Oceans of Work: Arms Conversion Revisited

Oceans of Work: Arms Conversion Revisited January 2007i

Oceans of WorkArms Conversion Revisited

British American Security Information

CouncilThe Grayston Centre,

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Published by the British AmericanSecurity Information Council

BASIC in the UK is a registered charity no.1001081. BASIC in the US is a non-profit organizationconstituted under Section 501(c)(3) of the USInternal Revenue Service CodeBASIC Research Report 2007.1 - January 2007

BASICFor 20 years, BASIC has worked as anindependent research and advocacyorganisation. Our research is respectedand trusted, and widely used by manyother organisations and individuals. Wefocus on transatlantic security and armscontrol issues as a means of creating amore stable and secure world. Withoffices, staff, advisors, patrons andgoverning board membership on bothsides of the Atlantic, we play a uniquerole as a transatlantic bridge for policymakers and opinion shapers.

See our website for further details onthe Trident replacement debate:www.basic int .org

The content of this report is the soleresponsibility of the author and doesnot necessarily reflect the views ofBASIC, its staff or Council members.

This report has been written by Dr.Steven Schofield, a BASIC Consultant.Dr Schofield’s doctorate at BradfordUniversity was on arms conversion andhe was the co-founder of the Project onDemilitarisation. He was the author ofthe first Oceans of Work reportpublished by the Barrow AlternativeEmployment Committee in 1987. He hassubsequently published widely onmilitary procurement, disarmament,industrial and technology policy andeconomic regeneration. He works as afreelance researcher. Contact details –[email protected]

AcknowledgementsThanks to Derek Brook, Ian Davis, PaulIngram, Terry McSorley, Maggie Mort andBarbara Panvel for advice and comments, and to the staff of Barrow Borough Council,Furness Enterprise and the North WestRegional Development Agency forinformation on the Barrow-in-Furnesseconomy.

SupportThis publication was made possible throughfunding from the Joseph Rowntree CharitableTrust, The Ploughshares Fund and the AnitaRoddick Foundation.

Cover photos: Bob StraughtonCover photo of welder: Vesta’s factory in

Campbeltown, Scotland. September 2004 © Greenpeace / Kate Davison

Cover photo of offshore wind turbines also© Greenpeace / Kate Davison

Back cover photo: Bob StraughtonInside front cover photo: John Northrup,

Tug Hill, NY, USA.

Printed by Seacourt Ltd, Oxford ona waterless offset printing pressusing paper of at least 75% post-consumer recycled paper.Seacourt are EMAS certified andcarbon neutral. www.seacourt.net

iiBritish American Security Information Council — w w w . b a s i c i n t . o r g

Contents

Executive Summary

Introduction

Chapter One - Historical Background to Arms Conversion

Chapter Two - The Barrow Shipyard and Oceans of Work

Chapter Three - Arms Conversion Research and Policy OptionsIntroductionCommunity ConversionMacro-Economic ConversionComprehensive ConversionConsolidation Rather Than ConversionConclusion

Chapter Four - The UK Military-Industrial Base and Arms ConversionIntroductionOptions for ChangeDefence Industrial StrategyThe Trident NetworkTrident EmploymentNon-Offensive Defence PolicyConclusion

Chapter Five - Alternative Technological Trajectories and Arms Conversion IntroductionEarly Years of Funding for Renewable Energy in the UKDenmark and Wind PowerThe UK and THORPContemporary PolicyA War on Global WarmingConclusion

Chapter Six - Barrow-in-Furness and the Closure of the ShipyardIntroductionEmployment Decline, 1990-2006The Local Economic ContextKeep Our Future Afloat Campaign (KOFAC), or Getting the

Shipyard Off Our Backs (GOSUB)Conclusion

Conclusion

Endnotes

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34 Windfarm in Washington State USA Photo: Tara Jorgensen

Oceans of Work: Arms Conversion Revisited January 2007iii

This report is published a month after the Government’s WhitePaper outlining its decision to replace Vanguard ballistic missilesubmarines with an indigenously-manufactured submarine tocontinue deploying Britain’s strategic nuclear weapons.1 TheHouse of Commons is due to vote on the White Paper in March.This report also comes two weeks after the House of CommonsDefence Committee published its report on the industrialrequirements surrounding this decision. The Committeeconcluded that British manufacture of nuclear-poweredsubmarines required a regular orderbook without gaps.2

This report puts the case for armsconversion as integral to a ‘nationalneeds’ programme of civil R&D andmanufacture, including a majorinvestment in offshore renewableenergy, for both security of supplyand to help tackle the growinginternational threat from climatechange. It is based on areevaluation of ‘Oceans of Work’,produced by the Barrow AlternativeEmployment Committee (BAEC) in1987, as part of the campaign bylocal trade unionists for alternative,civil work to the construction of theTrident ballistic missile submarinesat the VSEL shipyard in Barrow-in-Furness, West Cumbria. ‘Oceans ofWork’ put forward an ambitiousprogramme to utilise theshipbuilding and engineering skillsof the workforce, with particularemphasis on offshore renewableenergy, including wave and windpower systems.

The proposals were rejected by theVSEL management who stressed thecontinued importance of thecompany’s military specialism innuclear submarine manufacture.Employment declined, however,from 12,000 in 1987 to just over3,000 in 2006. Such job lossesreflected the broader pattern ofconsolidation and rationalisation inthe arms industries, with overalldefence employment down fromover 500,000 to 260,00 and withBAE Systems (formerly BritishAerospace) emerging as theeffective UK monopoly supplier infighter aircraft, surface vessels andnuclear submarines.

Executive Summary

Arms conversion is still popularlyassociated with the end of theSecond World War, and thesuccessful re-integration of millionsof people, both from the armedforces and from the armsindustries, into civil manufacturing.But this was essentially areconversion exercise back to civilproduction in which companies hadconsiderable experience prior to thewar. The emergence of highlyspecialised military firms has madethis traditional approach of plant-based conversion problematicbecause of the very differentdemands of civil manufacture andthe high transition costs.

Alternative models provide a morerelevant and contemporaryapproach to maximisingthe economicopportunities ofdisarmament. Forexample, undermacro-economicconversion,centralgovernmentcompensatesfor reducedmilitaryexpenditurethrough otherforms of spendingon infrastructure,housing, etc, bringingenhanced employment prospects,including those for redundantarms-industry workers.

More radically, as in this report,conversion is put forward as part ofa ‘national needs’ agenda,highlighting a fundamental shiftfrom military R&D andprocurement to a programme ofinvestment in civil technologies formajor objectives like renewableenergy and reduced carbonemissions in the face of a globalenvironmental crisis. Comparison ismade between Denmark, as theleading nation in the developmentand manufacture of wind turbinesduring the 1980s and 1990s, andthe UK’s industrial cul-de-sac ofnuclear reprocessing, to emphasisethe importance of centralgovernment leadership and broaderinstitutional networks for

successful (and unsuccessful)technological

trajectories. The potential

exists for amassiveexpansion ofwave andwind powerto satisfy upto 50% of theUK’s energyneeds by

2030, whileforming the

basis for a majorindustry employing

tens of thousands ofworkers to satisfy domestic

demand and export markets.

...a fundamentalshift from military

R&D and procurement toa programme of investment

in civil technologies formajor objectives like

renewable energy andreduced carbon emissions

in the face of a globalenvironmental

crisis.

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A key element of this new armsconversion framework is afundamental review of UK securitypolicy. Since the end of the SecondWorld War, the underlying doctrinepursued with remarkableconsistency by successivegovernments, has been to ensurethe UK can support the UnitedStates in global force projection.The MoD’s Defence IndustrialStrategy, published in 2005, whichemphasised the need for long-rangemilitary platforms, including fighteraircraft, nuclear submarines andaircraft carriers, is intended tocarry this doctrine on for the nexttwenty to thirty years.

A Non-Offensive Defence policy isone alternative that breaks with thissubordinate relationship and allowsthe UK to make an effectivecontribution both to newinternational security challengesand to international disarmament.The focus is on territorial defenceand a contribution to an EUpeacekeeping and reconstructionforce that can carry out UN-endorsed humanitarianinterventions. Under this policy,major offensive platforms,including the follow-onTrident ballisticmissile system,aircraft carriersandconventionalnuclearsubmarineswould becancelled andthe UK wouldbe a leadingproponent of anew internationalsecurity architecturebased on globaldisarmament. There wouldbe the potential for major annualsavings of between £3-4 billion onmilitary expenditure by 2012,available for the ‘national needs’programme of civil investment.

The industrial implications ofcutbacks to military procurementare serious yet manageable andtemporary, including the closure ofsurplus manufacturing capacity andthe run-down of military researchfacilities. Overall, approximately100,000 workers would lose theirjobs but many of these are based inrelatively prosperous regions of theUK, where alternative employmentopportunities are high, especiallyfor skilled industrial and technicalstaff. The shortage of highly-skilledworkers is perhaps the mostimportant bottleneck constrainingeconomic development, more sothan financial investment; an

injection of highly-skilledworkers with expertise

appropriate for thegrowing and

crucial sectorssuch as thedevelopmentandproductionofrenewableenergytechnologies

will stimulatethe civil

economy.

A small number ofmilitary-dependent

localities in relatively deprivedareas face major job losses,including Barrow which would loseall nuclear submarine work.

Here, the emphasis will be onregeneration policy, involvingnational government through theDepartment of Trade and Industry,the Regional Development Agenciesand local economic task forces toattract new industries and tosupport programmes like therelocation of civil service functionsto these areas. Although there will,inevitably, be disruption and higherunemployment in the short-term,the prospects exist for stronger andmore diversified local economies inthe medium to long term.

The research establishments will berun down as their focus changes tothe dismantling anddecommissioning of nuclearweapons. This offers theopportunity to redirect governmentsupported military R&D, running atover £2 billion a year, and heavilybiased towards the South East. Newcivil, regional research facilitiescould be supported around thenational needs agenda forinnovations in areas like hydrogenstorage of renewable energy anddecentralized energy distributionsystems.

Although a radical programme, thisis an entirely feasible one and isintended to demonstrate how theUK can take a leading role in a newinternational security agenda basedon disarmament and sustainableeconomic development.

Although there will, inevitably, be

disruption and higherunemployment in the

short-term, the prospects exist for stronger and more diversified local

economies in the medium to long

term.

Vesta’s wind-turbine factory in Campbeltown, Scotland. September 2004Photo: © Greenpeace / Kate Davison

Oceans of Work: Arms Conversion Revisited January 2007v

Introduction

It is now twenty years sinceresearch was carried out on thepossibility of alternative, civil workto the Trident ballistic-missilesubmarine programme at the VSELshipyard in Barrow-in-Furness,Cumbria. The construction of thefour Trident submarines was one ofthe biggest shipbuilding andengineering programmes everundertaken in the UK, employing atits peak, over 14,000 people locally.

‘Oceans of Work’, published by theBarrow Alternative EmploymentCommittee (BAEC) in 1987 4

provided an alternative approachthat stressed the over-dependencyof the company and the localeconomy on arms production. Itargued that the potential existedfor new, civil engineeringopportunities in the marine sector,particularly offshore renewableenergy systems like wind and wavepower, with enhanced prospects forskilled manufacturing jobs over themedium to long term.

Although the report receivedconsiderable national andinternational attention and wassupported by senior politicians andtrade union leaders, its proposalswere never seriously considered bythe company’s management. Theycontinued to stress VSEL’s expertisein military work and its specialismin nuclear submarine productionthroughout the 1990s and early2000s, while employment levels atthe yard spiralled ever downwards.

Why, if the report failed to achieveany of its objectives, is it useful torevisit these issues? Firstly, theGovernment has just published itsWhite Paper outlining its decisionto replace Trident with a newgeneration of ballistic missilesubmarines, with the promise of adebate and vote in the House ofCommons in March of this year.

“when policy becomes doctrine,

the acknowledgementlet alone assessment

of alternatives isrepressed.” 3

A Trident nuclear-armedsubmarine heading out to sea

from its base on the Clyde

This further undermines thenuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty(NPT) and commits the UK to anestimated £20-£30 billionprogramme. It will sustain only lowlevels of employment (around5,000-7,000 people nationwide),focused on a local economy inBarrow that is still heavilydependent on military work.

Secondly, the Barrow experience isa microcosm of broader trends inUK arms production, i.e.,consolidation and specialisationaround expensive military researchand development (R&D) andprocurement programmes. Theresult has been massive job lossesbut little effort to providealternative, civil manufacturingwork.

Thirdly, many of the argumentsraised in the original report aboutthe lack of support for civilalternatives like renewable energy,are even more relevant today, sincethe international energy crisis isdeepening and the issues of climatechange have become ever morepressing.

This report considers variousquestions, including:

•what lessons can be drawn fromthe Barrow and other armsconversion case studies on theopportunities for, and barriers to,conversion?

•what role can government playthrough R&D and procurement inpromoting new technologies thatoffer opportunities for civilmanufacturing? and

•can arms conversion beincorporated into a broaderframework for disarmament andsustainable economicdevelopment relevant tocontemporary conditions?

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Chapter One gives a brief history ofpost-war arms conversion in the UKto contrast conditions in 1945,where manufacturing capacity wasmainly reconverted back to civilwork, and the emergence of aspecialised military-industrial basein the 1960s and 1970s. Attention isfocused on the example of theLucas Aerospace Alternative Plan asa major inspiration for conversionin the UK during the 1970s and1980s.

Chapter Two provides a shortreview of the structure andobjectives of BAEC and the researchfor ‘Oceans of Work’, highlightingthe potential for new, civil marinetechnologies, the negative responseto its publication by the VSELmanagement, and other morefavourable reaction.

Chapter Three considers some ofthe theoretical issues raised in theacademic literature that provide acritique of the traditional, site-based conversion approach. Itdevelops an overview of the variousmodels including community-basedconversion, macro-economicconversion and comprehensiveconversion, drawing out the policyimplications of each approach.

Chapter Four provides acontemporary analysis of the UK’smilitary-industrial base in thecontext of consolidation andinternationalization, and theemergence of BAE Systems as thedominant force in UK armsprocurement. The government’sDefence Industrial Strategy (DIS) isassessed for its long-termcommitment to indigenousproduction on a new generation ofoffensive, conventional and nuclearplatforms.

An alternative framework based ona non-offensive defence strategy, aUK contribution to an EUpeacekeeping/reconstruction corpsand a major rationalisation ofspecialised military production isassessed for its impact onprocurement and employment.

Chapter Five draws on therecommendations of ‘Oceans ofWork’ to assess the choices taken inthe UK’s energy policies during the1980s and 1990s, comparing thecontinued R&D support for nuclearpower by the government againstthe rejection of renewable energy.Specific reference is made to theTHORP nuclear programme andwave power as alternative‘technology trajectories’, and how acomprehensive conversionprogramme could have led to amuch larger share of energy supplythrough offshore renewablesystems that also supported anindigenous manufacturing capacity.

Chapter Six considers the future ofBarrow in the context of itsdependency on nuclear submarineproduction, the failure to broadenthe local economic base andcontinued high levels of social andeconomic deprivation. The impactof the closure of the yard isassessed in relation to conversionpolicy for local economies that arehighly dependent on military work.

