On Impossible Imaginings

8/9/2019 On Impossible Imaginings

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Raleigh MillerGSU, 2008

On Impossible Imaginings1

0. IntroductionAlex Byrne (2007) has argued that, [i]maginability...is no guide to possibility. I will argue

that Byrne's defense of his argument does not succeed. The argument looks like this:

Argument (B)

1. We can imagine impossible P's.2. If we can imagine impossible P's, imaginability is no guide to possibility.3. Conclusion: Imaginability is no guide to possibility.

This conclusion, if true, is relevant to the dispute over whether the mental is different in kind

from the physical. Discourse concerning this question is referred to as the mind-body debate. Dualists

argue that the mental and the physical are ontologically distinct, either by virtue of being different sorts

of substance or by being different properties of physical substances. Many dualists, like Rene

Descartes and David Chalmers have advanced or endorsed so-called conceivability arguments. With

a broad brush, one might say that a prototypical conceivability argument, pertaining to the mind-body

debate, is structured as follows:

Argument (C)

1. It is conceivable that the mind exist without the body or that the body exist without the mind.2. If the mind and the body are conceivably separable, they are possibly separable.3. If the mind and body are possibly separable, the mind is not the body.4. Conclusion: The mind is not the body.

A well known reformulation of, or argument for2, premise one is suggested by David Chalmers, and is

known as the zombie argument.(c.f. Chalmers (online)) Zombies are physical systems identical to our

own bodies (brains and all), but within which no conscious experience occurs. According to the

1 Everything good about this paper, if anything there be, is owed to the generous help of Justin Bernstein, Jodi Geever,

PaulPfeilschiefter, and Ben Sheredos (listed alphabetically).

2 I consider Chalmers assertion regarding zombies a reformulation of premise 1. Others have suggested to me that it is

an argument for premise 1. Nothing rests on this distinction.


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dualist, zombies (or some comparable thought experiment that falls under the constraints of premise 1)

are conceivable. Materialists, who argue that the mental is not different in kind from the physical,

insist that premise 4 of (C) is false, and consequently aim to dismantle the zombie argument. The

literature has largely focused upon this dismantling in two ways. First, many have denied that zombies

are conceivable. Second, many have denied that the conceivability of zombies entails their possibility.

Byrne (with others)3

takes the second approach.

The form of conceivability discussed in this paper will be a species of positive conceivability,

which is contrasted with negative conceivability. A proposition, S, is negatively conceivable if it is not

ruled out by any internal inconsistency. Alternatively, S is positively conceivable only if one can

form some sort ofpositive conception of a situation in which S is the case (Chalmers 2002).

Presumably, positive conceivability of S makes a much stronger case for S's metaphysical possibility

than mere negative conceivability. But to form some sort of positive conception of a situation is to

imagine such a situation. If Byrne is right, and S's imaginability cannot guide us towards knowledge of

S's possibility, then a damaging blow has been dealt to the zombie argument, and dualism generally.

Consequently, this paper will concern itself with positive conceivability.

The conclusion of this paper is that Byrne has not made a persuasive case for premise one of

(B). In section I, I will develop Byrne's argument, and I will present three imaginable scenarios that

Byrne takes to be impossible. One suggested scenario is the perception of a visual illusion. In the

remaining two scenarios, non-identical objects are taken to be identical. In section II I will show that

Byrne has not satisfactorily demonstrated that visual illusions are examples of imaginable

impossibilities. In section III I will argue that in cases where non-identical objects are imagined to be

identical, the identity being imagined is not impossible. In section IV I will conclude that we are left

with no good reasons to reject the efficacy of imaginability towards establishing possibility.

