On the Status of 'Lexical Formatives'

On the Status of 'Lexical Formatives'Author(s): John AndersonSource: Foundations of Language, Vol. 4, No. 3 (Aug., 1968), pp. 308-318Published by: SpringerStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/25000334 .

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JOHN ANDERSON

ON THE STATUS OF 'LEXICAL FORMATIVES'

The purpose of this paper is to present various considerations which I would

suggest are relevant to a decision concerning the place of 'lexical items' or 'lexical formatives' in the grammar - in particular, concerning their relation to the different elements of the base, the stage at which they are introduced

and with reference to what structural information.1 I shall restrict the term

'lexical item' or 'formative' to serve as a designation for the individual

phonological entries appearing in the lexicon and developed by the phono logical rules.2 It is precisely the non-phonological content of such entries

which I shall be in part concerned to discuss. Various aspects of previous discussions of the place of lexical substitution rules, the structural informa tion determining their operation and the content of lexicon entries3 seem to

me to be called in question by recent developments in syntax.4 I want, in

particular, to consider the status of lexical items with reference to the view

of syntax outlined in Anderson (1968). The present paper can be regarded as an extension of the theoretical discussion initiated there (and, in one respect, an elaboration of the simple assertion made in footnote 8).

I would like firstly to consider the source of the anomaly represented by a

sentence like:

(i) * He walked on foot as far as Norwich.

In comparison, the following are non-deviant:

(ii) a. He walked as far as Norwich.

b. He travelled on foot as far as Norwich.

Further, this latter pair are in a paraphrase relation. How are we to account

for these facts of English? Superficially, the syntactic structures of the two

paraphrases are rather different. If we assume that their underlying structures

are similarly distinct (as would seem to be the case in terms of most current

accounts), then presumably the characterization of the relationship holding

1 I am grateful to Charles Jones, John Lyons and David J. Tittensor for their comments on an earlier version of this paper. 2 I assume for our present purposes that the phonology takes the form proposed by

Chomsky and Halle - see particularly: Halle (1964), Chomsky (1964), Chomsky and Halle

(1965). 3 See, for example, Chomsky (1965), particularly 84-90. 4 E.g. Fillmore (1968), Lyons (1966).

308

Foundations of Language 4 (1968) 308-318. All rights reserved.




between them will devolve upon the semantic component of our grammar. Such is basically the argument put forward by Katz and Fodor (though not with reference to these particular examples).5 But I would suggest that a

primary consideration in such an argument should be this: that the set of facts whose explanation is relegated to the semantics should be minimal -

particularly when the semantic explanation proposed duplicates syntactic relations already well known. Otherwise we may be imposing a premature limitation on the scope of the syntax. I want below to consider the conse

quences of adopting such a principle. In the present case, this consideration suggests that we interpret the

deviance of (i) as deriving from the fact that the underlying structure of a

sentence which has in it (superficially) the verb walk contains elements which are also present in sentences like (ii. b), and appear superfically in them as on foot. That is, we can derive walk as a variant of the verb underlying travel

before (deleted) elements which, if the walk variant is not selected, appear as on foot. Note that run, skip, etc. all can be regarded as having a similar deri

vation in this respect. The two variants travel on foot and walk are obviously not equally appropriate in all contexts; in certain environments one of the variants is obligatory (or at least 'more natural'). Consider: *He travelled

onfoot to the door, Ile walked to the door; These nomads always travel on foot on their wanderings, (?) These nomads always walk on their wanderings. As a

rule, the superficially less complex variant (with walk) is more generally acceptable. Also, in this particular case, the travel variant is 'marked' for

distance ('not short'), whereas the walk variant is less restricted in this respect. However, such restrictions can be incorporated in a quite natural way.

In another paper6 I have argued that there are a number of syntactic

(and, of course, semantic) motivations for relating sentences containing modals (like may) to sentences containing certain adjectives (like (be) pos sible). Compare: He may come tomorrow, It's possible that he'll come to

morrow. I did not follow out there the consequences for our view of lexical

items of suggesting that, for instance, sentences containing may and possible are variants of the same underlying structure. But such a view of modals

presumably relies on the same sort of notion of syntax as would allow us to

relate walk and travel on foot in the way proposed above. Both sets of sug

gested derivations pre-suppose a certain discrepancy between underlying semantico-syntactic specifications and the lexical items that are eventually introduced. Formatives may 'correspond to' a more or less complex sub

configuration in the underlying structure rather than simple bundles of

5 Katz&Fodor (1964), 483-486, 491-494. This follows from the equation 'linguistic description minus grammar equals semantics'. 6 Anderson (forthcoming), particularly part 2.

