+ All Categories
Home > Documents > Olive Value Chain Report - The RUAF Foundation Value Chain FINAL.pdfPage 3 of 15 This report...

Olive Value Chain Report - The RUAF Foundation Value Chain FINAL.pdfPage 3 of 15 This report...

Date post: 19-May-2018
Category:
Upload: lamkhanh
View: 216 times
Download: 1 times
Share this document with a friend
15
Olive Value Chain Report
Transcript
Page 1: Olive Value Chain Report - The RUAF Foundation Value Chain FINAL.pdfPage 3 of 15 This report provides a description of the actual situation for the olive value chain in the Gaza Strip,

Olive Value Chain Report

Page 2: Olive Value Chain Report - The RUAF Foundation Value Chain FINAL.pdfPage 3 of 15 This report provides a description of the actual situation for the olive value chain in the Gaza Strip,

Page 2 of 15

Table of Contents

Olive Value Chain .................................................................................................................................................................... 2

1 Value Chain characteristics .................................................................................................................................................. 3

1.1 Olive fruits .................................................................................................................................................................... 3

1.2 Olive oil ......................................................................................................................................................................... 6

1.3 Chain actors and recent interventions ......................................................................................................................... 7

1.4 Challenges and constraints in the olive sector ............................................................................................................. 9

2. Vision, scenarios and proposed interventions .................................................................................................................. 11

2.1 Vision .......................................................................................................................................................................... 11

2.2 Scenarios .................................................................................................................................................................... 11

2.3Needed systemic change ............................................................................................................................................. 12

2.4 Proposed strategy and interventions ......................................................................................................................... 12

2.5 Gender dynamics ........................................................................................................................................................ 14

2.6 Risk analysis ................................................................................................................................................................ 14

Page 3: Olive Value Chain Report - The RUAF Foundation Value Chain FINAL.pdfPage 3 of 15 This report provides a description of the actual situation for the olive value chain in the Gaza Strip,

Page 3 of 15

This report provides a description of the actual situation for the olive value chain in the Gaza

Strip, a mid-term vision for a more effective and inclusive olive market sector, constraints and

scenarios that have to be taken into account as well as proposed strategies to enhance

systemic changes in the sector necessary to progress towards the mentioned vision. Specific

attention is given to gender dynamics and risk analysis.

1 Value Chain characteristics Olives are important both economically and culturally for the people of Gaza. Olives are the

single biggest crop in the Palestinian economy and are a significant symbol of traditional

society, identity and ties to the land. Although olives are grown throughout Gaza, Al-Zaitoon

district, southeast of Gaza City, is one of the most important areas in the olive sector. Olive

quality in this district is regarded as the highest in the Gaza Strip (zaytoon is the Arabic word

for olive).

In Al Zaitoon there are roughly 400 small-medium scale producers (1-13 dunums), and 50

large-scale producers (13+ dunums). Approximately 50% of those working on small-medium

olive farms are women, who are particularly engaged during the harvesting period. About

85% of the labour on small-medium farms is unpaid family labour.

There are 21 processing units (olive presses) operational in the entire Gaza Strip, which

press between 100-400 tonnes of unbranded brine olives depending on seasonality (100

tonnes of olives equals about 25 tonnes of oil). The chain is controlled by men and women

are excluded from male-run olive cooperatives although they play a crucial role in weeding,

grading and sorting the olives and storing. Likewise, in the West Bank the olive oil sector is a

very much male dominated economic activity.

Men have overall managing/leading roles in the farms, as they oversee the overall cycle of

cultivation from the start: ploughing, irrigation, weed and pest control and fertilising, to

packing and transporting the fruits to the market. Women are involved in manual picking of

the olives. In addition, women process the olive fruits into unbranded brine cured olives and

olive oil in small processing units at the household level and sell their produce to neighbours.

They can only sell small volumes through informal networks within their communities, with

only small profits. They are not engaged in marketing to retailers or supermarkets.

1.1Olive fruits

The main olive varieties used are: Souri (90%, used for both fruit and oil), K18 and Shemlali

(remaining 10%, only used for oil). Souri olive production is cyclical and alternates every

year; good years can be followed by bad ones with a harvesting time lasting from September

to November. Olive trees are well suited for the environment of Gaza, being tolerant to both

saline water and drought. They can also be cultivated in poor soils (although yields and

quality of fruits and oil will be impacted).