3 C.f. Bailey (MS) Bokulich (MS) Barnes (2002), Dietrich (2001), Hill (1997), Yablo (1998) For denials of premise 1,

see Kirk (1999) Kirk (MS), Marcus (2004)


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I. ByrneSaul Kripke argues that proper names are rigid designators. (Kripke 1980) A rigid designator is

baptized of a token object (We shall name him Aristotle) and refers to that particular object in all

possible worlds. If X to rigidly designate A, then X refers to the same thing, A, in all worlds in which

A exists, such that the thing designated, A, is identical across possible worlds.4 Another way to say the

same thing is X picks out A in all possible worlds. If Y also refers to A in all possible worlds, then

in all possible worlds, X and Y pick out the same object. From this we can conclude that there is no

world in which X is not identical to Y, or, necessarily X equals Y.5,6

In such a case, it is impossible

that X is not identical to Y. Let a Kripkean impossibility be understood as follows:

A proposition, P, is a Kripkean impossibility if and only if,

(K) P asserts of two rigid designators, X and Y, which pick out the same object, that X is not Y

or, asserts of two rigid designators, X and Y, which pick out different objects, that X is Y.7

As a novel example, one may consider the proposition that Hesperus is not Phosphorus. This

proposition is false in this world, because Hesperus and Phosphorus both refer to the planet Venus.

Furthermore, because Hesperus and Phosphorus are rigid designators, and because they both pick out

Venus in all possible worlds, there is no possible world in which they do not pick out the same object.

4It is hard to briefly summarize this point without saying things that are actually false. For instance, in this case, A is NOT

actually identical across possible worlds. For instance, President Nixon is not identical to failed presidential candidate

Nixon. When I say that the thing designated is identical in all possible worlds, I should be understood as saying that the

thing designated is the same thing in all possible worlds, but even this risks inaccuracy, insofar as if two things are the

same thing (again, a confusing way to word it) they should share all the same properties, and should not differ in the

property of, for instance, whether they won the election. Im grateful to my colleagues for doing their best to help me

tighten this section, and I regret its inadequacy as it currently stands. I hope, and suspect, that whatever nuances have

been glossed over by my account will not prove damaging to the success of this paper.5

We can conclude as much, that is, with the help of an additional premise, which simply defines the necessary operator as

true in all [visible] worlds. That is, if necessarily , for any [visible] world, w, V(, w)=1, or is true is w. 6 I thank Ben Sheredos for pointing to a problem concerning the present account. He and I share the worry that in these

cases (and in many cases involving Kripkean identity) the expression of the identity is vague as to what is being

identified with what. I have said that, if X and Y pick out the same object, then X equals Y. But I have also said, of X

and Y, that they are designators, and that they are distinct designators (for instance Hesperus and Phosphorus). Thus, if

X equals Y is taken to mean that the designator X and the designator Y are identical to one another, this would be

nonsense. It is natural and charitable to assume that when such equivocations are committed, the author can be

understood as meaning that the object, substance, or person referred to by X is identical to the object, substance or

person referred to by Y. When identity claims are being thrown around willy nilly, however, there is a salient risk that

such a misstep may make some implausible claims look attractive, and Ben's concern is worthy of our attention.

7 The concept of a Kripkean impossibility is Byrne's.


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Therefore, Hesperus is not Phosphorus is false in allworlds. This is to say that Hesperus is not

Phosphorus is impossible. Byrne asks whether there is any proposition, P, which satisfies (K) and is

imaginable. If such a proposition can be found, then imaginability is not a guide to possibility.

To allay some initial concerns, we may gloss over the distinction between imagining that P and

conceiving that P. Byrne acknowledges that these are different, but we can weakly say that if

something is imaginable, then it is conceivable in some sense. Therefore, that this distinction is

ambiguous will not pose a problem for the structure of Byrne's argument as a whole. If P is imaginable

and impossible, then P is conceivable and impossible. If Byrne's argument goes through, the extent to

which imaginability is a guide to possibility, and a fortiori, the extent to which conceivability is a guide

to possibility, will have been undermined. For the sake of this paper, one may simply suppose that of

any proposition, the extent to which that proposition is imaginable is the extent to which that

proposition is conceivable.