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JOHN ANDERSON

features or category symbols.7 And (phonologically) distinct items may be related to the same underlying subcategorized category. - We are long accustomed to recognition of a limited variety of this latter phenomenon under the name of suppletion: go/went, good/better, etc.8 I am merely sug gesting that it is much more extensive than is generally recognized.

Further examples of like phenomena are provided by clauses containing come and go, or the corresponding 'causative' forms bring and take, which differ in respect of elements of the underlying structure other than the verb. To demonstrate this would require an extended discussion (taking account of, for example, Fillmore's proposals9). It is perhaps easier to illustrate, in

English, that clauses containing bring/take differ from those containing an other causative equivalent of come/go, namely send (which is also neutral to the deictic distinction), with respect to a non-verbal constituent. Consider:

(iii) I took my nephew with me. * I took my nephew with him.

*I sent my nephew with me.

I sent my nephew with him.

(There is also, of course, an 'aspectual' difference - cf. *I brought him but he

hasn't arrived yet, I sent him but he hasn't arrived yet. We can perhaps com

pare with this the distinction between go and set off; send appears to be the

causative equivalent of set off rather than go.) In these cases, too, the differ ent verbal 'forms' seem to be merely 'lexicalizations' of distinctions which

in the underlying structure are marked elsewhere. The causative relation itself (kill/die, for instance) apparently requires a similar explanation.

As our understanding of the nature of the base component deepens, it is

becoming clear that this sort of phenomenon is very general. We must

reckon with the fact that, semantically, many 'simple' items are not adequate

ly characterized in terms of a set of features, and that they pre-suppose abstract relations which seem (in many cases, at least) to be explicable with

reference to familiar syntactic notions, and, indeed, which often have alter

native realizations in which the underlying relation is more clearly discer

nible (as with the examples I have discussed). Indeed, Bach, in an as yet un

published paper on nouns and noun phrases, suggests that what appear

superficially as nouns are in general derived from noun phrases containing an underlying relative clause. I do not intend here to argue for or against

7 Cf. Chomsky (1965), ibid., 120-123. Further illustrations of phenomena permitting explication in similar terms are provided by discussions like Jespersen's concerning 'latent

comparatives' (Jespersen (1924), 248-249). 8 See too Anderson (1968), footnote 16. 9 Fillmore (1966b).

310




such a view (particularly since the direction taken by Bach's argument is rather different from that I wish to pursue below), but merely to consider, as a further example of the complex derivation of 'simple' items, one particular noun - though with the implication that this instance is not unique.

Consider now the sentence:

(iv) * The woman who bore me is not my mother.

This is anomalous; more precisely, it exemplifies the anomaly of 'contradic tion'. The question I want to raise once again is this: with reference to what

sub-part of the description of such a sentence can we explain this contradic tion? Is it possible to relate the anomaly to aspects of the syntactic deriva

tion of the sentence, or must we rely almost entirely on a semantic explana

tion, perhaps in terms of an interpretative semantics of the type proposed by Katz and Fodor?10 This is a question as to whether it can and need be the

case that the woman who bore me and my mother are syntactically related -

indeed are, more particularly, variants of a single underlying structure. Let us consider, then, the derivation of a noun phrase like my mother.

It is clearly implausible, I suggest, to derive my in my mother simply by means of a transformational rule operating upon an underlying structure

containing a relative clause consisting of I have..., as might be the case with

my book. (It is not that I believe that this is an accurate account even of the

derivation of my book,1l but I want here merely to point out that my mother

and my book are to be derived from rather unlike underlying structures.12) We have, moreover, some clues to a plausible derivation for my mother. The

determiner with mother is 'characteristically' 'possessive', and this 'possessive' determiner is normally the sole defining modifier. My poor mother is quite acceptable, but the lady in question is not usually being contrasted in such a

phrase with some other more opulent female parent of mine. Non-possessive definite determiners are quite possible with mother, as in The mother sat down; but part of the function of the the here is to indicate that somewhere in the

(linguistic or extra-linguistic) context we are told whose motheris being referred to. Similarly, we do find indefinite determiners preceding mother, but with certain implications. In a sentence like Any mother would be deeply hurt by the

ingratitude of her child, it is the 'relationship' (somebody's mother) pre-sup posed by mother that is crucial. A mother came in seems less natural than

A mother came in with her two children, unless there is something in the con

text to indicate the relevance of invoking here this particular relationship into which the woman referred to enters. Thus, with the indefinite deter

10 Katz&Fodor (1964). 11 Cf. Lyons (1967); Bendix (1966), 37-59, 123-132. 12 On this, see too the brief discussion in Halliday (1967), 25-26.

