On Security Governance Eng

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Security governance between State and market: human security and security

sector reform.

Alessandro Arienzo

One of the more interesting themes of the present debate about the role

of the State in relation to the changes of democratic politics and of the

economy on a worldwide scale is represented by the space acquired by

policies of governance. The latter is an ambiguous but very evocative concept,

so much so that it constitutes one of the key terms of the principal documents

written by international agencies and institutions like the UN, the WTO, the

World Bank, and the OECD. Such is its currency that it has even been

affirmed as the political category with which the attempt to prefigure and to

accomplish a whole process of reform of the practices of European

government has been undertaken.1

The term governance is used to designate, roughly, a form, a style ofgoverning that is different and alternative to the style of government.

2 The

former is horizontal, flexible and inclusive; the latter is hierarchical, rigid and

strongly centralised. This term is thus understood to mean processes and

structures of decision that cannot be traced back to the exercise of political

sovereignty. On the contrary, these process and structures are organised on the

basis of a horizontal and negotiable relation between bearers of manifold

interests, a relation which aims at shared decisions and collective action.3 The

relation between these two styles, between policies of governance and the

exercise of government, has often been understood in opposed, when not

mutually exclusive, terms. The comparison between these two models iscertainly part of the very complex debate on the role of the State and on the

presumed crisis that traverses the modern form of government, particularly in

its democratic guise. The models of a true and genuine democracy of

governance are opposed to a ‘Westphalian’ political and territorial order,

which is supposedly threatened by ‘globalising-provincialising’ impulses and

finds itself in difficulty due to the procedures of a democratic and

representative government that is now held to be ever less able to take rapid

and efficacious decisions.

1 The key document is the Governance in the European Union: a White Paper (COM, 2001,

428 final) published by the Commission of the EU. Among the extensive literature on theargument, I note the following: G. De Búrca and J. Scott, Constitutional Change in the EU:

from Uniformità to Flexibility?, Oxford, Hart, 2001; L. Hooghe and G. Marks, Multilevel

governance and European Integration, Boulder, Rowman & Littlefield, 2000; L. Hooghe, The

European Commission and the Integration of Europe. Images of Governance, Cambridge,

CUP, 2001; M. Jachtenfuchs, The governance approach to european integration, “Journal of

Common Market Studies”, vol. 39, 2001, pp. 245-264.2 J.N. Rosenau / E.-O. Czempiel, Governance Without Government: Order and Change in

World Politics, Cambridge, CUP, 1992.3 As an introduction to the theme of governance, see: L.S. Finkelstein, What is global

governance, «Global Governance», vol. 1, n. 3, 1995, pp. 367-371; J. Pierre and B.G. Peters,

Governance, Politics and the State, London, Macmillan Press, 2000; R. O. Keohane,

Governance in a Partially Globalized World , «American Political Science Review», vol. 95,

2001, p. 12 e ss; I. Bache and M. Flinders, Multi-level governance in theory and practice,Oxford, O.U.P., 2004; G. Borrelli (ed.), Governance, pp. 125-157.



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Among the contexts in which governance meets democratic theory and

in which the role and the function assumed today by territorial sovereignties in

international politics is interrogated with greater intensity, there is the

variegated context of the policies meant to favour processes of pacification,

development and transition or democratic transformation of vast areas of theworld. They are processes that, when they do not explicitly assume forms of

armed intervention or of peace enforcing, are presented precisely in the

clothes of good governance, operating in relation with multiple actors, among

them States, and through States and supranational institutions, in order to

guarantee ample and shared safety and security. The theme of security, in both

of these declinations, thus assumes a central role in the debates on the State

and democracy today. In the last decade, the transformations that have

occurred following the fall of the equilibria produced by the cold war have

produced profound and substantial changes in the theory and practices of

international security, thus assigning a growing role to policies of governance.

The proposal by the UN to develop politics of support and recovery for Statesand populations in difficulty on the basis of the new concept of human

security, and the concomitant process of affirmation at the global level of

security sector reform, are at the basis of the current hypotheses of security

governance.

The first part of this contribution is thus dedicated to reconstructing the

salient traits of theories of governance that operate on the foundation of

reflections on global security. The changes and transformation that have

occurred in this category will be analysed in the second part, giving specific

attention to the implications that they demonstrate in the international

management of movements of populations. My goal is to investigate therelation that is established between governance and State, beginning from the

transformations in the codification of the notion of security and from the

reflections produced in the field of security governance on the displacement of

populations following serious crises or emergencies. In the context of this

specific governance, I will attempt to paint a picture of differentiated policies,

set to work by – and by means of – multiple actors, including the State. The

goal of these policies is to bring economic development, security and

democratic government into synergy. This nexus is at the centre of reflections

on global security governance and constitutes the nucleus of a strategy that

aims to support failing (or transitional) States that risk being transformed into

‘rogue States’, thus activating dynamics of war. In the same way, this nexus isat the heart of an ensemble of focused policies that are today posited on the

basis of attempts to respond to the immense movements of populations

produced by poverty, conflicts, sickness and environmental disasters. In such

policies, the State is attributed different roles and functions and, in some

cases, competing roles: sometimes it operates as guarantee and principle

author of policies of security/safety; at other times it is nothing other than one

actor among many that compete in the realisation of definite policies at the

international level; more often, it is instead the ‘object’ of more complex

strategies of security governance. We thus come to see global security

governance as the exercise of a non-statal government over populations. It

necessitates the strengthening both of statal institutions and also of



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autonomous dynamics of the competitive market. Governance thus seems to

be able to be functional only in the shadow of the State and market.4. The first

offers it a normative and territorial context of reference, as well as the

guarantee of a substantial security community; the second furnishes it with the

general form of exchanges.

The State between governance and government

Governance is a complex category whose matrix is multidisciplinary. It

is used in different contexts: from theories of the State to doctrines of

administration and to organisational models of economic corporations, from

theories of local and urban governance to reflections on globalisation and on

international politics. In all these cases, it describes specific modalities of

coordination of collective action. Certainly, with the term “governance” we

refer to practices that usually regard groups or institutions whose operations

are not founded on the recourse to authority and to the sanctioning power ofstatal government, even if the fundamental objectives are not different from

those of government.