The production yield of olives depends to a large extent on the age of the trees. Trees start

to become economically productive after 5-10 years, producing 1-1.5 tonnes per dunum

(333rotl1 – 500rotl). From 10-20 years of age trees produce around 2 tonnes per dunum, and

trees over 20 years-old produce around 2.5 tonnes per dunum. A key characteristic of the

Souri olive tree variety however is large quantity production in one year, followed by lower

1ROTL is a unit of weight in some Moslem countries near the Mediterranean. It varies between 2/3 kg.

Page 4: Olive Value Chain Report - The RUAF Foundation Value Chain FINAL.pdfPage 3 of 15 This report provides a description of the actual situation for the olive value chain in the Gaza Strip,

Page 4 of 15

quantities the following year. In Al-Zaitoon district most trees are 5-10 years old, hence the

figures of 333 rotl – 500 rotl per dunum are used for calculating yields (1 rotl = 3 kg). The two

main olive products are olives fruits cured in brine, and olive oil.

In Al-Zaitoon district roughly 80% of production is sold directly by producers to consumers,

while 20% is sold by producers to traders in bulk. Larger-scale farmers more frequently sell

to traders due to the larger market volumes they can offer. Around 40% of the produce2is

pressed into oil and sold to the market, while the remaining 60% is sold as fruits to the

market to be processed into pickled and table olives. The price is established per quantity

unit of rotl. When selling directly to a consumer the price ranges from 20-35 NIS/rotl. Large

farmers are able to short sell their produce to traders for 10-25 NIS/rotl before harvesting

time, with traders taking on part of the risk. Because of the low capacity for cold storage in

Gaza, the olives must be pressed within 48 hours after harvesting, because fruits perish

quickly. The trader pays a deposit of around 25% of the value to book the crop, paying the

balance at harvest time. From this point on the trader effectively takes responsibility for

paying for the labour (pruning and harvesting) and any additional inputs. Depending on the

quality of orchard management, olive produce varies each year, this influences the

supply/demand price (higher price when yields and supply are low and vice versa).

The table below illustrates average income made depending on the market chain and level of

yield:

Table 1 Producer income when selling direct to consumers

Low yield (150 rotl per

dunum)

High yield (500 rotl per

dunum)

Low price (20 NIS) - 10.000

High price (35 NIS) 5.250 -

* Note: 80% of production sold direct to consumers

Table 2 Producer income when short-selling to traders

Low yield (150 rotl per

dunum)

High yield (500 rotl per

dunum)

Low price (10 NIS) - 5.000

High price (25 NIS) 3.750 -

* Note: 20% of production sold direct to traders

Olive orchards are characterised by their environmental sustainability, including resistance to

poor soil and saline water (although with better growing conditions, quality of the olives and

oil will be better, as will the prices). Olive trees are rain-fed however, farmers in Gaza tend to

irrigate olives at least four times per year. Only a minority of farmers, in order to intensify

olive production, use once a year both chemical and organic fertilisers, while some pesticides

are used when deemed necessary. The low use of chemicals is due to the high costs of

these inputs, not affordable to many farmers, but at the same time represents an opportunity

to steer toward a more organic type of farming.

2Ministry of Agriculture data refer to the total volume of olive fruits pressed into oil and the fruits sold without

pressing for each pressing unit in Gaza.

Page 5: Olive Value Chain Report - The RUAF Foundation Value Chain FINAL.pdfPage 3 of 15 This report provides a description of the actual situation for the olive value chain in the Gaza Strip,

Page 5 of 15

The table below describes the inputs used in olive production. It should be noted that the

actual labour costs per dunum depend on the amount of family labour used (i.e. un-paid

work) and the yield (as lower yields take as little as half the time to harvest). Medium and

large-scale producers hire seasonal labourers for two months, mostly for harvesting. Smaller-

scale farmers mainly depend on household labour, depending on the size of land and

availability of household labour. Labourers are paid 40 NIS per day and labour costs depend

on the size of the yield to be harvested. Approximately 50% of all labour is carried out by

women. Paid women labourers in Al-Zaitoon district, generally receive the same wages as

men.