A concluding chapter provides aframework for arms conversionthat links disarmament to a new‘national needs’ programme forcivil R&D and production.

Windfarm near Fluvannah, Texas, USA Photo: Sarah Fields

Oceans of Work: Arms Conversion Revisited January 20071

Historical background to Arms Conversion

Chapter one

Arms conversion generally invokesthe Old Testament expression,‘swords into plowshares’.5 Thispowerful imagery still resonatestoday, providing hope andinspiration for millions of peoplearound the world that peacefulalternatives can be found to theglobal arms race and to weapons ofmass destruction like the UK’sTrident ballistic missile system. Theforging of handcrafted weapons inthe agricultural societies of biblicaltimes may bear little comparison tothe industrialised andtechnologically sophisticatedmilitary production of today, butconversion has, of course, a muchmore recent and successfulhistorical experience.

The end of the Second World Warbrought with it a formidableeconomic challenge and manycommentators at the time feared areturn to the sort of massunemployment that blighted the1930s, with over 3.5 million armedforces personnel to be demobilisedand 3.25 million workers in armsmanufacture needing to findalternative employment. Suchpessimism proved groundless.Savings accumulated during the warwere available to spend on civilgoods, stimulating demand thatmore than compensated for theloss of military work and helping toachieve a relatively smoothtransition to full employment by1947.6

Shipyard workers at Barrow-in-Furness in 1900

The forging of handcrafted weapons in theagricultural societies of biblical times may

bear little comparison to the industrialised andtechnologically sophisticated military

production of today, but conversion has, ofcourse, a much more recent and successful

historical experience.

Not surprisingly, this successfulexperience is used to support theargument that arms conversionshould be a relativelystraightforward exercise today,since the restructuring of militaryindustries and employment wouldbe on a much smaller scale.However, there is a crucialdifference. For the vast majority ofcompanies, this was a return to pre-war production as tools andequipment were, quite literally,dusted off from the factory storesand brought back into use. So,rather than conversion, it would bemore accurate to describe this,generally, as ‘reconversion’, toforms of civil production in whichcompanies already hadconsiderable experience.7

The onset of the Cold War from theearly 1950s onwards, brought withit sustained high levels of militaryspending, unprecedented inpeacetime, and the emergence ofspecialised military industries inaerospace, shipbuilding,engineering and latterly,electronics, with little or noexperience of civil work. Thechallenges of conversion were nowmuch more formidable because ofthese specialisms, as well as thecompetition from established civilcompanies in all these sectors.

During the 1970s, one pioneeringcampaign inspired many peoplewith its radical vision of conversionto socially-useful production. LucasAerospace was a major armsmanufacturer, employing 13,000workers at 17 sites. The workerswere faced with clear indicationsfrom both the government andmanagement that reduced ordersfor military equipment, during oneof the periodic downturns inexpenditure, would probably leadto substantial job losses.8

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However, the work behind the Combine Planstimulated further efforts under the banner ofsocially-useful production, including a workingprototype of the road/rail bus and the setting

up of an academic centre, the Unit for theDevelopment of Alternative Products (UDAP)

in Coventry to follow through a range ofdesign concepts.

Rather than passively accept thisfate, trade union representativesfrom the various sites cametogether to draw up an alternativeplan that would help both toprotect jobs and to satisfy unmetsocial needs. For the members ofthe Combine committee, a keyfactor in arms conversion was therole of the state. The government,through military spending, hadprioritised certain types ofproduction but it could equally seta new national economic andtechnological agenda that looked tocombat the growing energy crisisand environmental pollution, aswell as improve public transportand health services. Therefore, itwas entirely feasible for thegovernment to re-direct militaryexpenditure into innovative civilmanufacture at companies likeLucas.

Over 150 products were eventuallyproposed in a detailed, six-volumecorporate plan that matchedworkforce skills and industrialfacilities to a range of alternativeproducts, including alternativeenergy systems – solar andhydrogen fuel cells; publictransport – a hybrid road-rail bus;and medical equipment – a kidneydialysis machine.

Not surprisingly, the Combine Planwas rejected out of hand by theLucas management who clearly sawit as a threat to their authority andto the company’s status as one ofthe leading UK military aerospacecompanies. The Labour governmentalso offered little support,preferring to treat this as a matterof internal industrial relationsbetween the company and theworkforce, rather than one ofnational policy and economicpriorities.9

However, the work behind theCombine Plan stimulated furtherefforts under the banner of socially-useful production, including aworking prototype of the road/railbus and the setting up of anacademic centre, the Unit for theDevelopment of AlternativeProducts (UDAP) in Coventry tofollow through a range of designconcepts.10

Other conversion studies were alsoundertaken during the 1980s,including one focused on theBritish Aerospace, Kingston sitewhich faced redundancies andpossible closure, as well as workassessing regional and localdependency on military contracting,in the Coventry area, and inScotland around the Faslane andCoulport naval dockyards that weredue to service the Tridentsubmarines.11 It was in this contextthat the Barrow research on thepotential for civil work at the VSELshipyard was undertaken.

Dreadnought - the first UKnuclear powered submarine

launched in 1960


Chapter two The Barrow Shipyard and Oceans of Work

The Barrow arms conversionproject emerged as a response tothe Conservative government’sdecision in 1980 to replace Polariswith the Trident ballistic missilesubmarine programme.Construction of the foursubmarines was to be carried out atthe VSEL shipyard, in a contractworth over £2 billion to thecompany that was expected tomaintain employment for the12,000-strong workforce well intothe 1990s.12

A group of local trade unionistsfrom the yard and active in thelocal Trades Council came togetheras the Barrow AlternativeEmployment Committee (BAEC) in1984. They were concerned aboutthe growing dependency of thecompany on military work andespecially on one large contractthat was vulnerable to cancellationif there was a change ofgovernment.13

The main objective was to draw upplans for diversification of theproduct base (accepting that theshipyard and engineering workswould continue with other militarycontracting), but with the emphasison civil alternatives to militarywork. BAEC received initial fundingfrom the Campaign for NuclearDisarmament (CND) to employ aresearcher, and an academic basewas provided by the Department ofPeace Studies at BradfordUniversity.14

VSEL (better known as the Vickersshipyard before privatisation of thecompany in 1986) had a long andproud tradition of commercialshipbuilding and engineeringduring the last century, includingthe construction of oil tankers andpassenger liners.

The main objectivewas to draw up plansfor diversification of

the product base,...but with the

emphasis on civilalternatives tomilitary work.

It was only during the 1960s and1970s that the company began toconcentrate on both ballistic missileand conventional nuclearsubmarine manufacture, resultingin a decisive shift in the balance ofproduction from civil to militarywork.

Therefore, the remit of the researchwas to identify promising ideasdeveloped internally and newopportunities in marinetechnologies that could use theskills base and facilities of thecompany for large-scale, marineengineering projects. Themanagement were approached forsupport but made it clear that theysaw no value in the research,prevented site visits by theresearcher, and refused to offertechnical analysis of product ideas.

BAEC’s ‘Oceans of Work’ waspublished in 1987. It identified arange of products, including civilengineering equipment and marine-based renewable energy, with thefocus on wave power, offshore windpower and tidal barriers. Some ofthese ideas had emerged from thecompany’s own design work suchas the Constant Speed GeneratorDrive (CSGD) and the OscillatingWater Column (OWC) wave powermachine, while others were basedon international comparisons ofemerging opportunities.15

The CSGD was designed by VSEL asa response to escalating fuel costsin order to provide a more efficientform of electrical power generationfor ships at sea. Through aninnovative gearing system, ships’generators could be driven directlyfrom the main engines, even with avarying speed, because the CSGDprovided the means to maintain aconstant output speed.


the report’s mostambitious proposal

was to set up agovernment-fundedmarine technology

R&D centre inBarrow to

co-ordinate anational

programme anddevelop the

expertise necessaryto build a cluster of

new marineindustries in

offshore renewableenergy andunderwaterexploration.

However, the design was notpursued by the company in the faceof international competition, inparticular from the Germancompany, Renk.

The OWC was a pioneering designput forward by the company in themid 1970s. Waves strike a columnof water trapped in an innerchamber, open at the sea base, andthe moving column acts as a pistonthat, as it rises and falls, forces airback and forward through a lowpressure turbine housed in thecolumn, in turn providing power.Again, the design was not pursuedby the company’s management anda similar prototype was built by aNorwegian company, Kvaerner BrugAIS, that became operational in themid 1980s.

A strong emphasis in the reportwas on international comparativeanalysis of marine technologies andthe role of central government R&Dfunding to support innovations thathad the potential to generatesubstantial new employmentopportunities. Recognising thispositive relationship betweengovernment and industry, thereport’s most ambitious proposalwas to set up a government-fundedmarine technology R&D centre inBarrow to co-ordinate a nationalprogramme and develop theexpertise necessary to build acluster of new marine industries inoffshore renewable energy andunderwater exploration.

The report did not dodge concernsabout internal barriers tosuccessful civil work at theshipyard. These centred on both thecost base for military productionand a management culture thatprioritised continued militarycontracting. Ministry of Defence(MoD) specifications, especially fornuclear systems, included manylayers of quality control and theintegration of complex sub-systemslike sonar, steam generating plantand communications that all had tobe inter-operational under extremeconditions of performance. Anycivil, commercial work would haveto be carried out within thisframework of military-industrialspecialisms and a highlybureaucratized military accountingand costing system.

The Oriana at night in 1960 in the Barrow docks

HM Submarine Vampire wasbuilt in Barrow and completed in 1943


The company’s senior managementalso had a strong cultural bias infavour of military work. For them,the development of a specialism innuclear submarine production hadgiven the company a uniquestrength as a prime contractor tothe MoD. Civil work, althoughpossibly welcome, simply could notoffer the same combination ofmarket strength and profitability,nor industrial and technologicalchallenge. In proposing a marinetechnology centre in Barrow,‘Oceans of Work’ attempted torespond to some of these concernsby indicating how marine industrialand technological resources couldbe re-configured, outside VSEL, andact as an incubator to a variety oflarger and smaller companies thatwere responsive to these new civilopportunities.

When ‘Oceans of Work’ waspublished, the then Chief Executiveof VSEL, Dr Rodney Leach,dismissed it out of hand. He calledit ‘mischievous’ for suggesting thata company that prided itself onmeeting a technological challengeequivalent to sending a man to themoon might consider suchalternatives. For him, commercialshipbuilding in the UK was interminal decline and new civilmarine systems were riven withtechnological and marketuncertainties. Any major expansionof marine-based renewables wouldrequire ‘social engineering on aglobal scale’. VSEL’s future wassecured by the management’s focuson Trident, other nuclearsubmarine and armaments work forthe MoD, and a renewed drive onarms exports.16

The irony that VSEL had become anindustrial extension of the MoD andwas building a platform forcosmically destructive weapons,seemed to have escaped Dr. Leachin his peroration to market forcesand against global socialengineering. But other commentarywas more reflective. Several reviewswelcomed the general thrust of thereport, that renewable energy andother marine-based systems offeredsignificant opportunities, includingpotentially very large exportmarkets, and that the UK might fallfurther behind other countrieswithout government support forinnovation during this early phaseof development. But there was alsoskepticism that VSEL could play anypositive role, mainly because of theinherent military conservatism ofthe company’s management.

Here, again, we meet thefundamental dilemma facing armsconversion; that of a mismatchbetween the prospects for new civilemployment in associated areasand the reality of militaryproduction at specialist armsmanufacturers, hamstrung byindustrial and cultural barriers thatmade even the more modestambition of product diversificationon site, with both military and civilwork, look highly unlikely, if notimpossible.

For all practical purposes theresearch was completed by the endof 1987 and, despite efforts by themembers of BAEC to take theproposals forward, the company’scourse had been firmly set onarmaments work and its specialistniche of nuclear submarines.

MV Copenhagan was the last passenger ship built at Barrow-in-Furness in 1973


Arms Conversion Research and Policy Options

Chapter three

IntroductionThere is now a substantial body ofacademic work on arms conversion,although interest tends to wax andwane with improved prospects fordisarmament, as at the end of theCold War, or the lack of them, as istragically the case now. The mainfocus has been on the UnitedStates, with its enormous armsindustry, but research has also beencarried out elsewhere, mainly in theUK and Europe.17 Majorcontributions of the literature havebeen to explore the characteristicsof a specialised arms industry inthe advanced Western economies,and to put forward various policyoptions for transferring resourcesfrom military to civil work.

Influential in setting the originalagenda was Seymour Melman, anAmerican academic, whose researchthrough the 1960s onwards,explored the negative economicimpact of military spending on theUS economy.18 He argued that theUS Department of Defense’s (DoD)insatiable demand for ever-moresophisticated armaments hadcreated a peculiar sort of anti-economy, a black hole characterisedby cost-plus contracting and the‘gold-plating’ of military equipment.

American corporations that hadbuilt their post-war success throughcontinued productivityimprovements and reliability in themanufacture of civil goods werenow being sucked into thisalternative reality where they wereencouraged to do exactly theopposite; to continuously add newcapabilities beyond originalspecifications and irrespective ofpotential complications, yet safe inthe knowledge that all costincreases would be passed onto theDoD.

Not only did this result in a seriesof procurement scandals overdelays, inflated contract values,faulty equipment and outrightcorruption, it also established aform of peacetime, specialisedmilitary-industrial firm. Thispeculiar creature’s expertise lay insatisfying the byzantinebureaucratic requirements of armsprocurement, rather than in thenormal concerns for cost controland productivity that were essentialin civil markets. As a result, thevery few attempts at convertingmilitary facilities to civil productionwere little short of disastrous,characterised by over-engineeredand unreliable equipment thatbroke down and faced costlyredesign and repair problems.19

The only way out of this crisis,according to Melman, was to put inplace an ambitious nationalframework for arms conversionthat required all the leading armsmanufacturers to draw up detailedconversion plans at each site and inconsultation with their workforces.His approach gained considerablesupport, including attempts atlegislation through Congress. It wasalso influential in the UK, where asimilar framework was proposed bythe Labour Party in the mid1980s.20

Clearly, this emphasis on site-basedconversion planning drew heavilyon the experience of reconversionat the end of the Second World War.So, having graphicallydemonstrated the serious barriersposed by military specialisms andthe lack of success in the,admittedly limited, attempts at site-based conversion, Melman insistedon maintaining a traditionalstructure for arms conversion.

...the US Department ofDefense’s (DoD)

insatiable demand for ever-moresophisticated

armaments hadcreated a peculiar

sort of anti-economy,a black hole

characterised by cost-plus contractingand the ‘gold-plating’

of military equipment.

Seymour Melman, 1947 - 2004


He believed that the process ofplanning would, itself, stimulatenew ideas and new ways of workingto liberate these facilities from thedead hand of military production.

But a growing consensus wasemerging in the academic literaturethat, given the characteristics ofthese specialist military-industrialsites, it was highly unlikely thatthey could make the transition tocivil work, even with substantialsupport from the state. Rather thanwaste resources in this way, thefocus of research became one ofassessing alternative approaches toarms conversion against the criteriaof maximizing the economicpotential of disarmament throughnew industrial and employmentopportunities.21

Community ConversionOne alternative that claimedsuccess was community conversion,an approach that focused on thecapacity to attract new employmentinto areas facing a decline inmilitary work. The Office ofEconomic Adjustment (OEA), partof the US Department of Defense,had the responsibility to assistcommunities facing military baseclosures during the 1960s and1970s. Small amounts of fundingwere made available to support there-use of administrative andaccommodation buildings forvarious new activities includingcommercial business premises,educational campuses and civilaviation.

