pre-Election Assessment Visit, Nov. 2-3 22

The Legislative and Regional Elections 26Analysis of Nov. 8 Regional Elections 27

Technical Assessment 31

The Presidential Elections 36The Campaign 36Technical Preparations 38Campaign Problems and Complaints 39

The Observation of the Presidential Elections 41Preparations for Electoral Observation 41The Leadership Team Agenda 42Election Day: Dec. 6, 1998 44Election Night 48

Post-Election Observation 51Challenges to the 1998 Electoral Results 51Politics in the Wake of the 1998 Elections 53

Recommendations and Suggestions 55 Procedural Recommendations 55 Legal Recommendations 56

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List of TablesTable 1: Planned Automation of the Voting Process 21Table 2: Outcomes in the 1998 Elections for Governors 28Table 3: Composition of Venezuelan Congress 30Table 4: Abstentionism in 1998 Regional Elections 34Table 5: Final Vote Totals — 1998 Venezuelan Presidential Elections 49Table 6: Official Electoral Statistics — 1998 Venezuelan Presidential Elections 50Table 7: Sample of States in Which the Results of the Governor’s Election were 51

Challanged as of January 1999

Endnotes 58

Appendices 59

About The Carter Center 84

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FOREWORD

Venezuela has long been a model ofdemocracy in Latin America, and has sentobservers and technical assistance to other

countries struggling to establish new electoralprocedures. Two members of The Center’s Councilof Freely Elected Heads of Government were twiceelected president of Venezuela – Rafael Calderaand Carlos Andrés Pérez.

Yet, when Venezuelans asked us to serve asinternational monitors for their electoral process in1998, we quickly responded. Dr. Jennifer McCoy,director of the Center’s Latin American and Carib-bean Program (LACP), traveled to Caracas withstaff member Becky Castle to meet with the Na-tional Electoral Council and the presidentialcandidates. They found widespread concern aboutthe 1998 elections, and a strong desire for interna-tional monitors. After a tumultuous decade, whichincluded two failed coup attempts, the indictmentand ouster of a president, a financial crisis, and asevere drop in oil revenues, Venezuelans wereanxious about these elections. The demise of thetraditional party system and the rise of independentcandidates, including a former coup leader, addedto the uncertainty.

After consulting with other regional leaders, weaccepted the National Electoral Council’s invita-tion. We organized a 42-member delegation andasked Patricio Aylwin, former president of Chile,and Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada, former presidentof Bolivia, both members of the Council of FreelyElected Heads of Government, to join me as co-leaders. President Sánchez de Lozada also joinedme in a pre-election visit in November. We werefortunate to have Nicholas Brady, former secretaryof the U.S. Department of the Treasury and author

of the Brady debt-reduction plan, as co-leaderduring the presidential elections. The experienceand wisdom of all three of these leaders addedimmeasurably to our effectiveness.

My thanks to all delegation members for theirdedication and hard work that made our mission asuccess. I also want to acknowledge Dr. McCoy,whose knowledge of Venezuelan politics andexperience in election monitoring enabled us toorganize a mission that contributed to a peacefuland orderly election in Venezuela.

Most importantly, I want to recognize theVenezuelan people, especially the election workers,whose dedication to sustaining their democraticsystem, even in the wake of profound change, madethese elections a true demonstration of democracyat work. ■

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PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

LACP interns Annamari Laaksonen, Vanessa Martí andDebbie Palmer, LACP program assistant Tanya Mújica anddelegate Rodrigo Chávez Palacios prepare for deployment.

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The Carter Center’s Council of Freely Elected Heads of Government

has observed 18 elections in 12 countriesin the Western hemisphere since 1989. Most ofthose have been transitional elections in coun-tries with little or no experience in freely com-petitive elections. Recently, however, we turnedour attention to established democracies facingextraordinary tensions threatening to erode theirdemocratic practices, and countries that invitedinternational monitors to help restore the equi-librium. In December 1997, the Council ob-served elections in Jamaica in a context ofspiraling violence, with hopes to help restore apeaceful process in that longstanding democracy.

During an October 1998 assessment missionto Venezuela, we saw some developmentsthat led us to accept the invitation of theNational Electoral Council (Consejo NacionalElectoral, CNE) to monitor the elections. First, theVenezuelan political system was shifting from astrong two-party system to a politically fragmentedone. Second, the national organization andpopulist message of front runner Hugo Chávez, aformer coup leader who had been jailed andpardoned, appeared to be polarizing the electorate.Third, the experiment with a new automated votecount system raised concerns among the parties andvoters. Overall, these changes produceduncertainty and anxiety about the electoral process,and the parties and candidates looked tointernational observers to help calm the waters andaffirm a clean election.

We decided that we could organize a delegationonly for the presidential elections, due to time andresource constraints. The mission was funded by agenerous grant from the U.S. Agency for Interna-

tional Development and with support from theCanadian International Development Agency1.The National Democratic Institute for InternationalAffairs (NDI) aided The Carter Center with grantadministration. I also want to thank ManuelArango and Ron Burkle for their generous support,as well as the in-kind support of The Coca-ColaCompany, BellSouth, Telcel, and Delta Air Lines.NDI, the International Foundation for ElectionSystems (IFES), and the Canadian Foreign Ministrydesignated qualified observers to serve on ourmission.

The mission was made possible through thesuperb organizational skills of the LACP staff –Shelley McConnell, Becky Castle, and Tanya

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Mújica. Harold Trinkunas flew to Caracas fromStanford University on short notice to serve as ourfield representative, bringing his knowledge ofVenezuelan politics and keen analytical abilities.Harold also wrote the bulk of this report.Additional Carter Center staff helped to make thisone of the best-organized election observerdelegations we have fielded. These included: JasonCalder, Deanna Congileo, Nancy Konigsmark,Curtis Kohlhaas, and Esther Low. Carter Centerinterns in the LACP program put togetherexcellent briefing books, kept us updated onVenezuelan politics, and in some cases joined us inthe field. They include Beth Bercaw, ChristieCrane, Alex Gillies, Annamari Laaksonen, VanessaMarti, and Debbie Palmer.

In Venezuela, our office was augmented withthe skills of two Venezuelans: Virginia López-Glassand Beatríz Fuentes, who managed the logistics ofdelegate teams traveling to 14 different states inVenezuela. Back in Atlanta, Pam Auchmutey andRochelle Williams managed the production of thisreport.

Finally, I want to thank the Venezuelan Na-tional Electoral Council for its responsive answersto all of our requests for information, andJacquelyn Mosquera for her patient and capablerole as coordinator of international election

observers. We were grateful for the warm receptionwe received throughout Venezuela. We wereextremely impressed with: the orderly voting thanksto the voters, election workers, and soldiers of thePlan República; the speed of the automatedtransmission of vote results in the presidentialelection; and the gracious and conciliatory speechesof the winner and losers. We hope the next stage ofVenezuelan democracy reflects the desiredemonstrated by the people both for change intheir political and economic life and for continuityof democratic principles. ■

Jennifer McCoy, Ph.D.Director, Latin American andCaribbean ProgramAtlanta, Georgia

LACP staff, Dr. Shelley McConnell,Becky Castle, Dr. Harold Trinkunas,and Tanya Mújica relax following the

elections.

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KEY ELECTION TERMS AND ABBREVIATIONSAcción Democrática Democratic Action party. The traditional social democratic party in

Venezuela.

Acta en Cero The initial tally sheet printed by every voting machine at the start ofthe voting process. It was supposed to indicate that the votingmachine registered no votes.

Actas (de Escrutinio) Tally sheets printed out or hand written at the end of the votingprocess at each voting table.

Apertura New party created by former President Carlos Andrés Pérez, whowon a Senate seat in the November 1998 elections.

Automatización Generic name given to the automation of the voting processduring the 1998 elections.

Boleta Electoral Electoral ballot.

Centro de Votación A voting center, typically established in a school to serve thesurrounding neighborhood. It usually had multiple voting tablesclustered into groups of three which shared a vote tabulatingmachine.

Centro Regional de Totalización An automated vote tallying center. There was one established ineach state plus one for the federal district and a national tallyingcenter that aggregated results from regional centers. The Spanishcompany INDRA managed these centers.

Circumscripción A voting district. Important for the regional elections, but less so inthe presidential elections.

Comandante de Guarnición The local garrison commander who controlled troops deployed forthe Plan República in a given area. There were 26 garrisoncommanders.

CNE The National Electoral Council (Consejo Nacional Electoral)organized the voting process across Venezuela. All seven Councilmembers were independents.

COPEI Comité de Organización Política Electoral Independente. Atraditional Christian democratic party in Venezuela.

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Cotillón Electoral Materials used at the voting tables, excluding the ballots. Includespens, folders, ink, stamps, labels, and privacy booths.

Cuaderno de Electores The register of voters assigned to a specific voting table.

CUFAN Comando Unificado de las Fuerzas Armadas Nacionales (ArmedForces Unified Command). The CUFAN controlled the 70,000troops deployed as part of the Plan República.

Impugnación A challenge filed against the results of the elections that the CNEis legally empowered to review.

IRENE Integración, Representación, Nueva Esperanza. A partyformed to support the candidacy of Irene Sáez.

JER Regional Electoral Council (Junta Electoral Regional). Charged withsupervising elections at the state level, as well as tallying andconfirming local electoral results.

La Causa R Political party based on the independent union movement. A strongnational party after the 1993 elections, it had only a limited regionalpresence during the 1998 elections.

Ley Orgánica del Sufragio The Venezuelan electoral law.y Participación Política

Máquina de votación A vote tabulating machine.

MAS Movimiento Al Socialismo. Traditional socialist party in Venezuela.Part of the electoral coalition supporting candidate Hugo Chávez.

Mesa Electoral A voting table, officially consisting of five poll workers who sat at atable to administer the vote. A voting center could have from oneto nine voting tables, typically clustered in groups of three sharing avote tabulatng machine.

Miembro de Mesa A poll worker.

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National Electoral Council See CNE

ORA Organización Renovadora Auténtica. Political party based inMaracay, Aragua state.

Patria Para Todos (PPT) Fatherland for All party. Leftist party that split from the La Causa Rparty. It supported Hugo Chávez in the presidential race.

Plan República Refers to both the plan and the personnel of the armed forces elec-toral security operation. Plan República were deployed at all pollingsites, and although many were young soldiers, each polling center hadan officer in charge. This plan has been implemented in every elec-tion since 1963 and is a source of pride for the Venezuelan military.

Polo Patriótico Patriotic Pole. An electoral alliance bringing together several newand old, left and left-center parties to support candidate HugoChávez.

Proyecto Venezuela Venezuela Project. New party backing candidate Henrique SalasRömer.

Queremos Elegir Venezuelan nongovernmental organization formed in 1991 todevelop and deepen democracy in Venezuela.

Recurso Jerárquico An appeal filed challenging a technical or administrative aspect ofthe electoral process.

Sala de Sustanciación Consejo Nacional Electoral committee assigned to determine thevalidity of tally sheets and compare them to the electronicallytransmitted results.

Tarjeta PCMCIA Electronic memory card that stored the electoral software for eachvote tabulating machine and tracked votes cast. The card wasinserted into the machine at the opening of the polls, and an acta encero was printed to show the card had not yet registered any votes.

Tarjetón Alternative name for an electoral ballot.

Testigos Políticos Poll watchers. Party witnesses to the voting process. Witnesses shouldhave had free access to their assigned polling sites during the electoralprocess.

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In brief, the 1998 Venezuelan electionsproceeded as follows:1. Although Venezuela has had competitive

elections for four decades, changing politicaldynamics produced a high degree of uncertainty inthe country, leading Venezuelans to invite interna-tional observers to monitor their elections for thefirst time. In particular, the decline of the two-partydominant system and the rise of independentcandidates, the emergence of a former coup leaderpromising radical changes as the leading candidate,and the introduction of a new automated votecount and transmission system all caused uncer-tainty and some uneasiness among Venezuelans.

2. At the invitation of the Venezuelan Na-tional Electoral Council (CNE) and with thewelcome of all the national political parties andmajor candidates, The Carter Center’s Council ofFreely Elected Heads of Government observed theDec. 6, 1998, Venezuelan presidential election.Through two pre-election visits, a field office, and a42-member international delegation on electionday, the Center assessed election preparations,voting procedures, and the new automated system.The Center also fielded a small staff team toobserve the Nov. 8 legislative and regional elec-tions, and cooperated with the delegations formedby the Organization of American States (OAS),European Union (EU), and the InternationalRepublican Institute (IRI).

3. Prior to the elections, parties and candi-dates had been concerned about the preparationsby the newly appointed CNE, the level of trainingof the newly drafted poll workers, the performanceof the vote tabulating machines, and the willing-ness of all candidates and their supporters to acceptthe results peacefully.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

4. Both the Nov. 8 and the Dec. 6 electionswere peaceful. Voters demonstrated particularpatience during the Nov. 8 elections as late starts,problems with the vote tabulating machines, andan extremely complicated ballot delayed the votefor hours. The CNE corrected many of theseproblems before the Dec. 6 election, which, with asimpler presidential ballot, proceeded much moresmoothly. Security officials under the PlanRepública maintained an orderly process on bothelection days.

5. The Center’s delegation visited 252 votingsites (many with three voting tables) in 13 statesand the federal district on presidential election day.The delegation found 96 percent were open by 8a.m. and 94 percent had party poll watchers (orwitnesses) supporting at least two different candi-dates. Finding no significant problems, the delega-tion concluded that the elections clearly expressedthe will of the Venezuelan people in one of themost transparent elections in the country’s history.

6. Venezuelans introduced the world’s firstnationally integrated electronic network to countand transmit the votes to central headquarters.After the polls closed at 4 p.m. on Dec. 6, the CNEannounced preliminary results at 6:37 p.m., with 76percent of the results counted. The rapidity of theannouncement and the decisive victory of HugoChávez, with 57 percent of the vote, contributed tothe immediate acceptance of the results by Venezu-elans and a calm election night. Gracious andconciliatory messages from both the winner andsecond-place finisher set the stage for Venezuela tomove forward in tackling its serious socioeconomicproblems.

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7. This report offers some suggestions forimproving the electoral process in the future,including better accounting for party and campaignfinancing, an earlier audit of the voter registrationlist, more extensive voter education and pollworker training, and a revamping of the physicalarrangement of voting tables to improve the flow ofvoters.

Poll workers greetPresident Carter at avoting center inCaracas.

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I8. Venezuelans voted peacefully, but defini-

tively for change. With more than 96 percentvoting for the two candidates who promised tooverhaul the system, Venezuelans carried out apeaceful revolution through the ballot box. Never-theless, significant differences of opinion remain totest the skills of Venezuela’s politicians. Key issuesinclude: how to tackle the poverty afflicting themajority of the population while facing a fiscal deficitof 10 percent of Gross Domestic Product, how to bestuse Venezuela’s rich petroleum resources, and how torestructure the political system through constitutionalreform. We are confident that Venezuelans will rise tothe challenge and address these issues with the samespirit of cooperation and commitment to democraticprinciples that The Carter Center witnessed Dec. 6. ■

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HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Venezuela has been a democracy for fourdecades, beginning with the transitionfrom the authoritarian regime of

General Marcos Pérez Jiménez in 1958.2 Duringthis time, it held nine presidential elections andexperienced five peaceful transfers of power be-tween opposing parties. Between 1958 and 1993,the election results for these offices were generallyaccepted and viewed as legitimate, although it waswidely acknowledged that small-scale fraud oc-curred episodically.