Imagining that P requires more than supposing, or entertaining that P. Byrne writes,

Something extra is needed: a mental image...is sufficientand perhaps it is also necessary. (9) In

order to imagine P, (e.g. that there are tailless kangaroos) we bring to mind an image that satisfies P (a

kangaroo without a tail). Likewise, for some P to be positively conceivable on Chalmers account

requires that one be able to form some sort of positive conception of a situation [, S,] in which [P] is

the case.(Chalmers, quoted above) One might charge that some possibilities (for instance, that

Germany won the Second World War) are not imagined as a mental image; Byrne does away with this

problem. For any P of this latter sort, to positively conceive of it is to bring to mind (or to be able to

bring to mind) an image that one would only ever see if the proposition was true. In the case of the

WWII example, we imagine Hitler waving from the balcony of Buckingham palace, or in the oft cited

case of Nixon losing the election, we can imagine Humphrey giving the state of the union address.

(Byrne 18-9) So, when we imagine P, we form a sensory representation which uniquely corresponds to

a situation in which P is true. Non-sensuous imaginings are reducible to, or expressible in, sensuous


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imaginings. Thus, if imaginability is a guide to possibility, nothing impossible should be sensuously

imaginable.

So far, by my estimation, Byrne has said nothing that will give him any trouble. It may be

worth suggesting that Byrne's account of imagination is strange, or that one can think of innumerable

instances of non-sensory imaginings that cant be reduced to sensory imaginings.8 For the present

paper, however, not much depends on whether this account is accurate. If one denies that all

imaginings are sensuous imaginings, one may simply take Byrne to be arguing that one can sensuously

imagine impossibilities. If so, then one can imagine impossibilities.9

For his argument to succeed,

however, Byrne has one further responsibility. He must demonstrate that there is some genuinely

impossible P, which is also sensuously imaginable. Here, I will suggest, Byrne's argument fails.

Ironically, Byrne seems to think that this is the easy part. He presents three candidates for impossible

imaginings.

1. One sees Stephen on the street, and misidentifies him as Vernon. One seems to have perceivedthat Stephen is Vernon. But, Stephen is not Vernon, and is in fact necessarily not Vernon (as

shown by Kripke). One has seemed to perceive something to be true which is necessarily false,

or whose truth is Kripke-impossible, and consequently10

logically impossible.

2. On a wistful summer day, one stares for several minutes at a roaring waterfall. Caught up in themoment, one drops one's camera, and in reaching downward inadvertently focuses on a pile of

rock. Amazingly, the rocks look to be moving. But the rocks are clearly not moving. Oneperceives the rock as both moving and not moving. This is a contradiction, and is clearly

impossible.

3. One goes to an ice sculpture museum. Amidst the art is a table, covered in frost. One seems to8

My colleague Paul Pfeilsheifter, for instance, points out that Byrne seems to argue for this very claim elsewhere (2006).

Paul also asks that we consider imagining that there is a prime number higher than the highest known prime number. I

actually suspect that this latter example could be reduced to a sensuous imagination (I, for instance, imagine a

mathematician concentrating on a very large number and saying Eureka!) At a certain point, however, if one wants todefend Byrnes claim, one will get caught telling implausible, if consistent stories. This is quite unimportant to the

present project however. I grant Byrne his reduction so as to move on to what is more pressing to my criticism.

9 It is not this simple though. The reason Byrne feels compelled to reduce non-sensuous imagination to sensuous

imagination is not hard to see. One could simply say (especially if one were seduced by the visual illusions argument

below) that one's sensuous apparatus is quite faulty, but one's logical apparatus is not. Hence, if indeed Byrne does

show that one can sensuously imagine something impossible, it is open to the dualist to say not all kinds of

imaginability entail possibility. Perhaps nonsensuous imagination, what we may call logical imagination, is required.

Byrne may be vulnerable here, especially if one doubts his account of the reducibility of nonsensuous imagination. This

is not my strategy, however, so I'll let Byrne have his reduction in exchange for his soul main conclusion.10

On Kripkes account, of which I shall not be skeptical in this paper.


