Constellation Neg A few notes – --all politics work, Aff and Neg, is in this file --some CP options in this file don’t really have net benefits yet. We may do more work on some of them, especially ITAR. --the heavy lift turn assumes the aff funds Ares V or the Space Launch System. Currently this turn is overwhelmingly good against the aff, but it has serious uniqueness problems (the US is pursuing the SLS now, although it isn’t funded to the full extent it should be)
Transcript
Constellation NegA few notes –
--all politics work, Aff and Neg, is in this file
--some CP options in this file don’t really have net benefits yet. We may do more work on some of them, especially ITAR.
--the heavy lift turn assumes the aff funds Ares V or the Space Launch System. Currently this turn is overwhelmingly good against the aff, but it has serious uniqueness problems (the US is pursuing the SLS now, although it isn’t funded to the full extent it should be)
NotesMars and Fusion advantage frontlines can be found in the Colonize Mars neg and Lunar Mining neg, respectively – the advantages are basically the same.
The ITAR CP can still be a solvency takeout if you’re losing on things like the perm
1NC Cooperation1. Obama space policy maintains US leadership at lower cost.Faith, 10 - independent technology consultant and Adjunct Fellow for Space Initiatives at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (April 26, G. Ryan, “President Obama’s Vision for Space Exploration (part 2)”, “The Space Review”, http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1616/1)On April 15th President Obama outlined the administration’s new plan for civil space exploration in a speech at the Kennedy Space Center. This article is part 2 of an analysis of the President’s announcement. The first part of the analysis discussed the cancellation and modification of the previous crew and cargo transportation efforts and the extent to which these changes represent a fundamental shift in the US approach to civil space exploration. President Obama’s new policy reflects the findings of the Review of
US Human Space Flight Plans Committee (also known as the Augustine Committee). The Augustine Committee found that the Constellation program was over budget and behind schedule, although the extent to which this is either a result of underfunding and the normal teething pains associated high technology procurement, or is symptomatic of poor technological decisions, is beyond the scope of this article. What is clear is that interactions among the White House, Congress, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and NASA tightened the program’s time and cost constraints, making it ultimately unsustainable politically and programmatically. Although President Obama’s new plan represents a sharp departure from the Constellation program , begun under the
previous administration, the new policy follows much of the same thinking that appears in President Bush’s 2004 Vision for Space Exploration. President Obama’s new plan modifies President Bush’s Vision for Space Exploration (VSE) by changing the approach to crew and cargo transportation to low Earth orbit (LEO). In the previous plan, NASA was to develop its own crew transportation system, comprised of two different rockets and a crew capsule, to send astronauts to LEO, including to the International Space Station (ISS). The capsule component would be augmented over time to provide a deep space transportation capability. Simultaneously, commercial transportation capabilities would be allowed to evolve, eventually taking over responsibility for crew transportation to LEO. The plan announced by President Obama makes reliance on commercial transportation of crew to LEO the primary plan, while retaining a secondary NASA-developed crew capability by pursuing the immediate development of an “Orion-lite” lifeboat that would be launched as an unmanned vehicle but could return crew from the ISS to Earth. The Orion-lite could, in addition to being evolved for deep-space travel, also be modified to transport crew to LEO, in the event that commercial systems are not able to meet that need. The new space exploration policy also stops development of the previously proposed heavy-lift vehicle , and delays final decisions on the design and development of a future heavy-lift vehicle until 2015. Under the previous architecture, existing equipment and designs would be evolved,
leading to the development of a heavy-lift vehicle that would become operational in the latter half of this decade. In response to the growing costs and technical difficulties associated with the previous launch vehicle design, the new plan calls for several years of technology development followed by a reexamination of an exploration heavy-lift strategy. President Obama’s plan calls for the development of a number of specific space exploration technologies , in contrast to the previous approach of letting NASA’s architecture decisions drive technology development. The array of technologies mentioned in the
new plan include on-orbit refueling, closed-loop life support systems, and in situ resource utilization—all of which are technologies that should, at least in the long-term, reduce the operational costs associated with maintaining a human spaceflight program.
2. Increasing human spaceflight shortchanges existing cooperation – undermines leadershipVincent G. Sabathier and Ryan Faith ‘6 - Vincent G. Sabathier is a senior fellow and director of the Human Space Exploration Initiative at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C, a senior associate with the CSIS Technology and Public Policy Program, from 2004-2009 he was senior fellow and director for space initiatives at CSIS. He is also senior adviser to the SAFRAN group and consults internationally on aerospace and telecommunications. Ryan Faith is program manager for the Human Space Exploration Initiative at CSIS. “U.S. Leadership, International Cooperation, and Space Exploration” 4/26 Published by the CSIS csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/060426_us_space_leadership.pdfThe future of international space exploration is at a turning point as is U.S. leadership. Space exploration has always been very complex on many levels. On the national front, one has been confronted with the political, diplomatic, budgetary, and technical swings and compromises that govern any national space program. Activities in space also lie in the middle of strategic and foreign policy considerations. As NASA has already had to sacrifice its image as a technology innovator to pursue exploration , it is understandable that it does not want to be further constrained by foreign policy requirements. Exploration, however, demands leadership, which in turn is dependent on foreign policy considerations. But one could argue that exploration in a difficult budget environment would cannibalize both the International Space Station (ISS) and science programs , two areas in which
most of the collaborative efforts today are taking place. Such an approach will result in a critical loss of U.S. leadership. Therefore, the current mindset, articulated by the expres2 sions “If we build it, they will follow” and “Forget diplomacy, let’s go back to the moon,” is closer to isolationism than to leadership. In other words, a quarterback by himself isn’t an entire football team.
3. Space cooperation doesn’t spill overOberg, 5 - 22-year veteran of NASA mission control. He is now a writer and consultant in Houston (James, “The real lessons of international cooperation in space,” the Space Review, 7/18, http://www.thespacereview.com/article/413/1)The future role of international partners in American projects under development is only now being assessed, and a cold-blooded assessment of costs versus benefits needs to be made, independent of feel-good boasts from space pilots. Partnerships do seem to give projects political (and budgetary) credibility within each nation, and they do force open windows of contacts so that countries don’t succumb to fearful misinterpretations of each other’s intentions and capabilities. Teaming arrangements have given some nations critical supporting roles on the major programs in the US and Russia, and one of the best examples are the robot arms supplied to the space shuttle and to the ISS by Canada. European equipment has significantly enhanced scientific benefits from shuttle flights. But for the biggest promises often touted for the “grand alliance” of the US and Russia , the scorecard is much less clear-cut . Having the Russians along was supposed to make the project cheaper, but it cost more to build the proper international interfaces. Launching all components into a northerly orbit accessible from Russia increased the space transportation cost by billions of dollars. Nor did the Russian presence make the project faster, better, or safer, as it turned out. NASA was supposed to “learn from the immense body of Russian experience”, but it seems they never did—they just flew their missions and learned the necessary lessons directly. Repeated inquiries to NASA to specify things that had been learned exclusively from Russian experience have resulted in a pitiful short list of trivial “lessons”. It can even be argued that the most important lessons learned were harmful. On Shuttle-Mir, NASA watched space crews dodge death on almost a monthly basis and may have subconsciously absorbed the lesson that since nobody had actually died, you could get sloppy with safety reviews and it wouldn’t ever bite you. They should have known better—and for most of its glorious history, NASA did know better—but the gradual degradation of NASA’s “safety culture” that led to the Columbia disaster was developing during the same years as Shuttle-Mir missions were flying. Dodge enough bullets (as the crew of Mir did in those days), they may have figured, and it proves you’re bulletproof forever. As far as “ not speaking about politics ”, that may be an acceptable rule in the narrow theater of spacecraft operations, but it is not a technique that can be generalized to apply to international partnerships as a whole . There, national policy requires a relationship with moral law as well as amoral “realpolitik”. There are plenty of regimes that the US simply would not partner with in the 1980s and 1990s, and for similar reasons, will not partner with today. Russia and the United States, and the world’s other spacefaring nations, will be conducting complex and challenging space missions in decades to come. Some efforts will be in parallel, some will be united, and some will be completely unrelated to each other. Strategists have a lot of information to base their choices on, except for one type of useless advice: they should smile when the old spacemen talk to them, and listen politely to their opinions, and applaud them, and then disregard them as soon as they’ve left the room.
4. A. Human spaceflight will tradeoff with NASA’s space science budgetChyba, 11 – professor of astrophysical sciences and international affairs at Princeton University (Christopher, “Contributions of Space to National Imperatives”, Senate Testimony, 5/17, http://commerce.senate.gov/public/?a=Files.Serve&File_id=c0c83770-946d-4be9-9c84-75d14e992c21Second, the report insists on scientific integrity. Each option presented for consideration was examined for its impact on science, and all else being equal options that did a better job furthering science were rated more highly. But human spaceflight should not be justified with exaggerated claims about its scientific payoff. Exploration with astronauts can have significant scientific benefits in several areas beyond the tautological justification of studying what happens to humans in space. As was emphasized by scientists’ testimony to the committee, astronauts have a tremendous advantage over robot spacecraft when it comes to field geology in particular. The ability to pick up a rock, turn it over, expose a fresh surface with a hammer and then use geological expertise to decide whether to move on or instead to “dig in” and examine the current site in detail is a human capability that far exceeds anything robot rovers can currently do. In a similar way, the ability to service and repair space observatories that face unanticipated problems favors the astronaut over the robot. But astronauts are also far more expensive than robot spacecraft or rovers, and have their greatest advantage in the most complex environments and circumstances. Mars is the most complicated surface environment we will face in the foreseeable future, so it is where astronauts will provide the greatest advantage. But it will be decades before humans walk on that world—if we are lucky—and for most other science in space, humans often get in the way. Moreover, if NASA’s space science budget is not protected, it could be raided to fund cost overruns in the human program. Human spaceflight, if it is to be justified and sustained, needs to be aligned with national priorities. Were key space-based research to be cut to fund human spaceflight, human spaceflight would be put into opposition with those priorities. This would serve neither science nor the future of human spaceflight well. We live in a time of extraordinary discoveries about outer space. We have learned that early Mars had standing liquid water on its surface, and that the resulting sedimentary rocks are still accessible. These are the kind of rocks that can contain information about the early martian environment, or even microfossils should life ever have existed on that world. We’ve learned that there are many other ocean worlds in our Solar System—moons of the outer planets that host liquid water oceans beneath their ice covers that are as big as our own. We’ve learned that solar systems are common, and that the arrangement of planets in our own is but one of a vast array of possibilities. And we’ve learned that most of the mass-energy of the Universe is not made up of the kind of matter we
are familiar with here on Earth—and that we don’t quite know what this more exotic mass-energy is. Human spaceflight should be an ally in, and certainly not an opponent of, these momentous discoveries.
B. Space science is a prerequisite to sustainable human explorationAllison Kempf ‘11 Writes her own blog which was published by CSIS Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) provides strategic insights and policy solutions to decisionmakers in government, international institutions, the private sector, and civil society. A bipartisan, nonprofit organization headquartered in Washington, DC, CSIS conducts research and analysis and develops policy initiatives that look into the future and anticipate change. “NASA's Vision for the Future of Human Space Exploration” 4/8 http://csis.org/blog/nasas-vision-future-human-space-explorationThe U.S. National Research Council released a report on 05 April 2011 that emphasizes a need for increased research funding and programmatic planning in the biological and physical sciences in order to advance human space exploration. The NRC committee that authored this report asserts that research in these fields has been significantly reduced in scope, largely as a consequence of budgetary challenges at NASA over the past decade. Research on human health and performance in space is particularly crucial to the future of human space exploration , but government policy and funding are not contributing sufficient resources to this field. The NRC discusses two key categories of space research: there is research that enables space exploration and research that is enabled by our access to space . The two are often interconnected, because much of the research that has the potential to further space exploration requires use of the space environment for experimentation and data collection . In order to promote the health of astronauts on prolonged space missions, research must be conducted on the effects of the space environment on the health and performance of astronauts. One way to achieve this is to collect and analyze psychological and physiological data from astronauts before, during, and after space flights. Researchers must work to determine what physical or mental changes can occur in humans as a result of exposure to the space environment and whether certain individuals are more vulnerable to these changes than others. For example, there is evidence that microgravity contributes to loss of bone and cardiovascular function in humans. Preventing this adverse response to microgravity requires an understanding of how gravity impacts biological mechanisms, particularly within the human body. The objective of this type of research is ultimately to determine how astronauts’ health and performance capabilities may be protected or even enhanced on deep space missions.
5. Space exploration won’t bolster US leadership – it doesn’t have the international supportVincent G. Sabathier and Ryan Faith ‘6 -- Vincent G. Sabathier is a senior fellow and director of the Human Space Exploration Initiative at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C, a senior associate with the CSIS Technology and Public Policy Program, from 2004-2009 he was senior fellow and director for space initiatives at CSIS. He is also senior adviser to the SAFRAN group and consults internationally on aerospace and telecommunications. Ryan Faith is program manager for the Human Space Exploration Initiative at CSIS. “U.S. Leadership, International Cooperation, and Space Exploration” 4/26 Published by the CSIS csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/060426_us_space_leadership.pdfU.S. Civil Space The United States, of course, remains the dominant player if only in terms of its budget allocated to space, in general, and to civil space, in particular. Further, the United States has a clear mandate to implement the presidential Vision for Space Exploration. Whether or not the United States will be able to attract and lead other nations to return to the moon remains uncertain and is the real question of leadership. For being first without having any followers is not leadership, it is merely being alone What is certain is that the implementation of the Vision for Space Exploration is generating difficulties nationally and internationally. The Western Allies There is the issue of the old allies, Europe and Japan. The traditional relationship between the Western partners of the ISS has changed. The transatlantic relationship, for example, although recovering
fast in light of the Iran crisis, is still perceived as weak. Further, in matters of space exploration, it has never been weaker. The trade limitations associated with International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR ) and the uncertainty surrounding the future of the space shuttle and its impact on the ISS have been eroding U.S. leadership in civil space . The recent cuts in the science programs meant to fund the vision, appearing in the FY 2007 budget, are amplifying the trend. It is essential to note that many things have been learned from the ISS. The main lesson is that no one can rely anymore on a single national space transportation vehicle, even less so when this vehicle exists only on paper.
6. Obama’s policies solve - a small approach without destination targets is the only politically sustainable strategy for space exploration and developmentHandberg, 11 - Professor and Chair of the Department of Political Science at the University of Central Florida (Rodger, “Small ball or home runs: the changing ethos of US human spaceflight policy,” The Space Review, 1/17, http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1759/1)As has been repeatedly said, Apollo was sui generis, one of a kind, a product of unique historical circumstances. NASA’s future in human spaceflight is budget wise and politically more supportable as a small ball approach. This is clearly less flashy, but today being politically sustainable must become the focus. The flexible path suggested by the Obama Administration is perceived by some as too vague and indefinite (see “Prognosticating NASA’s Future”, The Space Review, March 29, 2010). That may be an accurate judgment, but that plan envisions a process rather than a constituency or destination focus ,
which has been typical of NASA initiatives. Such a project or destination focus becomes finite, with an end date and no logical follow on into the future. Conceptualizing space exploration as a process rather than a destination or project allows you to build on success and push outward beyond the Moon and into the solar system. This also accommodates the development of a commercial human spaceflight program to handle trips to the ISS or tourists going to a Bigelow space habitat. NASA human spaceflight is not crippled or destroyed by such developments. Rather, NASA clearly must focus on exploration, not running a bus service to the ISS or other orbital locations. Commercial operations will eventually go where a profit can be made; their forte does not presently include actual exploration unless heavily subsidized. Why subsidize? Costs in the human space exploration domain are not necessarily lower than NASA with regards to exploration. We are not sending ships across the ocean in pursuit of gold as occurred during the European era of global exploration. Even suggestions of going to asteroids are built around some notion of profit. This approach returns NASA to its roots as a scientific and exploration agent . The space shuttle was important in sustaining a US presence in outer space but fundamentally it was incomplete because the shuttle stood alone, a relic of Apollo and its times. What this also means is that the US must become focused on maximizing its experience on the ISS. The VSE and Constellation program had no vision for the ISS: build it and then leave it to pursue the Moon or beyond. Leaving $100 billion on the table made little sense but resulted from the ISS being a compromised project once the Russians entered the program. The orbital position of the ISS was made by deliberate choice more difficult for the space shuttle to reach in the interest of fostering international cooperation. Rather than a dead end, the ISS now becomes part of this larger process of human exploration of space. The ISS provides much needed experience in long-duration flight—critical information for missions beyond the orbit of the Moon. One of the signs of the home run approach was the VSE’s willingness to write off the ISS so quickly after its completion. In fact, the US unilaterally proposed a truncated ISS construction process that would have severely damaged its partners’ programs by effectively eliminating their costly lab facilities, Columbus and Kibo. That effort was rejected. From the US perspective, rather than seen as an asset, the ISS became a burden after a hard decade long struggle to build it. The ISS became merely another project, which meant it was a dead end rather than part of an ongoing space exploration process. The politics of American space policy are such that NASA has to adjust or become another relic of the Cold War. The project or destination mentality grew in importance for NASA because it allowed for time and cost goals to be delineated even though both have historically been fantasies used to lull Congress to sleep. NASA consistently overruns cost projections. The reasons may vary but the results are the same: more money and time always is needed. The goal was getting the project approved; the grubby details would be worked out later. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) has repeatedly detailed the results: cost overruns with schedules almost completely out of control. The astronomy community is now confronting that with the $1.6-billion cost overrun for the James Webb Space Telescope, an overrun that would be devastating the rest of the scientific community. One result could be the delay in the Wide Field Infrared Telescope, which would search for dark energy across the universe. Projects are the political vehicle for obtaining support for human exploration but, unfortunately, they carry an aura of completeness. Once the Eagle landed on the lunar surface in 1969, the Apollo program was done—subsequent missions were merely running out the string. That reality made it politically easy for President Nixon to pull the plug on the last three Apollo missions. Those missions more heavily emphasized the scientific component, but for the political class, that was at best of marginal importance. A process approach looks something like the Mars exploration effort, where a series of missions are launched, each as a building block for the next and building on past missions. Mission failures occur, but they are not the end of the story. Small ball can be as exciting as the home run approach and much more fundable, especially in a harsh budget environment that will exist for the foreseeable future.
7. Space cooperation reflects greater relations – it doesn’t cause themOberg, 5 - 22-year veteran of NASA mission control. He is now a writer and consultant in Houston (James, “The real lessons of international cooperation in space,” the Space Review, 7/18, http://www.thespacereview.com/article/413/1)NASA’s chief astronaut during the Shuttle-Mir program in the mid-1990s, Charles Precourt, was even more enthusiastic about the practical benefit of space friendship. It will, he wrote for a NASA history book on the project, “provide the psychological impetus for politicians to force themselves to find an agreement to disputes that otherwise they wouldn’t.” This will happen, he believes, “because they’ll look up there and say, ‘Well, we have an investment in that, too. We have to keep this relationship going in a proper direction,’ rather than doing something rash.” Again, this planet’s historical record is inconsistent with this interpretation, which seems to place the international space flights in the role of the cause, rather than the consequence, of improved international relations. ASTP could happen because it symbolized the success of Nixon’s policy of détente with the USSR (the policy came first ). However, subsequent joint space projects were cancelled in the late 1970s by President Jimmy Carter (the man who had earlier warned about having “an inordinate fear of communism”) in response to Soviet aggression in Afghanistan and Africa. The cooperation resumed only as the USSR was collapsing in the early 1990s. Shuttle-Mir and the critical role of Russia in the International Space Station were enabled by the rise of a freer, more democratic Russian society, not by inertia from decades-old space handshakes. Even if Apollo-Soyuz had never happened, Shuttle-Mir (in some form) would have become possible in the political context of the early 1990s, and both
countries’ space teams would have found a way to proceed to the space dockings with little additional effort, even without any historical precedents. Alternately, with Apollo-Soyuz as historical fact, a surviving Soviet regime—with its political repressions, imperialistic client states, massive nuclear and conventional strike forces, and soul-killing society of deception—would never have been given veto power over the centerpiece of Western human space flight, the space station. So where does this leave the space handshakers? Well, like the robin who may think its song ushers in the spring, or the rooster who thinks he commands the sun to rise, a lot of spacemen in Russian and in America enjoy recalling their roles—honorable ones, to be sure—in carrying out such a mission. If they want to think their flight caused the international thaws rather than merely reflected them, they’ve earned the right to their point of view—just as sober historians, practical politicians, and sensible space buffs have the right to gently refuse to believe them.
1NC China CooperationChina coop nowGang 5/15 (Liu gang is a reporter for Xinhua news, “China favours "harmonious" use of outer space - diplomat” 5/15/2011 Lexis )
China hopes all countries would continue to strengthen open and inclusive international cooperation characterized by equality and mutual benefit and further improve related laws in outer space explorations, a Chinese diplomat told Xinhua. Huang Huikang, director of the Department of Treaty and Law in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, spoke about China's space policy as head of the Chinese delegation in Vienna attending the 54th session of United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) on June 1-10. At the meeting, marking the 50th anniversary of the foundation of the COPUOS, China called for building a harmonious outer space to achieve inclusive development. The notion of achieving the inclusive development of outer space has multiple connotations, Huang said. First, it implies tolerance for space environment, stressing the need to harmonize the exploration and use of outer space with space environment with an eye toward the sustainable development of outer space. Second, it denotes tolerance for all countries. All countries, big or small, strong or weak, have equal rights to use the outer space in a peaceful manner. Third, it contains tolerance for the entire mankind. Outer space exploration broadens people's vision and deepens mankind's self-understanding. Speaking of current challenges, Huang said that as outer space explorations in the 21st century become increasingly commercialized and as outer space explorers diversify, China holds that in the next 50 years, the international community should be jointly dedicated to the inclusive development of outer space to benefit all, especially those countries and people that do not yet have space capabilities. International cooperation is not only a product of the successful experience of human exploration and use of outer space, but also a basic guideline for directing the space activities of all countries, Huang said. As outer space explorers diversify and the realm of outer space explorations expands, "we should involve more countries that do not yet have space capabilities in outer space development, so as to achieve sustainable and inclusive development of outer space," Huang said. On the peaceful use of outer space, Huang said outer space law is an important instrument for safeguarding the harmonious development of the outer space, preventing its weaponization and realizing its sustainable development. "All treaties, principles, and declarations established by the COPUOS have played an important role in regulating space activities, maintaining space order and promoting space cooperation, and they should guide all countries' outer space activities," Huang said. Meanwhile, the commercialization of outer space activities and the risk of militarization of outer space require us to stipulate new space laws, improve the existing space law system so as to ensure the inclusive development of outer space, Huang said. In the future, China will continue to uphold the notion of harmonious outer space and work with the international community to realize the inclusive development of outer space and "achieve peace, development, cooperation and rule of law in outer space."
Cooperation with China fails – lack of mutual trust, technological disparity, China’s culture of secrecy and little incentives for information exchange. Seedhouse, Aerospace research scientist and Astronaut Training Consultant, 10 [ Dr. Erik Seedhouse, “The New Space Race, China Vs. the United States,” p. 213 accessed June 23, 2011, BJM]Transparency permits international counterparts to increase their confidence about whether an activity is taking place and also provides warning of suspicious behavior - a particularly important consideration for any nation deliberating on doing business with Beijing. But transparency isn’t just about sharing perceptions about risks and threats. It requires several important steps, including exchanges between laboratories, information concerning space budgets, operations, research and development programs, and agency-I0-agency contacts. Ultimately, transparency requires each counterpart to declare all activities. Such an agreement enables each nation to engage in reciprocal and observable actions that in turn signal a commitment to enforcing predictable rules of behavior. Transparency is a feature notably absent from China’s secrecy-bound space program - a situation exacerbated by the control by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) of virtually all Chinese space development. Such control is clearly a counterproductive factor in any potential agreement with international counterparts. However, even if the PLA wasn’t involved, neither Washington nor Beijing believes it confronts a common problem in space that demands mutual collaboration.
Furthermore, even if Washington and Beijing investigated the possibility of cooperation and engaged in measures to build transparency into their respective space programs, such an attempt would be futile given the disparity in the technological capabilities between the two countries. Other transparency barriers to collaboration include the obsessive culture of secrecy surrounding the Chinese space program and the reticence of Beijing to reveal just how technologically mature their space hardware is. This reluctance towards efforts in transparency and the insular nature of China’s security apparatus have resulted in US efforts to encourage greater bilateral exchanges failing miserably. Furthermore, as long as the US maintains its tremendous technological lead and overwhelming reliance on satellites for military operations and commerce, and as long as China continues to seek parity, the incentives for information exchange will remain slim to non-existent.
Cooperation in space doesn’t translate to better relations on Earth. Seedhouse, Aerospace research scientist and Astronaut Training Consultant, 10 [ Dr. Erik Seedhouse, “The New Space Race, China Vs. the United States,” p. 212 accessed June 23, 2011, BJM]
One suggestion made by analysts such as Taylor Dinkerman, a spaceflight observer writing for the space policy site Space Review, has been for the Americans to engage the Chinese in a space project to generate at least a minimal level of political trust. By pursuing this course of action, analysts hope that by cooperating in space, the political relationship between Washington and Beijing can be changed for the better. Unfortunately, despite what people may think about the supposed benefits that occurred as a result of the US-Russia partnership, “handshakes in space” do not compel world leaders to make peace, no matter how many speeches astronauts and cosmonauts make, extolling the virtues of cooperation. The reason cooperation in space will never help to overthrow old tensions between Washington and Beijing, no matter how many astronauts and taikonauts hug each other in LEO, is that diplomatic progress always comes first.
Cooperation with China in space is impossible – House appropriations and Chinese banMessier 11 (February 14, Doug, “House Measure Would Prohibit NASA Cooperation With China”, Parabolic Arc,http://www.parabolicarc.com/2011/02/14/house-measure-prohibit-nasa-cooperation-china/)
House Republicans have decided that they , rather than President Barack Obama, should run foreign policy as it relates to NASA’s international outreach efforts. House appropriators have inserted a provision into a proposed continuing resolution to fund that government that prohibits any joint cooperation between NASA and China on space. SEC. 1339. (a) None of the funds made available by this division may be used for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration or the Office of Science and Technology Policy to develop, design, plan, promulgate, implement, or execute a policy, program, order, or contract of any kind to participate, collaborate, or coordinate in any way with China or any Chinese-owned company unless such activities are specifically authorized by a law enacted after the date of enactment of this division. (b) The limitation in subsection (a) shall also apply to any funds used to effectuate the hosting of official Chinese visitors at facilities belonging to or utilized by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. In 2009, President Obama visited China, resulting in a mutual pledge to explore cooperation in space and an exchange of official visits. NASA Administrator Charles Bolden visited with Chinese space officials in October. The space agency has been working on a reciprocal visit by the administrator of the China National Space Administration. The prospects for significant cooperation are uncertain. Chinese officials were cool to Bolden’s overture. The NASA chief has said that neither side needs the other to succeed in its space program. The continuing resolution, which would fund the government for the last seven months of the fiscal year end Sept. 30, will be considered by Congress in the coming weeks. The White House likely sees the Chinese ban as a Congressional intrusion into its foreign policy-making domain; whether it fights the provision depends upon what compromises it needs to make in other areas and how much value it places on this outreach effort.
ITAR blocks US-China cooperation in spaceSelding 11 – Space News Correspondent (April 14, 2011, Peter, “Chinese Government Official Urges U.S.-Chinese Space Cooperation,”http://www.spacenews.com/civil/110414-chinese-official-space-cooperation.html)
COLORADO SPRINGS, Colo. — A top Chinese government space official on April 14 appealed to the U.S. government to lift its decade-long ban on most forms of U.S.-Chinese space cooperation, saying both nations would benefit from closer government and commercial space interaction. He specifically called for cooperation on manned spaceflight, in which China has made massive investment in recent years. Lei Fanpei, vice president of China Aerospace Science and Technology Corp. (CASC), which oversees much of China’s launch vehicle and satellite manufacturing industry, said China purchased more than $1 billion in U.S.-built satellites in the 1990s
before the de facto ban went into effect in 1999. Since then, the U.S. International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) have made it impossible to export most satellite components, or full satellites, to China for launch on China’s now successful line of Long March rockets. The ITAR regulations that tightened the U.S. technology export regime were put into place to punish China for its missile exports, and to slow development of China’s rocket industry by reducing its customer base. Most commercial telecommunications satellites carry at least some U.S. parts, which is why ITAR has all but locked China out of the global commercial launch market. The U.S. government is reviewing the current ITAR regime, which U.S. industry says has had the unintended effect of making it difficult to sell satellites and satellite components just about anywhere in the world.
1NC Russia CooperationMissile defense will inevitably collapse relationsCohen ’11 Stephen F. – PhD in Russian studies from Columbia University, former professor of politics and Russian studies at Princeton University, current professor at New York University, former advisor to President Bush, CBS News consultant, member of the Council on Foreign Relations, “Obama's Russia 'Reset': Another Lost Opportunity?”, June 10, 2011, America-Russia.net, http://www.america-russia.net/eng/face/278185917 In pursuing the one-way concessions implicit in 'selective cooperation,' Obama, like Clinton and Bush before him, seems unable or unwilling to connect the strategic dots of mutual security the way Reagan and Gorbachev did in the late 1980s. In effect, Obama is asking Moscow to substantially reduce its long-range nuclear weapons while Russia is being surrounded by NATO bases with their superior conventional forces and with an antimissile system potentially capable of neutralizing Russia's reduced retaliatory capability. In that crucial respect, the new arms-reduction treaty is inherently unstable. If nothing else, Obama is undermining his own hope of also negotiating a major reduction of Russia's enormous advantage in short-range tactical nuclear weapons, which Moscow increasingly considers vital for its national defense. Instead, as Medvedev also warned, unless the missile defense conflict is resolved, there will be 'another escalation of the arms race' that would, he added on May 18, 'throw us back into the cold war era.'
NATO expansion is the defining issue in US-Russian relationsCohen ’11– PhD in Russian studies from Columbia University, former professor of politics and Russian studies at Princeton University, current professor at New York University, former advisor to President Bush, CBS News consultant, member of the Council on Foreign Relations, (Stephen, “Obama's Russia 'Reset': Another Lost Opportunity?”, June 10, 2011, America-Russia.net, http://www.america-russia.net/eng/face/278185917)Not surprisingly, the Russian leadership entered into the reset in 2009 with expectations diametrically opposed to the unilateral concessions expected by the Obama administration. As an unnamed Kremlin aide bluntly told a Washington Post columnist, 'America owes Russia, and it owes a lot, and it has to pay its debt.' A year later, when the head of NATO assured the international media that the reset would 'bury the ghosts of the past,' it was another example of how little the US-led alliance understands or cares about history. The 'ghost' barring a truly fundamental change in relations is, of course, the twelve-year expansion of NATO to Russia's borders-the first and most fateful broken American promise. Despite assurances of a 'NATO-Russian friendship,' the Obama administration has not disavowed more NATO expansion and instead reaffirmed US support for eventual membership for the former Soviet republics of Ukraine and Georgia, Moscow's declared 'red lines.' No state that feels encircled and threatened by an encroaching military alliance-an anxiety repeatedly expressed by Moscow, most recently by Putin in April-will, of course, ever feel itself an equal or secure partner of that alliance. Still more, expanding NATO eastward has institutionalized a new and even larger geopolitical conflict with Russia . Moscow's protests and countersteps against NATO encroachment, especially Medvedev's statement in 2008 that Russia is entitled to a 'sphere of strategic interests' in the former Soviet republics, have been indignantly denounced by American officials and commentators as 'Russia's determination to re-establish a sphere of influence in neighboring countries.' Thus, Biden stated in Moscow in March, 'We will not recognize any state having a sphere of influence.' But what is NATO's eastward movement other than a vast expansion of America's sphere of influence-military, political and economic-into what had previously been Russia's? No US official or mainstream commentator will admit as much, but Saakashvili, the Georgian leader bent on joining the alliance, feels no such constraint. In 2010, he welcomed the growth of 'NATO's presence in the region' because it enables the United States and its allies to 'expand their sphere of influence.' Of all the several double standards in US policy-making -" hypocrisy," Moscow charges-none has done more to prevent an American-Russian partnership and to provoke a new cold war . * * * Given that the new NATO states cannot now be deprived of membership, there is only one way to resolve, or at least reduce, this profound geopolitical conflict between the US and Russia: in return for Moscow's reaffirmation of the sovereignty of all the former Soviet republics, Washington and its allies should honor retroactively another broken promise- that Western military forces would not be based in any new NATO country east of German y. Though anathema to the US policy establishment and weapons industries, this would, in effect, demilitarize NATO's expansion since 1999. Without diminishing the alliance's guarantee of collective security for all of its members, such a grand accommodation would make possible a real partnership with post-Soviet Russia. First, and crucially, it would redeem one of America's broken promises to Russia. Second, it would recognize that Moscow is entitled to at least one "strategic interest'-the absence of a potential military threat on its borders. (Washington has long claimed this privilege for itself, defending it to the brink of nuclear war in Cuba in 1962.) Third, the demilitarization of NATO's expansion would alleviate Russia's historical fear of military encirclement while bolstering i ts trust in Western partners. And fourth, this would reduce the Kremlin's concerns about missile defense sites in Eastern Europe, making it more willing to contribute what may be Russia's necessary resources to the still unproven project. Much else of essential importance both to America and Russia could then follow, from far greater reductions in all of their weapons of mass destruction to full cooperation against the looming dangers of nuclear proliferation and international terrorism. The result would be, that is, another chance to regain the historic opportunity lost in the 1990s.
Cohen ’11– PhD in Russian studies from Columbia University, former professor of politics and Russian studies at Princeton University, current professor at New York University, former advisor to President Bush, CBS News consultant, member of the Council on Foreign Relations, (Stephen, “Obama's Russia 'Reset': Another Lost Opportunity?”, June 10, 2011, America-Russia.net, http://www.america-russia.net/eng/face/278185917)Obama's recapitulations of failed American policies, along with his declared intention to pursue missile defense in Eastern Europe-plans to put interceptor missiles in Romania and related weapons in Poland have already been announced-can only severely limit his détente with Moscow, and possibly destroy it. Given Russia's overriding importance for vital US interests, the president seems to have no national security priorities. Even the wanton NATO air attacks on Libya are eroding support for the reset in Moscow , where lessons are being drawn that 'Russia was essentially deceived' (again) and Obama's partner Medvedev was 'naïve' in trusting the US-backed UN resolution on a 'no-fly zone' ; that nations without formidable nuclear weapons-first Serbia, then Iraq and now Libya (Muammar el-Qaddafi relinquished his nuclear materials in 2004) risk becoming targets of such attacks; and that NATO's slouching toward Russia is even more menacing than previously thought.
1NC Development1. Cancellation of funding for Constellations is key to the commercial space industryPelton 10 – Director, Space & Advanced Communications Research Institute, George Washington University (May 2010, Science Direct, Space Policy, Volume 26, Issue 2, “A new space vision for NASA-And for space entrepreneurs too?” Pages 78-80)Some have suggested that President Barack Obama's cancellation of the unwieldy and expensive Project Constellation to send astronauts back to the Moon for a few exploratory missions was a blow to NASA and the start of the end of
the US space program. The truth is just the reverse. Project Constellation, accurately described by former NASA
Administrator Michael Griffin as “Apollo on Steroids” provided little new technology or innovation and had an astronomical price tag. It was clearly too much for too little. If the opportunity costs of Project Constellation are examined (i.e. if we think what could have been done with an extra $100 billion of space funds), dumping it defies argument. With much less invested in a questionable Project Constellation enterprise we can do much more in space astronomy . We can invest more wisely in space science to learn more about the Sun, the Earth and threats from Near Earth Objects. David Thompson, Chairman and CEO of Orbital Sciences said the
following in a speech that endorsed the new commercial thrust of the NASA space policies on Nine February 2010: “Let us, the commercial space industry, develop the space taxis we need to get our Astronauts into orbit and to ferry those
wanting to go into space to get to where they want to go. We are in danger of falling behind in many critical areas of space unless we shift our priorities” [10]. With a change in priorities we can deploy far more spacecraft needed to address the problems of climate change via better Earth observation systems. We can fund competitions and challenges to spur space entrepreneurs to find cheaper and better ways to send people into space. We can also spur the development of solar power satellites to get clean energy from the sun with greater efficiency.
We can deal more effectively with finding and coping with “killer” asteroids and near earth objects. We may even find truly new and visionary ways to get people into space with a minimum of pollution and promote the development of cleaner and faster hypersonic transport to cope with future transportation needs. The real key is to unlock the potential of commercial space initiatives while giving a very middle-aged NASA a new lease on life. Here are just some of the possibilities that are on the horizon of a revitalized commercial space industry.
2. Heavy lift is unnecessary for low earth and near earth orbit – current launch vehicles solve better than NASABonin, 11 – aerospace engineer and co-founder of Consortium Technologies, LLC, a Virginia-based company developing innovative technologies for both terrestrial and space-based applications (Grant, The Space Review, “Human spaceflight for less: the case for smaller launch vehicles, revisited,” 6/6, http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1861/1)Heavy lift certainly isn’t necessary for delivering hardware to low-Earth orbit , and existing launch vehicles are certainly equal to the task . SpaceX has demonstrated this with their inaugural Falcon 9 and Dragon flight. Orbital will hopefully follow suit with Taurus 2, designed to provide low-cost commercial resupply of the International Space Station. United Launch Alliance (and the companies that comprise that joint venture, Boeing and Lockheed Martin) been launching EELVs for many years now, and several initiatives funded under CCDev aim to develop new low-cost commercial crew transportation systems. While none of these have yet delivered a person to orbit or cargo to the ISS, there is certainly more cause for optimism here than with heavy lift. Several of the above launch vehicles are mature and flying. NASA , in contrast, hasn’t successfully built a launch vehicle in decades , let alone with a spec written by Congress. Even for exploration missions, such as to near Earth asteroids, the Moon, or Mars, smaller launchers are similarly equal to the task , with the proviso that at least orbital rendezvous and docking is necessary. Fortunately, NASA has been doing rendezvous and docking for decades, and at this point can comfortably consider it something they’re good at.
3. Turn - HLLVs guarantee high launch costs and crowding out the private sectorBonin, 6 – aerospace engineer and co-founder of Consortium Technologies, LLC, a Virginia-based company developing innovative technologies for both terrestrial and space-based applications (Grant, The Space Review, “The case for smaller launch vehicles in human space exploration (part 2),” 1/9, http://www.thespacereview.com/article/529/1)Smaller launch systems exist in greater quantity because of greater demand. Whether or not humankind begins in earnest a program of exploration beyond LEO, a large market will still exist for smaller boosters, but the same can’t be said for HLLVs. To be sure, most heavy-lift advocates
acknowledge this fact: Robert Zubrin of Mars Direct fame recognized this past summer that a heavy-lift booster’s only real purpose can be human spaceflight beyond low orbit . There is another important issue that needs to be addressed. If the current NASA administration has its way, a program of manned lunar expeditions will evolve in the next few decades that only NASA itself will be capable of undertaking. Since NASA’s hardware will be optimized for launch on heavy-lift vehicles (along
with their characteristic low launch rate, high operations costs, and veritable standing army of ground staff), there will be limited potential at best for either the private sector o r other countries to get involved in a meaningful way. No nation in the world is capable of delivering 100 tonnes to Earth orbit in a single shot, and no private effort will be capable of developing heavy-lift launch technology anytime in the
foreseeable future, so with a program of lunar exploration designed for HLLVs, there won’t be anyone involved in launch anywhere but on the Cape. The civilian launch industry won’t grow, and NASA will be shouldering all of the launch costs instead of divvying them up between different companies or countries. It makes one wonder just what kind of a space age the 21st century will become. Smaller launch vehicles are cheaper to build, cheaper to fly, and cheaper to maintain, and for a given amount of payload that must be launched into orbit, smaller launchers are more economical by virtue of their higher required flight rate. If an exclusively US-based effort is what the American government wants for lunar or Mars exploration, then specifying medium-lift boosters and doing any of: Awarding exclusive launch rights to a single company with a pre-existing vehicle (the Lockheed Martin Atlas 5 could certainly get the job done); Awarding multiple launch contracts to several companies (say, to Boeing, Lockheed, and SpaceX, if they could all find a way to get along); or Just keeping the work in house and flying each module on the Crew Launch Vehicle would all represent much more cost-effective ways of flying than spending upwards of $10 billion on a single HLLV and edging everyone else out of the game.
1NC Industrial Base1. I’m calling bias on the Maser evidence – he owns his own company and says himself he would stand to benefit from the plan
2. New space contracts won’t protect aerospaceEric R. Sterner ‘10 Eric R. Sterner is a fellow at the George C. Marshall Institute, held senior staff positions on the House Armed Services and Science committees, and served in the office of the secretary of defense and as associate deputy administrator for policy and planning at NASA. William B. Adkins is president of Adkins Strategies, held a senior staff position on the House Science Committee and served at the Naval Research Laboratory and National Reconnaissance Office. “R&D Can Revitalize the Space Industrial Base”2/22 http://www.marshall.org/article.php?id=782)For nearly 20 years, the United States has been living off its investments in space. Unfortunately, its ability to do so is coming to an end, and the space industrial base finds itself increasingly at risk. Without a healthy foundation, the American people will not continue to enjoy the benefits that space systems provide and may well watch other countries, which invest their seed corn rather than consume it, surpass the United States. Several problems with the industrial base consistently rear their heads. These include an aging work force and the loss of critical skills as it retires, a lack of opportunities for young engineers to learn the ropes and “get their hands dirty,” a funding and acquisition approach that is not well-aligned with the boutique nature of contemporary space systems, limited budgets and a backlog of troubled programs. Furthermore, the space industrial base, particularly the second- and third-tier suppliers, has not been immune to the steady decline in the overall U.S. manufacturing base, which has been exacerbated by the recent economic downturn . Particular attention needs to be given to these lower-tier suppliers because that is often where unique, specialized skills reside. It is tempting to throw money at these problems, but dollars will not solve them. Resources are clearly necessary, but not sufficient , for a healthy space industrial base . Today, the United States often spreads the funding available around industry to protect as many jobs and heritage capabilities as possible, but such subsidies represent a hollow approach. “ Keep alive” funding will not revitalize industry; it only promotes stagnation.
3. No permanent job loss – cancellation sets the foundation for a stronger civilian industryRutherford 10 (Emelie, congressional reporter at Defense Daily with a graduate degree in print journalism at Boston University, “Obama Set To Sign NASA Plan That Keeps Some Constellation Aspects”, Lexis Nexis Academic, http://dl2af5jf3e.search.serialssolutions.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info%3Aofi%2Fenc%3AUTF-8&rfr_id=info:sid/summon.serialssolutions.com&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=Obama+Set+To+Sign+NASA+Plan+That+Keeps+Some+Constellation+Aspects&rft.jtitle=Space+%26+Missile+Defense+Report&rft.au=Anonymous&rft.date=2010-10-11&rft.issn=1529-7209&rft.volume=33&rft.issue=21&rft.externalDBID=SMDF&rft.externalDocID=2165780641)Overall, the NASA authorization bill lawmakers sent to Obama moves away from Constellation , but keeps alive aspects of it, including Orion. The legislation calls on NASA Administrator Charles Bolden to "continue the development of a multi-purpose crew vehicle to be available as soon as practicable, and no later than for use with (a new) Space Launch System." It adds: "The vehicle shall continue to advance development of the human safety features, designs, and systems in the Orion project." In addition, for the new heavy-lift rocket, the bill calls for building on working done on Ares I and the space shuttles that are being retired. The measure says Bolden should use, "to the extent practicable," "Ares 1 components that use existing United States propulsion systems, including liquid fuel engines, external tank or tank-related capability, and solid rocket motor engines; and...associated testing facilities, either in being or under construction as of the date of enactment of this Act." Some lawmakers who previously pushed back on Obama's controversial plan to cancel Constellation and instead invest in private companies to send astronauts to low-Earth orbit applauded the new bill, which is a compromise hashed out with the White House. Those former critics include Sen. Orrin Hatch (R-Utah). More than 1,600 people were laid off at ATK and other solid-rocket-motor companies in Utah after Obama called in February for eliminating Constellation. The "book is not closed on northern Utah's storied solid rocket motor industry," Hatch said after the House passed the NASA bill. "Though we will have hurdles to face in the future, the House passage of the Senate bill builds a foundation for the future of the civilian solid rocket motor industry in Utah," Hatch said in a statement. The bill includes language creating payload requirements for the heavy lift space-launch system that would nearly ensure Utah-built solid-rocket motors are used in them , Hatch said. The newly passed legislation has been touted by both Bolden and the Aerospace Industries Association. Constellation contracts will continue with the new fiscal year, because the FY '11 NASA appropriations bill has not yet been passed, Garver said. Contracts from FY '10 cannot be terminated and new programs cannot start until that legislation is signed into law.
4. Alt causes to aerospace decline—military cuts, oil prics, and economic downturnInvestment Weekly News 6/25 (6/25/2011, Investment Weekly News, “Aerospace and Defense; Aerospace Industry to Be 'Squeezed' by Steep Ramp-up in Commercial and Continued Cuts in Defense, According to AlixPartners Study”, p.15, ProQuest, FS)
There is significant risk, says the study, that commercial-sector suppliers will not be able to keep up with aggressive new manufacturing demands and will be challenged by: capacity constraints of their own (Tier-2 and Tier-3) suppliers that have under-invested in capability development; specialty raw-materials shortages (e.g., carbon fiber and titanium fasteners); and ongoing supply-chain delays and shortages resulting from the disaster in Japan. " The aerospace supply chain was basically decimated by the economic downturn, as even sold orders were put on hold or otherwise put in a lumpy, stop-and-go mode," said David Wireman, director in AlixPartners' Aerospace and Defense Practice. "From all indications, that supply chain is not at all prepared for steep commercial ramp-up curve that lies ahead, and production constraints are a very real possibility." Defense Sector But while demand on the commercial-aircraft side looks strong, defense, globally, looks to be weakening. According to the study, U.S. defense spending is expected to decrease by at least 12.2% by 2013 and by 6.5% by 2016, while defense spending in Europe, already down 2.8% in 2010, is expected to continue to drop sharply in the coming years, led by the U.K.'s recent announcement of an 8% cut by 2015 and promised drops of up to 25% in smaller European nations. As a result of these expected widespread c uts , says the study, defense priorities will shift toward extending the life of existing equipment, improving communication networks and investing more in weapons systems targeted at supporting today's more asymmetric warfare. However, says the
study, the scale of these new investments will not be enough to make up for cutbacks in major-platform investments such as the F-35 fighter aircraft series built jointly by Lockheed Martin Corp., BAE Systems PLC and Northrop Grumman Corp., which has already experienced significant cuts in planned production numbers. In response to these kinds of cutbacks, the larger defense companies will need to pursue a more diverse business mix that will lead to partnerships, M&A and consolidation among smaller players as larger companies pursue new markets, the study says. In sum, the study shows that both the commercial-aviation and defense industries face critical challenges that they will need to address. Key economic challenges will come from federal budget uncertainties, volatile fuel prices and new entrants into the few growing sectors of the industry. In particular, the recent volatility of oil prices, coupled with continued sluggish economies in the West, has made it hard to predict future industry trends. These factors are leading many aerospace and defense manufacturers , especially lower-tier suppliers, to delay investments , says the study. "The aerospace and defense industry faces a very challenging next few years," said Fitzpatrick. "The simultaneous need for near flawless execution on the commercial side and belt-tightening on the defense side, plus the need to deal with supply-chain challenges across the board while also seizing M&A opportunities will push management capabilities to the extreme." M&A Outlook Driven by supply-chain pressures in commercial and budget cuts in defense, the pace of mergers and acquisitions in the aerospace industry is expected to rebound in the next few years. In addition, it finds, low valuations today across the industry, with multiples generally below 10 times earnings before depreciation and taxes, have made deals look far more palatable.
5. Aff evidence ignores the unique Cold War context of Apollo – it doesn’t apply todayDelgado, 11 - Space Policy Institute, George Washington University (Laura, “When inspiration fails to inspire: A change of strategy for the US space program,” Space Policy 27 (2011) 94e98, Science Direct)In addition to being sorely reductionist, the inspiration argument has another critical fl aw: it reveals a static way of thinking about the conditions that nurture a generation, that shape even what it finds compelling and inspiring. It is true that many (not all) who became involved in space do talk about being inspired by some of the things already mentioned - the Moon speech and the Apollo missions. Others speak of the excitement imbued by the science fiction stories they grew up with. And still others responded to a powerful call of to expand to the highest frontier. Because of the interplay of the issues at the time, and the successful alignment of space with these key priorities, space truly was inspiring. But that was then. In no simpler way do we find evidence of a shift than by realizing that inspiration has now transformed from a consequence to a strategy. If space is what Americans are born to do, then why is it that they must be inspired to do it? The simple fact is that the cold war generation , which grew up with the Soviet fear and
witnessed the powerful rebirth of the scientific spirit that led to the Moon landings, is not the generation that policy makers are eager to inspire today . It is not Robert Heinlein’s generation or Robert Clarke’s, but Ray Bradbury’s, Neil Gaiman’s and Michael Crichton’s - and the messages and feelings evoked through their works are shaped by a different context. Consequently, the conceptions and ideals that worked then do not necessarily fit now. The “ narrow nationalistic scope of the frontier analogy ” , for example,
masks the fact that such a conception can have surprisingly little bearing on the younger public [2]. For a generation that is both witness to and active participant in the advances of globalization, it speaks more of conquest and violence, of a hardship that is not a feature of everyday life. For them (for
us), the notions of interdependence, cooperation coexisting with competition, and multiculturalism are more powerful and meaningful. This clash of conceptions , when not understood and addressed, can spell doom for efforts to draw younger members of the public to space because these can have the opposite effect.3 Space can easily be dis regarded as f oreign and unimportant or, worse, as part of the problem .4 Lacking a debate about what science and space mean today to the younger generations also leads to a situation where the inspiration argument bypasses whole groups of people who do not find its tenets compelling, but are instead driven by other concerns, interests, and emotions. Consider for instance the growing interest in climate sciences, renewable energy, and sustainable living. The number of people that feel compelled and drawn by their growing awareness of the frailty of the environment and the interdependence between human actions and quality of life is growing. Some say these feelings were first propagated with the Earthrise picture, of the Earth coming up from the curvature of the lunar surface but, while directly linked to space, it was not discovery, competition, or a drive to be the best, that this evoked. It was something else.