In some cases, there was an overallincrease in employment on site butthese tended to be ones located inor near large cities, where thecommercial attractions were clear.More remote and smaller basesfaced a bleak future. Similar small-scale programmes were developedin the UK and Europe at the end ofthe Cold War. The most significantwas the EU’s Konver programmeduring 1991-93 that allocated £15million to a number of eligibleprojects, including retraining ofredundant workers and re-use offormer military sites.22

Essentially, what these minorprogrammes reflected was anoverall reliance on market forces. Ifjobs were lost in the arms industryor at military bases, then it wasassumed that normal mechanismsof supply and demand wouldoperate. In other words, theeconomy was in a constant state of‘conversion’ with some industriesdeclining and others offering newopportunities. Previous experienceof structural unemployment instaple industries like coal and steelmay have demonstrated that theprocess could be an extremelypainful one in particular localities,and that similar job losses andclosures might well occur in thearms sector. But the government’srole was restricted to small regionalaid programmes in the attempt toattract new industries, allied toretraining packages for redundantworkers, even though, in alllikelihood, they would proveinadequate to deal with the scale ofthe cutbacks.

Macro-Economic ConversionOther approaches called for a moreambitious agenda, especially whenthe prospects for disarmamentlooked favourable and the balanceof government expenditure couldbe fundamentally changed. Macro-economic conversion emerged as astrong theme in the early 1990s,when it became clear that the ColdWar was drawing to a rapid end andthe opportunity existed to release asubstantial peace dividend.

One study in the UK analysed how areduction in military expenditure of50% was achievable over the period1992 to 2000, but would have verydifferent outcomes dependent onwhether the government providedcompensatory expenditure or not.In the first case where militaryspending was simply cut, overalldemand in the economy declined,Gross Domestic Product (GDP) fellby 3.5% and unemploymentincreased by half-a-million.


In the second, where the cuts werebalanced by a proportionateincrease in other forms of publicexpenditure there was an extra 1.8%growth in the economy and areduction in unemployment by half-a-million. There would be problemsof restructuring at the local levelfor a small number of military-dependent areas but these would bemanageable within the context of agrowing economy and newopportunities for employment.23

Of course, such large reductions inmilitary spending andcompensatory investment did notoccur, with an overall cut in UKmilitary expenditure in real termsof only 14% between 1991 and1998.24 But Keynesian analysis ofthis type reinforced a strongmessage from the body ofconversion research, that asustained period of disarmamentcan also provide real economicbenefits, including increasedaggregate demand andemployment, assuming that thegovernment was willing to play apro-active role at the level of themacro-economy.

Comprehensive ConversionBy far the most ambitious set ofproposals, which could bedescribed as comprehensiveconversion, went further than thisform of macro-economiccompensation for reduced militaryexpenditure. Fundamentally, itchallenged Western governments toembark on a programme ofsustained disarmament matched bya new national and internationaleconomic agenda for peacefuldevelopment.

The most eloquent exponent of thisapproach was Michael Gorbachevduring the astonishing period ofdisarmament initiated by the SovietUnion under his leadership. Hisspeech to the United NationsAssembly in 1988 encapsulated thesheer scale of these ambitions,including the abolition of nuclearweapons and other weapons ofmass destruction by the end of thecentury; the removal of all foreignbases, and massive reductions inconventional forces to a form ofterritorial defence only.

Parallel with internationaldisarmament would be aprogramme of development totackle the growing securitychallenges posed by poverty andenvironmental breakdown:

Initiating active steps to halt thearms race and reduce weapons isa necessary pre-requisite forcoping with increasingly acuteglobal problems – those of adeteriorating state of man’senvironment and the need tofind new energy sources andcombat economic backwardness,hunger and disease. The patternimposed by militarism – arms inplace of development – must bereplaced by the reverse order –disarmament for development.25

The dismantling of the Cold-Warmilitary economy, therefore, was amajor opportunity to re-directscientific and technologicalresources from military R&D, and touse government expenditures inways that met pressing social andeconomic priorities includingenergy supply, health, theenvironment and the rebuilding ofcivil infrastructure.26

Under the first Clintonadministration the United Statesdid pursue some technologicalpolicies that seemed to addressthese issues. For example, theleading government nuclearresearch establishments at LosAlamos, Lawrence Livermore andSandia, as well as the DefenseAdvanced Research Projects Agency(renamed ARPA and droppingDefense in recognition of thechanging emphasis) were expectedto develop partnerships withindustry in order to make aproductive contribution to the civileconomy, using their corecompetencies in areas likecomputer sciences and advancedmaterials.27

Parallel withinternational

disarmament wouldbe a programme of

development to tacklethe growing securitychallenges posed by

poverty andenvironmentalbreakdown...

Mikhail Gorbachev


Type

Factory-BasedConversion

Diversification

TechnologyTransfer

CommunityConversion

Macro-economicConversion

ComprehensiveConversion

Description

Individual sites move completelyfrom military to civil work

An increase in civil work withoutabandoning military production

Military research laboratories‘spin-out’ technologicalinnovations that might haveapplications in civilmanufacturing

Assistance to areas dependenton arms manufacture or militarybases facing redundancies andclosure

Government compensates formajor reductions in militaryexpenditure through other formsof civil investment.

A national and internationalneeds programme linkingdisarmament to an irreversibleshift from military to civil workwith the focus on sustainabledevelopment, e.g. renewableenergy

Implications

Rests heavily on the reconversionexperience at the end of World War Two butfaces serious barriers in the modern contextof specialised military-industrial firms

Normally this refers to restructuring at acompany level rather than site level. It canmean acquisition which may reduce theoverall dependency on military work or itmay mean companies divest militaryinterests but in both cases the capacity forarmaments production is maintained

Small scale programmes within the contextof large, government-funded military R&Dprogrammes and continued closerelationships between the researchlaboratories and major arms manufacturers

Stresses the role of regional and localassistance through attracting new industriesand through retraining. In practice,relatively small assistance programmes,although there is potential to expand thescale through various central government,regional and local economic agencies

No direct support to arms firms andsignificant redundancies in militaryemployment but more than compensated byoverall increases in demand and jobcreation in other civil sectors of theeconomy. It still leaves a substantial,specialised military-industrial base and thepotential for future increases in militaryexpenditure and production.

Calls for a total re-focusing of internationalsecurity through disarmament to priortisecivil programmes of R&D and production.Would require the dismantling of most ofthe specialised military-industrial capacity.A fundamental challenge to the Westernsecurity paradigm established by the US andits main allies after the Cold War.

Figure One: Typology of Arms Conversion


Much was made of the concept ofdual-use technologies, whereinnovations could be adapted toboth military and civil applications,particularly in the electronicssector. But the fundamentalstructure and military focus of thelaboratories was left intact, and thebulk of their partnership workcontinued to be with the giant armscorporations. A similar approachhas been taken in the UK with theDefence Diversification Agency(DDA), whose main role is tosupport limited forms oftechnology transfer from themilitary research establishments.28

Consolidation rather than ConversionSuch ‘conversion’ then was simply aform of disguised consolidation.The United States and its allies werecompelled to acknowledge theradical nature of the Gorbachevagenda, and the growing publicsupport for disarmament. At thesame time, they wanted to ensurethat the industrial andtechnological base for advancedweaponry and military supremacywas maintained, even though theirmain adversary had, quite literally,disappeared. Russia, the onlypotential military successor to theSoviet Union, was in a state ofeconomic chaos where armsexpenditure had collapsed.

Cuts in both nuclear andconventional forces were agreedthrough the major disarmamenttreaties of this period resulting insome demobilisation of armedforces and reduced expenditure.This served two purposes. First, itsatisfied domestic public demandthat progress was being made ondisarmament. Second, it preservedkey capabilities, including theoption for nuclear weapons andadvanced conventional weaponsthat gave the United Statesoverwhelming superiority for globalforce projection.

Fundamental to this strategy wasthe consolidation of the militaryindustrial base. Cuts in militaryR&D and procurement were carriedout but this still left militaryexpenditure at the average for thewhole of the Cold War period. So,unlike the end of other majorconflicts, the US and UKgovernments made it clear to theleading arms companies, that nodeep, structural changes would bemade. Rather, there would be ashort period of adjustment and theremoval of excess capacity but thiswould leave procurement and R&Dbudgets at what were stillhistorically high levels by normalpeacetime standards. And, just asimportantly, there was everyexpectation that militaryexpenditure would rise again in realterms, that all the major land, seaand air systems would bepurchased and that governmentsupport for arms exports would bemaintained, if not intensified.

During this period, therefore, therewas a substantial loss of jobs andrationalisation of capacity, with anestimated million arms industryjobs lost in the United States and afurther 500,000 in Europe.29 Butthe structure of specialistmanufacturers supported by thegovernment’s military researchestablishments remainedremarkably intact, hardlydistinguishable in terms ofcapabilities and real termexpenditure from the height of theCold War in the early 1960s whenPresident Eisenhower could warn ofthe dangers of a military-industrialcomplex.

there was everyexpectation that

military expenditurewould rise again in

real terms, that all themajor land, sea andair systems would bepurchased and thatgovernment support

for arms exportswould be maintained,

if not intensified.


ConclusionArms conversion research has beenimportant in clarifying the maincharacteristics of a specialised armsindustry and the range of policyoptions that could be applied to thetransition from military to civileconomy. The main debate hasbeen on the relevance of atraditional ‘swords into plowshares’model that was best served by theparticular conditions of the SecondWorld War but is generallyconsidered to be an anachronism inthis modern context. A variety ofapproaches have been identified,from the more modest, communityconversion programmes to a radicalcomprehensive conversionprogramme that calls for thelinkage of disarmament to anirreversible shift from military tocivil production.

The end of the Cold War is,therefore, the saddest of historicalparadoxes. How was it possible forone of the most remarkabletransformations in history,resulting in internationaldisarmament and a Europeanpolitical reconstruction scarcelyimaginable only a few years earlier,to mutate into one of the mostrapid resurgences of military powerin history?

What should have been a goldenopportunity for comprehensiveconversion became a cynicalexercise in the management ofexpectations. Western leaders usedthe collapse of the Soviet Union as ameans of consolidating militarysupremacy. Perhaps most cynicalwas the attempt to portray thedisarmament programmes as a sea-change in international relations,when the long-term strategy wasalways to sustain, and if possible,enhance the capacity for globalmilitary reach against any potentialadversary, as planned before thisshocking and completelyunprovoked outbreak of peace.

Military expenditure was allowed todecline by a limited amount thatsustained the capacity forindigenous military productionwhile conversion consisted of somevery small regional aid andtechnology transfer packages.These were totally inadequate forthe scale of the redundanciesexperienced, but as with thedisarmament programme, gave theillusion of good intent. The maincharacteristics of this post ColdWar consolidation were thatmilitary R&D continued to dominategovernment research, andspecialised arms industriescontinued to benefit from multi-billion pound procurementprogrammes.

The first Gulf War and theinterventions in the formerYugoslavia may have been used aslegitimation for grossly inflatedarms budgets, followed, morerecently by the threat from roguestates and international terrorism.But what they really signify is theessence of Western militarism,refined through the Cold War andcarried on into the new millennium- the power of the exaggeratedthreat and the manipulation of fearand anxiety. Given the popularexpectation of a major peacedividend, this strategy has beenremarkably successful, not justtemporarily deflecting those hopesbut permanently de-railing them bymaking them look totallyunrealistic in a world of spectresand demons.

The end of the Cold War is,therefore, the saddest of historicalparadoxes. How was it possible for

one of the most remarkabletransformations in history, resulting in

international disarmament and aEuropean political reconstruction

scarcely imaginable only a few yearsearlier, to mutate into one of the

most rapid resurgences ofmilitary power in history?


The UK Military Industrial Baseand Arms Conversion

Chapter four

IntroductionIn this chapter, the UK context forarms conversion is brought up todate by analysing the trends inmilitary restructuring andemployment since the end of theCold War. Significant has been theconsolidation around BAE Systems,the acknowledged ‘nationalchampion’ of UK armsprocurement, large-scaleredundancies, and rationalisation ofcapacity. The future of the militaryindustrial base is related to theMoD’s recently published DefenceIndustrial Strategy (DIS) thatprovides a longer-term perspectiveon government’s plans, as well asthe recent decision to replace theTrident ballistic missile system. TheDIS is contrasted with alternativesecurity policies around non-offensive defence and peacekeepingand how this would relate to acontemporary agenda forconversion.

Options for ChangeThe UK’s major strategic responseto the end of the Cold War was the‘Options for Change’ review,published in 1993.30

Acknowledging that the collapse ofthe former Soviet Union and theWarsaw Pact had brought an end tothe Cold War and to the militaryconfrontation in central Europe, thereview came to several mainconclusions on the restructuring ofarmed forces, with overallmanpower down by 18% and asimilar reduction in militaryexpenditure. Most significant wasthe sharp reduction in UK forcesdeployed in Germany, particularlytank regiments, that were no longerseen as necessary with the re-unification of Germany and theremoval of Soviet forces.

But the government continued withvirtually all the major programmesplanned prior to the end of theCold War, including the Eurofighteraircraft, conventional nuclearsubmarines and attack helicopters,albeit at reduced numbers. Also, thegovernment maintained its networkof military R&D institutions andworked closely with the majormanufacturers on the developmentof the next generation of weaponsfor offensive operations.

Fundamentally, both theConservative government (andsubsequently the Labourgovernment from 1997) wanted toretain influence with the UnitedStates as the sole remaining globalmilitary power. The significance ofOptions for Change, therefore, liesnot in the minor reductions to forceand equipment numbers but in theretention of equipment such asaircraft carriers, nuclearsubmarines and long-range fighteraircraft, seen as essential for theoffensive capabilities necessary as acontribution to US powerprojection. This remains theoverriding objective of UK militarydoctrine up to the present day andinto the foreseeable future:

The programme for the JointStrike Fighter and the futurecarriers together make up theprincipal components of theproposed carrier task force. Thatin turn is at the heart of theArmed Forces expeditionaryambitions, and the MoD’sprimary goal for large-scaleoperations, of maximizing itsinfluence in US-led operations.31

Vesta’s wind-turbine factory in Campbeltown, Scotland.

September 2004© Greenpeace / Kate Davison


The response of the major armscompanies was to accelerate theprocesses of consolidation andinternationalization that werealready well underway in the 1980sas they looked for newopportunities in global markets. Asa result, there emerged some verylarge military corporations thatcould be defined both as ‘nationalchampions’ having gainedmonopoly power over domesticmilitary procurement, and asinternational conglomerates withextensive links, either by ownershipor alliances, into other majormarkets.