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JOHN ANDERSON

miners also, a 'possessive' is implied, if not expressed superficially. All this is merely to stress in a very informal way the 'relational' character

of items like mother.13 Semantically, we are always concerned with 'some

body's' mother; the interpretation of mother involves a (perhaps one

member) class of people in a particular one-to-one or many-to-one relation

ship with another person. And similar interpretations can be associated with

father, parent, son, daughter and child, and other kinships terms, perhaps (though with greater complexity in some of these cases). Moreover, it is clear that (v. a) has as a paraphrase (v. b):

(v) a. Mary is Jane's mother. b. Jane is Mary's daughter.

And this, too, will require to be explicated somewhere in the descriptions we

assign to sentences containing such kinship terms.

Now, it would be possible, in principle, to characterize the semantic rela

tionships associated with such items within the framework of an interpre tative semantics, in terms of a set of notions analogous to those suggested

by Katz14 in his discussion of the pair of sentences:

(vi) a. John sold the book to Mary. b. Mary bought the book from John.

(or in terms of the modification to lexicon entries proposed by Staal15). How

ever, I would suggest that this would be to assign (in these particular cases) too much of the description to the semantics. We would be invoking seman

tic notions when at least part of the explanation of the synonymity of (v. a) and (v. b) (and anomaly of (iv)) has an obvious syntactic basis, with the

semantic and syntactic consequences I have noted. The semantic relation

holding between the nouns in Jane's mother is the same as that holding be

tween the nouns in the woman who bore Jane. And Mary's daughter is sim

ilarly parallelled by The woman/girl who was born to Mary. That is, the rela

tion holding between the 'possessive' and the 'head' in such phrases can be

explicated in terms of their derivation from an underlying syntactic struc

ture like that which underlies the phrases containing relative clauses. It is

not important that in many varieties of English The woman who bore me is

13 Which has been noted elsewhere by, for example, Lyons (1963), 72 (footnote 1); Lamb (1965), 56-58; and, following the latter, Halliday (1967), 24-25. See too Bendix

(1966), 4-5; Fillmore (1968), ? 5. 14 Katz (1967), 171-173. 15 Staal (1967). These proposals (and those made by Katz) are criticized in Bar-Hillel

(1967); in the cases I have discussed it does not seem to me, however, that 'meaning rules' of the kind suggested there are the only or the obviously preferable alternative to an account of the Katz or Staal type.

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not a very 'natural' phrase. - One would in general expect the superficially more complex variant to be more restricted. The 'reduced' variants would thus merely constitute another instance of 'possessive' phrases which are not derived from an underlying structure consisting of, in part, a relative clause

containing have16 (but see above). And this would enable us to account for

the sorts of restrictions discussed above. It would then be possible to show

the relationship holding between (v. a) and (v. b) in terms of a rather simpler and more general semantic apparatus than would otherwise be necessary, as well as to relate such 'possessive' phrases and their relative clause para

phrases in a similarly simpler fashion. Another set of phenomena, admitting of explication in terms of a like

derivation, is associated with the items teacher and pupil. Consider John is

Mary's teacher vs. Mary is John's pupil. Also, once again, we appear to have 'full' and 'reduced' variants: my teacher vs. the person who teaches/taught me

(cf. my ex-teacher vs. the person who (once) taught me); my pupil vs. the

person I teach/taught. There is a difference here from the mother/daughter situation, in that we find a correspondence in 'shape' between the 'head'

noun in one of the 'reduced' variants and the verb in the 'full' variants:

teacher/teach. In the case of employer/employee/employ, both 'reduced' form nouns show overtly their relation to the corresponding verb. Such deriva tions as have been outlined here are not without difficulties, but the syntactic relations involved are, I think, reasonably clear. And the consequences for our view of lexical items are similar to what seemed to follow from the deri

vation I proposed for walk.