6. Air power decline inevitable
Grant 9 -- PhD in IR and aerospace analyst for the Air Force (September 2008, Rebecca, Air Force Magazine, www.airforce-magazine.com/.../TheDocumentFile/.../0908AirDominance.pdf , FS)Over the years, critics have complained that the United States Air Force has not been a good steward of the military space enterprise. Others have charged that it has neglected long-range bombers. Some have argued that USAF has been too enamored of manned aircraft at the expense of unmanned systems. Rarely, though, has the Air Force been accused of falling short on air dominance. Yet, just such a situation is developing today. For the first time since its establishment as a separate service in 1947, the Air Force is in danger of losing its ability to guarantee air dominance. The problem stems not from lapses in technology or tactics. It stems, rather, from the breakdown of a fighter master plan set in motion after the Gulf War of 1991. Moreover, the Air Force must contend with Pentagon efforts to downgrade air dominance in favor of increasing US emphasis on ground-centric irregular warfare. The Air Force’s core fighter force has gotten old. In the wake of the Gulf War, the Air Force hatched a plan to thereafter acquire only highly advanced stealth fighters. That plan now has gone badly awry. As a result, USAF confronts the real danger of having insufficient numbers of advanced fighters for future needs.
7. Obama’s program is fine – increases jobs, and helps solve climate change – NASA officials themselves are happy with itDefense Daily 10 (“NASA Expects No Net Job Losses Despite End of Constellation Program” 4/9/2010, Lexis)
Top leaders of NASA yesterday defended President Barrack Obama's Fiscal 2011 agency budget from criticism that jobs will be lost if Congress agrees to terminate the Constellation manned moon-mission program as proposed by the White House. "While there will no doubt be challenges as a result of canceling Constellation, the funding for NASA is increasing, so we expect to support as many, if not more, jobs with the FY 2011 funding the president has proposed," NASA Administrator Charles Bolden told reporters during a teleconference yesterday. Those jobs may not, however, be concentrated in the manufacturing sector, according to Bolden. "Taking the long view, investments in science and technology innovation have proven to stimulate job growth," he said. "The new budget will support jobs in various scientific and engineering fields." Constellation is a Space Shuttle replacement effort made up of the developmental Ares I launch vehicle and Orion capsule and future Ares V heavy- lift rocket. ATK [ATK] has been the prime contractor for the Ares I first stage, Boeing [BA] has developed the Ares I upper stage, and Lockheed Martin [LMT] has been making Orion. Bolden and and Deputy Administrator Lori Garver said NASA remains on track to fly out the remaining Space Shuttle manifest of five flights by the end of this year. The FY 2011 budget provides the additional resources required to do so, according to Garver. The end of the shuttle program in conjunction with the pending termination of Constellation puts the jobs of some 9,000 personnel working on those endeavors in danger, according to industry watchers. Asked whether agency officials have been able to placate lawmakers' concerns about potential job losses from ending Constellation and the lack of a future vision for NASA, Bolden defended the new plan. "We think the president's vision for space exploration, both human and robotic, is pretty dynamic," he said. " What makes it different is that it's funded ." The Review of U.S. Human Space Flight Plans Committee, a blue-ribbon panel led by retired Lockheed Martin CEO Norm Augustine, found last year that Constellation, begun during the Bush administration, was facing major schedule problems and had not been adequately funded. Bolden also pointed to a significant increase in NASA's top line under the FY 2011 proposal. Bolden and Garver outlined the latest details of the president's NASA budget for the next several years. Proposed new spending projects include: * A $7.8 billion, five-year program to invent and demonstrate new approaches to spaceflight such as in-orbit fuel depots and rendezvous and docking technologies, and closed-loop life support systems. * A $3.1 billion, five-year new heavy lift research and development program to develop new engines, propellants, materials and combustion processes, ultimately leading to innovative ways of accessing space to go beyond low Earth orbit. * A $4.9 billion, five-year "broad space technology" program, including investments in very early stage and "cross-cutting" technologies such as communications, sensors and robotics, to include a flight demonstration program. * An additional $3 billion over five years for robotic exploration precursor missions that would pave the way for later human exploration of the moon, Mars and nearby asteroids. * A $50 million effort to further the commercial sector's capability to support transport of crew to and from low Earth orbit. NASA
has awarded Space Act Agreements to five companies for the development of crew concepts, technology demonstrations and investigations for future commercial support of human spaceflight. The administration's plan also supports space science research grants and dozens of missions to study the solar system. "We'll be sending a mission on the closest ever approach to the sun and enhancing our capability to detect and catalog near Earth objects that might pose a threat but can also help us understand the history of our solar system," Bolden said. He added that the proposed budget also provides expanded opportunities in two related areas: climate change and aeronautics. Over $2 billion in additional funds would accelerate the development of new missions to observe the Earth. "We'll accelerate the development of crucial satellites to improve our forecasting of climate change, focusing on the key unknowns in our ability to predict future climate impacts," he said. In aeronautics, Bolden said, NASA will focus on technologies and applications to reduce aircraft fuel needs, noise, and emissions. "These improvements to future air transportation will promote both the economic and environmental health of this country," he added.
8. Industrial base wont collapseScully 7/20 (Megan Scully has covered defense and national security for National Journal since April 2005. She previously worked for several defense trade publications, including Defense News and Inside the Army. “Pentagon Worries About Space Industry With End of Shuttle Program” 7/20/2011 http://www.nationaljournal.com/nationalsecurity/pentagon-worries-about-space-industry-with-end-of-shuttle-program-20110719)
In a national security space strategy released earlier this year, the Defense Department and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence pledged to foster an industrial base that is “robust, competitive, flexible, healthy, and delivers reliable space capabilities on time and on budget.” Key to that, Schulte said, is injecting stability in procurement by changing acquisition practices to focus more heavily on block buys and advanced procurement funding--efforts that require congressional approval. To sell their “evolutionary acquisition for space efficiency” strategy to lawmakers, Schulte and other Air Force officials are touting the benefits of their acquisition approach, including the potential for 10 percent cost savings . Administration officials are also seeking to reform the country’s archaic export control system to allow U.S. firms to sell overseas space technologies that are widely available in the commercial market--a move that would broaden their markets and boost their bottom lines . The goal, Schulte said, is to ease the administrative burdens and speed up the process of the export control system by creating a single agency to handle these exports, as well as a single system to collect information. The key, as with the acquisition changes, will be gaining support within Congress to lift some restrictions that are now in place. “It doesn’t make sense that we disallow our commercial companies from marketing technologies that are readily available on the commercial market,” Schulte said.
1NC Mars1. Bias – the Kaplan evidence on the Mars advantage is only citing a “senior research scientist with NASA's Langley Research Center and co-chair of NASA's Human Exploration of Mars Science Analysis Group”
2. No science/tech breakthroughs – 1AC Zubrin assumes life on Mars, but it’s unlikely to exist – toxic chemicalsO’Brien and Tobin 8 (Miles and Kate, reporters for CNN, “Toxin in soil may mean no life on Mars”, http://articles.cnn.com/2008-08-04/tech/nasa.mars_1_evolved-gas-analyzer-phoenix-lander-conductivity-analyzer?_s=PM:TECH // Vish)
NASA's Phoenix lander has discovered a toxic chemical in soil near Mars' north pole, dimming hopes for finding life on the Red Planet, the probe's operators said Monday. The chemical, perchlorate, is an oxidant widely used in solid rocket fuel. Researchers are still puzzling over the results and checking to make sure the perchlorate wasn't carried to Mars from Earth, the University of Arizona-based science team said. "While we have not completed our process on these soil samples, we have very interesting intermediate results," Peter Smith, the principal investigator for the project, said in a written statement. Early readings from a device aboard Phoenix called the Microscopy, Electrochemistry and Conductivity Analyzer, or MECA, "suggested Earth-like soil," Smith said. "Further analysis has revealed un-Earthlike aspects of the soil chemistry," he said. The Phoenix team has scheduled a teleconference for Tuesday to discuss the findings. "Oxidizing" soil conditions also were found at the Viking 1 and 2 landing sites in the 1970s, leading most scientists to conclude that there could be no life there. NASA's Odyssey orbiter first reported in 2001 that the planet's arctic plain was rich in water ice, mostly in the form of permafrost. Since the Phoenix lander touched down in May, robotic instruments on the craft have been collecting and analyzing soil samples, looking for organic compounds that would indicate Mars is or was able to support life. The new findings from Phoenix cast into further doubt the possibility that life exists on Mars' surface. But they do not rule out the possibility that life once existed, nor do they necessarily rule out the possibility of life existing now, perhaps in a deep underground aquifer. Phoenix's MECA instrument was designed to run four experiments on Mars' soil, testing for such characteristics as acidity and the presence of various compounds, minerals and salts. The science team has completed two MECA runs on soil, and perchlorate did not turn up in the first experiment. The Phoenix team are continuing to use MECA and another instrument called the Thermal and Evolved-Gas Analyzer, or TEGA, to look for organic chemicals. TEGA can also detect the presence of perchlorate, but so far has not done so. NASA also announced last week that the Phoenix mission has been extended to the end of September. The mission could be extended again if it is operational then, but the harsh Martian winter will bring it to an end if nothing else does, probably around November.
3. Squo solves – their Thompson evidence indicates SLS is what we need – Obama’s funding it in the status quo
1NC Solvency Constellation was a failure – over budget, behind schedule, and lacking in innovationLy 5-26 (Len, Senior staff reporter for the USC Annenberg School for Communication and Journalism Newspaper, “NASA Decides on Human Deep Space Vehicle”, http://www.neontommy.com/news/2011/05/nasa-decides-human-deep-space-vehicle)Constellation, started under George W. Bush's presidency, was to establish a human colony on the moon by 2020 in preparation for missions to Mars. The program was developing the next generation of NASA spacecraft ―Orion, the Ares 1 rocket to launch Orion and the Ares V rocket to launch cargo-- to succeed the space shuttle program. Elements of Apollo-and-shuttle-period technologies were used in Constellation. * President Barack Obama canceled Constellation last year in his fiscal 2011 budget request to Congress. Based on an independent panel's review, the program was determined “over budget, behind schedule, and lacking in innovation ” and “had drawn funding away from other NASA programs.” Instead, the budget called for investments that would “significantly lower operation costs” and potentially take humans “farther and faster into space .” C entral to that approach was NASA would partner with the private sector in a fundamentally new way: In the post-shuttle era, commercial vehicles would be the primary mode of crew transportation to and from the International Space Station, a laboratory in low-Earth orbit.
Status quo solves—Space X is building heavy lift now. Klotz 4/5 (Irene Klotz, April 5, 2011, Reuters, “SpaceX to build heavy-lift, low-cost rocket”, http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/04/05/us-space-business-rocket-idUSTRE73468B20110405)
(Reuters) - Space Exploration Technologies is building a rocket with twice the lift capacity of NASA's space shuttle that will also cut launch costs , the company's chief executive said on Tuesday.The new booster, called Falcon Heavy, is based on the company's Falcon 9 rocket, which has made two successful flights and which NASA has purchased to fly cargo to the International Space Station after the shuttle program ends this summer.A test flight of Falcon Heavy is planned for 2013 from Vandenberg Air Force Base in California, Elon Musk told reporters in a news conference broadcast over the Internet.Falcon Heavy can put about 117,000 pounds (53,071 kg) into orbit, twice the shuttle's 50,000-pound (22,680-kg) lift capability.Flights also would take place from the company's launch complex at Cape Canaveral Air Force Station in Florida, and possibly from nearby Kennedy Space Center, which is soliciting proposals from companies and agencies interested in taking over the space shuttle's launch pads.The shuttle program is ending after two more flights because of high costs and to free up funds to develop rockets that can travel beyond the space station's 220-mile (354-km) high orbit.With a price tag of about $100 million per launch, Falcon Heavy is about half the price of existing heavy-lift U.S. rockets built by Boeing Co and Lockheed Martin Corp."I think we can realistically start to contemplate missions like a Mars sample return, which requires a tremendous amount of lift capability because you have to send a lander to Mars that still has enough propellant to return to Earth," Musk said. "If you try to do a mission like that with a smaller vehicle, you have to have several launches and either do orbital rendezvous or do some sort of much more complex mission."Currently, it costs about $10,000 per pound to reach orbit. Falcon Heavy would cut that price to about $1,000 per pound, Musk said."We're very, very confident of being able to maintain those prices," said Musk, co-founder of PayPal and chairman and chief executive of electric car maker Tesla Motors.Falcon Heavy, like Falcon 9, has been designed to meet NASA's requirements for human space vehicles, Musk said.He said the company, based in Hawthorne, California, was ramping up for mass production of its proprietary Merlin engine, which powers the Falcon rocket family.
1NC Delta 4 CPCounterplan text: The United States federal government should fully fund the Delta 4 launch system.
Delta 4 solves best – it provides a lower cost alternative and greater efficiency than Orion or Ares 1Foust 9 (June 22, Jeff, aerospace analyst, journalist and publisher, “Constellation and its challengers”, “The Space Review”, http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1401/1)
Most of the afternoon portion of the hearing was devoted to several alternatives to the existing Constellation architecture, relying on either shuttle-derived or Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV)-derived approaches. That alternatives to Constellation, and in particular to the Ares 1 launcher, existed was hardly a new development. That these concepts were being presented in a public forum, in one case by the head of a major launch vehicle venture and in another by a senior NASA manager, was a significant change. A case in point was a presentation by Michael Gass, president and CEO of United Launch Alliance, on a proposal to use EELV-derived vehicles in place of Ares 1 and 5. That ULA would talk openly about such alternatives, and in detail, is a break from past practice: as recently as last fall, according to an Orlando Sentinel report, then-NASA administrator Mike Griffin complained to the CEO of Lockheed Martin, one of the two companies involved in the ULA joint venture, about ULA’s reputed efforts at developing alternatives to Constellation. A Lockheed Martin spokesman told the newspaper that the company was “fully supportive of NASA's Project Constellation and is not engaged in any activities advocating alternative launch vehicles.” Times have changed. In his presentation, Gass proposed using the Delta 4 Heavy to launch Orion in place of Ares 1. “Delta 4 Heavy provides a safe, low-cost capability to launch Orion, we believe, by 2014 with greater than 20% performance margin,” he said. “We believe the Delta system can support Orion with critical cost forecasts and schedules based on recent development experience, and meet the reliability needed for human spaceflight sooner than any other alternative.” “Delta 4 Heavy provides a safe, low-cost capability to launch Orion, we believe, by 2014 with greater than 20% performance margin,” ULA’s Gass said. Specifically, Gass proposed development of a new launch facility at Cape Canaveral with crew facilities for Orion missions. That would be coupled with development of an “emergency detection system” and other reliability improvements needed for human-rating the vehicle. According to Gass the new pad would cost $800 million and the human-rating work $500 million over four and a half years; after that the Delta 4 Heavy could launch Orion missions each $300 million each. Gass said this system could be run like a traditional launch services program or with greater NASA involvement, such as using the Michoud Assembly Facility in New Orleans for final vehicle integration as well as existing Kennedy Space Center infrastructure, including the Vehicle Assembly Building and Launch Complex 39A. To further shorten the gap, Gass said that Atlas 5 could be used for launching commercial capsules to the ISS as early as 2013, for $400 million in non-recurring costs for human rating and pad modifications and $130 million a launch. Gass added that ULA was also looking at modifications to the Atlas 5 and Delta 4 that could increase its LEO capability to at least 70 tons, and in the long term to over 100 tons, for NASA’s heavy-lift needs. That work continues studies previously conducted independently by Boeing and Lockheed Martin prior to the creation of ULA. “We joked when we were forming ULA that we would end up with a ‘frankenrocket’, and, lo and behold, it’s becoming true as the best qualities of both rockets are being integrated into our future evolution.” Gass’s presentation was followed by one from Gary Pulliam, a vice president with the Aerospace Corporation, which had recently performed a study for NASA comparing the costs of using Delta 4 Heavy for Orion versus Ares 1. That study looked at several variants of the Delta 4 Heavy and found that the most technically robust one, using four RL-10 engines in a redesigned upper stage, could not only exceed the technical performance of the Ares 1 but could be developed for $3 billion less. Versions of the Delta 4 Heavy with one RL-10 engine, or no upper stage at all, yielded cost savings of up to $6 billion but with reduced performance.
1NC NSS Restructuring CPText: The President should establish and lead the execution of a National Space Strategy and a National Security Space Authority, create a National Security Space Organization, and change Air Force and IC human resource management policies for space acquisition professionals
CP solves – consolidation creates a broader infrastructure of communication for future operationsYoung et al 8 - former Director of NASA's Goddard Space Flight Center (July 2008, Lieutenant General Edward Anderson, Vice Admiral Lyle Bien, General Ronald R. Fogleman, Mr. Keith Hall, General Lester Lyles, Dr. Hans Mar, “Leadership, Management, and Organization for National Security Space,” Report to Congress of the Independent Assessment Panel on the Organization and Management of National Security Space, http://www.armyspace.army.mil/ASJ/Images/National_Security_Space_Study_Final_Sept_16.pdf)
Recommendation 3. Create a National Security Space Organization. Assign the NSSO the functions currently assigned to the National Reconnaissance Office, the Air Force Space and Missile Systems Center, the Air Force Research Laboratories Space Vehicles Directorate, the operational functions of the of Air Force Space Command (AFSPC), and other Service organizations now providing space capability. The merged organization will report to NSSA for policy, requirements, and acquisition and AFSPC for organization, training, and equipping responsibilities. Spacecraft command, control, and data acquisition operations as well as launch will be the responsibility of National Security Space Organization (NSSO). The Director will be a Uniformed 3 Star or a Civilian 3 Star Equivalent reporting to AFSPC/CC for military Service organize, train, and equip functions and to the NSSA for policy, requirements, and acquisition matters. The NSSO would be a Joint interagency-staffed organization composed of the current Acquisition and Launch Resources assigned to the SMC, NRO, ORS, NRO S&T, AFRL/SD, USN, USA. To facilitate Life Cycle Program Management, Military Space operations currently assigned to the Services and NRO Ops will be assigned to this organization . Under the NSSO the staffs and capabilities of the NRO, SMC, and several other organizations now providing space capability would be the purview of a single director. In time, these entities would be integrated into an effective, unified organization designed to address the root causes of problems in space acquisition. Under unified leadership, this organization could focus on the most effective use of limited resources and on installing proven, successful engineering and acquisition practices, including early systems engineering and cost estimating. The organization’s primary responsibility would be the development and operation of space-based capabilities. Space Research, Development, and Acquisition: The NSSO would be assigned the acquisition and science and technology activities currently within the Air Force Space and Missile Systems Center, the National Reconnaissance Office, the Operationally Responsive Space Office, the Air Force Research Lab Space Vehicles Directorate, and other Service organizations now providing space capability. This consolidation would enable the assignment of available engineering and acquisition talent to the most important tasks. The organizations must be integrated, duplications eliminated, and best management practices instituted. Operation of Space Systems: The NSSO would be assigned the operating elements of NRO and military space, including SMC, NRO, AFSPC space operations, Air Force Research Laboratory Space Vehicles Directorate (AFRL/SD), Operationally Responsive Space (ORS) and other Service organizations now providing space operations capability. Integrating these operating elements would help to unify space operations, contributing to the development of space situational awareness and space control capabilities. The IAP strongly believes that essential operating relationships will not be undermined through the consolidation of the military space and intelligence space operational centers. To ensure this, the IAP advocates that existing operational tasking relationships be retained, and that any subsequent realignments in operational relationships be made only after careful study involving the customer communities and NSSO. Tasking for imaging would remain the responsibility of the National Geospatial- Intelligence Agency (NGA). Tasking for signals intelligence would remain with the National Security Agency. Tasking for military space would remain with U.S. Strategic Command by way of the Joint Force Component Command for Space. The structure of the NSSO and its key relationships are shown in Figure 3. The director would report to Air Force Space Command for organizing, training, and equipping and to the National Security Space Authority for policy, requirements, and acquisition. The NSSO would receive resources from Major Force Program 12, and associated space requirements would flow down from the National Security Space Authority. The organization would maintain relationships with the remaining NSS capability providers (e.g., NOAA, NASA, DARPA, and MDA). The organization would respond to operational tasking from the Intelligence Community and from U.S. Strategic Command. Operational tasking and priorities would be set collaboratively, and the responsibility for adjudicating disputes and establishing operational priorities would reside in the National Space Council, with staffing support from the National
Security Space Authority. The NSSO would establish liaison relationships with key user organizations, including the President, the National Security Council, the NGA, CIA, DIA, NSA, the combatant commands, the military departments, and other federal agencies. The staffing of the new organization will be the critical determinant of its eventual success. The IAP believes that the organization must have a strong Joint and interagency character consistent with its national mission. This will enable the organization to better understand and work with the broad range of customers who rely on space-based capabilities. At the same time, solid linkages and identification with the Air Force are essential to maintain strong connections with warfighters and to maintain the institutional support that only a military Service can provide. Thi s structure also provides a foundation for growth and evolution of the organization into a Corps or independent Service as necessary to adapt to future events. 24 The IAP’s recommendation to consolidate NRO, SMC, and other space capability providers goes substantially beyond the actions proposed by the 2001 Space Commission. We believe this fundamental restructuring is necessary and appropriate. We offer this recommendation fully understanding that it is likely to be highly controversial and challenging to execute. We are impelled, however, by the lesson of the failed experiment with the EA for Space to guide us. Confident in our conviction that it is essential to fix the problems with space acquisition and bridge the “cultural divide” between military space and intelligence space, we cannot in good conscience recommend half measures that would be circumvented or undermined.
The counterplan secures the weakening US leadership in spaceYoung et al 8 - former Director of NASA's Goddard Space Flight Center (July 2008, Lieutenant General Edward Anderson, Vice Admiral Lyle Bien, General Ronald R. Fogleman, Mr. Keith Hall, General Lester Lyles, Dr. Hans Mar, “Leadership, Management, and Organization for National Security Space,” Report to Congress of the Independent Assessment Panel on the Organization and Management of National Security Space, http://www.armyspace.army.mil/ASJ/Images/National_Security_Space_Study_Final_Sept_16.pdf)
Throughout its investigation, the IAP has interacted with many current and former NSS officials who share the concern that the current organizational structure and management system is not serving the Nation well. Today, the U.S. continues its leadership in space, but our advances have slowed at a time when other nations are investing heavily in advancing their space capabilities, and space technology is rapidly proliferating across the globe . Significant improvements are needed in the leadership and management of NSS programs, and lacking this the erosion of our leadership will continue . The IAP advocates a top-to-bottom overhaul to restore the vitality of National Security Space and regain and sustain the competitive advantages afforded the United States by our space programs . The proposed actions would foster a cohesive NSS effort by: • establishing a strategy at the national level, • consolidating leadership in the National Security Space Authority, and • integrating the organization, management, and operations of space capability providers in the National Security Space Organization . • increasing the numbers of technically competent, experienced government scientists, engineers, and acquisition managers who are “steeped in space ” and assigned to see programs through to completion. Our proposal is intended to establish focused, unified leadership for NSS at the national level as well as at the level of the National Security Space Authority . Under this unified structure for National Security Space the necessary leadership authority can be exercised and unity of action achieved. Strong leadership can reverse the current adverse trends in executing NSS programs and avert the loss of the U.S. competitive national security advantage . The resulting structure would better serve the needs of DoD, the Intelligence Community, and other users than does the system in place today. This call to action has the highest level of urgency.
1NC R&D CPText: The United States federal government should invest in research and development funding tax credits.
CP solves the aerospace industry through innovation – research and development is keySterner ’10 (Eric R. Sterner is a fellow at the George C. Marshall Institute, held senior staff positions on the House Armed Services and Science committees, and served in the office of the secretary of defense and as associate deputy administrator for policy and planning at NASA. William B. Adkins is president of Adkins Strategies, held a senior staff position on the House Science Committee and served at the Naval Research Laboratory and National Reconnaissance Office. “R&D Can Revitalize the Space Industrial Base”2/22 http://www.marshall.org/article.php?id=782)
There is a range of frequently discussed, sometimes employed policies and practices that will help manage the risks of a weak industrial base. These include stable funding, improved training, frequent flight opportunities and more frequent contract opportunities. However, what is missing in that mix is a plan for investments in research and development (R&D) and a re-engineering of the acquisition approach. Setting priorities and targeting R&D funding, particularly on key components and technologies provided by lower-tier suppliers, is essential to reinvigorating the technological underpinning of the industry. If the quantity of work is inadequate for fiscal reasons, the quality of the work will have to suffice. A key issue for the government will be balancing the pursuit of revolutionary and evolutionary technologies. The United States has pursued too many highly complex, revolutionary capabilities with massive programs that ultimately fail, creating a boom-or-bust contract cycle that ultimately harms the industrial base. It would be more prudent to err on the side of evolutionary investments focused on the most critical second-, third-, and fourth-tier components and suppliers. Such R&D should be targeted at near- and mid-term capabilities with the prospect of being injected into pre-planned product improvements. Increased research and development to raise technology readiness levels will keep scientists and engineers productively employed and eventually enable the kinds of revolutionary capabilities that the United States may have prematurely sought in the past. It also will help manage the risk of creating capability gaps, which result when overly ambitious revolutionary programs fail and threaten to leave warfighters in the lurch. Also, re-engineering the acquisition approach is critical to sustaining the investments over the long term. The R&D/acquisition/operations cycle must form a more integrated and sustainable portfolio of programs, with an eye toward positive reinforcement of the industrial base. Synchronizing the cycle of system development timelines, a mission’s operational life span and R&D expenditures will make it possible to sustain key segments of industry when procurements wind down and operational cycles wind up. The funding level and focus of R&D investments should alternate between evolutionary and revolutionary advancements in response to progress with system developments and on-orbit performance. Thus, the cycles become complementary . Such an approach also would produce a degree of fiscal predictability by creating a steady budget stream, giving different weights to R&D, procurement and operations funding at different points. Some will recognize this as a form of spiral development, which usually enables programs to better manage cost and schedule risk over time compared with more ambitious revolutionary programs. By synchronizing the industrial base’s work force, facilities and production to minimize starts and stops and seeking opportunities to inject new technology into flight systems, the industry can begin to reverse the downward spiral and work its way back to health. There is still a place for revolutionary R&D, which can change the state of the art, but more measured steps are warranted now. There is no simple solution to the problems of the U.S space industrial base. Ultimately, placing it on a firmer footing requires a combination of policies, practices and programs. Within that mix, pursuing a structured R&D agenda and coordinating it with procurement and operational cycles will help improve resident U.S. space capabilities and prepare the industry for the demands that will be placed upon it.
1NC NASA CPNASA should provide technical assistance to [any other space program].
NASA technical assistance builds international cooperationG. Ryan Faith ’10 G. Ryan Faith is an independent technology consultant and Adjunct Fellow for Space Initiatives at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, (CSIS). “President Obama’s Vision for Space Exploration (part 2)” 4/26 http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1616/1
Over the last several years, some international partners privately expressed frustration in the continuing lack of equity in their relationship with the US, and hoped instead for the U nited States to take a strong leadership position as “first among equals”. In addition, international engagement related to civil space exploration is seldom coordinated at multiple levels, including at the head of state, foreign policy, and technical levels. In cases such as the International Space Station and the Apollo-Soyuz program, parallel engagement has yielded far greater dividends than engagement exclusively at the space agency level. In the current situation, NASA may find it advantageous in the new policy to provide technical assistance to the European and Japanese space agencies to upgrade their unmanned cargo vehicles so they can transport crews to and from the ISS, as well as the ability to return cargo to Earth, since this is a form of engagement that can be led at the agency level, but could still yield worthwhile dividends. Not only would this provide a much broader technological and political risk management hedge against the potential difficulties associated with a Russian monopoly on crew transport to the space station, the existence of other national capabilities could yield both strategic logistical redundancy for the ISS and a strategic political redundancy for US human spaceflight programs. Absent further cultivation of European and Japanese capabilities, the only other international alternatives would involve engaging Chinese—or, perhaps at a later date, Indian—cooperation on the ISS, both of which could involve significant diplomatic complexities.
1NC Propellant Depot CPThe United States federal government should commit to building orbital propellant depots.
Existing technology can create a propellant depot, NASA just has to commit to itFoust, 8 – aerospace analyst, journalist and publisher. He is the editor and publisher of The Space Review and has written for Astronomy Now and The New Atlantis, Ph.D in planetary sciences from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (Jeff, The Space Review, “Propellant depots: an idea whose time has (almost) come,” 5/12, http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1127/1)
At the core of the concept is a new upper stage, the Advanced Common Evolved Stage (ACES), currently under study at ULA and based on the Delta 4’s hydrogen tank. The upper stage is protected from the Sun by a conical sunshield that is based on the technology used in the sunshield for the James Webb Space Telescope. That sunshield, Zegler said, is critical for any depot. “Without a sunshield, you will never achieve the boiloff rates that are required,” he said.An upper-stage-derived depot, launched on an EELV, could place 25 metric tons of propellant into low Earth orbit—about the same amount of propellant required by Altair. “Essentially you could bring up with this thing, on one of our smaller birds, the propellant for the descent to the Moon,” he said.Much of the same technology could be used for a dedicated depot, replacing the ACES stage with an extended tank that could fit inside the same sunshade but could contain 230 tons of liquid oxygen, well over that’s needed by ESAS. The tank would be launched empty and filled by other vehicles.Most of the technologies for this approach are in hand, Zegler said. A full-scale sunshield has been built and tested in the lab in the last year, with plans to eventually incorporate the technology into existing upper stages. “We’re trying to on-ramp this technology because we can gain performance in our existing vehicles for GSO [geosynchronous orbit] missions by using these simple sunshields,” he said. On an upcoming launch that uses a Centaur upper stage that will have excess propellant once it deploys its payload, Zegler said they plan to spin up the Centaur to test the rotational settling of the propellants, one solution to the problem of transferring propellants in zero-g.A bigger challenge than the technology, though, might be to get NASA and others to adopt the concept of propellant depots. While NASA administrator Mike Griffin has been open to the concept, suggesting in public speeches that NASA would be willing to purchase services from commercial fuel depots, right now ESAS doesn’t depend on the concept. That, said Bienhoff, who has briefed a number of NASA officials on his proposals, is an obstacle to gaining acceptance of the concept within NASA. “They’re bound by the architecture, and they can’t spend any money on it because it’s not in the architecture.”
1NC ITAR CP
Text: The United States federal government should double the number of ITAR licensing officers in the State Department, mandate licensing decisions are made within 60 days, establish a dispute mechanism [with final decisions within a second 60 day period], significantly upgrade the State Department’s electronic licensing system, establish a multiagency working group including the Commerce and Defense Departments, and re-establish Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls, as per Dinerman.
The CP solvesDinerman, 05 – The Space Review (Taylor, March 17, 2008, “ITAR’s failure”, http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1086/1)ITAR (International Traffic in Arms Regulations), which since 1999 has included not only weapons but communications satellites and virtually all spacecraft and most detailed information about them, has been one of the most spectacular “own goals”, as they say in soccer, in US history. Reduced to its essentials, it was a declaration of economic and technological war by the US government against the US national interest. ITAR handed over control of an important part of the US high tech economy to a set of hyper-cautious, hyper-legalistic, and slow-moving bureaucrats . In response to a critical GAO report in January of this year, the late Congressman Tom Lantos (D-CA) complained about “years and years of fundamental mismanagement at the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC).” He was right: the problem goes back to 1999, when Congress passed the regulatory power from the Department of Commerce to the State Department. Big companies, large organizations such as NASA, and the big universities have the time and the resources to overcome these obstacles. However, small companies or individual researchers do not. Even large companies have seen their profit margins reduced by the need to waste their recourses coping with these regulations. Some attempts have been made to try and improve this situation. In November 2007, Don Manzullo (R-IL) and Brad Sherman (R-CA) joined with a small bipartisan group of representatives to offer a couple of small but useful steps in the right direction. First, they would require the State Department to double the number of licensing officers on staff from 42 to 84. More importantly, it would allow space parts for systems that have already been exported to close allies to be shipped without having to go through the ITAR process. These are useful changes, but they fail to address the space industry’s most pressing problem, which is the classification of communications and other commercial satellites as “weapons systems”, something no other nation on this planet does. In late January the White House made a few, minimal changes in the way the ITAR regulations would be administered. Even taking into account the statutory limits involved, few serious changes were offered. The most potentially important part was the promise to require decisions on licensing to be made within sixty days of the application . Other changes include a new dispute mechanism and an upgrade of the electronic licensing system . One change that may be more significant than it seems is the establishment of a new multiagency working group that would include both the Departments of Commerce and Defense . The DoD in particular is painfully aware of the damage that ITAR has done to US industry and can be expected to put real pressure on the State Department to improve this situation. In the long run only Congress, with strong support from the White House, can resolve this problem. The Bush Administration has run out of time, so it will be up to the next administration to attempt to resolve this problem. The question involves more than just helping US companies to sell their products in the global marketplace. It involves a deeper question: how does a superpower balance the needs of its national security system and its need to trade? During the Cold War this question arose over and over again as the US attempted to wage economic warfare against the USSR and its empire. While it was often frustrated by the Europeans and Japanese and their mercantile philosophies, the US did raise the “hassle factor” for companies trying to sell high technology goods and services to Moscow. A similar campaign is now underway against Iran, but it will be many years before its full effects are felt by Tehran. A rebalancing of the US government’s approach must take place. ITAR as it now exists was an overreaction to the Clinton Administration’s all-out embrace of a mercantilistic philosophy. If the new President and Congress simply free up the flow of technology in the name of export promotion, he or she will simply insure that at some future date Congress will re-impose ITAR-like restrictions, perhaps in an even more draconian form. Part of a future solution would be to re- establish the CoCom, a tiny and highly effective multilateral Cold War organization that brought together the US and its NATO allies, as well as Japan and Australia , in an informal setting where they could agree on what and what not could be exported. The organization’s extreme discretion and its lack of a formal legal structure insured that no nation could publicly lose face. The fact that it lacked any means to enforce its decisions did not mean that it did not have clout. One example: in the 1980s, when it was found that Japanese and Norwegian firms had
sold equipment to the USSR that significantly improved their submarine technology, the US retaliated against those firms without arousing much of a backlash. While a new CoCom would be useful, the most important thing is for the US to find a way to trade with its close allies that treats them as trusted friends. The Validated End User program for a few highly reputable foreign firms is a small step in the right direction. However, much more is needed, and this can only be accomplished if the legislation is changed. It is doubtful that many foreign governments or firms are ready to spend any time or effort to help the US out of this dilemma. They are profiting—or at least they think they are profiting—from America’s mistake. This time next year the new President should put in place a small task force on ITAR reform that will report directly to him or her. This task force should work closely with Congress to present comprehensive legislation that can be passed and signed during the first year of the new administration. Otherwise, the problem will just get kicked down the road. The US space industry will continue to suffer and good, high paying jobs will continue to be lost.
We are at a critical turning point in export policy - ITAR isolates the US from any form of international cooperation and commerce destroying any chance of US industrial or innovative leadership – reform is necessary to solve for a sustainable futureAbbey and Lane 9 – George, Baker Botts Senior Fellow in Space Policy at the James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy at Rice University and Neil, Malcolm Gillis University Professor at Rice University (2009, “United States Space Policy: Challenges and Opportunities Gone Astray,” http://amacad.org/publications/spaceUS.pdf)In 2005 we emphasized that the success of the U.S. space science and exploration programs is closely related to the success of the commercial space industry. We noted that rev ision of ITAR was essential for the U nited S tates to improve its competitiveness in space commerce, particularly in the satellite industry . Since then, European aerospace companies have continued to encounter problems with U.S. trade restrictions . In response, they are choosing to avoid dealing with U.S. export controls by not using American- made parts, by becoming “ITAR-free” —meaning that their products are not subject to ITAR’s numerous restrictions and the U.S. government’s licensing requirements. Indeed, non-U.S. aerospace companies are advertising “ITAR-free” as a major selling point. The European Aeronautic Defense and Space Company (EADS) and other European companies have been working to develop components that can replace comparable U.S.-made parts. EADS has developed a satellite motor that is completely ITAR-free and therefore not subject to U.S. export license restrictions, allowing competitive access to worldwide customers. France’s Alcatel Space has had a company policy since 2002 to build ITAR-free communications satellites in order to avoid U.S. control over sales. On April 12, 2005, Alcatel launched its first ITAR-free satellite on a Chinese rocket. The company also received two major satellite contracts from China in 2005. Marotta, a British maker of spacecraft propulsion and propellant management equipment, advertises that its products “are European and hold ITAR-free status.” And when Surrey Satellite Technology, another British firm, discusses its satellite propulsion systems, they make clear that their systems are “completely ITAR-free.” 3 China has also been successful in pursuing space technology on its own. A U.S. policy that bars China from launching satellites with U.S. components had left China seeking customers from second-tier operators in Asia, Africa, and South America. Recently, however, China has, in addition to its contracts with Alcatel, secured a contract to launch European-based Eutelsat Communications’ five-ton satellite. Made without any U.S. components, the Eutelsat satellite is scheduled for launch by China’s Long March rocket in 2010. China’s launch bid, estimated to be as much as 40 percent below Western competitors, gives it a cost advantage. Other potential launch customers for China are France’s Thales Group and Italy’s Finmeccanica, which build satellites without U.S. components. China now has a solid track record, with fifteen commercial satellite launches since 2002, the most recent being a communications satellite for Venezuela in October 2008. China has scheduled fifteen more commercial satellites to be sent into orbit in 2009. A 2007 Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL)/Department of Commerce (DOC) report highlighted these and other problems being experienced around the world by the U.S. aerospace industry. The report, Defense Industrial Base Assessment: U.S. Space Industry, showed that complying with U.S. export control regulations carries a high price tag for U.S. companies and harms their global competitiveness . According to the report, export control compliance costs in the United States averaged $49 million per year industry-wide. Compliance costs grew 37 percent during the 2003–2006 period, with the burden of compliance significantly higher for smaller companies. 4 The report goes on to state that smaller companies feel that ITAR restrictions and limits are a major impediment to their ability to respond to proposal requests and subsequently sell products in foreign markets. Some smaller companies are starting to leave the space industry because of a sustained absence of profitability and a refusal of some foreign companies to deal with ITAR licensing issues. As a percent of foreign sales, the cost burden on smaller companies is nearly eight times that
of major firms. These compliance costs include insurance costs, consulting services, compliance-training costs, and Defense Technology Security Administration monitoring costs. For companies that are operating on tight budgets, these accumulating costs can be devastating. According to the AFRL/DOC report, average net margins are thin and below average for the smaller suppliers, around 5 percent, compared to 9 percent in the high-technology manufacturing sectors in the general economy. A direct correlation exists between export policy, the cost of compliance, and the financial health of the smaller suppliers. For entrepreneurial companies, the net margins (if they exist) are even lower because of the cost of compliance. Entrepreneurial companies have had to restrict discussions with several foreign investors because the companies could not provide the information to perform a due diligence, and this has impacted the availability of investment capital. This exodus has significant implications for the U.S. industrial base. An Aerospace Corporation analysis published in 2007 expressed concern about the U.S. space supplier base, where in certain critical areas, there is only one domestic supplier left or one financially weak supplier. 5 A 2007 white paper published by the Space Foundation in Colorado Springs, Colorado, noted that an overly restrictive export control regime, such as ITAR, results in an enfeebled and uncompetitive domestic space industry and can ultimately do as much damage to national security as a lax regulatory system. The foundation expressed concern that the U nited S tates is effectively ceding the dominant position in space that it has enjoyed for some time by allowing the expertise of the U.S. space industry to deteriorate. At the same time, the United States’ stringent export policy has essentially allowed global competitors to catch up in the global aerospace marketplace and develop capabilities that, in many instances, are similar to those developed in the United States. In Europe, as demonstrated by EADS and Alcatel, U.S. components and technology are slowly but surely being designed out of systems from satellites to rocket motors. The present U.S. export controls are also negatively impacting scientific research . The Space Studies Board of the National Research Council (NRC) of the National Academies noted this issue in a report summarizing a September 2007 workshop that included participants from the space research, export control, and policy communities to discuss the application of ITAR to space science. 7 Their report made note of the conflict related to the present export control regulations and scientific research. Scientific research encourages and thrives on open and free discussions and the interchange of ideas and approaches. Solutions to the environmental problems facing today’s world also require international cooperative research. But the current export rules greatly constrain or inhibit such interactions. Much of the university research —basic research—leading to these solutions is government-sponsored and falls under ITAR jurisdiction . ITAR licensing is also required when students or researchers from other countries participate in research. Obtaining ITAR approval places an added burden on researchers and creates uncertainty as to when and if approval will be forthcoming. Additionally, other nations are reluctant to subject themselves to restrictions created by U.S. law and regulations. As a result, the report said, foreign researchers view cooperative research with the U nited S tates as less and less desirable . The current export control laws also raise diplomatic and military concerns. Gordon England, U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense under President Bush, contends that technology exports should be encouraged because in this world of coalition warfare and building partnership capacity, it’s essential for us and our friends and allies to have greater interoperability . . . even with vastly different levels of investment. At every level of military activity, from discussions of interoperable hardware designs to battlefield support, the unintended consequences of ITAR can affect the ability of troops and their support personnel to carry out vital tasks. 8 The same is true of cooperative endeavors in human space exploration where a complete understanding, technically and operationally, of the spacecraft and its systems and the overall mission is critical. Looking back, had ITAR requirements been in place during the planning and operation of the space shuttle and ISS , with their multination crews and control centers, the result could have led to life-threatening situations. Indeed, substantive international cooperation probably would not have been possible . If placing space activities under ITAR yielded national security gains, then perhaps all the negative impacts on commerce and science, even military capability, would be worthwhile. But that is not the case. The current policy is simply the result of a “political football” being tossed around by policy-makers who assert that unfriendly nations will steal U.S. technology if the United States does not “lock it all down.” However, much of that technology is available for purchase in other parts of the world, and U.S. policies are encouraging countries to develop components and systems that are comparable or superior to U.S. technology, for their own use and for the world market and in lieu of using U.S. components and systems. The Obama administration needs to place a high priority on changing this policy and doing so quickly.
---Solvency
Ext. 1NC 1 – Constellation F ails Accelerating Constellation is technologically impossible.Foust 8 (December 22, Jeff, aerospace analyst, journalist and publisher, “Staying the course in a sea of change”, “The Space Review”, http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1275/1)Accelerating Constellation Another key issue facing Constellation has been the extended gap between the shuttle’s retirement in 2010 and Constellation’s introduction into service, now planned for late 2014. How much that gap can be shortened, and at what cost, has been the subject of intense scrutiny, including at NASA. Jeff Hanley, Constellation program manager, said in an interview with The Space Review last week that the agency had recently completed a study led by Ralph Roe, director of the NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC), and including the deputies for all the line organizations within Constellation, to study various options for accelerating the Ares 1/Orion initial operating capability (IOC). The first part of the study was to look at the shortcomings in the current plan that could prevent the planned IOC of September 2014. “That will require more money to go to that more robust plan to achieve the September 2014 date, on the order of a couple of billion dollars,” Hanley said. Moving the IOC back to the previous IOC date of September 2013, he added, would not cost much additional money: about $2.5 billion over the next two years. He added, though, that the September 2013 date is “very success oriented, but not un-executable.” A[n] third option the study examined was to further accelerate IOC to March 2013. “Based on where we’re at today, and what it takes to develop these very complex systems —the rocket, the spacecraft, and all the ground and mission systems—that accelerating that much is just technically not possible ,” Hanley said.
Constellation can’t meet tech requirements; that’s why it failed.Spencer 10 (Harry, spacecraft engineer, New Scientist, “NASA moon plan was an illusion, wrapped in denial,” 2/11,http://www.newscientist.com/article/dn18515-nasa-moon-plan-was-an-illusion-wrapped-in-denial.html (italics in original))Exploring with robots looks cheaper only because we set our expectations so much lower. Bolder goals need humans on the scene. Nevertheless, I'm not shedding tears for Constellation. Why not? Because it wasn't going to get us there. First, it probably wasn't going to work. Even so early in its life, the programme was already deep into a death spiral of "solving" every problem by reducing expectations of what the system would do . Actually reaching the moon would probably have required a major redesign, which wasn't going to be funded. Second, even if all went as planned, there was a money problem. As the Augustine committee noted, Constellation was already underfunded, and couldn't ever get beyond Earth orbit without a big budget increase. Which didn't seem too likely. Finally, and most important, even if Constellation was funded and worked ... so what? The programme was far too tightly focused on repeating Apollo, which was pointless: we already did Apollo! Early ideas of quickly establishing a permanent lunar base had already been forgotten. Constellation was going to deliver exactly what Apollo did: expensive, brief, infrequent visits to the moon. That was all it was good for. Sure, there were hopes that Constellation's systems could later be adapted to support more ambitious goals. But Apollo had those hopes too. It didn't work in 1970, and it wasn't going to work in 2020. The demise of Constellation is not the death of a dream. It's just the end of an illusion.
AT: Constellation increases scienceConstellation program only job stimulant – but scientific failPelton 06 – Director, Space & Advanced Communications Research Institute, George Washington University (November 2006, Science Direct, Space Policy, Volume 22, Issue 4, “Revitalizing NASA? A five-point plan”, Pages 221-225)Losing Focus. Over time NASA has evolved into a very large government bureaucracy with a vast range of employees, labs, centers and specialized facilities, along with a host of high-technology corporations that live off NASA contracts. To be blunt, NASA programs have at times been viewed in Congress more in terms of job stimulants and regional economic benefits than in terms of scientific or engineering merit. During both Democratic and Republican presidencies, NASA Administrators, including Dan Goldin, Sean O’Keefe, and most recently Michael Griffin, have sought to focus NASA's programs and achieve budgetary efficiency and greater effectiveness, but with only limited results. The latest vision of going to the Moon and Mars as defined by Project Constellation is -- to be perfectly candid--hugely expensive , limited in the production of new technology and promising limited new scientific knowledge. Further, it has led to major cutbacks in space science programs and reduced funding for truly innovative, longer-range technologies. There is little in NASA's current $15 to $16 billion a year budget that persons in the street might find of great significance or in the least bit germane to their daily lives. Indeed, there is nothing of consequence in today's NASA that might be considered of ‘popular relevance’. Thus there is no meaningful program for development of solar power satellites that might provide energy independence. Likewise there are no meaningful space programs to cope with global warming, tsunamis and worsening planetary weather conditions. Further, there are no significant programs to develop new systems or technologies that might prevent a catastrophic collision with near-Earth objects (NEOs). In short, NASA space programs with meaningful purpose or significance to the average citizen have been largely abandoned .
Constellation cancellation leads NASA back to its roots of innovation Mervis 10 (Jeffrey, deputy news editor for Science magazine, “Science Spared From Domestic Spending Freeze—for Now”, Science AAS Journal, http://www.sciencemag.org.proxy.lib.umich.edu/content/327/5966/628.full?maxtoshow=&HITS=10&hits=10&RESULTFORMAT=&author1=Mervis&title=Science+Spared+From+Domestic+Spending+Freeze+for+Now&andorexacttitle=or&searchid=1&FIRSTINDEX=0&volume=327&firstpage=628&resourcetype=HWCIT)What's not to like? Despite his pledge to freeze domestic discretionary spending in an attempt to shrink a $1.6 trillion deficit, President Barack Obama has asked Congress to boost science spending next year across the federal government . The request is part of the president's $3.8 trillion budget blueprint for 2011. Although Congress is certain to revise that plan as the year unfolds, for the time being agency heads are crowing. “I have to admit that right now, I'm not feeling a lot of pain,” says Arden Bement, director of the National Science Foundation (NSF), which would receive a boost of more than 7%, to $7.42 billion. What sold especially well this year was the argument that more research and a larger scientific workforce are long-range solutions to the country's dismal 10% unemployment rate. “We're overjoyed with the budget,” says Patrick Gallagher, director of the National Institute of Standards and Technology, which is slated for a 7.5% increase, to $922 million. “It shows that science and technology are really viewed through an economic lens.” An emphasis on jobs explains in part the boost for clean energy research programs at the Department of Energy (DOE), efforts meant to move the nation toward a low-carbon economy. In step with that goal, climate change also remains a priority for the Administration, which proposed a 21% hike in global climate research across eight agencies as well as a major realignment of Earth-observing satellite programs (see sidebar). The budget also takes a new view of human space exploration. The president has proposed a major reshuffling that turns the agency away from a program launched by President George W. Bush that was to have returned humans to the moon by 2020. The new policy has an unspecified target and timetable; in the meantime, however , it slashes more than $1.2 billion from space operations . In contrast, NASA's science directorate would receive a $540 million increase in 2011. “ This brings NASA back to its roots as an engine of innovation ,” says Sally Ride , the first U.S. woman in space and a member of an external commission that seemed to favor such a redirection.