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perceive that the table is made of ice. But the table is made of wood. One has perceived thatthat table is made out of ice, but that table, in all possible worlds, is made of wood. A table

made of ice, in any possible world, would be a different table. That that table is made of iceis impossible, but one has seemed to perceive as much.

Byrne thinks that these do the trick:

...given the received view about the close kinship between perception and imagination, thissupports the intuitive claim that one can sensuously imagine Kripkean impossibilities, even

in the face of the relevant empirical facts. (Byrne 16)

And further,

Given the examples in the previous two paragraphs, and the received view of the kinship

between perception and imagination, there is no evident reason to deny that one can sensuouslyimagine Kripkean impossibilities... (Byrne 17)

Surely these (1, 2, and 3) are familiar situations. We cannot deny that they, or situations like

them, occur regularly. But is the content of one's imagination, in such situations, impossible? In the

remaining discussion I will suggest that they are not. I will argue that, in these cases, Byrne has

misidentified the content of our imaginings, and that the actual content of our imaginings is not

impossible. First I will consider the second example. This case purports to be one of logical necessity;

that is to say, one has sensuously perceived a contradiction to be true. In section II, I will argue that

one has not, in the case of a waterfall illusion or any similar illusion, sensuously perceived

contradictory propositions, and that we have no good reason to think one is sensuously imagining a

contradiction to be true. Following this, I will consider the first and third cases. These cases purport to

be cases ofa posteriori necessity,11

and rely on the assumption that Kripke's account of rigid

designation and necessity is correct. I will not challenge this assumption. I will argue, in section III,

that in these cases the tokens being identified are not rigid designators, and thus their identification (or

non-identification) is not necessary. There are, on Kripke's account, two ways in which This table is

made of ice or That guy is Vernon can be understood. One of them treats this table and that

11A proposition is a posteriori necessary if it is true in all possible worlds but discoverable empirically. The correlative

concept, and that which Byrne thinks he has identified in the contents of various imaginings, is a posteriori

impossibility. A proposition is a posteriori impossible if it is false in all possible worlds, and consequently

impossible, but its impossibility is discoverable empirically.


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guy as rigid designators, and one does not. I will suggest that the imaginings in cases 1 and 3 are of

the second sort, and as such they do not pose a problem to imaginability arguments in the way that

Byrne thinks they do. That is to say, they are not impossible according to (K).

II.Visual Illusions

Consider the waterfall illusion. In a well known visual trick, one looks at a waterfall for long

enough, and then looks at a pile of rocks. The rocks will look as if they are moving. Byrne needs to

demonstrate that one can sensuously imagine an impossibility. One thing, which is certainly

impossible, is a logical contradiction, such as p and ~p. He takes the present case to be just such a

contradiction.

There are familiar examples of perceptual experience that are apparently of impossibilities. Inthe waterfall illusion, the rocks look both to be moving and not moving. (Byrne (2007) 16,

Byrne's emphasis removed, my emphasis added)

But we should be careful. In cases like this, the mode of apparently contradictory representations is

vitally important. There is, after all, nothing contradictory about Bill Richardson's beliefthat he is not

a presidential nominee, and his desire that he is a presidential nominee. These representative modes

carry with them varying conditions of satisfaction. Contradictory propositions can be attributable to a

coherent (that is, logically consistent) state of affairs as long as they are represented according to

modes that do not have the same conditions of satisfaction. According to Byrne, the rocks look to be

moving and look to be not moving. If this assertion is correct, then we indeed have a contradiction on

our hands. For something to look as if P requires that it look the way it would look if P.