Until 1993, democratic transfers of poweroccurred exclusively between the two traditionalparties, social democratic Acción Democrática(AD) and Christian democratic Comité deOrganización Política Electoral Independente(COPEI). Together these parties had garneredmore than 90 percent of the votes in every electionsince 1973.

During the 1993 elections, this pattern of astrong two-party system began to collapse, resultingin the election of former President Rafael Calderawith the backing of a heterogeneous group ofpolitical parties. Remarkably, his supporters did notinclude the party he founded, COPEI. Althougheveryone accepted Caldera’s election as legitimate,suspicions of electoral fraud existed concerning theallegedly low vote totals for a new left-labor party,La Causa R. President Caldera took office during atumultuous period, which followed the indictmentand ouster of a president and two failed coupattempts. The collapse of the financial system, theperiodic suspension of constitutional guarantees,and a deep and persistent economic crisis markedhis term in office.

This pattern of political uncertainty seemed

likely to be sustained in the 1998 elections, asevidenced by the dramatic shifts in public opinionduring the first nine months of the election year. InDecember 1997, Irene Sáez, the mayor of theChacao district of Caracas, led in the polls with 40percent of voter preference. Claudio Fermín, aformer leader of AD followed with 35 percent.After accepting the backing of the traditional party,COPEI, Sáez’s popularity began to decline inMarch. By April 1998, she had dropped to 18percent in voter preferences.

Meanwhile, Hugo Chávez, a former lieutenantcolonel in the Venezuelan army and a leader of oneof the failed 1992 coup attempts, began his dra-matic ascent, registering 30 percent in polls takenin May and achieving 39 percent by August 1998.Henrique Salas Römer, a former governor ofCarabobo state, also began to receive popularsupport, achieving 21 percent by August.3 Theseshifts in popular opinion and having both front-runners as independents created a great concernabout the outcome of the 1998 elections.

Adding to the uncertainty, a new electoral lawmandated the automation of the voting system andthe selection of a new, nonpartisan National Elec-toral Council (CNE). These steps were to reducepossible electoral fraud and increase the transpar-ency of the 1998 elections. However, CNE mem-bers were selected only 10 months before theelections. In this short time, the new CNE had tolearn about the Venezuelan electoral process andsimultaneously take charge of a traditional bureau-cracy that AD and COPEI parties had dominated.They also had to design and implement an auto-mated voting system to handle both the regionaland federal 1998 elections.

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To help reduce some of the uncertainty sur-rounding the process, the CNE took the unprec-edented step of inviting international observers towitness the 1998 elections. In September, Dr.Rafael Parra Pérez, CNE president, invited formerU.S. President Jimmy Carter and the Council ofFreely Elected Heads of Government to participateas electoral observers during the upcoming elec-tions (See Appendix 3). ■

John Newcomb, Neil Gaudry, Esther Low, and Jaime Ariezaga listen as otherteams provide reports on their election day observations.

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PRE-ELECTION

ASSESSMENT VISIT

To evaluate the need for observation,the Council of Freely Elected Heads ofGovernment authorized an assessment trip

from Oct. 6-9 by Dr. Jennifer McCoy, director ofThe Carter Center’s Latin America and CaribbeanProgram (LACP), and Becky Castle, programcoordinator. During their trip, McCoy and Castlemet with then-president Rafael Caldera, fivepresidential candidates or their representatives, theminister of interior, the CNE, and Indra, theSpanish company that managed the automation ofthe voting process. All welcomed the participationof electoral observers in general, and many stronglyfavored the participation of The Carter Center andthe Council of Freely Elected Heads of Governmentin particular.

Venezuelans cited several factors that made the1998 elections unique in the country’s democratichistory and contributed to their desire to inviteinternational observers. First, these elections repre-sented a historic watershed in Venezuelan democ-racy, and voter preference polls reflected a desirefor a profound political transformation. Traditionalpolitical institutions, such as the strong, hierarchicalpolitical parties, government-recognized labor andbusiness federations, and a presidentialist systemwere all crumbling in the face of citizen demands forchange and the decentralization of authority togovernors and mayors. The fact that all four lead-ing presidential candidates represented new politicalorganizations, formed specifically to back theircandidacies, confirmed the collapse of the two-partysystem. Ninety percent of the voters, as reflected inOctober opinion polls, desired a peaceful change inthe political system, with approximately 45 percent

PRE-ELECTION PERIOD

backing the populist candidacy of Chávez, and 40percent backing the moderate candidacy ofRömer.4 Only 10 percent supported the status quo,as represented by the traditional parties AD andCOPEI. The very high popularity of candidateChávez, a former coup leader who promised toreform the constitution via a constituent assemblyand revamp a system “corrrupted” by traditionalpolitical elites, served as a prominent indicator ofhow deeply voters desired change in 1998.

The second set of concerns expressed by Ven-ezuelans during the assessment visit focused on theunprecedented degree of automation being intro-duced into the voting process. Venezuela was thefirst country in the world to attempt to integrate anautomated ballot counting system with a singlenational integrated network to transmit the votingresults within minutes to a central headquarters.Having had previous electoral experience, theIndra company acted as the system integrator,coordinating hardware, software, logistics, andtechnical support for this process.

The CNE claimed that it would automatevoting centers representing 92 percent of theregistered voters with 7,000 voting machines. Only900 voting machines had arrived to date, and thefirst full test of the automated system was slated tooccur on Oct. 31, one week before the Nov. 8legislative elections.

The newly reformed electoral system also calledfor more citizen participation in implementing thevoting process to help improve transparency anddeter fraud. There were 360,000 poll workersconscripted via a lottery system from among regis-tered voters. They replaced the party poll workerswho had previously managed voting centers.

The new system permitted party witnesses toobserve the voting process, but only allowed them

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to participate if not enough lottery-selected pollworkers arrived to do the job. The introduction ofcitizen participation was intended to prevent atraditional source of electoral fraud in Venezuela,popularly known as “acta mata voto” (“the tallysheet trumps the ballot”). This type of fraudoccurred when party poll workers at a given pollingsite conspired to redistribute the votes of thoseparties that did not have poll workers present whenpreparing the final tally sheet.

While Venezuelans praised the efforts to im-prove citizen participation, some doubted whetherthis new cadre of poll workers would be notified ina timely fashion and receive sufficient training. TheCNE and Indra contracted with a Venezuelanuniversity, the Universidad Simón Rodríguez, totrain the poll workers, but this program began lateand was criticized for using poor training materials.Venezuelans also questioned how many poll work-ers would actually show up on election day, eventhough the CNE had announced plans to pay them(approximately U.S. $42 for the November elec-tions) and had threatened substantial fines for thosefailing to appear for work.

Venezuelans also expressed concern about theeffect that separation of the legislative and presi-dential elections would have on the electoralprocess. The two elections would be held within amonth of each other, instead of simultaneously ashad occurred on all previous occasions. The legisla-tive and regional elections slated to take placeNov. 8 were the most complicated since theyincluded five races on two ballots. Many of theballots were extremely complex due to the largenumber of regional parties that could participate inany given voting district (more than 450 nationallyand more than 80 in a single state). At the veryleast, multiple, complicated ballots could be

expected to introduce delays into the votingprocess, possibly raising tensions. Also, no onecould predict how the split timing of the twoelections would affect political support. The leadingpresidential candidates voiced widely heldsuspicions that the traditional parties devised thesplit to damage their candidacies, since the newpolitical movements associated with theindependent candidates were expected to performpoorly in the regional elections.

Following this visit, the Council of FreelyElected Heads of Government and The CarterCenter decided to accept the invitation to send adelegation of electoral observers to monitor the1998 presidential elections. The pre-conditions forobservation were met: The mission had beeninvited by the proper authorities and enjoyed thewelcome of all major parties. The Carter Centerdecided to participate because: a) the Venezuelanpolitical system was shifting from a strong two-partysystem to one based on political fragmentation; b)the front-runner, Chávez Frias, was a former coupleader who had been jailed and pardoned, andwhose strong organization and populist messageappeared to be polarizing the electorate; and c) theexperiment with an unprecedented degree ofautomation of the voting process raised concernsamong voters.

The Carter Center opened a field office inVenezuela on Oct. 16 and organized a Nov. 2-3pre-election visit by former President Jimmy Carter,Rosalynn Carter, and former Bolivian PresidentSánchez de Lozada to assess preparations for theNov. 8 regional elections. The Carter Center alsodecided to send a three-person staff team to witnessthe regional elections and observe trouble spots inpreparation for the Dec. 6 presidential elections.

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AUTOMATING THE VOTING

PROCESS IN VENEZUELAVenezuela is the first country in the world to

attempt to fully integrate its polling centers into asingle electronic network for transmitting andtabulating the votes of 92 percent of the registeredvoters.

Indra, as system integrator, contracted themanufacture of 7,000 voting machines to a U.S.-based company, Election Systems & Software. Italso contracted for electoral software from Spainand transportation services from Venezuela. Inaddition, Indra reached an agreement with aVenezuelan university, the Universidad SimónRodríguez, to select and train 8,400 technicians tosupport the automated voting system.

The CNE and Indra coordinated with thenational telephone company and municipal electri-cal utilities to ensure that the appropriate technicalinfrastructure was available at each voting site.

To test the system as a whole, Indra conductedpartial and full tests of the system before both theregional and presidential elections. Although

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Dr. Jennifer McCoy consults with President Carter during a pre-electionpress conference.

scheduled for Oct. 24, the first full test took placeon Nov. 1, only one week before the regionalelection, due to delays in contracting for anddelivering the vote tabulating machines.

The vote tabulating machines were designed toscan ballots as they were introduced into the ballotboxes, keeping a running tally of the votes cast on aremovable PCMCIA memory card. This card alsocarried the tabulating software that only read theballots assigned to specific voting stations.5

One voting machine was assigned to every threemesas electorales (“voting stations”). Each votingcenter, generally located in a school, could have upto nine mesas electorales. On election day, thepresidents of the voting stations would ask an Indratechnician to print out a tally sheet at the beginningof voting to show that no ballots had yet been cast(known as the “acta en cero” or the “zero tallysheet”). During the voting itself, each individualvoter would feed his or her ballot into the votingmachine, although an Indra technician would standby to assist in case of difficulty. At the end ofvoting, the presidents of the mesas electorales wouldask the Indra technician to transmit the voting

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results via modem to the regional vote countingcenters. These results were to be transmitted usingdata compression techniques that Indra assured thepublic would be tamperproof.

As the last step in the voting process, themachines would print out multiple copies of thefinal voting tally for the poll workers, electoralauthorities, and party witnesses, who were requiredby law to sign them. However, they could makedissenting observations on the tally sheet. Thesigned originals of the tally sheet, along with thePCMCIA card, then were transported to theregional tabulating centers that would verify theaccuracy of the electronically transmitted results.

The system incorporated multiple safeguardsinto the process. Voting machines included abattery backup that allowed them to operate for upto 12 hours. The machines were designed to shutdown automatically if they were tampered withbefore or during the election. If any voting machinebroke accidentially during the electoral process,Indra planned to attempt to repair it in the field. Ifthis was not possible, then the mesas electorales usingthat particular machine would have to use a tradi-tional manual voting method. Due to the expenseof each voting machine, the CNE did not have apool of replacement machines available during theregional elections, although additional machines

were later purchased for the presidential elections.The CNE established one Centro Regional de

Totalización in each of the 22 states and in thefederal district. Indra operated these centers, butmost were co-located with the Juntas ElectoralesRegionales (JERs). Each of these regional centers wasequipped with modems, servers, and personalcomputers to receive transmissions from votingmachines, tabulate the regional results, and retrans-mit them to the national tabulating center locatedin CNE headquarters in Caracas. Vote tallies frommanual centers would also be transported to theregional tabulating centers and entered into theautomated system.

During the regional elections, each JER wascharged with tabulating votes in its state andofficially proclaiming the victors. Federal authori-ties at the CNE only received a record of the resultsvia electronic transmission. Conversely, during thepresidential elections, the regional tabulatingcenters would simply serve as way stations for theelectronic transmission of the results to the CNE.The CNE would officially proclaim the president.Speed and accuracy were touted as the mainadvantages of the electronic voting system.

Table 1

Planned Automation of the Voting Process

DESCRIPTION AUTOMATED MANUAL TOTAL % AUTOMATED

DESCRIPTION AUTOMATED MANUAL TOTAL % AUTMATED

VOTING CENTERS 4,852 3,419 8,271 58.7%VOTING STATIONS 16,739 3,473 20,212 82.8%REGISTERED VOTERS 9,960,338 963,795 10,924,133 91.2%

(Source: Consejo Nacional Electoral, October 1998)

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Ambassador George Jones, Dr.Jennifer McCoy, and President

Carter observe a poll opening onDec. 6, 1998.

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The Polo Patriótico was a coalition of left-of-center parties that included the Movimiento QuintaRepública (Fifth Republic Movement, Chávez’ sparty), MAS, the third largest party, and PatriaPara Todos (a splinter from the Causa R party).Chávez’s campaign centered on a message ofradical change, punishing those elites who had“ruined the country” and calling for a constituentassembly to thoroughly reform the political institu-tions of Venezuela’s democracy, positions thatraised fears among the middle and upper classes. Inhis meeting with the delegation, Chávez pledged torespect the election results. He also said he ex-pected to win the second largest block of seats inthe new Congress. He argued that the new con-stituent assembly, the central theme of his cam-paign, could be convened legally through a na-tional referendum, a position many legal scholarsdisputed as being of doubtful constitutionality.

Römer, the successful former governor ofCarabobo state who held second place in publicopinion polls, also campaigned on a message ofchange. He advocated the continuing devolutionof power and resources from the central govern-ment to the states and municipalities. Salas Römerexpressed concern, shared by several other

PRE-ELECTION ASSESSMENT VISIT,NOV. 2-3

On Nov. 2, 1998, President and Mrs. Carter,accompanied by another member of the Councilof Freely Elected Heads of Government, formerBolivian President Sánchez de Lozada, and Dr.McCoy arrived in Caracas to meet with Presi-dent Caldera, the presidential candidates, the CNE,the minister of defense and military high command,and the OAS and European Union (EU) missionchiefs. They found the country calm and in themidst of preparations for the Nov. 8. regionalelections.

THE PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES

The delegation met with six presidential candi-dates during the pre-electoral assessment trip: HugoChávez Frias of Polo Patriótico, Henrique SalasRömer of Proyecto Venezuela, Irene Sáez of IRENEand COPEI, Luis Alfaro Ucero of AcciónDemocrática, Alfredo Ramos of La Causa R, andMiguel Rodríguez of Apertura. All assured theCouncil delegation that they would respect theresults of the November and December elections.However, they also expressed concern about theelectoral process and each other’s intentions.

Chávez met with the Carter Center delegationand discussed his political platform and plans for aconstituent assembly. As a former lieutenantcolonel, who led a coup against the democraticgovernment in 1992, he was jailed for two years.Later, he was pardoned by President Caldera,enabling him to run for office.