AT: Mars landingA human landing on Mars would be technologically and economically unfeasible. Augustine 9, U.S. aerospace businessman who served as Under Secretary of the Army from 1975-77. Augustine currently serves as chairman of the Review of United States Human Space Flight Plans Committee. 09 (8/1/09, Human SpaceFlight Committee, “Seeking a Human Spaceflight Program: Worthy of a Great Nation,” http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a524333.pdf, page 12 , accessed June 21, 2011, BJM)While Mars is the ultimate destination for the near-term human exploration of space, it is not an easy place to visit with existing technology and experience. No human has ever traveled more than three days from Earth, and none beyond 386 miles away for almost 40 years. No American has been in space much more than 180 days at a time, or exposed to the full radiation of free space for more than about a week. Mars requires a trip in space of almost 900 days . We do not have flight-demonstrated technology to confidently approach and land large spacecraft on the Mars surface . Mars is distant enough from the Sun that it is a weak energy source, and space-based surface nuclear power is probably needed. Under current plans, as many as 12 Ares V vehicles would be needed to launch each biannual set of missions. It seems likely that some form of advanced propulsion may also be needed to make travel feasible. A focused technology program almost a decade long would be required before system design could begin . The preliminary estimates of the cost of Mars missions are far higher than for other scenarios, all in an era when budgets are becoming highly constrained. If astronauts were to travel to Mars under these circumstances, it would require most of the human spaceflight budget for nearly two decades or more, and produce few intermediate results. When we finally reached Mars, we might be hard pressed to maintain the financial resources needed for repeated missions after the first landings, recreating the pattern of Apollo. For these reasons, the Committee found that Mars is the ultimate destination for human exploration of the inner solar system, but is not a viable first destination beyond low-Earth orbit FINDINGS ON HUMAN MISSIONS TO MARS Mars as the Ultimate Destination: Mars is the ultimate destination for human exploration of the inner solar system. It is the planet most similar to Earth, and the one on which permanent extension of human civilization, aided by significant in-situ resources, is most feasible. Its planetary history is close enough to that of the Earth to be of enormous scientific value, and the exploration of Mars could be significantly enhanced by direct participation of human explorers. Mars as the First Destination: ( “Mars First ” ) : Mars is not a viable first destination beyond low-Earth orbit at this time. With existing technology and even a substantially increased budget, the attainment of even symbolic mission s would demand decades of investment and carry considerable safety risk to humans . It is important to develop better technology and gain more experience in both free space and surface exploration prior to committing to a specific plan for human exploration of the surface of Mars.
Can’t lower launch costsRockets are incapable of lowering launch costs – technological advancement occurs at a snail’s paceCoopersmith, 11 - Texas A&M University (Jonathan, “The cost of reaching orbit: Ground-based launch systems,” Space Policy 27 (2011) 77-80, Science Direct)
2. Why chemical rockets?Since Sputnik launched the Space Age on 4 October 1957, chemical rockets have propelled every payload into orbit, a monopoly that will continue for the foreseeable future. Rockets have two major problems: cost and reliability. Reaching orbit today costs about $20,000/ kg, a daunting barrier.2 While very reliable, rockets are not fully reliable even after fi ve decades of experience: the failure rate of rockets carrying communications satellites to geosynchronous orbit (GEO) in 1997 - 2006 was 8% . One consequence is insurance rates of 11-20%, two orders of magnitude greater than for a Boeing 747.3The high cost of reaching orbit means satellites are built to maximize yield per kilogram with the tradeoff of high costs to develop, assemble, and test them. The ISS cost $115,000 a kg and NEAR $181,000 in 2009 dollars, while the scores of Iridium satellites cost only $7300 a kg 4.If chemical rockets cost so much and are unreliable, why use them? The reality is that they work well enough and the entire infrastructure for space exploration and exploitation has developed around rockets. Nor is the technology static. Rockets and satellites have improved greatly in capability while the cost/kg has dropped. A 2010 Tauri Group study found that sending a kg to GEO dropped from $32,000 to $21,000 (in inflation-adjusted 2008 dollars) or by 34% from 1999 to 2008.5 New generations of rockets will lower costs, but not radically. The SpaceX Falcon 9 will cost some $5000 a kg to low-Earth orbit (LEO), almost twice the $2850 per kg expected in 2003 for its cancelled Falcon 5.6 Similarly, the 1997 Cassini cost $300,000 a kg in 1999 dollars compared with $480,000 for the 1975 Viking and $935,000 for the 1962 Mariner 4.7What rockets have not done and cannot do is radically reduce the cost of reaching orbit. Lack of effort is not the problem. Billions of dollars have been spent over the past decades in exploring rocket-based alternatives such as single-stage-to-orbit (SSTO), reusable launch vehicles (RLVs), and other unsuccessful lines of development.8 As Jim Maser, President of Pratt & Whitney Rocketdyne, stated in 2009, the technological base for reaching orbit in 2020 will be “ Much like it is today. And that is not much different from what we were doing 50 years ago.”9
Low Launch Costs key to Space Exploration/DevelopmentHigh launch costs block increased exploration or developmentCoopersmith, 11 - Texas A&M University (Jonathan, “The cost of reaching orbit: Ground-based launch systems,” Space Policy 27 (2011) 77-80, Science Direct)
1. IntroductionWhen I fly from North America to Europe, I pay $6-12/ kg of me. When a satellite is launched into space, the customer (or taxpayer) pays roughly $20,000/kg. That fi gure is the major challenge facing space fl ight: until the cost of reaching orbit drastically decreases, the large- scale exploration and exploitation of space will not occur. These high launch costs have restricted access to space to those governments, corporations and organizations which can afford millions of dollars to launch a satellite. As a result, half a century after Sputnik, the annual total of all satellite launches is only a few hundred tons, the equivalent of two 747 freighter fl ights .1 Ground-based alternatives to chemical rockets exist, such as beamed energy propulsion and space elevators. While promising, they are all technically immature and will not develop without a substantial government investment. Just as it pushed the development of rocket technology in the 1940s and 1950s, the US government should set a grand challenge to radically reduce the cost of reaching orbit to $200 a kg by 2020. Meeting this goal must be accompanied by resources and institutional support to move the Technology Readiness Levels (TRLs) of these technologies from the laboratory to commercial fruition.
Ground Based key to Lowering CostsGround based launch systems are the only feasible way of dramatically lowering launch costs – it requires a sustained commitment to moving those technologies out of the laboratoryCoopersmith, 11 - Texas A&M University (Jonathan, “The cost of reaching orbit: Ground-based launch systems,” Space Policy 27 (2011) 77-80, Science Direct)
3. Alternatives to chemical rocketsOnly non-rocket ground-based systems (GBS) can drastically reduce the cost of reaching orbit. GBS keep the engine and most of the fuel on the ground so the spacecraft is almost all payload, not propellant. As well as being more efficient, GBS are inherently safer than rockets because the capsules will not carry liquid fuels and their complex equipment, eliminating the danger of an explosion. A large GBS system could launch thousands of tons a year, an order of magnitude more than current launchers. Unlike a rocket launch pad, ground systems would launch hundreds of payloads annually, payloads weighing tens or hundreds of kilograms instead of tons. Most importantly, the cost/kg should drop by two orders of magnitude to $200.10Like any technology in its formative phase, a range of possibilities exists, including beamed energy propulsion (BEP), space elevators, light gas guns, and magnetic levitation. The good news is that concepts for these ground-based systems exist; the bad news is that these concepts remain in the laboratory.In BEP a microwave or laser beam from the ground station strikes the bottom of the capsule. The resultant heat compresses and explodes the air or solid fuel there, providing lift and guidance. The concept is more than theoretical. In October 2000 a 10-kW laser boosted a 50-g lightcraft over 70 m at White Sands Missile Range in New Mexico, proving the underlying feasibility of the concept.11 Researchers at the University of Tokyo demonstrated the feasibility of microwave transmission in 2010.12Space elevators employ a thin tether attached to a satellite serving as a counterbalance thousands of kms above the Earth. A platform would crawl up the elevator. Generating more publicity than BEP, this concept depends on advances in materials strong and light enough to serve as the tether. Magnetic levitation and magnetic propulsion systems would provide a high initial velocity for capsules which would then propel themselves into orbit.13 The idea of employing a gigantic gun to launch space capsules received a very public unveiling from Jules Verne in his 1865 From the Earth to the Moon. Serious development occurred a century later with the American and Canadian governments funding the High Altitude Research Project (HARP) by Gerald Bull in the 1960s and the Super High Altitude Research Project (SHARP) at Lawrence Livermore Laboratory in the 1980s and 1990s.14If these systems are so promising, why have they not been developed? First, rockets have fulfilled existing demand adequately. Why invest in radically different technologies if the existing technology works sufficiently well? Second, although tests have demonstrated proof of concept, these technologies remain in the laboratory. On the nine-stage TRLs used by NASA and the US Air Force to plot how close to practical application a technology is, GBS technologies are at TRL 1e2, still in the early stages of proving their practicality and worth.15In 2003, LiftPortwas formed to produce a working space elevator by 2018. In 2006 that deadline was changed to 2031; 2035-45 may now be a more realistic guess. As Michael Laine, the founder of LiftPort, stated, “I really do believe that we haven’t even scratched the surface of all the potential problems out there. We just don’t know enough to ask the right questions yet, so it’s clear we couldn’t possibly have all the answers.”16All these areas have shown progress, as the papers at the six International Symposia on Beamed Energy Propulsion indicate. More concretely, in November 2009, NASA awarded LaserMotive $900,000 for meeting a space elevator challenge, and a startup, Quicklaunch, Inc., is trying to commercialize the SHARP-based gas gun.17Such progress, however, is limited by lack of sustained support and patrons. For GBS to rise up the TRL scale and move from the laboratory to a mature functioning system will require a sustained commitment of billions of dollars over many years. While launch costs will be low, the R&D, testing and infrastructure construction will demand significant resources. Let’s not delude ourselves, the public, or Congress. Turning GBS into a reality will be expensive. The issue is whether the benefits will be worth the costs.
Ground Based key to SSPDecreasing launch costs will stimulate the launch market for SSPCoopersmith, 11 - Texas A&M University (Jonathan, “The cost of reaching orbit: Ground-based launch systems,” Space Policy 27 (2011) 77-80, Science Direct)
4. Creating demand: if you build it, will they come?At the current level of payloads, developing GBS is not viable. GBS makes economic sense only if demand greatly increases, but demand will increase only if launch costs drop drastically. Where will new payloads come from? How can space cargoes expand from the hundreds to thousands of tons annually to justify developing a new system? The number of satellites providing existing services like observation and communications will certainly increase. Providing propellents, water and other supplies may create a new market. Quicklaunch has based its business plan on launching propellent.18 Other markets will clearly emerge by themselves, attracted by the lowered cost of reaching orbit.Radically reduced cost creates radically new markets. The capability to launch thousands of tons inexpensively every year provides opportunities for applications previously considered impossible. Two potential markets with annual demand in the thousands of tons could prove the “killer app” that justifies developing GBS: space-based solar power generation and nuclear waste disposal in solar orbit.4.1. Space-based solar powerSpace-based solar power (SBSP) promises GWof electric power with minimum environmental damage. While it was too ambitious when proposed in 1968, technological advances and growing concern about providing environmentally friendly electricity have renewed interest in collecting solar energy and transmitting it to Earth.19 A 2007 study by the National Space Security Office (NSSO) of the Department of Defense stated building a 1-GW solar power station in geosynchronous orbit was technically feasible.20 The major economic challenge will be launching the 3000 metric tons of material and equipment to construct an SBSP station. The NSSO study concluded, “ the nation ’ s existing EELV [Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle]-based space logistics infrastructure could not handle the volume or reach the necessary cost ef fi ciencies to support a cost-effective SBSP system“.21 Only drastic reductions in launch costs will make SBSP economically feasible, as Table 1 indicates. For SBSP to become a reality, reducing the cost of reaching orbit is as important as the SBSP technology.
Ground Based key to Disposing Nuclear Waste Ground based launch systems are vital to disposing nuclear waste in the SunCoopersmith, 11 - Texas A&M University (Jonathan, “The cost of reaching orbit: Ground-based launch systems,” Space Policy 27 (2011) 77-80, Science Direct)
4.2. Nuclear waste disposalSafely disposing of its waste continues to challenge the nuclear energy industry. The USA alone has produced 45,000 tons and 380,000 cu m of high-level spent fuel and waste, an amount expected to rise to over 77,000 tons by 2020. The Department of Energy’s (DoE) Yucca Mountain disposal site in Nevada will cost more than $96 billion over the next three decades, assuming it proceeds.22 The Nuclear Waste Management Organization of Japan (NUMO) estimates that disposing of 40,000 canisters of nuclear waste will cost three trillion yen ($36 billion), although it will not select an underground disposal site until 2028.23GBS could make disposing of nuclear waste in space feasible. Proposals for disposing of radioactive waste in space are slightly younger than proposals for SBSP.24 The concept is simple: a GBS system would launch capsules either directly to their destination (solar orbit or into the Sun) or into LEO. A solar sail or electric engine would then propel the capsule to its destination. Historically garbage has been buried or recycled. The idea of launching garbage up into space instead of placing it down seems counterintuitive. From an aerospace perspective, space is for satellites, not garbage. Neither engineering community has an inherent constituency for nuclear waste disposal in space, but GBS could change that.The attraction of space-based disposal is not only that of permanently solving a problem which threatens the future of nuclear energy, but also access to funding. The tens of billions of dollars destined for underground disposal could fund GBS development and deployment. Although it has not been expressed in these terms, the US government will spend over $1200 to store a kg of waste underground. If the cost of reaching orbit is suf fi ciently low, space-based waste could prove more attractive economically as well as politically and technically than underground storage.
DOE R&D key to Ground BasedDOE R&D support is vital to ground based launch systemsCoopersmith, 11 - Texas A&M University (Jonathan, “The cost of reaching orbit: Ground-based launch systems,” Space Policy 27 (2011) 77-80, Science Direct)
5. The challengeAt this point in its evolution, GBS is only a promising technology. No private corporation could dedicate the billions of dollars for a return that will not occur for years. Developing GBS into a usable technology is an appropriate and necessary role of government. Such long-term state support is common in the history of technology. The Space Race of the 1960s was propelled by the large investments -- over $12 billion (over $90 billion in 2011 dollars) by 1957 – by the US military in rockets and other space technology during the 1940s and1950s.25 The development of the computer may offer a good analogy. Government funding, mostly from the military, intelligence community, and NASA, greatly accelerated research, development and diffusion of computers from the 1940s on. The federal government did this to conduct projects of national significance such as the census, social security, weapons research (especially nuclear explosions), cryptoanalysis, and space exploration. Not until the 1970s did the civilian market grow large enough to seize the technological initiative.26The Obama administration and Congress should declare a national challenge of providing access to space by 2020 at $200/ kg or less. The timeframe is challenging, but should be achievable via a methodical, low-cost marathon rather than an Apollo-style sprint.Because there are so many promising approaches whose technologies are still immature, the fi rst few years should fund a wide array of projects to determine the better candidates . The cost of these early years should be fairly small because this research will be primarily in the laboratory. Some GBS are scalable, so demonstration projects could launch small payloads. Quicklaunch has proposed an eight-year evolution of its SHARP-based gas gun system from launching 1-kg cubesats to lofting 450-kg packages of propellent for less than $600 million.27New technologies have the greatest chance of success when users are involved in their design and development. Even as GBS is developing, so too should potential customers be cultivated both to expand the launch market and to educate the GBS community. What, for example, is the minimum payload weight that SBPS builders consider useful? Is it 1000 kg? 100 kg? 10 kg? What are the constraints such as acceleration and vibration for payloads? GBS needs an agency to nurture it until ready for commercialization.As part of its restructuring, NASA has revived its NASA Innovative Advanced Concepts (NIAC) program (cancelled in 2007 to help fund the Vision for Space Exploration). The agency’s Space Technology Roadmaps (STR) Technology Area Breakdown Structure (TABS) only has “ground launch assist” as part of possible future launch propulsion systems, indicating a lack of deep institutional support for GBS.28The DoE may offer a more inviting home, especially if its new Advanced Research Projects Agency - Energy (ARPA-E) administers the research to move GBS up the TRL ladder. Because DOE has less invested institutionally in rockets, it may prove a stronger sponsor. Furthermore, many GBS technologies are electrical in nature, necessitating a different skill- and mind-set than that of NASA ’ s rocket engineers and scientists . Indeed, changing launch systems will demand changing existing ways of organization, funding, thinking and acting.While this paper has focused on the USA, the search for alternatives to rockets is not exclusively an American endeavor. The International Symposiums on Beamed Energy Propulsion (ISBEP) have attracted engineers and scientists from Japan, China, Russia, Brazil, Korea, and other countries. Because the level of investment is so low at this stage, international cooperation in exploring GBS alternatives may easily be accomplished. A bit of friendly national competition (“Look what the Americans are doing - we must do the same!”) might accelerate GBS development.6. ConclusionReducing the cost to reach orbit will have, as the 2007 NSSO report proclaimed, “ a transformational, even revolutionary effect on space access.”29 Yet a good idea is only the first of many necessary steps for a successful technology. To develop GBS ’ potential - and distinguish its fate from the many promising technologies that are never developed - will demand a dedicated effort. Just as government funding developed the technology to extend our fi rst tentative footsteps into space, so too can a dedicated government program provide the technology to truly enable the large-scale exploration and exploitation of space.As Walter Faulconer, the former chief scientist of the Applied Physics Laboratory, stated in 2010, reducing the cost of access to space “is to me one of the biggest game-changers out there.”30 By vastly extending the range of the possible, low-cost launches will make the second half-century of the Space Age even more exciting than the first half-century.
---Development Advantage
Ext. 1NC 2 – Current Vehicles SolveCommercial launch providers are providing medium lift capacity nowStout 9 - Researcher and Analyst at the National Space Studies Center, Air University (Mark, “U.S. Space Leadership: Reverting to the Mean?”, The Wright Stuff, 10/29, http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/nssc/op-ed/american_spacepower_reverting_to_the_mean.pdf)Is there anything that can save us from reverting to the mean? In the long term--50 years or more--maybe not. However, if things are to improve in the next five years, it is almost certain to be caused by market-based competition from U .S. launch systems like SpaceX ’ s Falcon 9 or Orbital Sciences ’ Taurus 2 launch vehicles, or OSC ’ s Peacekeeper ICBM-derived Minotaur 4 and 5 launch vehicles . These systems, using old-
school rocketry like Falcon 9’s RP-1 (kerosene that’s been space-rated) and liquid oxygen burning engines and using similar proven concepts like recycling existing ICBM components a la the legacy Delta, Atlas, and Titan programs have an excellent chance to get our national space launch efforts back on a more affordable footing. While improvements in U.S. launch programs alone won’t preserve our space leadership, they are an essential and compelling starting point to do just that.
Smaller launch vehicles solve better – diversity launch options and substantially decrease launch costsBonin, 11 – aerospace engineer and co-founder of Consortium Technologies, LLC, a Virginia-based company developing innovative technologies for both terrestrial and space-based applications (Grant, The Space Review, “Human spaceflight for less: the case for smaller launch vehicles, revisited,” 6/6, http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1861/1)Heavy-lift is not necessary , and even if we had it, we could reasonably choose not to use it, in favor of diverse portfolio of cheaper, smaller, simpler vehicles. A program that requires what only a single rocket can provide puts all its eggs in one basket, and is correspondingly fragile: the program will be delayed if the rocket is delayed; grounded if the rocket is grounded; and perhaps lost entirely if the rocket fails. Are existing launchers sufficient? Having argued that HLVs aren’t necessary, the complementary question is whether or not smaller launch vehicles are sufficient. This author contends that the answer is unequivocally yes. Programs of both human spaceflight and human space exploration can readily be accomplished with existing or near-term launch vehicles, including (but not limited to) the United Launch Alliance Atlas 5 and Delta 4, SpaceX Falcon 9, as well as other launchers on the horizon such as the Taurus 2 and Falcon Heavy. While different vehicles are better for different types of missions (crew or cargo delivery, for example), the key advantage of using rockets that already exist (or are currently being developed by the private sector) is that the initial costs of any particular program can be substantially reduced . As well, the demand for a large number of flights can only be expected to increase competition and drive prices down, if competitively procured in the first place.
Committing to smaller launch vehicles will spur the commercial launch marketBonin, 11 – aerospace engineer and co-founder of Consortium Technologies, LLC, a Virginia-based company developing innovative technologies for both terrestrial and space-based applications (Grant, The Space Review, “Human spaceflight for less: the case for smaller launch vehicles, revisited,” 6/6, http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1861/1)Existing or near-term commercial launch vehicles are more than sufficient for human missions in LEO and beyond. Not having a heavy-lift vehicle doesn’t mean not having a robust and capable human space exploration program , and the benefit of using existing or near-term launch vehicles extends beyond the
reduced or eliminated up-front development cost. By undertaking space exploration with smaller launch vehicles, NASA could serve as an anchor tenant in the launch market, providing a demand that should encourage new providers, increase competition, and drive prices down further , to the benefit of both manned and unmanned spaceflight.
Ext. 1NC 3 – HLLV TurnEconomies of scale are achieved by launch rate – heavy lift requires fewer launches and therefore increases costsBonin, 11 – aerospace engineer and co-founder of Consortium Technologies, LLC, a Virginia-based company developing innovative technologies for both terrestrial and space-based applications (Grant, The Space Review, “Human spaceflight for less: the case for smaller launch vehicles, revisited,” 6/6, http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1861/1)Indeed, it is incorrect to apply economies of scale to the size of a rocket. Instead, economies of scale are actually realized much more powerfully by increased flight rate . A smaller launch vehicle, with lower development costs and lower recurring costs, will reliably be cheaper on a cost per kilogram basis than a heavy-lift booster delivering the same payload, because the flight rate will be higher . If a prospective HLV were to enjoy a sufficiently high flight rate that its cost/flight approaches the marginal cost of the vehicle, then efficiencies of scale could be realized; but no one can envision a time in the future where this kind of HLV demand will exist. For large capital investments, high utilization is the key to reduced cost , and is also the key to operational experience, which also reduces cost and increases reliability even further.
HLLVs require fewer launches which means they prevent the development of a launch marketBonin, 6 – aerospace engineer and co-founder of Consortium Technologies, LLC, a Virginia-based company developing innovative technologies for both terrestrial and space-based applications (Grant, The Space Review, “The case for smaller launch vehicles in human space exploration (part 1),” 1/3, http://www.thespacereview.com/article/526/1)While it is readily acknowledged that HLLVs will be the ideal technology when a demand exists that equals their potential, that demand does not yet exist, nor can it be seen on the horizon. In today’s economic climate, the need for massive boosters requiring massive spending may figuratively and literally be anchoring human space exploration to the ground. It needn’t be so. A closer look at the bottom line Advocates of heavy-lift launch systems generally talk about two key economic features which HLLVs possess and smaller vehicles don’t: high payload fraction, and fewer required launches per unit mission mass. (Non-economic issues, such as failure risk, will be discussed later.) Payload fraction is defined as the ratio of a launch vehicle’s useful payload mass to its gross weight at liftoff. By this metric, bigger boosters can be regarded as extremely effective compared to smaller launch systems. Heavy-lift vehicles can deliver a lot more payload to orbit for a given takeoff weight, and since weight is essentially the currency of spaceflight, this feature alone appears to be a good argument for their use. The second item—lower required launch volume for a given mission mass—basically means that, in order to deliver a fixed amount of hardware to low-Earth orbit (say, 150 tonnes, the
approximate starting mass of a human expedition to Mars), only one or two heavy-lift vehicles would be required to get the job done, as opposed to perhaps ten launches of a less capable launch system. At first glance, both arguments would appear to make a strong case for HLLVs. Proponents argue that fewer launches result in less complex deployment scenarios for large spacecraft requiring orbital assembly, and that greater payload fractions denote better mass efficiency, which, to put it simply, translates to more bang for a space program’s buck. But let’s take a closer look at these arguments, starting with the contention that better payload fractions result in reduced launch costs. In reference [1], Wright observes that because the majority of a launch vehicle’s gross liftoff weight is in fact propellant (which costs an insignificant amount compared to other components), optimizing mass fraction alone does not, in fact, result in a more cost-effective system. It helps, to be sure, but not nearly as much as minimizing support infrastructure or
personnel, neither of which HLLVs do. If payload fractions were really significant drivers in cost reduction, the Apollo Saturn 5 would not have cost $2 billion in inflation-adjusted dollars towards the end of its operational lifetime, nor would the space shuttle cost what it currently does (between $600 million
and $1 billion per launch.) No amount of increased mass efficiency can make a heavy-lift launcher as cost-effective as increased demand would, and high demand is something that heavy-lifters currently lack. The other contention of HLLV advocates—that low launch volumes increase mission effectiveness by reducing operational complexity—also permits different interpretations. Indeed, fewer launches mean fewer components that need to be pieced together on orbit, as well as less risk of mission-critical launch or assembly delays. However, issues of effectiveness and complexity permeate far more than just flight rates and assembly schemes. The overall launch system and its support infrastructure must also be considered when evaluating these characteristics, and since bigger boosters require far more personnel and far more elaborate facilities (and are themselves far more operationally complex), it is questionable whether or not “reduced volume” really results in reduced complexity, or better mission effectiveness overall. To illustrate, one might compare the launch of 200 model rockets to the launch of a single Lockheed Martin Atlas 5. In spite of having an incredibly high volume, the model rockets are nevertheless much simpler to fly than the Atlas because they require far less in terms of operational support. Regardless of the launch rate, each distinct launch itself has to be considered in terms of what it takes to get airborne—and the bigger the launch system, the harder it is to get off the ground in the first place. The issue of complexity has far less to do with launch volume, and much more to do with launch infrastructure—and if this is used as a criterion for evaluating effectiveness instead of required flight rate, heavy-lift vehicles certainly lag far behind smaller ones. Flight rate is indeed a key driver in launch costs, though not by virtue of the mechanisms typically suggested by heavy-lift advocates. The real costs in rocketry stem from capital and labor costs , which produce the opposite effects of what most heavy-lift backers contend. Because a huge amount of fixed capital exists to support any substantial launch system (in the form of launch pads, assembly facilities, etc.), costs are driven down not by decreased launch rates, but rather by increased launch rates . Large capital investments require high utilization in order to be profitable, and because larger rockets require larger capital investment, their characteristically lower launch volumes actually drive costs upwards (sky high, if you will). For a substantial capital investment, minimum cost will result from maximum use, not the reverse: if
you’re going to invest in a big launch pad, it’s in your best interests to use it as frequently as possible [1]. The only sort of launch systems for which lower flight rates are economical, therefore, are actually smaller boosters, and even then, similar economic arguments apply, making higher usage much more desirable in terms of cost amortization.
Empirically – flight rate makes a bigger difference on launch costs than economies of scaleBonin, 6 – aerospace engineer and co-founder of Consortium Technologies, LLC, a Virginia-based company developing innovative technologies for both terrestrial and space-based applications (Grant, The Space Review, “The case for smaller launch vehicles in human space exploration (part 1),” 1/3, http://www.thespacereview.com/article/526/1)So once again, we find that higher flight rates promote effectiveness, not the reverse . And while advocates of heavy-lift boosters, such as Robert Zubrin, often evoke arguments based on the economics of scale to promote larger launch systems, the aerospace industry at large has not yet experienced any such benefits, even in such high demand areas as civilian air travel. While larger jets can carry far more passengers , the variation in economy per seat-mile between big and small aircraft is actually quite small: civil flight economy scales much more powerfully with flight rate than vehicle capacity alone. Interestingly, this is the apparent basis for Boeing’s choice to shift emphasis towards developing smaller vehicles such as the 787 Dreamliner, which will carry fewer passengers per flight but enjoy larger flight rates than such behemoths as the Airbus A380. While A380 will need more support infrastructure than Dreamliner, and will only be able to service the most major of flight routes, it will nevertheless be competitive because a number of such major routes exist. However, no comparable argument exists for space launchers: there simply isn’t enough volume demand to truly make heavy-lift vehicles economical , nor is there likely to be for quite some time .
Large workforce demands increase heavy lift costsBonin, 11 – aerospace engineer and co-founder of Consortium Technologies, LLC, a Virginia-based company developing innovative technologies for both terrestrial and space-based applications (Grant, The Space Review, “Human spaceflight for less: the case for smaller launch vehicles, revisited,” 6/6, http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1861/1)The size of the workforce required to support a heavy-lift booster is problematic for other reasons. With a large launch vehicle, manufactured and assembled by a large number of people at a large number of facilities across the country, there are a lot of people involved and a lot of exchanges between them to manage. This is a bad idea if you actually care about having an efficient, cost-effective operation. Every facility-to-facility exchange, every piece of hardware shipped intra-program increases the risk of something going wrong—a risk that usually demands increased management oversight and documentation to mitigate. In the interests of designing for cost, ideally a program should minimize the size of the team doing the work, locate them as centrally as practical to expedite and maximize clear communication, and minimize the burden of managing exchanges and interfaces. This is one of the enabling philosophies of small, low cost spacecraft. This also appears similar to the philosophies of SpaceX.
HLLVs drive up labor costs which substantially increases overall launch costsBonin, 6 – aerospace engineer and co-founder of Consortium Technologies, LLC, a Virginia-based company developing innovative technologies for both terrestrial and space-based applications (Grant, The Space Review, “The case for smaller launch vehicles in human space exploration (part 1),” 1/3, http://www.thespacereview.com/article/526/1)But these arguments only speak to capital investment; labor costs are also a significant consideration. Heavy-lift boosters require far more personnel for operation and maintenance than smaller launch systems, and because of their characteristically lower launch volume, a larger number of workers will have to be paid far more per flight (which, admittedly, is just fine if you happen to be such a worker). Conversely, a smaller launch vehicle will require far fewer support personnel, who (if paid comparably to the heavy lift team) will be able to work on a much smaller per-launch budget. It gets better. Since the smaller team for the smaller launch vehicle will be firing off a much greater number of boosters per year on average, they will also become much more practiced in their jobs. Wright [1] observes what economists call the “learning effect” here: a task performed twice as often will typically improve efficiency by 10–20%. It makes no sense to staff a huge car factory with hundreds of workers, only to produce a handful of units per year: those workers would get rusty (no pun intended) at what they do anyway. A smaller team that does their job more often can be expected to stay sharper, and will correspondingly exhibit higher performance in general (for much less money per flight).
AT: NASA / HLLVs saferMultiple launches protect the overall delivery system from launch failure – HLLVs are more risky because they aren’t redundantBonin, 6 – aerospace engineer and co-founder of Consortium Technologies, LLC, a Virginia-based company developing innovative technologies for both terrestrial and space-based applications (Grant, The Space Review, “The case for smaller launch vehicles in human space exploration (part 2),” 1/9, http://www.thespacereview.com/article/529/1)However, perhaps the issue of failure in multi-launch mission designs is not, in and of itself, as critical an issue as detractors contend to begin with. In fact, in a political context, breaking up a mission into multiple components may actually be regarded as a great strength: while multiple launches certainly increase the likelihood of losing a component because of launch failure, any such loss would actually represent only a small percentage of the mission , and so, with the exception of the booster delivering the
crew to orbit (which would only be one out of every 12 launches in our reference mission design), failure in any single launch could be offset by delivering a replacement component to orbit. While a failing launch system may be shut down for investigation, a program that uses not just multiple launches, but also multiple types of launchers , needn’t suffer the same fate . On the other hand, a program of lunar or Mars exploration predicated on the use of a single, dedicated heavy-lift booster may find itself indefinitely delayed—or even permanently grounded—as a result of only one failed launch , which is all but certain to happen at some point during any vehicle’s operation. If the program is based on deploying entire missions with a single booster, then losing that booster would mean losing the crew, the spacecraft, the mission; and any chance of flying again any time in the near future. Literally and figuratively, a heavy-lift booster keeps all the mission eggs in one basket, while launch failure in a program using smaller boosters is, in short, less likely to be either mission or program critical : an important level of flexibility for a program of manned spaceflight to have, and something that “all up” launch vehicles simply can’t offer.
Launch failures are of greater risk with heavy launchBonin, 11 – aerospace engineer and co-founder of Consortium Technologies, LLC, a Virginia-based company developing innovative technologies for both terrestrial and space-based applications (Grant, The Space Review, “Human spaceflight for less: the case for smaller launch vehicles, revisited,” 6/6, http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1861/1)In spite of the advantages offered by propellant depots, they are not preconditions for undertaking exploration with smaller launch vehicles. The Mars for Less mission (with full disclosure of author bias) illustrates one approach for undertaking a Mars Direct-style mission with existing EELVs, using a set of four discrete propulsion stages assembled in low Earth orbit. Missions assembled and launched this way don’t need any on-orbit propellant transfer, so depots aren’t required at all, albeit at the expense of some efficiency and flexibility. A four-stage propulsion system of the sort specified in Mars for Less could be used to throw some 45–55 tonnes onto a Trans-Mars Injection (TMI) depending on the opportunity, and could also be used to deliver comparable payloads from LEO to Lunar orbit. This sort of approach is less effective in decoupling propellant launch from the mission, but could allow crewed expeditions to begin effectively right now, completely side-stepping the need for new launch vehicles or on-orbit infrastructure. It is true that missions requiring a larger number of smaller launches can be expected to have launch failures; but in a mission with multiple launches and multiple launch providers, a single failure is less critical. With the exception of the booster delivering the crew to orbit, failure in any single launch can be offset by delivering
a replacement component to orbit. And while a failing launch system may be shut down for investigation , a program that uses multiple launch providers needn’t suffer the same fate. On the other hand, a mission predicated on a single heavy-lift booster may find itself indefinitely delayed—or even permanently grounded — as a result of only one failed launch .
NASA isn’t better at crew safety than the private sectorSpencer, 10 – spacecraft engineer (Harry, New Scientist, “NASA moon plan was an illusion, wrapped in denial,” 2/11,http://www.newscientist.com/article/dn18515-nasa-moon-plan-was-an-illusion-wrapped-in-denial.htmlSwitching to commercial space transportation, for both cargo and crews, is long overdue. For over 20 years, NASA has been legally required to use commercial space transportation whenever possible – and has used every possible excuse not to. It's high time to end this. Opponents' main argument is that NASA will have trouble assuring astronaut safety if it uses commercial launch services. Hogwash. To be blunt, NASA has no financial incentive to build safe spaceships – the shuttle, on average, has killed its entire crew about every 50 to 60 flights, and yet it has kept going. (Indeed, after the Challenger disaster, NASA's shuttle budget increased; compare that to what happened after Boeing's first two launches of its Delta III rocket failed – no one bought more launches and the rocket programme folded.) Spaceship builders who have a direct financial interest in safety should do better, not worse. At
the very least, safety assessments should be done by an independent authority, with no vested interest in the answer. When NASA was considering launching its Orion capsule on Atlas or Delta rockets five years ago, its safety standards (pdf) were very strict indeed – and the commercial rockets ended up losing out. But when NASA started applying those standards to its own rocket when development of the Ares rocket and Orion crew capsule got well
underway a few years later, suddenly the standards were in need of revision, and the revised ones (pdf)
were much less demanding. It's time to give commercial space flight a fair trial.
AT: Design costs cheaperHeavy lift launchers cost more overall because of higher development costsBonin, 11 – aerospace engineer and co-founder of Consortium Technologies, LLC, a Virginia-based company developing innovative technologies for both terrestrial and space-based applications (Grant, The Space Review, “Human spaceflight for less: the case for smaller launch vehicles, revisited,” 6/6, http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1861/1)Is heavy lift necessary? I’ve presented a case against heavy-lift launch vehicles before in this publication (see “The case for smaller launch vehicles in human space exploration (part 1)” and “The case for smaller launch vehicles in human space exploration (part 2)”, The Space Review, January 3 and 9, 2006). Aside from the political benefit of a shuttle-derived HLV (where the word “benefit” is used dubiously), the typical (non-nostalgic) arguments presented in favor of heavy-lift boosters usually revolve around payload efficiency and simplicity. Heavy-lift proponents argue that HLVs are more efficient in terms of the cost per kilogram of payload delivered to orbit (since larger
launch vehicles require less mass per unit payload). In terms of the marginal cost per kilogram, this should technically be correct—but only if there are no large fixed or capital costs to amortize.
Unfortunately, because larger rockets tend to require significant capital investments, they also tend to have large development costs that must be remunerated over the life of the vehicle . Heavy-lift boosters also require large assembly, integration, and launch infrastructure , as well as large full-time support staff. These represent extremely large fixed costs , which also must be amortized
over the vehicle’s use. This is the key issue: because the heavy-lift rocket will typically have a low flight rate (likely
on the order of once per year), the HLV will have to pass its entire operating costs into the price of a small number of launches, in addition to a large fraction of its development cost. Thus, the net cost per kilogram will tend to be quite high .
The simplicity of large rocket design doesn’t confer cost advantagesBonin, 11 – aerospace engineer and co-founder of Consortium Technologies, LLC, a Virginia-based company developing innovative technologies for both terrestrial and space-based applications (Grant, The Space Review, “Human spaceflight for less: the case for smaller launch vehicles, revisited,” 6/6, http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1861/1)What about the simplicity of a large rocket? While there is certainly some aesthetic appeal to launching a big spacecraft with only one big launch vehicle, the cost of developing such a booster i n the first place makes the mission design costly and problematic to begin with (as the Constellation program most
recently experienced). And though HLV proponents often argue that larger boosters can minimize or eliminate orbital assembly—as though it were a bad thing—orbital assembly is in fact something that NASA has become quite good a t. Indeed, the International Space Station has illustrated that very large structures can be assembled in LEO with great effectiveness. Orbital assembly has arguably become a mature spaceflight capability—a capability it would be a shame to lose, since any future program of exploration will eventually outgrow any particular launch vehicle regardless the size. This is true for the same reason that every other form of transportation outgrows the capability of any single vehicle. (Indeed, this is a fate that almost befell Apollo.) At some point it becomes silly to just keep building bigger and bigger transports.
AT: Heavy lift key to MarsMars can be done with small launch vehicles – it just requires orbital assemblyBonin, 11 – aerospace engineer and co-founder of Consortium Technologies, LLC, a Virginia-based company developing innovative technologies for both terrestrial and space-based applications (Grant, The Space Review, “Human spaceflight for less: the case for smaller launch vehicles, revisited,” 6/6, http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1861/1)Even the most ardent supporters of using HLVs for human spaceflight, such as Bob Zubrin, have recently begun to acquiesce on using smaller launch vehicles (see “A transorbital railroad to Mars”, The
Space Review, May 23, 2011.) Mission designs like Zubrin’s Mars Direct, after all, are predicated on aggressive minimalism, forward equipment deployment and supply caching. It makes sense to go
a step further and eliminate the HLV bottleneck , which is otherwise incongruous with the design philosophy. Zubrin has recently proposed an ultra-minimalist Mars mission using the SpaceX Falcon Heavy, which will be capable of delivering 53 tonnes to low-Earth orbit. (While this can’t fairly be considered a small launch vehicle, it can certainly be considered an economical one: the advertised price range for a Falcon H is $85–125 million per launch, which translates into a game-changing $1,600–2,400 per kilogram. While Zubrin’s proposal for a two-person crewed Mars mission using three Falcon Heavy launches is a bit tight (and arguably doesn’t quite close), his full-scale four-person Mars Direct mission, consisting of two vehicles per complete expedition, could certainly be accomplished using multiple Falcon Heavy launches. A Mars Direct-style mission could be undertaken using only three Falcon Heavy launches per Mars-bound payload: the first launch would deliver the payload itself, while the subsequent two would deliver two high-performance hydrogen/oxygen propulsion stages, which would be mated to the payload and ignited successively to send the spacecraft Mars-bound. This system could throw between 45 and 55 tonnes trans-Mars, again depending on the opportunity, which would be sufficient to undertake Mars Direct with some (needed) margin. Assuming three launches per Mars-bound spacecraft, and two payloads sent to Mars roughly every two years, the average launch costs would be $375 million per complete expedition, using the upper end of the price range quoted by SpaceX. For perspective, this is about one third the cost of a single shuttle launch—a small price to pay for a continuing program of exploration. The same sort of dual-stage approach could be used to deliver comparable payloads to lunar orbit, for a more near term (and probably more realistic) return to the Moon program. It should be noted that this sort of approach does share one disadvantage with HLV-based mission designs: it assumes, and relies upon, the capabilities of a single rocket that doesn’t yet exist. But at advertised prices, that single vehicle is hard to dismiss casually—and there is certainly cause to believe in SpaceX, which has already privately developed two launch vehicles, processing and launch facilities, and a crew vehicle for less than $800 million (compared to the approximately $9 billion spent on the defunct and flightless Ares 1, with no end in sight when the program was ultimately terminated). A compromise approach using propellant depots could be used to deal other launchers back into the game, which is probably a more robust approach regardless.
HLLVs kill international cooperationHLLVs lock out international cooperationBonin, 6 – aerospace engineer and co-founder of Consortium Technologies, LLC, a Virginia-based company developing innovative technologies for both terrestrial and space-based applications (Grant, The Space Review, “The case for smaller launch vehicles in human space exploration (part 2),” 1/9, http://www.thespacereview.com/article/529/1)And what about the possibility of international cooperation? If a multinational mission architecture was desired, then both Russia and Europe (really France, but be careful to whom you say that) already have launch vehicles capable of delivering 20–25 tonnes to low-Earth orbit, in addition to America’s existing two (soon to be three). Because a mission design using medium-lift boosters requires far less capital investment that can be far better amortized over the course of the mission, an international cooperative may even encourage nations without significant launch industries to create their own systems that can do the job, or at least to fund individual component launches. (The Canadian Space Agency’s budget is only about $300 million Canadian per year, but the promise of a maple leaf emblazoned on a propulsion stage could go a long way towards encouraging a contribution.) Involving other countries would keep the competitive elements in space exploration constructively economic, rather than detrimentally political . Having different companies or countries bid for launch contracts would certainly be preferable to edging both out completely and leaving NASA to shoulder the entire launch burden with an expensive vehicle that no one else can match. It’s like giving NASA the only keys to the car, and then letting them drive off without insurance.
HLLVs kill explorationRelying on HLLVs will crush exploration – none will occur during development timesBonin, 6 – aerospace engineer and co-founder of Consortium Technologies, LLC, a Virginia-based company developing innovative technologies for both terrestrial and space-based applications (Grant, The Space Review, “The case for smaller launch vehicles in human space exploration (part 2),” 1/9, http://www.thespacereview.com/article/529/1)For a healthy, cost-sustainable space program to develop, the private sector must play a significant role, and the launch industry must be encouraged to grow. Mike Griffin has, in spite of supporting the agency’s present course, nevertheless acknowledged that the task of human space exploration is too daunting for NASA to undertake alone, and that if reliable commercial launch providers can emerge in the next five to seven years, they would allow NASA to concentrate its resources on more advanced activities. Those providers are already here: all that’s required now is a change in design philosophy away from the Apollo-style “big booster”, a delay or failure of which may deny humans the dream of meaningful space exploration. If the true purpose of President Bush’s Vision for Space Exploration is to open the inner solar system to mankind, then undertaking actual missions beyond Earth orbit should be the highest priority. Heavy-lift launch technology doesn’t currently exist , and its re- development will require several years —years in which no space exploration will occur at all. With our future in space hinging on the reliability of a single vehicle, the ability of NASA to persevere through setback or tragedy i s also called into question. Launch system redundancy, flexibility, and cost-effectiveness are the real keys to space exploration, especially if we want the exploration to last. For this reason, the use of a larger number of more modest, more attainable launch vehicles should be re-examined in earnest by policymakers and engineers alike. Humans have a promising future in space, but what’s the best way to get there?
SLS failsThe SLS doesn’t meet current launch needs – the Space X Falcon Heavy is a more flexible, smaller rocket that can meet the same demandBonin, 11 – aerospace engineer and co-founder of Consortium Technologies, LLC, a Virginia-based company developing innovative technologies for both terrestrial and space-based applications (Grant, The Space Review, “Human spaceflight for less: the case for smaller launch vehicles, revisited,” 6/6, http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1861/1)Roles and responsibilities The US is currently rocket rich, but its space program isn’t comparably so. In 2004, President Bush’s Commission on Implementation of United States Space Exploration Policy recommended that “NASA’s role must be limited to only those areas where there is irrefutable demonstration that only government can perform the proposed activity .” Launch vehicles do not qualify —indeed, the opposite is ostensibly true in this case—and Congress certainly shouldn’t waste further billions trying to force NASA into developing a new one, for no apparent reason than maintaining jobs in the post-shuttle era (and thus preventing there from really being a post-shuttle era). If there is a market for large, Saturn V-class heavy-lift vehicles, they will be developed. Indeed, it is notable that SpaceX is, with Falcon Heavy, in fact betting on the viability of a larger rocket—though in every important way, hopefully a fundamentally different sort of larger rocket. There is reason to be cautiously optimistic here, since SpaceX appears to approach vehicle development in a fundamentally different, cost-effective way . In the final analysis, the argument here isn’t really against heavy-lift launch rockets, but against unaffordable or unneeded ones. The forthcoming SLS is an example of both : a rocket whose requirements are written more by politicians than engineers, developed more for political reasons than technical or economic ones, and stands in marked contrast to what the private sector is doing and what NASA could be doing more of.
SLS will crowd out the commercial launch market and prevent launch innovationBonin, 11 – aerospace engineer and co-founder of Consortium Technologies, LLC, a Virginia-based company developing innovative technologies for both terrestrial and space-based applications (Grant, The Space Review, “Human spaceflight for less: the case for smaller launch vehicles, revisited,” 6/6, http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1861/1)The new S pace L aunch S ystem (also pejoratively termed the “Senate Launch System”) has the political benefit of sending billions of
dollars to former shuttle contractors, and preserving some NASA shuttle jobs. But aside from being a jobs program, SLS can be expected to accomplish little . In the best case, it will probably fail entirely , and in so doing will merely be wasteful; but in the worst case, there is the possibility it might succeed, and lock NASA into using 1970s technology for the indefinite future , while also marginalizing the involvement of commercial launch providers. Under such conditions, a “post-shuttle era” would never really come. In considering a new rocket for NASA’s (as yet unspecified) future missions, it is worth asking: what is necessary and sufficient for enabling reliable, affordable, and increased human space activities? Is there actually a sound engineering or economic case to be made for a new heavy lift launch system? Or can we accomplish just as much or more with the rockets we already have?
SLS causes NASA tradeoffDeveloping the SLS will tradeoff with other NASA exploration technologiesBonin, 11 – aerospace engineer and co-founder of Consortium Technologies, LLC, a Virginia-based company developing innovative technologies for both terrestrial and space-based applications (Grant, The Space Review, “Human spaceflight for less: the case for smaller launch vehicles, revisited,” 6/6, http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1861/1)Notwithstanding SLS, it has been exciting to watch NASA increasingly embrace commercial providers in recent years. Turning LEO transportation over to commercial vehicles would ideally allow NASA to focus on enabling technologies for missions beyond Earth orbit, for which the requirements are more challenging and several key issues
remain unresolved. But “ enabling technologies” should not include S enate L aunch S ystems, the pursuit of which will continue to cannibalize funds that could otherwise be spent addressing bigger challenges (such as advanced spacesuit technologies; high-closure life support systems; advanced space power systems; and entry, descent and landing of large payloads at Mars.) In-house launch vehicle development has had an extremely high opportunity cost for NASA, and they would better serve the cause of exploration by working on something else. But in this regard, the agency is beholden to Congress. If the United States actually cares about developing space—not just exploring it or studying it, but developing it in earnest, with the end goal of having a large number of people living and working in space—it would mean being able to launch crew and cargo economically. The way to accomplish this is more activity and more competition, with as much commercial involvement as possible. A heavy-lift “Senate Launch System” is not consistent with these objectives, which really just affirms what we already know: that space development is not actually that important to Congress. But hopefully, at the behest of commercial efforts, a day will come when human space activities will flourish regardless of what’s important to Congress.
The SLS fails – it won’t be used and tradesoff with space scienceFriedman, 11 - stepped down after 30 years as Executive Director of The Planetary Society. He continues as Director of the Society's LightSail Program and remains involved in space programs and policy. Before co-founding the Society with Carl Sagan and Bruce Murray, Lou was a Navigation and Mission Analysis Engineer and Manager of Advanced Projects at JPL (Lou, “The dangers of a rocket to nowhere,” The Space Review, 5/23, http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1849/1)In my view the situation in the United States with respect to access to space is no different than if we had a space czar whose motive was to keep the country grounded. Why does it seem like we can never get a rocket policy for civil space exploration right? Not since the 1960s, when we had no choice except to jump on military rockets, have we made an intelligent decision about access to space. Maybe it was because back then civil space exploration was born out of the notion that it demonstrated our military rocket process, and since then it seems disconnected from national security. I just read an interesting item about this in John Logsdon’s new book, John Kennedy and the Race to the Moon (see “Review: John F. Kennedy and the Race to the Moon”, The Space Review, February 28, 2011). Kennedy sent Nikita Khrushchev a congratulatory note on the launch of Venera-1, the first interplanetary mission. At the time, those considering space policy in the US considered that mission to be a demonstration of Soviet capability to orbit a nuclear warhead over Earth and de-orbit it at will, aimed at the US. They specifically noted that the Venus mission, launched on a powerful Russian rocket with large payload, began by orbiting Earth before applying a propulsive maneuver to take it out of orbit on its interplanetary path. Maybe that is why planetary exploration became part of a space race that was focused on nearer objectives. Russia has maintained its access to space, cheaply and reliably, by never deviating from the military rockets that launched the space age. Other countries, with much smaller space programs and space industries, also have clearer development paths than does the US—not necessarily smoother ones, but clearer ones, such as the Ariane series in Europe and the H series in Japan. China also seems to be following step-by-step development of their Long March family of rockets. But the US flails: starting, stopping, debating, re-starting, and so on. And our Congress, ever searching for more pork, now refuses to use what we already have in favor of building something we don’t need. Mark Matthews, writing for the Orlando Sentinel, recently made an important observation:
the Congressional “ S enate L aunch S ystem ” (as detractors of what is officially known as the Space Launch System call it) is being built to test a new crew capsule but will likely never get used for anything else . He also used the
term “rocket to nowhere”—a phrase for which I have some parental pride. The US will spend billions only to have to begin again from scratch if it really wants to go anywhere. From a timing point of view, that is fine. There are no missions that need heavy lift before 2020, but the money waste may set space exploration back further than that. Matthews’ piece is notable because it comes from Florida, one of the states with vested interest in the SLS. I have rationalized this by saying it is only wasted money and, at least, it is wasted on good people with good jobs. That is the state of human space exploration. Robotic exploration has allowed us to extend human presence into the solar system. But now that is threatened, too, by the same old bugaboo: lack of affordable launches, plus the wasteful allocation of limited funds to the SLS. Space science mission planners have recently been informed about big increases in the costs for the Atlas 5, costs that will lead to fewer missions. Repeating past mistakes, the government phased out use of the lower-cost Delta 2 on the promise of future launch vehicles. I completely agree with Alan Stern on the promise of the Falcon Heavy being good for space science (see “A new rocket for science”, The Space Review, May 16, 2011), but space science, and particularly planetary exploration, has learned many sad lessons relying on a launch vehicle not yet built. Human space exploration is dead in the water. The unintended consequence of the misapplied funds for the SLS is that it will not assist human exploration and will inhibit robotic exploration. NASA is trying hard to make lemonade from the Congressional lemons, but the ingredients are just too sour. No one in politics (Administration or Congress) seems to care even though the public does. In 1980 when we had a similar situation (popular program, but weak political support) we formed The Planetary Society for grassroots action. I urge my colleagues in the space community to take grassroots action now: urge Congress to reconsider their course and reset our human mission plans.