Table 3Annual cost of inputs per dunum (NIS) for olive fruit production

Low yield season, 150

rotl per dunum

High yield season, 500

rotl per dunum

Pesticides 300 500

Organic fertilisers 1000 1000

Chemical fertiliser 400 600

Water 1200 1200

Land ploughing (to mix fertilisers with soil

and kill grass)

150 150

Labour (40 NIS/day, person days/dunum

depend on yield)

300 800

Total costs 3350 4250

* Additionally, plastic piping is laid every 10 years costing ~1000 NIS per dunum

Table 4 Producer profits (NIS) per dunum when selling fruits directly to consumers

low yield, high

price

high yield, low

price

Income 5250 10000

Costs 3350 4250

Profit 1900 5750

* For the low yield fields, labour has been estimated at half the cost of high yield fields. The „low yield,

high price‟ and „high yield, low price‟ values in bold are understood to be the most likely scenarios for most

producers.

** It can be expected that for small-scale farmers with only a few dunums that the costs will be lower (and

profits higher) as they will use their own labour in part.

Page 6: Olive Value Chain Report - The RUAF Foundation Value Chain FINAL.pdfPage 3 of 15 This report provides a description of the actual situation for the olive value chain in the Gaza Strip,

Page 6 of 15

1.2 Olive oil

Traders (men only) buy roughly 20% of the total olive fruit harvest to produce olive oil. The

pressing of olives into oil is carried out by private presses. There are in total 21 presses in

Gaza Strip and 5 presses in the Al-Zaitoon district.

Pressed oil is bottled into unlabelled 16kg (20 litres) tin or plastic containers and then

distributed to local markets. Traders sell oil directly to favoured consumers, to the

wholesaler (6% commission) or directly to retailers.

Some medium and small-scale olive producers also press their olives at private presses, but

endure a longer waiting time as these presses give priority to pressing traders‟ olives( with

larger quantities). This negatively affects the quality attributes of the products of small- and

medium-scale olive producers, which in turn reduces the price they can fetch for their oil.

Usually only traders or relatively large-scale producers have sufficient quantities to press

olives individually, while small-scale producers do sometimes merge their products collecting

their fruits together to short go into pressing process.

Quality of pressed oil depends very much on quality of harvesting, pressing techniques used

and storage.One harvesting method consists of hitting olives branches with sticks to let the

olives fall on the ground. For good quality olives without damage, they should be hand-

picked or caught softly

Distribution is very underdeveloped, as direct/individual sales from farmers to presses to

consumers and local retailers dominate the market. Only a limited quantity of oil is labelled

and present in the market. Gaza consumers tend to buy in bulk in large unlabelled

containers, often once a year, and with no regulatory system in place for quality control.

Production and presses are currently not meeting the requirements of domestic demand due

to the low quality and supply of the product.There is a high local demand for both olive fruits

and olive oil as olives are a key component of local food consumption and the Palestinian

diet. Brined cured olives are offered at every meal in Gaza. Olive oil is also a key ingredient

that is increasingly replacing sunflower/corn oil. As a result, large quantities of oil are

imported from the West Bank and in some seasons from Syria. Imported oil is often cheaper

than locally produced oil.

The table below shows that fruits add more value than oil when sold, but not all olives can be

sold as table olives. They should be handled as two products from the same value chain. In

general however, both oil and table olives need to be better processed to fetch a higher

price.

Table 5 Costs, income and profit for olive oil producers and traders (NIS/dunum)

Producer Trader

Low yield,

high price

High yield,

low price

Low yield,

high price

High yield,

low price

Cost of buying olive fruit from producer 3750 5000

Production costs per dunum fruit 3350 4250 300 800

Page 7: Olive Value Chain Report - The RUAF Foundation Value Chain FINAL.pdfPage 3 of 15 This report provides a description of the actual situation for the olive value chain in the Gaza Strip,

Page 7 of 15

Pressing costs 0.9 NIS per dunum of fruit 135 450 135 450

Total Costs per dunum of fruit pressed 3485 4700 4185 6250

Total Costs per rotl of fruit pressed

(costs per dunum/rotl per dunum)