“It is rather a matter of a difference in processes. […] It [i.e.

governance] refers to the development of governing styles in which

boundaries between and within public and private sectors have become

blurred”5; “governance is ultimately concerned with creating the

conditions for ordered rule and collective action”.6

There are multiple and often very different models of governance.Renate Mayntz has placed these models in an arc of positions that go from a

new style of government, distinct from the model of hierarchical control and

characterised by a greater degree of cooperation and by interaction between

State and non-statal actors within mixed public/private decisional networks, to

an ensemble of distinct modalities of coordination of individual actions,

understood as primary forms of construction of the social order.7 This

expression can be used to mean different models or styles of political conduct

that vary from a more restricted interpretation of network to an extremely

broader interpretation that is applicable to any form of organising collective

action.

4 This is maintained by Philippe Schmitter, who argues that the State and the market are two

‘shadows’ that sustain any discourse and politics of governance. This thesis runs through all

his most recent interventions on the theme of governance. Among his many works, I therefore

refer only to the following: Examining the present euro-polity with the help of past-theories,

pp. 1-14 and Imagining the Future of the Euro-Polity with the Help of New Concepts, in

Governance in the European Union, pp. 121-50. Both essay are now to be found in

Governance in the European Union, edited by G. Marks, F. Scharpf, P. Schmitter, E W.

Streeck, London, Sage, 1996.5 G. Stoker, Governance as a theory: five propositions, “International Social Science

Journal”, vol.L, 1998, pp.17-28, p.17.6 Ibid., p.18.7

R. Mayntz, New challenges to governance theory, European University Institute, JeanMonnet Chair Paper RSC No 98/50, 1998.



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In the first and more restricted meaning, governance can refer to

practices of regulation and self-regulation of economic and financial

corporations, thus attributing to the State a merely regulative function. In such

a case, it is configured as a complex of political tools that aim at the self-

government of organised interests aligned with, and sustaining, a ‘minimumState’ that works to care for the autonomous flows of a competitive society.

However, this meaning can also be understood as a complex of policies that,

being centred on the preponderant role of negotiating procedures between

actors and on the contribution of expert knowledges, aspires to be a horizontal

and participatory resolution of the difficulties of democratic government. If

representative-democratic politics seems to accentuate its own elitarian and

conflictual results, thus revealing itself ever less able to govern effectively the

impulses of a complex contemporaneity, this notion of governance would then

be able to amplify the spaces of access to decision making and to the

realisation of policy. Consequently, it would be able to increase the number

and the quality of actors engaged in the process of political mediation.However it is defined, governance is certainly an index of the growing

importance that governing by policies assumes in opposition to the

government of politics and representation. As Giorgio Giraudi and Mariastella

Righettini write, it signifies

“the transition from institutional systems of government, prevalently

founded on institutions of representation (parties and parliaments) and

orientated to the centrality of the functions of inputs, to systems of

government orientated to the re-evaluation of modalities of action more

oriented to efficacy and to the efficacy of outputs”.8

It is a process that, delegating the major part of the processes of policy

making to non-representative institutions, tries to respond to the problem of

the exacerbation of the temporal and programmatical gap between the cycle of

policy and the political-electoral cycle. Governance can now be interpreted as

the most recent moment in a attempt at political rationalisation of a procedural

and goal-oriented nature. Its dispositifs aim to contain the conflicts produced

by the processes of globalisation and of internationalisation, setting networks

of actors to work in order to preserve the equilibria of politics and of the

market that rule the contemporary liberal democracies, and to circumscribe

and nourish the role, still central, of the authority of government.

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This taking of distance from the model of the vertical exercise of

government is perhaps one of the characterising elements of contemporary

8 G. Giraudi, M.S. Righettini, Le autorità amministrative indipendenti. Dalla democrazia

della rappresentanza alla democrazia dell’efficienza, Roma-Bari, Laterza, 2002, p.202. See

also: E.L. Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, “Stanford Law Review”, vol.

XXXVIII, pp.1186 ss; M. Gentot, Les autorites administratives indépendent , Paris, PUF,

1991.9On the significance of the term “dispositif”, beginning from Foucault’s usage, see the volume

edited by G. Jaquinot-Delaunay and L. Monnoyer, Le dispositif. Entre usage et concept ,

“Hermès”, n.25, 1999. See also: G. Deleuze, What is a dispositif ? In Michel Foucault

Philosopher , edited by Timothy J. Armstrong, New York, Routledge, 1992, pp. 159-168; G.Agamben Che cos’è un dispositivo, Roma, Nottetempo, 2006.



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reflections on governance. Additionally, it seems to be precisely that ‘phobia

of the State’, which according to Michel Foucault was indicative of a crisis of

the system of liberal governmentality that could be referred to the increase of

the economic cost of the exercise of freedom.10

The foucauldian thesis is

particularly important precisely because it ties the crisis of the form of liberalgovernment to the contextual promotion of freedom, on the one hand, and

links mechanisms of security to the goal of stabilising a specific modality of

governing the population, on the other. Considering it in this interpretative

frame, governance could be understood as an expression of a market-oriented

governmentality; by means of security policies, it is exercised on populations

and on intermediate nuclei of organisation of collective life, prevalently

operating on interests and on the deployment of knowledge. Nevertheless, in

this frame we would still need to understand the relation between this specific

type of governmentality and a State that would not be other than ‘a vicissitude

of government’, the ‘correlate’ of a certain way of governing.11

Thus, similar to the different disciplinary contexts in which it is used,there are also different models of governance thematised on the level of

international politics. Among these, one of the most significant is expressed

by the report On Our Global Neighborhood , written by the Commission of

Global Governance of the UN. In this document we find side by side and

intertwined two levels of analysis competing within an extremely broad and

articulated definition of the term. It is used both in order to understand an

ensemble of processes of a cooperative type aiming at attaining objectives

shared by diverse actors, and also in order to describe a modality of relation

between institutions (public and/or private, formally or informally

constituted), which is able to produce compliance and to animate efficientorganisational and decisional structures. Governance, therefore, as a complex

of processes and of structures that would represent:

“the sum of the many ways individuals and institutions, public and

private, manage their common affairs. It is a continuing process through

which conflicting or diverse interests may be accommodated and co-

operative action may be taken. It includes formal institutions and

regimes empowered to enforce compliance, as well as informal

arrangements that people and institutions either have agreed to or

perceive to be in their interest”.12

It is thus defined, at the same time, as: a) a system of formal and

informal institutions aiming at the definition and at the conduct of shared

politics on questions of ‘common interest’; b) a complex of ‘processes’

intended to allow the agreement between the parts on the basis of a horizontal

negotiation. The objective is that of delineating global networks of actors and

processes capable of operating autonomously from the more usual politics

10 M. Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics. Lectures at the College de France, 1978-1979,

London, Palgrave, 2008.11 M. Foucault, Security, Territory, Population. Lectures at the College de France, 1977-

1978, London, Palgrave, 2007.12 Commission on Global Governance, Our Global Neighborhood , Oxford, OUP, 1995, p.5.