***Heavy Launch
Ares I Bad Ares I will exceed the budget and further the “heavy-lift gap”. Ellegood 09-Space Policy Analyst at Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University (Edward Ellegood, October 5, 2009, “Is Ares 1 too little, too late?”, The Space Review, http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1481/1, DMintz)
Is NASA’s much-maligned Ares 1 rocket program getting a bad rap? Many at the agency think so. I tend to agree with NASA engineers who say problems like thrust oscillation and liftoff drift are being blown out of proportion. I also agree with former NASA chief Mike Griffin’s comments that problems with Ares 1 are being encountered precisely because there is actual work being done on the vehicle. (He suggested that design problems are par-for-the-course with rocket development programs, while “paper rockets” will always be problem-free.) Oddly enough, by criticizing Ares 1’s technical problems, its detractors may actually be boosting its credibility in Washington.Originally envisioned as a simple and low-cost reuse of Space Shuttle hardware, Ares 1 has become increasingly complex and expensive while its scheduled availability slides farther and farther to the right. Adding to Ares 1’s complexity and cost are challenges with the upper-stage “common bulkhead” and the J-2X engine, which have been cited by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) in a recent report as adding significant risk to the program. Efforts to mitigate these and other risk factors have contributed to the Aerospace Corporation’s finding that we shouldn’t expect an operational Ares 1 until 2017, five years beyond the 2012 target originally put forward by NASA in 2005.As Dr. Griffin might point out, big aerospace programs are no strangers to cost overruns, technical problems, and schedule delays. It seems to me, however, that the problems with Ares 1 are more fundamental. According to the GAO report released on September 25, the development costs for Ares 1 and its Orion crew capsule are likely to reach $49 billion, nearly double the $28 billion originally proposed. That’s billion with a “B” for a limited-mission rocket whose lift capacity is similar to already-developed Atlas and Delta rockets—vehicles that could be human-rated and ready sooner than Ares 1 and at a lower cost, according to the Aerospace Corporation study.While Dr. Griffin and others may be able to argue that Ares 1 costs are on track, and provide reasons against relying solely on commercial rockets for crew flights, it is harder to deny that Ares 1 is becoming a too-little/too-late solution as scenarios for Constellation and the International Space Station (ISS) evolve. The Augustine committee’s eight human space exploration options, as presented in their Summary Report to the White House, bear this out.Specifically, Ares 1 and the International Space Station (ISS) do not operationally or fiscally coexist in any of the options presented in the Summary Report, rendering the vehicle useless for ISS crew carriage. In other words, the Augustine Panel believes NASA can fund Ares 1 or the ISS, but not both.Furthermore, with its limited performance, the operational Ares 1 would be all dressed up with nowhere to go, waiting several more years for a heavy-lift partner to enable exploration missions beyond low Earth orbit. This “heavy-lift gap” is my biggest problem with Ares 1. The Augustine committee correctly asserts that a heavy-lift rocket is required for any meaningful exploration program, whether to the Moon, Mars, or other destinations. However, by sticking with Ares 1, NASA would actually prolong that gap until the mid- to late-2020s.So, although I too am concerned about changing rockets mid-flight, I believe Ares 1 has become a solution in search of a problem and a symbol of the government’s role as a gatekeeper for space. Unless the Augustine committee’s conclusions change significantly in their final report, it seems NASA should focus its efforts on developing a heavy-lift vehicle and give the private sector more responsibility for servicing the ISS.
Long Term Consequences to Heavy Launch Using heavy launch will have multi-decade consequences. Logsdon 7-6- professor emeritus at the Space Policy Institute and George Washington University, (John M. Logsdon, July 6, 2011, “Was the Space Shuttle a Mistake?”, Technology Review, http://mobile.technologyreview.com/computing/37981/, DMintz)
Today we are in danger of repeating that mistake, given Congressional and industry pressure to move rapidly to the development of a heavy lift launch vehicle without a clear sense of how that vehicle will be used. Important factors in the decision to move forward with the shuttle were the desire to preserve Apollo-era NASA and contractor jobs, and the political impact of program approval on the 1972 presidential election. Similar pressures are influential today. If we learn anything from the space shuttle experience, it should be that making choices with multidecade consequences on such short-term considerations is poor public policy.
No Military Use for Heavy LaunchThe military has no use for heavy liftFoust, 4 – editor and publisher of The Space Review (5/17/04, Jeff, The Space Review, “The myth of heavy lift,” http://www.thespacereview.com/article/146/1)RK
The costs of heavy-lift vehicle development would be less of an issue if there were other uses—and other paying customers—for such a vehicle. Outside the exploration program, though, there is unlikely to be much interest for any vehicle much larger than those available today, even at fairly modest launch costs. The US military’s plans for space for the foreseeable future assume nothing larger than a heavy EELV will be available; indeed, the Defense Department has turned its attention more recently to smaller, potentially more responsive vehicles. Even if a new heavy-lift vehicle was available, it’s unclear what use the military would have for it other than possibly some missile defense applications that have yet to be fleshed out.
Heavy Launch Unnecessary for Commercial SectorThe commercial sector doesn’t need heavy liftFoust, 4 – editor and publisher of The Space Review (5/17/04, Jeff, The Space Review, “The myth of heavy lift,” http://www.thespacereview.com/article/146/1)RK
The costs of heavy-lift vehicle development would be less of an issue if there were other uses—and other paying customers—for such a vehicle. Outside the exploration program, though, there is unlikely to be much interest for any vehicle much larger than those available today, even at fairly modest launch costs. The US military’s plans for space for the foreseeable future assume nothing larger than a heavy EELV will be available; indeed, the Defense Department has turned its attention more recently to smaller, potentially more responsive vehicles. Even if a new heavy-lift vehicle was available, it’s unclear what use the military would have for it other than possibly some missile defense applications that have yet to be fleshed out.On the commercial side, the largest customer is the satellite communications industry. While there has been a trend towards larger satellites, that trend has tailed off in recent years, given both overcapacity among existing satellites as well as a rash of problems with a new generation of large communications satellites. Even if that trend was to continue unabated, existing vehicles are large enough to accommodate these satellites for the foreseeable future. Other commercial applications, from remote sensing to emerging markets like space tourism, can get by mostly with smaller, possibly reusable vehicles.
Private Sector BetterRelying on private sector launch is superior to heavy lift – it’s cheaper and the private sector is well over capacity and increasing use lowers launch costsFoust, 4 – editor and publisher of The Space Review (5/17/04, Jeff, The Space Review, “The myth of heavy lift,” http://www.thespacereview.com/article/146/1)RK
Various alternativesIf a new heavy-lift launch vehicle is so unattractive, what are the alternatives? There are, in fact, several options NASA could explore to provide launch services for the exploration initiative that are, in the long run, more affordable and sustainable. Indeed, some or all of these options could be pursued to provide a long-term solution.One alternative is to take advantage of the existing overcapacity in the launch market today. Many of the new vehicles that have entered service in recent years were developed when companies and governments anticipated much higher launch rates than what has materialized, primarily because of a weak commercial market. This means that many vehicles are operating at a fraction of their launch and manufacturing capacity. This excess capacity could be utilized by the exploration program without the need to spend a dime on development.A good example is the Delta 4. When Boeing built its manufacturing facility in Alabama in the 1990s for the Delta 4, it was designed to produce as many as 40 “common booster cores” (CBCs) a year. Currently, though, the Delta 4 is used only by US government customers, primarily the Defense Department. For the foreseeable future, the Delta 4 might be called upon for, on average, perhaps two Delta 4 Heavy launches a year and four Delta 4 Medium/Medium-Plus launches. At three CBCs per Heavy launch and one CBC for each “single-stick” Medium vehicle, that amounts to only ten CBCs a year. That offers—theoretically, at least—an excess capacity of up to 30 CBCs a year, enough for ten Heavy launches. The same approach can be used for the Atlas vehicle.Given that international cooperation has been said to be a major aspect of the exploration program, creating international partnerships with Europe, Japan, and Russia would allow the use of excess capacity on the Ariane 5, H 2A, Proton, and Zenit launch vehicles, as well as Russia’s Angara booster under development. Higher launch rates of existing domestic and international vehicles could reduce per-launch costs by allowing operators to amortize costs over a larger number of launches. Moreover, the additional launches would reduce, if not eliminate, the need for government subsidies for these vehicles: the additional government-purchased launches for the exploration program would in effect become the subsidies, albeit for a more constructive purpose.
---Industrial Base Advantage
Ext. 1NC 2 - Contracts
Increasing procurement doesn’t solve – only attracting new talent solves aerospaceNewton and Griffin ’11 Elizabeth K. – director for Space Policy in the Center for System Studies at the University of Alabama in Huntsville, former strategist at NASA Marshall Space Flight Center, former program director at Dnetics Inc. supporting the National Missile Defense Program Office, former policy analyst at the UN Economic Commission for Europe in Geneva and at NASA Jet Propulsion Laboratory’s Flights Projects Office & Michael D. Griffin – physicist & space engineer, former Administrator of NASA, eminent scholar and professor of mechanical and aerospace engineering at the University of Alabama in Huntsville, former head of the Space Department at the Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory “United States space policy and international partnership” Center for System Studies, University of Alabama in Huntsville, AL 35899, USA, ScienceDirect, http://elsevier.com/locate/spacepol, Space Policy2.3. Sustainment of national capability The DoD ’ s acquisition changes portend an improvement in the USA ’ s ability to sustain its aerospace industrial bas e . Block buys will create more predictable, higher volume demand for suppliers,
intended to help stabilize the workforce. Nevertheless, the ‘ greying ’ of the aerospace workforce , with more than half eligible for retirement in the next fi ve years, creates continued risk that valuable knowledge will not be transferred to the younger workforce, because opportunities for experience on fl ight systems are limited .
Ext. 1NC 5 - STEMPublic already perceives there is large scale space program – empirically denies their Apollo argsLaunius 3 (Roger D. Launius "Public Opinion Polls and Perceptions of US Human Spaceflight." Published in "Space Policy" 19 (2003) pgs 173-174. Online at http://si.academia.edu/RogerLaunius/Papers/93299/_Public_Opinion_Polls_and_Perceptions_of_US_Human_Spaceflight_) One final observation from this review of polling data relates to the level of spending for NASA programs. With the exception of a few years during the Apollo era, the NASA budget has hovered at about one percent of all money expended by the US treasury . As shown in Fig. 14, with the exception of a few years in the mid-1960s as NASA prepared for Apollo flights to the Moon, stability has been the norm as the annual NASA budget has incrementally gone up or down in relation to that 1-percent benchmark. But the public's perception of this is quite different , as shown in Fig. 15. For example, in 1997 the average estimate of NASA's share of the federal budget by those polled was 20 percent. Had this been true, NASA's budget in 1997 would have been $328 billion. If NASA had that amount of money it would have been able to undertake a program to send humans to Mars. It seems obvious that
most Americans have little conception of the amount of funding available to NASA. At a fundamental level, all federal programs face this challenge as Americans are notoriously uninformed about how much and what the federal government spends on its programs. As a result there is a general lack of understanding that NASA has less than one percent of the Federal budget each year, and that its share of the budget has been shrinking since the early 1990s. Most Americans seem to believe that NASA has a lot of money , much more than it annually receives. Turning around those false perceptions of funding is perhaps the most serious challenge facing those who wish to gain public support for space exploration.
Space policies won’t inspire students to go into STEM fieldsDelgado, 11 - Space Policy Institute, George Washington University (Laura, “When inspiration fails to inspire: A change of strategy for the US space program,” Space Policy 27 (2011) 94e98, Science Direct)If only we could answer the “why space?” question. If only we could come up with a catchy phrase to light up people’s eyes and compel the masses. If only we could inspire the young generations just as the Apollo generation was inspired. Then the space program would see a bigger budget and a more vocal and populous following, the aerospace sector would be fed to satiety with a skilled and passionate workforce for decades to come and US leadership in space, even in the context of a growing number of space actors, would be a sure thing. If only. So the logic goes for those who see the most pressing issues of the US space program as a result of endemic emotional detachment. For these stakeholders, the compelling reasons that drove the country to glory in the most visible “battle” of the Cold War have been either forgotten or ignored. In their wake, the country has implemented space policies that have failed to attach themselves to the minds and hearts of the younger generations, threatening the very survival of the program they were meant to support. To solve this situation, the inspiration argument has been highlighted often in the past couple of years, to the point of predictability. Yet despite its widespread defense, ins piration alone has not reinvigorated support for the space program as proponents argue it would. At the root of the problem is that this logic, constructed out of a memory of the coldwar era, is sharply at odds with the interests and sensibilities of the generations it is supposed to reel in. The unpopular but potentially fruitful alternative is to draw attention to the pragmatic aspects of space, and to move away from concepts that made sense decades ago but which may prove counterproductive in the years to come. 1. Looking back: the Apollo myth A number of blue-ribbon panels, Congressional committees, and experts have said that the crucial element lacking not only to sustain US efforts in space but to see them take off again, enlarged and reinvigorated, is that of an inspiring vision. The quotation from the Book of Proverbs in the House Science & Technology Committee room – “where there is no vision, the people perish” – as well as the opening words of President Kennedy’s 1961 “Moon speech” are often cited to support this claim. The thrust of it is that the Apollo program was sustained by that vision, a vision that President Kennedy held and propagated, and that was shared by the American people. This vision rests on the demand not only for a longterm strategy of human expansion to the cosmos, but of one led by the USA, dependent “upon the adventurousness of the American people” [1], and so an ideal of American exceptionalism and Manifest Destiny. Simply put: “space is what the Americans do” [2]. While powerful enough, this vision is context-specific and more complex than some proponents seem to think. To begin with, this image of President Kennedy “ as a visionary leader committed to expanding the human presence throughout the Solar System” has been repeatedly discredited [3]. As Roger Launius further points out,
“there is not a shred of evidence to support this interpretation”. The truth is that President Kennedy was initially unsure about committing to the Space Race; the Apollo decision was all about timing. The impact of the Gagarin flight in 1961 and the embarrassment of the USA in the Bay of Pigs fiasco forced the president to look for ways to uphold the US image internationally. Influential documents circulated at the time linked space activities to national prestige,1 and it was in this context that, after being assured of its technical feasibility, President Kennedy was presented with the option of the Moon landing. In contrast to the image of one committed to a long-term vision in space, we find instead a president who saw in a specific space policy a resource: away to counter the Soviet threat in a public manner that would assuage both national and international concerns over suspected US disadvantage. It was, as John Logsdon writes, “a politically driven response” and “not motivated by a belief in the long-term importance of space exploration” [4]. President Kennedy could not have put it more clearly than when he told NASA Administrator JamesWebb, “I don’t care about space” [5]. For him, and for the other key players that drew the plan to its fruition, space was seen as an answer to a series of often disparate concerns that had little to do with an active agenda of inspiration. While the inspiring vision certainly helped sell the program, it was not enough to sustain it for long. Behind the scenes, the process was more tumultuous than it seems. While the president’s oft quoted speech successfully won congressional and public support and consolidated what efforts NASA and others had accumulated to make the program a reality, “the Apollo honeymoon ended in 1962” [6]. As the costs of the program escalated (to a total which would be
around $150 billion in current dollars) many began to question the wisdom of the commitment. For the first time there arose the ever recurring question of whether it was right for the nation to commit funds in a space program when there were other “more pressing” needs [7]. In the post-Apollo period there have been no more compelling reasons to justify a comparable commitment of resources. Total government space spending, which in 1964 was 5%, has been less than 2% in the past 20 years.2 In retrospect, Apollo was not the beginning of a space program
that would from then on indulge in a wealth of resources and seemingly unquestioned commitment. It was instead the outcome of a specific set of circumstances that gave the initial push to a program that would from then on have to fight for its own share of attention and budget.
Students don’t care about spaceDelgado, 11 - Space Policy Institute, George Washington University (Laura, “When inspiration fails to inspire: A change of strategy for the US space program,” Space Policy 27 (2011) 94e98, Science Direct)In this changed, post-coldwar context, the inspiration argument has proven insuf fi cient . Why is it that, despite so many inspiring messages, often invoking the words that proved successful in the past, people are not lining up at NASA ’ s doors or begging Congress for budget increases? It seems clear that the inspiration argument , which serves to lift the spirit, rarely translates into increased resources or support. Consider two recent examples. When the Columbia Accident Investigation Board concluded that NASA lacked direction, the Bush
Administration responded by crafting the 2004 Vision for Space Exploration (VSE), providing NASA with a set of multi-decadal
ambitious exploration goals meant to re-inspire the civil space program. The VSE was touted as “ fl exible ” and “ affordable ”, but resource allocation for these new challenges depended on retiring the Space Shuttle and de-orbiting the International Space Station (ISS) to liberate funds. Despite the powerful message and the exciting plans, the promised increases to NASA ’ s budget were not delivered. The usual delays and technical challenges of such a large-scale endeavor were thus exacerbated by insufficient funds that forced NASA to draw from the resources of other programs.
Replicating Apollo is impossible.Bormanis 10, B.S. in Physics from the University of Arizona, and an M.A. in Science, Technology and Public Policy, earned under a NASA Space Grant Fellowship at George Washington University, 10 (July 19, Andres, “Critical partnerships for the future of human space exploration”, “The Space Review”, http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1667/1)Constellation has been described as “Apollo on steroids.” It replicates many of the systems developed over forty years ago for the first manned Moon landings, with the intention of returning astronauts to the Moon sometime in the next decade. On the face of it, this sounds encouraging for those of us who want to see astronauts resume the journeys beyond Earth orbit that ended so abruptly with Apollo 17. But as NASA Deputy Administrator Lori Garver has noted, various presidents and congressional leaders have tried to “re-do” Apollo for the last forty years. Clearly they have not succeeded. Understandably, the Apollo program is deeply ingrained in the public
psyche, the glorious victory of a bygone era that many wish we could aspire to again. But today’s space advocates often forget that Apollo was a unique program designed to achieve a specific political goal in the 1960s: to demonstrate the social and technological superiority of the American political system over its chief
rival, the Soviet Union. The convergence of social, political, and technological forces that made Apollo possible no longer exists, and never will again . Those who decry the Obama Administration’s decision to cancel the Constellation program seem to ignore this fundamental fact. Trying to replicate the Apollo program makes about as much sense as trying to rebuild the pyramids. The emerging Obama space policy offers a new approach that acknowledges the substantial changes that have taken place in the world in the decades since Apollo. Those changes are
reflected in three critical partnerships: I. Public/Private Since its inception, NASA has depended on the resources of the private sector to develop the hardware that makes space travel possible. Building on military ICBM technology developed by General Dynamics, Lockheed, Boeing, and others, the Mercury and Gemini programs lofted American astronauts into Earth orbit. The Apollo Saturn V rocket was built, under NASA guidance, by a variety of military contractors for the purely civilian purpose of sending men to the Moon.
Ext. 1NC 6 – AP DeclineAerospace decline is inevitable—more funding is uselessSterner 10(February 22, 2010, Eric, Marshall Institute, “R&D Can Revitalize The Space Industrial Base”, http://www.marshall.org/article.php?id=782 , FS)Furthermore, the space industrial base , particularly the second- and third-tier suppliers, has not been immune to the steady decline in the overall U.S. manufacturing base , which has been exacerbated by the recent economic downturn . Particular attention needs to be given to these lower-tier suppliers because that is often where unique, specialized skills reside. It is tempting to throw money at these problems, but dollars will not solve them. Resources are clearly necessary, but not sufficient , for a healthy space industrial bas e. Today, the United States often spreads the
funding available around industry to protect as many jobs and heritage capabilities as possible, but such subsidies represent a hollow approach. “Keep alive” funding will not revitalize industry; it only promotes stagnation. There is a range of frequently discussed, sometimes employed policies and practices that will help manage the risks of a weak industrial base. These include stable funding, improved training, frequent flight opportunities and more frequent contract opportunities. However, what is missing in that mix is a plan for investments in research and development (R&D) and a re-engineering of the acquisition approach.
Ext. 1NC 8 – No CollapseNasa won’t collapse - Obama isn’t abandoning human spaceflightLogsdon 7/11 (John M. Logsdon is a Professor Emeritus of Political Science and International Affairs at George Washington University's Elliott School of International Affairs. He was the founder and from 1987-2008 Director of the Elliott School's Space Policy Institute. “The U.S. space program’s leadership black hole” July 11th 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/on-leadership/the-us-space-programs-leadership-black-hole/2011/07/11/gIQADj538H_story.html)
In more than 40 years of close observation of the U.S. space program, I don’t think there has ever been more uncertainty and fear of impending program collapse. One result of the current confusion is the too-widespread impression that the final flight of the shuttle means that the U.S. program of human spaceflight has come to an end. This is most certainly not the case. Many American astronauts will be living and working on the International Space Station for the decade to come. And yet equating the end of the shuttle program with the end of human spaceflight is symptomatic of the failure of national leaders to agree on and then communicate a vision of the U.S. future in space. There is no precedent for the White House and the Congress being so much at odds about how best to move forward in space, particularly since Congress has taken upon itself to specify the technical parameters of new developments, something traditionally an executive branch prerogative. Congress has lost much of its trust in NASA’s decisions and, in an unprecedented move, has specified both the basic design features and schedule for a new space booster . High among congressional concerns is preserving the manufacturing and operating capabilities—and the associated jobs in the space industrial base—that were developed during the shuttle era. Substituting congressional directives for NASA’s technical judgment seems ill advised.
AT: ICBMs deterICBMs and SSBNs can’t deterLowther 10—PhD, analyst with Air Force Research Institute(Summer 2010, Air and Space Power Journal, “Should the United States Maintain the Nuclear Triad?”, http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj10/sum10/04lowther.html , FS)Second, since signaling intent is a vital aspect of successful deterrence, eliminating the bomber leg of the triad would be a mistake. Designed to remain hidden from the view of an adversary, I CBMs and SSBNs offer no effective way of conveying American resolve or an escalation/de-escalation in postur e, should an adversary move toward conflict. The bomber fleet, however, effectively demonstrates resolve. For example, if an adversary were to openly challenge the status quo, the president could order the nation’s B-52s and B-2s on alert, put them in the air, and/or deploy them to forward bases. All of these actions are visible signals of American intent, designed to lead to a de-escalation of tensions. Without question, bombers are the most effective tool for overtly demonstrating resolve. A related point arises. Nuclear-capable bombers are one of the best tools for assuring allies that the United States remains committed to providing a credible extended deterrent. Neither ICBMs nor submarines can provide a visible show of resolve in the face of danger. Deploying nuclear bombers to an ally’s air base not only assures America’s friends but also deters the nation’s foes.
AT: Aerospace This is not an advantage. The World’s Forum For Aerospace Leadership 7-8 (The World’s Forum For Aerospace Leadership, July 8, 2011“AIAA PUBLIC POLICY COMMITTEE STATEMENT ON LAST LAUNCH OF SPACE SHUTTLE ATLANTIS”, http://intranet.aiaa.org/industryresources/PDF/AIAA_PPC_Statement_on_Final_Launch_of_Shuttle_Program.pdf, DMintz)
The launch of space shuttle Atlantis on 8 July closes an important epoch in American science, but does not signal the end of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration [NASA]. Nor, does the launch of Atlantis signal the end of American leadership in aerospace. Today, the United States is better positioned to continue leading the world in space exploration, understanding our planet’s environment, and making discoveries which benefit all of humankind. Just as in aviation, where in one hundred years we have seen the creation of hundreds of thousands jobs in small and large businesses across America selling products globally, in the next fifty years we will see the same in the field of space exploration. America remains the most capable nation serving humanity and spearheading discovery through aerospace science and technology. The launch of Atlantis is an opportunity to reflect on our achievements in aerospace and to welcome a bright future, destined to benefit from a continuation of America’s contributions driven by advances in aerospace science and engineering. The launch of space shuttle Atlantis neither erodes nor imperils America’s leadership in discovery in space. Our capacity to expand human knowledge of space, including looking back to the beginning of time, remains strong. For example, America’s outward focused eyes in the form of the Hubble Space Telescope [HST] and the Stratospheric Observatory for Infrared Astronomy [SOFIA] continue to lead the world in discovery in space. The ideas, creativity, and technology that produced HST and SOFIA have not disappeared with the last shuttle flight. It is the ideas, creativity, and technology in the capable hands of the aerospace workforce that constitute the engine of America’s strength and leadership in space discovery. That engine is strong and is growing stronger. Our follow-on to Hubble, the James Webb Space Telescope [JWST], will be the next great engine of discovery. HST, SOFIA, and JWST are useful eyes in the sky and remind us that international collaboration is a necessity for continued space discovery. Closer to Earth, NASA’s current and planned discovery activities related to neighboring planets, asteroids, and the moon continue to produce new knowledge that excites humankind. This NASA generated activity is robotic based and also builds a foundation for human involvement in space discovery beyond the moon. Any chance for humanity to fully understand Earth’s environment depends in large part on NASA’s Earth Observing System [EOS]. Through a series of polar-orbiting and low inclination satellites, EOS continuously provides new knowledge of Earth as an integrated system. This knowledge impacts our lives in various ways from food production to weather to effective management of natural resources. EOS will continue beyond the last Atlantis shuttle mission this week. Although EOS satellite launches were enabled by the space shuttle, retirement of the space shuttle fleet will not terminate EOS. NASA’s need for future EOS satellites may be launched on existing rockets. After Atlantis returns to earth, and the space shuttle era ends, NASA and industry research, will continue to provide safe air travel, strength in defense, expanded commerce, steady growth in manufacturing know-how, advances in materials, and high wages form high-skilled jobs. Right now, America’s aeronautics enterprise is stronger than it has been in decades. With vision and support provided by the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics [AIAA] and other professional societies, the federal government and industry generate exceptional returns [billions of US dollars] in international trade through the sale and maintenance of aircraft and aircraft engines. America continues to produce the highest quality and most efficient civil and military aircraft and rotorcraft in the world. All economic indicators point to future growth and leadership of America’s aeronautics enterprise. The US aeronautics workforce is rated number one in the world. Our aeronautics designers and manufacturers lead in aircraft advancement. We are well positioned to continue the production of true national wealth through aeronautics. More than the production of national wealth, our way of life and our form of government depend upon our leadership in aeronautics. The launch of Atlantis this week will not change this. The nation’s leading schools of aerospace engineering are currently experiencing unprecedented growth in student enrollment and increase in government and industry research funds. Outstanding faculty, useful facilitates, and a focus on quantum leap research problems covering the spectrum of aerospace science and technology characterize these leading US schools of aerospace science and engineering. The US is continuing to produce a aerospace workforce that is creative, innovative, well-educated, and prepared to maintain and to enhance America’s leadership in aerospace.
Over the last several decades since the Apollo program landed a human on the moon, NASA has produced more than the shuttle fleet. NASA has been the leader in the federal government in building a foundation that is alive and well, a foundation that enables American leadership in aerospace science and technology. The final Atlantis shuttle flight opens the door for continued growth in aerospace. We are just beginning our discovery in space and advances in aeronautics. America’s creativity, innovation, industry, and universities form a foundation that will propel us to higher level of achievement in aerospace. The post Atlantis world calls for more leadership, discovery, innovation, and creativity from NASA, not less.
Space shuttle ending won’t have a lasting effect on space leadership. Singla 7/8 (Vinita Singla, July 8, 2011, “NASA Takes a New Route in Space Leadership”, CNBC, http://www.cnbc.com/id/43470129/NASA_Takes_a_New_Route_in_Space_Leadership, DMintz)
The end of NASA’s space shuttle program will limit U.S. manned flight in the short term but is unlikely to threaten the country's long-term competitiveness in the space sector.Washington is actively promoting the privatization of lower orbital space flight as it redirects billions of dollars on next generation projects to explore deep, or outer, space, while counting on a continuation of international cooperation on big-budget, R&D projects as the International Space Station, or ISS."NASA feels strongly that it is time to do things differently and get out of owning and operating low-Earth orbit transportation and hand that off to the private sector," says NASA spokesperson Stephanie Schierholz. "As we move forward, we will continue the United States' leadership in space and derive all the benefits that flow from it. Tomorrow's space program is taking shape right now."President Obama is an outspoken booster of the space program and supports a 2011 NASA budget close to its 2010 level; he has challenged NASA to duplicate past glory and prowess by exploring deep space and reaching Mars by the 2030s.Current U.S. space spending, including the proposed $19 billion NASA budget, dwarfs that of other countries. At the same time, however, existing and potential rivals such as Russia, China, India and the U.K. are ratcheting up spending as America's budget flattens.That disparity is causing concern in some quarters, as is other countries' willingness to share technology and an over-reliance on the privatization strategy.For one, skeptics point out that it will be several years before the private sector has built a craft capable of taking U.S. astronauts to the ISS. In the meantime, the U.S. will pay for rides on Russia's Soyuz craft, as it has been doing since 2009."We will be buying seats on Soyuz and are temporarily out of competition. Down the line when new technologies and new spacecraft are approved and implemented we could conceivably jump ahead again," says Janet Stevens of the Space Foundation. “From a national pride perspective, it’s a blow."NASA's position on the space station transportation issue is simply that the U.S. needs to stop "outsourcing this work to foreign governments," says Schierholz.Contracts between NASA and private companies are already in place.SpaceX, for instance, is building a manned spacecraft called Dragon Capsule and has a $1.6 billion deal for 12 ISS missions, while Orbital Sciences [ORB 16.97 -0.34 (-1.96%) ]has a $1.9 billion contract for eight ISS flights. Other companies are also in the mix. Obama says the competition between corporations will drive safety standards, innovations and lower transportation costs.Again, critics disagree.
America will hold its space leadership—moon landing sealed it. Wu 7/8- a member of the Space and on the House Committee on Science, Space, and Technology (David Wu, July 8, 2011, “Pursuing the next giant leap in space exploration”, The Hill, http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/technology/170401-pursuing-the-next-giant-leap-in-space-exploration-, DMintz)
America’s founders were pioneers who risked everything to travel across unknown territories and oceans in pursuit of new frontiers. The generations of Americans who inherited this pioneering spirit embraced the idea that hard work and innovation make the impossible a reality: from establishing a lasting democracy out of a diverse people to landing a human being on the moon. Every day, thousands of visitors from across the globe walk the halls of the Smithsonian Air and Space Museum in Washington, DC to celebrate that very spirit. The museum not only provides young minds with a window into space exploration; it also inspires them to create broader vistas for themselves and for our nation.But our space heritage should not be condemned to surviving only in a museum. We must not only continue to educate and inspire future generations with the great space achievements of the past. We must set new national goals for future achievements in human space exploration.In 1960, Americans were worried about Russians winning the space race. The implications of Russian dominance were not limited to control of space, but included potentially devastating effects on our economic and military competitiveness. But then-President Kennedy challenged the nation to "achiev[e] the goal, before this decade is out, of landing a man on the moon and returning him safely to the Earth." In 1969, the world watched the first human, an American, take that now famous one small step into history. The moon landing not only sealed American leadership in space, but also unleashed a generation of mathematicians, scientists, and engineers who saw firsthand the results of American ingenuity and launched our nation into an era of unparalleled economic prosperity.In a time of growing debt, people question the value of taxpayer funded federal research. I passionately believe that federal investment in research and development grows our economy, creates jobs and shrinks the federal deficit. Economists say that between 65 and 90 percent of growth in U.S. per-capita income stems from innovation, defined broadly as new products, processes and business models. But we face increased international competition from countries that are investing more in science, technology and education than we are. If we are to once again have a stable economy, we must rededicate ourselves to the investments that make us strong: small business, education, and research and development. Research and development at NASA have resulted in an array of successful products and technologies that touch our daily lives, including heart rate monitors, wireless headsets, and water purification systems. In short, NASA's space program has helped our country become an economic powerhouse. Governments have an important and appropriate role to play in growing our science and technology capabilities and fostering innovation in our economy. The end of NASA’s shuttle program should not mean the end of our national commitment to exploration, innovation, research and education. While the program has not been without its shortfalls, the privatization of human space flight is simply too risky for an enterprise of national significance. There is certainly a place for the private sector in space flight. Where a market exists or can be created, such as carrying cargo or launching satellites, the private sector can and should predominate. But by privatizing all of current human space flight, we are jeopardizing our nation's leadership in space exploration and we are jeopardizing our children's future. Few people realize that the innovations that brought us vehicles capable of launching into space and returning safely were breakthroughs on par with the microchip: breakthroughs that are not likely to be equaled for a long time. Despite human sacrifices and budget pitfalls, the shuttle program established the United States as the leader in space exploration. It encouraged us to reach for the stars in both our dreams and our actions. It drove innovation and it challenged us to find creative solutions to technological challenges. As we move to the next chapter, it is imperative that we maintain a national role in space exploration. Our children deserve to live in a nation with a vision of the future that matches the dreams of our forbears: a vision that sees a solution to every problem, even if it lies beyond the stars.
This is only a transition; Bolden confirms space leadership is still ours. Sulkowicz 7/11-NYU Professor (Kerry Sulkowicz, July 11, 2011, “Saying good bye to the last space shuttle”, Washington Post, http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/saying-good-bye-to-the-last-space-shuttle/2011/07/11/gIQAzH7E9H_story.html, DMintz)
In a speech delivered to the National Press Club on July 1, Bolden did what a good leader should do under such circumstances: He made an emotional connection to his people, was honest about the facts, acknowledged the loss they’ve just experienced while putting it into larger context, and painted a vision that realistically yet reassuringly connects the past with the future.Bolden, himself a retired Marine Corps major general and a four-time shuttle flight veteran, has instant credibility with NASA's employees. And in his speech to the National Press Club, he drew on his own career to establish that emotional connection. “I spent 14 years at NASA before leaving and then returning to head the agency. Some of the people I respect most in the world are my fellow astronauts. Some of my best friends died flying on the shuttle. I'm not about to let human spaceflight go away on my watch. I'm not going to let it flounder because we pursued a path that we couldn't sustain.”Early in his remarks, he addressed head-on the concern that last week’s final shuttle flight marks the end of America’s dominance of spaceflight. Naysayers, he said, “must be living on another planet.” While he didn’t dwell on the sense of loss that some NASA employees must be feeling, he did add, “We are not ending human space flight, we are recommitting ourselves to it and taking the necessary – and difficult – steps today to ensure America’s pre-eminence in human space exploration for years to come.”
---Mars Advantage
Ext. 1NC 2 – No Life on MarsNASA confirms no life on Mars – water doesn’t mean there is lifeMoskowitz 10 (Clara, Senior Writer for Space.com, “NASA: Claims of Life on Mars 'Positively False'”, April 29th, 2010, http://www.space.com/8316-nasa-claims-life-mars-positively-false.html // Vish)
Despite recent media reports that NASA found evidence for life on Mars, the U.S. space agency says proof that we are not alone is still a ways off. A Wednesday article in the U.K.'s "The Sun" newspaper entitled, "NASA: Evidence of Life on Mars," reported that they agency had unveiled "compelling evidence" for Martian organisms. But NASA officials and veteran Mars mission scientists say "no." "This headline is extremely misleading," said Dwayne Brown, a spokesman for NASA based at the agency's headquarters in Washington, D.C. "This makes it sound like we announced that we found life on Mars, and that is absolutely, positively false." The piece claimed that the Mars Exploration Rovers Spirit and Opportunity, which have been wheeling around the surface of the red planet since January 2004, found pond scum, which the paper calls "the building blocks of life as we know it." "I think they have taken this stuff out of context," Brown said. Such a discovery would truly have been groundbreaking, since pond scum, scientifically known as cyanobacteria, are actually a form of life themselves, not just building blocks for it. "I can only assume that the Sun reporter misunderstood," said Cornell University planetary scientist Steve Squyres, principal investigator of the Mars Exploration Rover project, who was quoted in the story. "What Spirit and Opportunity have found is sulfate minerals... not organic materials, not pond scum, and not the building blocks of life as we know it. Water = life? The article, which has been widely quoted across the Web, appeared after NASA scientists spoke to reporters from an astrobiology conference celebrating the 50th anniversary of research aimed toward searching for life beyond Earth. The piece claims, "The recent missions have gathered evidence of sulphates on Mars, a strong indication there is water on the planet and therefore life." But just because there might be water does not mean that life follows. "Evidence of water does NOT mean that there was life," Squyres wrote in an e-mail. "We believe that water is necessary for life, but not that it is sufficient to assure life. The "...and therefore life" part of the statement therefore is simply wrong." While scientists have not yet discovered proof of living things anywhere in the universe beyond Earth, they are getting closer to knowing where to look and how to recognize the signs of life if they are present. And Brown said that NASA's various Mars missions, including the rovers and spacecraft such as the Mars Reconnaissance Orbiter and the 2001 Mars Odyssey ? both currently in orbit around the red planet ? are revealing a wealth of clues about the possibility of life there. It's just too soon to know for certain. Past life controversies Claims of finding life on Mars are not new. In August 1996 NASA researchers presented a Martian rock that they said showed clear signs of being affected by life. The rock, which had landed in Antarctica, contained holes and markings that appeared to have been formed by bacterial colonies living on it. The announcement made a huge splash, but in the decade that followed, most researchers have dismissed the claims of life, and found non-living explanations for the rock's markings. There has likewise been controversy over pronouncements that Mars could not possibly harbor life. In 1976, NASA's Viking 1 and 2 landers touched down on the Martian surface and performed three separate experiments to search for signs of life. Despite having sensitivities to detect organic molecules of a few parts per billion, no organic compounds were ever detected by either lander. Many scientists declared that Mars therefore must not have microbial organisms on its surface. Yet a more recent study found that perhaps the Viking experiments were not so sensitive after all, and cast doubt on the conclusion that microbes aren't there. Besides Mars, some particularly promising spots in the solar system include the Saturnian moons Titan ? with its lakes of methane and ethane ? and Enceladus, with its plumes of water vapor, and Jupiter's moon Europa, which is thought to harbor an underground ocean.
Ext. 1NC 3 – Squo SolvesHere’s the card – it’s highlighted to show how the evidence says we are committed to SLS in the status quo and that will solveThompson 11-Chief Financial Officer (Loren Thompson, April 2011, “Human Spaceflight”, Lexington Institute, http://www.lexingtoninstitute.org/library/resources/documents/Defense/HumanSpaceflight-Mars.pdf, DMintz)
By that time, though, President George W. Bush had articulated a new “Vision for Space Exploration” that proposed to return to the use of expendable launchers as the principal means of lofting humans into space. Efforts to develop a reusable successor to the Space Shuttle had encountered technical challenges that made traditional launch concepts the only feasible way of supplying the space station and continuing the human spaceflight program once the Shuttle fleet was retired around 2010. Bush’s vision evolved into a program called Constellation , which funded a new heavy-lift launch vehicle and crew capsule that could return humans to the Moon and then provide the basis for a manned mission to Mars. However, a presidential commission reported in 2009 (shortly after Bush left office) that the Constellation program was under- funded and therefore could not meet its intended goals . The two most pressing elements in any human spaceflight architecture are a new heavy-lift launch system and a multi-purpose crew vehicle suitable for exploration of deep space. Congress has directed that, to the maximum degree possible, NASA should leverage technologies and capabilities of the Ares man-rated launch system and Orion crew capsule that were part of the canceled Constellation program in implementing NASA’s revised human spaceflight plans. That approach will take advantage of investments already made in new technology while causing the least disruption to the nation’s highly specialized space workforce and infrastructure. Leveraging the state-of-the-art Ares and Orion systems provides the foundational capability required for the heavy-lift launch system now referred to as the Space Launch System (SLS) and the crew vehicl e, officially designated the Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle (MPCV). As the stepping-stone approach to Mars advances, both the propulsion system and the crew vehicle will be continuously enhanced to the point where a manned mission to Mars is feasible . By establishing Mars as the defining mission -- with SLS and MPCV as the foundational transport elements -- the stepping-stone approach can identify the intermediate missions and the incremental capabilities required to accomplish each new milestone. NASA and industry thus will understand technology gaps against which development roadmaps can be created, including “on-ramps” for technology breakthroughs and “off-ramps” for technology mis-steps. This will provide the space community with a stable and predictable future to ensure the necessary workforce is maintained, challenged and matured. Once the human spaceflight program moves beyond low-earth orbital missions, astronauts will also require new “extravehicular activity” (EVA) spacesuits and modules, and various robotic systems to assist them in space. The advanced cryogenic propulsion stage developed under the Ares upper-stage contract will be needed if NASA elects to return to the Moon, and a deep-space habitat will have to be developed if it elects to visit near-Earth asteroids In the near term, though, NASA’s human spaceflight budget will be dominated by spending for the Space Launch System and Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle. Those investments are essential requirements for continuation of the human spaceflight program , no matter what its planned objectives are. If Mars is to be the ultimate goal, then both systems must be developed with sufficient growth potential to evolve beyond their baseline configurations. For instance, the launcher may initially be able to loft a 130 metric-ton payload into orbit and 50 metric tons to fast-enough velocity to escape Earth’s gravity well, but eventually technology advances will be needed so that more challenging deep-space destinations can be reached. It will take some time for NASA to sort out its technology options and organize a development strategy that fits within projected budgets. The most important thing it must do in framing that strategy is to offer the public a vision of what human spaceflight can achieve if put on a stable course. The key to making that vision viable and sustainable is to provide a pathway to Mars -- the most Earth-like
object in the reachable universe beyond our own planet, and the only planet that might one day host a self-sustaining human colony.
---Leadership Advantage
Ext. 1NC 2 – Aff Kills CoopNo chance of international cooperation in spaceVincent G. Sabathier and Ryan Faith ‘6 - Vincent G. Sabathier is a senior fellow and director of the Human Space Exploration Initiative at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C, a senior associate with the CSIS Technology and Public Policy Program, from 2004-2009 he was senior fellow and director for space initiatives at CSIS. He is also senior adviser to the SAFRAN group and consults internationally on aerospace and telecommunications. Ryan Faith is program manager for the Human Space Exploration Initiative at CSIS. “U.S. Leadership, International Cooperation, and Space Exploration” 4/26 Published by the CSIS csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/060426_us_space_leadership.pdfThe environment for civil space is indeed more complex today than ever. Civil space activities have now reached “global status.” In the world of nuclear proliferation, initially only 5 nations, China, France, the UK, the United States, and the former USSR, had nuclear weapons and were able to discuss the topic behind closed doors. Now, there are more than 10 nations with the technology base needed to make and deliver nuclear warheads over thousands of miles. This new situation is completely different, and nuclear proliferation is difficult to control. The situation is wellknown and understood even if it is difficult to manage. The same situation has occurred with space technology, though this situation is much less well-known and understood—which is strange, as rocket technology is missile technology. The UN Office of Outer Space Affairs in Vienna has only been able to generate progress on the issue of space debris, and there is still no international forum to discuss other space issues. The lack of international cooperation o n critical issues arises largely from the view shared by many states that space is a strategic high ground . As such, countries are reluctant to engage with each other, fearing that their respective asymmetric advantages in space exploration might be eliminated or exploited . Whereas, in the 1950s and the 1960s, there were 2 main actors in space, there are currently 6 nations with full space capabilities and many more, such as Israel, Ukraine, Brazil, Pakistan, and Korea, with partial capabilities.
Ext. 1NC 3 – No CoopThe lack of a cooperation plank in the plan means they are likely to inhibit cooperation.Faith, 10 - independent technology consultant and Adjunct Fellow for Space Initiatives at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, (April 26, G. Ryan, “President Obama’s Vision for Space Exploration (part 2)”, “The Space Review”, http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1616/1)Further, by cooperating with the State Department, NASA could provide the United States government with a valuable and visible soft-power tool, broadening the political support for space exploration within the US. Granted, this could be rather more difficult than would be the case in something more concrete like the ISS or the establishment of a lunar base, owing to the inherent vagueness of the proposed Flexible Path architecture framework. President Obama did (and still does) have the opportunity to engage foreign leadership at the highest levels to pursue international cooperation , as President Reagan did with his Space Station Freedom project. However, having failed to include strong international language in the rollout of his proposal, and having lost the opportunity for engagement during the rollout of his policy, current trends suggest that it is unlikely that the President Obama will pursue cooperation at this level in the near future .
Obama won’t pursue international cooperationG. Ryan Faith ’10 G. Ryan Faith is an independent technology consultant and Adjunct Fellow for Space Initiatives at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, (CSIS). “President Obama’s Vision for Space Exploration (part 2)” 4/26 http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1616/1Although neither President Bush’s nor President Obama’s plan for space exploration particularly emphasized international cooperation, a cooperative approach could potentially yield greater political and budgetary sustainability, albeit at the risk of higher global project costs. In examining the programmatic tradeoffs associated with international cooperation, it is important to recognize that items which are contributed or procured by other partner nations are subject to different political trends, election cycles, and budgeting constraints, which in and of itself acts as a form of political and budgetary risk portfolio diversification. In addition to moving specific programs out of the purview of the American political cycle, international cooperation makes the decision to cancel a major program, such as the International Space Station, a potential diplomatic liability, strengthening the political safety of American programs involving foreign partners. Further, by cooperating with the State Department, NASA could provide the United States government with a valuable and visible soft-power tool, broadening the political support for space exploration within the US. Granted, this could be rather more difficult than would be the case in something more concrete like the ISS or the establishment of a lunar base, owing to the inherent vagueness of the proposed Flexible Path architecture framework. President Obama did (and still does) have the opportunity to engage foreign leadership at the highest levels to pursue international cooperation, as President Reagan did with his Space Station Freedom project. However, having failed to include strong international language in the rollout of his proposal, and having lost the opportunity for engagement during the rollout of his policy, current trends suggest that it is unlikely that the President Obama will pursue cooperation at this level in the near future.
Space cooperation doesn’t affect relations and escalates costsOberg, 9 - 22-year veteran of NASA mission control. He is now a writer and consultant in Houston (James, “The problems with “The Future of Human Spaceflight”,” The Space Review, 1/5, http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1278/1)One significant contribution to this cosmonautical cornucopia comes from the MIT Space, Policy, and Society Research Group, titled “The Future of Human Spaceflight”. With an impressive list of contributors and coordinated by lead author David Mindell, the 15-page report is a preview of some much longer treatments to be published in coming months. There is a lot to like in this report. It stresses the need for both basic science research in space and technology development to lay groundwork for future capabilities for more ambitious goals. Its attempt to define a logical metric of “goodness” for space policy vis-à-vis well-defined goals is a worthy effort. Both its broad perspectives and some specific recommendations are of great value. But on the bigger policy picture, it promotes some non-historic and deeply troubling myths of space policy that have led to grief in the past and, if accepted for future decisions, could serve as a roadmap for frustration and disaster. First, it falls for the classic wish-fulfillment fantasy that playing nice together in space— forming partnerships on significant space projects — can actually compel terrestrial nations to become more friendly to each other despite deep-seated conflicting goals. Second, the report promotes the view that the cost of large space projects can only be afforded if they are shared by an international alliance—contrary to all experience, including that of the ISS, that splitting national responsibilities for integrated projects makes them more expensive, not less. And thirdly, it promotes a dangerously diversionary and dead-ended theory for the root cause of space disasters such as the loss of the shuttle Columbia and its crew: that there was just not enough money, a factor that can easily be fixed by budgetary largesse. Using such views as foundations for policy decisions in the coming years can only result in more waste, more losses, and a lot more tears. There are also lesser issues, which can be dealt with in a follow-on review. Fundamentally, the sense of the report remains torn between opposing goals: using space in the “best interest of the United States”, and using space in the best interests of the world as a whole. While not a zero-sum game, “space leadership” does tend to benefit those who have it over those who do not, mainly in curtailing options to the secondary players and compelling dependent status on them for important space functions (think GPS). And while selling a policy aimed at benefiting the paying country (the US) may have domestic political value, too nationalistic a sales job at home could make selling it to potential partners more awkward. Internationalism does appear to be the report’s preference, and in particular, expanded national partnerships on joint projects. But to argue for this strategy, the report utilizes some highly questionable “history” when it asserts: “Human spaceflight is sufficiently difficult and expensive that international collaboration may be the only way to accomplish certain goals… International partnerships in human spaceflight represent the best use of science and technology to… bring nations together around common values,
hence they are a primary objective.” This statement is not a conclusion of analysis, but is a simple declarative fiat, a strategy not chosen on any rational balancing of plus and minus arguments. It represents dogma, not debate, so as a foundation for future space policy decisions, it has no more gravitas than any whim or wish of past policy proposals. This is worrisome because the stated historical background to this view is slanted. The example given, Apollo -Soyuz, allegedly occurred “at a time of tension between the nations”, but was “an effective instrument of global diplomacy.” This interpretation is, at best, silly , and at worst, 180 degrees away from reality. The Apollo- Soyuz followed, and did not cause, a period of US-Soviet diplomatic relaxation, and even as the mission occurred in mid-1975 the world was moving into renewed tensions over Soviet military adventurism in Africa and Afghanistan. Moves that led even a president such as Jimmy Carter (who had started out warning against “an inordinate fear of communism”) ordering that ASTP follow-on missions such as a Shuttle-Salyut docking be rejected. Diplomatic tensions ultimately faded, and Russian joined the existing International Space Station partnership, not because of any symbolic space feel-goodness but only after a fundamental shift in the Moscow regime . It’s not surprising that NASA likes to boast of how Apollo-Soyuz laid the groundwork for ending the Cold War (see “The real lessons of international cooperation in space”, The Space Review, July 18, 2005). Every rooster likes to think it brings
the sun up; every robin enjoys the idea that its song brings the spring. Delusional self-aggrandizement such as these words from a NASA astronaut in 1998 after his third visit to the Mir space station typify the mindset: So I just think that the fact that we’re cooperating with so many countries, eventually perhaps on the new Space Station, it will provide the psychological impetus for politicians to force themselves to find an agreement to disputes that otherwise they wouldn’t, because they’ll look up there and say, “Well, we have an investment in that, too. We have to keep this relationship going in a proper direction,” rather than doing something rash. So I think it’s the right way to do business. The man was a highly competent astronaut and totally trustworthy at the controls of the space shuttle. But to allow him and those who think like him anywhere near the controls of diplomacy would be an enormous mistake.
