On the Role of Outsiders in Technical Development Critical Management Studies Conference, July 14-16, 1999, Manchester Technology Management Stream (“Innovation and Emancipation: The Management of Technology and the Process of Work”) Concept 1 June, 1999 Work in progress Do not quote without permission Ibo van de Poel Department of Philosophy and the History of Technology Technical University of Delft De Vries van Heystplantsoen 2 2628 RZ Delft The Netherlands Telephone: +31 15 2784716 Fax: +31 15 2784934 E-mail: [email protected]
Transcript
On the Role of Outsiders in Technical Development
Critical Management Studies Conference, July 14-16, 1999, Manchester
Technology Management Stream (“Innovation and Emancipation: The Management ofTechnology and the Process of Work”)
Concept 1 June, 1999Work in progressDo not quote without permission
Ibo van de PoelDepartment of Philosophy and the History of TechnologyTechnical University of DelftDe Vries van Heystplantsoen 22628 RZ DelftThe NetherlandsTelephone: +31 15 2784716Fax: +31 15 2784934E-mail: [email protected]
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AbstractA number of authors have shown that outsiders can play an important role in bringing aboutradical technical change. A coherent conceptualisation of the possible role of outsiders intechnical development is, however, still missing. This paper tries to make a beginning withthis task by offering a conceptual framework for understanding the role of outsiders intechnical development. This conceptual framework builds on existing studies and insights intechnical development in general and the role of outsiders in it in particular.Paying attention to the role of outsiders in technical development is interesting for at least tworeasons. One is scholarly: if outsiders play an important role in bringing about radicaltechnical change, understanding their role in technical development is important forunderstanding the dynamics of technical change. The other reason is political and normative:outsiders may be an interesting entry to recognise and exploit the potential for more 'societallydesirable' forms of technical development that, for example, take away undesired effects ofexisting technologies.In the paper, outsiders are defined as people who do not share the rules that guide the designand further development of a technology. The totality of these rules makes up the‘technological regime’ of a technology. This regime is characterised by certain trajectories oftechnical development. Outsiders then are people who do not share the existing technologicalregime. This is a main reason why they may trigger radical technical changes, i.e. changesdeviating from the existing technological regime.A taxonomy of different types of outsiders is developed building on existing studies andinsights with respect to the role of outsiders. Three groups of outsiders are distinguished:societal pressure groups, professional scientists and engineers, and industrial outsiders. Thesegroups differ with respect to the resources they possess and that can be used to come to play arole in technical development. They also differ with respects to the elements of technologicalregimes on which they usually impinge.A number of social mechanisms through which outsiders can come to play a role intechnological regimes and invoke technical change are discussed and placed in a generalconceptual framework for analysing technical change and continuity.Finally, attention is paid to the desirability of a closer involvement of outsiders in technicaldevelopment. It is argued that technical change invoked by (initial) outsiders may be aninteresting route to bring about technologies with less societally undesirable effects and moredemocratic forms of technical development. The involvement of outsiders therefore is aninteresting practical route to ‘improve’ technological development from a societally point ofview.
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1. IntroductionA number of authors have shown that outsiders can play an important role in bringing about(radical) technical change and in transforming existing patterns of technical development(Constant, 1980, Tushman & Anderson, 1986, Utterback, 1994, Truffer & Dürrenberger 1997,Van de Poel, 1998). A coherent conceptualisation of the possible role of outsiders in technicaldevelopment is, however, still missing. This paper tries to make a beginning with this task byoffering a conceptual framework for understanding the role of outsiders in technicaldevelopment. This conceptual framework builds on existing studies and insights in technicaldevelopment in general and the role of outsiders in it in particular.Paying attention to the role of outsiders in technical development is interesting for at least tworeasons. One is scholarly: if outsiders play an important role in bringing about radicaltechnical change, understanding their role in technical development is important forunderstanding the dynamics of technical change. The other reason is political and normative:outsiders may be an interesting entry to recognise and exploit the potential for more 'societallydesirable' forms of technical development that, for example, take away undesired effects ofexisting technologies (cf. Rip, Misa & Schot, 1995 and Irwin, Georg & Vergragt, 1995).While the focus of this paper is on understanding the role of outsiders in technicaldevelopment, some attention will be paid to the normative arguments that may be broughtforward for increasing the role of outsiders in technical development.The paper starts with discussing the definition of outsiders. Outsiders will be defined as thoseactors who do not share the rules that guide the design and further development of atechnology. The totality of these rules makes up the ‘technological regime’ of a technology.Different categories of outsiders will be distinguished possessing different types of relevantresources and getting involved in technical development in different ways. The mechanismsby which these different outsiders come to play a role in technical development and the(potential) resulting technical changes will be discussed. Attention will be paid to the questionif outsiders more often than insiders trigger radical technical innovations. In the final section,some normative and political issues related to the role of outsiders in technical developmentare discussed.
2. The Definition of OutsidersIn many studies paying attention to the role of outsiders in technical development, the conceptof 'outsider' is not explicitly defined. One definition that often seems to be used implicitly isthat outsiders are those people that are not involved in the design of, and decision-makingabout a technology.1 Another definition that is sometimes used, either implicitly or explicitly,is that outsiders do not share the rules that are characteristic of a particular system ofinteraction.2 This second definition is in line with the general definition of outsiders given byHoward Becker in his 1963 book Outsiders. Studies in the Sociology of Deviance. It is alsoconsonant with the way Constant uses the notion of 'outsider' in his book The Origins of theTurbojet Revolution. In this book Constant shows that outsiders to the existing aero-enginecommunity initiated the turbojet revolution. This community had some common ideas abouthow to exploit further the potential of the existing technology for aircraft propulsion, i.e.piston-engines with propellers. The existing aero-engine community embodied what Constantcalls a 'technological tradition'. The outsiders - who eventually would initiate the turbojetrevolution - held ideas and had presuppositions that in some respects radically deviated fromthe existing technological tradition. That was an important reason why they triggered a radicaltechnical change.
1 This definition seems to be used implicitly by Tushman & Anderson, 1986, Utterback, 1994, and Truffer & Dürrenberger 1997.2 This definition is implicitly used in Constant (1980) and explicitly in Van de Poel (1998). Cf. also Bijker (1995).
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In this paper, I will use the second definition of outsiders. Outsiders are defined as thosepeople that do not share the relevant rules with respect to the design and development of aparticular technology. In this section, I will first discuss some of the relevant rules withrespect to technical development. I will call the totality of these rules the technologicalregime of a technology. Thereafter, I will discuss the relation between not sharing the relevantrules with respect to technical development, the technological regime, and being outside aparticular system of interaction.