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between States. In other words, we find in governance a series of dispositifs

able to intervene positively in an ample spectrum of conflictual situations that

remain irresolvable – or which can appear to be resolvable only with difficulty

– by means of interstatal relations alone. In such a way, it tends to favour the

realisation of shared politics without having recourse to the political-administrative frame of the statal bureaucracies or to the normative frame of

multiple juridical-political systems.

Today, the definition of governance proposed by this report is that which

is generally accepted and used in the international political debate, even if,

rather than prescribing a specific model of relation between different actors on

the global stage, it seems to describe those processes for which, from the end

of the Second World War, a growing number of institutions and organisations

has assumed an important role on a global scale, in order to confront global

emergencies (from the management of natural resources or international trade

to climate change), as well as in order to respond globally to local

emergencies (from humanitarian emergencies to environmental disasters).Precisely due to this, it is thus particularly significant that in a different report

of the UN in 2002, the Human Development Report – Deepening Democracy

in a Fragmented World ,13

good governance is described in completely

different terms as an ensemble of “institutions, rules and political processes”

that can be defined as democratic when it offers “a system with

institutionalised procedures for open and competitive political participation,

competitively elected chief executives and substantial limits on the powers of

the chief executives”.14

In such a way, it was possible to promote a

“participation through democratic governance”, which appears still to be

strongly linked to modules of representative government.15

In this document,the field of application of governance is restricted to the statal and institutional

level. There is thus configured with this expression a typically prescriptive

dimension that tends to affirm the political system that is prevalent on the

global level: the democratic-representative system. In this case, good

governance is nothing other than the exercise of a transparent representative

government, responsive and accountable according to the typical procedures

of democratic government.

These different meanings of governance that emerge from the

documents of the UN, rather than signalling the indecision and the

incoherence of the think-tanks of this organism, express the complex and

ambiguous relation that seems to be instituted between governance and State,and between governance and democratic government. In order better to

understand this relation, it is useful to investigate the contemporary debate

13 UNDP, Human Development Report – Deepening Democracy in a Fragmented World ,

New York – Oxford, OUP, 2002. The Human Development Reports are annual reports written

by the UNDP. Their publication began in 1990, “with the single goal of putting people back at

the center of the development process in terms of economic debate, policy and advocacy. The

goal was both massive and simple, with far-ranging implications – going beyond income to

assess the level of people’s long-term well being. Bringing about development of the people,

by the people, and for the people, and emphasizing that the goals of development are choices

and freedoms”, http://hdr.undp.org/aboutus 14

UNDP, Human Development Report – Deepening Democracy, p.36.15 Ibid., p.53.



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promoted within the UN on security governance. This puts the problem of a

‘non-statal’ government of populations at the centre of the reform efforts of

the international organisations, which is realised by means of policies of

territorial state-building and market building, and by means of policies of

support for transnational networks of collective actors and regulative powers.In this sense, security governance seems to activate two types of processes:

the first can be referred to policies of construction and reinforcement of statal

institutions; the second aims to promote both productive and pro-social

relations, and also a system of exchange that can favour the birth of an

efficient and competitive market. In the open scenes of this emerging

planetary security governance, the themes of development and of democracy

now constitute the fulcrum points around which there are attempts to create

‘shared’ global policies, which are articulated in a plurality of dispositifs of

security. On these themes, the series of programmatic documents written in

the last decade by the agencies of the UN operating in the field of global

security are important. They are important not so much because they delineatea picture of affirmed and realised policies, which remains a long way off, but

due to the modalities with which they indicate and develop some important

themes, and because of the solutions that they delineate for some of the

difficulties found in international politics. More than about policies, this is

now an investigation about the ‘discourses’ of global security. This

investigation emerges from the conviction that governance now constitutes a

category/instrument that is useful for comprehending today – that is, for

interpreting, rather than describing, the concrete developments of

contemporary politics.16

Human security governance and security sector reform

It is only recently that governance has been applied to the field of

security. This has been due to an important change that occurred in the

approach to the theme of security by the international organisms such as the

UN, the OECD, the World Bank and some of the States the compose the G8

and the security council of the UN. From being a category articulated

prevalently around the necessities of self-preservation of the State, security

today is interpreted in a broader sense as human security. The reasons for this

transformation are multiple. The permanent conflictuality of the so-called cold

war, whose strongly ideological traits characterised the multiplication ofinternal wars in the context of a relatively stable international order, has been

substituted by an incoherent and multiform intertwining of wars between

States, international police operations, preventative aggressions, humanitarian

crises, terrorisms and national and global resistances. The military equilibrium

between the super powers, which even gave some form and a direction to the

dispersed instances of conflict in the world, has fallen, thus liberating

16 A different approach (though in my opinion a complementary one) to that which is used in

this study follows the opposite path, beginning from the analysis of concrete practices in order

to track down their discourses and logics. An excellent example is offered by the volume of

Serena Marcenò, Le Tecnologie Politiche dell’Acqua. Governance e Conflitti in Palestina,Milano, Mimesis, 2005.