Ext. 1NC 4 - RollbackInternal NASA tradeoffs prevent solvencySterner, 10 – fellow at the George C. Marshall Institute, national security and aerospace consultant in Washington, DC. He has held senior Congressional staff positions as the lead Professional Staff Member for defense policy on the House Armed Services Committee (Eric, “Worthy of a Great Nation? NASA’s Change of Strategic Direction,” April,http://www.marshall.org/pdf/materials/797.pdf)Strategic Failure. Every few years the American civil space program faces a crisis of confidence. In 1990, Norm Augustine, in a role to which he has surely become accustomed, led a committee that studied the future of the U.S. space program. It identified a range of general concerns with the space program. Most notable at this time, it concluded: “[A]ny program that involves goals demanding 5, 10, or even 30 years for their achievement must enjoy a solid underpinning of broad, enduring support. The alternative is to suffer through a prolonged sequence of projects that are started, stopped, and restarted, only to be modified again and again.”34 After Columbia, and the Accident Investigation Board’s recommendation to refocus NASA programs, the Bush administration proposed a Vision for Space Exploration to return people to the moon, this time to stay, before going on to Mars. For seven years, a bipartisan consensus supported that program, but failed to adequately fund it. Rather than fixing the funding problem, the Obama administration proposes to destroy that consensus.More than anything, the administration’s budget request represents a change of strategic direction, away from a focused program of exploration in which the government opens frontiers and enables the private sector to follow, towards an unstructured program intended to help tomorrow’s leaders make decisions about the future of the space program. In many ways, it marks a return to the NASA that existed in 2003, when the space shuttle Columbia was lost, minus, of course, the space shuttle and with the addition of an as yet unfocused technology program. As such, it is vulnerable to the very structural flaws in the civil program that contributed to the loss of Columbia. The administration risks recreating the competition for resources in service of diverse constituencies and missions that the Columbia Accident Investigation Board flagged as an inherent problem for the agency. Not surprisingly, the CAIB’s finding was not new, but has plagued the agency since the Apollo program ended. The 1990 Augustine Committee noted then, “NASA is oversubscribed in terms of the projects it is pursuing, given its financial and personnel resources and the time allotted to pursue them….the consequence is clear: too many projects are initiated, resource shortages appear, and margins, if ever any were present in the first place, are inexorably eroded until little or no management latitude remains.”35 Arguably, this problem continued to afflict the agency after the VSE was announced. Nevertheless, it is one that the Obama administration’s plans will exacerbate. Therein lies the fundamental problem with the administration’s proposed changes to the exploration program. As desirable as the administration’s technology initiative and commitment to space commercialization are in isolation, they are not substitutes for focus and direction when considered in the context of vague destinations or an industry still in its infancy.
Funding Constellation would require the NASA to end participation in the ISS.Chyba 11 (Christopher F. Chyba, Professor of Astrophysics and International Affairs and Director, Program on Science and Global Security Princeton University, “Space Program and National Imperatives” Testimony before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation, Science and Space Subcommittee. May 18, 2011. Accessed on Proquest Congressional 6/22/11.)Fourth and finally, the Committee report called for budget and schedule reality. The report argued that the budget then foreseen for human spaceflight $99 billion over ten years would not allow NASA to do anything beyond low-Earth orbit . NASA could afford to pay for the new rockets and crew vehicle that would replace the space shuttle and make it possible to journey outward, but not for systems to land on the Moon or for operations on a path to take astronauts to asteroids or to fly around Mars. The report suggested that in order to do both to develop the new systems and to fly them to destinations beyond low-Earth orbit would require an increase in NASA's budget of around $3 billion per year. A problem forever confronting NASA is that it seemingly can have either the budget to develop a new human spaceflight architecture, or it can have the budget for ongoing astronaut operations but not both. To afford to develop a major new launch system, NASA has to stop flying. This is the current budget dilemma in a nutshell, and the ultimate reason for the upcoming "gap" in U.S. launch access to the ISS. Indeed, to develop Constellation, NASA planned both to stop flying the Shuttle and to terminate the ISS.
Constellation tradesoff with space sciencePelton, 10 - Space & Advanced Communications Research Institute, George Washington University (Joseph, “A new space vision for NASA - And for space entrepreneurs too?,” Space Policy, May, Science Direct)With much less invested in a questionable Project Constellation enterprise we can do much more in space astronomy. We can invest more wisely in space science to learn more about the Sun, the Earth and threats from Near Earth Objects. David Thompson, Chairman and CEO of Orbital Sciences said the following in a speech that endorsed the new commercial thrust of the NASA space policies on Nine February 2010:“Let us, the commercial space industry, develop the space taxis we need to get our Astronauts into orbit and to ferry those wanting to go into space to get to where they want to go. We are in danger of falling behind in many critical areas of space unless we shift our priorities” [10].
With a change in priorities we can deploy far more spacecraft needed to address the problems of climate change via better Earth observation systems. We can fund competitions and challenges to spur space entrepreneurs to find cheaper and better ways to send people into space. We can also spur the development of solar power satellites to get clean energy from the sun with greater efficiency. We can deal more effectively with finding and coping with “killer” asteroids and near earth objects. We may even find truly new and visionary ways to get people into space with a minimum of pollution and promote the development of cleaner and faster hypersonic transport to cope with future transportation needs.
New space missions tradeoff with NASA’s launch developmentChyba, 11 – professor of astrophysical sciences and international affairs at Princeton University (Christopher, “Contributions of Space to National Imperatives”, Senate Testimony, 5/17, http://commerce.senate.gov/public/?a=Files.Serve&File_id=c0c83770-946d-4be9-9c84-75d14e992c21A problem forever confronting NASA is that it seemingly can have either the budget to develop a new human spaceflight architecture, or it can have the budget for ongoing astronaut operations—but not both. To afford to develop a major new launch system, NASA has to stop flying. This is the current budget dilemma in a nutshell, and the ultimate reason for the upcoming “gap” in U.S. launch access to the ISS. Indeed, to develop Constellation, NASA planned both to stop flying the Shuttle and to terminate the ISS.
Sending humans beyond low earth orbit will cost 3 billion a year minimumChyba, 11 – professor of astrophysical sciences and international affairs at Princeton University (Christopher, “Contributions of Space to National Imperatives”, Senate Testimony, 5/17, http://commerce.senate.gov/public/?a=Files.Serve&File_id=c0c83770-946d-4be9-9c84-75d14e992c21Fourth and finally, the Committee report called for budget and schedule reality. The report argued that the budget then foreseen for human spaceflight—$99 billion over ten years—would not allow NASA to do anything beyond low-Earth orbit. NASA could afford to pay for the new rockets and crew vehicle that would replace the space shuttle and make it possible to journey outward, but not for systems to land on the Moon or for operations on a path to take astronauts to asteroids or to fly around Mars. The report suggested that in order to do both—to develop the new systems and to fly them to destinations beyond low-Earth orbit—would require an increase in NASA’s budget of around $3 billion per year.
Ext. 1NC 5 – Can’t Solve LeadershipConstellation won’t restore space leadership.Handberg 11, Professor and Chair of the Department of Political Science at the University of Central Florida, 11 (April 25, Roger, “Post-Constellation blues”, “The Space Review”, http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1620/2)Taking another pathway to the future is disturbing when you have a particular model of how to do human exploration in your head.What is happening now is that the U nited S tates is being forced to adapt to a situation where it no longer dominates events at least until the United States returns to routine human spaceflight . The reality, not always understood, is that this situation would have arisen even if the Constellation program continued on its projected, albeit delayed, path. Regardless of President Obama’s
choices, the US confronted a new situation due to the Constellation program’s failure to keep on track and on budget. Advocates ignore the reality that the bulk of Congress is not terribly driven or excited about the space program because its linkages to their constituents are not concrete and immediate . As a general proposition, most would support an American space program, but the reality is that support is not strong enough to drive them to significantly increase NASA’s budget without some greater sense of where the program is going. Prematurely killing the ISS was a perplexing decision from their perspective since NASA seemed to be throwing away a generation of its work and saying, in effect, “Let’s start over.” The Vision for Space Exploration in one sense was a clean-sheet concept despite the obvious carry forward aspects of the Apollo program, but Congress and the American people seem reluctant to start over without first exploiting what has taken several decades to build.
Ext. 1NC 7 – Space Coop FailsObama won’t pursue international cooperationG. Ryan Faith ’10 G. Ryan Faith is an independent technology consultant and Adjunct Fellow for Space Initiatives at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, (CSIS). “President Obama’s Vision for Space Exploration (part 2)” 4/26 http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1616/1
Essentially, President Obama’s plan resets NASA to the period immediately following the unveiling of President Bush’s Vision for Space Exploration in 2004, walking back from most of the major elements of the ESAS architecture developed by the previous NASA administrator, Michael Griffin. As stated earlier, the merit of resetting the ESAS architecture and discarding most of the Constellation program will doubtless provide the fodder for many heated space policy debates in future. Likewise, neither this nor the previous presidential plan seemed to be particularly interested in learning how to most effectively leverage international cooperation to help NASA meet its exploration objectives.
AT: ISS cooperationThe US won’t pull out of the space station.Mahoney 10, served as a spaceflight instructor at the Johnson Space Center and is now a freelance writer, 10 (March 29, Bob, “Prognosticating NASA’s future”, “The Space Review”, http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1594/1) The fact that the I nternational S pace S tation has been designated a national laboratory by Congress is a strong indicator that we’re going to maximize our nation’s return on its substantial investment. While it may not be as politically secure an institution as Lawrence Livermore or White Sands (no Congressional districts cover LEO), I’d say the chances of shutting it down prematurely (i.e., while it still functions adequately) are sli m . If the next administration elected in 2012 or 2016 (or the current administration, changing its policy) redirects NASA to concentrate wholly on BEO operations, all NASA participation in the ISS may be pulled. This does not, however, rule out continued US commercial participation or ongoing participation by other US government entities, such as the National Institutes of Health or the National Academy of Sciences. The premise of NASA using the space station for BEO research (B3) isn’t too far-fetched, but don’t expect ISS to become a staging depot for missions beyond. Its high-inclination orbit (which accommodates Russia as a partner) is not particularly good energy- and phasing-wise for getting elsewhere in the solar system. Possible, but trouble enough to suggest that once NASA starts flying again beyond Earth orbit they’ll seek other avenues. Besides, by the likely time we’d ever be ready to head further out, portions of ISS would be at least 20 to 30 years old. Staging lunar return or a future Mars mission from ISS circa 2018 or later would be like servicing a Prius in a 1950s farm shed. So, at a minimum, we should expect US government participation in the ISS to continue for at least the next four years , more likely the next six to ten, hardware permitting . (Private industry research will likely trickle along as well.) Of course, we can never forget that the Apollo program, with paid-for hardware already delivered, was cancelled even as the NASA team was hitting its stride in terms of maximizing scientific return. Hopefully that penny-wise and pound-foolish memory will lessen the chance of repeating such a scenario with our unique and paid-for orbiting research facility.
-China Cooperation
Ext. Coop Doesn’t SolveCooperation with China costs more and is less efficient. Seedhouse, Aerospace research scientist and Astronaut Training Consultant, 10 [ Dr. Erik Seedhouse, “The New Space Race, China Vs. the United States,” p. 212 accessed June 23, 2011, BJM]
The prohibitive cost of collaboration There are space experts who argue that international cooperation is essential in maintaining a space exploration program and, by collaborating with China, the US will surely save time and money in pursuing the VSE’s goals. In reality, the US is already locked into partnerships with more than a dozen nations as a part of the ISS program, including most of Europe. Washington has learned from bitter experience that major international projects almost always end up costing more, taking longer, and delivering less than a national program. While many observers have extolled the benefits of US-Russian cooperation during the ISS program, in reality, the venture was a disaster. First, because Russian hardware was years late in delivery, NASA’s costs spiraled out of control. Second, the situation was exacerbated by the billions of dollars wasted in redesigning integration hardware. Third, in exchange for just 5% of the financial contribution, Russia was granted 40% of the station’s facilities, in addition to making billions of dollars in foreign sales of space hardware! Not surprisingly, from a financial perspective, the US-Russian cooperation experience is one that the Americans will not want to repeat by collaborating with the Chinese.
China leadership inevitable – coop is impossible – plan wouldn’t happen fast enough to solveKeith Richburg
In December, China broke ground on what will be a 3,000-acre space launch center and theme park on southern Hainan Island, directly modeled on the Kennedy Space Center in Florida. When the center opens in 2014, members of the public will be able to watch launches live from a viewing platform. After struggling in space for several years, experts said China this year appears poised for several significant breakthroughs that could cement its place as a leader in space exploration. Last October, China launched a robotic probe, the Chang'e 2 lunar orbiter, which completed its six months' worth of tasks this spring. Because it still had fuel in reserve, the craft left its moon orbit last month for further exploration in space. This summer, China is scheduled to launch an unmanned space module, called Tiangong 1, or Heavenly Palace, and later this year will send up another unmanned vehicle, Shenzhou, which will try to dock with it. These will be crucial first steps in China's goal to develop a manned space station. The Obama administration has often expressed a desire to cooperate with China in space, but the idea has found little traction . Much of China's space program falls under the control of the military; details - including its funding - are kept secret, and China has shown little sign of wanting to open up. Also, U.S. restrictions on some sensitive high-technology exports to China make space cooperation difficult.
China will steal our techSeedhouse, Aerospace research scientist and Astronaut Training Consultant, 10 [ Dr. Erik Seedhouse, “The New Space Race, China Vs. the United States,” p. 213 accessed June 23, 2011, BJM]
Technology transfer China has a long history of acquiring technology by nefarious means. A good example is the launch of China’s lunar satellite, Chang’e, which appears to have been adapted from the design of DF H-3, a Chinese communications relay satellite. The DF H-3 was developed in record speed thanks to a large number of Western components used.2 These components included elements such as the Matra Marconi manufactured central processor, the infra-red Earth sensor built by Officine Galileo, and parts of the solar panel built by Messerschmitt-Boelkow-Blohm. When the Chinese decided to build the lunar probe, it simply adapted the Western DFH-3 components, enabling them to proceed quickly and reliably. More recently, the FBI, in conjunction with other US counter-espionage agencies, have tagged more than 100 people and companies allegedly involved in clandestine aerospace technology transfer benefitting China’s space program. For example, physicist Shu Quan-Sheng, a naturalized US citizen, was arrested on September 24th, 2008, on charges of illegally exporting space launch technical data and services, in addition to offering bribes to Chinese officials concerning the Long March (LM)5. Shu, a president of a NASA subcontractor, provided technical assistance and foreign technology acquisition expertise to several of China’s government entities involved in the design and development of the LM-5 space launch facility, an activity that the US alleges began in 2008.4 In another recent case, US citizen, Ping Cheng, and Singaporeans, Kok Tong Lim and Jian Wei Ding, were charged with conspiracy to violate export
administration regulations by attempting to illegally export high-modulus carbon fiber to China. The material, known as Toray M40 and Toray M60, is a corrosion-resistant material used for electromagnetic shielding in rockets and spacecraft.
China is actively developing counterspace technology, and despite rhetoric coming out of Beiing, they will not agree to space arms controlSeedhouse, Aerospace research scientist and Astronaut Training Consultant, 10 [ Dr. Erik Seedhouse, “The New Space Race, China Vs. the United States,” p. 113 accessed June 23, 2011, BJM]Consequences of counter-counterspace operations It would seem that America’s vast counter-counterspace capabilities mean China will likely lose any future conflict with the US, and lose badly. However, China’s ASAT test is not an anomaly, but an attempt to develop counterspace weapons capable of constraining America’s ability to exploit space in a conflict over Taiwan. Gradually, China’s counterspace programs will develop and diversify, as Beijing endeavors to negate the operational advantages of Washington’s space dominance. Regardless of whether Beijing’s counterspace enterprise succeeds or fails, certain consequences are inevitable. Perhaps the most significant outcome is the death of any agreement banning the deployment, testing, and deployment of space weapons. Given that counterspace operations represent the best chance China has of asymmetrically defeating American military power, there is no way Beijing will agree to space arms control, despite its rhetoric to the contrary. In the absence of such an agreement, Washington and Beijing will be free to embark upon the deployment of weapons in LEO, GEO, and all points in between, in an arms race in space that will put the civilian space race to the Moon in the shade.
Ext. Coop NowChina cooperation high now – recent meetings proveCheong 1/25 (Ching is a senior writer for the Strait Times, “A balancing act between two powers” 1/25/11 Lexis)
THE United States is willing to accommodate the rise of China - politically, economically and militarily - provided the process is peaceful and conducive to the US maintaining world leadership status. This is the most salient conclusion from the White House meeting between the presidents of China and the US last week. In other words, China will continue to accept US supremacy, in exchange for a more amicable global environment for its rise. At a joint press conference with his visiting Chinese counterpart Hu Jintao after their summit meeting, US President Barack Obama reminded China that it also has the US to thank for its rise. 'China's extraordinary economic growth... is a tribute to the Chinese people. But it's also thanks to decades of stability in Asia, made possible by America's forward presence in the region, by strong trade with America, and by an open international economic system championed by the United States of America,' he said. By stating this at the beginning of the press conference, Mr Obama made it clear that US policies can affect China's rise. In the US-China joint statement, the US reiterated that 'it welcomes a strong, prosperous and successful China playing a greater role in world affairs'. Mr Obama touched on this theme twice at the joint press conference. He defined two conditions for China's rise. First, it has to be peaceful . He said: 'We just want to make sure that the rise... occurs in a way that reinforces international norms and international rules, and enhances security and peace, as opposed to it being a source of conflict either in the region or around the world.' Second, it should tie in with US foreign objectives: The kind of partnership that Washington seeks with Beijing, according to Mr Obama, is one where China is a responsible actor on the world stage - a partner that ensures weapons of mass destruction do not fall into the wrong hands; a partner that helps deal with regional hot spots or issues like climate change. If China can accept these two conditions, the US would make life easier for its rival in every respect. Politically, China's core interests would be observed. The joint statement did not mention the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), one of the cornerstones of Washington's One China policy. Though Mr Obama referred to it at the press conference, the TRA has obviously been relegated to a less formal position. Similarly on human rights, a sensitive issue for China, the US is willing to accept, if not embrace, the Chinese position. 'China has a different political system than we do. China is at a different stage of development than we are. We come from very different cultures with very different histories,' Mr Obama noted. 'We believe part of human rights is people being able to make a living and having enough to eat and having shelter and having electricity,' he said. Observers pointed out that since China published its first White Paper on Human Rights in 1991, it has cited the ability to feed and clothe its people as its top contribution to human rights. It has also given reasons why freedom and democracy, as espoused by the West, are not for China. Two decades later, the US President seems to be echoing the same Chinese view of human rights. Economically, the US is willing to give China what it wants: recognition of its market economy, as well as a commensurate position in the world financial framework. In the joint statement, China 'welcomed the US' commitment to work towards China's market economy status (MES) in an expeditious manner'. Such efforts will go a long way towards removing trade impediments, and will greatly enhance the entry of Chinese products into the US market, as well as US high-tech imports into China. If the US takes the lead in granting MES to China, other Western developed countries will be compelled to follow suit. The joint statement also said the US 'supports China's efforts over time to promote inclusion of the renminbi in the Special Drawing Rights basket'. This satisfies China's quest to be accorded a position in the International Monetary Fund (IMF) commensurate with its economic might. China's voting rights in the IMF were raised recently. Militarily, the US is not going to edge China out. Both countries agreed to strengthen their military-to-military relationship and enhance cooperation on nuclear security, as well as deepen exchanges in the field of space, provided both sides establish mechanisms at all levels to avoid 'misunderstanding, misperception and miscalculation'. Bilateral relations aside, the US-China joint statement read like a laundry list of world issues, from saving the earth to space
cooperation, from fighting global security threats like terrorism and nuclear proliferation to defusing regional and local disputes such as those in North-east Asia and Sudan. All this shows that the US, after setting conditions for China's rise, is prepared psychologically to give China a greater presence on the world stage. Viewed this way, the presidential summit represented a delicate balancing act, showing how the two powers can achieve substantial benefits through cooperation.
Ext. Won’t CooperateChina is rapidly expanding into space now and is posed to rival the US in space capabilities – it rejects all cooperationDinerman, 7/7/11, Space Journalist and Senior Editor at the Hudson Institute, [“China's Continuing Drive For Space Power”, http://www.hudson-ny.org/2242/china-space-power, liam]Sometime between now and the end of this year, China plans to launch the first module of its new space station, confirming that China is determined to become a full-fledged, independent, comprehensive, world class power in outer space. China's methodical strategy of pursing mutually-supporting civil, commercial and military space activities is beginning to pay off. Space launch rockets can lift both civilian and military satellites; sensor technology can be adapted for both science and spying; communications systems are equally able to transmit orders to go to war or orders for children's toys. China's civil space projects include not only the space station and the manned Shenzhou capsules that will carry its Taikonauts to it and back, but also deep space probes such as the Chang'e 2 probe, which has now been dispatched from lunar orbit to a point almost a million miles from Earth. Its commercial activities until now have been limited to communications satellites and occasionally selling low-cost space launch services. US ITAR (International Trade in Armaments Regulations) technology export rules have, effectively prevented China from becoming a major player in the commercial space field. This has occurred in spite of efforts by some European aerospace firms to circumvent US restrictions by building so-called "ITAR Free" satellites. China's new comprehensive military space activities include intelligence gathering and early warning satellites, military communications satellites, a new space based navigation system similar to America's GPS. Last but not least, they have developed and tested a kinetic anti-satellite weapon that they used to blow up one of their old weather satellites in January 2007. Although in 1971, the devastating effects of Mao's Cultural Revolution were still all too evident, over the last 40 years China has changed out of all recognition. The country was impoverished, and its principal export a form of violent revolutionary ideology absorbed principally by gullible Western students, hippies and Intellectuals. In the late 1970s, China began slowly to dump most of Mao's ideology, and substitute Deng Xiaoping's concept: "To get rich is glorious." Today China exports, among other things; computers, solar panels, car parts, toys and a comprehensive array of semi-sophisticated weapons. It is the second-largest economy in the world, and has just overtaken the US as the world's largest energy user. There is, however, one policy from the Mao era that has not changed: China insists on maximizing its strategic independence. In his new book, "On China," Henry Kissinger explains that "The Chinese almost obsessive self-reliance was not always fully understood on the American side." This explains, in part, why US efforts to engage China in a mutually cooperative space exploration relationship, has been so frustrating and has lead nowhere. * * * Many Americans imagined that China would be eager to join the International Space Station partnership, along with Russia, Japan and Europe. Leaders at NASA and elsewhere imagined that China would see its role in the ISS partnership as a way of certifying its status as one of the world's primary spacefaring nations. Instead, China has chosen to build its own space program, on its own schedule. If China is using its space programs to bolster the political legitimacy of the ruling party, then it is certainly not the first, or the last, government to do so. What is more important than any propaganda dividend is the way China's overall technological level is enhanced by its successes in space. Space operations and exploration are inherently difficult: spacecraft must be able to operate with lack of atmosphere, lack of gravity, boiling heat, freezing cold and deadly radiation, and still perform their missions. Any nation that can master this can automatically master other strategically significant technologies – for instance, robotics, unmanned aircraft, communications and missile guidance, sensors. This ability, in turn, teaches China's aerospace engineers to do perhaps the hardest thing of all - to build software that can make a complex system work reliably under adverse circumstances. China's pursuit of what US space expert Dean Cheng of the Heritage Foundation calls "indigenous innovation" makes perfect sense from Beijing's point of view. The question for America is: Will we cling to our illusions about cooperation, or will we concentrate our efforts on building up our own native space power?
PLA control of China’s space program blocks cooperationMann, 7/10/11 [Simon, Sydney Morning Herald “Up, Up, And Away” http://www.smh.com.au/technology/sci-tech/up-up-and-away-20110709-1h7ze.html, liam]
''Many of us, including the President, including myself, including [NASA Administrator Charles] Bolden, believe that it's not too soon to have preliminary conversations about what involving China in that sort of co-operation might entail,'' Holdren told the committee. ''If China is going to be, by 2030, the biggest economy in the world … it could certainly be to our benefit to share the costs of such an expensive venture with them and with others.'' But the Republican-dominated committee, which characterised Beijing as a ''fundamentally evil'' regime, warned that any collaboration would violate US law. ''What concerns me most about the Chinese space program is that, unlike the US, it is being led by the People's Liberation Army,'' responded Virginia Republican Frank Wolf. ''There is no reason to believe that the PLA's space program will be any more benign than the PLA's recent military posture.'' Though well behind the US, Beijing is pushing an aggressive program to put an unmanned craft on the moon by 2013 and humans by 2020. It also aims to have its own space station orbiting Earth by as early as 2020. More immediately, China is launching a global navigational system for the Asia-Pacific region as a forerunner to delivering the satellite service globally in a direct challenge to America's global positioning system, technologies as vital for waging war as much as they are for managing traffic. Though Beijing's vaulting ambition rankles with some in Congress, Alanna Krolikowski, of George Washington University's Space Policy Institute, told the May hearing: ''As China invests in and derives greater benefit from space, it will acquire the same stake in creating a predictable, stable, safe and sustainable space environment that the US … and other countries already share.'' China's space ambitions ''are about prestige and about security and having a voice on the international stage'', says Ben Baseley-Walker, of the Secure World Foundation, which advocates for the peaceful development of space. He says the interest among many nations is opening myriad partnership possibilities. ''The US is no longer the one-stop shop if you want to get into space. There are other options, and I think that has shifted the power balance in how things are done. It's no longer the Americans and the Russians saying, 'This is the way it has to be'. It's more nuanced than that and it's very much in a state of flux.''
Ext. Kills HegSino-US space cooperation undermines US hegCheng 9 – Research Fellow in Chinese Political and Security Affairs in the Asian Studies Center at The Heritage Foundation (October 30, 2009, Dean Cheng, “U.S.-China Space Cooperation: More Costs Than Benefits,” http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2009/10/us-china-space-cooperation-more-costs-than-benefits)With the delivery of the full report from the U.S. Human Space Flight Review Committee (commonly referred to as the Augustine Report), the potential for a substantial, multi-year gap in U.S. manned spaceflight capability has drawn increased attention. In light of this problem, the idea has been raised in some quarters, including in the report, that the United States should expand its cooperation with the People's Republic of China (PRC) and leverage Chinese space capabilities. Such cooperation has far more potential cost than benefit. Very Real Problems The idea of relying on Chinese cooperation glosses over very real problems . At a minimum, it is an open question whether the PRC is capable of providing substantial support to the International Space Station (ISS) in the timeframes discussed by the report. It is important to recall that the PRC has had only three manned missions and has never undertaken a manned docking maneuver. Would the U.S. and its partners be comfortable inviting a neophyte Chinese crew to dock with the ISS? Beyond the technical issues, however, there are more fundamental political concerns that must be addressed. The U.S. military depends on space as a strategic high ground. Space technology is also dual-use in nature : Almost any technology or information that is exchanged in a cooperative venture is likely to have military utility . Sharing such information with China , therefore, would undercut American tactical and technological military advantages. Moreover, Beijing is likely to extract a price in exchange for such cooperation. The Chinese leadership has placed a consistent emphasis on developing its space capabilities indigenously. Not only does this ensure that China's space capabilities are not held hostage to foreign pressure, but it also fosters domestic economic development -- thereby promoting innovation within China's scientific and technological communities -- and underscores the political legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party. Consequently, the PRC will require that any cooperation with the U.S. provides it with substantial benefits that would balance opportunity costs in these areas.
---ITAR CP EXTS.
2NC CP Overview CP solves case – reformation now is key – that’s Abbey and Lane 9
[Leadership] – ITAR restricts competitiveness, and allowed other countries to catch-up with the US, ceding our technological leadership and overall space dominance
[Cooperation]a. ITAR restricts international research sharing, means we can’t solve global
problems b. ISS proves – if ITAR had been in place during the building of the ISS, it would’ve
failed
[Aerospace] – ITAR hurts competitiveness a. International Market – Other countries avoid purchasing from the US because of
ITAR, and are purchasing from “ITAR-free” countries instead, kills US aerospace competitiveness
b. Small Companies – high costs from ITAR restricts the ability of small companies to sell products internationally
The CP is a pre-requisite to the case, all the reasons why the CP solves are barriers the plan can’t overcome
Solves the case - ITAR inhibits international US cooperation in space and our global economic competitivenessSabathier and Bander 9 (Vincent Sabathier is senior fellow and director and Ashley Bander program manager of Human Space Exploration Initiatives at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C. Vincent G. Sabathier is a senior fellow and director of the Human Space Exploration Initiative at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C, a senior associate with the CSIS Technology and Public Policy Program, from 2004-2009 he was senior fellow and director for space initiatives at CSIS. He is also senior adviser to the SAFRAN group and consults internationally on aerospace and telecommunications. “Foreign Policy Opportunities for NASA ” 3/9, http://csis.org/publication/foreign-policy-opportunities-nasa)However, a new direction and a bigger budget might not suffice without some major policy changes. Also this month, the loss at launch of NASA’s Orbiting Carbon Observatory satellite, critically needed to monitor carbon in the atmosphere, as well as the delays of the next shuttle launch due to concerns with faulty valves, are symptomatic of a larger problem. This has some wondering whether the United States is currently, however slowly, ceding its leadership in space. This is, however, a difficult thing to demonstrate, for the same reasons it might be happening. Since 1999, the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) regime has created a virtual wall around the United States, treating all space technology as weapons . The wall has been very efficient in keeping the United States isolated and separate from the ITAR- free world . It has been completely useless in stopping the progress of other nations and has promoted international partnerships that exclude the United States. Some space technology remains strategic and must be protected. Rocket technology is indeed missile technology, but this has always been regulated under the very stringent Missile Technology Control Regime (MCTR). However, a reformed ITAR does not have to mean that all countries have access to all space technologies. An effective export control system should be a two-dimensional structure that would consider both the sensitivity of the technology and the level of trust in the partner nation. Again, the current system, which does not trust anyone and considers all space technology equally sensitive, is outdated, inefficient, and crippling. Under the current system, the U.S. industry has been confined to competing and cooperating mostly with itself, a little bit like Soviet aerospace companies during the Cold War. Because of this, people working in the U.S. space industry have had less opportunity to update their skills and knowledge, American companies have had fewer opportunities for benchmarking, and the products from these workers and companies are less compatible with items made outside the United States. Space capabilities in other parts of the world now come close to matching—in some cases, maybe even exceeding—American space capabilitie s. Much has been written about how damaging the overly stringent export controls have been to U.S. aerospace companies, especially to lower tier companies that do not have enough business within the ITAR wall and that are going out of business one by one. Little is written or said, however, about the development of foreign technologies and capabilities. Is it ITAR-induced ignorance or denial? Either way, this situation has not improved national security, and to some extent has triggered a downward spiral of paranoia. Overly stringent export controls, however, are not the whole of the problem. While space capabilities were developing worldwide, NASA stuck only to the International Space Stations (ISS) international cooperation mode. Recent NASA leadership decided to ignore domestic and
international capabilities alike to focus its effort on a new national space transportation system, resulting in additional self-isolation. Although international cooperation is incorporated in the very laws that define NASA, these polic y and programmatic c hoices have prevented the U.S. government from making use of civil space as an extraordinarily valuable foreign policy tool —from exercising smart power through space.
Generic SolvencySolves the case - ITAR inhibits international US cooperation in space and our global economic competitivenessSabathier and Bander 9 (Vincent Sabathier is senior fellow and director and Ashley Bander program manager of Human Space Exploration Initiatives at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C. Vincent G. Sabathier is a senior fellow and director of the Human Space Exploration Initiative at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C, a senior associate with the CSIS Technology and Public Policy Program, from 2004-2009 he was senior fellow and director for space initiatives at CSIS. He is also senior adviser to the SAFRAN group and consults internationally on aerospace and telecommunications. “Foreign Policy Opportunities for NASA ” 3/9, http://csis.org/publication/foreign-policy-opportunities-nasa)However, a new direction and a bigger budget might not suffice without some major policy changes. Also this month, the loss at launch of NASA’s Orbiting Carbon Observatory satellite, critically needed to monitor carbon in the atmosphere, as well as the delays of the next shuttle launch due to concerns with faulty valves, are symptomatic of a larger problem. This has some wondering whether the United States is currently, however slowly, ceding its leadership in space. This is, however, a difficult thing to demonstrate, for the same reasons it might be happening. Since 1999, the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) regime has created a virtual wall around the United States, treating all space technology as weapons . The wall has been very efficient in keeping the United States isolated and separate from the ITAR- free world . It has been completely useless in stopping the progress of other nations and has promoted international partnerships that exclude the United States. Some space technology remains strategic and must be protected. Rocket technology is indeed missile technology, but this has always been regulated under the very stringent Missile Technology Control Regime (MCTR). However, a reformed ITAR does not have to mean that all countries have access to all space technologies. An effective export control system should be a two-dimensional structure that would consider both the sensitivity of the technology and the level of trust in the partner nation. Again, the current system, which does not trust anyone and considers all space technology equally sensitive, is outdated, inefficient, and crippling. Under the current system, the U.S. industry has been confined to competing and cooperating mostly with itself, a little bit like Soviet aerospace companies during the Cold War. Because of this, people working in the U.S. space industry have had less opportunity to update their skills and knowledge, American companies have had fewer opportunities for benchmarking, and the products from these workers and companies are less compatible with items made outside the United States. Space capabilities in other parts of the world now come close to matching—in some cases, maybe even exceeding—American space capabilitie s. Much has been written about how damaging the overly stringent export controls have been to U.S. aerospace companies, especially to lower tier companies that do not have enough business within the ITAR wall and that are going out of business one by one. Little is written or said, however, about the development of foreign technologies and capabilities. Is it ITAR-induced ignorance or denial? Either way, this situation has not improved national security, and to some extent has triggered a downward spiral of paranoia. Overly stringent export controls, however, are not the whole of the problem. While space capabilities were developing worldwide, NASA stuck only to the International Space Stations (ISS) international cooperation mode. Recent NASA leadership decided to ignore domestic and international capabilities alike to focus its effort on a new national space transportation system, resulting in additional self-isolation. Although international cooperation is incorporated in the very laws that define NASA, these polic y and programmatic c hoices have prevented the U.S. government from making use of civil space as an extraordinarily valuable foreign policy tool —from exercising smart power through space.
Solves Aerospace/DevelopmentITAR prevents the economy and the aerospace industry from growing Smith 9 (Patti Grace, Member of the Board of Directors for the Space Foundation, testimony before the House Science and Technology Committee, Subcommittee on Space & Aeronautics “Enhancing the Relevance of Space to Address National Needs.” July 16, 2009. http://gop.science.house.gov/Media/hearings/space09/july16/smith.pdf)Thirdly, however, I feel I must touch upon a larger problem in order to address this question. In order for the US government to maximize the benefits of its investment in space, it needs to improve the acquisition of those systems. They should be developed faster and with more management discipline. We all know of space systems that have been over budget and behind schedule. Currently we are facing a number of gaps across the entire range of the civilian and national security space systems. From human spaceflight , to solar radiation detection , to next generation GPS , to missile warning , to climate and weather monitoring , there are, or soon will be gaps in coverage and capability that will hamper our ability to derive benefits from space. These gaps will also force us to be reliant on foreign space systems . I also would say that it is beyond a coincidence that we are seeing such a systemic gap problem in so many areas. Once we get back to better management of space systems, we can deploy more systems more often and accrue more benefits from them. Fourthly, we need to modernize the export control regime to allow U.S. space companies to compete effectively in the global marketplace. This is one area in which the U.S. already generates a positive trade balance, but it could be significantly larger and would provide more funds for U.S. companies to develop new jobs and innovations that help both the domestic space industry and the broader U.S. economy. The Space Report 2009 shows that the commercial sector now makes up 68% of the global space economy, so regulatory changes have the potential to generate considerably more R&D funds than direct investment by the government.
ITAR leads to collapse of the aerospace industry – only the CP solvesDubie, 07 – Vermont’s lieutenant governor and chair of the Aerospace States Association (Brian, December 26, 2007, “Fix ITAR to Protect our National and Economic Security”, http://aerostates.org/media-releases/fix-itar-to-protect-our-national-and-economic-security)China is not only interested in selling us low-tech products. Today they — and the rest of the world—are challenging our leadership in the quintessential American enterprise: aerospace . Specifically, China wants to be a global leader in rocketry and spacecraft. Today they buy their commercial communications satellites on the world market, but also give preference to satellite manufacturers willing to give preference to their rockets — something U.S. government policy makes difficult, if not all but impossible because of national security concerns. Today, commercial space applications are growing worldwide. Satellites have become essential for distance learning, telemedicine, television and radio broadcasting, forecasting weather and monitoring climate, executing search and rescue, navigation, communications, transportation, agriculture — in short, in virtually every realm of life. But satellites can’t get intoorbitwithout rockets and a launch. To advance their own national interests, the Chinese are giving preference to manufacturers willing to use their commercial rocket, which is cheaper because of their low wage rates and willingness to offer predatory pricing compared to the prices of the rockets sold by other countries. Their rockets originally were developed by the Chinese government for military purposes. Now, they are being used for commercial space applications at a time when commercial space is booming. A U.S. pet food producer cannot compete against a Chinese producer who uses substandard ingredients. Nor can a U.S. commercial space company compete when the Chinese government prices its Long March rockets at half the price available from other launch providers. This situation was recently compounded when French aerospace company Thales, which sells commercial satellites built by the French-Italian satellite-maker Thales Alenia Space, teamed with the Chinese government. Together they are determined to dominate the commercial space industry by offering the combination of a below-market Chinese Long March rocket and a satellite that contains no U.S. parts so that they can avoid applying for U.S. export licenses—something just about every other satellite manufacturer in the world must do. So, why don’t U.S. space companies team with Chinese launch providers ? The answer is simple: It runs counter to current U.S. policy. In 1999, Congress rewrote the U.S. export regulations, known as International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), transferring the authority for regulating satellite export licenses from the U.S. Department of Commerce to the U.S. State Department, which has been much tougher than Commerce was on satellite exports to China. In fact, since the shift, very few satellite exports to China have been approved, especially satellites to be launched aboard Long March rockets. The impact of this law has fallen hardest on U.S. satellite manufacturers and their U.S.-based
suppliers. The consequence is that by denying U.S. satellite companies full access to Chinese customers that want launches aboard Chinese rockets, the United States government actually has encouraged collaboration among the builders of Chinese Long March rockets, Chinese-owned satellite service companies and Thales, which builds commercial communication satellites through Thales- Alenia, its French-Italian satellite manufacturer. This European-Asian marriage could result in even greater loss of market share for the U.S. space industry and American workers, particularly among satellite component makers — and not just in the market for Chinese customers. Compliance with ITAR , while faster than it was five years ago, remains very time consuming. Even for commercial satellite buyers based in countries that are staunch U.S. allies, time is money and many would prefer to avoid time delays whenever possible, especially considering the uncertainty about how ITAR might be applied to a particular project. It is ironic that at the same time the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) rewards Thales, a DoD supplier, with new American contracts, Thales explicitly and publicly disregards U.S. policy on sharing satellite technology with China. Congress must take action to certify that companies doing business with the DoD abide by U.S. defense and security policies. Our government should not contribute to the profits of foreign companies that exploit our own laws at the expense of the American worker. One positive step would be for Congress to approve legislation that would prohibit the Defense Department fromgiving contracts to companies that use Chinese launch vehicles. However, ITAR is a problem even when Chinese rockets are not involved. The law actually has encouraged other countries to go into competition with U.S. satellite component makers by building factories to make satellite parts they once had to buy from U.S. companies. Instead of discouraging the spread of these technologies, ITAR is speeding it up. That hurts U.S. security and U.S. companies. On a panel at the 58th International Astronautical Congress held this fall in Hyderabad, India, Ray Williamson, a research professor at George Washington University’s Space Policy Institute in Washington, stated, “ In the long run ITAR is going to be destructive of U.S. industry.” Congress must act to reform ITAR regulations to strengthen our commercial space industries. The current regulations allow export licenses to be granted when a part is available commercially elsewhere in the world. In fact, the very existence of what Thales calls its “ITAR Free Satellite” suggests most satellite parts no longer belong on the list of prohibited exports. Are-evaluation of the ITAR controlled technologies is critical to ensure U.S. competitiveness and jobs.
ITAR hurts aerospace competitiveness – incentivizes purchasing from foreign companies Nosanov 9 (Jeffrey P., Program Planning and Assessment Lead, Nuclear Space Power Office at Jet Propulsion Laboratory / NASA, University of Nebraska, “Viewpoint: International Traffic in Arms Regulations—Controversy and Reform,” Astropolitics, 7:3, 206-22, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/14777620903382544 DA: 7/28/11, PC) The current state of the ITAR is very helpful for foreign companies of both friendly and even unfriendly governments. At the start of the decade, a large European satellite manufacturer, Alcatel Alenia Space, now Thales Alenia, announced that it would create an ‘‘ITAR-free’’ spacecraft, purged of all American components. Between 1998 and 2004, the company doubled its market share to over 20%, becoming a beneficiary of U.S. current export policies. Export controls also prompted the European Space Agency (ESA) to pay to develop a European supplier of solenoid valves, so that European space-propulsion could be independent of the American part. Similarly, Telesat, Canada’s satellite fleet operator, has said that ITAR is one of the reasons it has selected European satellite builders in recent competitions. In a similar vein, European Aeronautic Defense and Space Company (EADS) Sodern, a French subsidiary of the Franco-German company EADS and maker of satellite control and positioning systems announced in 2005 that it would start to phase out its American supplier base. 32 Concomitantly, American companies suffer. The major contractors, such as Boeing, Lockheed Martin, and Northrop Grumman are able to absorb the costs and delays associated with ITAR requests, but the secondary contractors , generally much smaller, are often unable to ride out the delays. Some of these sub-contractors are relied upon for supplying individual components, and are frequently the only manufacturer of a particular component. In a perversion of industry, security, regulation, and common sense, DOD may have to start purchasing satellite components overseas. Even more troubling, is the concern that the safe operation of the International Space Station (ISS) may be affected by delays associated with the TAAs involved. 33 Currently, there is a strong negative effect on the international competitiveness of the U.S. industry as ITAR-associated delays incentivize the use of ITAR-free partners. Foreign companies and partners face significant 218 J. P. Nosanov Downloaded by [67.194.4.78] at 11:49 28 July 2011 delays in obtaining even the smallest component from American companies. The situation has evolved to the point that it is easier and cheaper to obtain a needed part from elsewhere, and thus many avoid doing business with U.S. companies whenever possible. There is general agreement that the rules are stifling domestic business, but little attention is paid to ITAR’s impact on the international political level. The current system is still clinging to a political environment long past. Given the enormous expense of space activities, it is in the U.S. business interest to maintain partnerships with other nations. ITAR’s potential effect on ISS mentioned above is a good example of regulation run amok. In 2007, training for the use of a tool on ISS was delayed because of the need for ESA to sign a TAA to acquire a duplicate of the tool. 34 Training for space activities takes years and is extremely precise. Space Shuttle extra-vehicular activities (EVAs) are rehearsed and practiced for upwards of five years prior to their actual spacewalk. Training programs are designed by engineers and mission planners and should not be
manipulated or marginalized by regulatory hurdles. If this regulatory hurdle were ever to result in damage to a space object or injury or death of an astronaut, there would be terrible repercussions to U.S. outer space relations. ITAR’s damaging effect on U.S. industry may be the issue that gets the most coverage, but there also exists a strongly detrimental effect on national security. One of the ways in which the U.S. ITAR is more strict than the regulations of other nations is its requirement that the party that receives the technical item must agree that it will not transfer it again to a third party. The ITAR of countries such as Brazil, however, lack this additional protection. 35 If a Brazilian company sells a component to a European company seeking an ITAR-free alternative, then the U.S. ITAR-based third party sale prohibition does not apply. As foreign companies strive to avoid U.S. suppliers entirely, the so-called ITAR-flight will result in decreased U.S. oversight of arms transfers beyond the United States. Ultimately, ITAR is decreasing its own national security by incentivizing foreign party migration to ITAR- free sources . It is imperative that this trend does not continue . The only way to do so is to change ITAR such that we are no longer driving potential customers away. We must ensure that potentially dangerous components can be sold by the U.S., rather than by a country with fewer restrictions and less investment in maintaining international peace. When the U.S. is the main supplier of dangerous components, the State Department is able to maintain oversight of the transfer of the components.
The US is losing its grip on industrial leadership – ITAR is the root cause and hampers our ability to make spinoff technologiesFisher 10 – William, Lieutenant Colonel, United States Army (March 25, 2010, “U.S. Space Policy and Space Industry Strangulation,” http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA521763&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf) The Arms Export Control Act, International Traffic in Arms Regulations and the United States Munitions List are comprehensive, though very general in nature, leading the defense industry to describe them as complicated, costly and constrictive controls. 27 Implemented during the cold war, these control measures were designed to protect U.S. national security against the singular threat of the Soviet Bloc countries. 28 Much of that threat was in the form of technology advancement as the two countries sought to gain an advantage. The arms race is an example of this as not only the number of arms was a metric, but the sophistication, deadliness and level of technology of the weapon systems were also a factor. Clearly, an advanced and vibrant high technology industry, producing weapon systems more advanced than the other country, would be of great advantage. Control of sensitive technologies is paramount in this environment. In the 11 context of a bi-polar world the foundation for arms export control was built. Globalization, the end of the cold war, increased technological sophistication of other countries, and the diffuse nature of the threats to our national security are the hallmarks of the current world order. The problem is that the world has changed but U.S. regulatory body has not . The USML is of particular concern to industry as it not only pertains to items which are clearly designed for military purposes but it also controls more common items such as rivets, wires and bolts. 29 The effect of this is to reduce the agility of the defense industry as it tries to compete in the global market and frustrates would-be purchasers of U.S. goods because of long lead times and bureaucratic processes. An effect of this is the development and marketing of “ITAR Free” products by other Nations. 30 In the end, the market is driven away from U.S. suppliers and driven into the arms of foreign competitors. Another concern of the industry has been the length of time it takes for approval and license issuance under ITAR. For example, Congress must approve or reject a request to export a satellite because these systems exceed cost thresholds for mandatory Congressional review. By law the approval or rejection must occur within 30 days of the requests however, submission usually does not occur until all questions have been answered. Delays have also been experienced at the Departments of State and Commerce with some requests taking over ninety days to determine issuance of a license. 31 The cost of complying with U.S. export control regulations carries a high price for U.S. companies. It is estimated that the total cost to U.S. space industry companies is $49 million per year industry wide and grew a staggering 37% during the 2003 to 2006 12 timeframe. 32 This is money not easily parted with for an industry that reports running between 2.5% and 5% net profit margin for operations. 33 Also consider the opportunity cost of lost business because foreign consumers are not willing to wait for license approval to use ITAR restricted materiel. This cost is estimated at $ 600 million a year . 34 Another partial indicator of the effect of export control is the growing trade imbalance in the high technology goods market. From 1995 to 2008 the U.S. imported $75 billion dollars more in high technology goods then it exported while exports from China and other Asian countries to the U.S increased. 35 Globally, high technology exports, as a share of production, rose 18% from 1995 to 2008. The U.S. experienced a 14% drop in high technology exports during the same period indicating a dramatic shift in the high technology economic base. 36 Acutely affected has been the U.S. commercial satellite manufacturing and service sector as the U.S. is the only country that manages its commercial communications satellite industry as munitions. 37 In the years since export control was tightened in 1999 the U.S. commercial satellite industry as seen a significant drop in market share. While world satellite industry revenues have grown 14.2% for the period from 2003 to 2008 and totaled $144.4 billion in 2008, revenues of U.S. companies have declined . 38 In the area of satellite manufacturing, U.S. share of the market has fallen from 47% in 2003, to 29% in 2008, and U.S. share of launch revenues has fared even worse dropping from 66% in 2003, to 28% in 2008. Particularly troubling in the launch revenues is that
while the world market saw a growth of revenues of 31% ($1.2 billion in growth) between 2006 and 2008, the U.S. share remained flat with a growth of revenues of only .1% ($1 million). 39 These numbers indicate that the world satellite 13 industry has overtaken and surpassed U.S. companies in these markets . For an industry once dominant in these markets this has come as a significant blow. The market shift also indicates a technology base shift to other countries that has reduced the U.S. national security leaving the country vulnerable. In the past, innovative and advanced space technologies that could be applied as such, or spun out to other applications, were under the purview of the U.S. simply due to the fact that the U.S. space industry developed these technologies. Many of these new technologies had a direct effect in enhancing U.S. national security. The space based Global Positioning System ( GPS) is an example. Presently , however, the shifting of the high technology market to other countries , which includes human capital, means that innovative and advanced technologies will be developed outside of U.S. control and can be applied in a manner that leaves the country vulnerable. Will the next innovative technology, the next GPS, come from within or without the U.S.
ITAR hurts the aerospace industry – leads to long-term collapse of the aerospace industry Nosanov 9 (Jeffrey P., Program Planning and Assessment Lead, Nuclear Space Power Office at Jet Propulsion Laboratory / NASA, University of Nebraska, “Viewpoint: International Traffic in Arms Regulations—Controversy and Reform,” Astropolitics, 7:3, 206-22, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/14777620903382544 DA: 7/28/11, PC) The technical aspect of the space industry has resulted in the intertwining of the space and military industries from long before the launch of Sputnik 1. History shows that the United States will share arms with the world whenever it is not expressly prohibited from doing so. The challenge of international trade in arms control is to craft an effective policy that limits the transfer of items based on their actual inherent threat to national security. Too often, the decision is made on party lines or in a knee-jerk political response to current events. Our current situation is a perfect illustration of this backwards approach to arms control. It has now been ten years since satellite components were transferred back under the USML. The decision to do this was based on the Cox report and the exchange of technical data with China regarding the Long March rocket. For ten years, every other American company has been paying the price for past events, and the American space industry has suffered as a whole. It is now time to review the ITAR and apply a gcommon sense, risk-based approach . It will not be easy to accomplish this, as modern ITAR has become an entrenched institution. Despite calls from State Department insiders, representative, and industry leaders, ITAR change is coming slowly. Adoption of the proposed reforms highlighted herein is a good start, and will prevent the need for regular review by implementing guidelines that will prevent the current situation from happening again. Mike Gold of Bigelow Aerospace offers the following summary: The obsolescence of America’s export control regime is the white elephant in the room. Everyone knows it is there, even many regulators, yet nothing is done. Every year that the status quo continues is a year where the American aerospace sector falls further and further behind its international competition. If no action is taken, the export control problem will resolve itself, since , eventually, America simply won’t produce any aerospace technology worth exporting . 45 As the traditional leader in space, nationalism and history make it easy to disregard the economic effect of modern ITAR on the space industry. However, our competitors are catching up, and our ITAR may be just the advantage they need to get ahead.