Technological RegimesThe interaction systems in which technical developments take place are characterised byparticular rules. These rules vary in form and content. Some are related to the design of atechnology, others to its use, others again to divisions of labour and roles. Some rules areexplicitly laid down, for example in technical norms, others are implicit and will be followedby the actors on the basis of habits or tacit knowledge. Rules can also be embodied, forexample in production apparatus. The totality of the relevant rules makes up the technologicalregime of a technology (Nelson & Winter, 1977; Disco, Rip & Van der Meulen, 1992; Rip &Kemp, 1998; Van de Poel, 1998).If one is interested in technical development and change, the most important rules relate to thedesign and development of the technology in question. These rules are given in Figure 1 (Thefigure is from Van de Poel, 1998; cf. also Clark, 1985 on design hierarchy). One basic notionof technology underlying Figure 1 is that technical artefacts have a dual nature, being both aphysical object and fulfilling a social function (Kroes, 1996). Artefacts fulfil certainfunctions, can be used for particular goals and have to meet certain design criteria andrequirements, rules that are all on the left in Figure 1. On the other hand, technical artefactshave a physical structure that can be thought out and achieved with the help of scientificknowledge and other design tools and technical means, elements that are on the right inFigure 1.The other basic idea that underliesFigure 1 is that some rules intechnological regimes are more generaland abstract than others are. Whileearlier designed and produced artefactsthemselves are not rules, they contain(many) implicit rules than are used inthe further development of atechnology. They in other wordsfunction as exemplars (cf. Van den Belt& Rip, 1987. The notion of exemplarycomes from Kuhn, 1962). Other rules intechnological regimes are more generaland abstract. They may also containdynamic elements and can thus be usedto change other rules in atechnological regime. An example isthe expectation known as Moore’s law(Van Lente & Rip, 1998). This lawpredicts that the complexity of memory chips, expressed in the number of ‘gates’, will doubleevery one and a half year. Moore’s law is, of course, not a natural law, but is holds because –and as long as – actors believe in it, act on the basis of it and are (technically) successful.What is important is that the general expectation, expressed by Moore’s law, results in design
Figure 1 The Triangle of TechnicalDevelopment
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requirements for further chip development. So, Moore’s law contains a dynamic elementresulting in a more or less stable pattern of memory chip development.The different rules shown in Figure 1 can now be described as follows:• Guiding principles are general principles that relate the design of a technology to
doctrines and values that are used to legitimate a technological regime and its outcomes(Smit, Elzen & Enserink, 1998).
• Promises and expectations about future technology will, when shared in a technologicalregime, be translated into more specific requirements for new technology and so guide thedevelopment of new artefacts (Van Lente & Rip, 1998).
• Design criteria broadly define the kind of functions or functional requirements to befulfilled by an artefact and the kind of boundary conditions that are important in thedesign of a technology.
• Design tools are tools used in the design process. Design tools include scientificknowledge, design heuristics, technical models and design methods and approaches.
• Design concepts are concept for the design of a class of artefacts. Technical features andcomponent parts are characteristics of artefacts as they are designed in technologicalregimes.
• Requirements & specifications are a specification of the general design criteria that aretypical of a technological regime.
• Artefacts.
The Relation between Being Outside the Relevant System of Interaction and not Sharing theTechnological RegimeUsually, many of those outside a system of interaction will be ignorant of the specific rules ofthe relevant technological regime. However, if they (want to) become involved in the systemof interaction, they often (have to) learn or adopt these rules. Becoming an insider oftenmeans beginning to share the relevant rules (cf. Bourdieu, 1985). In the same sense, stayingan insider often means following the existing rules. This is the case because other actors willoften label rule-breaking behaviour as 'deviant' and try to exclude actors, who do or maybehave in a too deviant way (cf. Becker, 1963 and Parkin, 1974). This is not to say that thelimits of deviance are necessarily known to the actors in advance, but there may be a momentwhen an actor has 'gone too far' and has to face the counteraction of other actors, which mayultimately result in exclusion from the system of interaction. Below, I will give an example toillustrate the point in relation to technical development.3
In the late eighties and early nineties, governments - especially in the industrialised world -began to ban CFCs. This implied that the household refrigerator industry - among otherindustries - had to replace CFCs in their products. Until then, CFC 12 was commonly used ascoolant in household refrigerators.In Germany, the refrigerator firms developed a common strategy to replace CFC 12 byanother coolant. Like refrigerator firms in other countries they eventually choose HFC 134aas a substitute for CFC 12. This choice was, however, criticised by environmental groups likeGreenpeace because HFC134a contributed to the greenhouse effect. In 1990 or 1991,Greenpeace Germany came in contact with two German doctors who had developed a coolantbased on hydrocarbons. This coolant contributed less to the greenhouse effect, but it wasflammable which was potentially disadvantageous with respect to safety.Greenpeace tried to find a German refrigerator firm to commercialise the coolant but all ofthem refused until 1992. In that year, Greenpeace came in contact with a refrigerator firm
3 This example is based on Van de Poel (1998, 84-97). See also Verheul & Vergragt (1995). Hugo Verheul and Ibo Van de Poel carried outthe empirical research for this study in 1994. Part of the research was financed by the SEER programme of the European Community (DGXII).
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from the former East Germany, DKK Scharfenstein (later renamed as Foron). In EastGermany, DKK Scharfenstein had had a monopoly position but after the German unificationit had quickly lost market share and in 1992 the company was almost bankrupt. In thissituation, DKK Scharfenstein was willing to develop a prototype refrigerator withhydrocarbons as coolant. The refrigerator developed was later named the Greenfreeze.The behaviour of DKK Scharfenstein was seen as 'deviant' and 'undesirable' by the otherrefrigerator firms. They undertook action to stop this deviant behaviour. In September 1992,the seven largest German refrigerator firms sent a letter to retail trade in which they insistedthat the energy use of the Greenfreeze was too high. Moreover, they proclaimed that thefeasibility of hydrocarbons as coolant was not yet proven.Managing director Günther of DKK also endured the rejection personally. He describes ameeting of the ZVEI, the German branch organisation of refrigerator manufacturers, asfollows:
“We met people I knew from the past [. . .] and had sensible conversations with;suddenly all became distanced. We were treated at the ZVEI as if we were crazy orhad a bad, infectious disease. Right and left [to me] a place was free; nobody sat downnext to me. Only a few were prepared to shake hand with us.” (interview Günther,translated from German)
“We had the feeling that we were disqualified as terrorists” (ibidem.)