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energises and tensions to which it appears to be difficult today to give a single

meaning. Thus, if security was understood and practiced as national security

and defined in military terms during the cold war, the proliferation in the last

two decades of threats, emergencies and risks as well as the interpretation in

terms of security given to questions traditionally external to the spectre ofdefence, have promoted the progressive amplification of the concept. As

Heiner Hänggi has argued:

“it was increasingly noted that security might be endangered by more

than military threats alone, which led to the inclusion of political,

economic, societal and environmental aspects”; “there is a growing

recognition that in the age of globalization, and with the proliferation of

internal wars and ‘failed states’, individual and collectives other than the

state could, and indeed should, be the object of security”.17

This process has developed in parallel into a double transformation inthe approach to the theme of security. In the first place, there was the

elaboration of a new politics of security, described as security sector reform,

which has put in discussion both the strictly statal defensive interpretation of

security and also the centrality attributed to the public-statal actors,

particularly the army and the police. If both the statal institutions as well as

those structures whose primary function is to protect society have traditionally

been ascribed to the level of security, the expression security sector instead

attempted to expand its goals and methods from the usual military

environment to include public security and individual security from crime,

disorder and violence. The new security agenda has therefore stimulated thereconsideration of civil-military relations, with the goal of promoting a

definition of the security sector that can superannuate the mere subordination

of the armed forces to regularly ‘elected’ civil leaders, as was stabilised by the

Copenhagen Document on the Human Dimension (1990).18

The objectives of

this document were both the improvement of the efficacy of interventions to

guarantee the security of States, and the enlargement of spaces for the

democratic control of the diverse institutions connected to the promotion of

security. The launch in 2000 by the secretary general of the UN Kofi Annan

of the Global Compact Initiative affirmed, instead, the principle according to

which peace and international security were placed in more danger from intra-

statal conflicts than by conflicts between States. The weakness and thepotential collapse of the State constituted, therefore, dangers for regional and

global security greater than those represented by States endowed with an

excessive military power. The same campaign also emphasised how an entire

series of non-statal actors were now able to put at risk the security and good

governance of States, and noted that the victims of the conflicts that have

17 H. Hänggi, Making Sense of Security Sector Governance, p.6, in Challenges of Security

Sector Governance, edited by H. Hänggi and T. H. Winkler, DCAF & LIT Verlag, 2003, pp.

3-23.18 And therefore by the successive Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe

(CSCE) held in the same year, and finally by the Moscow Document on the Human Dimension (1991).



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occurred in the post cold war period have been constituted almost solely by

civilians. Precisely in order to offer a response to these dramatic claims, the

necessity of a collective security no longer focused on the security of States

was proposed, a collective security that would be able to include a safety net

for individuals, for their rights and for their potentialities of development.According to the indications given by the secretary general of the UN in

the important document written in 2001 by the Development Assistance

Committee (DAC) of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and

Development (OECD), entitled DAC Guidelines: Helping Prevent Violent

Conflict , security is defined as

“an all-encompassing condition in which people and communities live in

freedom, peace and safety, participate fully in the governance of their

countries, enjoy the protection of fundamental rights, have access to

resources and the basic necessities of life, and inhabit an environment

which is not detrimental to their health and well-being. The security ofpeople and the security of states are mutually reinforcing. A wide range

of state institutions and other entities may be responsible for ensuring

some aspect of security”.19

On this basis, there was thus the need to begin a security system reform,

understood as the affirmation of a

“‘security system’ – which includes all the actors, their roles,

responsibilities and actions – working together to manage and operate

the system in a manner that is more consistent with democratic normsand sound principles of good governance, and thus contributes to a well-

functioning security framework”.20

Security system reform has represented an important turning point in the

codification of security and of the role that statal institutions must play in

order to guarantee it. However, it assumed an even broader meaning when the

UN itself promoted it as a key component of the broader “human security”

agenda begun in its programme of development (UNDP).21

The second transformation has been due precisely to the assumption of

new considerations on the theme of security by the United Nations, beginning

in the early 1990s. This has resulted in the expression human security. Theseconsiderations have expanded the range of activities of security to include

themes of the guarantee of political and economic liberties, economic and

civil development, individual and collective protection from political, ethnic

and religious oppressions, from criminality and corruption, from poverty,

illiteracy and disease as well as from natural calamities. The first current

definition of the term appears in the Human Development Report of 1994.

19 OECD-DAC, The DAC Guidelines: Helping Prevent Violent Conflict , Paris, OECD

Publishing, 2001, p.38.20 Ibid.21

OECD-DAC, Security System Reform and Governance, Paris, OECD Publishing, 2005,p.11.



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The observation that

“the concept of security has for too long been interpreted narrowly as

security of territory from external aggression, or as protection of national

interests in foreign policy or as a global security threat of nuclearholocaust… Forgotten were the legitimate concerns of ordinary people

who sought security in their daily lives”,22

is followed by the affirmation according to which

“human security can be said to have two main aspects. It means, first,

safety from such chronic threats as hunger, disease and repression. And

second, it means protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the

patterns of daily life – whether in homes, in jobs or in communities”.23

The initial definition thus referred security to a twofold freedom:freedom from fear and freedom from want. It listed seven specific elements

that composed human security: 1. economic security, understood as absence

of poverty; 2. food security, understod as absence of hunger and malnutrition;

3. medical security, understood as access to medical care; 4. environmental

security, understood as absence of pollution and access to environmental

resources; 5. personal security, understood as absence of threats to the person

and to property of goods; 6. security of community, understood as the

protection of the existence of groups and cultures and of their conservation; 7.

political security, understood as enjoyment of civil and political rights. This

vision was strongly contested due to its excessive extension of factors relevantto a notion of security understood, at least on the international level, in more

limited terms. At the same time, it was also criticised for having offered a

merely negative definition of security. In order to respond to this second

objection, a different definition of diversity was proposed in 2000. Between

2000 and 2003, the concept has been articulated both within the notion of a

‘responsibility to protect’, promoted as a central category for the international

policies of the Canadian International Commission on Intervention and State

Sovereignty (ICISS), and also within the different proposal of a notion of

‘responsibility for development’, promoted by the Commission on Human

Security (CHS), strongly promoted by Japan and by its then minister Keizo

Obuki.

24

The document Human Security Now of 2003, written by thiscommission and taken up by the UN, took into account and integrated both the

proposals. It affirmed that human security “is concerned with safeguarding

and expanding people’s vital freedoms. It requires both shielding people from

acute threats and empowering people to take charge of their own lives”.25

In

22 UNDP, Human Development Report , New York, Oxford University Press, 1994, p. 22.

23 Ibid.24 On these developments, see: R. Paris, Human Security: Paradigm Shift or Hot Air ,

“International Security”, vol. 26, n.2, 2001, pp.87-102; G. King and C.J.L. Murray,

Rethinking Human Security, ‘Political Science Quarterly’, vol.116, n.4, 2001-2002, pp. 585-

610; D. Henk, Human Security: Relevance and Implications, ‘Parameters’, vol. XXV,

summer 2005, pp. 91-106.25 CHS, Human Security Now, New York & London, Grundy & Northledge, 2003, p. iv.