In the UK, both British Aerospaceand GEC carried through aggressiveacquisition programmes during the1990s. BAE Systems (as it becameknown) finally bought out GEC’smilitary divisions in 1999 for £6billion, to become the dominantforce in UK procurement witheffective monopoly power in fighteraircraft, submarines andwarships.32 Although a littlesmaller than the American giantsLockheed, Boeing and Northrup,BAE Systems has acquired severalUS military companies, includingthe most recent, United Defense,for $4 billion, elevating thecompany as the sixth largest USDepartment of Defense (DoD)contractor.33 BAE also pursues anaggressive arms export policy,including the long-running andhighly controversial Al Yamamhacontract, with Saudi Arabia. Thefirst sales occurred in September1985 and the most recent contractfor 72 Typhoon fighter aircraft wassigned in August 2006.34 It is nowthe world’s fourth-largest militarycontractor.35

A similar process has occurredelsewhere in Europe with theemergence of the Franco-Germanaerospace company EADS,combining the French companiesAerospatiale and Matra with theGerman company DASA, and nowalso incorporating CASA of Spainand Finmeccania of Italy. AnotherFrench-based company, THALES(formerly Thomson CSF) tookcontrol of Plessey’s militaryelectronics business and is now amajor contractor in the UK.

Many of these giant corporationshave both civil and militarycapacities. However, even whereproduction is in the same sector,the civil and military divisionsoperate as separate entities, andthere is very little sharing ofresources given the very differentdemands and specifications ofmilitary compared to civil work.

Below this level of giantcorporations there is a largenetwork of subcontractors who playan important role in the productionchain, providing key subsystems,like aircraft engines, sonar systems,etc. Many are themselvessubsidiaries of the largercompanies but there are also majorindependent companies like RollsRoyce (aircraft engines and nuclearpower plant). However, it becomesincreasingly difficult to track thecontent and value of subcontractorwork further down the supplychain, and many companies maywell be unaware of the ultimatedestination of components.

This industrial consolidation andrationalisation accelerated thedecline in both direct and indirectmilitary-industry employment.According to the MoD’s figures,overall defence employment was510,000 in 1991/2 and declined to260,000 in 2003/4.36 Of these170,000 jobs were dependent ondomestic military equipmentexpenditure and 90,000 dependenton arms exports. In the context ofoverall employment in the UK, then,arms employment is very small. Itis concentrated in specializedsectors of the UK manufacturingbase, particularly in aerospace,shipbuilding and electronics.37

Regional distribution of defence-related employment appears tofavour the South East and the SouthWest, though there are significantobstacles to accuratemeasurement.38 Historically, keysites were also developed that wereless vulnerable to air attack frommainland Europe with importantconcentrations in the South Westaround Yeovil, (helicopterproduction), Bristol (aerospace) andthe North West (fighter aircraft andsubmarines).

According to theMoD’s figures,overall defence

employment was510,000 in 1991-02

and declined to260,000 in 2003-04.

Of these 170,000jobs were dependenton domestic military

equipmentexpenditure and

90,000 dependent onarms exports.


Research facilities are alsogeographically concentrated in theSouth East with two majororganisations, the Defence Scienceand Technology Laboratory (DSTL)under government ownership andQinetiq, the privatised element ofwhat was previously the DefenceEvaluation and Research Agency(DERA). DSTL employs about 3,000personnel, while Qinetiq employs9,000.39 The other significantemployer is the Atomic WeaponsResearch Establishment (AWRE)based at Aldersmaston andBurghfield (see below) and run by aprivate sector consortiumemploying 3,600 people. It isestimated that 40% of allgovernment R&D personnel areemployed by the MoD.40

Defence Industrial StrategyWhat future then for the armsindustry and employment in theUK? The MoD has recentlypublished a substantial report, theDefence Industrial Strategy, thatsets out its approach toprocurement and its relationshipwith industry. The report’s mainpurpose is to clarify what the MoDconsiders to be the essentialindustrial and technologicalcapabilities that it wants to seeretained in the UK, includingnuclear submarine and majorsurface vessel construction, fighteraircraft and attack helicopters. Italso trails an expectation ofreduced demand for new platformsand greater emphasis on upgradesand through-life maintenance ofequipment. Again, the overallcommitment to supporting the USmilitary strategy could not beclearer.41

In the light of these trends, furtherconsolidation must be expected.BAE Systems has sold its stake inthe Airbus consortium to fundfurther military acquisitions both inthe UK and in the United States. But there is no guarantee thatprivate sector companies, underpressure to maximise profits, willretain production work in the UK.There may well be moves to takethis ‘offshore’ and in all likelihood,a continuation of the long-termdownward trend in employment.

The Trident NetworkThe Government announced inDecember 2006, through thepublication of a White Paper, itsintention to order a new fleet ofreplacement submarines to theexisting Vanguard-class at theearliest opportunity. It alsoannounced a debate and vote in theHouse of Commons in March 2007,though it is still unclear what formthis vote will take.

The main argument, even amongthose who support the UK’s ballisticmissile system, centres on whetherthere is a need to make an earlydecision, or whether the existingfleet’s life can be extended and thedecision delayed. Radicalalternatives involve withdrawingthe existing submarines from patrolwhile taking a pro-active role innuclear disarmament and non-proliferation negotiations thatmake replacement unnecessary.42

There are close parallels to theprevious decision to replaceBritain’s nuclear force, made by theConservative government in 1980.While the government was at painsto deny that any final decision hadbeen made, much preparatory workwas underway to ensure that theUK had the industrial andtechnological capabilities forbuilding and maintaining a newgeneration of ballistic missilesubmarines.

A Trident submarine is escorted out to sea from Barow Photo: Bob Straughton


A crucial consideration at that timewas the US’ probable upgrade fromthe existing Trident C4 ballisticmissile to the newer and largerTrident II D5. Because of the UK’stotal dependency on US missiletechnology, it was essential to planfor larger submarines even thoughno official statement had beenmade:

I think we have to say that asshipbuilders even though wehave not been asked the questionby the Ministry of Defence wesimply must look to thepossibility that we might becalled upon to build a submarineto take on board the mostadvanced missile system whichwould be available at the time.That is why in our thinking wetake a 12,000 ton boat and aTrident II system.43

The fact that Dr Kinloch, fromBritish Shipbuilders, felt compelledto deny that the MoD had specifiedthe expected submarine size, eventhough the D5 programme was welladvanced, speaks volumes for theway that the government handledthe decision on Trident.

As a House of Commons DefenceCommittee report said at the time:

Parliament’s role in the decisionto procure a successor system toPolaris has been limited toendorsing a decision alreadytaken. Decisions on defence, andon Britain’s strategic nucleardeterrent have historically beentaken by a small elite of verysenior Cabinet Ministers, CivilServants, and Service Chiefs, andthis present decision was noexception…We urge, thereforethe present Government, andfuture Governments to takeParliament, the public, industryand the defence policyinstitutions more into itsconfidence in the future.44

In December 2006 the Governmentpromised a formal debate in theHouse of Commons and a vote inMarch 2007, but the fundamentalproblems of secrecy and elitedecision making remain familiar.

Similar preparatory work has beenunderway to ensure facilities areavailable for a new submarine-based system. These include a £1billion additional investmentprogramme at the AWRE, includinglaser equipment and ahydrodynamics facility to simulatenuclear warhead explosions, as wellas new facilities at the DevonportDockyard for the servicing ofballistic missile submarines at acost of £933 million.45

The Government argues that theseare simply general modernisationprogrammes required to managethe existing stockpile of nuclearwarheads or to support the fleet ofnuclear submarines. The patternfits that for the original Tridentprogramme: to argue that no finaldecision has been made but to haveeverything in place for the formalannouncement.

This demonstrates the utterdetermination on the part of thoseelite groups who have always heldthe power over decisions on nuclearweapons to ensure that the UK willbe in a position to construct a newgeneration of nuclear submarines,compatible with the US’ choice ofsubmarine-launched ballisticmissiles, and to do so at the earliestopportunity consistent with theinconvenience of a parliamentarydebate.

Trident Employment An enduring ritual of militaryprocurement is the ministerialannouncement of a new order,highlighting the thousands of jobsthat will be generated. Local MPsthen queue up to welcome theorder for bringing much-neededwork to their constituencies,despite the fact that militaryemployment has already beendecimated, that the trend continuesdownwards and that even multi-billion pound contracts only serveto secure existing employmentrather than create new jobs.Trident, it would seem, will be noexception.


Prior to the contracts for the firstgeneration Trident programme,initial estimates for employmentput the figures as high as 20,000direct and 25,000 indirect jobs. ButMoD reports during the 1980s onthe progress of Tridentconstruction consistently reducedthose figures until, by the mid1980s, they had declined to only7,000 direct and 9,000 indirectjobs.46 Contracts included theconstruction of the submarines atBarrow, and the PWR 2 nuclearpropulsion plant built by RollsRoyce at Derby.

Although it is beyond the scope ofthis report and would require afuller analysis of the Tridentnetwork and employment at eachfacility, a reasonable assumptionwould be that the major capitalinvestment of recent years hasresulted in reduced demand forlabour and that employmentgenerated now will be at muchlower levels, possibly between 5,000and 8,000 people nationwide for theperiod of construction.

If Trident’s replacement is delayedthere would be strong pressure tomaintain this military-industrialnetwork, mainly through theconstruction of extra, conventionalnuclear submarines. A significantlywide constituency sees this as theideal solution to the dilemma ofemployment impacts.

Non-Offensive Defence PolicyHere, we come to the crux of theproblem facing the UK over thefuture of its military-industrialbase. As long as governmentdoctrine locks UK defence andindustrial policy into servingBritain’s position as a significantbut dependent military ally of theUnited States, then the country willcontinue with a specialised armsindustry constructing hugelyexpensive military platforms. Evenif Trident were not replaced, theexpectation of the UK’s military-industrial network would be for alarger programme of conventionalnuclear submarines ascompensation, which could then belegitimized as a contribution to theprotection of aircraft carrier groups.

The issue of Britain’s nuclearposture is of secondary importanceto its overall approach to securityand its relationship to the UnitedStates. A Non-Offensive Defence(NoD) policy is one option that callsfor a total re-alignment of UKmilitary forces in order to carry outtwo main tasks - territorialprotection of the UK mainland andinternational peacekeeping. Thecountry would rely much more oncoastal defences built on patrolvessels, early warning aircraft andsurface-to-air missiles. Anyinternational role would be througha United Nations peacekeepingmandate and as part of a broaderpeacekeeping force, ideally throughan EU peacekeeping corps withexpertise in both militarystabilisation and civilreconstruction.47

Clearly, the implications for therestructuring of the armed forcesand military industries would beserious in that much out-of-areaequipment including aircraftcarriers and nuclear submarineswould no longer be required. Otherlong-range forces would be neededfor peacekeeping activities but atmuch-reduced levels. Theopportunity would then exist torationalise the European armsindustries with consequent savingsof significant proportion, retainingsome specialist capacity that couldsatisfy a non-offensive securitypolicy and utilising the broaderEuropean civil technology andmanufacturing base for lessspecialist equipment.

For example, a case could be madefor a small fleet of conventionaldiesel-electric, coastal patrol,submarines for territorial defence.The German company, HDW hasexperience of this work and couldbe expected to carry out theprogramme, while other excessnaval submarine capacity in the EU,especially the UK and Frenchnuclear submarine facilities, isclosed down.48

Decline of shipyard employment in Barrow, 1990 - 2006


The cumulative UK savings onequipment expenditure for a smallnumber of offensive militaryplatforms would be in the region of£3-4 billion a year by 2015(representing around half thedefence equipment procurementbudget), accepting cancellationcosts on some orders presently inthe early stages of production.These resources could be allocatedto peacekeeping andreconstruction, governmentspending elsewhere, or reducedoverall government spend. Theycould represent significantinvestment potential for alternativecivilian projects applying theappropriate skills freed up.

Military industries would be facedwith further cuts in capacity andemployment could decline byapproximately 100,000 jobs overthe next five years, including 4,000to 5,000 staff at the militaryresearch laboratories. Given thetimescale, and the relatively smallnumber of job losses, theadjustment would be manageable,especially for those in relativelyprosperous regions wherealternative work is more likely to beavailable. The transfer ofinvestment and skills elsewhere inthe economy could lead to greaternumbers of jobs.49 Only in a fewlocal economies that rely heavily onmilitary work will there be seriousdisruption and even here, assumingeffective regeneration andretraining programmes, theprospects in the medium to longterm are positive.

ConclusionThe British state has been nothingif not consistent in maintaining theindustrial capacity for long-range,offensive weapons, even thoughsuch capabilities are irrelevant tothe defence of Britain and its armedforces have been relegated to therole of a minor appendage to the USmilitary.

Given the extraordinary costs ofentry and exit into militaryprocurement, the industrial andtechnological consequences havealso been fairly predictable, withthe emergence of BAE Systems,through rationalisation andconsolidation, as the UK monopolyproducer for many of theseoffensive platforms.

Under a NoD policy there would bea fundamental change of directionsignalling the UK’s intention tofulfill its internationalresponsibilities through a EUpeacekeeping and civilreconstruction corps while at thesame time leading a renewed effortat disarmament and armsconversion. Trident’s replacementand most of the major offensivesystems like the new JSF fighteraircraft, aircraft carriers andconventional nuclear submarineswould also be cancelled, along withmajor reductions in military R&D.

The loss of 100,000 jobs in thearms industries over a five-yearperiod would be a relatively minoradjustment in the context of thenational economy and where manyjobs are based in relativelyprosperous regions and demand,particularly for skilled workers, ishigh. There would be real short-term difficulties in those few ‘hotspots’ of local dependency onmilitary procurement in lessprosperous regional economies, likeYeovil in Somerset, and Barrow inCumbria but support is availablefor regeneration programmes inthese areas.

Approximately £3-4 billion a year ofsavings on military expenditurewould be available for investmentin a comprehensive conversionprogramme by 2015, depending onthe level of other peacekeeping andreconstruction commitments, toinvest in new areas of civiltechnology and manufacturing,including marine-based renewableenergy that offer the prospects ofsignificant new employment.

Under a NoD policythere would be a

fundamental changeof direction signallingthe UK’s intention to

fulfill its internationalresponsibilitiesthrough a EU

peacekeeping andcivil reconstructioncorps while at the

same time leading arenewed effort atdisarmament andarms conversion.


Chapter fiveAlternative TechnologicalTrajectories and Arms Conversion

Early Years of Funding forRenewable Energy in the UKSerious interest in renewables canbe traced back to the energy crisisof 1974, when the Organisation ofPetroleum Exporting Countries(OPEC) cartel raised oil prices andthe government sought alternativeenergy sources. In 1976, theDepartment of Energy published areview that identified wave poweras the most attractive of therenewable options, possiblymeeting half of all the UK’s energyneeds through a major constructionprogramme. Availability was highand would correspond withpatterns of demand:

[Wave power] is worth pursuingbecause it offers the prize of asubstantial contribution to ourenergy supplies from arenewable, non-polluting,indigenous resource.50

Funding and evaluation werecarried out through a relativelysmall government research body,the Energy Technology Support Unit(ETSU). From the mid 1970s to theearly 1980s wave power received atotal of £17 million of funding, thelion’s share of overall renewablesfunding but still very small incomparison to nuclear power; in1980 alone the government spent£340 million on nuclear research.51

Early working prototypes wereevaluated but very demandingcriteria were set for continuedsupport, based on constructing alarge-scale, offshore wave energystation capable of generating twoGigawatts of power, similar in scaleto a conventional power station,and achieving cost competitivenesswith existing energy sources in theregion of 4.5 – 5.5 pence per kwh.