Günther was punished for breaking the rules of the game. The first, and perhaps mostimportant, rule he had broken was that an alternative to CFC12 was to be chosen by theGerman refrigerator manufacturers collectively. But he also had broken a number of technicalnorms and rules, for example that a refrigerator coolant had to be non-flammable.Despite efforts to disqualify DKK and its Greenfreeze, DKK and Greenpeace were able togather about 65,000 orders for the Greenfreeze. Moreover, the Greenfreeze acquired thesafety approval from the TÜV (the Technical Certification Institute in Germany). Fearing aloss of market share, the other refrigerator companies now also felt forced to develop arefrigerator with hydrocarbons as coolant.This example shows that actors may - and presumably often will - try to punish or correctdeviant or rule-breaking behaviour of other actors. In this specific case, the refrigerator firmswere eventually not successful. In the end, they had to accept the transition to householdrefrigerators using hydrocarbons as coolant, which since has become the rule, at least inGermany and large parts of Western Europe.The case also shows how Greenpeace, initially outside the relevant system of interaction andnot sharing (at least some) of the rules of the dominant technological regime, could becomean insider in the sense of being part of the system of interaction but not in the sense of sharingall the relevant rules. This means that outsiders may become part of the relevant system ofinteraction by other mechanisms than adopting the existing rules through processes likeeducation and socialisation. In this case, Greenpeace could come to play an important rolebecause it was able to mobilise important other actors, like DKK and the consumers ofhousehold refrigerators.The example finally shows something about to degree to which insiders have to follow theexisting rules of a technological regime. Although DKK was in a special position, being acompany from the former DDR, it was inside the relevant system of interaction. Its decisionnot to follow some of the relevant rules was presumably a conscious one. Being almostbankrupt, DKK had little to lose. It regarded the development of a more environmentallybenign refrigerator with backing from Greenpeace as a possible means to regain market share
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and to save the company. It may have foreseen the reaction of the other fridge manufacturers,but this reaction could hardly be worse than going bankrupt.In general, actors will follow the relevant rules, the technological regime, not only out of habitor unconsciously but also because they think they have something to lose by not obeying tothe rules, or because they think they have something to win by obeying. This explains whyactors in specific situations may perform rule-breaking behaviour, although they usually donot so.There are other reasons as well why insiders not always have to follow the relevant rules. Oneis that the rules existing in a technological regime may be ambiguous, disputed orinapplicable in a new situation.4 Different rules may also conflict in particular situations. Thisambiguous and sometimes contradictory character of rules creates room for strategicbehaviour of actors. This is not to say that actors can behave as they want, but that the ‘right’interpretation of the rules may be unclear or contested.Another point is that some of the rules in technological regimes are specific for a particularcategory of actors. Such rules amount to so-called roles.5 While designers may share certaindesign heuristics or technical models, users may be ignorant of such rules. This shows that notall actors will uniformly share the rules of a technological regime. Some rules are role-specific. This has important implications. It means - depending on the specific division oflabour and content of roles in a technological regime - that some insiders may be in a betterposition to initiate innovations than others are. This may even be innovations that break withsome of the rules of the existing regime (Van de Poel, 1998).The above implies that both insiders and outsiders may not completely share all the rules of atechnological regime. This suggests that both insiders and outsiders may initiate innovationsdeparting from the current regime and eventually transforming the existing technologicalregime, although outsiders will probably do so more often than insiders. In the rest of thepaper, I will focus on the role of outsiders in (radical) technical change. In doing so, I willfocus on outsiders that 1) are outside or at least marginal in the relevant system of interactionand 2) do not share some of the relevant rules with respect to technical development.
3. A Taxonomy of OutsidersIn studies paying attention to the role of outsiders in technical development, differentcategories of outsiders play a role. Below, I propose a taxonomy that tries to do justice to thedifferent types of outsiders that may initiate (radical) technical change. The taxonomyconsists of three categories of outsiders: 1) societal pressure groups, 2) engineers andscientific professionals, and 3) firms. The three groups are distinguished with respect to thedifferent kinds of resources they possess. Such resources can be used to achieve a role intechnological development and to trigger technical change. I will argue that the differentgroups also differ with respect to the typical elements (rules) of existing technologicalregimes on which they impinge and with respect to the kind of social mechanisms by whichthey may trigger (radical) technical change. These aspects are summarised in Table 1.
Societal Pressure GroupsThe term societal pressure groups is used here as a broad umbrella term for such diversegroups as environmental groups, animal rights groups, feminist groups, nature conservationgroups, local protest groups, consumer groups and organisations, patient organisations,churches and labour unions, et cetera.Numerous examples can be given in which such societal pressure groups have influencedtechnical development. Anti-nuclear groups, for example, have had an important impact on
4 Note also that rule-breaking behaviour needs not always to be recognised as such by other actors in a system of interaction.5 According to Boudon (1981, 40), 'A role is defined by the group of norms to which the holder of the role is supposed to subscribe.'
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the development of nuclear reactors. In some countries, their protests eventually triggered apolitical ban of nuclear power. In other countries, they contributed to declining economicprospects of nuclear energy. This is one of the main reasons why no new nuclear reactorshave been built in the United States since 1978 (Bupp & Derian, 1978, Jasper, 1990).Societal pressure groups may not only inhibit the development of a particular technology, butalso promote it. Contraceptive techniques provide an example. Walsh (1995) describes howsince the twenties the 'birth control movement tried to break down the complex of moral,religious and cultural values and prejudices, which denied knowledge of contraceptivetechniques to the majority and confined contraception to its own clandestine milieu beneaththe surface of "respectable" society. They put pressure on the medical profession to take amore positive attitude to birth control and worked with some of the more progressive doctorsin evaluating different contraceptive methods and providing supplies and information in theclinics they established' (Walsh, 1995, 269, note left out). Eventually, the birth controlmovement had an important impact on the acceptance of contraception in general and theacceptance of particular contraceptives, like the pill, in particular. Societal pressure groupsmay also play an active role in the development of new technologies or the furtherdevelopment of already existing design concepts. The role of Greenpeace in the Greenfreezecase provides an example. Other examples are the development of windmills and of moreenvironmentally sound sewage treatment methods (Verheul & Vergragt, 1995 and Jørgen &Karnøe, 1995).Apart from inhibiting and promoting technical development, societal pressure groups mayinfluence the course of technical development and invoke technical change (Van de Poel,1998). The earlier discussed Greenfreeze case shows how Greenpeace triggered an importantinnovation that deviated from the existing technological regime of household refrigerators. Inthe case of nuclear reactors, the mentioned public protests were a main reason for thepromotion of a new approach to nuclear reactor design in the eighties (van de Poel, 1998).This approach is known as ‘inherent safety’ and professionals outside the dominant nuclearcommunity were among the first to promote it. The birth control movement not onlypromoted the development of contraception technologies, but also their shaping. They did so,for example, 'by evaluating different products and putting pressure on the manufacturers toimprove their reliability' (Walsh, 1995, 270). Other technical developments shaped by societal
Elements of Figure 1 onwhich groups usuallyimpinge
Functions, designcriteria, requirements
(elements on the left inFigure 1)
Technical models, designconcepts (elements on the
right in Figure 1)Translations between
different elements
Technical Artefacts
Mechanisms for outsidersinvolvement and technicalchange
Lead articulatorsDelegitimation detourSocial Experiments
Jurisdictional vacanciesEntry of outsider firmsin existing or newmarkets