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the more recent document Security System Reform and Governance,26

written

in 2005 by the Development Assistance Committee of the OECD, arguments

for adhesion to this new definition of the term security are located in the

attempt to make it valid as an operative context within which the interventions

of governments and international institutions in contexts of crisis can bepromoted and directed. In this document, security is connected “to personal

and State safety, access to social services and political processes. It is a core

government responsibility, necessary for economic and social development

and vital for the protection of human rights”.27

Nevertheless, as security sector

reforms is still strongly concentrated on the use of public resources for the

guaranteeing of security of citizens, it cannot but confirm the centrality of

statal institutions connected to such a function.28

In fact, the lines of

intervention stabilised by the OECD, although establishing the necessity of

States’ favouring the realisation of ‘extensive’ and structured policies of

security in a system of policies that are not derivable solely from defence,

intelligence and policing, affirm that

“the overall objective of security system reform is to create a secure

environment that is conducive to development, poverty reduction and

democracy. This secure environment rests upon two essential pillars: i)

the ability of the state, through its development policy and programmes,

to generate conditions that mitigate the vulnerabilities to which its

people are exposed; and ii) the ability of the state to use the range of

policy instruments at its disposal to prevent or address security threats

that affect society’s well-being.29

The centre of reform policies for the security sector therefore remains

the State. Thanks to the support of many actors, that State must be made

capable of utilising its own political and institutional resources in order to

guarantee the affirmation of complex understanding of security. The goal is

now to promote a notion of security that is no longer centred on the

recognition of external and internal enemies, but that occurs within a whole

government approach, whose objectives are “[to] foster interministerial

dialogue, implement institutional change, and mainstream security as a public

policy and governance issue”.30

The construction of this ‘secure environment’, and its positioning

alongside different institutions that compose the State and government andthat seem to play a prevalent role here, however, requires the participation of

26 Two important previous documents that anticipated the themes were: DAC, Helping

Prevent Violent Conflict (2001) and DAC, Poverty Reductions (2001). Also important is the

document Security issues and development co-operation: a conceptual framework for

enhancing policy coherence, in Conflict Prevention and Development Co-operation Papers,

vol. 2, n.3, 2001, pp. 33-71.27 OECD-DAC, Security System Reform and Governance, op cit., p.11.28

Although it was precisely beginning with it that there began the discussion around the

themes of the ‘privatisation’ of security and of developments inherent to the market of private

security.29

OECD-DAC, Security System Reform and Governance, op cit. p.16, italics mine.30 Ibid., p. 12.



12

different actors. Civil society, adequately supported by international

programmes of cooperation and development, must, in fact, create and diffuse

“a pro-reform environment for democratic governance”.31

The construction of

a democratic environment is held to be the result both of the promotion of

security, and of an economically productive and competitive space. Itconstitutes, therefore, one of the elements by means of which a virtuous circle

between security and development should be activated. Development,

however, seems to be articulated still, and prevalently, on a national and

territorial basis.

The report Human Security Now, however, had already clarified how

the reform of sectors connected to security was an integral part, but not

exhaustive, of a more complex human security. The security policies of States

and of international organisms therefore had to be supplemented by policies

centred on the development of people and populations. Furthermore, the

network of powers that has to support and promote these policies does not

have a determinate territorial basis; on the contrary, it exists in the intersticesof this rupture between States and the national and territorial dimension that

constitutes one of the characteristics of what we call global governance. This

network is plural and global, because it is constituted by governments, by

different institutions that operate on the global, regional or local level, by

differentiated realities that are supposed to compose national and international

‘civil societies’. This situation prompted Roland Paris to say that

“the idea of human security is the glue that holds together a jumbled

coalition of ‘middle power’ states, development agencies, and NGOs –

all of which seek to shift attention and resources away fromconventional security issues and toward goals that have traditionally

fallen under the rubric of international development”.32

Certainly, if “security and development are increasingly seen as being

inextricably linked”, it thus becomes necessary “to mainstream security as a

public policy and governance issue”.33

And it is precisely due to this that the

report Human Security Now emphasises the complementarity between human

security and security of the State. In particular, it emphasises the necessity of

favouring the care of individuals and of communities in a context that does

not contemplate in an exclusive fashion threats comprehended as dangers for

security: “achieving human security includes not just protecting people butalso empowering people to fend for themselves”.34

For such an end, “the

range of actors is expanded beyond the State alone”.35

The security of the

State is no longer, therefore, the objective of security. Rather, it constitutes

merely an instrument, albeit necessary, which a security system needs to

assure in order to guarantee the promotion of democratic freedoms and the

development of a competitive market.

31 Ibid., p. 16.

32 R. Paris, Human Security, p.88.33 OECD-DAC, Security System Reform and Governance, p.16. 34

HSC, Human Security Now, New York, 2003, p. 4.35 Ibid., p. 52



13

All these documents thus allow us to observe the twofold relation that

is instituted between security policies and interstatal politics, on the one hand,

and between security and development, on the other hand. In the context of

the new security agenda, the notions of security and of development are thus

shown to be interdependent. Security is no longer linked in exclusive terms tothe level of statal defence of its own order or the level of the security of the

population faced by pressing and imminent threats. It is instead linked to

processes of growth and of economic-social development that, while based on

policies of promotion and of individual and collective defence from

immediate threats, contribute to the strengthening of the State and the care of

populations understood as aggregations of individuals. Security thus becomes

human security.

Security governance therefore includes in a single nexus two different

declinations:

a) the first, which we can call ‘security-conservation’, includes themost common reflection on the defence of the State and of the

nation from the external and internal enemy. As we will see, a

particular tension is also assumed in this case, a tension that is

relative to the strengthening of the statal institutions by means of

processes of international governance (of help and support) and of

State building.

b) the second can be defined as ‘security-development’. This is the

security related to intervention on populations, on their productive

and self-reproductive capabilities. It is the more complex humansecurity that, theorised by the UN, explicitly underwrites the

proposals of global security governance. It prefigures, alongside

processes of State building, paths of market building and of

“activation” of a potent civil society.

The first includes both that range of instruments at the disposition of

the State – the ordinary and extraordinary constitutional provisions, the army,

intelligence services – that aim to guarantee the conservation of the political

order faced by pressing threats, and also the processes of institutional,

bureaucratic and administrative construction that tend to configure a stable,

efficient and democratic statal architecture. The second and perhaps moreimportant declination, on the other hand, includes those dispositifs that aim to

promote a certain economic and social development, in such a way as to

constitute not so much the objective of processes of political and institutional

stabilisation, as in the past, as, instead, their precondition. This twofold

strategy of security is not prevalently concerned, therefore, with States and

borders, but with populations and individuals according to a project of

strengthening and development centred on a democratic political model.