IntroductionArms conversion researchpresented a radical case for linkingdisarmament to national economicrenewal, utilising scarcegovernment funding and R&Dsupport for new priorities such asrenewable energy andenvironmental technologies.Marine-based renewables, asadvocated in the original ‘Oceans ofWork’, could have made asubstantial contribution to the UK’soverall energy supply by the end ofthe 1990s but, despite considerableinterest in early forms of wave andwind power, the government’slimited support was effectivelyended in the early 1980s in favourof nuclear research.

This goes to the heart of thedilemma facing arms conversion,because it demonstrates howchoices over technological options,and what effectively becomenational technological andindustrial trajectories, are deeplycontested terrain. Key institutionsand networks can have a decisiveinfluence in setting the terms bywhich one set of technologicalchoices is prioritised and others aremarginalised or closed off.

The legacy of those decisions iswith us today, not only in the lostopportunity for a much largerindigenous renewable energysector, with employment andexport benefits, but also throughthe continued support fordisastrous nuclear projects like theTHORP programme, theconstruction of another generationof nuclear power stations andresearch on nuclear fusion. Theissue, therefore, is not just one ofthe redirection of funding but thecreation of a new set ofinstitutional relationships for long-term, civil R&D and investment.

Off-shore turbines Photo: Greenpeace / Kate Davison


Initial assessments by ETSUsuggested that the wave powerprototypes generated electricity at20p per kwh, and it concluded thatthe economic prospects for large-scale offshore wave energy werepoor compared with otherrenewables. Government supportwas abruptly cut back in 1982.52

Although land-based wind powerwas rated as having some potentialand tidal power had longer-termprospects, the general perceptionleft from this early period ofresearch was that renewables werenot cost effective and would nevercontribute a large proportion of theUK’s energy needs. This hung like ashroud over UK-based renewableenergy for the following ten tofifteen years.

The role of ETSU came undergrowing criticism, especially fromthe advocates of wave power. It wasbased at Harwell, the home of theAtomic Energy Authority (AEA) andthe heart of research on nuclearpower.53 While ostensiblyindependent, concerns were raisedthat ETSU had a strong institutionalbias towards nuclear power. Theuse of crude cost estimates forwave power, using data from first-generation prototypes that took noaccount of the potential forinnovation and efficiencyimprovements in subsequentdevelopment work, only heightenedsuspicions. Certainly, there were nosimilar, stringent cost criteria forthe major nuclear researchprogrammes on fast breederreactors and nuclear fusion at suchearly stages in their development.54

There was some supportive analysisfrom ETSU scientists andencouragement to prototypedesigners right up to the time thatfunding was cut, suggesting thatthere was a real debate within theorganisation and some measure ofinternal conflict. However, keypeople, with decision-makingpowers over both nuclear andrenewable funding seemed to viewthe two, not as complementary, butas competitive technologies.

At a time of growing concernsabout the safety and viability ofnuclear power, the over-ridingpriority would seem to have been tosecure government support for arange of controversial nuclearprogrammes. If renewables gained,not just a foothold, but a platformfrom which to launch a crediblecase for large-scale investment, thefuture of nuclear energy fundingmight be jeopardized and this wassimply unacceptable.55

The evaluation criteria by whichwave power and other renewableswere rejected appears to confirm aninstitutional strategy for securingnuclear power against a potentialthreat. Certainly, during the 1990sthere was a growing critique of theframework for decision-making onenergy research and the House ofCommons Science and TechnologyCommittee called for a re-assessment of support forrenewables. A consensus of opinionemerged that wave power had beenunfairly treated, that it couldsatisfy a large proportion ofdomestic demand and that a majorindustry could be developed withexport markets worth up to £500billion:

Given the UK’s abundant naturalwave and tidal resources, it isextremely regrettable andsurprising that the developmentof wave and tidal energytechnologies has received so littlesupport from the Government.56

Denmark and Wind PowerOther countries viewed thepotential for renewables verydifferently. Denmark had alreadydecided, through a nationalreferendum, that nuclear powerwould play no part in its futureenergy supply. Instead, the countrywould maximise the potential forrenewables, especially wind power,in which it had an abundance ofpotential onshore and offshoresites. Ambitious targets were set tohave in place sufficient capacity tosupply a quarter of the country’senergy needs over a twenty-yeartimescale.57

Off-shore turbines Photo: Greenpeace / Kate Davison


Relatively small prototypes weretested to see which designsachieved the best results forreliability, and incentives weremade for further developmentincluding guaranteed connection tothe national grid. An importantfeature of this early phase wascommunity ownership, with localgroups taking shares in new windfarm development. An enthusiasticgroup of practitioners workedclosely with designers to provide aconstant feedback loop onperformance, technical problemsand suggestions forimprovements.58

As a result of this pioneering work,refinements were made to the bestdesigns that allowed for largeronshore and offshore wind powergenerators, easily satisfying theoriginal target for national energysupply. The Danish wind powerindustry is now the world’s largestand 90% of the wind turbinesmanufactured in Denmark are foroverseas customers. In 2003, theDanish manufacturers had a totalworld market share ofapproximately 38%, generating acombined turnover of almost 3billion Euros and providingemployment to over 20,000 people,from wind turbine factories tomaintenance and research.59

Of course, there was no guaranteethat support would lead tosuccessful development. The USDepartment of Energy programmefor wind power was very generousbut focused on a design by BoeingAerospace for a massive turbinecapable of generating 2.5 MW ofpower. The prototype was plaguedby technical difficulties centred onthe stresses on its giant blades andwas finally abandoned in 1985.These sorts of problems, intransposing complex systemsengineering from large aerospaceand military platforms to civilengineering projects with verydifferent specifications, wereidentified in much of the armsconversion literature.60

In comparison, Denmark utilised aclassic model of civil technologicaldevelopment. Relatively small scale,first-generation prototypes werebuilt and lessons learnt, newentrants added further innovationsthat improved on performance,bringing costs down and paving theway for major investment in thepresent generation of much largerturbines for onshore and,increasingly, offshore wind farms.Once a critical mass of productionhas been reached, it stimulates awhole series of what could bedescribed as third generationinnovations with ripple effectsbeyond the original technology.

For example, now that wind powerhas grown to become a mature andessential element of energy supply,a focus of technologicaldevelopment is on the variability ofweather conditions and how toensure a consistent source ofpower. One possible solutioncentres on storage, whereby aproportion of renewable energywould, through the electrolyzing ofwater, produce hydrogen that canbe transported by pipeline to powerstations in liquid (or gas) form to beutilised as a secondary supply, oreven, potentially, be used fortransport applications. Suchinnovations could be applied toother forms of renewables, likewave power, and even open up theprospect of a radical restructuringtowards a system of local powerdistribution. This could providedramatic savings on much of thepower lost in long-distancetransmission through the nationalgrid.61

The UK and THORPNuclear power continued to distortdevelopment priorities in the UK inthis period, itself built on thestate’s military requirement forplutonium. The grand vision of thenuclear establishment was a‘plutonium economy’, fuelling anew generation of fast breederreactors that would supply thelion’s share of the UK’s energyneeds, followed ultimately by theholy-grail itself, nuclear fusion withthe tantalising prospect of limitlessand pollution-free power.62

The Danish windpower industry isnow the world’s

largest and 90% ofthe wind turbinesmanufactured inDenmark are for

overseas customers.In 2003, the Danishmanufacturers had

a total worldmarket share ofapproximately

38%...


Originally, nuclear power stationshad been constructed simply toprovide plutonium for the UK’snuclear weapons. Intermittently,they were connected into thenational grid. As the civil nuclearpower industry developed duringthe 1960s and 1970s, the UK lookedto take advantage of this experiencethrough the reprocessing ofplutonium, considered to havemajor export potential.

Several other countries with civilnuclear programmes were buildingup stocks of material from whichplutonium could be extracted, andthis reprocessed plutonium was tobe used in a future generation offast breeder reactors that wereexpected to dominate nuclearpower generation by the end of thecentury. Contracts to reprocess1500 tonnes of oxide fuel had beennegotiated with Japan andGermany, amongst others, and theThermal Oxide Reprocessing Plant(THORP) was to be built atWindscale, in Cumbria, by BritishNuclear Fuels Limited (BNFL) tocarry out this programme at anestimated cost of £1.2 billion. Thiswould be an enormous industrialundertaking, expected to employ7,000 people during constructionand over 3,000 when operational inthe early 1990s.63

Even at this early stage the THORPplant was proving controversial,with concerns that alternatives suchas dry storage of plutonium werenot being given properconsideration, that the demand forplutonium was exaggerated andthat its transportation involvedserious dangers, particularly oftheft or diversion into military uses.

The Windscale Inquiry wasundertaken in the mid 1970s toconsider these issues and to advisethe government on future options.Essentially, it accepted theeconomic rationale put forward byBNFL that new supplies ofplutonium would be required for aUK fast breeder reactor programmeand that alternatives like drystorage were technically untestedand unattractive.64

Construction went ahead during the1980s but the economicjustification proved illusory. No fastbreeder reactors were built in theUK because of severe technicaldifficulties and concerns oversafety, and the fast breeder reactorprogramme was officially cancelledin 1993 on technical and costgrounds.65 Similar problems werebeing experienced abroad andTHORP’s foreign customers weredesperately trying to extricatethemselves from their originalcontracts for plutoniumreprocessing.

As William Walker concluded in hiswidely aclaimed study of THORP:

One of Britain’s largest facilitieswas being turned on to provideplutonium that was no longerneeded or wanted, and whosestockpiling was considered bymany to endanger internationalsecurity.66

Yet, despite these circumstancesand a final parliamentary debate toreconsider this decision in 1994 inthe light of these changingcircumstances, a final decision wasmade to make the plantoperational. By now the rationalehad moved from reprocessing forfast breeders to adding plutoniuminto fuel for conventional reactors.BNFL constructed a Mixed OxideFuel (MOX) facility adjacent toTHORP at a cost of £300 million,which was completed in 1996.67

Since becoming operational THORPhas experienced a series oftechnical problems, the mostserious being in May 2005 when asubstantial leakage of radioactivespent fuel led to the plant’s closurefor two years. The plant is now wellbehind its schedule forreprocessing.68

Since becomingoperational THORPhas experienced aseries of technicalproblems, the most

serious being inMay 2005 when a

substantial leakageof radioactive spentfuel led to closurefor over a year.

Sunset at Sellafield, home ofThorpe

Photo: © Greenpeace / Rezac


Contemporary PolicySo where does this leave us interms of energy policy? The LabourGovernment has recently showngreater interest in supportingrenewable energy as part of itsoverall commitment to reducingcarbon emissions and securingalternative sources of energy to oiland gas imports. The renewablesobligation on energy suppliers hasset a target of 10% of total supplyby 2010, although the contributionhas only grown to 5% at presentand there is concern the target willnot be met. Also, land-based windfarms, the primary focus fordevelopment, have provedcontentious for their local impact.Larger, offshore wind farms arenow coming on stream. TheGovernment has just given the go-ahead for the world’s largest off-shore wind farm to be sited withinthe outer Thames Estuary, knownas the London Array.69

Wave power is undeveloped, withsmall pilots on remoter islandcommunities, including anOscillating Water Column (OWC) onthe Scottish island of Islay.

The most important demonstratorprogramme is the 750 kW Pelamisinstallation that the Edinburgh-based company, Ocean PowerDelivery, is testing. The variablemotion of the wave is used to pumphigh-pressure fluid to hydraulicmotors, driving electricalgenerators that produce power,which, in turn is fed by cable to theshore and into the grid. Thecompany recently announced anorder with the PortugueseGovernment for three machines inwhat is intended to become a 2.25MW wave energy farm off the northcoast of Portugal, and it is alsotesting a ‘wave hub’ scheme off StIves Bay in Cornwall.70

The UK Government has alsoincreased R&D support to wavepower as part of its overall supportfor renewables. But the majority ofenergy funding still remains withnuclear fusion at £52 million in2003/04 compared to renewablesas £23 million.71

Overall energy R&D support had, infact, declined because the cuts inother nuclear research were notmatched by increases forrenewables but the government hasrecently announced a new initiativeto support a broad range of energyresearch with increased fundingthrough a public/privatepartnership.72

The nuclear option is now firmlyback on the agenda, with thegovernment arguing that there is agap in energy supply because ofincreased demand and the phasingout of older coal and nuclear powerstations. According to this view,nuclear is essential in helping to fillthis gap, while also providingenhanced security of supply, andcontributing to the UK’s carbonreduction targets. The projectionsare for up to ten nuclear powerstations providing up to 25% oftotal supplies by 2030.73

This is a remarkable turnaround, asit was only in 2003 that a previousenergy review had rejected thenuclear option as commerciallyunattractive because of seriousuncertainties about total costs,decommissioning and insuranceliabilities.74 Norshould a nuclearbuild programmebe seen as astopgap measureto help tackleglobal warmingwhile otherrenewabletechnologiescome on stream.The vision of anuclear future isstill very muchalive through acombination offuturegenerations ofconventionalfission plantsand ultimatelyfusion power. Bycontrast, wavepower is stillseen as marginal.

A wave-power plant on the Island of Pico in the Azures.

The power rating for this plant is about 600 kW.

The impacts of climatechange are being felt acrossthe world, particularly in the

poorest countries


A War on Global WarmingThe scientific evidence is now veryclear that the threat from globalwarming is greater and morepressing than first considered andthat the original targets forreductions in emissions ofgreenhouse gasses set out ininternational agreements are totallyinadequate.

For example, Sir Martin Rees,President of the Royal Society,expressed dismay at the G8 leaders’“worrisome lack of determination”to accelerate development of newenergy sources, given the expected50% rise in the world’s energyneeds - and carbon dioxideemissions - in the next 25 years andcalled for a co-coordinatedprogramme of research onalternative energy sources. Helikened the scientific challenge tothat posed by the scale of theApollo or Manhattan projects andwarned that if action was not takenin the next five to ten years it maynot be possible to stabilize andreduce carbon emissions, and thatthe planet faced catastrophicclimate change.75

In this context, the UK has thecapacity to substantially increaseits use of renewables as part of acoordinated national programmeincluding energy conservation andalternative fuels for transport,which aims to reduce carbonemissions by 60% by 2030 andeliminate them in a post-carboneconomy by 2050. Investment inoffshore renewables and into newforms of hydrogen storage andtransmission networks would beintegral to that new framework.

ConclusionThe UK effectively abandonedresearch in the early 1980s on anindigenous offshore renewableenergy industry that had thepotential to satisfy much of ouroverall energy needs by thebeginning of this decade, as well ascreate thousands of engineeringand construction jobs and a vibrantexport market. Instead, it continuedwith the THORP reprocessing plant,one of the biggest industrial whiteelephants ever seen, and continuesresearch on nuclear fusiondependent upon an illusion ofunlimited power at someindeterminate time in the distantfuture.

Is it over-simplistic to compare thetwo sets of choices: one forrelatively small amounts ofdevelopmental funding in infantbut diverse and highly promisingtechnologies; the other for largeprojects in a mature sector wherethe UK was seen as a leadingplayer? At the level of scale, theanswer is, of course, yes. But interms of the processes ofengagement and disengagement,these radically differentexperiences tell us a great dealabout the role of the state and keyinstitutional networks in framingtechnological options.