General mechanism inrelation to transformation oftechnological regimes (seeSection 4)
Aggression Demand
Table 1 A Taxonomy of Outsiders
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pressure groups include the development of more silent aero-engines, of environmentallysound paints and of more ‘humane’ poultry housing systems (Van de Poel, 1998).Societal pressure groups usually impinge on those elements in technological regimes that arerelated to the goals and functions for which a technology can be used, or to design criteria orrequirements to be met by technical designs (cf. Van de Poel, 1998). These are all elementson the left in the triangle of technical development (Figure 1). This is related to the fact thatsocietal pressure groups typically aim at changing the social world in one way or the other.Usually, they are not so much interested in technology as such, but in the way technologiescan be used for societal goals, or the kind of secondary effects technologies may have andwhich may be considered undesirable. In the latter case, societal pressure groups may urge forthe taking away of these undesired effects by the incorporation of new design criteria orrequirements in an existing technological regime.Societal pressure groups usually lack the technical competence or the managerial power toinfluence technical development in direct ways. Often, they will try to make themselves heardthrough protests for or against certain (features of) technologies. By articulating – directly orindirectly – desirable or undesirable functions and secondary effects of a technology, theymay function like Rip, Misa and Schot (1995) have called lead articulators. These are'carriers of credibility pressure and … actors who put and maintain a certain issue on theagenda. … [P]ressure groups can act as lead articulators, in the same way that economistshave identified the role of lead users. They help articulate a certain demand or mode ofacceptance and in this way influence technical change' (Rip, Misa and Schot, 1995, 351).Societal pressure groups may also mobilise other actors against an existing technologicalregime, as in the earlier discussed case of the Greenfreeze. This social mechanism can becalled a delegitimation detour (Van de Poel & Disco, 1996; Van de Poel, 1998). A first step ina delegitimation detour is the rhetorical labelling of particular (dis)functions or secondaryeffects of a technology as morally objectionable. If this rhetorical labelling is successful, otheractors may feel compelled to undertake actions against certain features of an existingtechnological regime as well. Which actors these are may differ from case to case. Generallyspeaking, however, two types of actors seems to be a good position to be mobilised againstexisting technological regimes in a delegitimation detour: users and governments (or moregenerally formulated: regulators). These actors are – generally speaking – not insensitive topublic opinion. So if a certain technology, or certain features of it, is generally seen asillegitimate this may provide these actors with a reason to act. These two categories of actors,moreover, have usually less invested in existing technology than such actors as the designersand producers of a technology have.6 Finally, users and governments can usually influencetechnical development more directly than societal pressure groups can do. If a significantgroup of users stops buying the existing technology or switches to an alternative technology,this may have a profound influence on technical development as in the earlier discussedGreenfreeze case. Governments can also profoundly influence technical development viaforbidding certain technologies, subsidising alternative options or enforcing technicalstandards.The willingness of users to stop buying existing technical products and of governments(regulators) to change authoritatively the rules of a regime will usually depend on theavailability of technical alternatives. Users will usually not give up the benefits of an existingtechnology unless an alternative is available that provides comparable benefits and takes awaysome undesirable effects. Governments often consider the social and economic costs ofregulation of a technology too high unless viable alternatives are available.Technical alternatives may be developed by insiders who largely share the existing
6 Of course, there are also cases in which users or governments (regulators) have much invested in and are heavily dependent on the existingtechnology.
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technological regime as well as by outsiders. Insiders may do so because, as was arguedearlier, they need not share the existing technological regime entirely (for empirical examples,see Van de Poel, 1998). Outsiders may form coalitions or social networks to develop analternative technology. Such initiatives can amount to what Verheul and Vergragt (1995) havecalled social experiments, ‘i.e. examples of self-organisation in which citizen groups and non-governments organizations play a leading role’ (Verheul & Vergragt, 1995, 320). Empiricalevidence suggests that such initiatives usually focus on existing technologies (Verheul &Vergragt, 1995, see also Van de Poel, 1998). Examples are the Greenfreeze, windmills andmore ‘humane’ housing systems for laying hensThe contribution of social experiments to technical development is not so much thegeneration of new concepts as well as creating a protected space to turn a technical conceptinto a working technology. If other actors, like the users of an existing technology orgovernments and regulators, begin to regard such alternative technologies as viable, this maytrigger technical change.
Professional Engineers and ScientistsA second category of outsiders are professionals engineers and scientists who are not (yet)involved in design and R&D activities with respect to a particular technology and do notshare the relevant rules of the technological regime. In contrast to societal pressure groups,these groups possess an important resource that may be useful to influence technicaldevelopment directly: scientific or engineering knowledge. This also means that professionalswill usually impinge on those of technological development that are related to scientific andengineering knowledge like design tools and design concepts. They may also bring inknowledge to make translations between the different elements of a technological regime, likethe translation of design criteria into more concrete requirements.If professional outsiders acquire a role in a technological regime, they will usually triggertechnical change. Because they do not share all the rules of the existing regime, theirinvolvement will probably lead to changes in the current patterns of technical development.Outsider professionals may be able to acquire a role in a technological regime if certain gapsin the division of expert labour exist or are created. Abott (1988) has called such gapsjurisdictional vacancies in the professional system of expert labour (see also Disco, 1999).Such vacancies may already exist but usually they will emerge due to the internal dynamics oftechnological regimes or through the actions of different groups of outsiders.Available empirical evidence suggests at least four ways in which jurisdictional vacanciesmay emerge in the system of expert labour that is devoted to technical design of, and R&D ona particular technology. One way is through the articulation of new design criteria. Anexample in which this happened is the design of the Oosterschelde barrier in the Netherlands(Disco, 1999 and Van de Poel, 1998). The Oosterschelde is an estuary in the southwest of theNetherlands. When in 1953 the south-west of the Netherlands was struck by a huge stormflood, killing 1835 people, it was decided to close off the Oosterschelde as part of the DeltaPlan, a plan to increase the safety from flooding in the south-west of the Netherlands. Theclosure of the Oosterschelde was originally planned to start in the late sixties, early seventies.At that time, however, environmental groups and fishermen’s organisations succeeded inmobilising public opinion against closure. They especially stressed the ecological value of theOosterschelde estuary. Eventually, the government decided not to close off the Oosterscheldebut to build a semi-permeable storm surge barrier, as a kind of compromise between safetyand the new design criterion ecology. This technical change was triggered by the actions ofthe mentioned social pressure groups. It subsequently led to a demand on professionaloutsiders like ecologists and biologists because the new design criterion ecology had to betranslated into more concrete design requirements. Knowledge to make this translation was