Consequently, if something looks as if P, it cannot also look as if not P.12

12 We can rule out cases in which some X would look the way it does whether P or not P is the case. For instance, the gym

bag has a cat sleeping inside. If there were no cat sleeping inside, it would look the same. Therefore, the way the bag

would look given P and the way the bag would look given ~P are the same. This need not be a concern, for in such a

situation we would not say the bag looks as if a cat is sleeping inside, because we know the bag would look the exact

same if the cat were not sleeping inside. We do not say the water looks as if it's 50 degrees, though we may say it feels

as if it were 50 degrees. Though we believe that the water might look the same if it were twenty degrees, we assume it

would feel differently. For an extended discussion of this, and also one of my favorite philosophical works, see Dretske,

Seeing and Knowing. I borrow the gym bag example from my friend PaulPfeilschiefter. He may or may not have

borrowed it from Byrne.


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But here, Byrne is wrong. In a situation such as the waterfall illusion, it is false that the rocks

look as if they are not moving. They look as if they are moving. That is the illusion, after all. What

may be true is that the subject believes thatthe rocks are not moving. In fact, this is almost certain to

be the case. Thus, one takes two propositions to be true. 1) The rocks look as if they are moving. 2)

The rocks are not moving. But this is hardly a contradiction, and it is hardly impossible!13 Byrne

writes as though every visual illusion supports his case. I maintain, however, that with any visual

illusion that one could produce, a similar distinction could be drawn, and the apparent contradiction

would be dissolved. The lines behind the squares look to be non parallel, but they are parallel. The

lines in Guitar Hero look to be moving, but they are not moving. In each case, contradictory

propositional contents are only satisfied if they are assigned to distinct modes of representation, once

this clarification has been accomplished, the apparent contradiction will vanish.

Byrne does mention one category of visual illusion which may be better served to demonstrate

his point: M.C. Escher's impossible objects. For instance, a man sits on a bench with what looks like a

box frame. (See Appendix). But as one looks closer, one realizes what the man holds is quite strange.

The corners of the frame cross one another in ways that no actual frame could. The frame is

impossible. And yet, we are looking right at it. We sensuously perceive it, which means that if asked

to, we could sensuously imagine it. Might this show that we can sensuously imagine impossible

things? I have two suggestions against such a claim.

First, if we look at the entire frame, we don't actually see the object. This is part of the

enjoyable strangeness in the phenomenology of looking at such paintings. We have Gestalt tendencies

to make the frame a coherent box when looked as a whole. It is only when we look at particular parts

of the box that we can work out what exactly is so strange about it. We look at such images in a

piecemeal fashion: first at this corner, then at this other corner, until we discover what is incoherent

13A colleague has suggested that exclamation points are inappropriate to philosophy papers. I respectfully disagree. I think

philosophers should be exclamatory more often.


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very poor footing.

So much for visual illusions. What, then, ofa posteriori necessities?

III.Kripkean IdentiesSaul Kripke argues that proper names are rigid designators. A rigid designator picks out an

object in all possible worlds. So if two rigid designators pick out the same object, they do so in all

possible worlds. Another way to say this is that they are necessarily identical. In this sense, it is

impossible that Bob Dylan is not Robert Zimmerman, or that Hesperus is not Phosphorus. The

introduction of the rigid designator was a response to the received view of reference, endorsed by Frege

and Russell, that names are definite descriptions. If a proper name is a definite description, then the

name picks out the unique object that satisfies all or most of a unique set of properties. This was a

monumental step in the philosophy of reference, because it solved a serious problem that the Frege-

Russell picture faced. If Aristotle is a definite description, then Aristotle refers to Plato's greatest

student AND the teacher of Alexander the Great AND the author of theNichomachean Ethics

AND...etc. But Aristotle could not have written theNichomachean Ethics. By this I mean, there is a

possible world in which Aristotle did not write theNichomachean Ethics, but wrote a steamy romance

novel instead. In this sense, most of the properties of Aristotle could have not been true of Aristotle,

and yet Aristotle would still be Aristotle. Kripke concludes, Aristotle cannot stand in for a definite

description; it must designate the same person in all worlds, even worlds in which Aristotle had not

written theNichomachean Ethics, and worlds where Aristotle had not become a philosopher at all.

kin, so if we can seem to perceive contradictions, as we do in cases of visual illusion, then we can imagine them. He

makes some comments to this effect in his paper. His comments, however, leave one unsatisfied as to the nature of this

kinship. What's more, I think we have to acknowledge a distinction between thinking one is imagining, and actuallyimagining, though I feel severely under-equipped to rigorously define such a distinction. Consider the first time an

undergraduate is asked if they can imagine a round square. In my experience, a great many of them say yes! They must

be coaxed: We're not talking about changing the meaning of the words, we're talking about all of the properties that

make something a circle, and all of the properties that make something a square. Can you imagine a single object

having all of those properties? Finally they say no.