THORP was the apotheosis of theUK’s energy policy. Largeinvestments had been made by thegovernment in various forms ofnuclear power and much politicalcapital and credibility rested on themaintenance of the nuclear option.The value of this comparison is inhighlighting how technologicaldecision-making is bounded byinstitutional influences includingsenior politicians, representativesof the nuclear industry, key civilservants such as those in theDepartment of Energy and theMinistry of Defence, and supportivenetworks of trade unions and localMPs with vested interests inTHORP’s continuation.


The rigged terms of referenceallowed it to survive a publicinquiry, a growing body ofopposition during the 1980s as thefast-breeder dream dissolved, andthe increasingly desperate attemptsof its main customers to extricatethemselves from their contracts. Nosuch institutional support existedfor wave power. A core group ofdecision makers saw renewableenergy not as complementary tonuclear but as a potentially directcompetitor for limited sources ofR&D funding and, therefore, set theevaluation criteria in such a way asto guarantee failure.

Denmark’s alternative technologicalroute demonstrates the vitalimportance of political leadershipin setting clear priorities. Byrejecting nuclear power andemphasising the role of windpower, the country was set on atrain of development that resultedin a vibrant new industry, satisfyingthe domestic market and becomingthe leading international exporter.The use of relatively simpleprototypes and a feedback loop oftesting, evaluation and innovationled to constant improvements, andlarger turbines for offshore power.All this within 10-15 years of theoriginal government support. NowDenmark generates 20% of itselectricity from wind turbines andplans to increase this to 40% by2030.

Germany, also, is intending tosupply 10 GW through offshorewind by 2030 - 25% of its overallsupply.76

There is no reason, given the scaleof potential capacity that the UKenjoys, why the Government couldnot aim for at least 50% of energysupply from offshore wave andwind power by 2030. This wouldinvolve a multi-billion technologicaland industrial investment but it isan entirely feasible one in thecontext of an arms conversionprogramme, where funds weremade directly available from thesavings in military expenditure overthe next twenty years. Theindustrial and employment benefitswould also be significant both fromthe domestic programme andpotential exports and would morethan compensate for the loss ofemployment in the arms industries.

In the context of support for otherrenewables such as roof-based solarphotovoltaics and energy efficiencyprogrammes for housing, the needfor nuclear power and fusionresearch would be eliminated, whilethe UK could work towards the newtarget of eliminating carbonemissions by 2050. This would be asignificant contribution that the UKcould make to international effortsat climate control.

There is noreason, given thescale of potentialcapacity that theUK enjoys, whythe Government

could not aim for50% of energysupply from

offshore waveand wind power

by 2030.

The Devonshire Dock Hall onBarrow Island is the main UK

submarine factory today


Barrow-in-Furness and theClosure of the Shipyard

IntroductionBarrow-in-Furness, despite large-scale redundancies at the shipyard,still represents one of the mostmilitary-dependent local economiesin the UK. Attempts at attractingnew industries into the area havemet with limited success, levels ofsocial and economic deprivationremain high and a local consensusexists that the prosperity of thetown and the district rests onsecuring future nuclear submarineorders – its ‘specialist niche’.

From a widerperspective, thecancellation of allnuclear submarineproduction wouldbe a welcomesignal that the UKwas fundamentallyreforming itssecurity policy,while savingbillions of poundson uselessweapons.Inevitably, thiswould lead to theclosure of the yardwith the loss ofseveral thousandjobs and asignificant localeconomic impact.The question thenis a simple one,does this act as acatalyst for changeto a normal,peacetime localeconomy,accepting thatthere will be aperiod of painfuladjustment, or willthe area try tocling onto thevestiges of formerglory?

Employment Decline — 1990-2006When Trident was in its peak ofproduction in the late 1980s andearly 1990s, the total workforcenumbered over 14,000. Theseexceptionally high levels could notbe maintained, but the combinationof capital investment in the newconstruction hall, reduced ordersfor nuclear submarines after the‘Options for Change’ review, andthe failure of the company to winany significant export orders fornaval vessels led to a steep decline,with employment down to 6,000 bythe mid 1990s.77

During this time VSEL saw twochanges of ownership, from thelocal management consortium thathad controlled the company sinceprivatisation in 1986, to GEC whichtook over the company in 1995 andfinally to British Aerospace, nowBAE Systems in 2000. Thesechanges reflect the broaderconsolidation of the UK militaryindustrial base and BAE’s effectivemonopoly power.

The initial GEC bid in 1994 wasreferred to the Monopolies andMergers Commission (MMC)because of concerns that thecompany’s ownership of the Yarrowshipyard in Glasgow, combinedwith the Barrow shipyard, wouldcreate a monopoly in navalshipbuilding and undermine theMoD’s competition policy. GEC wasactually bidding against VSEL for anuclear submarine contract, butargued that it could maintaincompetition after acquisition byoutsourcing much of the work. TheMoD was satisfied with thisarrangement, even if competitionmight have led to the closure of theBarrow yard.78

Chapter six

Tenements on Barrow islandPhoto: Bob Straughton


British Aerospace also opposed thetakeover of VSEL by GEC oncompetition grounds. Thosereservations of course disappearedby the time it took over GEC in2000 and secured its ownmonopoly position in UK militaryprocurement across many sectors.The company made it clear that theyard would be the main focus forits nuclear submarine design andbuild programmes, coupled tolarger surface vessel constructionshould MoD orders providesufficient workload.

But the process of job lossescontinued. The end of the Tridentbuild programme, compounded bysevere technical problems anddelays on the new generation ofAstute class nuclear submarines ledto a further hemorrhaging of jobsover the last four years withemployment now at 3,200, of which600 are design staff. The originalcontract for the first threesubmarines has increased from£2.5 billion to £3.5 billion and theGovernment has delayed anydecision on the next batch of up tofive while negotiations continuewith BAE on controlling costs.79

There are serious concerns thatwithout firm contracts for at leastanother three Astute Classsubmarines and, longer term, thefollow-on Trident ballistic missilesubmarines, there may be furthercutbacks in employment. But evenassuming a large order book fornuclear submarines, and some workon aircraft carrier sections andother naval support ships, there isno expectation that there will bemajor additions to employment atthe yard.

The Local Economic ContextWhat significance does the yardretain for the local economy, giventhat employment has declined byover 70% since the 1980s? At thattime a massive 40% of maleemployment in the district wasdependent on the yard but it is nowless than 20% with aproportionately smaller multipliereffect in terms of secondaryemployment generated by localexpenditure.80 However, though thedependency of the local economyon the shipyard has reduced, it stillrepresents by far the mostimportant employer in the Barrowdistrict, with relatively high wagesin a generally low-wage localeconomy, and contributes anestimated £70 million to localdemand.

This dependency has long beenrecognised as a weakness, withconsiderable efforts made by thelocal authority and FurnessEnterprise, the district’s economicdevelopment agency, to attract newindustries and employment. Barrowhas assisted-area status thatprovides grant funding for businessstart-ups and the development ofexisting businesses, and there hasalso been major investment toreclaim land for new industrialestates and business incubators.However, the record is patchy,especially in attracting largeremployers, and new jobs havetended to be on the low end of thepay scale in service sector worksuch as call centres.81

A view of Piel Castle and RoaIsland at the entrance to the

Walney Channel, BarrowPhoto: Bob Straughton


What is most striking, despite thepresence of the shipyard, is how thedistrict has consistently sufferedfrom levels of deprivation that aresome of the highest in the country.National comparison based on thegovernment’s Deprivation Indicesthat incorporate statisticalinformation includingunemployment, income, housingand education ranked Barrow as the29th most deprived local authorityout of 354 in England. Of the 13wards in Barrow borough, six,located mainly around the shipyard,are amongst the most deprived 10%in the country.82

The decline in employment at theyard, therefore, serves to highlightfundamental and long-standingweaknesses in the local economy.Not only has unemploymentremained higher than the nationalaverage, there is generalacknowledgment that many people,particularly older men whopreviously worked at the yard, haveregistered for incapacity benefit butwould otherwise have beenregistered unemployed. Takentogether, the overall total indicatesa very high level of unemploymentand inactivity at up to 14% of the39,000 workforce in the district.83

Most commentators ascribe theseunderlying problems to Barrow’srelative isolation and difficulttransport/communication links –‘the longest cul-de-sac in Britain’ –which is said to discouragepotential investors. The North WestRegional Development Agency isresponsible for coordinating muchof the regeneration funding butprovides rather confusing messagesabout the potential of the district.On the one hand, it has played acentral role in generating financialand institutional support that haveled to some large programmes,including the reclamation ofdockside land and other brownfieldsites for, potentially, large-scalecommercial and housingdevelopment. On the other, it basesmuch of the broader regionalstrategy on ‘city-regions’, where thelarger conurbations like Manchesterare seen to provide the critical massof service and manufacturingindustries that stimulate demandfor employment in adjoining areas.

This is hardly reassuring fordistricts like Barrow that lack thegeographical proximity to Liverpooland Manchester.84

Keep Our Future Afloat(KOFAC) or Getting theShipyard off Our Backs(GOSUB)In this context, it is not surprisingthat local leaders in Barrow, acrossthe political spectrum, see thecontinuation of nuclear submarinedesign and construction asessential to the future of thedistrict. A lobby group called ‘KeepOur Future Afloat Campaign’KOFAC has been set up, mainlythrough the trade unions butsupported by the local authorityand Furness Enterprise, amongothers. Its remit is to press thegovernment for assurances overfuture nuclear submarineprogrammes, and to make the casefor the yard to take a major role inthe construction of the two newaircraft carriers and other navalsupport vessels.85

Various arguments are raised aboutkeeping naval manufacturing skillsand design expertise in the UK,while providing a range ofapprenticeships for young workers.But the most potent argumentremains the capacity of the yard tosatisfy MoD requirements fornuclear submarines. In support ofthis, the Rand Corporation, a high-profile American think-tank oninternational security issues,produced a very detailed analysis offuture nuclear submarinerequirements.86

By any standards, this is a mostremarkable document, because inarguing the case that the MoD isbest served by providing a steadyordering pattern that sustainsproduction and design capacity inBarrow, the report maps out an‘ideal’ procurement schedule thatwill guarantee the yard design andproduction work over a thirty yeartimescale on no less than threegenerations of nuclear submarines:Astute, Trident and the MaritimeUnderwater Future Capability(MUFC).87

The decline inemployment at the

yard, therefore,serves to highlightfundamental and

long-standingweaknesses in thelocal economy...

Taken together, theoverall total

indicates a veryhigh level of

unemployment /inactivity at up to14% of the 39,000

working populationin the district.


Not content with a form of planningthat would be the envy of the SovietUnion’s Politburo, this bastion ofAmerican free-enterprise alsorecommends that the existingTrident fleet be run for a period of30-35 years (five to ten years longerthan originally envisaged) and itsreplacement be delayed. In thatway, a further five Astute-classnuclear submarines will take up thebase programme from 2010-2015,allowing a smooth transition toTrident and avoiding a bottleneckof work on both Astute and Tridentin the latter half of the next decade.Trident would then be the baseprogramme into the 2020s withMUFC set to follow in the late 2020sand early 2030s.

The local economic developmentagencies are also active in providingdirect funding to BAE to supportthe yard’s future naval work. ARegional Selective Assistance (RSA)grant of £250,000 was made to BAEto support a £2.5 millioninvestment in submarine assemblyequipment in 2004, along with atraining grant of £435,000 toupgrade design and manufacturingskills. Funding has also been madeavailable by the North WestRegional Development Agency tomaintain the Buccleuch Dock, whichis presently not in use, but has thefacilities for large-scale surfacevessel construction, in anticipationof future work on sections ofaircraft carriers that a BAEconsortium is due to construct. TheMoD, itself, has also recentlyannounced a £40 million fundingprogramme to maintain essentialnuclear design and productionskills, as part of its overall DefenceIndustrial Strategy for indigenouscapabilities. A proportion of thiswill be allocated to BAE for workersin Barrow.88

As things stand, therefore, the mainthrust of local economic policy, andstate funding through the DTI, theRDA and the MoD, is to focus onthe future of the yard.

Although this form of stateassistance to private sectorcompanies is not unusual, the factremains that BAE with £8 billionsales and an operating profit of£653 million in 2006 is benefitingfrom scarce forms of regenerationfunding that might be used forother more productive purposes,since its only objective at presentcan be to secure existing jobsrather than create new ones. Thisspeaks volumes for the perceiveddependency of Barrow on the yardand the leverage that BAE can bringto bear through the possibility ofdiverting work elsewhere orthrough the threat of furtherredundancies.

The simple fact is that the limitedsuccess at attracting new industriesunder the present pattern ofregeneration funding, coupled tothe dependency on BAE, is leavingfundamental weaknesses of thelocal economy unresolved, asevidenced by the high levels ofdeprivation. The key issue then isnot how to secure future nuclearsubmarine work, but on thecontrary, to construct an alternativeeconomic approach in which theyard has been closed down, and,after a period of adjustment, thedistrict can enjoy a new form ofsuccessful and balanced economicdevelopment.

The key issue thenis not how to secure

future nuclearsubmarine work,

but on the contrary,to construct an

alternativeeconomic approachin which the yardhas been closed

down, and, after aperiod of

adjustment, thedistrict can enjoy a

new form ofsuccessful and

balanced economicdevelopment.

The view of Barrow, from thevillage of Leece (about 2 miles

away) shows only thesubmarine-building hall and

the Victorian Town Hall ClockTower

Photo: Bob Straughton


An interesting approach is providedin a study sponsored by FurnessEnterprise that looked at levels ofdeprivation in the district andrelated this to the national policy ofrelocating civil service posts awayfrom London and the South East.The authors argued that Barrow, asan area of serious deprivation,should be considered a high-priority for relocation to providenew employment opportunities.Unfortunately, the present dispersalcarried out by central governmentdepartments shows very littlecorrelation to aiding deprived areas,with many functions beingrelocated to parts of the North thatare relatively affluent.89

The level of employment from civilservice relocation would not, initself, compensate for the loss ofjobs in the yard, either numericallyor in terms of a skills match formanufacturing workers. But theresearch illustrates how analternative strategy that builds newnetworks between centralgovernment, the local authority, theprivate sector and the localregeneration agencies can beindependent of the shipyard. In thiscase, the focus would be on thelarge number of unemployed andunder-employed people in thedistrict who are presentlymarginalised but who could benefitfrom new forms of service sectorwork, particularly if regenerationfunds were made available for long-term training programmes.

This would call for a new set ofpriorities. Without the shipyard’spresence there could be muchgreater sense of urgency totranslate these ideas for newemployment from theory intopractice. Certainly, if centralgovernment saw relocation as aviable option to an area normallyconsidered to be one of economicisolation, then other forms ofinvestment, particularly withgovernment grants available, aremore likely to gain support.