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candidates, that even though more independentpersons led the new CNE, the electoral bureaucracyremained in the hands of the traditional parties whichpreviously had been associated with fraud. He alsostated that he did not expect to achieve great successin the Nov. 8 elections partly because the CNE-prepared ballots distorted his party symbol and madeit difficult for voters to recognize.

Candidate Sáez, former mayor of a Caracassuburb, had seen her popularity drop precipitouslyafter she accepted the endorsement of COPEI, thetraditional Christian democratic party. In her meet-ings with Presidents Carter and Sánchez de Lozada,Sáez explained her decision by arguing that thesurvival of democracy and the governability of Ven-ezuela depended on the survival of political institu-tions, such as the party system. Nevertheless, sheexpected to be strengthened by the positive results ofCOPEI in up to eight governorships that wouldvindicate her decision. Her principal concerns, whichmatched those of other candidates, included the newpolling officials. Some of whom, she claimed, wereilliterate and would not be properly trained to carryout their functions. She also raised the issue ofcampaign finance, pointing out that some candidateswere running considerably more television advertisingthan was allowed under electoral law.6

AD candidate Ucero, expected his party to winmore than half the gubernatorial races in the Nov. 8elections, despite his own poor showing of 6 percentin the public opinion polls. He also thought that thesevictories would boost his own candidacy for thepresidency. In his meeting with the delegation, Uceroexpressed concern that the newly selected pollworkers, who had replaced the traditional partyrepresentatives, would lack the training to carry outtheir functions. Like Sáez, he expressed concern thatdespite the electoral law’s provision that students andteachers be included

at every voting table, many of these poll workerswould be illiterate and unable to perform their duties.He also feared overall confusion and violence in stateswith close gubernatorial elections and cited the statesof Zulia, Sucre, and Bolivar as particularly vulnerablein this respect.

Ramos expressed concern about the possibility ofelectoral fraud under the new automated votingsystem, claiming his own party had been deprived ofvictory due to fraud in previous elections. MiguelRodríguez, representing a new party that includesformer President Carlos Andrés Pérez, Apertura,discussed his unsuccessful attempt to form a coalitionamong opponents of Chávez.

ELECTORAL PREPARATIONS

The Carter Center pre-election delegation alsovisited the CNE for a briefing on the new electoralsystem and a demonstration of a vote tabulatingmachine.

In this meeting, the seven principal members ofthe CNE assured the delegation that the new systemwould be ready in time for the Nov. 8 elections. Theyalso informed the delegation that the Oct. 31 nationaltest of the automated voting system had been success-ful, with a 90 percent success rate in the transmissionof results. The CNE reiterated its full confidence inthe new automated voting system, arguing that itwould increase transparency, accuracy, and speed indelivering results.

As the CNE explained, 80 percent of voterswould use a fully automated voting system thatincluded both automatic tabulation of ballots andelectronic transmission of the results. Twelve percentwould have their votes tallied automatically, but dueto the absence of telephone lines, the results would behand carried to the respective JER. The remaining 8percent would cast their ballots by the traditionalmethod, and these results would be tallied by pollworkers at their voting center.

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Given the high percentage of the populationcovered by the automated voting process, the CNEbelieved it would be able to transmit the resultswithin a few hours of the end of voting at 4 p.m.

Each voter would cast two ballots: one forfederal senators and deputies and a second ballotfor state governors and assembly members. TheVenezuelan electoral system allocated some posi-tions such as the federal senate by proportionalrepresentation and a closed party list. For otherposts, such as for state governor, the candidatescompeted nominally (first past the post). Federaldeputies could be selected either by proportionalrepresentation from a closed party list, or nomi-nally, from multimember districts.

Each ballot was 8 by 20 inches, and couldcontain identification boxes on both sides of theballot for more than 80 parties (as was the case inthe state of Miranda), with ovals next to each boxfor voters’ selections. (See Appendix #5 for asample legislative ballot.)

All of these different mechanisms for selectingcandidates had to be accommodated in the regionalelections, which resulted in a ballot that was diffi-

cult to read and interpret. The CNE assured thedelegation that Venezuelans were accustomed tovoting under the rules of the current electoralsystem, and they would have little difficulty inter-preting the ballot. However, First Vice PresidentMiriam Kornblith acknowledged the voting systemhad changed since 1993 to replace single-memberdistricts with multimember districts in elections tothe federal Chamber of Deputies and this mightgenerate confusion. To minimize this concern, theCNE took steps to display poster-sized ballots atvoting centers for voters to examine. The CNE alsoreported it was taking an active role in educatingthe public through a television and radio campaignthat began Oct. 21.

During the pre-electoral visit, the CarterCenter delegation met with the minister of defense,Vice Admiral Tito Rincón Bravo, and the militaryhigh command to discuss their role in the upcom-ing electoral process. The military high commandassured Presidents Carter and Sánchez de Lozada oftheir impartiality during the electoral process andtheir firm commitment to respecting the electionresults.

Augustín Berrios,President Aylwin Azocar,Mrs. Carter, PresidentSánchez de Lozada,presidential candidateIrene Sáez, PresidentCarter, and NicholasBrady meet at theCaracas Hilton before theDec. 6 presidentialelections.

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Since 1963, the armed forces had providedsecurity for all aspects of elections, an operationknown as Plan República. This operation involvedthe armed forces guarding electoral materials,voting centers, and regional and national votetabulating centers, as well as maintaining publicorder on election day.

For the 1998 elections, 70,000 troops would bedeployed under the direction of General MartínezOchoa, commander of the National Armed ForcesUnified Command (CUFAN). The armed forcesalso would be responsible for transporting tallysheets and the PCMCIA software cards containing abackup of the vote tally to the regional countingcenters after the end of voting. Although theelectoral results would be known long before thesematerials arrived, they were necessary for verifyingthe accuracy of the electronically transmittedresults. The armed forces also were responsible forstoring the ballots after the end of elections for atleast 45 days, since these would provide a physicalrecord of the vote, should there be a legal challengeto an official result. Because the armed forcesenjoyed a very high degree of confidence amongthe population and were perceived as nonpartisan,Venezuelans viewed this substantial degree ofmilitary participation as an additional guarantee ofthe honesty and integrity of the electoral process.

COOPERATION WITH INTERNATIONAL OBSERVERS

The delegation met with ambassadors andrepresentatives of the OAS and EU, each of whomplanned to field small delegations for the Nov. 8regional elections and larger delegations for theDec. 6 presidential elections. All three missionsagreed to jointly coordinate deployment and shareinformation. They also agreed to consult with eachother before making any post-election publicstatements. The OAS delegation chief, EdgardoReis, announced its plans to conduct a parallel votetabulation during the presidential elections. While

the “quick count” would not provide informationon the outcome any more rapidly than the newautomated voting system, the OAS thought itwould add confidence to the official results. TheCarter Center agreed to help the OAS collect dataif needed on Dec. 6, which would prove to be auseful collaboration. ■

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Following the Nov. 4 departure of theleadership team, three Carter Center staffmembers remained in the country to

witness regional elections and perform a technicalanalysis of the voting process. Two staff membersdeployed to Zulia state, where a highly polarizedand contentious race for governor was taking place.The third partnered with an EU observer from theUnited Kingdom to witness elections in Caracasand neighboring Vargas state. Carter Center staffalso witnessed voting returns at regional votetallying centers the evening of Nov. 8.

Zulia state was chosen because it wasexpected to have the most problematicregional elections. Supporters of both leadingcandidates had warned of possible electoralfraud and violence there, and the AD candi-date for governor, Manuel Rosales, hadpublicly requested the presence of interna-tional observers.

Just prior to the elections, the CNEdismissed the members of the JER in Zuliastate on grounds of mismanagement andpartisanship. The CNE assigned its secondvice president, Rafael Garcia Borges, asintervenor. He arrived the morning beforethe election to attempt to restore order andsupervise the elections. The Carter Centerteam arrived in Maracaibo the evening ofNov. 7 and met with Borges and local politi-cal representatives. By the time the staff teamvisited the Zulia JER, Garcia Borges hadsuccessfully re-established control over theregional electoral machinery, and he assured TheCarter Center staff the elections would proceed

Mesa workers check voters’ identity and verify their eligibility tovote at a polling station in Vargas state.

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smoothly.On election day, the team visited eight voting

centers and witnessed three poll openings and twopoll closings. At these sites, the voting processproceeded freely and fairly, although the teamnoted some problems. The most common includeddelays at the start of voting and inexperienced pollworkers. That evening, the staff team met with theregional Indra manager and witnessed the receptionof the electronically transmitted results at theregional vote counting center. With more than 75

THE LEGISLATIVE AND REGIONAL ELECTIONS

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percent of the results tabulated, the first officialbulletin with electoral results for Zulia was issuedshortly after 11 p.m. It gave an overwhelmingvictory to the Polo Patriótico candidate andincumbent governor, Francisco Arias Cardenas. Atno time during election day did the Carter Centerteam witness disturbances or acts of violence, eventhough voters grew impatient with the long delaysexperienced at some voting centers.

The Carter Center/EU team deployed inCaracas also found that elections proceeded well,although with problems similar to those witnessedby the Zulia team. They visited nine voting centersin the neighborhoods of La Guaira and Catia-la-Mar in Vargas state, and Catia and 23 de Enero inCaracas. The principal problems observed werelong delays before and during the voting process.Also, unlike Zulia, a significant number of mesaselectorales had to use party witnesses because manypoll workers selected by lottery never arrived.However, the team observed a high level of coop-eration between poll workers and party witnesses atall locations they visited. The Caracas staff memberobserved closings at 5:30 p.m. and 8:30 p.m., andthen observed the electoral returns at the regionaltabulating center for the federal district. As in Zulia,the Caracas team did not witness any public distur-

bances or acts of violence, a common fear voicedby Venezuelans prior to the elections.

Following the regional elections, the CarterCenter staff met with other EU observers to ex-change information and opinions concerning theelectoral process. EU teams, which had deployed tosix states in Venezuela, observed problems verysimilar to those that the Center’s teams witnessedin Caracas and Maracaibo. This factor helpedimprove confidence in the findings. Both the EUand the OAS made public statements concerningthe regional legislative elections, but The CarterCenter declined to do so due to the small numberof observers it fielded. Instead, its teams focused onlearning about the Venezuelan electoral process toprepare for observing the presidential elections.

ANALYSIS OF THE NOV. 8REGIONAL ELECTIONS

Politically, almost all major parties achievedtheir stated goals and thus could claim success inthe legislative and regional elections. This relativesuccess discouraged the parties from resorting toviolence to alter the electoral results. The newautomated voting system reported results withspeed and accuracy despite some problems.

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John Newcomb(second from left) andHorace Sibley (fourthfrom left) meet withother internationalobservers and CNEofficials in the state ofSucre.

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Table 2

Outcomes in the 1998 Elections for Governors

Political Parties Official Number Number of Total Stake in(Polo Patriotico of Governorships Governorships Governorshipsindicated with held in Allianceasterisk)

ACCIÓN DEMOCRÁTICA (AD) 8 1 9COPEI 5 5 10MAS* 4 5 9MOVIMIENTO QUINTA REPÚBLICA* 1 6 7PATRIA PARA TODOS* 2 7 9PROYECTO VENEZUELA 1 2 3LA CAUSA R 1 6 7CONVERGENCIA 1 5 6

(Source: Alfredo Keller, Venezuelan electoral analyst)

Overall, these elections emphasized the continuingdemocratic convictions of the citizenry. Fifty-fourpercent of Venezuelans turned out to vote, a highernumber than in previous regional elections.

Two parties had dominated the electoral scenebetween 1973 and 1993 – the social democraticparty AD and the Christian democratic partyCOPEI. In 1993, new parties emerged on the sceneto challenge their leadership, and in 1998, thenumber of parties proliferated. Three parties lostground in the 1998 regional elections: COPEI, LaCausa R (a left-labor party), and Convergencia (theelectoral grouping that supported PresidentCaldera). AD had mixed results, losing severalgovernorships, but increasing its representation in

the legislature. The new party, the MovimientoQuinta República, led by Hugo Chávez, won about25 percent of the congressional seats, and thecoalition led by Chávez, the Polo Patriótico, woncontrol of 35 percent of the seats in the Chamber ofDeputies.

THE GOVERNORSHIPS

Compared to predictions made before Nov. 8,AD lost ground in the gubernatorial elections, whilethe Polo Patriótico did considerably better. How-ever, taking into account the electoral alliancesamong parties at the state level, the outcome wasquite balanced. The results of the governors’ raceswere as follows:

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A voter feeds his ballot into a voting machine with atechnician’s help.

Several analysts spoke of the gubernatorialelections as a political earthquake that dramaticallyreshaped the distribution of party strength in theregions. Certainly, the reduction of AD’s governor-ships from 12 to 8 indicated a shift away from thetraditional parties, but at the same time, COPEIincreased its governors from three to five. Victoriesof Polo Patriótico candidates in Vargas (the coastalstate near Caracas) and in the plains state of Barinas(where Chávez’s father won the governorship)surprised analysts. However, considering that 16 of18 incumbent governors won re-election, the actualshift in state leadership was relatively small. Rather,the pattern of support for established regionalleaders changed. This reflects the opportunisticalliances made by political parties on a state-by-statebasis. For example, while the COPEI party wascompletely opposed to a Chávez victory in thepresidential race, it was allied with his party, theMovimiento Quinta República, in the western stateof Zulia, where they jointly won the governorship inthe Nov. 8 elections. In another state, DeltaAmacuro, AD and COPEI made an alliance to winthe governor’s race, even though they competed atthe national level. Thus, electoral alliances gavemultiple parties a stake in the success of eachgovernor and in the results of the regional elections.

All parties generally accepted the outcome inthe governors’ races with the exception of the PoloPatriótico. It immediately challenged the results ofthese races in at least 7 of 23 states. AD thenchallenged the victories of Polo Patriótico candi-dates in the states of Barinas and Guárico. Theselegal challenges to the results of the Nov. 8 electionare expected to take years to resolve through theprocess established by Venezuelan electoral law.7

OUTCOME OF THE CONGRESSIONAL RACES

The Nov. 8 elections produced an entirelyheterogeneous Congress, in which no group has agoverning majority. AD managed to remain theleading minority in both chambers of Congress, andit was the strongest party in the assembly of moststates. Chávez’s Movimiento Quinta Repúblicarepresents the second largest single party, followedby COPEI, and Proyecto Venezuela, the new partythat supported presidential candidate HenriqueSalas Römer. If Chávez’s electoral alliance with thesocialist party MAS and the radical party Patria ParaTodos (PPT) holds together, the Polo Patriótico willcontrol 34 percent of the deputies in the newCongress, compared to AD’s 30 percent. In otherwords, any president would need to devise a work-able majority in the Congress to govern.