23.2 9.4 27.9 12.5

Total costs per rotl of oil

1 rotl fruit in high yield = 600gm oil (factor conversion =

5), 1 rotl fruit in low yield = 800 gm oil (factor

conversion = 3.75)

87.1 47.0 104.6 62.5

Average price received for a 16kg container of oil 600 400 600 400

Average price per rotl (container 16kg/rotl3kg,

conversion 5.33)

112.6 75.0 112.6 75.0

Oil Profit per rotl

(average oil price – costs per rotl of oil)

25.4 28.0 7.9 12.5

Oil profit per dunum

(oil profit per rotl* rotl per dunum)

763.4 2804.7 317.8 1672.5

*The above table assumes „low yield high price „and „high yield low price‟ scenarios

1.3 Chain actors and recent interventions

Major stakeholders in the olive value chain include local producer committee, especially in

al-Zaytoun district, local NGOs (mainly the National Society for the Protection of Olives,

UAWC, PARC, MAAN and the Palestinian Environmental Friends), INGOs (including Oxfam,

CARE and ICRC), and government institutions (mainly the MoA whoprovides limited

extension services on pest control). Traders play a key role as importers, importing oil and

pickled olives from the West Bank. In 2013, olive oil (low quality) was brought from Syria into

Gaza through the tunnels between Gaza and Egypt. There is one large processor (Abu

Humaid) in Gaza who imports olive fruits from the West Bank but does not buy from local

producers. Input suppliers import chemical fertiliser and pesticides. Local nurseries produce

seedlings locally in Gaza. Framers also buy manure from animal breeders. The best fertiliser

however is organic (cow, sheep, chicken dung; all can be/is produced within Gaza Strip.

Fertilising trees needs to be done once every 4 years with 3 bags (40 kg) of dung/tree of cow

dung).

Olive production has received significant support in recent years, including the provision of

technical support for packaging, field trials, training and extension services, the introduction

of water harvesting cisterns for supplemental irrigation, improvement of irrigation practices,

as well as the distribution of olive seedlings and free inputs. These interventions have

resulted in some improvements in orchard management practices and fruit quality. However,

the support was provided to only a minority of farmers and improvements in productivity were

limited (nor did these interventions ensure the sustainability, as they provided free inputs

and some extension services using paid agronomists for short period of time (couple of

months). Furthermore, there still have been serious incidences of pests and diseases,

notably olive fruit fly damages and Peacock Eye disease.

Producers need to organise in groups so that it will become feasible to make breakthroughs

in productivity of orchards and harvesting techniques (cooperative buy-in of small simple

Page 8: Olive Value Chain Report - The RUAF Foundation Value Chain FINAL.pdfPage 3 of 15 This report provides a description of the actual situation for the olive value chain in the Gaza Strip,

Page 8 of 15

tools, etc) and in creating economies of scale for the pressing and storage of olives and

marketing.

Table 6 List of major actors in the olive sector

Actor Description

Local producer committees

(especially in Al-Zaytoun district

Representing olive producers in the Al-Zaytoon area. Liaising and

networking with NGOs to channel support to producers. All the

local producer committee members are men.

National Society for the

Protection of Olives

The main CBO in Al Zaytoon area which implements various

donor funded projects such as the rehabilitation of agricultural

lands, and expansion of olive tree cultivation through providing

farmers olives seedlings, trainings and free inputs. All

CBOmembers are men.

UAWC A local NGO specialising in agricultural development in Gaza,

UAWC has implemented many projects such as the improvement

of irrigation practices through providing olive farmers drip

irrigation, tension meters - to measure water stress of the trees-

and training.

PARC A local NGO specialising in agricultural development in Gaza,

PARC has implemented many projects such as the improvement

of irrigation practices through providing olive farmers drip

irrigation, tension meters and training. It also promotes organic

olive production through supporting olives farmers with pest traps,

organic pesticides and training.

MAAN Implemented awareness programmes on the use of fertilisers and

pesticides for olives (safe use of pesticides, improved

productivity)

Palestinian Environmental

Friends

A local NGO based in Rafah. PEF produced compost by using

the cake of olive and distributed the compost to olive farmers and

other farmers. All the board are men, and the majority of

executives and project staff are men (25% women)

Oxfam Oxfam has funded a project for the safe use of pesticides and to

improve the productivity of olives and other commodities. This

project was implemented in partnership with MA'AN.