ConclusionEarlier this year an offshore windfarm, consisting of 30 turbinesgenerating 90 MW of electricity andlocated close to Barrow’s WalneyIsland, began providing power tothe national grid. This was apartnership between CentricaEnergy and Dong, the Danish stateelectricity company that wasresponsible for the construction ofthe turbines. As far as the Barroweconomy was concerned, becausethe prime contractor was Danishthe only benefit was a handful ofjobs in the contract for ongoingmaintenance. If anything couldsymbolise the yawning chasmbetween alternative futures for thedistrict it is the wind farm as asignpost to the new civil economyand the submarine constructionhall representing a dying militaryculture.

The closure of the Barrow shipyardmay be considered unthinkable bymany people in the local area butthat should not distract us fromlarger policy issues. Cancellingnuclear submarine production andclosing down specialistmanufacturing capacity that has noother utility would save the UK £50billion pounds in procurementcosts alone over the next 30 years(estimating the total costs on threeclasses of submarine) and releaseresources for a national conversionprogramme. Employment for arelatively small number of people inBarrow has to be weighed againstthose benefits.

The MoD itself has been preparedto countenance the possibility ofclosure, as long as nuclearsubmarine design and productioncapacity remained somewhere inthe UK. This was further illustratedby its decision to withdraw thecontract for servicing nuclearsubmarines from the RosythDockyard in Scotland and award itto the Devonport Dockyard inPlymouth, in the expectation ofsignificant savings, and despiteintense opposition from ScottishMPs and trade unions over the lossof several thousand jobs in the Fiferegion.

If anything couldsymbolise the

yawning chasmbetween alternative

futures for thedistrict it is thewind farm as a

signpost of the newcivil economy and

the submarineconstruction hallrepresenting adying military

culture.


There will, inevitably, be a massivelobbying exercise in Barrow topreserve military contracting andemployment and it would be easyto buckle under the pressure.Nothing could be more counter-productive and the governmentshould show as equaldetermination to follow through anew security policy as the MoD hasdone in pursuing its priorities inthe past.

Clarity and determination overpolicy might also help overcomethe local psychological barrier ofdealing with the closure of the yardand help to refocus attention on theunderlying problems of the area,namely its relative economicisolation, its consistent pattern ofdeprivation and low wages, and itslow priority in the context ofregional economic policy. The fact that a large proportion ofthe state funding available forregeneration has gone to preserveemployment, training and facilitiesat the yard is symptomatic of theselimited horizons, since the yard hasseen consistent decline in itsworkforce that is now at anhistorically low level.

A task force similar to thosebrought together for other majorredundancy exercises is needed,incorporating all the local interestgroups, economic agencies, and theRDA, along with centralgovernment departments, led bythe DTI and responsible formaximizing the benefits fromvarious sources of regenerationfunding. Instead of KOFAC, it couldbe called GOSUB (Getting theShipyard off our Backs) to signalthat, far from being a lament for adead industry, closure could be acatalyst for a new, and strongereconomy. This would include newservice sector and manufacturingemployment, tourism, therelocation of central governmentfunctions, and commercial andhousing development on reclaimeddockyard land. The release ofskilled manufacturing workers anddesigners from the yard might alsostimulate new offshore energy workgiven this supportive environment.

Although the immediate periodfollowing on from closure would,inevitably, result in a seriouseconomic downturn, the task forcecould ensure a rapid re-orientationof economic policy to these newpriorities and have sufficientresources from local, regional andcentral government to carrythrough a comprehensiveprogramme. After a five year periodof adjustment, it would bereasonable to expect a growing levelof overall employment and newopportunities, particularly for arange of people in the district who,historically, have been overlookedin the concentration on nuclearsubmarine production.

An aerial view of Barrow-in-Furness island showing the

large docks (the dark areas)


If conversion is defined as publicpolicy to irreversibly redirecteconomic effort currently focusedupon military production as aresult of previous governmentmilitary investment, then the lastsuccessful example in the UK was atthe end of the Second World War.Since 1990 we have witnessed theconsolidation of the armsindustries, the rationalisation ofcapacity, the loss of hundreds ofthousands of defence jobs and theclosure of factories. We have alsoseen the re-use of military bases,the retraining of redundantworkers, the transfer oftechnologies from military researchestablishments. All this occurred inspite of, rather than because of,government policy.

Throughout the post-war period,the British state has doneeverything within its power tomaintain a military-industrial basefor the research, development andproduction of high technologyweapons, spending hundreds ofbillions of pounds in the process.Nothing has been allowed to deflectfrom that policy, not even the endof the Cold War - the bestopportunity in fifty years to set anew framework for peace andinternational development.

The Gorbachev disarmamentagenda provided a key role for armsconversion in ending the scourge ofmodern war, by linkingdisarmament in the present, to thedismantling of the capacity toconstruct weapons in the future;this was based upon the recognitionthat the build up of armamentsitself contributes to internationaltension. Billions of pounds releasedin the form of a peace dividendcould have been available for acomprehensive conversionprogramme that put, at its highestpriority, civil R&D and productionfor sustainable development inwhich renewable energy played akey role.

Here, the visionary example of theLucas Plan, around the concept ofsocially-useful production, shouldbe acknowledged, because itanticipated the immense scale ofthe challenges facing theinternational community in areaslike energy and transport policy,and identified the capacity of thestate to redirect resources frommilitary to civil programmes giventhe political will to do so.

Climate change is widely recognisedas an emergency far greater thanany other we have faced. This is thereal war and it is one we are losing.Support is growing for anemergency programme of energyresearch on a scale not seen sincethe Manhattan project to rapidlyconstruct a post-carbon economy,with the objective of zero emissionsthrough renewable energy, energyefficiency programmes and therecycling of materials. But it isdifficult, if not impossible, to seehow sufficient resources will bemade available unless the majorindustrial powers co-ordinate aprogramme of arms conversion andsocially-useful production on aninternational scale.

Under a new drive for general andcomprehensive disarmament thereneeds to be a phased programme,beginning with the elimination ofnuclear weapons and all otherweapons of mass destruction,followed by the closure of foreignmilitary bases and the removal ofall long-range offensive weapons.Countries would be expected toabide by a strict UN Charter thatallowed only limited, non-offensiveforces for territorial defence and acontribution to internationalpeacekeeping. In the UK’s case thiswould best be achieved through aEU peacekeeping corps that had thecapacity both for militarystabilisation and post-conflictreconstruction.

Conclusion

A growing body ofscientific opinionrefers to globalwarming as anemergency far

greater than anyother we have faced.This is the real warand it is the one we

are losing.


A large proportion of armsmanufacturing capacity would beclosed down because it ischaracterised by what can bedescribed as ‘redundantcomplexity’ – none more so thanthe Barrow shipyard. It has no otherpurpose than to constructspecialised military equipment andits facilities cannot be converted tocivil use – the traditional model of‘swords into plowshares’ is nolonger applicable. Similarly, themilitary research establishmentsshould be contracted during thephased programme of disarmamentand staff relocated to existing ornewly established civil R&Dfacilities as demand for skilledtechnical and scientific staff wouldbe high. The UK could set up aregional research structure, as isthe case with the GermanFraunhofer research centres, usingthe opportunity to end the heavybias of military research funding tothe South East and stimulate a morebalanced approach through theRegional Development Agencies.

Over a ten year period the overallresources available for acomprehensive conversionprogramme would grow by £3-4billion a year for the UK alone,providing funds for new civil R&Dand manufacturing programmes.These would generate far moreemployment opportunities thanthose lost by the rationalisation ofthe military-industrial base.

A small number of military-dependent local economies likeBarrow-in-Furness face particulardifficulties when arms productionis ended. Unemployment can beexpected to rise in the short term,in areas already experiencing highlevels of deprivation and whereefforts to attract new industrieshave met with limited success. Butthis sort of dependency is rare andshould serve to remind people inthe district of a lesson painfullylearnt by others, that a specialistniche can become an economicnoose when circumstances change.

Even in Barrow, the level of militaryemployment has already declinedsubstantially from 14,000 to 3,000in the past 20 years. The realchallenge is to overcome thepsychological barrier and refocusregeneration funding so that itceases to be a prop for a dyingindustry but is used to support thediversification of the localeconomy. Lessons could be learntfrom task forces set up elsewhereto deal with industrial closures andlarge-scale job losses, in manycases, much larger than those to becarried out in Barrow.

Some may argue that this is abetrayal of the original campaign toprovide alternative work at VSEL.But the real lesson to emerge fromthe ‘Oceans of Work’ study is thatthe focus of conversion should notbe on military-industrial sites buton the institutional relationshipsthat encourage the successfuldevelopment of new civiltechnologies and industries. In thecase of wave power, identified as amajor option for marineengineering, it was precisely thelack of institutional support atcentral government level and theopposition of a powerful nuclearestablishment that led to itsdemise, and with it the opportunityfor new manufacturing work andemployment.

Walney Barrow off-shore windfarmPhoto: Bob Straughton


Comprehensive conversion, then,looks to match resources to civilpriorities for programmes thatcontribute to a new security agendaaround escalating resources for theresearch and production ofrenewable energy. There is noreason why the UK, like Denmark,could not utilise its huge reservoirof renewable energies to satisfy thebulk of its energy needs, whileterminating plans for nuclear powerand ending research on the illusionof nuclear fusion.

A multi-billion pound constructionprogramme for offshore wind andwave power, to provide 50% of totalUK energy needs by 2030, wouldrequire a major investment indesign and manufacturing capacityon a par with that generated for theNorth Sea oil industry in the 1970s.A research priority would also beon secondary storage capacity andnew distribution networks thatmaintain constant energy supplies.

Of course, the level of investmentrequired from government does notappear likely at present. But adistinction needs to be drawnbetween the improbable and theunfeasible. The set of proposalsoutlined here, be they disarmamentor economic adjustmentprogrammes, offers noinsurmountable difficulties and canbe placed within the mainstream ofUnited Nations proposals fordisarmament and models forsustainable economic development.

Instead, policy is driven bydoctrine, and the narrowness of thedebate is reflected in the optionsbeing put forward for the Tridentreplacement programme.Cancellation, as a contribution tointernational disarmament, issimply not on the agenda as far asthe government is concerned. Themost ‘realistic’ proposal on offer isto extend the life of the existingballistic fleet in the hope ofdelaying a final decision.

And rather than look to utilisingthe £25 billion cost of Trident foran arms conversion programme, themain alternative put forward forany loss of ballistic missilesubmarine work is to build evenmore conventional nuclearsubmarines. In other words, theyare in a hole, and still digging.

Without a new and invigoratedagenda for disarmament there is nodoubt that the trends of increasedmilitary spending and theproliferation of both nuclear andconventional weapons willcontinue. And like the grim periodof militarism prior to the FirstWorld War, a cycle of action andreaction could lead to increasinginternational tension. The UnitedStates, with its vast militaryinfrastructure and ideology, offersonly an Orwellian dystopia ofpermanent war preparation. Otherstates, including regional powerslike China, are realistic enough toknow that the full range ofsuperpower capability may bebeyond them, but through acombination of indigenousproduction, arms imports andlicensed production they can amassformidable armouries throughwhich to gain some sort of leverage,even against the United States.

But the inevitable outcome will beregional arms races and the breakdown of international security. TheUnited Nations was createdessentially to prevent precisely this,through a combination ofdisarmament and ever-strongerinternational institutions withsufficient authority to resolvedisputes. It is doubtful that the UNcan survive if existing agreementslike the Non-Proliferation Treatycontinue to be undermined.

The UK can make a differencethrough disarmament and throughan arms conversion programmethat addresses a broader securityframework on peacekeeping,climate change and sustainabledevelopment. Or it can continue onits present course as a minorappendage to the US military. Asmall town in Cumbria may wellsymbolise those future paths topeace or to war.

The set of proposalsoutlined here, be they

disarmament oreconomic adjustmentprogrammes, offersno insurmountable

difficulties and can beplaced within the

mainstream of UnitedNations proposals for

disarmament andmodels for

sustainable economicdevelopment.

A church in the shadow of a crane on Barrow IslandPhoto: Bob Straughton


1 The Future of the United Kingdom’sNuclear Deterrent: Defence White Paper2006 (Cm 6994), published 4 December2006. Available online at:http://www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/AC00DD79-76D6-4FE3-91A1-6A56B03C092F/0/DefenceWhitePaper2006_Cm6994.pdf

2 The Future of the UK’s Strategic NuclearDeterrent: the Manufacturing and SkillsBase, House of Commons DefenceCommittee Fourth Report, 19 December2006. Available online athttp://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200607/cmselect/cmdfence/59/5902.htm

3 William Walker, Nuclear Entrapment -Thorp and the Politics of Commitment, p.132 (Institute for Public Policy Research,IPPR, 2000).

4 I was employed by BAEC as the researcherfor the project from 1985-1987 - seeChapter Two.

5 Isiah 2:4, “…and they shall beat theirswords into plowshares and their spearsinto pruning hooks: nation shall not lift upsword against nation, neither shall theylearn war any more.”

6 Economist Intelligence Unit, The EconomicEffects of Disarmament (EIU, 1963). Workersinvolved in arms production and membersof the armed forces who had accounted for42% of the working population, accountedfor 10% at the end of 1947. Other factorsneed to be considered, including the largenumber of women who left the workforce,approximately 1 million, but the generalpicture is one of rapid recovery in outputand employment after a short adjustmentperiod. A similar picture emerges from theUSA where over nine million militarypersonnel were demobilized andunemployment remained under 4%. SeeJudith Reppy, ‘The United States’ in TheStructure of the Defense Industry: AnInternational Survey, edited by Nicole Balland Milton Leitenberg (Croom Helm, 1983)pp. 21-2.

7 Peter Southwood, Disarming MilitaryIndustries - Turning an Outbreak of PeaceInto an Enduring Legacy, pp. 9-15(Macmillan, 1991).

8 Hilary Wainwright and Dave Elliott, TheLucas Plan : A New Trade Unionism in theMaking? (Allison and Busby, 1982).

9 The Lucas Plan can be seen, at one level, asan anti-redundancy campaign but it alsoevolved into a radical vision of both thepossibilities for peaceful technologies andalso for workers’ control over theproduction process. Mike Cooley, one of thefounders of the Combine, emphasised howComputer Aided Design and Manufacturecould either be used to de-skill work or toenhance skills and worker satisfaction. Hisbook was highly influential in stressing theimportance of human-centred designcapabilities. See Architect or Bee (LangleyTechnological Services, 1980).

10 Wainwright and Elliott, op.cit., pp. 226-230.

11 For a review of UK conversion projects inthis period see Paul Quigley and SteveSchofield, Alternative Uses, Better Futures :A Compendium of Work by the BradfordArms Conversion Group (Dept of PeaceStudies, 1994)

12 See House of Commons DefenceCommittee, Strategic Nuclear WeaponsPolicy (HC 36, 1980/81) for a review of thedecision to replace Polaris.

13 The main opposition Labour Party had anofficial policy to cancel Trident at that time.

14 See Steven Schofield, Employment andSecurity - Alternatives to Trident, An InterimReport (Peace Research Reports No. 10,Bradford University School of PeaceStudies, 1986) for background informationon BAEC and on early research into civilalternatives.

15 Barrow Alternative EmploymentCommittee, Oceans of Work - The Case forNon-Military Research, Development andProduction at the VSEL Shipyard, Barrow(BAEC, 1987).