The number of senators and deputies in theVenezuelan Congress varies from election to elec-tion because, to ensure proportional representation,some parties are assigned extra legislators accordingto their electoral quotient.8 The electoral quotientis akin to the minimum number of votes required toelect a legislator, and it is used to calculate thenumber of legislators any given party should have inCongress. The base number of legislators (48 in theSenate and 189 in the Chamber of Deputies) isdivided into the number of valid votes in thelegislative elections (4,963,760) to determine theelectoral quotient (103,412 in the Senate and26,263 in the Chamber). The electoral quotient fora given Chamber is then divided into the total

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Table 3

Composition of Venezuelan CongressElectoral alliance Polo Patriótico indicated with asterisk

Political Parties New Congress Previous` CongressSenators Deputies Senators Deputies

AD 20 (33.9%) 62 (30.75% 16 (30.2%) 55 (27.1%)MVR* 12 (20.3%) 45 (22.27%) 0 0MAS* 5 (8.47%) 18 (8.91%) 5 (9.43%) 24 (11.8%)PCV* 0 1 (.495%) 0 0PPT* 1 (1.7%) 7 (3.47%) 0 0COPEI 8 (13.56%) 27 (13.37%) 14 (26.42%) 53 (26.11%)Projecto Venezuela 4 (6.78%) 20 (9.9%) 0 0La Causa R 1 (1.7%) 7 (3.47%) 9 (16.98%) 40 (19.7%)Apertura 3 (5.08%) 3 (1.485%) 0 0Convergencia 3 (5.08%) 4 (1.98%) 5 (9.43%) 26 (12.81%)IRENE 1 (1.7%) 2 (.99%) 0 0Renovación 1 (1.7%) 2 (.99%) 0 0Other 0 4 (1.98%) 4 (7.55%) 5 (2.46%)Total 59 202 53 203

(Sources: El Nacional, 12-21-1998 and 1993 Consejo Supremo Electoral figures. Includes senators for life and legislators assigned by electoral quotient.)

number of votes any given party receivednationally to determine the number of legislatorsthey should have under the Venezuelan electorallaw. If the actual number elected directly is lessthan this, extra legislators are assigned to this party.Thus a party such as IRENE, from which nodeputies were directly elected but which received61,112 votes, would receive two deputies byelectoral quotient. In the Senate, this leads someparticularly populous states, such as Miranda andZulia, to be represented by three senators, insteadof two. This system of calculating additionallegislators generally only applies to parties thatnationally received a substantial number of votesbut were unable to elect any legislators in thenominal (first-past-the-post) races.

Venezuelans quickly realized that the 1998congressional results could influence whether a newpresident would call for a constituent assembly. Theissue of convening a constituent assembly to carryout a reform of the constitution was a dominanttheme in 1998 election campaigns, reflecting astrong desire for change among the voters. It alsowas a controversial issue, because the 1961 Venezu-elan constitution did not appear to provide a legalbasis for such a constituent assembly. Many believethat the constitution must be amended by theCongress to permit such a measure or that theconstituent assembly must be convened outside theframework established in the existing constitution.

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The Polo Patriótico, the only group that sup-ported calling for a constituent assembly withoutamending the constitution, was in the minority inboth chambers of the legislature. Its presidentialcandidate, Hugo Chávez, argued that a referendumwould provide the legal basis for convening aconstituent assembly. In a meeting with PoloPatriótico’s governors-elect on Nov. 14, Chávezrestated his commitment to convening a constitu-ent assembly with the power to dissolve Congressand the Supreme Court. He said the current elec-toral system produced a legislature that did notreflect the will of the people, and, if elected, hewould sign the decree calling for a referendum on aconstituent assembly on Feb. 15.

However, after the Nov. 8 elections, significantnational figures, such as Pedro Nikken, a humanrights lawyer, and Alan Brewer-Carias, a formerminister of state, shifted their position on calling aconstituent assembly. They argued that the newCongress would have sufficient legitimacy tosuccessfully reform the constitution. Even theleadership of the MAS party (the socialist partyallied with Polo Patriótico) called for a consensualapproach to reforming the constitution, rather thana majoritarian one. One public opinion poll takenafter the regional elections showed that whilesupport for a constituent assembly was still high,voters preferred a consensual approach by a sub-stantial margin.9 These shifts in elite and massopinion indicated that the constituent assemblyissue would continue to be controversial bothduring and after the Dec. 6 presidential elections.

TECHNICAL ASSESSMENTThe new voting system generally worked

successfully, reporting more than 70 percent of theresults within hours of the poll closings. By Nov. 15,95 percent or more of all votes, whether automatedor manual, had been tallied. Also, the lotterysystem for selecting poll workers seemed to have

worked partially, and many praised the poll work-ers’ dedication and hard work during the electoralprocess.

However, the Nov. 8 elections revealed severalflaws in the new system, most of which may havebeen associated with human error, inexperience,and inadequate planning. The four principal prob-lems reported during this process were: the com-plexity of the ballots, the inexperience of thetechnicians operating the voting machines, theinadequate physical infrastructure of the votingsites, and delays caused by difficulty issuing creden-tials to poll workers and assembling a quorum ofthese workers so voting could begin. This resultedin long lines at polling places, with some votersreporting waits of up to four hours.

The security provided by the Plan Repúblicawas generally praised, although crowd controlpresented a problem at some visited voting centers.

BALLOT COMPLEXITY

The ballots’ complexity for the regional elec-tions led to two problems: delays due to the lengthof time voters needed to complete their ballots anda high number of null votes. The large number ofparties on each ballot and the small print made itdifficult for voters to find their preferred candidate.Poll workers at several of the sites visited by CarterCenter observers reported that the ballots’ com-plexity mostly affected the elderly or those withpoor eyesight. This slowed the process while theyreceived assistance. Moreover, since there often wasonly one voting booth per polling station, manyvoters experienced long lines.

Null votes were higher than expected in theseelections, although they were distributed unevenlyacross the races for governors, national legislators,and local legislators. The governors’ races typicallyhad only 5 to 8 percent null votes, while votes forsenators and deputies were tabulated as null 10-15percent of the time, rising to 16-22 percent for state

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assembly races. In part, this distribution can beattributed to difficulty reading the ballots, but italso may reflect a lack of voter interest orknowledge about the regional legislative races.

INEXPERIENCE OF INDRA TECHNICIANS IN OPERATING

VOTING MACHINES

Indra, a Spanish company, carried out theautomation of the 1998 elections. It coordinatedhardware, software, and training from both interna-tional and Venezuelan sources. The degree ofautomation achieved in the Venezuelan elections isunprecedented, and the Nov. 8 elections repre-sented the first full operational test of the system.

According to the CNE, Indra, and the armedforces, about 10 percent of the voting machinesfailed during the regional elections, forcing pollworkers to use the traditional manual votingmethod in these cases. Many of these failures wereattributed to failures in the PCMCIA cards andtechnicians’ errors. After the Nov. 8 elections, theUniversidad Simón Rodríguez, the Venezuelaninstitution contracted to select and train theoperators, announced it would retrain some of theoperators before the Dec. 6 elections but claimedonly 147 of the voting machines failed due tohuman error.

POOR PHYSICAL INFRASTRUCTURE

Although almost all sites seemed to have therequisite electrical and communications connec-tions, many were too cramped to adequately holdthe polling stations assigned to them. Most votingcenters were established in schools and other publiccenters. However, the limited number of votingmachines (one for every three polling stations) ledthe CNE to put several polling stations in eachclassroom, rather than one per room as had oc-curred in previous elections.

Overcrowding resulted, compounded by thefact that each classroom had only one entrance.

This contributed to long lines for voters and mayhave compromised ballot secrecy. Also,overcrowding led the local representatives of thePlan República to restrict access by party witnessesto the polling stations, often discriminating againstthe representatives of new or minority parties.

ASSEMBLING AND CERTIFYING POLL WORKERS

Many voting centers opened considerably laterthan expected Nov. 8 due to some absent pollworkers. The CNE had selected a list of primaryand alternate poll workers by lottery from thevoters in the electoral registry months before theelection. The Universidad Simón Rodríguez was tonotify these voters of their selection and thenprovide training through its long-distance learningnetwork. This differed from previous elections, inwhich political parties supplied the poll workers.

In the weeks leading up to the regional elec-tions, there were widespread reports that the CNEhad neither notified many citizens of their selectionnor provided proper training to them. However,the CNE partially addressed this problem byconscripting more than three times as many pollworkers (360,000) as were required to staff thevoting tables.

A substantial number of poll workers selectedby lottery either arrived late or did not appear onelection day. Electoral regulations required votingstation personnel be drawn from primary andalternate poll workers before party witnesses couldbe included. In Zulia, where sufficient poll workersshowed up on election day, this was not as great aproblem as in Caracas, where many tables had tobe partially constituted with party witnesses.

Even when enough poll workers showed up,some of them were not admitted to the polling sitesbecause they lacked credentials due to CNE delaysin issuing them. This meant a substantial number ofpolling sites did not open until 9 or 10 a.m., insteadof 6:30 a.m. as planned. This also contributed to

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delays in closing polling sites, some of which werestill open for voting at 10 p.m. The CNE laterreported that 18,000 party witnesses and 103,000persons selected by lottery had served as pollworkers during the regional elections.

SECURITY AND THE PLAN REPÚBLICA

Almost all reports praised the operation of thearmed forces electoral security operation, known asthe Plan República, during the regional elections.Very few voting sites reported instances of abuse ofauthority by military officials. However, at somesites, military officials conducted security searchesof male voters, although this was the exceptionrather than the rule. Also, there were almost noreports of electoral violence.

Electoral observers noted a clear pattern in thesuccess of the Plan República, particularly in thearea of crowd control. Due to problems citedearlier, in this report, many voting centers had longlines of people waiting to vote. In places whereprofessional officers or noncommissioned officerswere present, crowds generally waited in an orderlyfashion. However, in places where security hadbeen assigned to lower ranking soldiers (mainlyconscripts), crowd control was poorer. Also,conscripts were generally less familiar with the roleof electoral observers, which meant Carter Centerobservers were temporarily denied access to one setof voting tables in Maracaibo. EU observers re-ported a similar incident during their efforts.

ALLEGATIONS OF FRAUD

A poll taken soon after the election showed aconsiderable degree of citizen confidence in theautomated voting system. However, the results inseveral gubernatorial and legislative races werechallenged by political parties. Allegations of fraudincluded tampering with tally-sheets, errors intabulation, and electronic fraud during transmissionof the results. Eventually, 155 challenges to the

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Carter Center delegate Jaime Areizaga speaks with anofficer from the Plan República in Maragas.

outcomes of the elections of governors and federalstate legislators were filed. Members of the PoloPátriotico filed many of these challenges, and otherparties responded tit-for-tat. For example, the PoloPatriótico challenged the election results inMiranda state, although its candidate has lost by awide margin. In Barinas, AD challenged theelection of Hugo Chávez’s father as governor.

In a separate motion, La Causa R filed a na-tional challenge to the election, based on the claimthat it was impossible to adequately audit electroni-cally tabulated and transmitted voting results.(Under Venezuelan electoral law, any votingprocess must be auditable for it to be valid.) TheSupreme Court quickly dismissed this challenge asgroundless. All of these claims were made throughthe previously established legal process that assignsresponsibility for conducting an initial investigationto the CNE.

In states where electoral results were chal-lenged, some political activists marched on thelocation of the Regional Electoral Council (JER) todemand that it not proclaim an official victor untilthe results had been audited. In the 1993 and 1995elections, similar protests resulted in the seizure ofelectoral council buildings by defeated politicalparties. To prevent a repetition of these events, the

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Table 4

Abstentionism in 1998Regional Elections

Number of Voters Percentage Votes Cast 5,792,391 53.86%Abstentionism 4,962,748 46.14%

(Source: CNE 1998 Regional Elections website)

Plan República garrisoned the JERs in all of thestates where protests occured, and no such seizureswere reported following these regional elections.

Despite allegations of fraud, the CNE and theJER worked rapidly to proclaim victors in the Nov.8 elections. The CNE believed it was obligated todesignate official victors in all regional elections,despite legal challenges. In the weeks following theelections, the CNE ensured that all regional elec-toral councils carried out their legally mandatedduties, despite the reluctance of some JERs inhighly contested states to proclaim victors.

Only in Carabobo state, where an undercurrentof political conflict and intimidation existed, wasthe CNE forced to relocate the JER to Caracas tofinish the process of tabulating, confirming, andproclaiming the official electoral results. Accordingto CNE President Dr. Parra Pérez, the process ofchallenging the elections was entirely separate fromthat of adjudicating the Nov. 8 results. If previousexperience holds true, these challenges will be tiedup in the judicial system for years to come.

THE REGIONAL ELECTIONS: A CONTINUING

COMMITMENT TO THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS

Venezuelan citizens expressed a continuingcommitment to the democratic process in the Nov.

8 elections, one that went beyond what mostanalysts expected given extremely high abstentionrates in past elections. Abstentionism decreasedfrom previous regional elections by at least 15percent to total 46 percent. Anecdotal evidencesuggests that turnout would have been even higherif citizens had faced fewer obstacles. Certainly, thenumber of participants was lower than theexpressed intention to vote (which exceeded 75percent in most public opinion polls before Nov.8). The two- to four-hour wait reported at manypolling sites presented the primary obstacle andmay have dissuaded as many as 5 percent to 10percent of registered voters from participating.Several observers reported meeting voters who hadreturned two or three times to their polling site inhopes of finding a shorter wait. Participation wasexpected to be even higher in the Decemberpresidential elections.

Contrary to many expectations, the votingprocess took place peacefully throughout Venezu-ela. In the weeks after the elections, there were nosignificant reports of violence, and the few politicalprotests that occurred were small and ended peace-fully. Voters, poll workers, political witnesses, andsoldiers all seemed to cooperate to make the

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elections a success, despite some flaws in the newelectoral process.

The shortcomings of the new system did notsignificantly affect the outcomes of the regionalelections. Only in two states (Guárico and Vargas)were the results in the governor’s race close enoughthat a legal challenge might reasonably change theoutcome. Problems with delays, overcrowding, andmishandling of the electoral machines were ex-pected to be less significant in the presidentialelections due to a simpler ballot.

Following the regional elections, the CNE’s firstvice president, Miriam Kornblith, announced thatall technicians would be retrained prior to thepresidential elections. Also, all members of thevoting stations were required to return for theDecember elections, guaranteeing a supply ofexperienced poll workers. The CNE announced itplanned to re-engineer the flow of voters throughthe polling stations after the Dec. 6 elections. Thecommanders of the Plan República reviewed theirperformance based on their electoral experienceand announced plans to end any security searchesof voters prior to their entrance into voting sitesand improve the access of party witnesses to thevoting tables in crowded situations. ■

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THE CAMPAIGN

The regional elections’ outcome had adecisive and polarizing impact on thepresidential race, although this was not

immediately apparent. Hugo Chávez and hiscoalition emergedsuccessfully fromtheir first test ofpopular support.

Meanwhile,the strength of thetraditional parties,AD and COPEI,in the regionalelections temporarily masked the weakness of theirpresidential candidates. Römer’s party, ProyectoVenezuela, had not done as well as anticipated inregional elections. This was expected to have someimpact on his standing among voters.