I also think it reasonably clear how, in terms of such a notion of the base

as is pre-supposed by the derivations discussed above, we might accommo date part of an explanation of the relation holding between the sentences discussed by Katz cited in (vi).17 Katz rejects an explanation in terms of

identity of underlying phrase markers "because this would require that we take one as a base form and derive the other from it transformationally" and

"because other syntactic solutions would distort the quite straightforward syntactic structure" of these sentences. But the underlying relations here can be given a straightforward syntactic characterization, with reference to which either of the two variants represented by (vi. a) and (vi .b) is readily derivable. The relevant underlying clause can perhaps be represented as in (vii):

16 Cf. e.g. Lees (1960), 64-73; Bendix (1966), 37-59. Consider also the diverse derivations pre-supposed by the following: Today's politicians, John's purchase, women's rights, John's defeat (of7by his enemies), love's captives, the house's occupants, Newton's First Law, John's death, friendship's rewards, the sun's rays. 17 And also sentences like those cited as problematical in Chomsky (1965), 162 163.

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JOHN ANDERSON

(vii)

nom NP VP abl NP acc NP

? the book sold/ from John to Mary bought

nom = nominative; abl = ablative; acc = accusative (or adlative).

The last two categories are dynamic sub-types of the locative category (cf. Lyons (1966), p. 229). From the structure abbreviated in (vii) those imme

diately underlying (vi. a) and (vi. b) can be derived by a 'subjectivalising' transformation applied to the appropriate constituents. Compare here rule (II. iii. 1) in Anderson (1968), (lii) (where the reader is also referred for a dis cussion of the form of grammar pre-supposed by such structural descrip tions as that presented in (vii)). The choice of sell or buy is related to which

constituents are subjectivalised.18 It is likely that other aspects of the meaning of buy and sell are also to be

explicated in terms of additional component subconfigurations not repre sented in (vii). - Consider, for example, the anomaly represented by *He

bought it for nothing as compared with He got it for nothing. In this respect, then, the representation in (vii) is over-simple; and it also simplifies in omit

ting the development of the various NP's and the VP, and in a number of

other ways where factors irrelevant to the present discussion are involved.

There is moreover a further aspect which I have neglected to consider so far.

This is the fact that an imperative possibility is available with both buy and

sell - which raises the question of how we are to account for this within the

framework outlined in Anderson (1968), where it was suggested that there is evidence for considering the imperative possibility to be dependent on

(among other things) the presence of an underlying ergative phrase (see par ticularly footnote 33). This could be allowed for in the present cases by a rule

which added the feature ergative to either abl or acc (as it is possible to add

it to nomg9) before the subjectivalising rule, which then moves into subject position the constituents marked as ergative. In this case, the subjectivalising rule would be exactly rule II. iii. 1 (see above), and not merely a similar rule

or an extension of that rule. If the subjectivalising rule does not operate, then

the case (abl or acc) which is marked as ergative is manifested as by, and the

copula is introduced. So:

18 Such a relationship (between sell and buy) is suggested by Lyons (1963), 72. 19 See the postscript to Anderson (1968).

314




(viii) a. The book was sold by John to Mary. b. The book was bought from John by Mary.

But, under such an interpretation, we are limiting the sense in which (vi. a) and (vi. b), and (viii. a) and (viii. b), can be said to be in a paraphrase relation, since the (a) instances differ from the (b) with respect to who is regarded as

prime performer in the action - i.e., with respect to which case element

receives the ergative feature.20 This sort of explanation of the relationship between (vi. a) and (vi. b) and

of the phenomena already discussed requires that we allow transformational relations to hold between structures which do not contain items which are

phonologically identical (except for what is deleted or introduced transfor

mationally). This in turn suggests that we could consider transformational relations in general to hold between abstract structural descriptions which do not contain phonologically specified items (formatives) - i.e., structures into which lexical items have not yet been introduced. The configurations upon which transformations or realization rules 21 are to operate have, then, as their terminal elements (terminal) categories and features. This is already required if we are to permit rules like II. iii. 1 in Anderson (1968) (although this consequence was not pursued there), which is a realization rule which

precedes the base rules for phrases. Thus, by definition, it will operate on abstract structures into which phonological specifications have not yet been inserted. Identity conditions (if such are required) are accordingly to be stated in terms of semantico-syntactic specifications alone.