ITAR blocks US technological leadership and competitiveness – only reformation can solve Nosanov 9 (Jeffrey P., Program Planning and Assessment Lead, Nuclear Space Power Office at Jet Propulsion Laboratory / NASA, University of Nebraska, “Viewpoint: International Traffic in Arms Regulations—Controversy and Reform,” Astropolitics, 7:3, 206-22, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/14777620903382544 DA: 7/28/11, PC) WHY REFORM ITAR? A 2008 article in The Economist sums up the modern ITAR controversy: Exporting technology has always presented a dilemma for America. The country leads the world in most technologies and some of these give it a military advantage. If export rules are too lax, foreign powers will be able to put American technology in their systems, or copy it. However, if the International Traffic in Arms Regulations 215 Downloaded by [67.194.4.78] at 11:49 28 July 2011 rules are too tight, then it will stifle the industries that depend upon sales to create the next generation of technology . It is a difficult balance to strike and critics charge that America has erred on the side of stifling. They claim that overly strict export controls have so damaged the space industry that America’s national security is now threatened by its dwindling leadership in space technology . The system, they complain, fails to distinguish between militarily sensitive hardware that should be controlled and widely available commercial technologies, such as lithium-ion batteries and solar cells. The zealous application of the export rules is the American space industry’s biggest handicap. 28 The events of the 1990s, regarding the export of Comsats, provide a prime example of the struggle to strike an appropriate balance. Prior to the regulatory tug-of-war, all items related to satellite manufacturing were regulated by the Department of State under ITAR. In 1990, however, President Bush ordered that du al-use items be removed from the USML unless doing so would result in a national security risk, or if the items exceeded certain military-capable specifications. This was done in an effort to
comply with a new multilateral export control agreement, the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM). At this time, the U.S. was the only nation in the world to control Comsats as munitions items. In 1995, a Department of State working group reviewed export controls on Comsats and recommended a narrower definition of military-sensitive technologies. By 1996, all jurisdictions over Comsats was transferred to the Department of Commerce, following a brief period in which some dual use items were controlled by State and some by Commerce. A mere three years later, with the passing of the Strom Thurmond National Defense Authorization Act, the control of satellites and related technologies was transferred back to the State Department. The U.S. export control regime in its current form is stricter than the several multilateral export control agreements of which it is a party. The Wassenaar Arrangement, the successor to COCOM, is a good example. It focuses on encouraging transparency of national export control regimes. Meanwhile, the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) is an association of countries that share the goals of non-proliferation of unmanned delivery systems capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction, and coordinating national export licensing to that end. The MTCR relies on mutual adherence to common export policy guidelines, the MTCR Guidelines, applied to a list of controlled items. All MTCR decisions are taken by consensus, and MTCR partners regularly exchange information about relevant national export licensing issues. ITAR reform is not a new issue. The general agreement among industry parties is that ITAR is significantly more strict than necessary . There exist several examples of seemingly innocuous items whose export is immensely complicated by ITAR. The most extreme example of this is the so-called ‘‘ITAR Coffee Table.’’ An article in The Economist explains: In the spring of 2006, Robert Bigelow needed to take a stand on a trip to Russia to keep a satellite off the floor. The stand was made of aluminum. It had a circular base and legs. It was, says the entrepreneur and head of Bigelow Aerospace in Nevada, ‘‘indistinguishable from a common coffee table.’’ Nonetheless, the American authorities told Mr. Bigelow that this coffee table was part of a satellite assembly and so counted as a munition. During the trip, it would have to be guarded by two security officers at all times. 29 Mike Gold, Director of Bigelow Aerospace’s Washington, D.C. Office and Corporate Counsel, wonderfully demonstrates the absurdity, irrationality of the situation: Since the stand had been crafted to fit the spacecraft, it fell under the auspices of ITAR and was therefore treated accordingly. Specifically, due to one of the afore mentioned provisos to Genesis I’s [space technology] TAA, BA [Bigelow Aerospace] was required to keep this metal coffee table under guard on a 24=7 basis. One can only imagine the repercussions of Russian agents gaining access to the Genesis I stand. Its secrets could have easily been sold to Iran or North Korea, where America’s enemies could someday use such technology to serve sandwiches or even tea on. 30 An equally irrational outcome results when ITAR is applied to foreign employees of foreign space programs. Canada’s radar satellite (RADARSAT) program was launched by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA ) in exchange for free access to the data obtained by the satellite. Bruce Mann, Senior Counsel for the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade of Canada, explains the unusual situation regarding the impact of ITAR on personnel: Although the Canadian Access Control Policy in the 2000 Canada-U.S. IGA [Intergovernmental Agreement] states that the satellite operators will obtain import or export permits pursuant to ‘‘applicable laws,’’ no express reference to, or obligation deriving from the United States International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) appears in the Act. Nevertheless, ITAR has had a significant impact on the RADARSAT programs as well as other aerospace and defense-related industries where technology has been exported from the United States to Canada under an export license. As the United States Department of State applies the ITAR, contact with or exposure of ITAR technology to a person who is a national of a proscribed country constitutes a ‘‘deemed export’’ of the technology to the proscribed country. This discrimination, based on International Traffic in Arms Regulations 217 Downloaded by [67.194.4.78] at 11:49 28 July 2011 place of birth, has meant that some dual-national Canadian citizens, even though they hold high-level security clearances and may have renounced their other citizenship, have not been allowed access to certain sensitive technology or meetings where technology was discussed. 31
STEM I/L Solvency ITAR blocks the STEM internal link and competitiveness – people will be driven to work for direct competitors of the US Nosanov 9 (Jeffrey P., Program Planning and Assessment Lead, Nuclear Space Power Office at Jet Propulsion Laboratory / NASA, University of Nebraska, “Viewpoint: International Traffic in Arms Regulations—Controversy and Reform,” Astropolitics, 7:3, 206-22, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/14777620903382544 DA: 7/28/11, PC) The long-term effect of the current regime can only be to drive talented, experienced people away from any projects in which American companies are involved. At one time in history, this would not have left much work available to such a person. However, as domestic and national space programs continue to grow and expand all over the world , the ITAR may conceivably push away valuable people as other opportunities become available . These people may end up sufficiently ‘‘blacklisted’’ such that they can then only find work with the direct competitors of the U nited S tates— the only groups left unaffected by the reach of the extremely broad ITAR . A more specific and case-by-case approach to export controls is necessary in order to prevent this result.
ITAR restricts access of STEM students into our space industry Landry 10 – Major, USAF, thesis, Degree of Master of Science in Research and Development Management (August 2010, Kalliroi, “EXPLORING THE EFFECTS OF INTERNATIONAL TRAFFIC IN ARMS REGULATIONS RESTRICTIONS ON INNOVATION IN THE U.S. SPACE INDUSTRIAL BASE,” http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA535245)Many believe there is a limited pool of talent available for space technology development projects that may in turn affect the innovation potential in the space industry. It appears that some of the best and brightest individuals choose to work in other industries offering higher salaries or greater prestige. Several respondents acknowledged that for some projects the best talent might be foreign nationals . In such cases, ITAR restricts their participation in the space industry. Some companies will not even consider foreign talent for space projects . In any case, many foreign students, possibly some of the hardest working, are educated in some of the best universities in the 46 U.S. Upon graduation, many of these students will not find employment in the U.S.; they return to their homelands and contribute to the growing competition around the globe.
Solves Cooperation/LeadershipITAR restricts cooperation on space – CP solves Nosanov 9 (Jeffrey P., Program Planning and Assessment Lead, Nuclear Space Power Office at Jet Propulsion Laboratory / NASA, University of Nebraska, “Viewpoint: International Traffic in Arms Regulations—Controversy and Reform,” Astropolitics, 7:3, 206-22, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/14777620903382544 DA: 7/28/11, PC) ITAR specifications are responsible for the U.S. inability to cooperate with foreign nations in the development of more advanced GNSS. In the absence of ITAR — or in the presence of a more lenient version — U.S. industry could participate in a thriving global market . While there is a method to obtain a so-called ‘‘ITAR-Waiver’’ from the Department of State that allows such international cooperation, it is time consuming. ITAR rules and the associated delays from the Department of State waiver acquisition process deter foreign players from working with companies in the U.S . The resultant penalties to the American GNSS industry are twofold. The most obvious consequence is that U.S. industry is in a much weaker market position. Potential profit is lost to foreign ITAR-free markets as buyers pursue easier alternatives. The NDAA of 1999 is especially harsh in this area. Prior to its implementation, the USML included ‘‘satellites specially designed or modified for military use.’’ By including ‘‘communications satellites, remote sensing satellites, scientific satellites, research satellites, navigation satellites, experimental and multi-mission satellites,’’ U.S. industry is thoroughly prevented from being a true global player in the GNSS market. 38
ITAR blocks international cooperationGarretson 10 (Peter A., was a Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) International Fellow in India, and a Visiting Fellow at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA) New Delhi. He is an active duty Air Force officer on sabbatical as an Air Force Fellow, August 2010, “SKY’S NO LIMIT: SPACE-BASED SOLAR POWER, THE NEXT MAJOR STEP IN THE INDO-US STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP?” http://www.idsa.in/sites/default/files/OP_SkysNoLimit.pdf Accessed: 3/18/11) There is also significant criticism of ITAR’s effect on US strategic position with respect to advantage in space,11 and the need for the US to be more open in space cooperation. For instance, the recent Augustine Commission repor t summary of key findings said “ space exploration has become a global enterprise… Actively engaging international partners in a manner adapted to today’s multi-polar world could strengthen geopolitical relationships , leverage global resources, and enhance the exploration enterprise …The US can lead a bold new international effort…If international partners are actively engaged, including on the ‘critical path’ to success, there could be substantial benefits in foreign relations and more resources overall could become available.”12 Even more critical is the National Security Space Office’s (NSSO), the policy office that coordinates between US military, intelligence and civil space programmes (see description under stakeholders), recent Space Transportation Roadmap, which says: “In order to achieve needed suborbital and/or orbital space transportation capabilities through the 2025 time frame, what international cooperation will be required?’…Industry and government stakeholders generally responded that the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) serves as one of the most significant obstacles to US progress and competitiveness in space. Implemented at a time when the US benefited from an asymmetric technological advantage that enjoyed a wide margin, its goal of safeguarding US national security and furthering US foreign policy objectives were rational. The risks of international space partnerships and enterprises, and of foreign investment or technology sharing in commercial space endeavours, were obvious , even on balance with lost opportunities….However, today’s globalised, multi-polar world has changed the dynamics , and the balance of that risk . The Department of State’s strictly bureaucratic enforcement of ITAR fails to recognise the global and egalitarian shifts in technological advantages placing a self-insulated US at great risk in terms of both commerce and national security. Profitable technology and investment opportunities are missed on all fronts, as the US becomes evermore blind to the actual state of the art . In fact, certain foreign technologies are evolving to the asymmetric advantage of our competitors, all the more so because ITAR prohibits the sort of commercial teaming that would permit our deeper insight. The reality today is that US national security benefits from a deep insight of the space technologies of international commercial competitors just as much as those competitors benefit from understanding ours. In fact, in the realm of advanced technologies generally, not just those that are space-related, it is difficult to imagine any that are not dual and multipurpose. In conclusion, with respect to ITAR, there was a government and industry consensus that ITAR regulations need to be substantively revised in a way that recognises that broader international space partnerships are in our national security interest.”13
ITAR blocks US-China cooperation in spaceSelding 11 – Space News Correspondent (April 14, 2011, Peter, “Chinese Government Official Urges U.S.-Chinese Space Cooperation,”http://www.spacenews.com/civil/110414-chinese-official-space-cooperation.html)COLORADO SPRINGS, Colo. — A top Chinese government space official on April 14 app ealed to the U.S. government to lift its decade-long ban on most forms of U.S.-Chinese space cooperation, saying both nations would benefit from closer government and commercial space interaction. He specifically called for cooperation on manned spaceflight, in which China has made massive investment in recent years. Lei Fanpei, vice president of China Aerospace Science and Technology Corp. (CASC), which oversees much of China’s launch vehicle and satellite manufacturing industry, said China purchased more than $1 billion in U.S.-built satellites in the 1990s before the de facto ban went into effect in 1999. Since then, the U.S. International Traffic in Arms Regulations ( ITAR ) have made it
impossible to export most satellite components , or full satellites, to China for launch on China’s now successful line of Long March rockets. The ITAR regulations that tightened the U.S. technology export regime were put into place to punish China for its missile exports, and to slow development of China’s rocket industry by reducing its customer base. Most commercial telecommunications satellites carry at least some U.S. parts, which is why ITAR has all but locked China out of the global commercial launch market. The U.S. government is reviewing the current ITAR regime, which U.S. industry says has had the unintended effect of making it difficult to sell satellites and satellite components just about anywhere in the world.
ITAR hampers the US’ ability engage in international cooperation Kaufman 8(7/9/08, Marc, Washington Post, “US Finds It’s Getting Crowded out There”, Global Policy Forum, http://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/152/25824.html)Ironically, efforts to deny space technology to potential enemies have hampered American cooperation with other nations and have limited sales of U.S.-made hardware. Concerned about Chinese use of space technology for military purposes, Congress ramped up restrictions on rocket and satellite sales, and placed them under the cumbersome International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR ). In addition, sales of potentially "dual use" technology have to be approved the State Department rather than the Commerce Department. The result has been a surge of rocket and satellite production abroad and the creation of foreign-made satellites that use only homegrown components to avoid complex U.S. restrictions under ITAR and the Iran Nonproliferation Act. That law, passed in 2000, tightened a ban on direct or indirect sales of advanced technology to Iran (especially by Russia). As a result, a number of foreign governments are buying European satellites and paying the Chinese, Indian and other space programs to launch them. "Some of these companies moved ahead in some areas where , I'm sorry to say, we are no longer the world leaders ," Griffin said.
ITAR blocks US-China cooperation in spaceSelding 11 – Space News Correspondent (April 14, 2011, Peter, “Chinese Government Official Urges U.S.-Chinese Space Cooperation,”http://www.spacenews.com/civil/110414-chinese-official-space-cooperation.html)COLORADO SPRINGS, Colo. — A top Chinese government space official on April 14 app ealed to the U.S. government to lift its decade-long ban on most forms of U.S.-Chinese space cooperation, saying both nations would benefit from closer government and commercial space interaction. He specifically called for cooperation on manned spaceflight, in which China has made massive investment in recent years. Lei Fanpei, vice president of China Aerospace Science and Technology Corp. (CASC), which oversees much of China’s launch vehicle and satellite manufacturing industry, said China purchased more than $1 billion in U.S.-built satellites in the 1990s before the de facto ban went into effect in 1999. Since then, the U.S. International Traffic in Arms Regulations ( ITAR ) have made it impossible to export most satellite components , or full satellites, to China for launch on China’s now successful line of Long March rockets. The ITAR regulations that tightened the U.S. technology export regime were put into place to punish China for its missile exports, and to slow development of China’s rocket industry by reducing its customer base. Most commercial telecommunications satellites carry at least some U.S. parts, which is why ITAR has all but locked China out of the global commercial launch market. The U.S. government is reviewing the current ITAR regime, which U.S. industry says has had the unintended effect of making it difficult to sell satellites and satellite components just about anywhere in the world.
Solves Leadership Leadership and the aerospace industry is on the brink - The US is falling behind due to ITAR – satellites and “ITAR-free” goods proveDamast 10 – received his J.D. from Georgetown University Law Center in May 2010. He is currently employed by the Air Force Space Command (GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, Volume 42, pg. 211-232, “ EXPORT CONTROL REFORM AND THE SPACE INDUSTRY,”)Because of the unique constraints of ITAR relative to foreign export controls, foreign satellite manufacturers and operators have been discouraged from sourcing to the American market . At worst, as in the case of China, they were either unable to obtain American parts or satellites at all within reasonable price or time constraints; at best, as in the case of close allies, American parts added cost and time. This added difficulty created openings for competitors: ESA funded development of European solenoid valves to cut out American parts from their supply chain. 56 A Spanish company funded development of reflectors and American companies found themselves with global competitors where previously they had none. 57 Efforts such as these, much of them driven by a desire to avoid the onerous restrictions of American export controls, have enabled the production of “ITAR-free” satellites, closing foreign markets to American businesses . As this “ITAR-free” competition grows, foreign businesses have become able to ignore American export controls by simply sourcing abroad. Surveys of satellite operators reveal this perverse effect of ITAR. In the 2006 –7 COMSTAC survey, 42% of respondents identified American export controls as having a serious negative effect on their business; 58 in the 2008 –9 survey, only 15% did so. 59 Among the factors cited for this change was the availability of “ITAR-free” satellites from European and Chinese manufacturers. 60 American manufacturers have felt this market shift in their bottom lines: between 2003–2006, U.S. manufacturers attributed $2.35 billion in lost sales to long wait times for ITAR license processing. 61 Although historically U.S.-manufactured satellites were far more capable than those available abroad, that gap has been shrunk , if not outright closed, by European and Chinese manufacturers since 1999. 62 From 2000 to 2008, the American share of satellite manufacturing declined from $6 billion out of a global industry of $11.5 billion to $3.1 billion out of $10.5 billion. The S atellite I ndustry A ssociation has attributed this decline i n part to ITAR, noting that over that time period, the majority of business which had previously gone to American manufactures was going to European manufacturers instead. 63 In the 2003–2006 period alone, American manufacturers saw their share of the commercial communications satellite market drop by twenty percent. 64 Whether as a cause or an effect, innovation by American companies has suffered as their share of the market has fallen: while American companies have not introduced a new generation of communications satellite bus since 1999, European companies have introduced four, and China and Japan have each introduced one. 65 Reports commissioned by the Pentagon have found that although the first tier U.S. satellite businesses were still doing well, due to being buoyed by strong defense spending, the second and third tier players— subcontractors and commodity suppliers—were being significantly harmed. 66 It also found that all tiers of the satellite industry were seeing margins far lower than related industries in the high tech or aerospace sector. 67 Moreover, national security was by far the largest customer for the domestic industry. 68 Falling export share exacerbated this condition: by 2007, export business accounted for only 10% of industry revenues. 69 The implications are serious: in the space arena, ITAR may be undermining its own purpose. The intent of ITAR, and of placing satellites and space-qualified parts under the ITAR regime, is to ensure America’s technological edge in a sector that Congress has deemed essential to national security and to prevent America’s competitors from gaining access to key technologies in that sector. The actual result of this policy has been to encourage the development of foreign industry and reduce America’s technological edge , in some cases to the point of parity. 70 Further, by constraining American industry’s ability to compete in global markets, to obtain advanced technologies from abroad , and to cooperate with our allies, it is possible that current policies will ultimately result in America actually falling behind in areas it once dominated. 71
ITAR undermines US leadership and the aerospace industry Bialos 9 – Jeffrey, Executive Director of the Program on Transatlantic Security and Industry at the Center for Transatlantic Relations at Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies (September 2009, Fisher, Koehl, “Fortresses & Icebergs: The Evolution of the Transatlantic Defense Market and the Implications for U.S. National Security Policy,” http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA531715)Multiple studies have highlighted the serious issues posed by the current U.S. system of defense trade controls—the ITAR. This study is not intended to examine whether and to what degree ITAR rules and policies are reasonable and sound; the specifics of these ITAR issues are beyond the scope of this study. However, the impact of ITAR on the Transatlantic defense market relationship is material to this study and, hence, we have focused on it. The results of our many interviews are consistent: ITAR is viewed as a significant barrier to Transatlantic defense market
development by governments (including some U.S. government officials, current and former) and market participants. Western European countries and firms—including the UK government and firms—clearly stated that they do and will in the future avoid ITAR controlled articles and technologies where they can in defense acquisition because ITAR controls limit operational sovereignty, increase the risks of schedule delays, and restricts the freedom to re-export. Market participants, U.S. and foreign, consistently reported that ITAR slows the speed of obtaining licenses needed for sales and collaboration, unduly limits the release of U.S. technology, creates business uncertainty, and generally makes Transatlantic defense industrial cooperation difficult. Specifically, the obstacles posed by ITAR are as follows: • Limits on Operational Sovereignty. Reliance on ITAR-controlled systems in their operations potentially limits their operational sovereignty; in times of crisis, these nations want the flexibility and autonomy to modify and adjust their systems to changing missions in real time and repair them without obtaining prior approval from the U nited S tates or relying on U.S. suppliers . The use of “black boxes” and other restrictive solutions limits the ability of these countries to operate freely with their military systems—limitations these countries are reluctant to accept. The UK, one of our closest allies, as well as France and Italy, expressed strong concerns about this issue. 47 • Program Delays. Relying on ITAR-controlled systems and subsystems also can create risks of schedule delays on their programs—which also has significant cost implications and contractual implications for contractors. In most countries we visited, examples were offered. • Re-Export Restrictions. ITAR re-export restrictions can limit these countries’ own flexibility to export systems with U.S. components to third parties. This is a crucial issue for a country like Sweden, for example, which relies on export sales and the economies of scale to keep its defense industry viable. • Multinational Facilities. Finally, ITAR restrictions that prohibit unlicensed foreign nationals from having access to ITAR-controlled technology cause headaches for defense firms in the countries we have studied because those firms typically employ foreign nationals from numerous European, and other, countries. European governments and firms have long raised this issue with the United States. This trend was first evident in the space sector, where restrictive ITAR policies were adopted after the China satellite controversy in the mid-1990s. Clear evidence has emerged in a recent study that Europe has developed ITAR-free solutions (including complete ITAR-free satellite systems), and that the U.S. space suppliers’ market shares in global space markets are eroding in part as a consequence of these actions . 48 Additionally, because foreign space faring nations have been forced to develop their own space capabilities beyond the scope of U.S. export controls, the U.S.’ unwillingness to share space technology with foreign space programs has had the unintended consequence of creating real proliferation risks beyond the control of U.S. licensing authorities. Tangible Evidence of ITAR Design Arounds Years of European talk of “designing around” or “designing out” ITAR-controlled articles and technologies have now begun to be translated into action. Based on the many interviews we conducted for this study, there is clear evidence that European governments, including our closest allies, and their firms are designing out ITAR components and subsystems where they can in defense systems and products. While European governments will procure ITAR-controlled systems and components if they need to (i.e., where the capability is otherwise not available), they also will avoid it where they can—especially to maintain export flexibility on European platforms. • Some governments in Europe are adopting “ITAR-free” as an express policy or informal practice. The new French White Paper explicitly cites the need for non-ITAR-controlled electronics components to avoid limitations on French freedom of action. • In one case, a key ally has sought to ensure “operational sovereignty” over a capability by requiring that the program be staffed with domestic engineers free of ITAR restrictions. • European contractors have developed policies to avoid the use of ITAR products and technologies, or have “dual track” production of components—one subject to ITAR and one not. Even firms not trying to design out ITAR components confirm that ITAR restrictions are a factor in choosing suppliers—a non-ITAR component will be chosen to avoid re-export issues, if possible. European governments and firms may at times face choices between better but ITAR restricted U.S. capabilities and components and less capable but unrestricted foreign sources of supply. Increasingly, there are more choices available—as consolidating European firms become more robust. Where the differential is not great, European governments and firms are increasingly opting for the non-ITAR choice. Additionally, some U.S. firms have themselves sought to maintain access to these markets by developing an ITAR-free product line (e.g., in the aerospace arena) to remain competitive. The Adverse Impact on U.S. Subsystem Suppliers This striking ITAR-free evolution operates particularly to the detriment of U.S. component and subsystem suppliers, whose products now are precluded in numerous cases from competitions within Europe. Over the longer term, the restrictions under ITAR and the resulting European ITAR-free movement also may serve to create European solutions outside of the scope of U.S. export controls that raise concomitant proliferation risks for the United States. While the “ITAR-free” trend is apparent in all of the Western European countries studied, it varies in intensity from one country to another. Table 10 sets forth the country-specific scores. It is notable that even the UK, our closest ally, has now taken up this movement. • Poland and
Romania. In contrast to Western European countries studied, we found no real complaints in Poland or Romania about ITAR. As these countries at present do not design, build or export many defense products with U.S. components or subsystems or do so in a very limited way, re-export flexibility is not a pressing issue for them. Also, they have little cooperative engagement with U.S. firms in advanced technology areas. • Sweden. Swedish officials and firms raise all of the ITAR-related concerns heard in the other Western European countries. However, with significant U.S. content in Swedish systems, neither the government nor Swedish companies follow an “ITARfree” policy. Swedish companies did, however, confirm that ITAR restrictions are a factor in choosing suppliers, and if given a choice in a competitive environment, the non-ITAR component will be chosen to avoid re-export issues. Also, Swedish officials do believe that the recent U.S. reluctance to accommodate their request on some major technology transfer issues reflects economic and not security reasons, which they view as departures from prior times, when, in their view, strategic considerations were dominant in the relationship. • United Kingdom. Even the UK has been increasingly frustrated with the lack of U.S. willingness to share sensitive technology—which came to a head in the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program—as well as with the usual procedural complaints associated with ITAR. The failure of the U.S. Senate to ratify a recent U.S.-UK treaty designed to address these issues has reinforced UK concerns. UuK concerns, often expressed in terms of “operational sovereignty,” have grown and could affect the UK-U.S. relationship in the future if not addressed. While the UK has not adopted a “design around” policy, it is taking some steps to ensure operational sovereignty on major platforms and reduce ITAR exposure. • Italy, France and Germany. Government and business representatives consistently expressed the desire to find ways around ITAR by building or purchasing ITAR-free equivalents of various systems and components. While large firms in Italy and France underscored that they understand how to work within ITAR and are fully supportive of the U.S. regime, they also report this complicates technical solutions and schedules in dealing with U.S. products. In France, as noted above, this is now formalized in French policy. In Germany, one executive called it a “trend all over Germany to do without ITAR parts and components.” Finally, ITAR has implications for European market access to the U.S. defense market. As discussed in detail in Section II, Chapter 14, the consequence of U.S. export control rules has been to build walls between the U nited S tates and other countries, making collaboration with even our closest allies very difficult in key defense and related technology areas and eroding trust with our traditional partners. The problem is particularly pronounced for foreign firms seeking to access the U.S. market, which requires licenses to bring foreign technology into the U.S. market because of the need for exchanges between foreign and U.S. engineers as foreign technologies are tailored to U.S. requirements. Thus, from this perspective, the United States was afforded the lowest score on ITAR-related issues. In sum, fairly or not, ITAR is a major detrimental factor in the Transatlantic defense market that limits the opportunity for cross-border trade. Of course, it should be recognized that ITAR restrictions serve a very legitimate purpose—the protection of U.S. sensitive technologies and products that afford our military its qualitative superiority. Hence, it probably is unfair to view ITAR as the root of “all problems,” as one U.S. official put it. Indeed, in some areas, there is a cogent basis for the U.S. view that European controls have not been sufficiently robust. That said, however, it also is plain that U.S. ITAR rules are having an adverse impact on our armaments and defense industrial relationship with some of our closest allies.
Leadership/Competiveness BrinkCompetitors are rapidly gaining ground – reform is key now to ensure future US industrial, economic, and technological advantagesSokoloski and Tierney 10 - MARTIN M. IEEE Senior Member and 2004 IEEE Engineering and Diplomacy Fellow, TOM, IEEE Senior Member and is Vice-chair of the IEEE Los Alamos Northern New Mexico Section (May, “Technology Export Controls Revisited,” http://www.todaysengineer.org/2010/may/export-controls.asp)In contrast, the ITAR does not automatically exempt technologies from regulation with an “intent to publish.” Some academic institutions, industrial laboratories, and national laboratories that perform both fundamental and defense research are considered “non-exempt” regardless of the eventual intent of the research. This alternate interpretation by ITAR has resulted in a significant amount of criticism by the academic community to the extent that many are strongly discouraging defense-supporting research on their campuses to preserve an academic freedom environment. A potential solution for this problem is to regulate fewer technologies more efficiently with improved enforcement. Former Lockheed-Martin CEO Norman Augustine sums this up well by saying the export control system should be redesigned such that it “build[s] higher fences around smaller fields.” Export controls remain an important tool for preserving national security and to meet our nonproliferation obligations under multilateral agreements like the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Missile Technology Control Regime. Technologies that can pose grave danger to the United States are what the controls should protect. The problem is the system regulates too many technologies inefficiently and with a net negative effect. For example, ITAR creates a “virtual wall” around the U nited S tates by treating all space technology as though they are all weapons . “Space capabilities in other parts of the world now come close to matching— in some cases, maybe even exceeding — American space capabilities.” [xvi] The process of updating the USML by adding and removing relevant technologies that are readily available from foreign systems is bureaucratic and lengthy. As currently implemented, the ITAR no longer slows the rise of foreign space industries because comparable or more advanced technologies are available from other sources. The continued decrease in available U.S. launch platforms and the requirements to use foreign launch systems places the current ITAR in conflict with U.S. national space policy, which encourages international cooperation on mutually beneficial space activities. IEEE-USA's Committee on Transportation and Aerospace Policy delivered letters to the Secretary of State, the Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy, and even to President Bush requesting revision of the export controls policy. IEEE members in the U.S. Space Industry cite the outdated policies as contributing to losing shares in the international market. The nation’s advanced technology and manufacturing sector is at risk of losing its ability to compete in global competitive markets. The U.S. export controls policy must be modernized , taking into account the growing globalization of economics and technology development. In a world where more advanced technical degrees are being obtained overseas and the U.S. technical workforce is shrinking, there’s an exponentially-increasing need for foreign expertise in U.S. businesses, universities and laboratories. International cooperation and collaboration is a growing requirement in technology industry, academia and defense. To many, the space industry is a litmus-test for U.S. competitiveness in research, technology and engineering. The rest of the world is rapidly acquiring equivalent or more advanced technologies , in part due to the United State's inability to obtain the best and brightest talent, collaborate globally and promote its innovations to emerging markets. The outdated export control system is contributing to the decline in the U.S. space industry companies by artificially slowing interactions for both domestic and foreign markets Speaking at a recent the U.S. Export – Import Bank (Ex-Im Bank) conference in Washington, President Obama stressed the need to reform the export regulations to boost U.S. exports without sacrificing national security saying, “What we want to do is concentrate our efforts on enforcing controls on the export of our most critical technologies, making American safer while enhancing the competitiveness of key American industries.” IEEE-USA has recommended that the export control process be restructured within the federal government to balance economic interests against the inherent risks associated with military technologies. The U.S. government needs to enable instead of hinder U.S. economic competitiveness by offering more efficient export licensing systems based upon protecting only those critical technologies that are critical to national security. [xvii] Ensuring the scientific and technological competitiveness of the U nited S tates by adhering to and preserving the fundamental research exclusion as defined by NSDD-189 is a prerequisite for both national security and economic prosperity . [xviii] In addition, under the Arms Export Control Act and the Export Administration Act, expert authorities should be directed to administer the regulations. Subject matter expertise from industry, academia and the government must be involved in the process of identifying the technologies that require regulation and removing technologies that are available in the open market. Further simplification of the process should include identifying a single regulatory authority for all export licensing and enforcement. Finally, the restructured export control regulation should mandate that this federal organization utilize sufficient and appropriate scientific, technical and engineering expertise in concert with national security intelligence and analysis to be able to understand the implications of the exports they are regulating.
We are at a critical juncture - Current export policy drives away the foreign educated workforce and reform is necessary to solveAbbey and Lane 9 – George, Baker Botts Senior Fellow in Space Policy at the James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy at Rice University and Neil, Malcolm Gillis University Professor at Rice University (2009, “United States Space Policy: Challenges and Opportunities Gone Astray,” http://amacad.org/publications/spaceUS.pdf) Further compounding the damage done to U.S. industry, export controls and visa restrictions are preventing skilled scientists and engineers from joining the U.S. workforce. Bill Gates, chairman of Microsoft Corporation, has testified to Congress that the United States is driving away the world’s best engineers and computer scientists by limiting H-1B visas and other immigrant worker programs. More than half of the students in computer science programs at top U.S. universities are from other countries, but a limit on H-1Bs means many of those students can’t stay in the United States after they graduate. . . . The fact is, other countries’ smartest people want to come here, and that’s a huge advantage to us and in a sense, we’re turning them away. . . . I believe this country stands at a crossroads . . . . Economic progress depends more than ever on innovation. If we do not implement policies like those I have outlined today, the center of progress will shift to other nations that are more committed to the pursuit of technical excellence. 9 Even though the need for more engineers and scientists is clear, companies are starting to phase out the hiring of foreign nationals because of the stringent U.S. export control policy. 10 Hiring a foreign national requires an export license, a technology control plan, special training in export control compliance, facility modifications, computer network architecture modifications, and escorting and monitoring the employee. To ensure that it is innovative and competitive, U.S. industry needs to take advantage of the capabilities provided by foreign scientists and engineers. But to do so requires that U.S. export control rules and immigration policies be modified
The industrial base is on the brink – global engagement is key to their survivalLandry 10 – Major, USAF, thesis, Degree of Master of Science in Research and Development Management (August 2010, Kalliroi, “EXPLORING THE EFFECTS OF INTERNATIONAL TRAFFIC IN ARMS REGULATIONS RESTRICTIONS ON INNOVATION IN THE U.S. SPACE INDUSTRIAL BASE,” http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA535245) From 2007 through 2009, there have been at least eight studies that examined the health of the U.S. industrial base in general and the effects of ITAR specifically on the SIB. Key findings agree across these studies with regard to the space industry. Large defense contractors in the SIB are healthy, but there is some concern for key lower-tier suppliers (CSIS 2008; AFRL 2009). AFRL’s 2009 Industrial Base Assessment points out that d emand for global commercial and domestic military space systems is strong through at least 2012 (AFRL 2009). Upgrade and replacement efforts for nearly all on-orbit assets currently under-way in the national security space sector contribute to the “good” financial health of top-tier manufacturers in the SIB (CSIS 2008). However, export control requirements present a significant barrier to competing in foreign markets while there is an insufficient domestic demand to keep all suppliers operating at efficient capacity (AFRL 2009). Abbey and Lane (2009) show there is a direct correlation between export policies, cost of compliance, and financial health of smaller suppliers. Furthermore, domestic sources are diminishing or are at-risk for key items such as solar arrays and radiation-hardened electronics (AFRL 2009). U.S. space firms need to expand to the global community in order to survive. The concern for key lower-tier suppliers directly relates to a concern for innovation in the SIB. The Space Foundation’s 2008 study on ITAR and the U.S. space industry states that lower-tier companies are a major source of innovation. Lower-tier 11 companies invest a much higher percentage of internal funds as a percent of sales on space Research & Development (R&D) than larger aerospace contractors who rely more on government funding for research (Taylor 2007; NSSO 2008). Growth in R&D expenditures was seen primarily in lower-tier companies as an investment in innovation to remain competitive (Taylor 2007). However, the Institute for Defense Analyses’ 2007 study mentions that U.S. commercial firms are reluctant to engage in R&D activities for the DoD because of potential Department of State restrictions (Van Atta et al. 2007). Another report states that ITAR discourages companies from supplying their best technologies to the DoD so that they can compete in commercial and international markets for potentially higher sales volume and profits (OUSD-ATL 2009).
The industrial base is on the brink - ITAR restrictions will increasingly constrict the US’ ability to compete in the global market
Landry 10 – Major, USAF, thesis, Degree of Master of Science in Research and Development Management (August 2010, Kalliroi, “EXPLORING THE EFFECTS OF INTERNATIONAL TRAFFIC IN ARMS REGULATIONS RESTRICTIONS ON INNOVATION IN THE U.S. SPACE INDUSTRIAL BASE,” http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA535245)
1. What are the effects of ITAR restrictions on innovation in the U.S. SIB? This research did not reveal significant evidence that ITAR has a direct effect on innovation. The space industry has experienced some negative effects as a result of ITAR restrictions, such as increased costs due to compliance requirements and increased timelines due to the lengthy licensing process. These negative effects hinder the ability to compete in the global market, thus making growth for lower-tier companies difficult to 64 achieve. The industry may expect some secondary negative effects on innovation due to lower-tier companies abandoning the space industry, leaving a void in its primary source of innovation. This is already a risk for key technology areas where there are only one or two domestic suppliers, such as radiation hardened electronics and solar arrays. Companies specializing in these technology areas may not be able to compete in the global market due to ITAR restrictions; however, foreign companies are allowed to compete with them in the US market, making their survival challenging. If a company remains in the space industry, funds for ITAR compliance activities may be diverted from funds for internal R&D investments, thus reducing the potential for innovation. 2. Are there any indications that innovation in the SIB is declining since stricter ITAR restrictions were imposed in 1999? If so, what are they? The most useful indicators of innovation in the space industry are R&D expenditures as a percentage of total space sales and U.S. market share data over a tenyear period. The R&D expenditures data revealed a greater potential for innovation to occur in Tier 2 and Tier 3 companies because of a greater percentage of investment in R&D. There was a decrease in Tier 3 percentages from 2003 to 2006, which may indicate a decline in innovation, but a causal relationship cannot be inferred with certainty. The market share data reveals a decrease in the U.S. share of global satellite manufacturing, indicating a potential decline in space innovation. The DoD attributes the decrease in market share to U.S. export controls and foreign policies to increase indigenous capabilities (Taylor 2007). Within this context, it is possible to assume that 65 U.S. innovation has not changed, but an increase in foreign innovation has caused the U.S.’s decreased market share of the space industry. 3. What is the perception of the health of innovation in the SIB from space leaders in government and industry? The general perception is that innovation in the space industrial base is healthy. U.S. companies are able to develop products and services to meet the unique needs of their customers. Interview respondents feel confident in the U.S.’s ability to innovate and lead the space industry with superior technologies. However, U.S. export control policies threaten this ability because they limit participation in the global space market. Respondents expressed concern that innovation in the space industry will suffer if there are no changes to the current export control system.
Leadership and the aerospace industry is on the brink - The US is falling behind due to ITAR – satellites and “ITAR-free” goods proveDamast 10 – received his J.D. from Georgetown University Law Center in May 2010. He is currently employed by the Air Force Space Command (GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, Volume 42, pg. 211-232, “ EXPORT CONTROL REFORM AND THE SPACE INDUSTRY,”)Because of the unique constraints of ITAR relative to foreign export controls, foreign satellite manufacturers and operators have been discouraged from sourcing to the American market. At worst, as in the case of China, they were either unable to obtain American parts or satellites at all within reasonable price or time constraints; at best, as in the case of close allies, American parts added cost and time. This added difficulty created openings for competitors: ESA funded development of European solenoid valves to cut out American parts from their supply chain. 56 A Spanish company funded development of reflectors and American companies found themselves with global competitors where previously they had none. 57 Efforts such as these, much of them driven by a desire to avoid the onerous restrictions of American export controls, have enabled the production of “ITAR-free” satellites, closing foreign markets to American businesses. As this “ITAR-free” competition grows, foreign businesses have become able to ignore American export controls by simply sourcing abroad. Surveys of satellite operators reveal this perverse effect of ITAR. In the 2006 –7 COMSTAC survey, 42% of respondents identified American export controls as having a serious negative effect on their business; 58 in the 2008 –9 survey, only 15% did so. 59 Among the factors cited for this change was the availability of “ITAR-free” satellites from European and Chinese manufacturers. 60 American manufacturers have felt this market shift in their bottom lines: between 2003–2006, U.S. manufacturers attributed $2.35 billion in lost sales to long wait times for ITAR license processing. 61
Although historically U.S.-manufactured satellites were far more capable than those available abroad, that gap has been shrunk, if not outright closed, by European and Chinese manufacturers since 1999. 62 From 2000 to 2008, the American share of satellite manufacturing declined from $6 billion out of a global industry of $11.5 billion to $3.1 billion out of $10.5 billion. The Satellite Industry Association has attributed this decline in part to ITAR, noting that over that time period, the majority of business which had previously gone to American manufactures was going to European manufacturers instead. 63 In the 2003–2006 period alone, American manufacturers saw their share of the commercial communications satellite market drop by twenty percent. 64 Whether as a cause or an effect, innovation by American companies has suffered as their share of the market has fallen: while American companies have not introduced a new generation of communications satellite bus since 1999, European companies have introduced four, and China and Japan have each introduced one. 65 Reports commissioned by the Pentagon have found that although the first tier U.S. satellite businesses were still doing well, due to being buoyed by strong defense spending, the second and third tier players— subcontractors and commodity suppliers—were being significantly harmed. 66 It also found that all tiers of the satellite industry were seeing margins far lower than related industries in the high tech or aerospace sector. 67 Moreover, national security was by far the largest customer for the domestic industry. 68 Falling export share exacerbated this condition: by 2007, export business accounted for only 10% of industry revenues. 69 The implications are serious: in the space arena, ITAR may be undermining its own purpose. The intent of ITAR, and of placing satellites and space-qualified parts under the ITAR regime, is to ensure America’s technological edge in a sector that Congress has deemed essential to national security and to prevent America’s competitors from gaining access to key technologies in that sector. The actual result of this policy has been to encourage the development of foreign industry and reduce America’s technological edge, in some cases to the point of parity. 70 Further, by constraining American industry’s ability to compete in global markets, to obtain advanced technologies from abroad, and to cooperate with our allies, it is possible that current policies will ultimately result in America actually falling behind in areas it once dominated. 71
ITAR encourages other countries development of indigenous technology baring the US from international cooperationBerteau et al 10 (David J., Senior Adviser and Director of the CSIS Defense-Industrial Initiatives, as well as a handful of other researchers from CSIS, April 30, 2010, “National Security and the Commercial Space Sector,” http://csis.org/files/publication/100430_berteau_commercial_space.pdf Accessed: 3/9/11) U.S. export control policies have long been a matter of controversy, but the consensus among those interviewed by CSIS is that these policies continue to be a significant driver in the evolution of space capabilities, markets, and industrial capabilities. As U.S. International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) are applied to space technologies, the launch of satellites with U.S. technology content by foreign launch providers is prohibited unless the U.S. government authorizes such a launch. The avowed purpose of this restriction is to protect against the transfer of sensitive satellite technology to foreign countries, with the twin goals of protecting U.S. advantages in space technology and preventing the use of this technology by U.S. adversaries to the detriment of U.S. national security. Expert opinion is divided about whether such restrictions enhance or inhibit U.S. national security capabilities. Some have maintained that when a nation launches rockets, military or commercial, its military capabilities are enhanced. Others contend that several commercial launches a year do little to enhance military capabilities. Some note that the United States has launched many payloads with foreign launch vendors and developed very robust security procedures to protect sensitive U.S. technologies. Others note the growing sophistication of foreign intelligence threats and a potential for cyber intrusions which are difficult to counter. Some believe that export controls have kept technologies which benefit U.S. national security out of foreign hands. Others have argued that other nations have developed their own technology base in response to U.S. export controls, undermining U.S. security. Whether these nations would have developed new space technologies in the absence of U.S. export controls is moot. It is clear, however, that many countries have been undeterred by U.S. export control policy, and some have used those controls as a catalyst to develop indigenous space capabilities. For example, China’s decision several years ago to create a China-centric space community stems in part from the fact China has been barred from launching satellites with U.S. components. By 2007, China had partnered with Bangladesh, Indonesia, Iran, Mongolia, Pakistan, Peru, and Thailand to develop an earth observation satellite system, had organized a satellite association in Asia (the Asia Pacific Space Cooperation Organization), and had designed, built, and launched a communications satellite for Nigeria.32 It also launched a Chinese-built communications satellite for Venezuela in 2008 . Europeans also view the U.S. export control regime as a catalyst for some of their space activities. Daniel Sacotte, head of ESA’s Human Spaceflight program, was quoted in 2005 as saying, “It’s a shame, but it’s not for me to comment on U.S. law, only to note its effects, and for the Rover [the U.S. Mars probe], ITAR would
have made cooperation too complicated to be feasible. … We are now obliged to develop our autonomy in various areas, which is no bad thing … We may also find partners besides NASA.”33 In line with this announcement, the ESA is funding the development of a European supplier of solenoid valves in order to remove that U.S. part from European space propulsion systems. The Spanish company CASA developed its own capability to supply reflectors as part of the European ITAR-free space technology movement (it previously had limited capability), and today it is a global competitor in reflectors technology. Similarly, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh proudly announced to the Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO): “It is a matter of particular pride that international technology denial regimes have not impeded your efforts—in fact, they have spurred you to greater heights.”34 U.S. companies also believe that export controls make penetration of foreign markets more difficult. As demonstrated by the responses of U.S. space executives to a survey conducted by Booz, Allen & Hamilton in 2006, U.S. companies are frustrated by the uncertainty involved in complying with ITAR. Fifty-six percent of respondents disagreed or strongly disagreed with the statement that export controls are easy to understand; 71 percent disagreed or strongly disagreed with the statement that the time it takes to process an export control request is predictable; and 85 percent agreed or strongly agreed that this lack of clarity and unpredictability in the process hinders their ability to make strategic business decisions.
ITAR restrictions limit ISS efficiency and international coopBerteau et al 10 (David J., Senior Adviser and Director of the CSIS Defense-Industrial Initiatives, as well as a handful of other researchers from CSIS, April 30, 2010, “National Security and the Commercial Space Sector,” http://csis.org/files/publication/100430_berteau_commercial_space.pdf Accessed: 3/9/11) In scientific collaboration, evidence is amassing concerning the restrictions imposed by the U.S. export control regime. Nobel laureate George F. Smoot noted: “Collaboration between U.S. and European scientists is harder now than it was before U.S. technology-transfer rules were tightened in 1999 … U.S. government officials charged with reviewing bilateral or multilateral science projects have been so worried about being accused of letting sensitive technologies slip into the wrong hands that they have overcompensated.”58 William Gerstenmaier, NASA’s associate administrator for space operations, put it more bluntly:“[Export controls cause] problems between us and our international partners that are really more of a problem than the benefit we are gaining by having the ... restrictions in there.”59 The International Space Station (ISS) Independent Safety Task Force reinforced this position in its final report, which noted that: “[A] contractor workforce comprises the majority of the [International Space Stations] operations workforce and must be able to have a direct interface with the [international partners] IP operations team to assure safe and successful operations. Their interactions and their ability to exchange and discuss technical data relevant to vehicle operations are severely hampered by the current ITAR restrictions.” In addition, the report noted that: “Currently the ITAR restrictions and the IP’s objections to signing technical assistance agreements are a threat to the safe and successful integration and operations of the Station.”60
ITAR has uniquely propelled China and Russia ahead of usGold 8 – Michael, Director and Corporate Counsel of Bigelow Aerospace's Washington, D.C. Area Office (January 1, 2008, “The Wrong Stuff: America's Aerospace Export Control Crisis,” http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1025&context=nlr)In almost any real sense, America has lost the space race to the Russians. America once held an international monopoly for commercial space launch. Now, we have managed to go from being No. 1 to having only one commercial space launch in 2006.6 Our domestic launch companies have become so lazy and bloated that only the U.S. Government can afford their services. If the government was to stop purchasing U.S. rockets or open its contracts up to foreign competition, the American launch industry as we know it would most likely cease to exist. 7 In stark contrast, the Russian Aerospace sector is booming. Russian rockets accounted for twelve commercial launches in 2007-more than half of all commercial launches in the year, and double that of their closest competitor, the European Arianne system, that was responsible for six commercial launches in 2007.8 Moreover, once the Space Shuttle is retired in 2010 (assuming no major failures occur prior to 2010 forcing the Shuttle to be taken out of service even earlier), Russia and China will become the only two nations capable of launching people into space. How much America's backward export control regime has influenced the U.S.'s downward spiral in commercial space launch is arguable, although it would be impossible to contend that it has not been a contributing factor to today's dismal situation. 9 However, where the harm done by the ITAR is probably most keenly felt is in
the U.S. satellite manufacturing industry. Since all space hardware was moved to the ITAR/the USML in 1999, the once dominant American commsat manufacturing sector has seen its share of the global market drop from a dominant eighty three percent to a soft fifty percent. European competitors such as Alcatel Alenia (which explicitly advertises an "ITAR-Free" satellite) have doubled their market share while U.S. entities,11 and particularly small and medium sized businesses, are withdrawing from international contracts. 12 In the meantime, China, one of the primary countries that the ITAR was intended to keep advanced space technology away from, has of course continued to purchase state-of-the art hardware from European and Israeli suppliers, costing U.S. companies as much as $3 billion in Chinese-related business alone.13 In short, if the objectives of the 1998 export control reforms expanding the ITAR were to cripple domestic U.S. capacity, lose billions of dollars, and bolster European competition, all without impacting Chinese capabilities, then we should rest assured that the mission has been accomplished. Not only does the ITAR as currently implemented have a significant negative impact on the nation's commercial and economic interests, but it also fails in its primary goal to bolster national security. 14 By diminishing or outright eliminating America's space hardware manufacturing capabilities, Department of Defense contractors become more and more dependent on foreign systems and components. This is why many national security experts are now advocating ITAR reform. 15 Ironically, America's own export control regime has become a significant threat to American security. If the stakes were not so high, it would almost be laughable.