CARE CARE has funded projects for the rehabilitation of agriculture

lands and expansion of olive tree cultivation. This project was

implemented in partnership with UAWC and PARC.

ICRC ICRC promoted use of organic fertilisers and pesticides to be

used in olive orchards

Ministry of Agriculture Provide extension on the pest control.

Abu Humaid Large processor in Gaza who imports olive fruits from the West

Bank but does not buy from local producers. All his employees

are men.

Page 9: Olive Value Chain Report - The RUAF Foundation Value Chain FINAL.pdfPage 3 of 15 This report provides a description of the actual situation for the olive value chain in the Gaza Strip,

Page 9 of 15

1.4 Challenges and constraints in the olive sector The diagram below presents a problem tree analysis highlighting the key challenges and

constraints encountered in the Gaza Strip olive and olive oil sector, detailing underlying

causes and effects on Palestinian male and female farmers and other actors in the olive

value chain. This problem tree was made by the participants to a workshop of the Gaza UPA

Platform held on 20 March 2014 in Gaza City. Participants are representatives of the 30

organisations that are playing a key role in the Urban and Peri-urban Agricultural sector.

Diagram 1- Problem Tree Analysis for the Olive Sector in the Gaza Strip

Low productivity and

profit by olive producers

and processors

Olive producers / processors

Limited livelihood capacity

Low income Increase in

unemployment rates

(labourers and farmers

leaving )

Low productivity of orchards

Weak competitive capacity of the local product with imported products (price and quality)

Weak exten

sion

services

Lack of co

ord

inatio

n an

d co

op

erative

wo

rk amo

ng p

rod

ucers

Weak q

uality m

on

itorin

g systems

Po

oro

rchard

man

ageme

nt

Lack of access to

finan

cial services

High

costs (p

resse

s) and

lack of

equ

ipm

ent

Po

or p

ressing an

d sto

rage

techn

iqu

es

Op

po

rtun

ities for m

ore efficie

nt u

se

of ch

ain ( b

oth

olives an

d o

il) no

t

fully u

sed

Po

or b

rand

ing an

d m

arketing

practices

Page 10: Olive Value Chain Report - The RUAF Foundation Value Chain FINAL.pdfPage 3 of 15 This report provides a description of the actual situation for the olive value chain in the Gaza Strip,

Page 10 of 15

The main challenges are related to low orchard productivity and weak competitiveness of

local oil and processed fruits compared to imported products.

The main causes for the low productivity of orchards are:

1. Low productivity and fluctuation between low/high yield years because of poor

orchard management practices.

2. Almost all of the olive orchards are cultivated in a traditional way, not as a commercial

activity, with very few inputs and minimal orchard management (providing good

manure, soil tillage, water conservation, pruning, pest management).

3. Improper use of irrigation (especially supplementary irrigation) and use of low quality

water.

4. Lack of a proper disease management model especially for pests such as

Spiloceaeoleaginea, Dacusoleaegmel, Euphyllura olivine costa,

Phloeotribusscabaeoidesbern and Rhynchitescribripennis.

5. Insufficient agricultural extension (at local and national levels)

6. There is traditionally little organisation among olive producers to coordinate and

cooperate in olive related activities. Besides family solidarity networks, farmers are

not used to work together and organise themselves in professional and structured

cooperatives. Collaboration is needed for joint pressing, storage and marketing. Olive

orchard production remains often an individual farmer‟s business. Such organisation

(in cooperatives) is a necessity to create added value to the chain. For many it is a

side crop, but not just for home consumption. Many families have some area with

olive trees, that alone they cannot press or market. Small farmers are often left out

when delivering olives to presses and further processing. Cooperatives will provide

members/small farmers better access to the necessary processing steps, be it for

table olives or for olive oil.

7. Lack of optimisation of a “dual track production chain”: only developing the olive fruit

chain will mean that there is a lot of unused olives but that can still be used for

making quality oil. Only developing the olive oil chain will mean losing the added

value table olives (fresh or pickled).