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lacking in the existing technological regime. So, a jurisdictional vacancy was created that wasfilled by professional biologists and ecologists. This resulted not only in changes in the designof the Oosterschelde barrier, but also in more general changes in technological regime ofcoastal barriers in the Netherlands. Ecological design criteria have since become a legitimateand common concern in this regime.A second way in which a jurisdictional vacancy may be created is through the acceptance of anew design approach in a technological regime. Biotechnologists and microbiologists, forexample, have, since about the seventies, argued for a biotechnological approach to the designof sewage treatment plants (Van de Poel, 1998). They argued that in this way sewagetreatment plants could be designed in a more optimal way and that particular problems insewage treatment plant design could be solved. In this way, they tried to create a jurisdictionalvacancy in the system of expert labour that was, until then, mainly occupied by civilengineers (and, to a lesser extent, chemists). Insofar as the new biotechnological designapproach was accepted, microbiologists and biotechnologists were able to acquire a role insewage treatment plant design and research and certain changes in sewage treatment plantdesign materialised.A third route for the creation of jurisdictional vacancies is the articulation of new designconcepts that require engineering and scientific knowledge not available in the current regime.Professional outsiders may propose such new design concepts, even in the face of a stillfunctioning technology. In that case, they may argue that a presumptive anomaly exists. Theterm presumptive anomaly has been introduced by Constant (1980). According to him, apresumptive anomaly arises if an old technology still functions, ‘indeed still may offersubstantial development potential, but science suggests that the leading edge of future practicewill have a radically different foundation’ (Constant, 1987, 225). Constant describes thecreation of a presumptive anomaly in the case of the so-called turbojet revolution. The(outsider) proponents of the turbojet presumed that - given the earlier advances instreamlining of aircraft - the propeller would become the limiting element if future increasesin aircraft speed were to be achieved. They derived this insight from aerodynamic science.This presumptive anomaly created the room (jurisdictional vacancy) for at least a smallnumber of people to focus their attention on new technological options like the turbojet, whilethe existing technology (piston engines with propellers) was not yet malfunctioning orwithout development potential. Eventually, the turbojet would become a technical andcommercial success resulting in a radical technical change in aero-engine design.In the case of the turbojet, the involvement of outsiders eventually resulted in theabandonment of existing design concepts and technical models. Outsider professional may,however, also come to play a role in the further development of existing technical models anddesign concepts. Jurisdictional vacancies, in other words, may also exist or be created in thedivision of expert labour with respect to existing technical models and design concepts. Thedesign of sewage treatment plants provides and example again (Van de Poel, 1998). Alreadybefore the articulation of a biotechnological design approach to sewage treatment plantdesign, microbiologists had – with some success – tried tocontribute to technical models forsewage treatment plant design. They did so by the development of design parameters thatboth had a practical relevance for the dimensioning of sewage treatment plant and had amicrobiological meaning. In this way, they created room for their contribution to sewagetreatment plant design without entirely overthrowing the existing way of sewage treatmentplant design. This made their contribution certainly more acceptable in the eyes of the alreadyinvolved civil engineers.
Firms (Industrial Outsiders)A third category of outsiders that may initiate technical change is firms outside the established
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industry producing a technology. These may be (resourceful) firms from another industry butalso newly established firms. The latter may be established because the founders expect tomake profits with a (new) technical concept, but also for ideological reasons. Examples of thelater are eco-entrepreneurs who started producing ‘natural paints’ or environmentally friendlydetergents out of dissatisfaction with the ecological performance of existing products (cf.Irwin, Georg & Vergragt, 1995).While there are large differences between different types of industrial outsiders, outsider firmsusually possess some financial and managerial resources and engineering expertise to acquirea role in existing technological regimes or in a new technological regime. They will usuallytry to intrude into existing markets or to create new markets by developing new technicalproducts.A number of authors have argued that industrial outsiders play a major role in initiatingradical technical innovations. Tushman & Anderson (1986), for example, describe eight majortechnical breakthroughs in the airline, cement and microcomputer industry. In doing so, theydistinguish between competence-destroying and competence-enhancing discontinuities. 'Theformer require new skills, abilities, and knowledge in both the development and production ofthe product. The hallmark of competence-destroying discontinuities is that mastery of the newtechnology fundamentally alters the set of relevant competences within a product class'(Tushman & Anderson, 1986, 442). Competence-enhancing discontinuities, on the otherhand, 'are order-of magnitude improvements in price/performance that build on existingknow-how within a product class. Such innovations substitute for older technologies, yet donot render obsolete skills require to master the old technology' (Tushman & Anderson, 1986,442). Tushman and Anderson find that the two competence-destroying discontinuities in theirsample are merely initiated by industrial outsiders (7 out of 11 firms), while insiders usuallyintroduce competence-enhancing discontinuities (35 out of 37 firms).Utterback (1994) makes similar observations on the basis of a sample of 46 discontinuousproduct and process innovations from the typewriter, lighting, plate glassmaking, ice andrefrigeration, and imaging industry. Apart from the distinction between competence-destroying and competence-enhancing innovations, he makes two other distinctions: betweenassembled and non-assembled (homogeneous) products and between innovations that aremerely substitutes of existing products and innovations that broaden the market. He arguesthat competence-destroying innovations of assembled products that broaden the market aremost likely to be initiated by outsiders. This is confirmed by his data: 5 out of 6 cases areinitiated by outsiders with one inconclusive. If two of the three factors (competence-destroying/ competence-enhancing, assembled/ non-assembled, broadening the market/substitute) are 'positive', it also are usually outsiders initiating the innovation (16 out of 18cases with one insider and one inconclusive). If one factor is positive, outsiders and insidersseem equally important (14 cases, 6 outsiders, 6 insiders, 2 inconclusive). If no factor ispositive, it are usually insiders initiating the innovation (7 out of 8 cases, one inconclusive).The findings of Tushman and Anderson (1986) and Utterback (1994) are corroborated byother studies. Porter (1990) studied more than 100 industries in 10 countries. He finds that'often innovators are “outsiders,” in some way to the existing industry' (Porter, 1990, 48).Stoelhorst in a study of the semi-conductor industry found that ‘disruptive new technologiesin the semiconductor industry were launched by firms that were relatively new to theindustry’ (Stoelhorst, 1997, 335). Truffer & Dürrenberger (1997) make a similar point indescribing outsider initiatives with respect to the development of less environmentallyharmful cars.A main reason why radical innovations come more often from industrial outsiders thaninsiders is that outsiders have little to lose in pursuing radical innovations while industrialinsiders often have a lot to lose (cf. Utterback, 1994). Insiders usually have invested a lot in
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the current technology. It may take years before investments in R&D and productionapparatus for current technology are earned back. Material, managerial and knowledgeresources are often related to current technology. Firms also often seem to focus on theircurrent users and their wishes in further developing their technical products (cf. Bower &Christensen, 1995). As a result, industry insiders have little incentives to shift their attentionto new, often unproven, areas of technical development that may result in radical innovations.Outsiders do not carry the burden of sunken investments and resource allocation to currenttechnology. They are therefore often in a better position to develop and introduce radicalinnovations. In the words of Porter (1990, 49): ‘Outsiders may be better able to perceive newopportunities. Or they may possess the different expertise and resources required to competein a new way. Leaders of innovating companies are frequently also outsiders in a moreintangible, social sense. They are not part of the industrial elite nor are they viewed asaccepted participants in the industry. This makes such companies less concerned withviolating established norms or engaging in unseemly competition.’Of course, outsiders will not always or necessarily be successful. But, if they are they maywell initiate radical technical changes and transform the existing technological regime.Sometimes, initial or relative outsiders may be so successful in pursuing a radical innovationthat they become one of the market leaders in an industry (Porter, 1990, Utterback, 1994;Stoelhorst, 1997). Outsiders may also become marginal players. Still, they may triggertechnical change because they may introduce radical innovations that are mimicked byestablished firms, for example because these firms fear to lose market share.