The alternative is to introduce the phonologically specified items buy or sell into the frame provided in (vii), and to let the choice of item (buy vs. sell) determine the placement of the ergative feature. But it seems to me highly

implausible to frame the rules introducing a syntactic feature like ergative in terms of a differentiation according to phonological specification. There is little hope of generalising such rules over other items. Such is also the

case in the walk/travel on foot situation. It would be possible to frame a rule

to the effect that the elements underlying on foot are deleted when walk

(phonologically specified) rather than travel (phonologically specified) is introduced. But we would then need additional rules, with an identical effect,

involving skip, run, etc. Surely it is the deletion requirement or the lack of it

20 And the same would be the case if we interpreted these examples as involving a super ordinate causative clause, which might be an alternative way of allowing for imperatives and by-phrases in these instances. A similar explanation to the above would also perhaps hold in the case of the sentences containing teach and learn mentioned as problematical in Fillmore (1966a), 28-29. Compare too lend/borrow. 21 See Anderson (1968), 6-8.

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JOHN ANDERSON

that (partially) determines whether we get (the phonological shapes) walk, skip, etc. or travel, go, etc., rather than vice versa.

To account for the walk/travel on foot distinction, we would seem to need an optional 'lexicalising' transformation (analogous to selectional rules22) which adds the feature 'pedestrian' (say) to the complex symbol underlying walk/travel in the environment of the elements underlying on foot. If the

lexicalising transformation operates, then the elements which otherwise

appear as on foot are deleted, and walk, etc. meet the conditions for sub

stitution. If it does not operate, then there is no deletion, and travel, etc.

meet the conditions for substitution. Similarly, mother and father can be

regarded as being dominated by complex symbols containing the feature

'parental' (say) introduced under the appropriate conditions, which feature is not present in the symbols dominating woman and man. The selection of

buy vs. sell is governed simply by the distribution of the ergative feature (as noted above), presumably via a selectional rule.

If such an account proves acceptable, then it would appear that the lexical

substitution rules and the realization rules rely on the same type (and often

precisely the same set) of structural information - the structural descriptions generated by the subcategorisation and constituency rules of the base23 and, in many cases, by selectional and/or lexicalisational rules. Thus, the two sets

of rules (substitution and realization) are, in this respect, logically indepen dent of each other. However, it seems (in terms of most current accounts) that we must allow the realization rules to introduce certain syntactic ele

ments, like the copula (in terms of the account given in Anderson (1968)), which must then be specified phonologically. That there are these two stages, abstract syntactic element and then phonologically specified item, appears to be required by the fact that the syntactic category may have several

phonological representations - as be, have, etc. for the copula24. Also, in

this way all realization rules can be restricted to operation upon abstract

(not specified phonologically) syntactic structures. The situation exemplified by the copula suggests that the lexical substitution rules could be required as

a whole to follow the realization rules, and thus act uniformly on the output of the syntax.

By so doing, we group together the rules which operate purely on abstract

syntactic elements (subcategorisation and constituency rules, lexicalisational,

selectional and realizational rules) as preceding the lexical substitution rules

(which introduce phonological specifications). We have, in fact, arrived at a

22 Chomsky's (1965, 90-106) 'context-sensitive subcategorization rules'. 23 See Anderson (1968), 2-6. 24 On be and have, cf. Lyons (1966), particularly 228-230; Lyons (1967); Bach (forth coming).

316




much more 'stratified' view of these pre-phonological rules,25 in that we can now regard the lexical substitution rules as 'inter-stratal', mapping syntactic specifications on to phonological. It is not surprising, then, that the effect of lexical substitution rules and their conditions of operation are analogous to those of 'representational' or 'realization' rules as described by Lamb.26

Both types of rule are unordered, and they bring into relation specifications in terms of two disjoint alphabets (syntactic vs. phonological); and the effect of both types of rule is (in some sense) to add a phonological specification to

a syntactic one. This formal correspondence deserves to be explored further.

I have suggested here that an 'upward' extension of the scope of the syntax

provides, in principle, at least part of the explanation of various phenomena connected with the meaning of 'simple' items whose explication has (by

implication at least) in most previous work been relegated almost entirely to the semantics. This seemed to me to have various consequences. Among these is the restriction of realization rules to operation upon phonologically unspecified syntactic configurations. There are also motivations, partly connected with this restriction, for ordering the lexical substitution rules after the realization rules; a 'correspondence' (to put it no more strongly) between rules of the type of lexical substitution and representational rules is thus revealed. The adoption of the view of syntax outlined

in Anderson (1968) and developed here also has certain consequences for our notion of semantics. It should already be clear that the proposals made

here involve a 'raising' of the lower bound of a semantic theory. To develop the discussion of semantics further would take us beyond the scope of the

present paper. I would merely suggest that in the area of semantics too

recent developments in syntax will require us to reconsider a number of

assumptions, in particular with respect to the structure of the semantic com

ponent27 and its place in the grammar as a whole.28

Edinburgh University Department of English Language

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Anderson, J. M.: 1968, 'Ergative and Nominative in English', JL 4, 1-32.