The main causes for the low competitiveness of products are:

1. Poor technological skills during pressing and post-harvesting, notably with respect to

pressing and storage techniques, including better separation of damaged and high

quality olives, better washing, better crushing, centrifuging machinery to separate oil

from water (has to be done in two phases) plus an extremely clean press environment

to avoid poor smell, a, odours that affect the quality of the oil.

2. Low processing quality, due to: 1) Delays in pressing (olives should be processed

within 48 hours of harvesting), especially among smallholders. 2) Low quality of

presses, with dirty press environment, inadequate machinery, improper filters and

inadequate storage. Current pressing machines are old and few farmers have access

to the needed stainless steel storage tanks (nor to cold storage) and keep their olive

oil in plastic containers, and the stored product rapidly deteriorates

3. There are no adequate financial services that can support olive producers and

presses to make initial investments in improving quality of equipment, storage, olives

and olive oil; especially to improve quality of olive oil pressing; for the latter

investments are necessary of around 50,000 to 100,000 USD/press. For processing

Page 11: Olive Value Chain Report - The RUAF Foundation Value Chain FINAL.pdfPage 3 of 15 This report provides a description of the actual situation for the olive value chain in the Gaza Strip,

Page 11 of 15

into table (pickled) olives and olives paste light equipment is needed (see experience

in the West Bank).

4. The MoA provides irregular and ineffective extension (and cannot reach all the

farmers) and other support services (quality control) due to lack of financial and

human resources and knowledge.

5. Poor branding and marketing practices (packaging).

Women face other specific problems especially when processing the olive fruits into

unbranded brine cured olives and olive oil in their homes. They do not have access to

finance and assets and are not able to purchase the needed equipment and inputs (such as

storage and packaging equipment and materials). Therefore, their production is low and of

irregular quality. The poor access to finance is exacerbated by financial institutions‟ high

requirements standards for guarantees.

Improvements could be facilitated in the process of pressing olives in order to obtain higher

quality olive oil and in improving storage facilities and techniques. Several projects have also

been implemented to make better use of olive oil by-products (such of use of olive cake in

composting and as animal fodder). However, they remained on small scale and did not

benefit from research support to validate and improve on results, or for scaling up, as they

did not establish regular links between farmers and research/extension institutions. In

addition, there was a lack of marketing linkages within such innovations.

2. Vision, scenarios and proposed interventions

2.1 Vision

The following vision was developed by a large number of local actors actively involved in the

Gaza olive sector in a workshop facilitated by the project of the Gaza Platform for Urban and

Peri-urban Agriculture (March 20th, 2014)

“All olive farmers and processors (men and women) generate an income that will

achieve an adequate standard of living, guaranteeing the dignity of households,

sustaining their food security and improving their socio-economic situation. The olive

sector becomes a key pillar in the Gaza economy, introducing better performing olive

varieties, improved orchard management and pressing facilities so as to produce

higher quality olives and olive oil, while ensuring the access of a greater number of

low-income households to the various olive products”.

2.2 Scenarios

The olive sector in the Gaza Strip is considered as one of the least affected sectors by social,

political, economic and institutional factors in comparison with other agricultural sectors. In

part this is due to a relative independence on external inputs and markets, for another part to

the importance of olive and olive oil in the Palestinian Gaza family food pattern, as well as

due to the ability to store olive oil for longer periods. Two scenarios were defined that

represent the projected political and economic contexts that could affect the way the olive

sector may grow in the Gaza Strip in future.

Page 12: Olive Value Chain Report - The RUAF Foundation Value Chain FINAL.pdfPage 3 of 15 This report provides a description of the actual situation for the olive value chain in the Gaza Strip,

Page 12 of 15

First scenario: Political stability. A political stable environment will entail the existence

of a national unity government grouping all spectrums of society. This government will

establish diplomatic relations and will gain international support and Israel‟s commitment

towards a long term reconciliation and progress in the peace process.

Second scenario: Political instability: Foreseen political instability entails the

continuation of political disagreement, reluctance towards national reconciliation, failure

of negotiation efforts with Israel, constant tension at all levels, with potential signs of a

third popular uprising (Intifada). Political instability will also mean that the Government in

Gaza does not enjoy international support, entailing the continued siege and closure,

while donors continue their support to provide urgent humanitarian assistance with some

development projects. This situation entails a lack of stability in all political, social and

economic aspects.