Following the Nov. 8 elections, AD and itscandidate, Luis Alfaro Ucero, sought to positionthemselves as the principal challengers to theacknowledged front-runner, Chávez. Given thatAD controlled 30 percent of the legislators in thenew Congress and one-third of the governors,Ucero and the party leadership publicly argued thiswould translate into a strong boost for their candi-

THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS

date, replacing Römer of Proyecto Venezuela insecond place. They also argued that any anti-Chávez coalition should be led by its presidentialcandidate, and they called on Salas Römer toresign to allow the formation of a “democraticpole.” Candidate Chávez and the Polo Patriótico

also stated publiclythat they saw AD astheir principalcontender. GeneralMüller Rojas,Chavez’s campaignmanager argued thatthe strength shown

by AD in the regional elections would translateinto strong support for the party in the presidentialelections, and that Römer no longer presented themain challenger to the Polo Patriótico. Römerinitially did not respond to these attacks, but hecontinued his policy of refusing any official supportfrom other political organizations. Instead, Römer

President Carterand presidential candidate

Henrique Salas Römermeet in Caracas prior

to the elections.

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The strength of the traditional parties, AD andCOPEI, in the regional elections temporarily masked

the weakness of their presidential candidates.

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called on the traditional parties to allow theiractivists, whom he believed favored his candidacy,to vote their conscience.

The post-Nov. 8 polls suggested that thepresidential race remained polarized betweenChávez and Römer, with the presidential candidatesof the traditional parties trailing far behind.10 Publicopinion polls placed Chávez in the lead with 6 to12 points over the fairly steady 38 percent forRömer, although one outlier (Consultores 21)placed Chávez ahead 57 percent to 26 percent.Ucero generally remained at 6 to 7 percent andSáez at 3 percent. This was a shift from the pollsbefore the Nov. 8 election, some of which hadshown Römer practically tied with Chávez. Someanalysts theorized that the twin attacks by AD andthe Polo Patriótico on Römer damaged his standingwith the public. However, others voiced suspicionthat the polling data was being deliberately alteredto manipulate public opinion.

This evidence of weak public support forcandidates of the traditional parties led the newlyelected regional leaders of AD and COPEI to rebelagainst them and force their ouster. By Nov. 13,COPEI began reconsidering the candidacy of IreneSáez. It initially had sought to extricate itself fromits trailing position through an alliance with AD.

The AD-COPEI coalition talks collapsed Nov.24, when COPEI’s leadership refused to supportUcero as the alliance candidate. Shortly thereafter,AD’s governors rebelled and forced the partyleadership to withdraw its support from Ucero. Afull conclave of the party leadership (ComitéDirectivo Nacional) officially revoked Alfaro’scandidacy on Nov. 27. COPEI adopted a “wait-and-see” position, quietly negotiating the resigna-tion of its candidate, Sáez.

By revoking its support for its official candidate,AD’s action provoked an electoral crisis. Venezu-elan electoral law allows parties to name substitutecandidates if their official nominee dies, is

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President Aylwin Azocar, President Carter, presidentialcandidate Hugo Chávez, President Sánchez de Lozada,and Secretary Nicholas Brady meet in Caracas prior tothe Dec. 6 presidential elections.incapacitated, or resigns. COPEI avoided a crisiswhen Irene Sáez agreed to resign as the party’scandidate, though she stayed in the race with thesupport of two smaller parties.

However, candidate Ucero refused to resignfrom his position as AD’s candidate. The CNE,which is the body competent to issue new electoralregulations under current legislation, was thereforeforced to rule on whether the AD slot on the ballotbelonged to the party or the nominee. AD filedmotions before the CNE and a court to compelUcero to give up his position on the ballot. WhileVenezuelan electoral law (Ley Orgánica del Sufragioy Participación Política) does not speak to this issue,the law on political parties does establish that thesymbols of a political party belong to the organiza-tion, not an individual.

Even though the CNE had not yet ruled on theissue, AD and COPEI quickly named Römer astheir party nominee on Nov. 28 and 29 respec-tively. The party leaderships proceeded to ordertheir activists to vote for the new nominee. In themeantime, although the CNE initially raised somedoubts about whether a ballot spot could be takenaway from a candidate, it eventually returned the

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party slot on the presidential ballot to AcciónDemocrática on Dec. 1. This allowed the party toofficially substitute Römer for Ucero.

This electoral crisis had significant repercus-sions on the campaigns of the two leading presiden-tial contenders, Chávez and Römer, and createdadditional uncertainty concerning the outcome.Chávez attacked the traditional parties for theirtreatment of their presidential candidates, accusedthe CNE of favoring the traditional parties with itsruling on the Ucero case, and denounced thenomination of Römer by AD and COPEI as a lastgasp effort by the status quo to defeat him. In hisfinal campaign rally, Chávez asserted that the onlyway he could lose the election would be throughfraud, and that his alliance would be prepared todefend his victory.

In the meantime, Römer initially refused toaccept the endorsement of AD and COPEI, citinghis opposition to any negotiations with the statusquo. In the very last week of the campaign, heaccepted the support of the traditional parties, butonly from their governors and mayors, rather thanfrom their central leadership. Salas Römer wasendorsed by 15 governors-elect and more than 200mayors.

By receiving the endorsement of the regionalleaders, Römer hoped to avoid the taint of beingassociated with the status quo leadership of thetraditional parties. However, since opinion pollscould not be published during the final week of thecampaign, there was a great deal of uncertaintyabout the impact of AD and COPEI support forRömer.

TECHNICAL PREPARATIONSThe CNE and the Plan República began prepar-

ing for the presidential elections shortly after Nov.8. Given the failure of more than 550 votingmachines in the previous elections, Indra made aconsiderable effort to restore damaged machines.The CNE and Indra announced that 2 percent ofvoting machine operators would be replaced, otherswould be re-trained, and a backup set of PCMCIAcards for the machines would be prepared for thepresidential elections. The CNE also ordered anadditional 720 voting machines (in addition to theoriginal 7,000) for the presidential elections andbegan negotiations with local cellular telephonecompanies to extend the reach of the automatedvoting system. Even so, Eladio Hernández, a CNEautomation manager, stated there were still 966machines unable to transmit results electronicallyon election day, and their tally sheets would haveto be transported to the national tabulating centerby the soldiers of the Plan República.

The CNE conducted two tests of the votingmachines and the electronic transmission networkprior to the elections. The first occurred Nov. 25and achieved 90 percent success in transmission ofresults. The second test was conducted Nov. 28,and it also reportedly was successful.

To reassure voters and the political parties ofthe effectiveness of the automated process, theCNE initiated a random audit of one ballot boxfrom each of the 196 voting districts in Venezuela.The CNE did not complete the audit before thepresidential election, but in those districts where ithad occurred, no unusual discrepancies wererevealed between the number of votes talliedmanually and those transmitted electronically.

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The armed forces completed transferringmaterials used in the regional elections to the CNEby the second week of November. The votingmachines were stored at regional garrisons or Indrawarehouses in preparation for the presidentialelections. Responding to rumors and public fears ofunrest following the elections, General MartínezOchoa, head of the Plan República, repeatedlyreassured the nation that the armed forces wereprepared to guarantee public order and stability. Healso announced the armed forces had developed acontingency plan (Plan Soberanía) to restore orderif disturbances occurred during or after the electoralprocess. On Nov. 30, the armed forces againdeployed to guard voting centers and transportelectoral materials.

CAMPAIGN PROBLEMS AND

COMPLAINTSDuring November, the CNE concentrated on

preparing for the presidential elections although itdid follow up on a few complaints related to thepolitical campaigns. The principal official actiontaken by the CNE in this area concerned politicaladvertisements used by the Römer campaign.Under Venezuelan electoral law, political cam-paigns are not permitted to use advertising thatdepicts the image of an opposing candidate or theirparty symbols without their permission. Twice, theCNE banned political advertisements by the Römercampaign that included the image of Chávez.Candidate Römer later complained publicly thatthe CNE had singled him out on this issue.

Following regional elections, the politicalparties slowly began submitting their claims of fraudto the judicial process. The CNE’s Sala deSustanciación, which investigates fraud involving theoverall electoral process, had received 14 official

claims by Nov. 14. The Consultoría Jurídica, whichreceives claims concerning individual tally sheets,had received none by Nov. 12. Eventually, theseofficial claims would rise to 155, most of whichwere still pending in January 1999. In general, theCNE largely confined itself to receiving partycomplaints during November and delayed makingformal decisions until after the presidentialelections.

DIFFICULTIES WITH THE PRESIDENTIAL BALLOT

The decision by the AD and COPEI parties towithdraw support for their own nominees andsupport Römer created a difficult problem for theCNE. By the time this substitution had been formal-ized, it was too late to change the ballots forthe presidential elections. The first lot of ballots hadalready arrived in Venezuela on Nov. 15. AsAppendix #5 shows, the presidential ballot had apicture of a party’s presidential nominee in eachidentification box. After the substitution, voterswho selected the AD or COPEI party would bevoting for Römer, even though the ballot continuedto depict the image of Ucero or Sáez.

A further complication was that Venezuelanscould vote for more than one party in the presiden-tial elections, as long as the parties they selectedhad nominated the same candidate. The votetabulating software contained in the voting ma-chines contained programmed information on thesealliances, and the machines would therefore readballots with multiple selections for the same candi-date as valid. For example, a voter who favoredUcero as presidential candidate could fill in ovalsfor the Acción Democrática and ORA parties, bothof which had nominated Ucero. This would beregarded as a valid vote by the tabulating software.However, the voting machine would read ballots asnull if voters selected multiple parties that were not

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in an electoral alliance.Once AD and COPEI substituted Römer for

their original candidates, the pattern of electoralalliances programmed into the tabulating softwarewas no longer valid. Juan Navarro, the president ofIndra, announced to the public on Dec. 2 that itwould be impossible to reprogram the software forthe voting machines since too little time remainedbefore the presidential election. Thus, returning tothe previous example, a voter who cast a ballot forboth AD and ORA in the presidential electionswould no longer be casting a valid vote, since ADnow supported Römer instead of Ucero.

Moreover, a Römer supporter who selectedboth AD and Proyecto Venezuela in his ballot(parties that now had an official electoral alliance)would have his vote mistakenly read as null by thevoting machine, since it was not programmed torecognize the new alliance. One member of theCOPEI party leadership informed The CarterCenter that a study by his party indicated that nomore than 4 percent of voters had selected multipleparties in previous elections. Even so, this margincould be significant in any close election, and manywarned the Dec. 6 elections could be decided by anarrow margin.

One day before the elections, the CNE officiallyruled each voter should select only one party on thepresidential ballot. They issued instructions to allpoll workers that they should inform the voters ofthis new ruling as they received their ballots. Thepress published this information and announced iton radio and television. However, it was not clearwhether all registered voters and poll workers wouldbe informed of this decision in a timely fashion.Furthermore, since AD and COPEI had nominatedRömer only days before the presidential campaignshad ended, no one could be certain all voters hadreceived information on the substitution. Thiscreated the possibility some voters could select ADor COPEI with the expectation of voting for Ucero

or Sáez respectively, but have their votes tabulatedas supporting Römer. ■

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THE OBSERVATION OF THEPRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS

On Dec. 6, 1998, 6,988,291 Venezu-elans (63.76 percent of registeredvoters) cast their ballots in a peaceful

election for their ninth president of the democraticera. The Carter Center’s Council of Freely ElectedHeads of Government deployed a delegation of 42observers from seven different countries.

Delegation leaders included President and Mrs.Carter, former Bolivian President Gonzalo Sánchezde Lozada, former Chilean President PatricioAylwin, and former Secretary of the U.S. Depart-ment of the Treasury Nicholas Brady. The delega-tion also included representatives from the Na-tional Democratic Institute and the InternationalFoundation for Election Systems.

The Council delegation was one of severalinternational observer delegations, including thosefrom the OAS, the EU, CAPEL, and the Interna-tional Republican Institute. In all, more than 200international observers were present during the1998 presidential elections, according to the CNE.

PREPARATIONS FOR ELECTORAL

OBSERVATIONCouncil observers began arriving in Caracas

Dec. 3. The observers met Dec. 4 for a full day oftraining, including meetings with representatives ofleading presidential candidates, the CNE, and localnongovernmental organizations.

All political party representatives were confident oftheir candidate’s victory, but also expressed awillingness to respect the elections’ outcome.

Dr. Chang Motta, CNE technical director,briefed delegates on the automated voting systemand preparations for the elections. He expressedconfidence that the automated system wouldovercome problems registered during the Novem-ber regional elections. Delegates also heard from alocal nongovernmental organization, QueremosElegir, concerning problems surrounding the 1998elections. While Queremos Elegir praised the newparticipation of independents as poll workers andfelt the elections would be fair, it was critical of theCNE for concentrating too heavily on the automa-tion of the elections. Instead, it felt the CNE shouldhave focused more on supervising the politicalcampaigns, including monitoring campaign financ-ing and political advertising, as Venezuela’s elec-toral law requires.

On Dec. 5, the delegates deployed by groundand air to 14 different states to observe the presi-dential elections. (See Appendix 6 for deploymentsites.) Teams were deployed to Venezuela’s cities,which contain more than 80 percent of the popula-tion. Council observers also were present in ruralareas and frontier states. The leadership dividedinto four teams, to observe in Caracas and thestates of Miranda and Vargas.

Upon arrival, teams met with representatives

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previous visit and what their expectations wereconcerning the outcome of the presidentialelections. The leadership also met with otherinternational observers, including the head of theOAS delegation, Secretary General Cesar Gaviria,and the head of the EU delegation, Ana Miranda.All agreed to share information among observersand to consult with other delegations before makingpublic statements.

The leadership team met with President Calderaand several of his ministers at a lunch held in honorof the international observers at the PresidentialPalace on Dec. 5. The president and his ministersexpressed confidence in the transparency of theupcoming elections and downplayed any possibilityof electoral violence. In a separate meeting with theminister of defense, Vice Admiral Rincón Bravo,and the commander of Plan República, GeneralMartínez Ochoa, the leadership team receivedsimilar assurances that all necessary preparations forthe election had been carried out. They also assuredthe Council that the armed forces would accept theoutcome of the presidential elections, whatever theresults. The minister of defense discounted rumorsof military resistance to Chavez’s election or to theconvening of a constituent assembly.

MEETING THE CANDIDATES

The leadership team met with presidentialcandidates Chávez, Römer, and Sáez. Römerexpressed confidence in his own victory. He feltthat the last- minute support by AD and COPEIwould be positive for his candidacy, particularly inrural areas, although it might hurt him in Caracas.However, because he had run a close secondthroughout the campaign, Römer expressed con-cern that, should he win, his adversaries’ reactionmight be negative and possibly violent. He also was

of local political parties and the regional electoralcouncil. The teams deployed to Monagas andCarabobo states also met with the military officersin charge of the local Plan República. In general,delegates were well-received and local officials wereenthusiastic about the presence of internationalobservers. Although some members of regionalelectoral councils expressed concern about possibleproblems during the elections, there was aconsensus that the presidential elections would runmore smoothly than the regional ones. Most localparty officials expressed confidence the electionswould be transparent. However, in states whereresults of the regional elections were challenged,especially Guárico, tension existed among the localparties as revealed in their meetings with theobservers.

Several Carter Center teams assisted the OASin gathering primary and secondary samples for theOAS “quick count.” Both of these samples trans-mitted to Caracas on Dec. 6 and would enable theOAS to develop a relatively accurate picture offinal electoral results. Teams also met with otherinternational observers in the field, includingdelegates from the EU, the International Republi-can Institute, and the National Democratic Insti-tute.