However, this strategy cannot and does not want to reduce the State as an

instrument of order and of containment of conflicts and of populations. In

substance, the strengthening of the State and of its institutions is always

possible by means of the promotion of well being and of the development of



14

its population; but this means that, simultaneously, the situations in which a

State does not exist or, though existing formally, is not able to guarantee any

security, become more complex. In these cases, the model activated by human

security presupposes that it is the market, free exchange of interests and the

flowing together of more complex relations that can be referred to aninternational and global civil society. These are to be constituted as the

preconditions and the instruments of efficacious State building. It thus offers

the political legitimacy and consensus that weak or failed institutions lack.

Furthermore, the States to which this security governance prevalently refers

are failing or transitional states: weak political and institutional organisations,

often organised exclusively around the repressive potential of the army and

around the redistribution of external aid. In reality, recent reflections on

security governance derives from the failure of traditional policies of peace

building, and from the evident limits of programmes of peace enforcing. The

construction of a stable statal-territorial organisation remains a cardinal

element of security policies. However, it is the networks of regulative powerand of international organisms that have to promote the construction of a

market and of an economy of development and, by means of this, to favour

civil society and to give form to the political legitimacy that are necessary for

the construction of a firm statal authority. In other words, only the correct

functioning of the market and of the autonomous flows of international civil

society can offer political legitimacy to processes (often diversely intended) of

statal and territorial construction and stabilisation.

Populations, migrations, development

Security governance, as it appears in these documents, shapes a

complex of policies that intervene on the most diverse aspects of human life.

These policies find application on local, regional, and global levels by

intervening on people and on populations. Certainly, themes such as control

and administration of birthrates and mortality, the proliferation of conflicts

and wars, of struggles against epidemics, famine, new diseases, poverty and

scarcity of resources, posit the exercise of a specific governmentality at the

centre of these policies. This governmentality has as its object not only the

States, nor simply individuals, but populations, although the individual

remains the social unit of reference. The individual appears as the holder of

rights and is put at the basis of processes of construction of the democratic-representative political architecture. These processes are declined as

procedures of empowerment.

Yet when security intervenes as a guarantee of safety or of

development, it intervenes upon groups and populations on the basis of a

profoundly different logic of government. This logic affects population as an

‘aggregate body’, as a united set of processes and phenomena that can be

made objective. In this context, the territorial dimension shows its importance

as a principle of separation and spatial division that is necessary for the

localisation of security interventions. Indeed, processes of State building and

market building that underlie policies of global security governance can end

well only if they are able to offer paths of stabilisation and territorial



15

localisation. It is possible to construct the object “population”, which is then

intervened upon by means of dispositifs of multiple security, only within well

defined territorial frameworks, even if potentially permeable.

Once again, the existence of an indissoluble relation between State and

territory is no longer the precondition for the existence of sovereign politicalorder. On the contrary, it is the construction of a sovereign order that becomes

the objective of policies that are ordered on a territorial basis and that aim at

the construction of State institutions and of a productive and mercantile space.

In this sense, control and management of migrations, the containment of

phenomena like movement and de-localisation of populations due to

environmental or military crises, probably represent the principal testing

ground of these policies, as they lie at the crossroad of all these problems.36

Discourses around security, when they are applied to these phenomena, are

perhaps those that help us to understand in greater detail the logic of

government of populations that underlies contemporary reflections on global

governance and the role that they attribute to the State.The logic of governing the phenomenon of migration follows the lines

of promoting foreseeable and ordered movements through concerted and

multilateral policies of global governance of migrations: “Multilateral

approaches are essential for promoting orderly and predictable movements of

people. Needed is an international migration framework of norms, processes

and institutional arrangements to ensure such order and predictability”.37

Order and predictability are, in these cases, verifiable objectives only on the

basis of the efficacy of territorial intervention of implemented policies. These

policies certainly exist due to the contribution of several actors, but they still

see a central role attributed to statal authorities. It is precisely the necessity ofcontrol and territorial management of phenomena, fluid in their own nature,

which pushes towards concerted policies and toward the strengthening of

territorial divisions. This is because “to identify and implement solutions to

displacement situations […] through voluntary repatriation, resettlement or

integration into host communities”,38

implies an effort by the international

community to reinforce territorial control and government of populations,

exercised by State institutions with the support of supranational actors and

policies.

In this sense, the change that has occurred in the last decades regarding

support policies for refugees is significant. While refugees were previously

“taken care of” by welcoming policies that were centrally organised on thebasis of an individual right to find refuge in the host country – a policy with a

juridical ‘matrix’, which is focused upon the individual as the bearer of

inalienable rights – the refugee is today “taken care of” by security policies

that provide assistance and support to repatriation, but also forced

mobilisation.39

These policies are supported by humanitarian intervention

which is offered by the networks of organisations and international agencies

36 D. Graham (ed.), Migration, Globalisation and Human Security, London, Routledge, 1999.

37 HSC, Human Security Now, p. 52.38 Ibid.39

On this theme, see: H. Adelman, From Refugees to Forced Migration: the UNHCR and Human Security, ‘International Migration Review’, vol.35, n.1, 2001, pp.7-32.



16

and that are implemented by resorting – when necessary – to the usage of

force by States. The comments of Nevzat Soguk seem to be important in this

context. He has stressed how the conventional discourse on the refugee

constitutes, in reality, a narrative procedure

“on human displacement and estrangement, that seems more strange

than conventional. It is a strange discourse, for it has no place for

displaced humans, and no place for the refugee and the refugee’s

voice”.40

This narrative is configured as a discourse about the State, which aims to

reinforce the State and its territorial dimension:

“Conventional refugee discourse is instrumental in statecraft. […] the

refugee discourse, articulating a specific historical image of the refugee,

serves as a boundary-producing discourse instrumental in the expression,empowerment and institutionalization of a territorialized figure of

citizen-subject, the presumed foundational subject on the basis of which

the sovereign state has been articulated historically. Refugee discourse

is, in other words, a statist discourse, anchored primarily in statism”.41

In this sense, the State is confirmed both as the holder of a monopoly of

the usage of legitimate force and as the holder of a monopoly upon the

legitimate circulation of commodities and people.42

However, at least in the

latter case, regulation of processes and the management of fallouts produced

by this regulation have to be undertaken by international security ‘agents’. Inthis light, the pronouncement of the High Commission of the United Nations

for refugees in its Hague Program of 2004 is significant.43

It maintained “an

increasing externalisation of tools and measures of control of migrations, even

of those aiming to make policies of repatriation more effective”.44

Instead of

structuring interventions on the basis of individual rights, the eventual

attribution of which remains among the competences of territorial

sovereignties, security governance tries to define a migration framework

within which these moves can be played out and their containment and

protection can be offered. Certainly, this framework will be able to work only

by means of States and beyond them, as the irreducible dimension to the

territorial division of migrations and movements of peoples makes de-territorialised policies necessary, alongside strongly territorialising policies.