In view of the unlikelihood of the first scenario to materialize, strategies and interventions for the olive sector in the Gaza Strip will work under the assumption of the second and current scenario. Resultant strategies to achieve the vision formulated in section 2.1 will take into account the constraints posed by this scenario and work notably on systemic changes that encompass decreasing dependence on external inputs, that promote better orchard management and harvesting, improve oil pressing and work on creating higher value products for the local market in the form of table olives (pickled and /or stuffed) and olive paste (tapanane).

2.3 Needed systemic change

In view of the vision above, the analysis of the current context for the olive sector, the

challenges and constraints mentioned in section 1, and the scenario under which

strengthening of the olive sector in the Gaza Strip has to be achieved, the project Consortium

recommends that the following systemic changes are facilitated by the project and operated

by the local actors involved in the sector.

Where most of the here recommended systemic changes in the olive value chain would be

necessary under both scenarios (more and les political stability), they become critical for the

survival of the olive sector in the Gaza Strip under the second scenario. For the olive sector

the following three systemic changes are essential to pursue:

1. Optimising the olive chain and improved use of olives for different chain products (oil,

table olives) by facilitating better processing and storage for higher quality products

for a local market.

2. Better coordination between producers for joint pressing and processing; improved

linkages between research, extension and direct chain actors.

3. A deliberate focus on women, being key players in processing, to support them in

diversifying and increasing quality of table olive products (pickled and/or stuffed

olives, olive paste) and their local marketing.

2.4 Proposed strategy and interventions

The vision for the olive sector is to work on achieving increased income and a good standard

of living for olive producers, processors and other actors in the chain. This can be achieved

through the improvement of their production and processing practices, requiring on their turn

development and use of new capacities and practices, to achieve higher profits.Furthermore,

Page 13: Olive Value Chain Report - The RUAF Foundation Value Chain FINAL.pdfPage 3 of 15 This report provides a description of the actual situation for the olive value chain in the Gaza Strip,

Page 13 of 15

by improving product quality and applying production quality standards both in orchards and

presses/storage facilities competitiveness of the Gaza olive products with products from

Israel and West Bank will be improved. As a consequence, it is foreseen that the living

conditions and income of small producers (poor families and women) as well as those of the

processing units and potentially other actors involved in the sector will improve and increase.

A long-term development strategy should go through the reinforcement of technological

innovation in orchard practices, harvesting, pressing and storage practices and increasing

product quality and hence economic profitability. This requires increasing and improving

extension and training; enhancing access to finance, certification of product quality and

consumer marketing. Improvement of the processing and production sector will increase

demand for better and other support services such as production of local products against

competitive prices (organic fertiliser, cold storage using solar energy, processing equipment,

etc.).

Proposed interventions include:

1. Facilitate the establishment of a local olive platform in Zaytoon District for coordination

and cooperation with all actors in the olive sector to enhance the quantity and quality of

production and processing/storage3. Based on a process of match making and

partnering among producers, processors, traders, consumers and service

organisations (research, training, extension), linkages will be strengthened and trust

will be built, and joint interventions will be tested and monitored. Facilitation and

capacity building could be provided to these local chain platforms to help them improve

specific support and functions (quality control, processing of table olives, storing, filling,

packaging, branding etc.). Such a platform could also be instrumental to facilitate

access of farmers and processors to sources of information (weather forecasts, pest

protection and prevention, market prices, etc.) and encourage and support learning and

exchange between olive producers and processors.

2. Facilitating access to co-financing for improved processing. Special emphasis should

be put however on the involvement of financial institutions in such platforms to facilitate

more permanent access of olive producers and processors to financial services.

Private service providers that are encouraged to better and more appropriately support

producers and processing/marketing may also need co-investment funds.

3. To facilitate women‟s access to extension/training initiatives. Women processors will be

supported to improve household-based processing, product diversification and

quality.Co-funding could be specifically facilitated to support women involved in the

processing units to access capital and equipment, and to cope with possible market

shocks and hazards.