4. Outsiders and Radical InnovationThe previous section shows that outsiders can, and sometimes do, play an important role ininitiating (radical) technical innovations. It does, however, not show – what sometimes hasbeen suggested – that outsiders will more often initiate radical innovations than insiders do.To answer the question if this is indeed the case, it is necessary to be somewhat more preciseabout the notion of ‘radical innovation’. Below, I will propose to define radical technicalinnovation in relation to existing technological regimes and the possible transformation ofsuch regimes. From the notions of regime transformation and radical innovation that Ipropose, it follows that there are good reasons to hypothesise that outsiders play acomparatively more important role in initiating radical innovations than insiders do. Finally, itwill be shown that available empirical evidence corroborates this hypothesis.
Radical InnovationTechnological regimes are not static. They enable certain innovations, while they constrainothers. This was already shown by the earlier example of Moore’s Law. This law ‘predicts’that the complexity of chips doubles every one and a half year. The socio-technical rulesimplied by Moore’s law result, as we have seen, in a trajectory of technical innovation.Innovations that are in accordance with the rules of the current technological regime and,therefore, are enabled by that regime, can be called incremental innovations. Innovations thatare largely constrained by the current regime because they break with important rules may becalled radical technical innovations. The incrementalness or radicalness of an innovation isthus defined in relation to an existing technological regime.It is useful to compare these definitions of incremental and radical technical innovation withthose proposed by other authors. Tushman & Anderson (1986) call an innovation radical if itachieves a jump in price/performance ratio of the technology in question. Such innovationsmay be competence-destroying or competence-enhancing. Utterback (1994) adds twodimensions to this by distinguishing between market-broadening innovations and innovationsthat substitute existing products and between assembled products and non-assembled
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products. The latter dimension clearly does not distinguish between different kinds ofinnovations in the same kind of technical domain but between different kinds of technicaldomains. So, Tushman & Anderson (1986) and Utterback (1994) together suggest threecharacteristics that each makes an innovation more radical: a jump in price/performance ratio,competence-destroying and market-broadening. The latter two characteristics will usuallycoincidence with a break with a current technological regime. Competence-destroyinginnovations will usually break with some of the major rules of a technological regime, for thesimple reason that some of these rules are related to required competencies to design thetechnology in question. The same holds for market-broadening innovations. They will at leastbreak with the (some of) existing rules of users. Innovations that achieve a jump inprice/performance, however, do not necessarily break with the existing regime. Suchinnovations may – or may not – be enabled by the existing regime as is shown by the earlierexample of Moore’s Law. If such innovations are radical depends on the degree in which theybreak with the rules of the existing regime.Two general characteristics that may make innovations radical thus stand out: competence-destroying and market-broadening. Typically, these are also the two main characteristics ofwhat Abernathy and Clark (1985) call architectural innovations (see also Clark, 1985). Suchinnovation ‘departs from established systems of production, and in turn opens up newlinkages to markets and users’ (Abernathy & Clark, 1985, 7). Architectural innovations thushave two characteristics: 1) they disrupt existing markets or customer linkages and/or createnew ones and 2) they disrupt or make obsolete existing competencies.The definition of radical innovations as innovations that break with the existing technologicalregime is thus to an important degree consonant with characteristics of radical innovations asdiscussed by Abernathy & Clark (1985) and Utterback (1994). It may, however, be that someinnovations break with the rules of the existing regime without either disrupting existingmarkets or making obsolete existing competencies. Innovations that are based on new designcriteria are a case in point. Such innovations often require new expertise and competencies totranslate the new criteria into requirements and to integrate them into new designs, but theydo not necessarily make obsolete existing competencies. Neither do they necessarily disruptexisting user linkages. Such innovations may still be called radical because they may imply aradically new way of designing a class of artefacts. The earlier mentioned case of theOosterschelde barrier illustrates this. Here, the introduction of a new design criterion –ecology – resulted in a new way of designing coastal barriers in the Netherlands. The reasonwhy this shift can be called radical is not only – or even merely – because it implied in theintroduction of a radical new design concept (a storm surge barrier). Rather, the shift can becalled radical because it implied a new way of designing coastal barriers, in which ecologyhas become an integral design criterion among traditional accepted design criteria like safety,and in which the inclusion of ecologists and biologists in coastal barrier design has beenaccepted.
Radical Innovation and the Transformation of Technological RegimesSuccessful radical innovations transform technological regimes. As a result, existingcompetencies may become obsolete and new ones may be required. This, in turn, mayprofoundly influence industrial leadership and industrial structure in a technical domain. Thetransformation of technological regimes also influences the performance of technical productsand the occurrence of environmental and societal secondary effects.To understand how and when radical innovations have such profound implications, it isnecessary to focus on radical innovation as part of the dynamics and possible transformationof technological regimes. As will become clear, not only the impact but also the occurrence ofradical innovations may often be understood as part of this dynamics.
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In relation to technological regimes, three general types of processes of technical change canbe distinguished (Van de Poel, 1998):• Reproductive processes: in which the rules of the existing technological regime remain the
same. Technical innovation is absent;• Processes of cumulative innovation: in which some of the major rules of the regimes
remain the same, but in which rules lower in the triangle of technical development changein a more or less ‘regular’ or ‘predictable’ way. Innovation is incremental and patterned;
• Processes of transformation: in which at least some of the major rules of the technologicalregime change, eventually resulting in changes in the otherrules as well. Innovation is radical.