Without a clear territorial dimension, it appears to be difficult to build a

system capable of individuating in time the risks that are linked to these

phenomena and to operate in order to restrain situations of worse

40 N. Soguk, Refugees and Statecraft , ‘International Politics’, vol. 35, 1998, pp.447-468, cit.

p.448.41 Ibid., p.449.42

J. Torpey, The Invention of the Passport. Surveillance, Citizenship and the State,

Cambridge, CUP, 2000.43 Presidency conclusions, 4-5th November 2004 – 14292/04 Annex I.44

E. Rigo, Pratiche di cittadinanza e governo della circolazione nello spazio europeo, op cit.p.291, in Biopolitica e democrazia, edited by A. Vinale, pp.279-296.



17

disadvantage:

“The security risks arising during large-scale forced population

movements need to be acknowledged and better understood […] Given

the permeability of borders and the ease of travel, efforts to strengthenthe refugee regime and establish and international migration framework

need to be accompanied by improvements in the protection of the

internally displaced persons”.45

Security governance, therefore, is exercised by attempting to prevent, to

anticipate and to govern the crisis in consideration of the ineliminable facts

that are offered by migration impulses, by the fallibility of policies of

repression or mere containment of migrations. As Enrica Rigo points out,

“to govern circulation means to govern the predictability of an event that

can occur or not. The calculation of an aleatory factor which isexpressed by the notion of luck (chance?) […] that politics and law

make when they assume as their object no longer human nature but the

population. Substantially, it is the government of security, understood

not only in the private-security sense”.46

In this context, development and economic promotion policies assume a

prevalent and determinant role, in a double sense: on the one hand, the

construction of a competitive market promotes wealth and economic

development, thus slowing down the most dramatic reasons for the

movements of populations and favouring a migration that is linked to

aspirations instead of necessities. On the other hand, promoting regulated and

ordered movements “reinforces the interdependence of countries and

communities and enhances diversity. It facilitates the transfer of skills and

knowledge. It stimulates economic growth and development”.47

It is the first of these two observations that receives more attention in

Human Security Now. The link between development and migrations is

certainly complex: if natural fluctuations of markets and the unavoidable

phases of economic crisis can push people to emigrate, it is also true that most

of the movements that are directed towards the richest countries come from

middle-income countries. This occurs because

“research also shows that poverty reduction strategies may contribute to

increased movements of people in the short and medium terms because

people have access more to the money, information and networks that

are essential for moving from one country to another”.48

Certainly, migratory policies are closely linked both to demographic

dimensions and to dimensions of control of resources (human and

45 HSC, Human Security, p.52.46 E. Rigo, Pratiche di cittadinanza, p.295.47

HSC, Human Security, p. 41.48 Ibid., p. 44.



18

environmental) as well as to dimensions of the economy and the market.

Franck Düvell emphasises how the current policies are articulated beginning

from needs of the labour market and how they compose a global regime of

government of ‘hybrid’ migrations, in which States, post-national formations

and new global actors such as the International Organisation for Migration orthe multiple NGOs that intervene on this theme compete.

49

In the section of Human Security Now entitled Economic security - the

power to choose among opportunities, as well as in the document A

Development Co-operation Lens on Terrorism Prevention, the link between

security and development is also evoked in order to respond to the fears

provoked by an international terrorism that is favoured by these movements of

people and populations. Migration data, and in more general terms,

movements of populations and people, assume a very particular importance

within the framework of security policies. This occurs because these

movements, more than other phenomena, reveal the conditions of deep

insecurity that characterise the condition of the planet. It is possible to addressthis condition only by defining ‘structural’ and long-term policies. For this

reason, in both the documents, the necessity of programmes that structure the

relation between governments, donors and all those actors who are involved in

the processes of prevention of conflicts and of support for development are

strongly stressed. At the same time, the necessity of strengthening governance

by means of policies that encourage the correct development of difficult areas

is re-emphasised. In other words, “the key issue is how to establish a

democratic political order, buttressed by social and economic growth”.50

The governmental logic that gives shape to the specific practices of

government of security governance is thus the expression of the efforts ofredefinition of the relations between State and government. It is, therefore, a

definition that occurs on the basis of specific mechanisms of security, which

operate as agents of economic development in the forms of a genuine

governance of populations. In this sense, what Michel Foucault wrote during

his course in 1978 on biopolitics seems to be confirmed: namely, that what

was at stake specifically in the liberalism that developed from the 1930s until

now is how to regulate the global exercise of political power on the principles

of a market economy”. Security governance shows how the global exercise of

a certain type of political power is based upon principles of regulation of the

economic system. In this sense, today a new and very particular intertwining

between macro- and micro- economic paradigms would seem to confirm thefoucauldian thesis of a liberal system that gives birth to an economic and

social regime in which the enterprise is not simply an institution, but a way of

acting in the economic and social field. According to Foucault in this society,

the more the law allows individuals the possibility of acting as they want in

the form of free enterprise, the more there are developed in society multiple

49 F. Düvell, La Globalizazzione del controllo delle migrazioni, in I confini delle liberta. Per

un’analisi politica delle migrazioni contemporanee, edited by S. Mezzadra, Roma,

DeriveApprodi, 2004, pp.23-50. Of the same author see also: Europäische und internationale

Migration. Theorie, Empirie, Geschichte. Münster, Lit, 2006; and F. Düvell and B. Jordan

Migration: Boundaries of Equality and Justice, Cambridge: Polity, 2003.50 HSC, Human Security Now, pp. 67-68; italics mine.



19

forms and peculiar dynamics of securing and strengthening the unity of the

‘enterprise’ by way of security policies.