THE LEADERSHIP TEAM AGENDAOn Dec. 4 and 5, the leadership team, which

consisted of President and Mrs. Carter, PresidentAylwin, President Sánchez de Lozada, SecretaryNicholas Brady, and Dr. Jennifer McCoy, met withpresidential candidates, party leaders, and govern-ment officials. The purpose of these meetings wasto hear from Venezuelans how the electoral processhad evolved in the month since the Council’s

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concerned that mass media would not respect rulesprohibiting them from announcing exit polls untilafter voting centers closed. Römer thought an earlyannouncement would hurt him, since it might bebased on exit polls conducted mainly in urbanareas.

In his meeting with Council leadership, HugoChávez also ex-pressed confidenceof victory and saidhe already waspreparing to governin a spirit of recon-ciliation and toler-ance. He felt thelast-minute substitu-tion by AD and COPEI of their presidential candi-dates violated the law and it reflected the despera-tion of the status quo parties. Chávez restated hiscommitment to convene a constituent assemblythrough a national referendum and said this wouldbe legal without prior reform to the constitution.The Council leadership team, while understandinghis desire for radical change, reminded him thatadhering to the strict constitutional process would

The Council team emphasized it would be im-portant for the victor to reach out to opponents.

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President Sánchez de Lozada, General Martínez Ochoa,Minister of the Interior Vice Admiral Rincón Bravo,President Carter, Nicholas Brady, and President AylwinAzocar at the Ministry of Defense residence in Caracas.

shore international and domestic confidence in hisnew government, should he win the election. TheCouncil team emphasized it would be important forthe victor to reach out to opponents and reassureboth Venezuelans and the internationalcommunity with a conciliatory message after theelections. Chávez reiterated he was a democrat and

would seek to governdemocratically, buthe understood itwould take time forhis opponents to feelconfident of this.

Sáez acknowl-edged she was un-likely to win the

election, but said that, in a polarized electoralscenario, someone had to remain in the politicalcenter, acting as a conciliator. She cited her recentmeetings with all the principal political parties andpresidential candidates as evidence of her willing-ness to act as a bridge between the contendingcandidates. The leadership expressed its support forher role as a political conciliator.

MEETING THE PARTIES

The Council also decided to meet with theprincipal political parties, AD and COPEI, thathad nominated new presidential candidates in thefinal week of the elections, AD and COPEI. Bothparties’ leaders believed the present polarizedelection offered a choice between dictatorship anddemocracy, and declared they had chosen to throwall their support behind the democratic option withthe best possibility of winning the election, repre-sented by Römer.

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Nicholas Brady, Mrs. Carter, President Carter, President Caldera, OASsecretary general Cesár Gaviria, President Aylwin Azocar, PresidentSánchez de Lozada, Ana Miranda, Foreign Minister Burelli Rivas andother dignitaries meet at Miraflores, the Venezuelan presidential palace.

Several party leaders also worried that, shouldChávez win the election, he would choose to call aconstituent assembly without reforming theconstitution to permit it. They generally believedthis path would lead to a political and militarycrisis.

Presidents Carter, Aylwin, and Sánchez deLozado, and Secretary Brady met with several ofthe principal leaders of MAS in the afternoon ofDec. 5. The message of the MAS leadership wasconciliatory. They said they believed that Chávezwould win the election, but the possibility ofelectoral violence was overstated. They also saidthe traditional parties would have to renew them-selves, but they looked forward to working withAD and COPEI to carry out the reforms needed torenew Venezuelan democracy. MAS leaders alsofelt that a consensual path to constitutional reformand a constituent assembly was viable.

ELECTION DAY: DEC. 6, 1998On election day, observers from the Council of

Freely Elected Heads of Government visited 252voting sites in 13 states and the federal district ofVenezuela. Most began their days at 5:30 a.m., theofficial time set for poll workers to arrive and set upvoting stations. Some observers reported findinglong lines of voters even at this early hour, pa-tiently waiting for the polling sites to open.

Observers visited voting centers throughout theday to evaluate the voting process and the politicalclimate. At closing time, they also observed votecounts, mostly at automated voting sites. In almostall cases, observers were able to report these resultsto the Carter Center headquarters in Caracas.Delegates who participated in collecting primaryand secondary samples for the OAS “quick count”reported results from designated voting centers to

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Polling booths set up at avoting center in readiness for

the Dec. 6 elections.

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observers were favorably impressed by the relaxedatmosphere at most of the voting centers theyvisited. The observers found party witnessessupporting at least two different candidates in 94percent of all voting centers. In 87 percent of thevoting stations observed by the delegation, pollworkers selected by lottery constituted the mesas,with the rest of the sites containing a mix of lotteryand party workers. In more than 95 percent ofcases, Carter Center observers found the pollworkers to be nonpartisan and well-trained.

In about 10 percent of the centers, CarterCenter observers reported poll workers had notreceived appropriate training from the UniversidadSimón Rodríguez, but even in those instances,previous experience during the November electionsensured a smooth voting process.

Also, the CNE apparently communicatedeffectively with poll workers on short notice, sincealmost all observer teams reported voters werebeing informed of the latest CNE decision requiringthem to select only one party on the presidentialballot.

OAS headquarters as well. While they notedoccasional problems, Council observers felt thevoting process went very smoothly and thefunctioning of the automated voting system wastechnologically impressive.

Council observers reported no significantproblems in the overwhelming number of votingcenters they visited. Almost 96 percent of centerswere open by 8 a.m., and 68 percent were openshortly after the official time of 6:30 a.m. Althoughthere were long lines at many voting centers earlyin the day, most voters had to wait for less than 30minutes to vote, a considerable improvement overthe experience of the regional elections. Therewere only two instances reported by Carter Centerdelegates in which voters had been waiting formore than two hours; in both cases, it was the resultof a defective voting machine. Both voters and pollworkers attributed the generally shorter waits to theexperience gained in the November elections andthe simpler presidential ballot.

Poll workers, party witnesses, and voters re-ported a good working relationship, and the

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President Carter observes a voter preparing to feed her ballot into the votetabulating machine.

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The vote tabulating machines operatedsmoothly throughout the day, showing considerableimprovement over the reported rate of failure inthe November elections. In almost all cases, pollworkers and party witnesses had watched the Indratechnician print out a tally sheet at the beginningof the vote that verified the machine had been setto a zero count. In 4 percent of the voting sites,party witnesses reported being unable to print outthe “zero” tally due to a paper jam in the printer. Inthese instances, poll workers and party witnessesvisually verified the zero count on the votingmachine’s screen and noted this observation on therelevant electoral form. Only 15 voting sites visitedby Council observers had malfunctioning votetabulating machines.

Observers also noted some machines appearedto be more sensitive to how ballots were insertedthan others. For example, in one voting center in apoor neighborhood of Caracas, delegates observeda machine that rejected most voters’ initial attemptto insert the ballot. This required the Indra

machine operator to assist almost all voters incasting their ballots at this voting site.

In fact, Carter Center observers reported thatballot secrecy was not completely assured in 13percent of the sites because participation of theIndra machine operator in the voting process meantthat the ballot might be observed as it was cast.However, they also reported that voters did notseem concerned by this reduced level of ballotsecrecy. In almost all sites visited, both partywitnesses and poll workers thought the votingprocess was proceeding very well.

In general, observers thought Plan Repúblicasoldiers did an excellent job of providing securityfor the electoral process. They reported problemswith crowd control in only four (of 252) voting sitesvisited, mainly in Caracas. Generally, voters re-sponded positively to the military’s role in theelections, and relations between military personneland poll workers were smooth.

However, observers in Carabobo and Bolívarstates reported military presence was particularly

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President AylwinAzocar listens to a

poll worker whoexplains his role in thevoting procedure at a

voting center in Brisasdel Paraíso, Caracas.

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Overall, observers found the participation ofthe armed forces helpful in ensuring a peacefuland transparent electoral process.

heavy. Some voters in Bolívar mentioned to thedelegates that they thought the military hadassumed too high a profile during the elections. Theobserver team in Carabobo noted the military paidclose attention to their activity. They found itdifficult to observe or to have a conversation withvoters or poll workers without being overheard by amilitary officer. Overall, observers found theparticipation of the armed forces helpful in ensuringa peaceful and transparent electoral process.

The close of voting and tallying of ballots went

particularly smoothly due to automation of theprocess. In centers that had been automated, theprocess of transmitting the results occurred withinminutes of the close of voting. After transmission,observers reported it took poll workers and partywitnesses little more than one hour to complete thenecessary forms and provide the Plan República

with the documentation and tally sheets to betransported to the National Election Council. Theclearest indication of the smoothness of theautomated voting process was the rapidity withwhich the CNE was able to announce results on theevening of Dec. 6.

Overall, the Council of Freely Elected Heads ofGovernment observers expressed enthusiasm aboutthe election process and were impressed by thetechnology involved in the automation of the vote.Problems were reported in only 16 of 252 votingsites visited, and most of these would not affect theresults of the elections. The delegates found voters,poll workers, party witnesses, and soldiers workedtogether harmoniously to make this a transparentand peaceful election that clearly reflected the willof the Venezuelan people.

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A hand-drawn poster ina local CNE officeshows towns within thestate of Táchira and listsvoting center locations.

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ELECTION NIGHTAt 6:37 p.m. on Dec. 6, 1998, the CNE an-

nounced on live television that Hugo Chávez Friashad been elected president. The voting tallyannounced was 57 percent for president-electChávez and 39 percent for the second-placewinner, Henrique Salas Römer, with a 65 percentturnout among registered voters. These results wereannounced based on returns from voting centerscovering 76 percent of registered voters, which hadbeen successfully transmitted electronically fromacross the country. President and Mrs. Carter andDr. Jennifer McCoy observed the transmission ofthe results at the CNE’s Caracas headquarters from5 p.m. on, and they were on hand to congratulatethe CNE council members for a successful electoralprocess when the first results were announced.

The rapidity with which the CNE announcedthe vote surprised most people and was seen asevidence of the success of the automated votingsystem. The OAS contacted the Carter Centershortly after the announcement by the CNE andinformed the Council’s leadership team that their

“quick count” showed a victory for Chávez of 59percent to 38 percent. This information, drawnfrom a random sample of voting centers, gave theCarter Center confidence in the partial results itsobservers had been phoning in from acrossVenezuela.

Initially the second-place winner, Römer, saidhe would not concede the election until all voteshad been tallied. This reflected his view that votingresults expected to arrive later in the evening andon the following days, largely from rural areas,would tend to favor his candidacy. Shortly after theCNE made its announcement, the Römer campaigncontacted the Carter Center headquarters. Theleadership delegation reported that the OAS “quickcount” and the delegation’s own informationmatched the results provided by the CNE andconfirmed the magnitude of Chávez’s victory. Theleadership also noted the delegation observed veryfew problems during the electoral process, none ofwhich would affect the voting results.

By 8 p.m., Römer made a gracious and concilia-tory concession speech on live television. Only four

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Table 5Final Vote Totals —1998 Venezuelan Presidential Elections

Candidate Total Votes Percentage of VotesHugo Chávez Frias 3,673,685 56.20%Henrique Salas Römer 2,613,161 39.97%Irene Sáez 184,568 2.82%Luis Alfaro Ucero 27,586 0.42%Miguel Rodríguez 19,629 0.30%

hours after the official poll closing time, Chávez wasthe acknowledged president-elect of Venezuela.President-elect Chávez’s initial statements also wereconciliatory, and he proceeded to hold a lengthypress conference late on the evening of Dec. 6 tofamiliarize Venezuelans with his proposals for theupcoming government.

Prior to his departure from Venezuela, PresidentCarter held a meeting with President-elect Chávezon the morning of Dec. 7 at the Circulo Militar inCaracas. President Carter offered his congratula-tions to the president-elect, and they discussedChávez’s plans forhis government.President Carteralso spoke bytelephone with thesecond-placefinisher, Römer,who had returnedto Carabobo statethe morning ofDec. 7. PresidentCarter congratu-lated Römer on his campaign and concessionspeech, and they discussed his potential future rolein Venezuelan politics.

As Presidents Carter and Sánchez de Lozadastated in their final press conference on Dec. 7, theVenezuelan people had voted peacefully, butdefinitively, for change. The leadership team alsocongratulated the voters, the CNE, poll workers,and soldiers on the success of the elections. Presi-dent Carter called the electoral outcome a “peace-ful revolution,” a statement that Venezuelansquoted often in the days that followed. Chávez wonby more than a million votes over his nearest rival,winning victories in 20 of 23 states. The margin ofvotes by which Chávez won left little room for

(Source: CNE, “Resultados Electorales Venezuela 1998”)

doubt as to the credibility of the results.Furthermore, as the preliminary statement from theCouncil of Freely Elected Heads of Governmentpointed out, the automated vote count system —the first national electronic system in thehemisphere — brought a new level of transparencyand confidence to the process. This combinationmade the 1998 Venezuelan elections among themost peaceful and transparent in the country’s 40-year history of democracy. ■

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Table 6

Official Electoral Statistics – 1998 Venezuelan Presidential Elections

Total Votes Percentage of Votes

Number of Registered Voters 11,001,913Number of Ballots Cast 6,988,291 63.76%Number of Abstentions 3,971,239 36.24%Valid Votes 6,537,304 93.55%Null Votes 450,987 6.45%

(Source: CNE, “Resultados Electorales Venezuela 1998.”)

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Virginia López-Glass, BeatrizFuentes, and Becky Castle staff the

Caracas office.

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POST-ELECTION OBSERVATION

CHALLENGES TO THE 1998ELECTORAL RESULTS

Hugo Chávez’s margin of victory overhis nearest contender, by more thanone million votes, was of such magni-

tude that no challenges to the presidential electoralresults were filed after Dec. 6. Initially, it seemedthe results from the November regional electionswould be respected, since all parties achieved atleast partial success. However, 155 challenges,called impugnaciones in Venezuela, were filedagainst the results of the regional elections, many ofthem after the presidential elections had concluded.The CNE rejected 30 of these, and 112 were stillpending as of Jan. 17, 1999. Nine challenges were

admitted for further investigation. Challenges in thegovernors’ elections were filed in all states exceptfor Zulia.11

The CNE is the body legally empowered toconduct the initial review of any challenge to anelectoral process. An electoral process can beimpugned by parties, voters, interested organiza-tions by presenting a Recurso Jerárquico to theCNE.12 A Recurso Jerárquico can challenge anoutcome on one or more of the following grounds:1) an error in the tally sheets or other officialdocuments related to the functioning of a pollingsite; 2) an error in the act of totaling the electoralresults; 3) an error in adjudicating the votes to agiven candidate or party; 4) an error in proclaimingan electoral result. There is a period of 20 days

Table 7Sample of States in Which the Results of the Governor’s Election

Were Challenged as of January 1999

State Party Challenging Total Absolute Percentage Party Votes Margin of Margin of

Votes Victory

Apure José Montilla (AD) Polo Patriótico 94,911 15,591 16.42%

Barinas Hugo Chávez (MVR) AD 157,171 3,084 1.96%

Bolívar Jorge Carvajal (AD) Polo Patriótico 258,259 12,717 4.92%

Carabobo Enrique Salas Feo Polo Patriótico 499,601 72,325 14.48%

(Proyecto Venezuela)

Cojedes José Galíndez (AD) Polo Patriótico 81,640 21,121 25.87%

Falcón José Curiel (COPEI) Polo Patriótico 227,323 27,217 11.97%

Guárico Eduardo Manuit (MVR) AD 176,967 1,726 0.98%

Miranda Eduardo Mendoza (COPEI) Polo Patriótico 602,916 108,201 17.94%

Portuguesa Iván Colmenares (MAS) AD 197,080 7,955 4.04%

Sucre Eloy Gil (AD) Polo Patriótico 206,168 22,197 10.77%

(Source: CNE 1998 Regional Electoral Results)

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following any election in which to file a RecursoJerárquico, except for a presidential election, whenthe filing period is 30 days.13 However, Article 232of the Electoral Law states the act of filing achallenge is not grounds for delaying theproclamation of an official victor in an election.14

Once the Recurso has been filed, the CNE’slegal department (Consultoría Jurídica) is chargedwith investigating the allegation. This departmentcan either dismiss the challenge if it is groundless,or ascertain the truth if the challenge has merit.