These three types of processes correspond to three types ofprocesses of social change distinguished by Boudon (1981).Boudon’s classification is based on a general sociologicalscheme consisting of three elements: a system of interaction,its environment, and outcomes (Figure 2). The system ofinteraction consists of actors with certain characteristics andcertain relations among these actors. The technological regime– the rules that guide the (inter)actions of the actors involved –is embedded in this system of interaction. The environment ismade up of a number of actors not involved in the relevantsystem of interaction and economic, historical, institutionaland technological givens. The third element is the outcomesproduced by the actors in the system of interaction. Theseinclude the technical artefacts actually designed, but also(secondary) effects that result from the production and use ofthese artefacts.The arrows in Figure 2 stand for causal relations between thedifferent elements. According to Boudon (1981), causalrelations of type (A) and (B) can be found in any process of social change. The causallinkages of type (C), so-called feedbacks, may be absent in some processes of social change.According to Boudon, the absence or presence of such feedbacks results in different processesof social change (Figure 3). More specifically, Boudon suggests that reproductive processestake place if interaction outcomes are not fed back to the existing system of interaction. As wehave seen earlier, in the case of technical development this situation is characterised by stablerules and the absence of technical innovation. Boudon further suggests that in the case ofcumulative processes (of innovation), interaction outcomes are fed back to the system ofinteraction, while feedbacks with the environment are kept latent. Earlier, it was suggestedthat in this case technical innovation is incremental and patterned and that some elements inthe triangle of technological development - especially those in the upper part of Figure 1 -remain stable while others - in the lower part - change according to certain patterns ortrajectories. Boudon finally suggests that a transformation of the existing system ofinteraction and its outcomes will occur if feedbacks from the environment become manifest:‘[T]ransformative processes are characterized by the existence of feedback effects from theoutputs of the system, or the characteristics of the system of interaction on the system’senvironment. This action on the environment provokes, in turn, a modification of the system’(Boudon, 1981, 123). For technical development, this would mean that feedbacks from theenvironment result in radical innovations deviating from the existing regime and eventually ina transformation of the existing technological regime.Boudon’s conceptual scheme suggests three important points with respect to the possibleoccurrence of radical innovations and the transformation of technological regimes. The first is
Figure 2 Boudon'sGeneral SociologicalFramework
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that radical innovation, and the possible transformation of technological regimes will often bethe result of reactions of actors in the environment to earlier outcomes.7 Boudon distinguishestwo mechanisms by which feedbacks from the environment can become manifest: aggressiontoward the environment or a demand upon the environment.In the case of aggression, the technological regime produces outcomes disliked by actorsoutside the technological regime and which make them intervene. Typical examples aresecondary effects, i.e. effects of technology that were not taken into account during designand may be disliked by regime outsiders. Such outsiders are typically the earlier discussedsocietal pressure groups and the way in which they may try to feed back undesired outcomesof existing technological regimes includes the earlier discussed delegitimation detour.In the case of demand, a technological regime produces outcomes disliked by certain insidersor it is characterised by certain problems, which cannot (easily) be solved by insidersthemselves. Such a demand may be latent and be made manifest by regime outsiders. Anexample is a demand upon engineering and scientific professionals due to the existence ofjurisdictional vacancies in the system of expert labour as discussed before. Also the (entry) ofnew firms can be headed under the general term ‘demand’ because the entry of these firmshelps to achieve more optimally existing (technical) functions or new technical functions.The second point that the Boudon-scheme suggests is that the impact of outsider involvementwill at least partly depend on the existing dynamics of technical change. Outsiders do notproduce technical outcomes directly but via the existing system of interaction.8 The effect ofinvolvement and actions of outsiders will therefore partly depend on the dynamics oftechnical change in the existing system of interaction.Finally, the conceptual scheme of Boudon suggests that only - or at least mainly - outsiderstrigger radical innovation, and the transformation of technical regimes. This hypothesis is in 7 Boudon does, however, not rule out the possibility of what he calls exogenous change, i.e. change caused by changes in the environmentthat are not a result of earlier interaction outcomes.8 Outsiders may, however, during a process of transformation become insiders to the relevant system of interaction. In that case, they mayhave a more direct impact.
Figure 3 Processes of Social Change Distinguished by Boudon (1981)
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line with the earlier conceptualisation of outsiders and radical innovation. If outsiders areactors who do not share some of the main rules of existing technological regimes and ifradical innovations are those innovations that break with some of the rules of existingregimes, it is natural to presuppose that it are outsiders who trigger radical innovation.
Are Radical Innovations More Often Initiated by Outsiders Than Insiders?Although there is much empirical evidence that shows that outsiders can play an importantrole in initiating radical innovations, much less empirical data exist which respect to therelative importance of outsiders compared to insiders in initiating (radical) technicalinnovation. On this account, the study of Utterback (1994) provides interesting data.Utterback (1994) studied 46 discontinuous product and process innovations from thetypewriter, lighting, plate glassmaking, ice and refrigeration, and imaging industry. Heclassifies these innovations along three dichotomies: assembled/ non-assembled, competence-destroying/ competence-enhancing, broadening the market/ substitute. He also indicateswhether insiders or outsiders initiated these innovations.If radical innovations are defined as innovations breaking with the current technologicalregime, we can call the innovations studied by Utterback radical if they are eithercompetence-enhancing or market-broadening or both. If we reinterpret Utterback’s data in
this way, we get Table 2. This table shows that outsiders initiate 26 out of 31 radicalinnovations, while insiders initiate 10 out of 11 incremental innovations. This clearlycorroborates the hypothesis that regime outsiders will more often than regime insiders initiateradical innovations. It further suggests that incremental innovations will usually be initiatedby regime insiders.