The intertwining between micro- and macro- economics seems, indeed,

to function as a principle of regulation of the liberal economy of power and as

a logic of the exercise of those powers that compose it. Micro-economicsintervenes by offering those first principles on the basis of which rules and

normative prescriptions are defined. In an axiomatic way, these rules and

prescriptions have to lead the rational behaviour of individuals. In this way,

the aim is to reconstruct their strategic interactions and to define the lines of

optimisation of choices and preferences. The different theories of rational

choice and the modelling produced by game theory are the most well known

expressions of these theories. Macro-economics, even though it is based

mostly on the same assumptions that regulate micro-economics, is instead

concerned with the economy at an aggregate level and with the effects of

general equilibrium that behaviours and economic processes produce at a

global level. Micro-economic logic works as a ‘matrix’ on which specificprocesses of individualisation are grafted and on which they take form. These

processes constitute the grid of intelligibility and the rational core of projects

of reorganisation of the welfare state and of the reordering of the labour

market that mark neo-liberal contemporaneity. Micro-economics, therefore,

structures the ‘internal’, rational limit for the game of competition and the

procedures of its regulation. On the other hand, macro-economics gives form

to the ‘external’ limit of competitive dynamics, by structuring and describing

the environment within which processes of economic globalisation and

internationalisation have to assume a dynamic but stabilised and systemic

structure. This happens, in particular, through the models described byinternationalist macro-economics, those that emerge from the different trade

theories (established micro-economically) and the complex systems of

analysis of price-equilibrium (asset pricing).

Moreover, economic theory in the last decades has extensively scaled

down the idea that in the formalisation of models, individual preferences as

well as the technological and institutional framework in which these

preferences worked, could be taken for granted. Moreover, the idea that

economic agents are fully rational, self-interested and endowed with

potentially unlimited capacities of calculation and attention has been

reconsidered. Thanks to the reflections of Nobel Prize winners like Herbert

Simon and Daniel Kahneman (although the process has much more distantroots), the study of cognitive limitations in decisional processes as an

unavoidable component of micro-economic theory has been completely

affirmed in economics. A theoretical framework has emerged that poses the

problem of preferences in close connection with the problem of ‘social’

mechanisms of transformation and composition of these preferences. This

framework has transformed the traditional micro-economic models into ‘auto-

poietic’ models in which even the choices act upon preferences. As Pierluigi

Sacco and Stefano Zamagni argue, “the process of social selection becomes,

in a certain sense, the true fundamental level of description of economic

phenomenology”, and thus,



20

“insofar as pro-sociality can conquer a socially salient position, the

object of economic policy is no longer simply that of arranging

incentives that push self-interested agents to choose in a coherent way

with the goals fixed by the policy maker. The object of economic policy,

instead, becomes also that of creating the conditions for a growth and fora strengthening of pro-sociality and for its intelligent usage for the

prosecution of social welfare”.51

Governance, particularly in its security declination, represents an effort

of activation of pro-social behaviours. It is in the attempt of building a

complex of inter-individual and collective pro-social relations that we find the

profound reason for the emergence of a security governance that aims to

structure a new relation between the State and non-state actors, although

within the limits that are imposed by the equilibrium between economic

development, security dispositifs and representative democracy. Economic

development of the market and democratic political order thus composesystems of verification, the principles on the basis of which the results that

have been reached by policies of security governance can be verified.

Therefore, security, development and population are perhaps the terms that

more than others mark how the processes of transformation of current liberal

governmentality express a ‘critical’ moment of acceleration and systemic

change. On the one hand, there is the will to see the political democratic

model affirmed on a global scale; on the other hand, there is the attempt to

support this model by means of policies of governance that empty the

representative dimension and reduce the space of the exercise of government.

In similar terms, there is therefore the attempt to favour autonomousdevelopments of a competitive market through regulative policies that,

however, have to be supported by dispositifs of security because the

conservation and the increase, on a global level, of prevalent power structures

need the enlargement of the liberal political space and of the market.

These policies use governance as well as wars by intervening on

populations and individuals, also by means of statal units. In this framework,

the democratic political system is certainly ‘the’ political model of reference,

even if it has been transformed from a representative system centred upon

government into a more complex and ambiguous mixed system of

government/governance. In such a system, the weakness of State institutions

is compensated for with transnational networks of support, processes ofpolitical or economic delocalisation, or of re-allocation on a macro-regional or

global scale of instances of decision. The State, therefore, maintains a role – a

function – that is central and unavoidable today. It remains, on the global

level, the “unit of measurement” of spaces needed to guarantee those

territorial divisions from which the organisation, prediction, intervention upon

movements (of men or commodities) and management of flows begins. The

supply of strength that is proper to States works, like the Hobbesian sovereign,

to confirm and guarantee the ‘pacts’. Individuals and populations are the

51 P. Sacco and S. Zamagni, Introduzione. Qualcosa è cambiato e molto ancora si profila

all’orizzonte, p.10, in P.Sacco e S. Zamagni (eds), Teoria Economica e Relazioni Interpersonali, Bologna, Il Mulino, 2006.



objects of new governmental practices that are exercised on a local and global

scale, which, although they transcend the State, exploit its sovereign

dimension in order to guarantee the continuity of those processes of political

individualisation that we call citizenship. This citizenship is described by

Human Security Now in the following terms: “a person’s membership in aparticular state, is at the centre of democratic governance. It determines

whether a person has the right to take part in decisions, voice opinions and

benefits from the protection and rights granted by the state”.52

Thus, it is not an accident that global security governance is proposed

precisely by starting from the contexts in which the cores of state-political

power are weaker but where the possibility of building a political-state order,

on the basis of market and civil society principles, is greater. In these places,

development founded on the construction of concurrential and competitive

open markets is found alongside diversified instruments of security that

embrace the level of construction or of the strengthening of the existing

political order and state system – that are necessary for the government ofpopulations – as well as the broader level of the construction of a social,

plural, competitive, democratic organisation by means of specific processes of

individualisation. Security governance is presented as the declination of a

governmental rationality, at the centre of which there is a process of

‘attenuation’ of the State as well as a politics of negotiation between ‘rational’

actors on the basis of specific interests. The micro-macro system offers to this

politics, composed of strategic interactions between ‘rational’ actors, a logic

and a system of verification; security provides its guidelines; and the

population constitutes its privileged object.

52 M. Foucault, Nascita della Biopolitica, p. 133.

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