However, the CNE will call for a new electiononly if an impropriety materially could have alteredthe outcome of an electoral contest. For example,if the legal department determines electoral fraudwas committed on tally sheets covering 5,000votes, but the victor in that election won by40,000 votes, the CNE would not call for a newelection. In handling the 1998 regional elections,the CNE had a Comité de Sustanciación to speed theinvestigation of legal challenges to the totaling andadjudication of votes and the proclamation ofvictors, while the investigation of fraud committedregarding tally sheets remained in the hands of theConsultoría Jurídica.

Voters or parties who are dissatisfied with adecision made by the CNE regarding a RecursoJerárquico, or who wish to challenge the administra-tive decisions, actions, or omissions of the CNE canfile a Recurso Contencioso Electoral. Article 235 ofthe Electoral Law specifies that this is a rapid meansof challenging CNE decisions in regard to parties,candidates, nominations, the electoral registry, andreferendums.

A Recurso Contencioso must be filed within 15days of the CNE action being challenged. If itaddresses actions concerning the nomination andelection of candidates for governor, state assembly,or municipal posts, this Recurso must be heard bythe Corte Primera de lo Contencioso Administrativo

(an appeals court). If a Recurso Contenciosoaddresses elections to federal positions, thefunctioning of electoral bodies, the recognition ofnational parties, the adjudication or totalization ofvotes in a presidential election, or CNE decisions, itis heard directly by the Political-Administrativechamber of the Supreme Court.

In other words, the Recurso Contencioso can befiled both as an appeal to a CNE decision on aRecurso Jerárquico, or to challenge any other deci-sion, action, or omission by the CNE. The courtshave the authority to order the CNE to remedy anyof the faults presented in a Recurso Contencioso.Should these faults be of such a magnitude to alterthe result of a previous electoral process, a newelection must be held within 60 days of the court’sdecision.

While the new 1997 Electoral Law sets fairlyshort deadlines, legal challenges to previous elec-tions have not been quickly resolved. As GeneralMartínez, commander of the 1998 Plan República,pointed out, the armed forces still are storing ballotsfrom elections held over a decade ago because thelegal challenges in these case have not been re-solved. While this is unusual, more recently, theCNE held new elections for governors two yearsafter the challenged vote in 1993.

It is hoped that, under the provisions of the newElectoral Law, the process of appealing the 1998election results will occur more quickly. However,some delays already have been introduced into theprocess since the investigation into the initialchallenges was suspended for one month during theCNE’s winter holidays. Nevertheless, as the previ-ous table shows, most governors whose elections arebeing challenged were elected by substantialmargins, which makes it unlikely that the CNE willoverturn the official results. The elections to thelegislative assemblies, typically decided by a smallnumber of voters due to the limited size of the

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electoral districts, are likely to provide more fertilegrounds for successful electoral challenges.

POLITICS IN THE WAKE OF THE

1998 ELECTIONSVenezuela faced a difficult economic and

political situation in 1999. The gap betweenPresident-elect Chávez’s campaign promises and theeconomic realities of Venezuela appeared intrac-table. Arguments over the process of convening aconstituent assembly generated intense politicaldisagreement among political parties and in civilsociety. However, the presidential elections wereuniversally viewed as legitimate, and Chávez wasthe unquestioned winner. Whatever the politicaland economic disagreements Venezuela faced, therewas no question of Chávez’s constitutional mandateto govern.

Reactions to Chávez’s victory were initiallypositive. The President-elect’s first messages toVenezuelans, both on television and at his victoryrallies were conciliatory. His erstwhile opponentsresponded in a similar fashion. Most major politicalparties, including AD and COPEI, agreed to coop-erate with the new government in the legislature tofacilitate convening the constituent assembly, thecenterpiece of Chávez’s agenda. There was evensome discussion among opposition parties withregard to granting the new president emergencypowers to address the deepening economic crisis.Chávez’s initial appointments of General RaúlSalazar as minister of defense, and Luis Miquilena,the executive coordinator of the MovimientoQuinta República, as minister of interior, were well-received. The economic markets also reacted wellat first, with a sharp “relief” rally in the Caracasstock exchange, a reduction in interest rates, and animprovement in the exchange rate, followingChávez’s initial conciliatory statements.

This early euphoria began to dissolve as Ven-ezuelans confronted their profound economic crisis.One technical report by the Venezuelan Congressestimated that the 1999 fiscal deficit would reach10.4 percent of GDP, the equivalent of nearly $10billion.15 Analysts estimated that the deficit couldbe even larger if the new president fulfilled hiscampaign promises to raise salaries and wages.Chávez argued that the deficit gap could be closedthrough improved tax collection, a reform of thecustoms agency, a broader value-added tax, and arenegotiation of the foreign debt.

However, knowledgeable private sector econo-mists estimated that these measures would not closethe deficit by more than 2 percentage points in themedium term, leaving a substantial gap in govern-ment spending that would have to be closed byother means, including loans from internationalfinancial institutions. Since economic policy wasnot at the center of the presidential campaigns anddid not dominate discussion after the election,many Venezuelans were uncertain about the eco-nomic direction of their country. This uncertaintywas then reflected in a weakening of both theexchange rate and the stock market.

Also, politicians began to realize there was lessconsensus on the issue of the constituent assemblythan had been previously. As a candidate, Chávezhad promised to convene a referendum on a con-stituent assembly by executive decree on Feb. 15,1999. His opponents argued that the existingconstitution did not allow for the convening of aconstituent assembly, nor for a referendum in thematter. They argued instead that the constitutionneeded to be reformed to permit such a procedure.

Chávez and his supporters denied a referendumwould be unconstitutional, basing their argumentson their interpretation of the constitution and theelectoral law. They also questioned the legitimacy

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of the legislature elected in November 1998, sinceit was selected under rules governing the existing“discredited” political system. They further arguedthat voters in the regional elections were uncertainabout who they had voted for due to thecomplexity of the electoral system.

In the wake of the election, AD and COPEIlegislators offered to cooperate in a reform of theconstitution to permit the convening of a constitu-ent assembly, and newly elected Senator (andformer President) Carlos Andrés Pérez stated thathe would introduce such a reform once the newCongress convened Jan. 23, 1999.

Initially, President-elect Chávez seemed open tosuch a process, as long as the reform occurred by hisFeb. 15 deadline for convening a referendum.However, Chávez and his supporters later rejectedreforming the existing constitution. Only hours afterhis Feb. 2 inauguration, he issued a decree conven-ing the referendum. This decree rejected a priorconstitutional reform on the grounds that the“status quo” parties would use this opportunity todiminish the scope and the power of any constitu-ent assembly. The Supreme Court ruled in Januarythat using a referendum to convene a constituentassembly was indeed constitutional. ■

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The elections confirmed Venezuela’s richtradition of democratic choice ofleadership. They also confirmed the deep

desire for change among Venezuelans. AsVenezuelans strive to improve their political andeconomic systems, we offer our congratulations andgratitude for being privileged to witness thisdemonstration of faith in democratic principles.

In the same spirit, we would like to offer ourobservations not only about the strengths, but alsothe weaknesses of the electoral process that couldbe improved in future elections. Our missionfocused on the preparations for and conduct of theelections and did not include a systematic monitor-ing of the voter registration process or the cam-paign. Further, the suggestions below focus onprocedural and legal aspects of the elections, ratherthan the structure of the electoral authorities.

PROCEDURAL RECOMMENDATIONSREGISTRO ELECTORAL

Although most political parties seemed satisfiedwith the current electoral registration process, TheCarter Center heard some concerns about theadequacy of the Registro Electoral. Even though theCNE registered numerous new voters in 1998, TheCarter Center would encourage Venezuelans toexpand the number of opportunities for citizens toregister. The program for computerized registry,introduced on a limited basis before the 1998elections, should be expanded. Also, in the 1998elections, the audit of the Registro Electoral beganlate, and results were not available before theNovember vote. In future elections, the CNEshould audit the registry earlier in its preparations.

EDUCATING VOTERS

Venezuela overcame a major hurdle by success-fully holding elections using a fully automatedvoting system for the first time. Council observersgenerally thought voters were sufficiently well-informed about the new voting system to cast aballot that accurately reflected their preferences.However, given the complexity of the votingsystem and the ballots, the CNE should consider anearlier start to its voter education campaign thanthe one carried out during the 1998 elections,which began Oct. 21.

TRAINING POLL WORKERS

The replacement of party poll workers withthose selected by lottery was a success during the1998 elections. However, many delays associatedwith the voting process were caused by poor train-ing of voters conscripted to operate the pollingstations. This problem resulted not from any fault ofthe poll workers, but rather from the delays in theirnotification and in the haphazard nature of their

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training which began in October 1998. Notificationand training of these workers should begin at aconsiderably earlier date in future elections.

SUPPORTING THE AUTOMATED VOTING SYSTEM

Between the regional and presidential elections,there was a clear improvement in support for thevoting machines and in the quality of the techni-cians. The CNE should take steps to ensure that, infuture elections, technicians are properly trainedand a pool of replacement voting machines isavailable, as done during the 1998 presidentialelections.

INCREASING AUTOMATION OF THE VOTE

In general, automation of the voting systemaccomplished its purpose: increasing transparencyof the vote, reducing fraud, and reducing politicaltensions by providing accurate early electoralreturns. To further this process, Venezuela shouldcomplete the process of automating the remainingvoting centers that used manual voting during the1998 elections. It also should further develop the

telecommunications infrastructure supporting theelectronic transmission of voting results.Alternative means of reaching rural areas that lackthis infrastructure, such as through satellite andcellular telephone, should be explored.

RE-ENGINEERING THE VOTING PROCESS

Congestion in polling sites was clearly one ofthe main problems during the 1998 Venezuelanelections. This partially resulted from the decisionto locate up to three mesas electorales and their votetabulating machine in the same room. The flow ofvoters through the polling sites could be improvedby adding more vote tabulating machines. Thiswould allow the CNE to reduce the number ofmesas electorales assigned to a given room.

Alternatively, the CNE should consider locat-ing voting machines in a different room from themesas assigned to it for small voting centers. Byreducing congestion in the rooms where the votingtakes place, the CNE could improve access forparty witnesses and provide a higher degree ofballot secrecy for voters.

LEGALRECOMMENDATIONSCAMPAIGN FINANCE

Although the CNE is clearly empowered tosupervise campaign and party finances, little effortwas made in this area during the 1998 elections.This was reflected in violations of the restrictions onpolitical advertising through the mass media. Aspart of the effort to increase transparency of theelectoral process, the CNE should demand greateraccountability from parties and candidates as to thesources of their funding. Some of this could beaccomplished by enforcing current electoral law.However, increasing transparency and reducingcorruption in this area may require further legisla-tion, as well as upgrading the CNE’s technical

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President Sánchez de Lozada (left) and Chuck Costelloobserve a mesa worker explaining the ballot and votingprocess to a voter in Caracas.

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capabilities to supervise the parties and candidates.

CLARIFYING SUBSTITUTION RULES FOR CANDIDATES

Clearly, one of the major crises faced by theCNE during the electoral process was caused by theAD’s and COPEI’s last-minute decision to substitutetheir presidential nominees. The CNE shouldreaffirm its ruling to reserve control over the ballotspot for the party, rather than the candidate. TheCNE should decide permanently to restrict votersto selecting a single oval in the presidential elec-tion. This would help reduce complexity in thevoting process. However, Venezuelans shouldconsider reforming the present electoral law to setreasonable deadlines for candidate substitutions.This would allow the CNE to provide accurateballots to the voters and ensure that tabulatingsoftware is up to date.

REDUCING BALLOT COMPLEXITY

The ballot in the regional elections could beconsiderably simplified by reducing the number ofparties allowed to participate. Although this wasnot a problem during the presidential elections, thenumber of parties allowed on the ballot duringregional elections greatly complicated voting (86 inMiranda state, for example).

Venezuelans may want to consider raising therequirements for registering new parties and alteringelectoral law to encourage smaller regional partiesto merge. This would allow the CNE to give eachparty greater visibility on the ballot, reduce conges-tion due to the presence of large numbers of partywitnesses, and reduce voter confusion regarding theballot’s complexity. ■

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1 This report was made possible through supportprovided by the U.S. Agency for International Development(USAID) under the terms of Grant No. AEP-5468-A00-5038-00. Additional funding was provided by the CanadianInternational Development Agency (CIDA). The opinionsexpressed herein are those of the author(s) and do notnecessarily reflect the views of USAID or CIDA.

2 Venezuela is a federal republic, divided into 22 statesand a federal district. Each state elects a governorand state legislative assembly. The terms of office for federalpositions (presidency, Senate and Chamber of Deputies) arefive years.

3VenEconomy special publication, Elections 1998 –Meet Your President, pp. 55-56. Polls conducted byDatanálisis.

4Datanálisis poll, released Oct. 30, 1998, published in ElUniversal. Poll conducted between 19 and 23 of October. AMercanálisis poll released on Oct. 21, 1998, showed HugoChávez at 39 percent and Henrique Salas Römer at 38percent.

5 There are currently 196 electoral districts(circunscripciónes electoral) in Venezuela.

6 This apparent violation of electoral rules was partiallyverified by a local NGO, Queremos Elegir, which studiedtelevision advertising by the campaigns. Queremos Elegirfound that candidates were exceeding the maximum amountof airtime allowed to any candidate on any given day (fourminutes on any one station).

7 Following the 1993 elections, legal challenges in twogubernatorial elections led to new elections, but only after atwo-year delay.

8 The Senate is elected by proportional representation,calculated on the basis of two seats per state. In other words,for a party to capture both seats in a given state, it must wintwice as many votes as any other contender. Deputies areelected by a mixed system, with half of the positionsavailable in a given state elected nominally and the other

half selected by a closed party list.9 Andrés Stambouli, Demoscopio poll, October 1998.10 Opinion polls by Datanálisis, Mercanálisis and Datos,

published Nov. 23 to 29, 1998. The short time periodbetween the regional and presidential elections preventedmost Venezuelan polling organizations from conductingmore than one survey of public opinion, and the results ofthese were all hurriedly published the last week of Novem-ber, since Venezuelan electoral law forbids publication ofpoll results in the final week before an election.

11 “Impugnada elección en 22 gobernaciones,” ElUniversal, Jan. 27, 1999.

12 Voters or organizations located outside Caracas areallowed to submit a Recurso to the local Regional ElectoralCouncil. This council must transmit the complaint withinone day to the CNE.