5. Outsiders and the ‘Improvement’ or Democratisation of Technical DevelopmentOutsiders make a difference for technological development. This does not mean that they canbring about radical technical innovations at will or that they can enforce their visions of bettertechnology on current regime insiders. Nevertheless, it seems that outsiders, generallyspeaking, play an important role in triggering radical innovations and setting off processes oftransformation of technological regimes. Such transformations may result in technologies thatbetter meet societal design criteria like environmental sustainability. Moreover, they maymake technological development more ‘democratic’ in a broad sense. Consider, for example,the case in which societal pressure groups successfully feed back particular undesirablesecondary effects, like negative environmental consequences, to an existing technologicalregime so that these secondary effects are translated into new design criteria, likeenvironmental sustainability, that begin to play an important role in the further developmentof the technology in question. Many people will consider this a desirable development.Does this also mean that the involvement of outsiders in general results in ‘better’ or more‘democratic’ forms of technological development? This question is not easy to answer for atleast two reasons. First, it is not easy to predict beforehand what the involvement of outsiders
Table 2 Characteristics of Innovations Studied by Utterback (1994)
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will mean for technical development. This will not only depend on the outsiders, their goals,actions and strategies, but also on the existing dynamics of technical development. The actualeffects of outsider involvement will probably differ from case to case and even in concretecases it may be very hand to make reliable predictions. Second, even if we can say somethinguseful about the effects of outsider involvement on technical development, no consensusseems to exist about what ‘better’ or ‘democratic’ exactly means. Even in concrete cases, itmay be very difficult, if not impossible, to achieve agreement on the question if a particulartechnical development is desirable.Nevertheless, there seems to be an important potential for improvement and democratisationin the involvement of outsiders in technical development. If we look at the mechanisms that,according to Boudon, initiate processes of transformation, these seem to imply a potential forbetter forms of technological development. Following the Boudon-scheme, processes oftransformation set off either because outsider groups think they can solve a problem in atechnological regime or reach existing or new functions (of a technology) in a better way(demand) or because a technology has secondary effects that are disliked by certain groups insociety (aggression). So, processes of transformation may well result in the better fulfilmentof existing functions, the fulfilment of new functions, or in the taking away of undesirablesecondary effects. If such achievements are considered improvements will also depend on the(social) costs that has to be made to achieve them. Safer technologies, for example, may wellcost more and this may be considered a serious disadvantage that is the eyes of some notcounterbalanced by the improvements in safety. Radical innovations triggered by outsidersmay have many advantages over the existing technology but they will also make currentcompetencies obsolete and they may thus lead to unemployment.Occasionally, processes of transformation may result in Pareto-optimal outcomes, i.e.outcomes in which nobody is worse off than in the initial situation and in which at least someare better off. Such outcomes will probably be considered desirable by almost everyone.Often, however, processes of transformation and technical change induced by outsiders willmake some better off and others worse off. If the overall result will be considered desirablewill depend on the particular case and even in concrete cases it may often be very difficult toreach agreement whether a particular development is desirable or not.Involvement of outsiders in technical development may not only lead to better technologiesand better forms of technological development, but also seems to make technical developmentmore democratic. Technology is, at least in some respects, one of the main forces shaping ourmodern industrial society. People are subjected to technical risks and secondary effects oftechnologies, while they have hardly a direct say in the design and use of these technologies.A number of authors like Sclove (1995) and Bijker (1995b) have therefore argued for moredirect forms of public participation in technical development. Inspired by the ideals of strongdemocracy, they consider a closer involvement of societal groups and the public in general intechnological development almost a virtue on its own.While there are good reasons to argue that a closer involvement of initial insiders may insome cases make technical development more democratic, in the sense that the interests andvalues of those not directly involved in, but possibly affected by, technical developments aretaken better into account. Direct public participation is, however, not the only way todemocratise technical development and perhaps not the most desirable one. Democratisationof technical development may also be achieved indirectly, i.e. via the actions ofdemocratically elected governments and other democratic institutions. Such governments can– try to – regulate technical risks, enforce new technologies considered desirable (technology-forcing) or protect potential victims of technical developments. Such indirect democratisationmay well have a number of advantages over direct democratisation. Citizens are oftenconcerned about technical developments, but this does not necessarily mean that they are
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interested in a closer involvement in technical development. They will probably lack the timeand abilities to become involved in the development of all technologies that may possiblyaffect their lives. In practice, only a limited number of social groups and citizens can thusbecome involved in technical development. This immediately raises questions about therepresentativeness of the groups and citizens that do become involved. Do they represent thepublic at large or merely their own interests and concerns? As we have seen, involvement ofoutsiders may lead to Pareto-optimal outcomes, but also to cases in which some are better offand others are worse off. It may be argued that the question what is most desirable in suchcases can best be answered by parliament and other existing democratic institutions becausethey are believed to represent the entire population.Even if one believes that indirect democratisation is to prefer over direct democratisation, acloser involvement of outsiders in technical development may still have an importantinstrumental value in achieving the goal of democratisation. As we have seen earlier,governments will usually be hesitant in trying to influence technical developments or toenforce, for example, technical standards if no viable technical alternatives are available.Outsiders may play an important role in developing such alternative technologies. Moregenerally, results form technology studies show that governments have a limited ability ininfluencing technical development (Rip, Misa & Schot, 1995 and Schot & Rip, 1996). Someauthors have argued that governments are just one of the actors that shape technicaldevelopment. While this may be an exaggeration, it is clear that governments cannot steertechnical development at will. Enlarging the role of outsiders in technical development may,therefore, sometimes be a far more practicable way to democratise technical development orto achieve better forms of technical development, as has been recognised by, for example, theproponents of CTA. This reflects a more general point. Strategies to improve or democratisetechnical development will only be successful if they take into account the existing dynamicsof technical development and change. Otherwise, they will almost surely fail. Outsiderinvolvement is part of the dynamics of technical change, as we have seen. Therefore, it is aninteresting point of departure to think about strategies for improving or democratisingtechnical development.
6. ConclusionsUnderstanding the role of outsiders in technical development is important for understandingthe dynamics of technical change. Because outsiders do not share the current technologicalregime, they may well initiate radical innovations that depart from that regime. Such radicalinnovations result in the transformation of a technological regime and, thus, in differentpatterns of technical development.There are two reasons to suppose that outsiders will more often initiate radical innovationsthan insiders do. One is that outsiders do not the share the relevant rules of technicaldevelopment, the technological regime. The other is that radical innovations occur duringprocesses of transformation and that such processes are triggered, at least in the Boudon-scheme, by feedbacks from the environment. The hypothesis that outsiders more often initiateradical innovations than insiders do is, as we have seen, corroborated by empirical evidence.Three groups of outsiders may play a role in technical development: societal pressure groups,professional engineers and scientists and industrial outsiders (firms). Societal pressure groupsusually lack resources to influence technical development directly. They may, however,successfully articulate modes of acceptance for a technology. They may also mobilise otheractors, especially users and the government, against - features of - a technology via a so-calleddelegitimation detour. Finally, they may play a role in the development of alternativetechnologies in so-called social experiments. Professional scientists and engineers usuallypossess knowledge and skills that may be useful to influence technical development. They
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may acquire a role in technological regimes, as we have seen, if certain jurisdictionalvacancies (Abbot) exist or are created in the current division of expert labour. Industrialoutsider firms usually possess some financial and/or managerial and/or knowledge resourcesto develop alternative technologies via which they may acquire a role in a technical domainand trigger technical change.The three mentioned groups of outsiders differ not only with respect to the resources theypossess and the mechanisms by which they may come to play a role in technical development,but also with respect to the elements of technological regimes on which they usually impinge.Societal pressure groups will usually articulate new functions, design criteria andrequirements. Professional engineers and scientists will usually impinge on those elementsthat are related to engineering knowledge and skills. Industrial outsiders, finally, will usuallyfocus on producing new technical artefacts. In sum, we can conclude the three groups ofoutsiders will in different ways and with different results influence technical development.Finally, it has been argued that outsiders may be an interesting entry to achieve societallymore ‘desirable’ and/or more democratic forms of technical development. Although theinvolvement of outsiders will not always or necessarily improve technical development, itseems to offer a potential for improvement, especially because some other forms of improvingor democratising technical development, e.g. via direct government regulation, may be hard toachieve in practice. Understanding the potential role of outsiders in technical development isthus also important from a political or normative point of view.
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