4. Build capacity of extension institutions, including local extension departments of MoA,

the National Society for the Protection of Olives and UAWC to better support producer

3The National Society for the Protection of Olives, a well-known CBO respected by different market

actors, could be the local platform coordinator

Page 14: Olive Value Chain Report - The RUAF Foundation Value Chain FINAL.pdfPage 3 of 15 This report provides a description of the actual situation for the olive value chain in the Gaza Strip,

Page 14 of 15

groups and promote good orchard management, pest and disease management using

participatory training approach (PTD, UPA producers‟ learning and action field

schools). Link with research institutions including the Faculty of Agriculture of al-Azhar

University and Faculty of Science of the Islamic University with a view to provide better

support to producer groups &processing units, provide updated information and

researches for new initiatives, help developing new potential products, improve the

quality of produce, and develop new processing techniques. Extension institutions will

be encouraged to involve more women or train their men staff to be more gender

sensitive in order to more effectively reach women producers and processors.

In addition, the local olive chain platform and Gaza wide UPA platform will be encouraged to:

1. Improve quality standards of olive oil through facilitating knowledge development and

funding for better processing techniques with more modern equipment and olive mill

management as well as better storage. Introduce a simple toolkit (as is used in the West

Bank) to test free acidity levels as an indicator of olive oil quality (the lower free acidity,

the better quality). This should go together with promoting cold storage (based on solar

energy) to enable oil and fruits to be well preserved and sold beyond the peak harvest

season. Important knowledge inputs for this action could be sought from relevant

expertise developed over the last 8 years in the West Bank.

2. Promote better use of olive by-products such as waste from the presses for making

compost or use in animal fodder.There is a high demand for good fertilisers in Gaza.

Olive residues are already used by one cooperative as input for animal fodder pellets.

3. Also through the above platform, supplementary irrigation methods might be introduced

to producer groups - this would not only directly promote olive productivity and quality,

but would also allow for inter-cropping of annual plants.

2.5 Gender dynamics

Apart from the specific problems women encounter in the olive sector as already mentioned

in section 1, women, in comparison with men, face more difficulties in accessing information,

training, financing the market, as they are subject to restrictions in access to assets and

movements, especially if married or divorced. They also have poor communication and

coordination with other market actors (ex. extension and training services; retailers). It has to

be recognised here that the olive sector in Palestine is dominantly a men‟s trade, although

women are highly involved in processing at household level. It is often difficult for them to be

involved in knowledge and skills training or become part of an extension programme. They

need support in processing the olive fruits into unbranded brine cured olives for table olives,

pickled and /or stuffed, and/or olive paste and olive oil in their homes.

2.6 Risk analysis In the case of the Olive Value Chain, risks are less closely related to the blockade of the

Gaza strip described under Scenario 2, as compared to other urban agricultural sectors. The

intervention strategy is targeting foremost the local market as demand is far from satisfied

even for low quality olives and olive oil. The main impediment created by a continuing

closure of the Gaza Strip is in obtaining modern press equipment from outside (new or

second-hand from abroad or the West Bank).

Page 15: Olive Value Chain Report - The RUAF Foundation Value Chain FINAL.pdfPage 3 of 15 This report provides a description of the actual situation for the olive value chain in the Gaza Strip,

Page 15 of 15

The main risks as related to development of a viable olive value chain are the following:

1. Farmers maybe reluctant to make new investments as it will take between 4 and 6 years

before trees to bear high volumes of fruits. However better orchard management might

already results in improvements after 1-2 years‟ time.

2. Furthermore, there is some expressed risk that Israeli forces might take actions that

destroy trees, during incursions or other military actions that involve levelling of land. In

fact a tendency is observed where farmers take calculated risks to plant notably olive

trees within the so-called high-risk zone where tree planting is not tolerated by the Israeli

military forces. They take these risks to explore how far they can go in gaining back lost

arable land, while this is most easy with olive trees that do not require much care as

compared to other fruit trees.

3. There is an important risk that value chain actors will be unwilling to accept a zero

distribution approach as the olive sector has always received large volumes of free

inputs.

4. There may be a risk of male olive growers and processors not accepting women

developing new olive products and obtaining the benefits of this.

5. Market actors may not accept and are unwilling to test new pressing and storage

techniques such as more performing pressing machinery and cooling by solar energy,

and hence are not inclined to take the correlated risks to invest in such technologies.


Recommended