ITAR has pushed china away from us and damaged our cooperation – Sino-European cooperation provesHitchens and Chen 8 – Theresa, Director of the Center for Defense Information, David, Principal Research Analyst at Centra Technology, Inc. (June 2008, “Forging a Sino-US ‘‘grand bargain’’ in space,” http://www.cdi.org/pdfs/HitchensGrandBargain.pdf)
Considering Chinese investment in its space program as a centerpiece of national prestige and as a lever for economic development, the USA has the opportunity to link a variety of related economic incentives with opening, and concluding, negotiations on a code of conduct in space, including Chinese abandonment of destructive antisatellite weapons programs. These potential bargaining chips include such options as participation in the International Space Station (ISS), joint exploration missions, reform in US policies restricting sales of commercial satellite hardware, and licensing of Chinese launch services. In exchange, China might willingly restrict behaviors that could lead to strategic miscalculation in space, as well as certain forms of counter-space capabilities. Providing what the Chinese want in civil and commercial space arguably would cost the USA little, and in this value–cost differential exists the potential of a mutually beneficial agreement. In international prestige, no greater prize currently exists for China than to be recognized and be admitted as a partner in the ISS. While the ISS program would benefit from Chinese investment and the potential use of Shenzhou modules for crew or cargo transport, the reality is that China needs ISS more than ISS needs the Chinese, even with the imminent retirement of the Shuttle fleet. With the successful docking and cargo transfer of the European Space Agency’s Automatic Transfer Vehicle in March 2008, the need for a backup to Soyuz is not yet a dire urgency [10]. The approach can be gradual, with perhaps the visit of a Chinese space tourist to the station, before the docking of a Shenzhou cargo vehicle, then perhaps the inclusion of a Chinese module to the station, culminating in a routine rotation of Chinese personnel on the station. Indeed, ISS participation offers a stepwise schedule of incentives in negotiations with the Chinese. After the 1998 Strom Thurmond Defense Authorization Act imposed restrictions on the export of commercial satellites and related technologies under the State Department’s Munitions List and the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), Beijing considered such policies as primarily an effort to contain China’s rise as a space power and to prevent its space industry from competing with US industry on the international market. The congressional rationale for the move was, and remains, concern about the transfer of space technology that could be used by the Chinese to improve their intercontinental ballistic missiles, even though technology migration has traditionally gone the other way around, from ballistic missiles to space launch vehicles. Whatever the motivation, the immediate effect of the export control shift was to all but close the Western satellite and launch market to China and vice versa, since US export law extends to all space systems that use US parts. US export laws may have slowed, but have demonstrably failed to ‘‘contain’’ China’s progressive development of space launch and satellite technology. They have also failed to prevent—and some argue have instead provoked— Sino-European cooperation in space, leading to the growth of an ‘‘ITAR-free’’ business model in both Europe and China, to the detriment of the US space industry. As noted by a recent report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, ‘‘Not only have these requirements harmed our domestic technological and manufacturing base, but they have had a drastic negative effect on both the hard and soft power utilization of space’’ [11]. Further, the commercial satellite industry has long advocated the exemption of certain technologies from the list, arguing that these technologies are already available off-the-shelf. It
seems that US government officials are finally listening, as the Pentagon’s Defense Technology Security Administration and the National Security Space Office are working to review satellite components with an eye to removing at least some of them from the Munitions List [12]. Thus, the cost of ITAR reform, with regard to commercial space, is in reality likely to be much less than some fear, and may be necessary for maintaining the viability of the US satellite industry. Finally, lifting the ITAR restrictions, in whole or at least in large part, opens the previously blocked path of cooperation with China in space exploration. Cooperation on civil space traditionally has been seen in the USA as a tool of soft power and a method of dampening tensions between potential adversaries, dating back to the Apollo– Soyuz Test Project. Enabling, for example, a multi-nation cooperative program in lunar exploration would again be a ‘‘prestige’’ incentive for China, which wants very badly to be seen as a world-class space power. Arguably such broad international cooperation on space exploration would also benefit the USA directly by allowing NASA to more widely share the nontrivial cost burdens at a time when budgetary pressure on the US government is growing rapidly.
AT: Perm do both 1. Still links to the net-benefit – this outweighs the case 2. The CP is a pre-requisite to the plan, doing the CP first is key
AT: Perm do the CP then the plan 1. Still links to the net-benefit 2. TF perms are a voting issue
a. Ground – they can always claim to do something whenever – allows them to no-link out of DA’s kills neg ground
b. Intrinsic – adds sequence to the plan, moots the 1NC c. Severance – they sever out of the immediacy of their aff destroying our ability
to garner offense and makes their aff conditional
AT: Perm do the plan then the CP 1. Still links to the net-benefit 2. No solvency – Extend Abbey and Lane 9 – removing/reforming ITAR is a pre-
requisite to the plan, cross-apply from the overview why ITAR restrictions are barriers to aff solvency
3. TF perms are a voting issue 1. Ground – they can always claim to do something whenever – allows them to
no-link out of DA’s kills neg ground 2. Intrinsic – adds sequence to the plan, moots the 1NC 3. Severance – they sever out of the immediacy of their aff destroying our ability
to garner offense and makes their aff conditional
AT: No Quantitative DataEven if quantitative data isn’t enough – the US loses massive opportunities for international cooperation because of ITARVan Atta et al 8 – Richard, Senior Research Analyst at the Institute for Defense Analyses (October 2008, Mark Bittmann, Paul Collop,y Bradley Hartfield, Bruce Harmon, Marshall Kapla,n Nicolas Karvonide,s Michael J. Lippitz, Jay Mandelbaum, Michael Marks, Malcolm Patterson, Kay Sullivan, “ Export Controls and the U.S. Defense Industrial Base – Revised,” http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA490280)ITAR controls, while specific to a limited number of very specialized militaryrelated materials, also entail industrial base dynamics that are largely similar to those described for the dual-use industry. Most of these exports are to established European markets, and most licenses are ultimately approved. As such, no demonstrable adverse impacts were identified due to ITAR’s denial of licenses of US CF-PMC feedstock for military specific aerostructures. However, the Department of State’s implementation processes for the review and approval of licenses is besieged with serious problems including substantial delays, inconsistencies in decision-making, intrusions into supplier-customer relationships, and lack of process visibility, efficiency and accountability . These mounting problems in ITAR’ s implementation could reduce US leadership in European defense markets through European integrators designing out US ITAR products and providing incentives for the formation of non-US competitors . ITAR also imposes pervasive controls on technology know-how (i.e. TAAs and MLAs), impacting not only defense firms abroad and foreign defense ministries of close US allies but also directly affecting ongoing DoD military aircraft production (UH-60 Black Hawk), development of future combat systems (F-35 Lightning II) and associated export trade offset ventures. Various manufacturing, and development programs, have experienced scheduling delays, significant increases in costs and impediments to innovation of importance to DoD. Industry reports that millions of dollars of added supply chain costs result from these controls. ITAR is increasingly impacting commercial aircraft production, due to “tainting” of CF-PMC aerostructures. Decades old legacy technology originally developed by industry with DoD funding and (or) qualification testing for a former defense program are typically considered ITAR classified (tainted). The added costs of industry “fire walls” and requalification of legacy ITAR technology for future commercial uses are measured in the tens of millions of dollars. Not only does this conflict with the fundamental business case for advancing a dual-use industrial base for the ultimate benefit of DoD and the civilian economy, but ITAR tainting can retard the continued technology maturation and future evolution of earlier R&D investments. For example, ITAR tainting impacted DoD’s recently concluded $150M Composites Affordability Initiative (CAI), in which private industry contributed 50% of the cost. The commercial aircraft industry is reluctant to commercialize CAI technologies because of ITAR tainting as major aircraft OEMs prohibit use of such tainted technologies in their products. Thus, DoD and US industry are not fully utilizing CAI’s CF-PMC investments for either military or commercial applications. Similar ITAR tainting impedes DoD partnerships with US industry an local universities through such investment vehicles as R&D broad agency announcements (BAAs), internal research and development (IR&D), Small Business Innovative Research/Small Business Technology Transfer (SBIR/STTRs) and Cooperative Research and Development Agreements (CRADAs). US firms and domestic universities are “opting-out” of DoD R&D cooperation opportunities and US industry is offshoring R&D abroad to escape ITAR tainting of future dual-use developments. This is ironic since a cornerstone to the past success of the US dual-use industrial base for CF-PMC aerostructures is founded on the spin-on/spin-off opportunities, public-private collaboration and risk sharing entailed in this dual-use approach. In conclusion, the impacts and effects of export controls on this highly strategic and economically important US industrial base is not meaningfully measured by the modest loss of traditional export sales of physical products. More important are the broader effects on future competitiveness and implications of export controls at the global supply chain level for such a highly distributed manufacturing and R&D enterprise. This wider perspective on larger-scale industrial base impacts of export controls requires developing a greater understanding of national and economic security implications and expanded insights on the highly dynamic and increasingly globalized, dual-use, US advanced materials industrial base. Even if there is little quantitative data for the past effects of ITAR – the status quo will push the US out of its innovative leadership roleVan Atta et al 8 – Richard, Senior Research Analyst at the Institute for Defense Analyses (October 2008, Mark Bittmann, Paul Collop,y Bradley Hartfield, Bruce Harmon, Marshall Kapla,n Nicolas Karvonide,s Michael J. Lippitz, Jay Mandelbaum, Michael Marks, Malcolm Patterson, Kay Sullivan, “ Export Controls and the U.S. Defense Industrial Base – Revised,” http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA490280)The Institute for Defense Analyses was tasked to assess the economic impacts of export controls on the defense industrial base. In conducting the study emphasis was placed on employing quantitative metrics of these impacts, getting “beyond anecdotes.” The study focused on four industry sectors: satellites, microelectronics, machine tools, and advanced materials. For all of these
sectors quantitative data, while generally available on business health and trends, did not reveal major impacts of export controls . With controls limited to trade-related activities to certain proscribed destinations, such as China, North Korea, some Middle Eastern countries , and a few others, and the aspects of what is controlled being limited to certain higher-tech products and processes, by and large the overall economic impact of these controls is marginal compared to the overall scale and scope of these industries. However, the impact on specific leading companies in the most advanced segments of these industries is, along with general globalization trends, encouraging leading edge product development to move overseas. US implementation of export controls act like an import tariff on selected advanced technology products from the US. In a globalizing world, where firms are increasingly multinational and product development is multinational, a tariff on exports encourages firms to move advanced research overseas. In segments where the US maintains a significant historical lead and a diverse industry, such as in satellites and microelectronics, these impacts are not pronounced. In segments such as machine tools and advanced materials, where the markets are dominated by a small number of firms—often only one or two in a given country—export controls could contribute to the US-based firms abandoning the leading edge of the industry. There is clearly an opportunity today for government and US industry to come together to modernize export controls to facilitate the shared goals of national security and economic competitiveness. Certain reforms can be made to simplify the application process, such as more effective information technology solutions and better integration of the various government offices involved in the licensing process. Reforms such as the Validated End User provisions of the recent “China Catch-All” proposal, if implemented appropriately and efficiently, could greatly facilitate maintaining international customer relationships. The control lists themselves need to be continuously updated so that different agencies are not applying different controls to identical technologies and, more importantly, so that time is not wasted attempting to control technologies that no longer warrant such scrutiny, while facilitating faster and better review of genuinely critical technologies.
AT: Reform NowThe current ITAR bill in congress has bureaucratic inefficiencies that will hamper ITAR’s effectiveness – exclusion of China Damast 10 – received his J.D. from Georgetown University Law Center in May 2010. He is currently employed by the Air Force Space Command (GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, Volume 42, pg. 211-232, “ EXPORT CONTROL REFORM AND THE SPACE INDUSTRY,”)H.R. 2410 also adds yet another layer of difficulty to the export control regime by maintaining satellites and related technologies on the USML as to China and China alone. This would create serious [*229] problems of administration and enforcement. Historically, items have either been covered by the USML, which distinguishes by use, not destination, or by BIS's Commerce Control List (CCL), which does distinguish by destination or end-use. There is some precedent for classifying items on multiple lists, as many items subject to permissive export on the CCL are also subject to nearly complete denial under the Treasury Department's list of embargoed countries. n112 A key difference arises, though, due to ITAR's lack of a de minimis exception. This will create uncertainty in the application of the law to American exports, because a product may be exported under EAR control but then be re-exported to China far down the distribution chain, long after it has been incorporated into another product . For example, a component may be exported to Europe or Japan permissively under EAR jurisdiction for use in manufacturing a commodity satellite bus. That manufacturer may also source the same part from a foreign supplier. The satellite may then be bought by an operator who decides shortly thereafter to launch from China. The satellite component would then become subject to all of the restrictions of ITAR, including the need for a TAA and DTSA monitoring--possibly without the knowledge of the exporter, manufacturer, operator, or launcher. Had the item been covered by ITAR throughout, the exporters would have had to be responsible for their product through the entire supply chain and any attempts at re-export would have required licensing; the same is true under EAR for items requiring licenses, which is not the case for de minimis parts. Given the severity of the penalties for violating ITAR, n113 this places a heavy burden on exporters. In practice, the regulations would be unenforceable unless the original manufacturer kept tabs on the part all the way down the line until final disposition. Enforcing the regulations would therefore require such an effort. At that point, the protections required would only be slightly less intrusive than ITAR--if so, the legislation will have failed to achieve its stated purpose. An additional complication arises in that some satellite components, such as certain kinds of communications equipment and solar panels, are currently classified not under ITAR jurisdiction, but under EAR jurisdiction. From an administrative perspective, this would require keeping two lists: one for satellite components on the CCL as of the date of H.R. 2410's passage and one for those subject to ITAR. Under the bill, those that were on the CCL, such as solar panels, could be exported to China as much as [*230] allowed under the EAR, while those that were not, such as fuel for a satellite's maneuvering rockets, would be subject to ITAR. A further complication could arise in that the Executive could choose to place some of the items currently under EAR jurisdiction under ITAR jurisdiction. At that point, the Executive might lose the discretion to return them to EAR jurisdiction for export to China. Alternatively, a separate list would need to be maintained of those items that were originally subject to EAR as of the date of the bill's passage but were subsequently transferred to ITAR jurisdiction: the Executive might then retain the discretion to return those items to the CCL. Given these problems of implementation, it might be better to eliminate the China exclusion entirely and simply allow BIS to subject satellite exports to China to the highest levels of licensing scrutiny afforded under the EAR. Furthermore, the post-Tiananmen requirement that the President approve, and notify Congress of, every satellite exported to launch from or by China remains in effect. n114 If Congress were truly worried about Chinese military use of civil American space technologies, it could simply mandate a general policy of exclusion under the EAR, thus preserving the de minimis exception. Alternatively, it could add a de minimis exception to ITAR. The current political climate , however, allows for none of these changes . In fact, the original draft of the bill did not include the China exclusion; its addition was necessary to pass the bill.
AT: Links to Politics ITAR reform is bipartisan – reliance on China Kusiolek 11 (Richard, Satellite-evolution magazine writer, “Cautious optimism - 2011 US ITARReforms,” January/February 2011, http://www.satellite-evolution.com/issues-2011/sea-jan-2011/itar.pdf DA: 7/29/11) *Quoting Patricia Cooper, President of the US Satellite Industry Association (SIA)ITAR’S upshot Reinsch spoke that “they (Obama Administration) said that their goal for ITAR reform was the middle of 2011 anyway at least that is their goal. However from my experience they have missed every time line goal that they set. I would be surprised if they met that timeline for ITAR reform legislations.” Cooper stated that “you can forget about your crystal ball as no one knows as we have a new Congress. However, we are hopeful as there is bi-partisan support in the House and many of those supporters ITAR) reform are in positions of leadership and respect. Congress has a specific concern regarding China that it treated with a global orientation. Many of our members would like to see all restraints from launching from China to go away ! As a group we are saying you do not have to address that now. There is a great world of trade and transactions and they have nothing to do with China…free those concerns that are specific to China…Congress should not decide how satellites should be treated…Congress should trust the same agencies who evaluate satellite-related technologies such as UAD defence technology.”
The CP is bipartisan – bipartisan working group proves Manzullo 9 (Donald A., Common Defense Quarterly The Journal for International Defense Cooperation, Representative Donald A. Manzullo “Export Control Reform – Needed Now More Than Ever,” Fall 2009, http://www.commondefensequarterly.com/archives/CDQ3/exports.htm DA: 7/29/11) American manufacturers face a staggering number of challenges during this recession, and a key obstacle to global competitiveness is the regulatory barrier associated with exporting into the international marketplace. Modernizing the U .S. export control policies would increase competitiveness while reinforcing U.S. national security. A modernized system would also allow the U.S. to work more closely with international partners and help to achieve more efficient and effective interoperability with our allies. I created the Congressional Export Control Working Group in January 2007 with the goal of informing Members of Congress about the importance of common sense export control reform. The bipartisan Working Group is co-chaired by Rep. Earl Blumenauer (D-OR) and Rep. Joe Crowley (D-N.Y.). We have hosted key administration officials as well as major industry representatives and have coalesced around a plan of action on several key issues. Defense Trade Controls Recognizing the primacy of U.S. national security concerns, my initial efforts to improve the export control system have addressed the State Department. The Defense Trade Controls Performance Improvement Act was originally introduced in November 2007 and passed the House in May 2008 as part of a larger security assistance package. The legislation has now passed the House again, this time as Title VIII of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act (H.R. 2410). The legislation, which I co-wrote along with Rep. Brad Sherman (D-CA), will reduce defense trade license processing times, create a spare part waiver for our closest allies, and make licensing of defense items more predictable and transparent. These process improvements will, in turn, make U.S. defense manufacturers more competitive in the global marketplace and strengthen our ties with partners and allies abroad. No longer will these manufacturers have to fear being shut out of foreign markets or designed out of products merely because they are regulated by the International Traffic in Arms Regulations ( ITAR ). Without this legislation, foreign customers will continue to search out products that are “ITAR-free” to avoid being entangled in U.S. export control laws.
CP doesn’t link to politicsSpacePolitics.com, 07 – SpacePolitics.com (SpacePolitics.com, February 26, 2007, “A window of opportunity for export control reform”, http://www.spacepolitics.com/2007/02/26/a-window-of-opportunity-for-export-control-reform/)The strategy proposed by David Garner, a retired Air Force colonel responsible in part for the current regulations, is to have a presidential commission study the issue and propose solutions; this would provide some political cover for members of Congress who might otherwise be less willing to back reform . Otherwise, Garner warns, “If we don’t take the opportunity, politics is going to eat us alive and, frankly, my good friends across the Atlantic will take advantage, as they have for the last seven years, of the legislation we created and they’re just going to continue to beat the crap out of us.”
AT: Prolif DAProliferation won’t happen – there’s been one instance where it was the case, and it wasn’t trueMcVey, 09 – Chair of the International Section at Williams Mullen specializing in global transactions and with extensive experience in the federal regulation of international business transactions (Thomas B., December 23, 2009, “ITAR and U.S. Export Controls”, pg 21, http://www.williamsmullen.com/files/Publication/35c703b5-0aaf-4a20-b00f-b68202cdc7dd/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/6e77ee82-7dc2-47c9-a233-b6912ee31230/ITAR-and-US-Export-Controls.pdf)The allegations involved 63 unlicensed exports to a variety of countries of various service parts controlled under Export Commodity Classification Number 2B350 for reasons of chemical and biological weapons proliferation, specifically, Teflon-coated valves. The violations occurred between 2003 and 2007. The company voluntarily disclosed the violations, and cooperated fully with the investigation.
AT: “As Per” theory 1. Our CP text is specific enough – no abuse 2. Cross-ex checks – they can just ask what we defend 3. In-depth research – Specific solvency advocates key to research specific policy
proposals 4. Vagueness – specific solvency advocates key to avoid vague CP texts, which
make the neg more of a moving target 5. Reject the argument not the team
---ITAR Takeout EXTS.
Ext: STEM I/L Solvency ITAR destroys our educated job base and undermines US leadership in innovationFinarelli and Alexander 8 - Margaret G. ISU Vice President for North American Operations and Joseph K. director of the Space Studies Board (2008, “SPACE SCIENCE AND THE INTERNATIONAL TRAFFIC IN ARMS REGULATIONS,” http://www.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=12093&page=R1)An important premise that was mentioned often during the workshop was that science is intrinsically an international enterprise, whether conducted by private-sector organizations or by academic institutions.1 Unlike industry, universities are inherently open in their operations. Participants noted that advances in space science benefit substantially from the diversity and expertise of foreign researchers at universities and national laboratories and from academe’s open environment for the exchange of information. However, ITAR requirements pose obstacles for international participation in research at U.S. institutions. An important side effect of the obstacles is that international interest is diverted away from the United States as a research partner to alternative foreign providers , such as China, Russia, and India . The experiences of other space agencies (such as the European Space Agency and the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency) in dealing with the United States on ITAR have led to concerns abroad over collaboration with the United States and have stimulated policies that encourage foreign industry to avoid collaboration and to become autonomous in space projects to avoid the burdens imposed by ITAR. Diminishing U.S. Access to Foreign Expertise Participants argued that the current ITAR regime, contrary to the intent of export-control regulations, serves as a detriment to U.S. national interests in at least two ways. First, there is a “reverse brain drain” effect in which talented U.S.-trained scientists and engineers are avoiding what they perceive as an overregulated U.S. science market. Scientific and technical professionals are reluctant to become engaged in space research, because they find the effort to deal with ITAR frustrating or even insurmountable . Second, the administrative burden, cost, and unpredictable delays leading to loss of contracts to international competitors adversely affect the entrepreneurial small-business base of U.S. third-tier suppliers that are important elements of the U.S. aerospace industry. During the workshop, some participants noted that ITAR is having a serious effect on foreign cooperation with U.S. scientists, especially because of lack of clarity in the regulations, inconsistency in their application, and delays associated with approval of TAAs. Those problems are expected to worsen as projects, such as the James Webb Space Telescope and the Mars Surface Lander, become more ambitious and complex. International participants in the workshop went so far as to speculate that without high-level U.S. government relief on ITAR, the development of highly integrated infrastructure programs, such as those envisioned for human space exploration, will be impossible. Handicaps on Effective Space-Mission Designs In addition to concerns about effects of ITAR on science and technology in the broad sense, speakers noted more specific effects on individual projects. Participants believe that ITAR constraints compromise the capabilities and scientific return of individual space missions by making it difficult for mission science teams to take advantage of the best skills and resources in participating partners’ countries. For example, teams involved in international projects often devise less-than-optimal spacecraft test plans that minimize the exchange of information rather than maximize the chances of mission success, thereby compromising instrument development and testing. ITAR requirements also increase mission cost, technical risk, and schedule uncertainties by restricting the flow of critical but routine technical data required to implement scientific investigations.2
ITAR undermines the US’ ability to attract foreign students to sure up our declining industryFisher 10 – William, Lieutenant Colonel, United States Army (March 25, 2010, “U.S. Space Policy and Space Industry Strangulation,” http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA521763&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf)The regulatory requirements have also had a negative effect on the pool of human capital available in the U.S. for research and development. For many of the same reasons that materiel was controlled (the ongoing cold war), human capital and intellectual capital are also regulated. In this area the world has experienced great change. As with technology, the regulatory requirements have not changed to meet the requirements of the modern world. Traditionally, the United States had to worry about science and technology flowing out of the country. Today, the U.S. has to be concerned about keeping science and technology flowing into the country. 40 As other countries, India and China for example, experience increased economic growth; investment is made in its
human 14 capital. This includes world class schools with advanced curriculua in science and technology. In these, and other emerging countries, a world class education system, coupled with a viable industrial base to provide jobs, and a broadening middle class and upper middle class, makes staying near family, hearth and home an attractive option to studying, working and living in the U.S.. The result is that talented human capital remains home instead of emigrating to the United States. 41 U.S. space policy, implemented through the AECA and ITAR, has impeded the flow of human capital into the U.S. space industry. Because ITAR restricted information can only be accessed by U.S. citizens or shared with foreign citizens through the licensing process (information is treated like an export), hiring talented foreign scientists and engineers is problematic . Compounding the problem is the fact that licenses are granted for specific information and projects and sharing of information across projects, even in the company, is forbidden unless further licensing is obtained. Limits placed on the number of H1B1 Visas, those used for non-immigrating persons with specialty skills who want to work in the U.S., reduce the overall pool available and exacerbate the problem. The reason this is a major problem for the U.S. is because there are not enough U.S. citizen engineering students to support projected growth in the industry. The U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics is predicting an 11% increase in space related engineering positions between 2006 and 2016. 42 These are new positions and the prediction does not take into account retirements from an aging workforce with approximately 58% of the workforce over 50 years of age. Lockheed Martin has indicated it will need 140,000 engineers over the next ten years just to cover engineer retirements. 43 While enrollment 15 for baccalaureate engineering degrees at U.S. universities in 2008 is primarily U.S. students (94%), foreign students enrolled in masters programs make up almost half the population (43%), and are over half for doctoral programs (52%). 44 Trends from 1999 to 2007 for engineering baccalaureate degrees awarded are fairly flat running between 91% and 94%. The U.S. student to foreign student ratio for masters programs shows a downward trend from 2000 to 2004 but recovered by 2007 to just 1% higher than 1999 at 61%. U.S. student doctorial degrees awarded have experienced a significant and sustained downward trend from 1999 to 2007 with a 16% decline over that period. 45 Two disturbing trends that point to a dilution of the U.S. high technology intellectual base are found in authorship of science and engineering articles and the U.S. share of patent grants issued by the U.S. Authorship, or in this case co-authorship of U.S. science and engineering articles between U.S. and the international community has increased by 27% from 1988 to 2007. This indicates a reduced pool of available U.S. engineers with doctorial level education to drive innovation within the industry. 46 Indeed, this is a two sided coin that clearly shows greater international cooperation, which is welcomed, but it also shows the U.S. science and engineering community not having the resources to author articles independent of the greater international community. Similarly, the U.S. share of U.S. patent grants has been on the decline from 1995 to 2008 dropping by 7% during that period. 47 The number of patent grants obtained by an individual or corporation is an indication of successful and marketable innovation. The drop for the U.S. and corresponding rise in U.S. patent grants for Asian countries is another indication of shifting intellectual capital. 16 It is clear that to sustain growth and fill expected engineering positions that the U.S. will have to depend on talented and specialized foreign human capital. Unfortunately, due to a globally broadened technology base and an expanding middle and upper middle class in many of the countries from which these foreign workers hail, the U.S. might be at a competitive disadvantage . In other words these workers will opt to work at home. Access to information, feeling of being part of a team, the ability to work in a desired discipline or on a desired project will all be factors in the individual decision of where to settle and start or continue careers. AECA, USML and ITAR all work against the U.S. in that they restrict access to information and the ability to work on desired projects because of a perceived threat to national security.
Ext: AerospaceNo solvency – ITAR blocks competitiveness and cooperation Nosanov 9 (Jeffrey P., Program Planning and Assessment Lead, Nuclear Space Power Office at Jet Propulsion Laboratory / NASA, University of Nebraska, “Viewpoint: International Traffic in Arms Regulations—Controversy and Reform,” Astropolitics, 7:3, 206-22, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/14777620903382544 DA: 7/28/11, PC) Meanwhile, despite the prevailing paranoia of the Cold War, the U.S. began to increase its activities providing weapons, technology, and military equipment to states around the globe. This expansion was rapid and saw little accountability. National concerns over this activity rose to a chorus in 1976, culminating in the creation of the modern International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR). As the strength of ITAR grew, it came to apply to not only weapons and military equipment, but also to the growing Comsat market. The modern Comsat market is a global, multibillion-dollar industry involving players from dozens of countries. The U.S. has unquestionably been the leader in space for the majority of the time since Early Bird, but some see a decline in the competitiveness of U.S. industry. Some of the blame for this trend is on ITAR , which , critics say, is crippling U.S. industry with over-reaching regulation . Furthermore, there is a concern that ITAR is decreasing national security by encouraging foreign parties to avoid U.S. industry altogether.
ITAR is destroying the aerospace industryDinerman, 05 – The Space Review (Taylor, May 16, 2005, “Fixing ITAR: the saga continues”, http://www.thespacereview.com/article/374/1)The recent launch by a Chinese rocket of a European-built satellite, made with no US components, and the difficulties that Richard Branson’s Virgin Galactic is having getting access to Burt Rutan’s designs for the next generation of suborbital vehicles which they have financed, are two of the latest signs that the ITAR process is doing more and more serious harm to the US space industry. The problem is not susceptible to an easy legislative fix. Congress had heard the complaints from industry and from the rest of the space community, and has not acted. If a fix is to be found it, it will have to be elsewhere. This problem began in the early years of the Clinton Administration when, in 1994, they abolished the Coordinating Committee on Multilateral Export Controls, or COCOM. Based in Paris during the Cold War, COCOM tried to set limits on what weapons and technologies could, or could not, be exported. COCOM was replaced by the weak and ineffective Wassenaar Arrangement. The situation got much worse after the January 1995 explosion of a Chinese Long March rocket carrying the Hughes-built APStar 2 communications satellite. A second explosion in 1996 led the Chinese to carry out an investigation to figure out what kept going wrong with their rockets. Hughes and Loral both assisted the Chinese and, in doing so, were found to have broken US law. This case became enmeshed in the intense politics of the investigations into the Clinton campaign’s fundraising practices. The GOP-controlled Congress brought intense pressure to bear on the Clinton Administration to tighten up export controls, and forced the shift of final authority for s[ace products from the Commerce Department to the State Department. Almost immediately the US industry felt the effects. Exporters soon discovered that there was a new sheriff in town and that he had a mean streak. Foreign governments and companies which had long-established relationships with American companies faced new, and unexpected, sets of obstacles to doing business with America. Unlike the days of the COCOM, where the rules were well understood and there was a sense, however tenuous, of solidarity, allies such as Britain and Canada found themselves being treated in the same way as Russia and China. In the 1980s, the Reagan administration used the COCOM to restrict the USSR’s access to Western technology. They pushed as hard as they could to prevent Soviet Russia from gaining access to even the simplest types of computers. According to Norman Friedman’s history of the Cold War (The Fifty Years War, Naval Institute Press) they were reduced to buying Hewlett Packard calculators in order to salvage the microchips to equip their nuclear warheads. The US was able to occasionally sell sabotaged chips to the Soviets, which meant that they had to individually test each of their illicitly procured items, adding considerably to their cost. This did not go down well with America’s allies, or with many US businessmen, who saw the Communist superpower as a corrupt customer, rather than as a threat. In the 1990s, the same logic applied to Saddam’s Baathist regime. Today, it is evident in the efforts to break the arms embargo against China, or the way the Iran nuclear program is being handled. There are probably a few merchants out there who are happy to go on selling dual-use technology to North Korea. In that case, however, even the most masochistic salesman must eventually give up if, year after year, the client refuses to pay for the merchandise. The problem with export controls is a variation on what economists and some environmentalists call “the tragedy of the commons.” A good example of this is the fact that fishing in international waters is completely out of control and threatens to exhaust the world’s fisheries. No nation wants to restrict its take because they know that, if they did, somebody else would just step in and grab the fish. ITAR is America’s way of restricting its own exports of dual-use technology without having any impact on what other nations are willing to sell. This situation is rapidly becoming unsustainable. The complex interagency process for deciding which items belong on the munitions control list moves at the speed of the Washington bureaucracy, while the private sector is moving much faster (even if they are not nearly as fast as they think they are.) In February 2002, the State Department announced that they were going to try to streamline and automate the export licensing process. Three years later, it seems that not much has changed. The US space industry has been harmed by the post-1998 tightening of the export control process: there can be no doubt about that. These regulations may have slightly retarded the development of certain types of weapons by America’s adversaries but, if so, there is probably no way to prove it. Economically there is no way this situation can be rationally justified. Militarily the benefits are so hard to
detect as to be almost certainly close to nil. From a foreign policy perspective this looks like yet another counterproductive US sanctions policy.
ITAR effectively undermines the US’ leadership in international space commerce – “ITAR-free” market provesCole 9 – Anthony, Major, United States Air Force (December 2009, “U.S. EXPORT CONTROLS AND THE SPACE INDUSTRIAL BASE: IMPACTS AND OPTIONS FOR THE FUTURE,” https://www.afresearch.org)Extensive surveys of 202 U.S. companies, recently conducted by Department of Commerce, revealed that U.S. export controls are making a negative impact on the moral and performance of the U.S. space industry. In a startling contrast, 95% of those surveyed within the U.S. space industry felt they were moderately or strongly positioned to compete within the U.S. domestic market while only 54% felt similarly about exporting to foreign markets.16 Among the surveyed companies, several had “self-eliminated from foreign markets” to better concentrate on domestic opportunities, others cited ITAR as a “major impediment” in foreign sales due to absence of profitability or refusal by “foreign customers to procure equipment that requires U.S. ITAR licensing.”17 The survey further detailed 59 foreign product categories in direct competition with U.S. products and discovered that export licensing requirements were the leading cause of competitive disadvantage in 63% of those categories.18 In addition, 58% of the U.S. companies responded that U.S. export controls were the number one barrier for them to enter foreign markets.19 It is easy to see why U.S. companies are so concerned with export controls. A recent report revealed that, on average, it takes from nine to 20 months to gain approval for a satellite export and to notify Congress.20 Although less than 1% of these ITAR applications were denied from 2003 to 2006, the reported loss of sales to foreign customers was $2.35 billion, primarily resulting from lengthy processing times.21 U.S. companies are not the only groups concerned about the impact of U.S. export controls. One study of the U.S. space industry revealed that “nearly every potential international buyer of satellites in 2002…indicated that the U.S. export control system is a competitive disadvantage for U.S. manufacturers.”22 This sentiment has lead to another troubling unintended consequence with the emergence of a foreign “ITAR-free” market as foreign customers attempt to maneuver around ITAR restrictions. Thales Alenia Space, a European space company headquartered in France, has been a proponent of “ITAR-free” products and is the only western company that has created a product line designed to avoid U.S. trade restrictions on satellite components.23 Bolstered in part by “ITAR-free,” Thales doubled its market share from 10% in 1998, to over 20% in 2004.24 The effects of “ITAR-free” products further compound the woes of the embattled U.S. space launch community. Without ITAR restrictions, foreign companies are free to pursue low cost launch alternatives that were previously unavailable to them, such as the Chinese Long March vehicle. Savings generated by avoiding ITAR bureaucracy, combined with lower cost launch vehicles, work to make U.S. companies less competitive even when they offer products with better performance or reliability.25 Clearly, the negative impacts of U.S. export controls are tangible but the U.S. space industry has options to improve the situation.
ITAR restrictions increase competition and US leadership in global markets – GPS provesStevens 9 – J.P., Vice President for Space Systems at the Aerospace Industries Association (6/18, AIA Written Testimony Release, “AIA: Space Effort Needs Steady Funding, ITAR Reform, and Commercial Launch Indemnification,” the hearing is no longer available on NASA.gov, http://www.parabolicarc.com/2009/11/29/aia-space-effort-steady-funding-itar-reform-commercial-launch-indemnification/)For many years the benefits of space programs were provided primarily by the United States and Russia. Our leadership was based on the strength of our engineers and scientists, and research and development supported by our industrial base. Our lead was also achieved because space was given a Cold War priority and funding at a level it no longer receives. Now other nations with the foresight to make the necessary investments and a pool of talented workers have rapidly caught up. By learning from our early successes and mistakes their investments – while not insubstantial – have generally not needed to be as great as ours to reach near parity. Allow me to quickly mention just a couple of areas where the U.S. can rapidly lose its leadership edge in space: satellites and human spaceflight. Satellites are now employed and built by a number of nations. Because of U.S. export control restrictions some foreign built satellites actually advertise themselves as ITAR free The U.S. share of overall world wide satellite
manufacturing revenues was 47 percent or 4.6 billion dollars – in 2003 but it decreased to only 29 percent or 3.1 billion dollars, in 2008. An example of other nations developing their own satellite systems can be seen with Global Positioning System satellites, or GPS. Our GPS system is used by our military, airlines and emergency responders. It also provides exact timing that allows our communications to share limited bandwidth with more than one party at a time. This timing is also important to accurately mark financial and banking transactions. Of the 144 billion dollars generated world wide by satellite revenues in 2008, roughly 23 billion are directly related to America’s GPS system. As a result, other nations are moving into the global navigation satellite market. Russia has modernized its GLONASS system and plans to launch six more satellites by March. It should be complete next year. The Europeans and Chinese both plan to have their systems Galileo and Compass – operational between 2014 and 2017. India and Japan are also developing their own systems. New global navigation satellite systems will compete with our system, impacting our revenues. They will also raise issues of compatibility (ensuring new systems don’t impact the function of existing ones) and interoperability (where the systems can work together). In regard to human spaceflight, other nations clearly recognize the value of space programs as innovation drivers, increasing world stature and as a source of national pride. The Chinese orbited one Taikonaut for nearly a full day in 2003. Since then they have achieved significant milestones (multiple crews, orbital maneuvers and space walks). The Chinese have made these steps at about the same pace as the U.S. and U.S.S.R. did during the moon race and they are doing it with far fewer flights. The Chinese Shenzhou spacecraft is an adapted design of the Russian Soyuz, which the U.S.S.R. once sent around the moon and returned safely to the Earth with turtles aboard as biological specimens. Using several flights on its Long March V rocket currently under development – they could make a human moon landing within a decade. India is planning to set up an astronaut training center in 2012 and is looking at a human launch around 2015. They have also sent a probe into lunar orbit. The Europeans and Japanese have developed and flown remote control cargo ships the ATV and the HTV – to the International Space Station. The Europeans have suggested in time they can replace the cargo section of their craft with a capsule creating a human rated spacecraft.
ITAR exacerbates our current launch market and raises costs – we are losing our control over the global marketsCole 9 – Anthony, Major, United States Air Force (December 2009, “U.S. EXPORT CONTROLS AND THE SPACE INDUSTRIAL BASE: IMPACTS AND OPTIONS FOR THE FUTURE,” https://www.afresearch.org)
Export controls play a significant role in U.S. space launch because they exacerbate economic conditions which threaten this vital, and weakening, industry. The economic fragility of the international space launch market can be traced back to the 1990 ‟ s when anticipated commercial launch demand did not materialize .5 During this period many decisions on how to structure the U.S. space launch industry were based on the promise of a burgeoning commercial launch market driven by anticipated prosperity of space-based services such as satellite TV, internet, and communications. Ultimately, the declining demand for commercial satellite services, increased satellite transponder efficiency, and numerous launch failures which impacted the launch insurance industry combined to create a U.S. launch market with the government as the primary customer.6 With a launch rate far below expectations, the U.S. government was left to pay substantial price increases for launch services while also providing an annual subsidy to maintain the industrial base for the Lockheed-Martin Atlas V and Boeing Delta IV boosters which comprise the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) program. With EELV as the only indigenous U.S. program capable of launching the majority of its satellites, the U.S. government felt compelled to approve the merger of Lockheed-Martin and Boeing launch businesses into a new joint venture called the United Launch Alliance in 2005.7 This move was intended to cut costs, maintain two families of launch vehicles to help assure access to space, and ensure the solvency of the EELV program. This period of competitive weakness continues today and threatens to rob the U.S. of assured access to space. It is ironic this situation is further aggravated by export controls, originally intended to protect the United States launch industry, which are now working in favor of international launch service providers. Outdated U.S. export controls are making a bad situation worse for the U.S. launch industry. Export controls were created to emphasize protection of U.S. technologies without necessarily accounting for economic factors such as market and revenue share. This lack of attention to market economies may have a lasting impact on the weakened U.S. launch market. According to an annual report by Space
Security Index, the percentage of U.S. commercial launches worldwide has increased from 6% in 2005 to 21% in 2008.8 By most accounts, increased market share is a good thing, unless you are not generating sufficient revenue when compared to other countries. Over this same period U.S. commercial launch revenue increased only 7% in spite of an impressive 15% increase in market share.9 In contrast, European countries on average lost market share from 29% in 2005 to 18% in 2008. However, over this same period their revenue increased from 25% to 40% of total commercial launches worldwide.10 It is also noteworthy that as of January 2008, twelve nations possessed the capacity to launch their own satellites. 11 Clearly much has changed in the few decades since export controls were first drafted and the United States and Soviet Union monopolized the international launch market. It is challenging to directly link export controls to market share or lower U.S. revenue, but this data clearly demonstrate that U.S. export controls have, at the very least, been ineffective at prohibiting the development of foreign launch markets.
ITAR undermines US industrial leadership – “ITAR-free” satellites prove and a “blanket” licensing program solvesZimmerman 9 – James, President of International Space Services, (2009, “APPROACHES TO FUTURE SPACE COOPERATION AND COMPETITION IN A GLOBALIZING WORLD,” http://www.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=12694&page=R1)
The third panel discussion focused on space cooperation and competition from a national security perspective. The panel discussion was moderated by Space Studies Board member Warren Washington (National Center for Atmospheric Research) and included presentations by A. Thomas Young (Lockheed Martin, retired) and Eric Sterner (independent consultant). Both panelists noted that because space is a critical element of U.S. national security, national security considerations will always be taken into account by the administration and Congress as civil space programs are pursued. Panelist Eric Sterner (former staff member, U.S. House of Representatives Armed Services Committee and Science Committee), observed that Congress does not have a common viewpoint with regard to “national security.” Congress does, in general, view international space cooperation as positive, although it is not a major area of interest, Sterner observed. International space cooperation does occasionally get congressional attention when the proposed collaborative project impacts a domestic issue of interest to members of Congress. One such concern is the need to ensure that the United States preserves its industrial base to conduct national security activities. In some cases, Sterner observed, congressional officials express interest in cooperation with a specific country, because of their overall interest in U.S. relations with that country, and necessarily because of the substance of the joint project. Sterner added that most congressional officials who focus on national security matters do not believe that collaborative space projects will fundamentally improve the behavior of another country, such as Russia, toward the United States. The panel paid particular attention to the impact of U.S. export control regulations on international cooperation—in particular ITAR. Young noted that while it is necessary to maintain an ITAR regime, the implementation of the current regulations has had unintended consequences that may in some cases be hurting U.S. national security objectives. The current ITAR regime, for example, may have accelerated, not slowed, the efforts of some countries to become space capable. Both panelists took the position that ITAR has had a significant impact of space cooperation between the United States and other countries.5 One consequence of these difficulties, a panelist observed, is that increasingly the United States is no longer viewed as the partner of choice. The panelists and workshop participants discussed in considerable detail the current impact of and prospects for modifying the ITAR regime. Although improvements to the ITAR process have been made in recent years, further improvements, such as issuing “blanket” licenses on a program basis (for the ISS program, for example), should be considered, several workshop participants suggested. The lack of such “blanket” program-level licenses can inhibit effective communications among the partners, and in some cases could present serious threats to the success and safe conduct of joint projects. Several workshop participants thought that reform of the ITAR process should be treated as a higher priority by the new administration and Congress. Others, including the panelists, noted that some administration and congressional officials are very concerned that any changes to the ITAR regime could undermine U.S. national security. The fact that the ITAR regulations have stimulated foreign manufacturers to develop “ITAR free” satellites is a small price to pay, in the view of these officials. The negative impact that the ITAR regime is having on U.S. industry and on scientific cooperation is also not compelling to those in Congress who prefer to maintain the current ITAR regulations, if doing so will save one American life. As a consequence, changes to the current ITAR regime will be difficult to achieve, they both observed. Several participants expressed interest in taking a proactive approach with the new administration and Congress on how the ITAR process could be revised to make it more efficient and effective. A point to be emphasized in such discussions, one panelist noted, is that the ITAR regime as it is currently being implemented is having counterproductive consequences in some cases.
ITAR undermines effective US leadership in the space inudstryKyler 7 – Brent, Commander, USN Internationalization of Space, (Spring 2007, “Export Control and U.S. Space Industry,” http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/archive/2008/December/Documents/ICAF_SPACE.pdf)
One of the most significant defense trade export control regimes affecting the space industry is the ITAR. There is an open debate among the State Department (DoS), the U.S. Congress, and the space industry as to whether these regulatory restrictions are harmful for U.S. businesses and U.S. foreign policy. The DoS contends that ITAR has had limited negative effect while providing necessary security benefits to the nation. The Congress concedes there may be room for improvement or revision but has consistently failed to act. American-based companies argue ITAR is a significant trade barrier that acts as a substantial tariff, stifling U.S. trade and weakening the ability of U.S.-based space companies to compete. It is time to re-examine current export control policies and procedures, balancing the denial of access to critical U.S. technology with maintaining a viable and innovative space industrial base. ITAR governs the export of arms and defense technologies including satellites. ITAR authorizes control of import and export of items on the U.S. Munitions List (USML). The dual-use nature of certain space technologies makes export controls like ITAR necessary, but also tends to make them more onerous when seen from the global commercial market perspective. The dilemma for the U.S. space industry is that space technologies have been classified under the USML since 1999. Prior to that date, space technology transfer was handled by the less cumbersome and more market-friendly Commerce Department. The overarching goal of ITAR is to advance U.S. national strategic objectives and foreign policy via trade controls. The majority of space technologies targeted by ITAR are components rather than complete systems, because the theory is that complete systems are subject to tighter global scrutiny, are more expensive to acquire, and are more difficult to bring into production in all but a few highly industrialized countries. ITAR has certainly limited the proliferation of U.S. controlled technologies, but has it done so at the expense of maintaining U.S. space industrial competitive advantage? Export control policies intended to protect U.S. security may not achieve their goal if they are outdated and overly bureaucratic. Complex ITAR rules force the providers and customers to wade through lengthy processes to obtain export approvals on many, globally available components. One of ITAR’s most serious problems is that the USML is largely out of date, protecting nearly all technologies in mature global industries rather than focusing on cutting-edge technologies. In 2000, significant ITAR revisions were proposed to help industry and allies—dubbed the Defense Trade Security Initiative (DTSI). DTSI proposals included allowing partners on major cooperative defense projects to perform work under one license, reconsideration of the USML, expedited licensing review for NATO countries, and extension of ITAR exemptions to qualified countries. These important improvements never gained traction as the events of September 11th, 2001, dampened much of the enthusiasm for easing export controls (Schinasi, 2005, p. 2). ITAR Effects on U.S. Space Industry ITAR regulations have negatively affected the U.S. space industry’s ability to rapidly and cost-effectively compete in the high technology space arena, an arena that not only depends upon technological innovation but also requires speed of action. Barring the unlikely event that ITAR restrictions will be eliminated in the very near future, the single greatest industry impediment is 11 the long delay to obtain U.S. government approval for licenses, thus degrading the ability of U.S. space industry companies to quickly enter into mutually supportive relationships. As ITAR continues to provide downward pressure on the U.S. share of the international space market, it has not been adjusted to distinguish among a wide range of technologies. For example, simplistic, widely available, satellite solar arrays are treated the same as military-specific encrypted satellite transponders. Missed technology sharing opportunities, in a very competitive, capital-intensive, space technology market, have eroded the U.S. space industrial base and labor force. From a U.S. government standpoint (e.g., NASA), interoperability with foreign space agencies continues to be difficult, diminishing cost-sharing opportunities. Worse, still, the U.S. risks turning potential partners and customers into competitors. ITAR may impact smaller businesses differently than the large firms. As the larger U.S. space firms move toward a lead systems integrator construct, technological innovation migrates to lower tier companies. The lower tier firms, however, experience ITAR-related barriers of entry as they try to recruit highly qualified workforce from bigger firms because they are restricted from hiring capable foreign workers. When viewed from this lower tier perspective, ITAR may be more about the loss of U.S. technical space capability than about profit and loss.
ITAR erodes the US industrial base - inefficiencies increase Chinese technological development and hamper the US’ ability to cooperateFarkas 10 - Evelyn N. former Senior Fellow at the American Security Project (April, “U.S. Export Controls: Emerging Consensus On Increasing Risk,” http://americansecurityproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/09/US-Export-Controls-Consensus-and-Risk-FINAL.pdf)
U.S. and foreign companies today have alternative sources for many dual-use, and even military, items in other countries and are developing mechanisms for skirting U.S. regulations—partnering with foreign entities that can export items the U.S. companies cannot and developing sophisticated “ITAR-free” products, including satellites. When foreign companies
and entities avoid purchasing U.S. goods, services, and technology because of the delay, uncertainty, and costs of the U.S. export control process, this harms U.S. economic interests and can, over time, erode the U.S. defense industrial base. However, according to one administration official, the national security concern is that “more immediately we have no visibility and certainly no control.” 35 Export controls reportedly have not impeded Beijing’s efforts to gain access to technology. The GAO states, “Through joint ventures or incentive programs to encourage international companies to locate to China, China has gained access to more advanced technology than it previously had or could produce on its own.” 36 According to the GAO, the export control system is hampered by vulnerabilities and inefficiencies, which together with weaknesses in other government programs (such as the Foreign Military Sales program and reviews of foreign investments in U.S. companies) place U.S. critical technologies at risk of “theft, espionage, reverse engineering and illegal export.” 37 The GAO asserts that the U.S. government has been unable to weigh competing U.S. national security and economic interests in large part because of interagency coordination challenges, inefficient administration of the programs, and the lack of systematic evaluations of program effectiveness. Neither State nor Commerce can identify weaknesses in the current system because they have not conducted systematic assessments of the effectiveness of their programs. As one example of a vulnerability that is not being measured, the GAO points to the lack of DOD oversight of foreign-owned or influenced contractors to ensure that they are preventing unauthorized access to U.S. classified information. 38 In the case of export controls on satellites, foreign availability has thwarted U.S. policy objectives vis-à-vis China. Foreign suppliers have stepped in to replace U.S. satellite companies prevented from exporting to China since Congress passed legislation in 1999 moving satellites under AECA jurisdiction (a response to the discovery that Chinese companies had received technical information from Loral-Hughes that helped them improve their space-launch capability). 39 Being excluded from the Chinese market has left U.S. industry in a position of relative disadvantage to their foreign competitors.