Accordingly, the argument of this section should be taken as a meek categorical claim, if there is such a thing. In any

case where the content of an imagination seems to be impossible, it is probably the case that one is failing to actually

imagine what has been presented. Maybe this will be doubted, but I don't think it will be doubted by materialists, since

they rely on a similar argument structure with respect to the Zombies. (You think you're imagining zombies; you're not

actually imagining zombies.)


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But Kripke's theory does not purport to characterize all references. After Kripke, we need not

assume that all referential words and phrases are rigid designators. Indeed, we must allow that many

are not. For instance, the teacher of Alexander the Great refers to Aristotle in this world, but in many

possible worlds it refers to a different person entirely. Consider a world, similar to ours, in which Fred

was a philosopher of repute, and a contemporary of Aristotle's. In such a world, the proposition that

Fred was the teacher of Alexander the Great is false, but it is not impossible.15

In some possible

world, we suppose, that proposition would be true. Identities between definite descriptions, or between

rigid designators and definite descriptions, are contingent, not necessary.

But what about that guy is Vernon? Or this table is made of ice? These sentences employ

demonstratives as referential phrases: that guy and this table. Are these demonstratives rigid

designators? If so, then it appears that by identifying that guy with Vernon, one has imagined that

two designators, which necessarily refer to separate things, refer to the same thing, and this is

impossible.16

This, according to Byrne, is what has happened. Consider the following:

Suppose one is familiar with the daughter of Mr. and Mrs. Truman. In fact, she and Queen

Elizabeth look remarkably alike. Seeing the Queen on the street, one misidentifies her (by sight)

as the daughter of Mr. and Mrs. Truman. One sees her as the Trumans daughter; I saw the

Trumans daughter on the street and recognized her immediately, one might say. What one

seemed to perceive, namely that that woman is the Trumans daughter, is impossible. (Byrne

17; Byrne's emphasis)

Here Byrne says that the identity between that woman and the Truman's daughter is, if true,

necessarily true, and if false, necessarily false.17

But this is only true if the demonstrative that

15And, in some sense, insofar as we can imagine a world in which this is possible, it is possible in our world. Possibly

possibly P entails possibly P in modal system S4 (requiring transitivity of the is visible or R relation between possibl e

worlds.) S4 is an unproblematic extension of the minimal system K, and insofar as the concept of necessity operative hereis at all robust, it ought to pack transitivity into R. I am hesitant to reiterate the first sentence of this footnote with a tone of

certainty, however, as the involvement of a rigid designator Fred may complicate the issue. I suspect not, however, as a

rigid designator picks out the same object in all worlds in which the object exists. As such, possibly possibly P probably

entails possibly P in this case, and gives us no cause to worry about Fred as a rigid designator. However, nothing rests on

this, and to avoid complication we may simply discuss imagining a world in which Fred exists and is such-and-such.16

Im noticing a vagueness in the way this is written. Regrettably,Im noticing it with very little time left before the paper

is due, and so I cannot fix it now. Future versions of this work, if any there be, need to work this sentence out more

precisely. This footnote is more or less a note to self.17

I think Byrne is giving himself some undue trouble here, and I have tried to make his argument stronger by speaking of

Stephen and Vernon. On Kripke's account, only an identification between rigid designators is necessary. Identities between


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woman is a rigid designator. We must investigate whether such is the case.