Anderson, J. M.: (forthcoming), 'Some Proposals concerning the Modal Verb in English'. Bach, E.: (forthcoming), 'Have and be in English Syntax', Lg.

25 See Lamb (1965), particularly 38 (and footnote 4). 26 See Lamb (1964a), (1964b), 58-66 and (1965), 39-48. 27 The suggestions made above would reduce its complexity at the expense of extension of transformational relations. 28 Cf. here Hockett (1966), particularly 270-272.

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Bar-Hillel, Y.: 1967, 'Dictionaries and Meaning Rules', Foundations of Language 3, 409-414.

Bendix, E. H.: 1966, Componential Analysis of General Vocubalary, Mouton, The Hague. Chomsky, N.: 1964, 'Current Issues in Linguistic Theory', in Fodor and Katz, 50-118. Chomsky, N.: 1965, Aspects of the Theory of Syntax, M.I.T. Press, Cambridge, Mass. Chomsky, N. and Halle, M.: 1965, 'Some Controversial Questions in Phonological

Theory', JL 1, 97-138. Fillmore, C.J.: 1966a, 'A Proposal concerning English Prepositions', in Georgetown Uni

versity Monograph Series on Languages and Linguistics 19, 19-33. Fillmore, C.J.: 1966b, 'Deictic Categories in the Semantics of "Come"', Foundations of

Language 2, 219-227. Fillmore, C.J.: 1968, 'The Case for Case', in Proceedings of the Texas Symposium on

Language Universals (ed. by E. Bach and R. Harms), Holt, Rinehart & Winston, New York.

Fodor, J.A. and Katz, J. J.: 1964, The Structure of Language: Readings in the Philosophy of Language, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, N.J.

Halle, M.: 1964, 'Phonology in Generative Grammar', in Fodor and Katz, 334-352 (Re printed from Word 18 (1962), 54-72).

Halliday, M.A.K.: 1967, Grammar Society and the Noun, H.K. Lewis, London. Hockett, C.F.: 1966, 'Language, Mathematics and Linguistics', in Current Trends in Lin

guistics, III: Theoretical Foundations (ed. by T. Sebeok), Mouton, The Hague, 155-304.

Jespersen, 0.: 1924, The Philosophy of Grammar, Allen & Unwin, London.

Katz, J. J.: 1967, 'Recent Issues in Semantic Theory', Foundations of Language 3, 124-194. Katz, J.J. and Fodor, J.A.: 1964, 'The Structure of a Semantic Theory', in Fodor and

Katz, 479-518 (Reprinted from Lg 39 (1963), 170-210). Lamb, S.M.: 1964a, 'On Alternation, Transformation, Realization and Stratification', in

Report of the Fifteenth Annual Round-table Meeting on Linguistics and Language Studies

(Georgetown University Monograph Series on Language and Linguistics, 17), George town University Press, Washington.

Lamb, S.M.: 1964b, 'The Sememic Approach to Structural Semantics', in Transcultural Studies in Cognition (ed. by A. K. Romney and R.G. D'Andrade) (American Anthropo logist 66, 3, 2), 57-58.

Lamb,S.M.: 1965, 'Kinship Terminology and Linguistic Structure', Formal Semantic

Analysis (ed. by E.A. Hammel) (American Anthropologist 67, 5, 2), 37-64.

Lees, R.B.: 1960, The Grammar of English Nominalizations (Publications of the Research Center in Anthropology, Folklore and Linguistics, 12), Indiana University, Blooming ton, Ind.

Lyons, J.: 1963, Structural Semantics, Blackwell, Oxford.

Lyons, J.: 1966, 'Towards a "Notional" Theory of the "Parts of Speech"', JL 2, 209-236.

Lyons, J.: 1967, 'A Note on Possessive, Existential and Locative Sentences', Foundations

of Language 3, 390-396.

Staal, J.F.: 1967, 'Some Semantic Relations Between Sentoids', Foundations of Language 3, 66-88.

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On the Status of 'Lexical Formatives'

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