13 The law establishes an exception to these time limitswhen a challenge alleges that a candidate was not eligible torun for the position to which he or she was elected. Forexample, a candidate’s election might be challenged on thegrounds that he or she does not meet the age or citizenshiprequirements. In this case, there is no time limit for filing aRecurso Jerárquico.

14 Information on the legal procedures described in thissection was provided by the Consultoria Jurídica of the CNEand drawn from the relevant articles (216-250) of the LeyOrgánica del Sufragio.

15 “Estado requiere $9,984 millones,” El Universal, Jan.15, 1999.

ENDNOTES

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APPENDICES

Appendix 1: Council of Freely Elected Heads of Government, 60Members List

Appendix 2: Map of Venezuela 61

Appendix 3: CNE Invitation to The Carter Center, 62Sept. 30, 1998

Appendix 4: Preliminary Statement, Nov. 4, 1998 64

Appendix 5: Dec. 6 Presidential Ballot 66

Appendix 6: Carter Center Deployment Teams 67

Appendix 7: Preliminary Statement, Dec. 7, 1998 68

Appendix 8: Checklist — Venezuela Presidental Elections 70

Appendix 9: Venezuelan Elections Results 72

Appendix 10: Selected News Articles 73

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THE COUNCIL OF FREELY ELECTED HEADSOF GOVERNMENT

Jimmy Carter, Chairman, former President of the United States of America (1977-81) George Price, Vice-Chairman, former Prime Minister of Belize (1981-84, 1989-93;

Premier, 1965-81) Incumbents Fernando Henrique Cardoso, President of Brazil (1995-present) Leonel Fernández Reyna, President of the Dominican Republic (1996-present) Jamil Mahuad, President of Ecuador (1998-present) Carlos Saúl Menem, President of Argentina (1989-present) P.J. Patterson, Prime Minister of Jamaica (1992-present) Ernesto Pérez Balladares, President of Panama (1994-present) Arthur Robinson, President of Trinidad and Tobago (1997-present) Miguel Angel Rodríguez, President of Costa Rica (1998-present) Julio Maria Sanguinetti, President of Uruguay (1985-89, 1995-present) Former presidents and prime ministers Raúl Alfonsín, former President of Argentina (1983-89) Nicholas Ardito-Barletta, former President of Panama (1984-85) Oscar Arias Sánchez, former President of Costa Rica (1986-90) Jean-Bertrand Aristide, former President of Haiti (1991-96) Patricio Aylwin Azocar, former President of Chile (1990-94) Fernando Belaúnde Terry, former President of Peru (1963-68, 1980-85) Belisario Betancur, former President of Colombia (1982-86) Rafael Caldera, former President of Venezuela (1969-74, 1994-1999) Rodrigo Carazo, former President of Costa Rica (1978-82) Vinicio Cerezo, former President of Guatemala (1986-90) Joseph Clark, former Prime Minister of Canada (1979-80) John Compton, former Prime Minister of St. Lucia (1987-96) Gerald Ford, former President of the United States (1974-77) Osvaldo Hurtado, former President of Ecuador (1981-84) Luis Alberto Lacalle, former President of Uruguay (1989-95) Alfonso López Michelsen, former President of Colombia (1974-78) Carlos Andrés Pérez, former President of Venezuela (1974-79, 1989-93) Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada, former President of Bolivia (1993-1997) Erskine Sandiford, former Prime Minister of Barbados (1987-94) Edward Seaga, former Prime Minister of Jamaica (1980-88) Pierre Trudeau, former Prime Minister of Canada (1968-79, 1980-84) Juan Carlos Wasmosy, former President of Paraguay (1993-1998)

Appendix 1

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Appendix 2

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Appendix 3

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Appendix 4

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

Statement by former Presidents Jimmy Carter andGonzalo Sánchez de Lozada

Nov. 4, 1998

PRESIDENT CARTER: It is an honor for my wife and me to be here in Venezuela to observe theelections in a country with a long and deep democratic tradition. We have been invited by the NationalElectoral Council as international observers. At the Carter Center we work with a group of thirty-oneleaders from around the hemisphere, called the Council of Freely Elected Heads of Government. I have thepleasure of presenting a member of this group, former president of Bolivia, Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada.

We are coming in order to support the democratic process, without any authority to determine theresults, but with the ability to observe, and to inform the national and international community. It is ahistoric moment in the political development of Venezuela with the emergence of new parties and move-ments and independent candidates. It is an honor for us to be witnesses to the celebration of democracy inthe coming weeks.

On this trip we have visited the National Electoral Council to learn about the electoral system here,and we watched a demonstration of the voting machines. We are very interested in seeing how this innova-tion functions during the elections. In addition, we have confidence that it will facilitate the vote-countingprocess and ensure a clean and honest tabulation.

We have also met with six of the presidential candidates, including Luis Alfaro Ucero, Hugo Chávez,Henrique Salas Römer, Irene Saez, Alfredo Ramos, and Miguel Rodríguez. All of them have told us thatthey respect the authority of the electoral council and that they will respect the results of the elections nomatter who wins.

We will have a small group observing the November 8 (parliamentary and gubernatorial) elections andan international delegation of about 25 persons for the (presidential) elections on December 6.

In all elections, there are some problems and technical difficulties. In Sunday’s elections, with theinnovations in the ballot and the electoral system, and with the large number of parties and candidates, youare sure to see some irregularities. But if everyone remains calm and aware, no matter what anxieties mayarise, we are confident that the elections are going to be an important celebration of the democracy in thiscountry.

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Now I would also like to present Dr. Jennifer McCoy, director of the Latin American Program at TheCarter Center, and Dr. Harold Trinkunas, our representative during the election period.

I would now like to ask President Sánchez de Lozada to offer some brief comments.

PRESIDENT SÁNCHEZ DE LOZADA: Thank you, President Carter. We are all looking forward tobeing here in December. It is going to be a very important election; it has generated considerable anticipa-tion throughout the hemisphere. Above all, I would like to emphasize that we are truly surprised at thenumber of candidates and parties – you are world champions in political parties, and the candidates arewidely diverse. There are extremely novel and experimental systems that are going to be useful for all ofLatin America.

We all accept that in the globalized society we have to exchange goods and services, but we also needto exchange knowledge. I am coming to see with great interest the large successes and the small defects,and hopefully to take away knowledge that will be useful for my country and other nations on the conti-nent. You are going to have some complaints; we are here to try to clear them up, and we will go forwardwith great interest. ■

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Appendix 5

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CARTER CENTER DEPLOYMENT TEAMS

1. Caracas President Carter, Mrs. Carter, Nancy Konigsmark, Jennifer McCoy, Curtis Kohlhaas

2. Caracas and Baruta, Miranda State Nicholas Brady, Harold Trinkunas

3. Caracas and La Guaira and Catia la Mar, Vargas State President Aylwin, George Jones

4. Caracas President Sánchez de Lozada, Chuck Costello

5. Caracas, San Antonio de los Altos and Los Teques, Miranda State Ron Burkle, John Burkle, John Hardman, Ken Abdalla, Ari Swiller

6. Caracas Becky Castle or Tanya Mujica, Deanna Congileo, Kent Spicer

7. Maracay, Aragua State Terrance Adamson, Jonathan Hartlyn

8. San Juan de los Moros, Guárico State Pablo Galarce, Neil Gaudry

9. Barcelona, Anzoátegui State Mary Anne Chalker, Jason Calder

10. Barquisimeto, Lara State Ed Casey, Fidel Chávez Mena

11. San Cristóbal, Táchira State Rodrigo Chávez Palacious, Annamari Laaksonen

12. Cumaná, Sucre State John Newcomb, Horace Sibley

13. Maracaibo, Zulia State Rafael Torribio, Ken Roberts

14. Ciudad Bolívar, Bolívar State Jesús Ortega, Vanessa Marti

15. Maturín, Monagas State Jaime Areizaga, Esther Low

16. Barinas, Barinas State Shelley McConnell, Debbie Palmer

17. Mérida, Mérida State Harry Vanden

Appendix 6

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PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

Election Observer Delegation of The Carter Centerand the Council of Freely Elected Heads of Government

1998 Venezuelan Presidential Elections

Dec. 7, 1998

We congratulate the Venezuelan people for their enthusiastic participation in yesterday’s election,and for their demonstration of faith in the democratic process. They voted calmly and peacefully, butdefinitively for change. We congratulate Venezuela’s National Electoral Council and all of those whoworked to ensure a smooth and efficient electoral process. The automated vote count system — the firstnational electronic system in the hemisphere — brought a new level of transparency and confidence to theprocess.

We were invited by the National Electoral Council and welcomed by the candidates to observethese elections, the 18th that we have monitored in this hemisphere. We are a delegation of 43 personsrepresenting nine different countries of the Western Hemisphere and Europe. The delegation is led by threeex-presidents representing the Council of Freely Elected Heads of Government, based at The Carter Cen-ter: Patricio Aylwin of Chile, Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada of Bolivia, and myself. We were joined by formersecretary of the U.S. Department of the Treasury, Nicholas Brady.

As part of our observation activities, we made two pre-election visits in October and November,opened a field office in mid-October, and deployed a small staff observer team for the Nov. 8 elections.Immediately before the Dec. 6 elections, the delegation leaders met with the top three candidates, PresidentCaldera, and the minister of defense. After the elections, the leaders spoke with both President-electChávez and the second-place finisher Henrique Salas Römer. We applaud their expressions of conciliationand calls for all Venezuelans to work together for the future of the country.

On election day, our delegation visited 252 voting sites in 13 states and the federal district ofVenezuela. We will publish a final report in the coming weeks. Our preliminary findings include thefollowing:

· The voting started before 8 a.m. in more than 93 percent of the sites we visited.· Polling officials were professional and impartial. In more than 86 percent of the sites we visited,

they were assigned their posts by lottery and had had experience in the Nov. 8 elections.

Appendix 7

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· Our delegates overall reported that the soldiers working under the Plan República did anoutstanding job in providing security and logistical support.

· In 94 percent of the sites with voting machines that we visited, the machines functioned well.· Both electoral officials and party witnesses reported that the process was going smoothly in more

than 95 percent of the sites we visited.

Overall, we found that the voters, poll workers, party witnesses and soldiers all worked togetherharmoniously to make this a transparent and peaceful election that clearly reflected the will of theVenezuelan people. We congratulate President-elect Hugo Chávez and the newly electedCongress and governors, and we urge them to address together the difficult challenges that faceVenezuela. ■

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CHECKLIST — VENEZUELAPRESIDENTIAL ELECTION

DEC. 6, 1998Team names: ______________________________________ Time of visit: ______

State: ______________ Circumscription: ____ Center: ______________ Table: _____

Voters registered: _______ Number who have voted: _______

Please write any descriptive comments on the back of the form.

Outside the Polling Center

1. How long has the first person in line been waiting to vote? ____ hrs.

2. Are the Plan República soldiers adequately regulating the flow of voters? Y N

Inside the Polling Center (select only one table per machine)

3. At what time was the first vote cast? (circle one) 6 – 7 a.m.7 – 8 a.m.8 – 9 a.m.9 – 10 a.m.after 10 a.m.

4. Are witnesses from at least two parties that support different candidatespresent and watching the procedures at the table? Y N

5. Did witnesses from at least two parties that support different candidatesverify that the machine registered zero votes when voting started? Y N

6. The officials were: a) assigned their post by lottery _______ b) party witnesses who became polling officials _______ c) some of both _______

Appendix 8

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7. Did the polling officials receive training from the CNE and/orthe Universidad Simón Rodríguez? Y N

8. Do the polling officials appear to be nonpartisan? Y N

9. Do the polling officials appear to be well-trained? Y N

10. Do the voters appear to understand the process? Y N

11. Is ballot secrecy assured? a) yes, completely ____b) except for Indra official ____c) no, unsatisfactory ____

12. If the table is automated, is the machine functioning smoothly? NA Y N(If the answer is no, please specify why not.)

13. Do polling officials say the process is: a) going very well ____b) satisfactory ____c) unsatisfactory ____

14. Do at least two witnesses from parties supporting different candidatessay the process is: a) going very well ____

b) satisfactory ____c) unsatisfactory ____

15. If they are present, do domestic observers (Queremos Eligir) say theprocess is: a) going very well ____

b) satisfactory ____c) unsatisfactory ____

16. In your view, is the voting process characterized by:a) no significant problems ____b) a few significant problems that will not affect the outcome ____c) serious flaws that could affect the outcome of the vote ____

PLEASE ADD ANY DESCRIPTIVE COMMENTS BELOW(Elaborate on the above questions, or discuss any evidence of poor organization, partisan procedure, or

an intimidating or violent election climate.)

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Appendix 9

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Appendix 10Copyright(c) 1998, The Washington Post. Reprinted with permission.

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Copyright(c) 1998, El Universal. Reprinted with permission.

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Copyright(c) 1998, The Economist. Reprinted with permission.

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Copyright(c) 1998, The Dallas Morning News. Reprinted with permission.

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Copyright(c) 1998, El Globo. Reprinted with permission.

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Copyright(c) 1998, El Nacional. Reprinted with permission.

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Copyright(c) 1998, El Nacional. Reprinted with permission.

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Copyright(c) 1998, The New York Times. Reprinted with permission.

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Copyright(c) 1999, The Irish Times. Reprinted with permission.

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Copyright(c) 1999, The New York Times. Reprinted with permission.

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ABOUT THE CARTER CENTER

The Carter Center strivesto relieve suffering byadvancing peace and

health worldwide. With afundamental commitment tohuman rights, the Center isguided by theprinciple thatpeople, with thenecessary skills,knowledge, andaccess to resources,can improve theirown lives and thelives of others.

Founded in1982 by Jimmy andRosalynn Carter inpartnership withEmory University,the nonprofitCenter works toprevent and resolveconflicts, enhance freedom anddemocracy, and improve health.The Center collaborates withother organizations, public orprivate, in carrying out itsmission. In this way, the Centerhas touched the people’s lives inmore than 65 countries.

Charitable contributionsfrom individuals, foundations,corporations, and other donorssupport the Center’s activities.Programs are directed by residentexperts or fellows. They design

and implement activities incooperation with President andMrs. Carter, networks of worldleaders, and partners in theUnited States and abroad.

The Center is located in a35-acre park, two miles east ofdowntown Atlanta. Four circular

pavilions house offices for theformer president and first ladyand most of the Center’s programstaff. The complex includes theIvan Allen III Pavilion and thenondenominational Cecil B. Day

Chapel, other confer-ence facilities, andadministrative offices.Adjoining the Centeris The Jimmy CarterLibrary and Museum,a repository for therecords of the Carteradministration. It isoperated by theNational Archivesand Records Adminis-tration of the federalgovernment and isopen to the public.The Center and theLibrary and Museum

are known collectively as TheCarter Presidential Center.

More information about TheCarter Center is available on theWorld Wide Web at www.cartercenter.org. ■

The Carter Center is located in a 35-acre park two miles east ofdowntown Atlanta.

THE CARTER CENTER ◆ ONE COPENHILL ◆ 453 FREEDOM PARKWAY

ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30307 ◆ (404)420-5100 ◆ FAX (404)420-5196WWW.CARTERCENTER.ORG

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