16 Steven Schofield, VSEL Barrow and ArmsConversion, (PhD Thesis, BradfordUniversity, 1990) and Maggie Mort, Buildingthe Trident Network: A Study of theEnrollment of People, Knowledge andMachines (MIT Press, 2002) for furtherinformation on BAEC and on the responsesto the publication of Oceans of Work.

17 Arms conversion research can be placed inthe broader context of the literature on theCold War arms race, the economics ofmilitary spending and the United Nationsproposals for disarmament anddevelopment For an overview see PeterSouthwood, op.cit.

18 Seymour Melman, The Peace Race (VictorGollanz, 1962), Pentagon Capitalism, ThePolitical Economy of War (McGraw-Hill,1970), Profits without Production (AlfredKnopf, 1983). The concept of cost-maximization has been challenged but thehigh cost-base of complex systemsintegration and bureaucratic accountabilityis recognised as a serious barrier toconversion. See also Mary Kaldor, TheBaroque Arsenal (Abacus Books, 1983).

19 Melman, Profits with Production, pp. 220-221.

20 The bill put forward by Representative TedWeiss, H.R. 425, Defense EconomicAdjustment Acct, 1977 is the mostcomprehensive example, see WilliamHartung, The Economic Consequences of aNuclear Freeze (Council for EconomicPriorities, 1984), pp. 91-95. See also BillNiven, ‘An Approach to Defence IndustryConversion’ END Papers, Five (END, Spring1983).

21 Michael Renner, Economic Adjustmentsafter the Cold War - Strategies forConversion (Dartmouth PublishingCompany, 1992) provides a goodinternational comparative study.

22 See Soutwood, op.cit, pp. 192-193 for theOEA and N. Cox and N. Hooper, ‘TheEuropean Union KONVER Programme’,Defence and Peace Economics, (Vol. 7, 1996,pp. 75-94).

23 Terry Barker, Paul Dunne & Ron Smith,‘Measuring the Peace Dividend in the UK’,Journal of Peace Research, Vol 12, No. 4,November 1991, pp. 359-375.

24 World Armaments and Disarmament SipriYearbook 1999, p. 295 (StockholmInternational Peace Research Institute,1999).

25 Project on Demilitarisation, The Triumphof Unilateralism - The Failure of WesternMilitarism (Prodem, 1993), p. 4. Seehttp://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/cold.war/episodes/23/documents/gorbachev/ for acopy of the speech.

26 Ann Markusen and Joel Yudken,Dismantling the Cold War Economy (BasicBooks, 1992) which called for a nationaleconomic development strategy at the endof the Cold War, based on popular planningfor R&D in environment, health, andcommunity regeneration.

27 Office of Technology Assessment, DefenseTechnology - Redirecting Defense R&D(OTA-ITE-552, 1993).

28 http://www.dda.gov.uk/.

29 Project on Demilitarisation, WesternHypocrisy on Arms Conversion, pp.12-13(Prodem, 1993)

30 Ministry of Defence, Defending Our Future:Statement on the Defence Estimates, (Cmnd2270, House of Commons, 1993).

31 House of Commons Defence Committee,Future Capabilities, p. 44 (HC 45, Session2004/05). There have been other defencereviews since Options for Change withgreater emphasis on the issue of terrorismand homeland security but thefundamentals of UK policy in itssubservient relationship to the US remainconsistent.

32 See Steven Schofield, The UK and Non-Offensive Defence (Security Studies Group,2002).

33 Paul Dunne and Eamon Surry, ‘ArmsProduction’ SIPRI Yearbook 2006 (OUP,2006)

34 Stephanie G. Neuman, ‘Defense Industriesand Global Dependency’, Orbis, Vol 50, No.3, 2006, pp. 429-452, See also, Ian Davisand Emma Mayhew, What Happens When aWhite Elephant Meets a Paper Tiger? TheProspective Sale of Eurofighter TyphoonAircraft to Saudi Arabia and the EU Code ofConduct on Arms Exports, (BASIC PapersNo. 49, 2005) and,http://business.timesonline.co.uk/article/09067-2320097,00.html

35 SIPRI Yearbook 2006, StockholmInternational Peace Research Institute, table9A.1, page 421.

36 http://www.dasa.mod.uk/

37 For a technical analysis of employmentstatistics see A.J.W. Turner, M.G. Chalmersand K. Hartley, Estimated UK EmploymentDependent on MoD Expenditure and DefenceExports, Defence Industrial Bulletin, No. 5(Defence Analytical Service Agency, 2003)also, Robert Bowles et al, Identifying theFlow of Domestic and EuropeanExpenditures into the English Regions(Nuffield College, Oxford University, 2003)and Bryn Morgan, Defence Employment1996-97 (House of Commons ResearchPaper 99/27, House of Commons, 1999).

38 Identifying the flow of domestic andEuropean expenditure into the Englishregions, Final Report for the Office of theDeputy Prime Minister, Sept 2003, DTLRContract No. LGR 65/12/75. Section 4.7,page 102 Available online at:http://www.nuffield.ox.ac.uk/projects/odpm/Identifyingtheflow.pdf

39 www.ost.gov.uk/setstats.

Endnotes


40 Chris Langley, Scientists in the Laboratory -Military Involvement in Science andTechnology and Some Alternatives, p. 8(Scientists for Global Responsibility, 2005).

41 See Steven Schofield, The DefenceIndustrial Strategy and AlternativeApproaches (BASIC Papers No. 50).

42 Paul Ingram, Decisions over the future ofBritish Nuclear Weapons, (BASIC GreenPaper, December 2006). Available online athttp://www.basicint.org/nuclear/beyondtrident/greenpaper.pdf.

43 House of Commons Defence Committee,Strategic Nuclear Weapons Policy, p.18 (HC36, Session 1980-81) evidence by DrKinloch, Managing Director, CorporatePlanning, British Shipbuilders.

44 Ibid, p. xxxviii

45 Aldermaston Update, September 2003,Public Accounts Committee, DevenportDockyard - The Construction of NuclearFacilities at Devenport (HC 90, Session2002/03).

46 Comptroller and Auditor General, Ministryof Defence and Property Services Agency:Control and Management of the TridentProgramme (HC 27, Session 1987/88).

47 Steven Schofield, The UK and Non-offensiveDefence - An Introductory Study on theImplications of the UK adopting a Non-offensive Defence Stance (Security StudiesNetwork, 2002). Also Alternative DefenceCommission, Defence Without the Bomb(Taylor and Francis, 1983). For EU optionssee Jocelyn Mawdsley & Gerard Quille,Equipping the Rapid Reaction Force -Options and Constraints on a EuropeanDefence Equipment Strategy, BICC Paper No33 (Bonn International Conversion Centre,1983).

48 Keith Hartley, Naval Shipbuilding in the UKand Europe : A Case for Consolidation?(Centre for Defence Economics, YorkUniversity, 2003).

49 A report co-authored by senior MODeconomists suggests that reductions indefence employment will lead to thecreation of greater numbers of jobs in thecivilian sector. See Malcolm Chalmers, NeilDavies, Keith Hartley and Chris Wilkinson,The Economic Costs and Benefits of UKDefence Exports (York University Centre forDefence Studies, November 2001).Paragraph 86, page 33.

50 Department of Energy, Energy Researchand Development in the UK, Energy PaperNo. 11 (Dept of Energy, 1976).

51 International Energy Agency, IEA EnergyTechnology R&D Statistics 1974-1995(OECD, 1997) p.177.

52 David Ross, Power from the Waves (OUP,1995) is the most comprehensive bookavailable on the background to UK policyon wave power R&D.

53 ETSU had responsibility for both nuclearand renewables because nuclear wasclassified as an ‘alternative’ energy sourceto non-renewable fossil fuels.

54 A fast breeder reactor is one where fuel isirradiated with high-energy neutrons andwhich produce more fissile material(usually plutonium) than it consumes.Nuclear fusion is the process wherebyhydrogen atoms fuse together at very hightemperatures (tens of millions of degreescentigrade) to form helium.

Long-term research has focused on holdingthe resultant super-heated plasma throughthe use of magnetic forces as a source ofheat for power. The Dept of Energy Reviewin 1986 commented: “On purely economicterms it would be hard to envisage costeffectiveness for fusion R&D on thetimescales and levels necessary to achieveeventual power reactor deployment. Itsjustification is likely to be strategic andpolitical rather than economic.” Backgroundpapers relevant to the 1986 appraisal of UKEnergy R&D and Demonstration, B87 (ETSU,Dept of Energy, 1986).

55 See Ross, op.cit

56 House of Commons Science andTechnology Committee, Wave and TidalEnergy, p. 197 and xxi (HC 291, Session2000-01).

57 David Elliott, Energy, Society andEnvironment - Technology for a SustainableFuture p. 164 (Routledge, 2003).

58 Bora Douthwaite, Enabling Innovation - APractical Guide to Understanding andFostering Change (Zed Books, 2002)Douthwaite uses Denmark’s wind powerindustry as a successful example ofinnovation in which the tradition of co-operatives and community ownershiphelped stimulated rapid learning anddissemination of knowledge as well asovercome some of the opposition that hasoccurred in other countries. See also Adrian Smith and Andy Stirling,Inside or Out? Open or Closed? - Positioningthe Governance of SustainableDevelopment, Science Policy Research Unit(SPRU, Brighton University, 2006) for ananalysis of socio-technological frameworksfor innovation.

59 www.scandinavica.com/culture/nature/wind.htm.

60 Elliott, op.cit, p. 199.

61 Lester Brown, Plan B - Rescuing a PlanetUnder Stress and a Civilization in Trouble,pp. 159-160 (WWW. Norton, 2003).

62 Walt Patterson, Nuclear Power (Penguin,1976) provides a good introduction to thedevelopment of nuclear power. The searchfor commercial development of nuclearfusion could have come directly out ofSwift’s satire, Gulliver’s Travels. There is avery funny encounter between Gulliver anda scientist who is carrying out experimentsto extract sunlight from cucumbers, so thatthe king’s garden can have a guaranteedsupply of warmth during inclementsummer-time weather. The scientist isconfident of future success, in this caseafter six or seven years of research, if onlyhe can be guaranteed funding. But thesatire does not simply lie in the absurdityof the research, nor the optimistictimescale for it to reach fruition, but in thecontext of poverty and hunger that Swiftsaw around him everyday, where immediateconcerns are ignored to pursue a chimera.For the official assessment of the prospectsfor fusion, see www.fusion.org thatdescribes the UK’s own project and thejoint European programme, TORUS, bothbased at Culham. An estimated £20 billionworld wide has been spent on fusionresearch to date.

63 William Walker, Nuclear Entrapment :THORP and the Politics of Commitment(Institute for Public Policy Research, 1999)

64 Ibid, pp.17-21.

65 See the House of Commons EnergyCommittee, The Fast Breeder Reactor (HC119, Session 1989/90)

66 Walker, op.cit, p. 137.

67 Ibid, p.117.

68 Thorp may have to stay closed until 2007because of the serious nature of theradioactive discharges. Seewww.belosa.org/article/thorp_2007.

69 See news reports: ‘World’s Biggest Off-shore Wind Farm Approved for ThamesEstuary Site’, Guardian 19th December2006, available online at:http://politics.guardian.co.uk/green/story/0,,1975066,00.html.

70 www.oceanpd.com/pelamis.

71 Hansard, w/ans, col 878w, 21/10/2004.

72 A proposed Energy Technologies Institutewould be set up with £500 million ofgovernment funding to be matched by theprivate sector, although the actual focus ofresearch is not yet clear, other than itshould contribute to security of supply.http://www.gnn.gov.uk/environment/detail.asp?ReleaseID=227095&NewsAreaID=2&NavigatedFromDepartment=False

73 http://www.greenpeace.org.uk/contentlookup.cfm?SitekeyParam=D-E.

74 Energy White Paper, Our Energy Future,Creating a Low Carbon Economy, p. 12(Cmnd 5761, 2003). The emphasis has beenon the UK carbon-reduction target of 60%by 2050 in line with proposals to keep theatmospheric carbon dioxide concentrationbelow 450 ppm, consistent with atemperature rise to 2o C above pre-industrial levels, but this does not takeaccount of cumulative emissions between2000 and 2050.Much deeper cuts will beneeded to achieve this target.

75 http://environment.guardian.co.uk/energy/story/0,,1845526,00.html.

76 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/1765054.stm.

77 For a detailed analysis of VSEL during thisperiod see the Monopolies and MergersCommission, The General Electric Companyand VSEL - A Report on the Proposed Merger(Cmnd Paper 2852, 1995)

78 Ibid. p. 14.

79 Public Accounts Committee, MoD MajorProjects Report 2004 (HC 410, Session2004-05).

80 The MMC calculated on a local multiplierof 1.7 jobs for each shipyard worker.

81 Furness Enterprise, Assisting Companies toCreate New Jobs, 1992-2005 (FurnessEnterprise, 2005) and Furness EnterprisesAnnual Report and Accounts 2004-05(Furness Enterprise, 2005) for a listing ofcompanies supported and employmenteither generated or sustained.

82 See Barrow Borough Council,www.barrowbc.gov.uk/default.aspx?page=1572.

83 According to official figures only 1,298people were out of work and claimingunemployment benefit but the figure ismisleading because there are a hugenumber of people who have been divertedto incapacity benefit, with estimates thatbetween 2,500-2,700 men and 1,900 womenof these are hidden unemployed who wouldwork if opportunities existed. See, StephenFothergill, Tony Gore and Ryan Powell,Relocating Public Sector Jobs - The Case forDeprived Non-Traditional Locations, pp. 28-29 (Centre for Regional Economic andSocial Research, Sheffield HallamUniversity, 2005)


84 North West Regional Development Agency,North West Regional Economic Strategy,2006, (NWDA, 2006) website: nwda-cms.amaze.co.uk, also, www.nwda.co.uk/SimpleContent.aspx?news=1&area= 72&subarea=73&item=20044021804927169&yr=2004.

85 See Keep Our Future Afloat Campaign(KOFAC) evidence, House of CommonsDefence Committee, Future Carrier andJoint Combat Aircraft Programmes, pp. 96-101 (HC 554, 2005-06). Also, KOFAC, A KeyRole for Barrow Shipyard In Building theFuture Royal Navy (KOFAC, 2006). The yardhas recently completed the construction oftwo landing platform dock (LPD) supportships for the MoD and KOFAC is arguingthat this is a solid basis for theconstruction of large sections of theaircraft carriers that can then betransported to the final assembly yardelsewhere.

86 John F. Schank, Jessie Riposo, John Birklesand James Chiesa, The UK NuclearSubmarine Industrial Base - SustainingDesign and Production Resources, (RandCorporation, 2005), See also Keith Hartley,The UK Submarine Industrial Base - AnEconomic Perspective (York University,2002) (http://www.york.ac.uk/depts/econ/research/documents/uksib.pdf#search=%22Keith%20Hartley%2C%20UK%20Submarine%22.

87 The multi-role MUFC concept includesvertical-launch missile tubes to allow thesubmarines to fire both nuclear, long-rangemissiles (possibly including Trident D5, ora lower cost but less capable ballisticmissile) and conventionally-armedTomahawk cruise missiles. See,http://navy-matters.beedall.com/mufc.htm.

88 See North West Evening Mail, 28/07/2006Shipyard to Get Cut of £40 millionsubmarine cash.

89 Fothergill et al, op.cit.

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