Before we can evaluate whether an identity is necessary, we must know when we are facing a

rigid designator and when we are not. Grammar will not help. We cannot say that any demonstrative

is or is not a rigid designator. We cannot even say this about proper names! As Kripke points out,

Jack the Ripper is a definite description; it refers to whichever individual committed certain

murderous acts. Likewise, I suggest, a demonstrative that object may be a definite description or a

rigid designator, depending on how it is used. Rather than trying to sharply delineate which words or

phrases shall count as rigid designators and which shall count as definite descriptions, these labels are

best understood functionally. A referential phrase is a rigid designator only if it fixes trans-world

identity. A referential phrase is a definite description if it refers to whatever object satisfies a set of

properties. And this is the best we can do.

Kripke himself suggests that not all demonstratives are rigid designators. Consider the

following:

Of course, it is only a contingent truth (not true in every other possible world) that the star seenover there in the evening is the star seen over there in the morning , because there are possible

worlds in which Phosphorus was not visible in the morning. But that contingent truth shouldn'tbe identified with the statement that Hesperus is Phosphorus. It could only be so identified if

you thought that it was a necessary truth that Hesperus is visible over there in the evening...But

[that is not] a necessary truth...These are contingent marks by which we identify a certain planetand give it a name. (Kripke 105; my emphasis)

This passage should reorient us in our discussion. Let us remember what is at stake: the

question is whether That guy is Vernon expresses a proposition that, if true, is necessarily true, and if

false, is necessarily false. It would only be such a proposition if That guy and Vernon are both

definite descriptions are contingent. Identities between rigid designators and definite descriptions, are contingent. Byrnesuggestion that that woman is the Truman's daughter is, if true, necessarily true, assumes that both that woman and the

Trumans' daughterare rigid designators, and neither case seems obvious. Instead, That guy is Stephen presents at least

one reference that is quite certainly a rigid designator, leaving us to focus on that guy. For this reason I consider myself

to be strengthening Byrne's argument by focusing on That guy is Stephen. It has been suggested that I contradict myself

here. I said above that not all proper names are rigid designators, so why is Vernon taken to be obviously a rigid designator?

For instance, Jack the Ripper is understood as a definite description. This should not be worrying. I am here assuming that

Kripkes account is accurate. Kripkes own account argues that we should understand Jack the Ripper as a definite

description. However, this is clearly a strange and degenerate case, and is opposed to prototypical proper names, which

Kripke argues are rigid designators. I hope to have given no reason that Vernon should be considered anything but a

prototypical proper name, and as such it may be treated as an unproblematic rigid designator.


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rigid designators. But what does that guy refer to? A fixed individual with trans-world identity? I

think not. That guy refers to a token object in the world with a set of relevant properties, namely the

property of occupying a particular place in space-time, and perhaps having certain other properties that

we would use to identify Vernon, such as a particular height, a particular hair style, a particular voice,

etc. After all, necessary identity goes both ways, so to treat that guy as a rigid designator is to

suggest that if that guy wasn't Vernon, then he wouldn't be that guy. This seems quite confused.

I submit that that guy functions as a definite description (and not as a rigid designator) in the

case that Byrne describes.18

To reiterate Kripke, that guy could only be...identified [as a rigid

designator] if you thought it was a necessary truth that Vernon occupied that place in space-time. But

surely we do not think so, because if Vernon does not occupy that space he will still be Vernon, just as

Aristotle would still be Aristotle even if he never studied philosophy.

So, Jill sees Stephen on the street, and says that guy is Vernon. Jill has not identified two

rigid designators, as she would have if she exclaimed Stephen is Vernon! Jill has employed that

guy as a definite description, and is wrongly asserting that the person meeting that description is

Vernon. The identity she proclaims is false, but possible. Indeed, there is a possible world in which

Vernon did satisfy all the properties that uniquely individuate that guy. In this case, no one has

imagined anything impossible.

So what of the table? Byrne writes of our ice-table:

Similarly, suppose sees a certain table (in fact made of wood, but covered with frost), at an ice

sculpture exhibition. One takes it to be made of ice: I looked at the table and clearly saw it was

made of ice, one might say. What one seemed to perceive, namely that that table is made of

ice, is impossible. (2007, 17, Byrnes emphasis)

The consideration here will be largely the same. Again, there are two ways to understand the

phrase that table. The mere fact that that table is a demonstrative does not tell us all we need to

know. We must inquire as to whether the demonstrative is establishing trans-world identity. But

18This sentence was rewritten thanks to a comment by Ben Sheredos. The way it appears here is word-for-word the rewrite

that Mr. Sheredos recommended. As such, he deserves a sort of informal citation.


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surely it can't be! Any world in which an ice-table occupies the exact same space and looks the exact

same as the wooden table does in this world is a world in which a different table occupies that space.

The only intelligible way to interpret that table is made of ice is to understand that table as a

definite description. It designates a set of properties (location in space-time, looking a certain way,

etc.) and in any possible world, whatever table satisfies those properties is that table. Thus imagining

that that table is made of ice is only to imagine a world in which an ice table satisfies those

properties. The speaker in this case has not imagined anything impossible.

IV.ConclusionAlex Byrne's argument may well be sound. I do not rule out that there is such a thing as an

imaginable impossibility, but I can't think of one. Byrne thinks he has; by my estimation he has not.

All of the examples of imaginable impossibilities that have been presented are either examples of a)

confusing the content of an imagined state of affairs (as in the case of visual illusions) or b) mistaking

definite descriptions for rigid designators, and consequently taking propositions to be necessary (and

thus, if false, impossible) when they are contingent (if false, still possible). As far as this paper is

concerned, it remains to be seen whether imaginability arguments may successfully figure in possibility

claims. Two routes seem open (if they have not yet been travelled) towards closing this question: a)

someone may present an example of an imaginable impossibility that does not fall to one of these

errors, or else b) we might be given an a priori reason to suppose that nothing impossible is

imaginable.

Perhaps the Zombie argument is already dead. Perhaps not. If not, Byrne has not contributed to

its downfall.

References

Bailey, Andrew R. (MS). The unsoundness of arguments from conceivability. Accessible here:http://www.uoguelph.ca/~abailey/papers/TheUnsoundnessofArgumentsfromConceivability.pdf

Barnes, Gerald W. (2002). Conceivability, explanation, and defeat.Philosophical Studies 108


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(3):327-338.Bokulich, Peter (MS). Putting zombies to rest: The role of dynamics in reduction. Accessible here:

http://people.bu.edu/pbokulic/papers/zombie.pdf

Byrne, Alex. (2006) "Color and the Mind-Body ProblemDialectica 60: 223-44 (2006)

Byrne, Alex. (2007) Imaginability and Possibility. (2007) Forthcoming in Philosophical

Perspectives.

Chalmers, David. (2002.)Does conceivability entail possibility?

Conceivability and Possibility

,T. S. Gendler and J. Hawthorne. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Chalmers, David (Online) Mind and Modality. Accessible here: http://consc.net/papers/mm.html

Dietrich, Eric (1998). It only seems as if zombies are logically possible, or how consciousness hides

The truth of materialism: A critical review of The Conscious Mind.Minds and Machines 8 (3).Hill, Christopher S. (1997). Imaginability, conceivability, possibility, and the mind-body problem. Philosophical Studies 87 (1):61-85.

Kirk, Robert E. (1999). Why there couldn't be zombies. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society

Supplement73:1-16.Kirk, Robert E. (forthcoming). The inconceivability of zombies.Philosophical Studies.

Marcus, Eric (2004). Why zombies are inconceivable.Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82

(3):477-90.

Kripke, Saul. (1980) Naming and Necessity. Harvard University Press. Cambridge University.Yablo, Stephen (1998). Textbook Kripkeanism and the open texture of language.Philosophical

Quarterly 81 (1):98-122.

Appendix

M.C. Hammer Escher. Main with Cuboid (1958)

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