ITAR undermines US space innovation and global aerospace leadershipLandry 10 – Major, USAF, thesis, Degree of Master of Science in Research and Development Management (August 2010, Kalliroi, “EXPLORING THE EFFECTS OF INTERNATIONAL TRAFFIC IN ARMS REGULATIONS RESTRICTIONS ON INNOVATION IN THE U.S. SPACE INDUSTRIAL BASE,” http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA535245)
Several studies have researched the effects of ITAR on the U.S. industrial base because the DoD holds a strong interest in understanding the state of the defense industrial base. This resource is vital to maintain the ability to produce military capabilities and provide surge support when needed. Evidence of the importance the DoD places on the Defense Industrial Base is seen in examples such as the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Industrial Policy (DUSD-IP), the Annual Industrial Capabilities Report submitted by DoD to Congress, the Defense Contract Management Agency’s Industrial Analysis Center, and established councils at the joint level and service level. All of these examples have the primary goal of maintaining awareness of issues affecting the industrial base so that the DoD may leverage the industrial base effectively to meet warfighter needs. The councils and reports study and address issues such as globalization; manufacturing and engineering expertise; eroding U.S. leadership in science, technology, and engineering; the aging workforce; and DoD policies and requirements. 5 Space Industrial Base The U.S. continues to lead the world in space technology development, but the current domestic demand is not sufficient to sustain the U.S. space industry (AFRL 2009). Access to the global space market will result in growth for the U.S. space industry. However, any transaction with a foreign country involving space technology requires ITAR approval. This is typically not a problem for large companies with established export programs. There is, however, a greater impact to small firms due to the resources required for registration and maintaining a compliance infrastructure. Because smaller companies are considered to be a major source of innovation (Space Foundation 2008), the combination of barriers to their participation in the global market and the low domestic demand for space technologies may result in less opportunities for space innovation in the U.S. This could lead to the conclusion that ITAR is stifling U.S. space innovation. While space innovation may be suffering in the U.S., space innovation is increasing overseas, and the U.S.’s dominance in space technology may be losing its edge. Companies outside the U.S. are now developing technologies and components traditionally supplied by the U.S., thus creating more competition. ITAR raises barriers for competition in the global space market. One reason for barriers raised by ITAR is that the export license process takes too long. Foreign governments are able to take advantage of these barriers to keep economic benefits within their own nations. For example, they may intentionally set shorter deadlines for contract proposals which they know U.S. companies will not be able to meet due to the lengthy ITAR licensing process (Space Foundation 2008)
ITAR puts strain on our industrial base – license requirements, costs, and technology classificationLandry 10 – Major, USAF, thesis, Degree of Master of Science in Research and Development Management (August 2010, Kalliroi, “EXPLORING THE EFFECTS OF INTERNATIONAL TRAFFIC IN ARMS REGULATIONS RESTRICTIONS ON INNOVATION IN THE U.S. SPACE INDUSTRIAL BASE,” http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA535245)
All the space industry studies agree that ITAR inhibits the ability to compete or participate in the global space community (Taylor 2007; CSIS 2008; NSSO 2008; Space Foundation 2008; AFRL 2009). The uncertainty of ITAR processes and processing times impacts the space industry’s confidence to compete in foreign markets (CSIS 2008). Lengthy processing times for license requests are a major cause for loss of foreign sales (Taylor 2007; Space Foundation 2008). Export control compliance costs are a significant burden for lower-tier firms (Taylor 2007; NSSO 2008; Space Foundation 2008). “As a percent of foreign sales, the cost burden on Tier 3 companies is nearly eight times that of Tier 1 firms” (CSIS 2008). Tier definitions are Tier 1 – prime contractors, Tier 2 – subcontractors, and Tier 3 – commodity suppliers (Taylor 2007). ITAR makes it difficult to hire the best talent and also inhibits access to foreign technology (NSSO 2008). The U.S. Munitions List (USML), which lists the products and services that ITAR protects, includes technologies that are already commercially available in other countries (NSSO 12 2008; Space Foundation 2008). Specifically, the USML classifies commercial communications satellites as “munitions.” As a result, satellite manufactures must adhere to ITAR licensing requirements when developing products that include any components also found on the protected communications satellites – these components may already be openly available outside the U.S.
Continued ITAR restrictions destroy the US’ ability to innovate – the US government holds it downLandry 10 – Major, USAF, thesis, Degree of Master of Science in Research and Development Management (August 2010, Kalliroi, “EXPLORING THE EFFECTS OF INTERNATIONAL TRAFFIC IN ARMS REGULATIONS RESTRICTIONS ON INNOVATION IN THE U.S. SPACE INDUSTRIAL BASE,” http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA535245)
Looking to the future, respondents considered how the space industry would evolve if there was no change to the U.S.’s approach toward export controls. The dominant concept, mentioned by almost half of all respondents, was that of a continued drawdown of U.S. suppliers (see Table 4). Considering the number of U.S. suppliers in the industry has decreased since 1999, there is a threat that suppliers will not survive because manufacturers choose to rely on imported goods. Companies consider leaving the space industry if there is a lack of market base and look towards shifting their business lines from space to other industries, such as medical or energy. This can lead to a death spiral for critical technologies in the U.S. where there may no longer be as many satellites built domestically. As a result, there is a potential secondary effect on the domestic launch capability – if there are fewer satellites built in the U.S. there is less need for U.S. launches, and U.S. space launch may slowly disappear, or in a best case, may provide a diminished capability. Related to supplier drawdown, 17% of respondents commented on the industry’s high dependence on government support. Some may argue that the U.S. space industry is only lingering because of defense and government support. Since the DoD and other government agencies are the principal customers of the space industry, ITAR comes into play for many business opportunities outside the U.S., resulting in less export opportunities. With a limited domestic commercial market base and limited opportunities to export, the U.S. government will have to fund and manage the U.S. space industrial base to keep it alive. Respondents expect that under current export controls, costs will continue to increase. Companies pass the high cost of ITAR compliance to customers through higher cost of products and additional overhead costs on contracts. Respondents (11.76%) also expect that innovation will continue, but will require more planning and coordination due to the hassle of dealing with ITAR and long timelines required in the licensing process. There were several other expectations mentioned by respondents. More foreign competition is likely because other countries will continue their technology development 42 to meet their own needs. U.S. companies will likely have many lost business opportunities due to ITAR restrictions or
choosing to walk away from potential sales to avoid ITAR hassles. Finally, the evolving global economy along with ITAR frustrations will increase momentum for reform of export controls.
ITAR restrictions destroy our manufacturing leadership in spaceHertzfeld 10 - Research Professor of Space Policy and International Affairs at the Elliot School of International Affairs (Henry R., Space Technologies and the Export Control System in the United States: Prospects for Meaningful Reform,” Yearbook on Space Policy, 2009, Part 2, Pages 210-225)
A recent study by the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) 489 shows the dramatic change in the distribution of commercial space activity in the economy. As Figure 14 illustrates, in the last seven years there has been a relative decline in the U.S. manufacturing of launch vehicles, the manufacturing of satellites, and the manufacturing of ground equipment. 490 The decline in launch vehicle manufacturing likely reflects the economic slowdown in the early 2000s and today the industry is showing signs of recovery from both NASA and DOD investments as well as the above mentioned entrepreneurial efforts. But the relative decline in building satellites and ground equipment in the U.S. is more likely a fundamental change. One reason for this is the maturation of the space. For years the U.S. had the unchallenged global leadership in the quality and capability of its satellites and receiving equipment. That leadership has steadily eroded with the increased technical abilities around the world coupled with national interests pushing the need for their own independent manufacturing capability. Further compounding these efforts is the U.S. export control regime that makes it very difficult, expensive, and time-consuming for firms and governments in other nations to purchase U.S. manufactured satellites and components. The statistical trend is evident. However because there are multiple reasons for the growth of space manufacturing abroad, the total decline cannot be attributed to any one cause alone. 491 In 2007 the United States had exports of spacecraft, missiles, rockets and parts that were just over two billion dollars and imports that were just under one billion dollars. 492 Those data include both civil and military hardware. Reflecting the above trends in foreign capabilities, the 2:1 ratio of exports to imports for space hardware is a significant decline from the 3:1 ratio that existed in the mid-1990s. Similar data for the trade of space services are not reported in the same data series. These findings are also supported by a recent study by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Their analysis emphasises the rapid growth of foreign capabilities in space in two aspects: many more nations have space programs including commercial satellite and component manufacturing and the technical sophistication and capability of those systems is competitive with U.S. manufacturing in many areas. In the last nine years, besides the U.S., there are now two other countries with their own positioning and navigation systems, double the number of nations with reconnaissance satellites, twelve nations with launching capability, and 38 nations that operate and control their own communications satellites. The CSIS also finds five nations with imaging satellites of one-metre resolution or better, eight nations with radar imaging satellites (some commercial, an option not available from U.S. satellites). 493 Similar trends are observed by the Space Security Organization, 494 and in the Space Foundations Space Report 2008. 495 All of these nations and their companies are quite willing and able to offer their space goods and services on the world market; those that do not contain U.S. components are exempt from ITAR restrictions. 496 The list of commercial space competitive problems continues in the CSIS study and includes evidence that the 2 nd and 3 rd tier manufacturers in the U.S. of space equipment are particularly hurt by export controls. Costs for those companies of compliance with the export control regime have risen by almost 50% between 2004 and 2006. Those costs include: insurance, consulting and software, training of employees, DTSA (Defense Technology Security Administration) monitoring, and outside legal expenses. 497 The same study has indicated that lost sales to those firms as a percent of sales opportunities in 2006 was nearly 14% from ITAR alone (another 3% was attributed to the DOC-administered EAR). The message is quite clear: U.S. export controls, particularly ITAR, have had a significant impact on U.S. manufacturing leadership in space and have created a sizable cost burden to all firms engaged in international trade in those commodities. The impact has been particularly harmful to small firms and firms lower down in the supply chain. 498 And, not reported in these numbers are the firms that have decided to forgo competing in this market because of the imposition of large expense and potential liability from exposure to ITAR liability.
ITAR harms our national security by undermining our businesses and pushing business out of the USShenai 10 – Nina, adjunct scholar at the American Enterprise Institute (February 2, 2010, “Export Control Reform 2010: Transforming the Legal Architecture of Dual-Use and Defense Trade Controls,” http://www.mincomes.it/semproitalia/tavolo_strategico/8_documenti/UN-CEFACT/UN-CEFACT/Contenuti/USA_2010_Export%20Control%20Reform%20Paper.pdf)
No successful reform effort would be complete without paring down the lists of products controlled, curtailing turf battles between cabinet agencies, and bolstering efforts to ensure that sensitive technologies are kept out of the hands of adversaries, among other high-profile priorities. However, there are other arguably fundamental problems with the legal architecture of the U.S. export control system that go to the heart of its effectiveness. Export controls are considered an essential national security function of the U.S. Government. As such, the system lacks many of the basic legal and procedural safeguards which are hallmarks of the U.S. legal system. National security must be a paramount concern in licensing and other decisions in the export control context. However, this does not mean that exporters should have to face unfettered discretion by government officials or decisions inconsistent with governing statutes and regulations that are unreviewable – that is, all unsubstantiated, in the name of national security. An export control system that is a moving target actuall y damages natio nal security by stifling U.S. business, undermining U.S. high-tech manufacturing, and in turn driving research and development and manufacturing abroad beyond the reach of the U.S. regulatory regime. Legal reforms of the export control system are needed both to ensure that agencies interpret and follow their governing laws and regulations in a predictable and transparent manner, and to provide recourse when the agencies do not. Added procedural safeguards need not disturb the critical national security calculus in these determinations. This paper argues that national security and due process should not be mutually exclusive in this context. Improvements in the export control system’s legal architecture, namely enacting robust administrative procedural safeguards and limited judicial review while simultaneously protecting classified information and national security determinations, will improve the workings of the system. This paper examines the current legal framework of U.S. export controls and the shortcomings of the existing legal regime, and considers how sister legal regimes under U.S. law could provide models for the reform efforts. Finally, the paper proposes certain reforms to improve the system, including the publication of redacted agency decisions to promote transparency, the creation of administrative records to substantiate agency decisions, and the institution of limited judicial review to create a robust corpus of export control law.
Ext: SolvencyCP solves – streamlining the licensing process encourages lower-tier companies and innovationLandry 10 – Major, USAF, thesis, Degree of Master of Science in Research and Development Management (August 2010, Kalliroi, “EXPLORING THE EFFECTS OF INTERNATIONAL TRAFFIC IN ARMS REGULATIONS RESTRICTIONS ON INNOVATION IN THE U.S. SPACE INDUSTRIAL BASE,” http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA535245) Another concept mentioned by 23% of respondents refers to global sociopolitical concerns. One respondent suggests that we have a closed market. For example, we cannot sell to Arab nations because we do business with Israel; India does not buy from other nations; space business with China is restricted. Still, global business opportunities should be encouraged because economic competition is essential for national security. Thus, ITAR licensing decisions should consider both economic competition and national security. Economic competition, as opposed to military conflict, encourages more innovation. The way contracts are executed in the space industry may also have some effect on innovation. Because many contracts usually include cutting-edge technology development, it is common to see “cost-plus” contracts awarded to prime contractors. This option minimizes the cost risk for the contractor. However, one respondent mentioned that sometimes the prime contractors arrange “fixed-price” contracts with lower-tier companies and small businesses, which is not appropriate for development projects. These lower-tier companies and small businesses assume more cost risk and may not be willing to push their more innovative ideas. Another complaint suggests that 48 the government contracting process is too complex and burdensome for small businesses. One respondent asserts the DoD should put forth more of an effort to make its procurement practices friendlier to small businesses that do not have teams of attorneys to help them navigate the process. This would enable the more innovative portion of the industry to continue to provide products and services to the government.
Streamlining ITAR procedures solves Finarelli and Alexander 8 - Margaret G. ISU Vice President for North American Operations and Joseph K. director of the Space Studies Board (2008, “SPACE SCIENCE AND THE INTERNATIONAL TRAFFIC IN ARMS REGULATIONS,” http://www.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=12093&page=R1)Workshop participants called attention to the need for streamlining and simplification of ITAR or ITAR procedures. Examples of revisions worthy of consideration are the following: For activities conducted for the Department of Defense, there is a foreign military-sales exemption whereby commercial exports are exempt from the licensing requirements of ITAR if they are in furtherance of a program between a U.S. government agency and a foreign government (a government-to-government program). Workshop participants argued that a similar exemption should be granted to NASA so that exports by U.S. entities that are in support of an international collaborative space project that is being conducted under a formal government-to-government agreement can be excluded from ITAR licensing requirements. Participants cited numerous examples of cases in which a scientific research instrument or instrument subsystem was designed and built by a foreign partner, delivered to the U nited S tates for testing or integration into a scientific satellite, and later returned (“exported”) to the foreign instrument team for calibration or repairs before launch. Export licenses were required in such cases even though the equipment being “exported” originally came into the United States from the overseas partner. Participants argued that such a requirement defied logic and added delays and administrative burdens without serving the fundamental purpose of export control s, and they argued for approval of exemptions for such cases. Likewise, participants supported a repair-and-return exemption that would allow a U.S. company that purchases and imports an item from a foreign entity to return (“export”) an unmodified imported item to the original manufacturer for repair or recalibration without having to get a license. Several participants called attention to problems that have stemmed from misconceptions among foreign collaborators about the purpose of a technical-assistance agreement (TAA). In particular, many foreign collaborators try to restructure the agreements into funding agreements and thereby cause unnecessary delays in completing the approval process. Participants proposed standardization of the TAA format to use a DDTC-approved template and educational program that could alleviate some of the problems.
CP solves – returning commercial satellites to the Department of Commerce bypasses restrictions Mahon 8 – Steven, United States Army Reserve Judge Advocate General’s Corps (December 3, 2008, “THE INTERNATIONAL TRAFFIC IN ARMS REGULATIONS: AN IMPEDIMENT TO NATIONAL SECURITY,” http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA489976&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf)The Coalition’s goals are a fine start in reforming the ITAR and returning competitiveness to the U.S. satellite industry. However, because of the political sensitivity of The Coalition members’ relationship with both Congress and the State Department, 55 its
recommendations do not go far enough and, alone, will not save the U.S. space industry. The following recommendations, if implemented, will improve the export control system such that the U.S. is able to control and protect critical defense technologies but is not hindered in its ability to sell and export those commercial technologies that are not critical to our national defense and security. The desired end state is to preserve U.S. space industry superiority with an intended consequence of increased national security. 1. Return Jurisdiction Over Commercial Satellites To The Commerce Department Given the statistics and data presented above, it almost goes without saying that removing commercial satellites from the United States Munitions List and returning them15 to Commerce Department oversight is the first step in correcting the U.S. export control system. Since 1999, when all satellites were placed on the USML and export control was returned to the State Department, the U.S. satellite industry has undergone a substantial and dramatic decline. Removing commercial satellites from the USML and returning them to EAR oversight at Commerce is the first necessary step in encouraging and supporting the U.S. industry’s return to competitiveness.
Licensing reforms solve – streamlines the process creating certainty of timelinesMahon 8 – Steven, United States Army Reserve Judge Advocate General’s Corps (December 3, 2008, “THE INTERNATIONAL TRAFFIC IN ARMS REGULATIONS: AN IMPEDIMENT TO NATIONAL SECURITY,” http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA489976&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf)
Develop a Licensing Triage Program to Separate Routine and Complex Applications Currently there is no process in place at State or Commerce to triage applications. License and agreements are assigned and staffed as received. This permits routine applications to clog the processing pipeline while more critical19 applications sit idle pending assignment. Because staff time is at such a premium, a four-level category designation, with very clear guidelines, should be established. For example, a level one application would require immediate attention both because of the technology involved, and the status of the end-user/purchaser. 67 Each application would note which category it fits within, citing the criteria satisfied for inclusion in the category. Coupled with the new category designations should be a set of mandatory processing timelines, which would vary based on the category level. One of the biggest problems with the current USML export system is that exporters have no certainty as to how long the application process will take. This makes commercial transactions extremely difficult. Mandatory processing times would solve this issue. 68 6. Implement Pre-Approval, Program-Level, Licensing Currently a program license (one all-encompassing license) can be granted for major systems programs. Such a license permits the prime contractor to submit one application for a single license covering all USML hardware, technical data and technical assistance on the program. In reality, however, the process is ineffective and, therefore, rarely used. Because of the voluminous paperwork required for a program license, contractors typically submit individual licenses for the underlying components because it is far more efficient. Additionally, a program license, once granted, has little flexibility so that if there are changes in the program, separate amendments must be filed for each change. To correct this deficiency, State should grant pre-approval, at a program level, for large systems that would not otherwise be prohibited at a component level. A key20 element of this recommendation would be permitting industry to implement minor, documented changes, without having to submit a new license application. This change alone would encourage industry to use this process. The U.S. currently sells prior generation weapons and communications systems around the world. There is no reason that a pre-approval process could not be implemented that would rapidly speed the export of major commercial systems for all but the most advanced systems. 7. Permit Expanded, Pre-Approved Licensing Of Prior Generation Commercial Satellite Technology Satellite technology and manufacturing processes that are currently available to, or in use by, foreign competitors are not treated any differently (more leniently) than cutting-edge, U.S.-only technology. This standard puts U.S. manufacturers at a decided economic disadvantage. If a commercial satellite customer (foreign or domestic) can buy the same or similar technology from a foreign source, at equivalent or better pricing, without the uncertainty created by ITAR review and approval, why would they buy from a U.S. source? The answer is simply that they will not. 69 Any technology that is currently in commercial use by foreign entities, available for commercial sale by foreign entities, or is prior generation technology compared to the current U.S. technology, (in other words, is fungible technology) should be immediately placed on a list of “readily marketable technology” that would not be listed on the USML and would be subject only to EAR review and approval.
Ext: Leadership ITAR reform solves US perception of a dying leader – we cite the maker of ITARAbbey and Lane 9 – George, Baker Botts Senior Fellow in Space Policy at the James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy at Rice University and Neil, Malcolm Gillis University Professor at Rice University (2009, “United States Space Policy: Challenges and Opportunities Gone Astray,” http://amacad.org/publications/spaceUS.pdf)Retired U.S. Air Force Col. David Garner, former chief of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency and one of the architects of ITAR restricting the export of U.S. satellites and components, now says the rules need a thorough overhaul because they are damaging U.S. industry with no corresponding benefit to U.S. national security. Garner, speaking at the Satellite 2007 industry conference, said those who helped update the ITAR regulations had no intention of placing almost all satellite systems and components on the State Department-controlled U.S. Munitions List of material to be considered equivalent to arms for export purposes. Garner said the ITAR rules today constitute a minefield for companies seeking licenses to deal with non-U.S. entities to export satellites or related components. 11 Many believe that a cleanslate approach is needed to fix the fundamental disconnect between ITAR as it is being applied to space science research and the needs of the U.S. space science community as it endeavors to maintain world leadership. In short, the rules need to be changed. Controlling critical space technology exports that would put the nation at risk is indisputably important. But equally important is to be competitive on the world market and to encourage cooperative scientific research when such commerce and research does not compromise critical technology. An export control regime and regulatory environment that protects critical military technologies and technical expertise while still allowing commerce and international scientific partnerships to flourish and the U.S. space industry to prosper and grow should be possible to implement. The ISS is an example of a cooperative space exploration program that benefits all partners.
Ext: Commerce Leadership/Development
ITAR reform restricts the US ability to engage in commercial space cooperationBerteau et al 10 (David J., Senior Adviser and Director of the CSIS Defense-Industrial Initiatives, as well as a handful of other researchers from CSIS, April 30, 2010, “National Security and the Commercial Space Sector,” http://csis.org/files/publication/100430_berteau_commercial_space.pdf Accessed: 3/9/11) In addition to encouraging partnerships with foreign providers, the U.S. government may choose to reevaluate and revise certain export control policies and procedures. As the key executive branch agencies charged with implementing export controls, the Departments of State, Defense, and Commerce have acknowledged the need for statutory and regulatory reform, including but not limited to possible changes to the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) that implement the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2778). These departments continue to review existing export control statutes and regulations with a view toward reducing processing times and streamlining the licensing process. They also have focused in recent years on sensitive technologies like those in the satellite domain. For example, in 2007, the State Department’s International Security Advisor Board (State ISAB) issued a report stating: “The Department of State should be prepared to facilitate international cooperation in the use of space through U.S. export policies. The Department of State, therefore, in its regulation of satellite exports, should focus on ways to streamline the licensing process. While it is obviously essential to protect U.S. national security and space control, the current process damages U.S. cooperation with friends and allies and weakens the U.S. commercial space satellite industry and the underlying industrial base that develops civil, commercial, military, and intelligence space assets.”52 ITAR is a particularly significant topic among international interlocutors, which argue that these regulations are unnecessarily restrictive and time-consuming, and are counterproductive in that they promote foreign nation technology development and dissemination to the detriment of U.S. suppliers. U.S. executive branch agencies generally agree that ITAR is ripe for reform, noting that several nations that are close military and trading partners (e.g., the United Kingdom and Canada) have sought ITAR waivers for years. A 2007 State Department report states that: “The current International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) list is too broad. It includes too much technology that is widely available internationally. Moreover, a single international transaction involving commercial space technology now often requires multiple licenses. Licenses often come with extensive restrictions that make resubmission necessary, causing further delay and uncertainty for U.S. manufacturers in the commercial international market place.”53 One solution proposed by the ISAB is to review the ITAR list, regulate only key technologies and exporters, and issue broad licenses to streamline the process.54
ITAR restricts the US’ ability to compete in the global space marketLandry 10 – Major, USAF, thesis, Degree of Master of Science in Research and Development Management (August 2010, Kalliroi, “EXPLORING THE EFFECTS OF INTERNATIONAL TRAFFIC IN ARMS REGULATIONS RESTRICTIONS ON INNOVATION IN THE U.S. SPACE INDUSTRIAL BASE,” http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA535245)
The main concern is that instead of protecting U.S. national security interests, the export policy has closed off a profitable export industry. “The result has been the deliberate development by overseas manufacturers of … devices and systems that are the equivalent of American technologies … not subject to ITAR” (Wheatley 2009). Even in the case of U.S. dual-use technologies, export restrictions do not have any impact on what other nations are able to sell (Dinerman 2005). Dinerman (2008) poses a relevant question: How does a superpower balance the needs of its national security system and its need to trade? The majority of the articles reiterate the fact that ITAR has negatively affected the U.S.’s participation in the global space market. Foust (2005) points out that since oversight of satellite technology exports was transferred to the State Department, “it has become far more difficult for U.S. companies to sell satellites and satellite components to customers outside the [U.S.], even to friendly nations such as Canada and Britain.” Global competition has grown and U.S. companies are finding it
difficult to compete with foreign companies offering ITAR-free satellites. Contractors around the globe have the option of acquiring equivalent technologies from companies outside the U.S. Wheatley (2009) provides two specific examples: (1) Canada has specifically cited ITAR as a reason for selecting European satellite builders and (2) EADS Sodern, a French company, is phasing out its American supplier base.
ITAR hamstrings any US ability to compete in the global marketLandry 10 – Major, USAF, thesis, Degree of Master of Science in Research and Development Management (August 2010, Kalliroi, “EXPLORING THE EFFECTS OF INTERNATIONAL TRAFFIC IN ARMS REGULATIONS RESTRICTIONS ON INNOVATION IN THE U.S. SPACE INDUSTRIAL BASE,” http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA535245)
The primary goal of this research is to explore the effects of ITAR on innovation in the space industry. Respondents were directly asked to provide their perceptions of this topic. The following paragraphs explain the most common responses in addition to a few of the unique responses. In general, respondents said that ITAR makes U.S. companies less competitive in the global space market. It inhibits our competitive stance throughout the world by restricting the sale of components or technologies that are readily available from other sources. The effects mentioned may pertain to innovation, changes to business approaches, or unintended consequences. Table 3 summarizes the specific groupings of responses discussed in this section. The most commonly mentioned (52% of respondents) effect of ITAR is that it increases costs for space products and services. Working in a restricted market drives costs up. The primary cause for this is the high cost of compliance. Companies end up 37 paying lawyers to figure out how to comply with ITAR. They must also pay fees to the government for compliance. Registration alone is difficult for small businesses. A company must invest significant effort and funds to maintain a compliance program. Due to the uniqueness of space missions, companies are not able to benefit from an economy of scale. These factors add cost and overhead to any contract, making it difficult to meet an international price point. Approximately half of the total responses to this question refer to longer timelines resulting from ITAR requirements. The export licensing process takes too long. Many acknowledge that the U.S. has superior technology, but customers may not be willing to go through the involved process of licensing and subsequently choose to avoid the substantial waiting period. Congress must also process the licensing request if the sale is above a certain dollar threshold, which most space programs typically exceed. Congress’s process can average approximately three months in addition to the standard licensing process. Furthermore, ITAR reduced the ability to make quick deals. It is difficult for U.S. companies to accommodate the quicker timelines that foreign customers desire. Over 40% of the respondents commented that ITAR has little or no effect on innovation. The impact of ITAR is not necessarily in the area of innovation. They explain that there is much innovation in the industry; however, ITAR complaints emerge when trying to market outside of the U.S. or when looking for a launch provider. Some companies do not consider ITAR until after something is invented. ITAR’s effect on marketing is a concept that was mentioned by 29% of respondents. The market is more restricted for lower-tier businesses. For example, a Tier 3 company can sell to Tier 1 and 2 businesses, but it is harder for them to sell to foreign customers. There are many innovative companies in the U.S., but a restricted market drives costs up and pushes the improvement cycle out. ITAR may cause the innovation process to take a little longer while trying to stay within the rules for communication. This is related to the concern of 29% of respondents that ITAR affects communication and knowledge sharing. ITAR hinders free technical exchange between a company and foreign engineers because a license is required before the communication can happen. When marketing to overseas customers, a company is able to share only a very limited amount of information, which makes their marketing efforts ineffective. Innovation can also occur when knowledge from others is shared or imported. ITAR prevents the sharing of knowledge, which means the U.S. is not always able to know about others’ technologies. The U.S. is unable to benefit from this input to innovation. Respondents also expressed great frustration with the hassles of the ITAR process. ITAR has reduced the ability to make quick deals because of the timeliness of the licensing process and requirements such as requiring a purchase order in order to get a license. A license may have many restrictions making it difficult to conduct productive anomaly resolution, the process of analyzing the cause of, and recovering from, hazards to a space mission. ITAR hassles also turn away potential foreign customers. Europe and others are moving away from ITAR components because of the hassle of third-party transfers. They also choose not to buy from the U.S. because of the possibility of DoS disallowing the transaction because of U.S. priorities. Much of the frustration experienced by the space industry is due to a lack of understanding of the rules. This is one of the biggest hurdles for small businesses. One 39 respondent referred to a paranoia that causes companies to protect their technology needlessly under ITAR. They need to be educated on the licensing process to
overcome the fear or ignorance of the unknown. Some of the confusion happens because it is difficult to determine when space technology is munitions. One respondent stated that industry must be cognizant of consequences and risks of illicit trade and nefarious enduse. Another respondent commented that the best you can do is to be diligent and sincere in trying to comply.
ITAR undercuts any chance of future technological leadership by straining our ability to participate in international commerce – satellites prove Mahon 8 – Steven, United States Army Reserve Judge Advocate General’s Corps (December 3, 2008, “THE INTERNATIONAL TRAFFIC IN ARMS REGULATIONS: AN IMPEDIMENT TO NATIONAL SECURITY,” http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA489976&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf)
Worldwide, the U.S. has long been seen as the leader in all technical aspects of space and satellite technology. Unfortunately, the ability of the U.S. to maintain a technological lead is directly related to the success of its commercial space market, and never has that market been so weak. Before the shift in export control policy in 1999, the U.S. dominated the commercial satellite-manufacturing field with an average annual market share of 83 percent. Since then, market share has declined to less than 50 percent. 36 While the plummeting market share cannot be blamed solely on tightened export regulations, 37 they have surely played a significant part in the decline. 38 For example, since the change in export policy, “no Chinese satellite operator has chosen to purchase any satellite that is subject to U.S. export regulation and have instead selected European and Israeli suppliers,” at an estimated loss to U.S. manufacturers of $2-3 billion.” 39 Commentators have cited the U.S. export control system as the primary cause for dwindling market share. “American companies that produce satellites have great difficulty competing in the world market due to a rigid interpretation of ambiguous statutory requirements and a cumbersome and confusing licensing process that leads to long delays and uncertain outcomes.” 40 “The most serious barrier to U.S. competitiveness in space commerce, particularly in the satellite industry, is U.S. policy on export controls. Export control policies have already seriously damaged the U.S.11 commercial satellite industry and promise to do the same to the ability of the United States to conduct space operations with international partners.” 41 Further evidence of the U.S decline in a globally increasing market is borne out by the economic performance of Boeing Satellite Systems International, long the worldwide leader in satellite technology and manufacturing. In 1999, in response to an expanding commercial satellite market, Boeing purchased the El Segundo Division of Hughes Electronics for $3.8 billion. 42 In 1999, satellite export control returned to the State Department and Boeing’s commercial satellite business began to crash: 43 In 2003, Boeing Satellite Systems delivered only five satellites, down from 11 in 2000. As few as 10 commercial space vehicles were built in 2003, down from 25 annually in the late 1990s. At Boeing’s El Segundo facility, employment has dropped to between 5,700 and 6,000 people from 9,000 when Hughes was purchased. In addition, the ITAR has had such a negative economic impact on U.S. satellite manufacturers that they are increasingly wary of even bidding on certain foreign contracts. If they anticipate a certain level of ITAR problems, such as on Koreasat 5 with its dual civil and military uses, U.S. companies will often choose not to expend the bid and proposal money necessary to submit a competitive bid. 44 As a result, “U.S. satellite manufacturers have lost somewhere between $2.5 and $6 billion since 1999 primarily due to ITAR regulations.” 45 Certainly the Federal Government recognizes the negative economic impact the current regulations are inflicting. In 2003, the White House, in addition to issuing a new National Security Policy in 2002 and a new National Space Policy in 2006, issued a new12 U.S. Commercial Remote Sensing Policy. The policy specifically addresses the vital importance of a robust commercial satellite capability to the Nation’s security. The policy states that it is in the national interest to “enable U.S. companies to compete successfully as a provider of remote sensing space capabilities for foreign governments and foreign commercial users, while ensuring appropriate measures are implemented to protect U.S. national security and foreign policy interests.” 46 Furthermore, the White House specifically noted the negative impact regulatory inefficiencies were having on the domestic market. The U.S. Government will “provide a timely and responsive regulatory environment for licensing the operations and exports of commercial remote sensing space systems.” 47 Unfortunately, the current U.S. export regulations have not only crippled the domestic market, they have also had the unintended consequence of creating, and then strengthening, a competitive foreign space industry—one that competes directly and very effectively with U.S. manufacturers
---R&D CP EXTS.
Aerospace SolvencyText: The United States federal government should invest in research and development funding tax credits.
CP solves the aerospace industry through innovation – research and development is keySterner ’10 (Eric R. Sterner is a fellow at the George C. Marshall Institute, held senior staff positions on the House Armed Services and Science committees, and served in the office of the secretary of defense and as associate deputy administrator for policy and planning at NASA. William B. Adkins is president of Adkins Strategies, held a senior staff position on the House Science Committee and served at the Naval Research Laboratory and National Reconnaissance Office. “R&D Can Revitalize the Space Industrial Base”2/22 http://www.marshall.org/article.php?id=782)
There is a range of frequently discussed, sometimes employed policies and practices that will help manage the risks of a weak industrial base. These include stable funding, improved training, frequent flight opportunities and more frequent contract opportunities. However, what is missing in that mix is a plan for investments in research and development (R&D) and a re-engineering of the acquisition approach. Setting priorities and targeting R&D funding, particularly on key components and technologies provided by lower-tier suppliers, is essential to reinvigorating the technological underpinning of the industry. If the quantity of work is inadequate for fiscal reasons, the quality of the work will have to suffice. A key issue for the government will be balancing the pursuit of revolutionary and evolutionary technologies. The United States has pursued too many highly complex, revolutionary capabilities with massive programs that ultimately fail, creating a boom-or-bust contract cycle that ultimately harms the industrial base. It would be more prudent to err on the side of evolutionary investments focused on the most critical second-, third-, and fourth-tier components and suppliers. Such R&D should be targeted at near- and mid-term capabilities with the prospect of being injected into pre-planned product improvements. Increased research and development to raise technology readiness levels will keep scientists and engineers productively employed and eventually enable the kinds of revolutionary capabilities that the United States may have prematurely sought in the past. It also will help manage the risk of creating capability gaps, which result when overly ambitious revolutionary programs fail and threaten to leave warfighters in the lurch. Also, re-engineering the acquisition approach is critical to sustaining the investments over the long term. The R&D/acquisition/operations cycle must form a more integrated and sustainable portfolio of programs, with an eye toward positive reinforcement of the industrial base. Synchronizing the cycle of system development timelines, a mission’s operational life span and R&D expenditures will make it possible to sustain key segments of industry when procurements wind down and operational cycles wind up. The funding level and focus of R&D investments should alternate between evolutionary and revolutionary advancements in response to progress with system developments and on-orbit performance. Thus, the cycles become complementary . Such an approach also would produce a degree of fiscal predictability by creating a steady budget stream, giving different weights to R&D, procurement and operations funding at different points. Some will recognize this as a form of spiral development, which usually enables programs to better manage cost and schedule risk over time compared with more ambitious revolutionary programs. By synchronizing the industrial base’s work force, facilities and production to minimize starts and stops and seeking opportunities to inject new technology into flight systems, the industry can begin to reverse the downward spiral and work its way back to health. There is still a place for revolutionary R&D, which can change the state of the art, but more measured steps are warranted now. There is no simple solution to the problems of the U.S space industrial base. Ultimately, placing it on a firmer footing requires a combination of policies, practices and programs. Within that mix, pursuing a structured R&D agenda and coordinating it with procurement and operational cycles will help improve resident U.S. space capabilities and prepare the industry for the demands that will be placed upon it.
Permanent R&D tax credits solve innovationAlbaugh 4/27 -- Fellow of the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics and member of the International Academy of Astronautics (4/27/2011 , Jim Albaugh, “Keeping America’s Lead in Aerospace”, Speech to the 10th Annual Aviation Summit US Chamber of Commerce, http://www.aia-aerospace.org/newsroom/speeches_testimony/ , FS)
There are a number of policies that encourage innovation in America. We need to renew the U.S. R&D tax credit. Wherever R&D goes, innovation and economic growth follow. The tax credit will expire, once again, at the end of this year. We need to renew it as a “permanent, stable and predictable incentive” for research in the U.S. It’s an effort that I know all of you support. The credit helps more than
18,000 companies of all sizes. Last year, President Obama set the goal of making R&D spending 3% of U.S. GDP. A stronger, permanent tax credit will help us get there.
Tax incentives is key to aerospace competition and businessNational Aerospace Week 10 (September 18, “Aerospace and Defense: The Strength to Lift America,” http://www.nationalaerospaceweek.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/04/whitepaper.pdf) National Aerospace Week
The United States has always relied on technology as a competitiveness multiplier. However, there must be a business environment that supports innovation underlying that superior technology. Without this environment, we will lag in the global marketplace no matter how advanced our products . Adopting a tax code that adheres to the principles of efficiency, innovation, competitiveness and simplicity will pay dividends across the board . U.S. companies will have more business, there will be more jobs for Americans and the nation will experience more economic growth . Congressional action on repealing the three percent withholding tax, making the research and development tax credit permanent and lowering corporate tax rates are all an excellent first step forward. Supplying the systems and services that support America’s men and women in uniform is one of the most important functions of the aerospace and defense industry. The defense acquisition system — when properly used — is a powerful tool for ensuring that systems, supplies and services are provided at fair and reasonable prices in compliance with the cost, schedule and technical parameters of government contracts. The ability of the defense acquisition process to produce the best military equipment at the best value for taxpayers is dependent on several important factors — a strong industrial base, a rational and flexible acquisition process, well-defined 2010 Aerospace Industries Association of America, Inc. 9 requirements, budget realism, stable procurement plans, a well-trained and experienced acquisition workforce and support from Congress. All are interdependent and all operate in a dynamic environment that faces continuing challenges
CP solves aerospace—innovation, science and tech leadership, and educated work force are keyAugustine 5 Chair of the National Academies Committee on Prospering in the Global Economy of the 21st Century (November 4, 2005, Norman R., Newsletter from the Office of the Vice President for Research and Graduate Education - U. T. Dallas, “US Science and Technology Is on A Losing Path”, volume 5, issue 35, http://www.utdallas.edu/research/fyi/051104/commentary.html)
The aerospace industry is especially susceptible to these broader economic trends. Without well-educated scientists and engineers, the industry will not be able to compete with well-organized programs in countries with abundant engineering talent. In addition, security issues in the industry highlight its reliance on homegrown talent, as opposed to importing its people from abroad. Troubles in the aerospace industry also could have implications throughout the US economy. In particular, the industry has been especially effective at making use of and producing systems engineers, some of whom eventually move to other industries. If aerospace were to decline, a considerable portion of these valuable individuals would be lost. I recently chaired a 20-member committee, created by the National Academies, and asked by Congress to examine the threats to America's prosperity. We concluded that the US needs to start doing several things differently. America needs to recruit new math and science teachers and support students who are pursuing degrees in those subjects. The US government should increase research funding by 10% annually over the next several years, with primary attention devoted to the physical sciences, engineering, mathematics and information sciences . Our committee asked the government to provide permanent tax incentives for US-based innovation so America can be one of the most attractive places for long-term innovation-related investments. The elements of success in the modern world are not mysterious; they comprise an environment that fosters innovation, leadership in S&T, and well-trained workers. We have time to do something about the current trends if we start now.
CP solves aerospace—solves the economy, jumpstarts aerospace, and it’s a signal of national commitmentMarburger 1—director of White House Office of Science and Technology Policy, Presentation to the Commission on the Future of the United States Aerospace Industry(11/27/01, John Marburger, “The Future Belongs to The Mobile”, http://www.spaceref.com/news/viewpr.html?pid=7179 , FS)
Today, I call for this Commission to help the President and the Congress define the steps necessary to develop a new air transportation system, a system that will not only enhance our national
security at home and abroad but simultaneously provide a civil aviation system that will enable a new era of mobility for all our citizens, new business opportunities for our most imaginative entrepreneurs, and greater productivity for the entire nation. The necessity of this call to action is clear to see. But the strategy and design for its implementation is surely complex and needs the thoughtful analysis of this able Commission. I offer three strategic developments that I believe are necessary. 1 - We need national leadership to develop an integrated global air transportation system that simultaneously meets our national defense, homeland security and civil aviation requirements. Today, that leadership is dispersed among many agencies and organizations that properly deal with the aviation community. In the Federal government, this includes the Department of Transportation's Federal Aviation Administration, NASA, and the Departments of Defense, Commerce, and State. Often these departments and agencies deal with aviation-related issues independently, without prior coordination, and sometimes at cross-purposes to each other. All have separate authorizing and appropriating Congressional Committees. State and local governments also play important aviation development roles and private industry has numerous near-term competing forces that often prevent longer-term solutions in the national interest. We need strong leadership to understand these competing concerns, and then intelligently and decisively move ahead. I call upon the Commission to assess these needs and responsibilities and suggest how this National leadership might best be created. 2 -The core of an integrated 21st Century transportation system will be a common infrastructure of communications, navigation, and surveillance system design and operation. The aviation system needs an infrastructure that is secure and allows all classes of aircraft, from airlines to unpiloted vehicles to operate safely, securely, and efficiently from thousands of communities based on market size and demand. It also needs to be able to operate within a national air defense system and enable military and commercial aircraft to operate around the world in peacetime and in war. The communications, navigation and surveillance system that the civil aviation system uses today is not much different from that used in the 1960's - ground based radar tracking, a reliance on voice radios, and overburdened air traffic controllers guiding growing numbers of individual aircraft throughout their flights. Not only does this system design not take advantage of new technological capabilities to increase its capacity, reliability, and efficiency, it is reaching its inherent scalability limits. We should be harnessing key technologies being developed by the Department of Defense, NASA, and private industry to enhance our homeland defense and civil aviation system. This includes high bandwidth satellite voice and data communications, precision navigation with GPS and necessary back-ups, global surveillance that continuously tracks both present aircraft position and updates a conflict-free flight path, technologies to vastly improve our short-term (2-6 hour) weather forecasts, digital terrain and airport data bases that create clear-day safety and efficiencies in any visibility condition, and new air transportation management systems that use the power of information technology to move vehicles with unprecedented efficiency, guaranteed safety, and immediate recognition of unauthorized deviations. I call upon the Commission to provide those organizational and technology investment strategies that will enable the development of this next-generation core capability. 3. Finally, we need to create new management approaches and development processes in aerospace that foster and reward continuous innovation by industry, government, and academia. How can we re-invigorate the aerospace risk/reward payoff from the view of Wall Street? What incentives can we provide to the Department of Defense, FAA, NASA, and industry to cooperate to aggressively develop and implement new technologies? How can we attract a new generation of engineering students to the aerospace field? Our current systems and practices are out of date and need to be revamped. I challenge the Commission to identify what changes are needed to best create a climate of innovation for aviation's future. History has shown the power of a mobile society. Early in our history, President Jefferson opened our frontiers for a growing population to move westward by foot and wagon train. President Lincoln brought west and east closer together for transport and trade with the transcontinental railroad. President Eisenhower foresaw the emerging needs and vast future benefits of an interstate highway system linking the entire nation for automobile and truck transport and national defense. Rapid travel through the air has been the latest opportunity to efficiently link the country - and the world - together. My vision, proven by history, is this: The Future Belongs to the Mobile. We need to unshackle our current air transportation system to allow America to lead that future. It is rare that such a landmark opportunity for effective government action presents itself. Now we have an opportunity to: Improve our nation's security Provide not only a short term economic stimulus in a time of stagnating national economic growth, but a long term investment in the high value technologies and systems needed to expand the reliability, efficiency, and capacity of air transportation - a crucial pathway to national productivity increases. Support a critical sector of the economy hit by job losses and sales reductions Revitalize research and development in technologies that have historically provided spin-off applications and benefits to many other industries.
---Delta 4 CP EXTS.
AT: PermNASA lacks the budget to fund multiple human exploration programs. Foust 8 (February 4, Jeff, aerospace analyst, journalist and publisher, “Defending Constellation”, “The Space Review”, http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1054/1)
That policy introduced some practical constraints as well. Although it would be “highly desirable” from an engineering perspective to have one transportation system optimized to serve the ISS and another specifically for lunar missions, NASA’s budget is not large enough to support multiple architectures. “We get one system,” he said. “It must be capable of serving in multiple roles, and it must be designed for the more difficult of those roles from the outset.” Similarly, he noted that successful aerospace systems, including both aircraft and rockets, often remain in service for decades; the same will be true for Constellation. “We are designing today the systems that our grandchildren will use as building blocks, not just for lunar return, but for missions to Mars, to the near-Earth asteroids, to service great observatories at Sun-Earth L1, and for other purposes we have not yet even considered.” Another constraint that went beyond the strict wording of the policy was the desire to have a system more capable than that developed for Apollo. “To return after fifty years with nothing more than the capability we once threw away, seems to me to fail whatever test of common sense might be applied to ourselves and our successors,” Griffin said. So in developing ESAS, NASA planned for lunar missions that would initially feature sortie missions for one week and a four-person crew, capable of landing anywhere on the lunar surface, with the later development of a lunar outpost. Those enhanced requirements require additional mass: a translunar injection (TLI) mass of 70-75 metric tons, compared to the 47 metric tons on Apollo 17. “If we need more capability to TLI than can be provided by a single launch of a Saturn-class vehicle, we can reduce our objectives, we can build a bigger rocket, or we can attain the desired capability by launching more than one rocket,” Griffin said. The first option is undesirable and the second, while desirable from an engineering standpoint, is infeasible given the existing launch and manufacturing infrastructure, and would be overkill for missions to the ISS. Thus, NASA settled on a mission architecture that involved the launch of two rockets whose payloads rendezvous in Earth orbit before heading to the Moon. “Not that anyone asked,” Griffin said, “but I personally consider this to be the best civil space policy to have been enunciated by a president in four decades or more, and the best authorization act to be approved by the Congress since the 1960s.” The simplest dual-launch system, Griffin said, would be to simply launch two identical rockets. It would require the development of only one vehicle, saving money; further cost savings would some from the higher flight rate of the single vehicle. However, such a vehicle would end up being “vastly overdesigned” for ISS missions. It would also be, in Griffin’s view, undersized for eventual human missions to Mars. He estimates that a human Mars mission would have a mass on the order of the ISS, and it would be preferable to place such a mass in orbit using a few launches of a larger vehicle than many launches of a smaller vehicle. “I hope we’re smart enough that we never again try to place such a large system in orbit by doing it in twenty-ton chunks,” he said. Thus, ESAS settled on a two-launch architecture with two different vehicles: a smaller vehicle for putting a crewed spacecraft in orbit, regardless of destination, and a larger vehicle carrying the payload needed for missions to the Moon and, eventually, Mars. This leads to one of the biggest questions about ESAS: the use of a shuttle-derived vehicle for the smaller rocket than something derived from the existing EELV families, the Atlas 5 and Delta 4. “Now that’s been a really charged question,” Griffin admitted. It’s a logical approach, he said, and something he himself had supported in the past. “To cut to the chase, it will work, as long as—key point—you are willing to define Orion as that vehicle which can fit on top of an EELV. Unfortunately, we can’t do that.” One obstacle is performance. The exploration architecture requires placing 20.3 metric tons in orbit for ISS missions and 23.3 metric tons for lunar missions, requiring the development of a new upper stage for the EELVs. A second issue is risk: the EELVs were not designed for manned missions and thus would have to be human rated. While that term can mean different things to different people, Griffin specifically mentioned the need for “significant upgrades” to the Atlas 5 core stage, and than an abort from a Delta 4 would exceed allowable g-loads on the crew. A probabilistic risk assessment developed during ESAS concluded that the Ares 1 would be nearly twice as safe as an EELV-derived launcher.
---NSS Restructuring CP EXTS.Text: The President should establish and lead the execution of a National Space Strategy and a National Security Space Authority, create a National Security Space Organization, and change Air Force and IC human resource management policies for space acquisition professionals
CP solves – consolidation creates a broader infrastructure of communication for future operationsYoung et al 8 - former Director of NASA's Goddard Space Flight Center (July 2008, Lieutenant General Edward Anderson, Vice Admiral Lyle Bien, General Ronald R. Fogleman, Mr. Keith Hall, General Lester Lyles, Dr. Hans Mar, “Leadership, Management, and Organization for National Security Space,” Report to Congress of the Independent Assessment Panel on the Organization and Management of National Security Space, http://www.armyspace.army.mil/ASJ/Images/National_Security_Space_Study_Final_Sept_16.pdf)
Recommendation 3. Create a National Security Space Organization. Assign the NSSO the functions currently assigned to the National Reconnaissance Office, the Air Force Space and Missile Systems Center, the Air Force Research Laboratories Space Vehicles Directorate, the operational functions of the of Air Force Space Command (AFSPC), and other Service organizations now providing space capability. The merged organization will report to NSSA for policy, requirements, and acquisition and AFSPC for organization, training, and equipping responsibilities. Spacecraft command, control, and data acquisition operations as well as launch will be the responsibility of National Security Space Organization (NSSO). The Director will be a Uniformed 3 Star or a Civilian 3 Star Equivalent reporting to AFSPC/CC for military Service organize, train, and equip functions and to the NSSA for policy, requirements, and acquisition matters. The NSSO would be a Joint interagency-staffed organization composed of the current Acquisition and Launch Resources assigned to the SMC, NRO, ORS, NRO S&T, AFRL/SD, USN, USA. To facilitate Life Cycle Program Management, Military Space operations currently assigned to the Services and NRO Ops will be assigned to this organization . Under the NSSO the staffs and capabilities of the NRO, SMC, and several other organizations now providing space capability would be the purview of a single director. In time, these entities would be integrated into an effective, unified organization designed to address the root causes of problems in space acquisition. Under unified leadership, this organization could focus on the most effective use of limited resources and on installing proven, successful engineering and acquisition practices, including early systems engineering and cost estimating. The organization’s primary responsibility would be the development and operation of space-based capabilities. Space Research, Development, and Acquisition: The NSSO would be assigned the acquisition and science and technology activities currently within the Air Force Space and Missile Systems Center, the National Reconnaissance Office, the Operationally Responsive Space Office, the Air Force Research Lab Space Vehicles Directorate, and other Service organizations now providing space capability. This consolidation would enable the assignment of available engineering and acquisition talent to the most important tasks. The organizations must be integrated, duplications eliminated, and best management practices instituted. Operation of Space Systems: The NSSO would be assigned the operating elements of NRO and military space, including SMC, NRO, AFSPC space operations, Air Force Research Laboratory Space Vehicles Directorate (AFRL/SD), Operationally Responsive Space (ORS) and other Service organizations now providing space operations capability. Integrating these operating elements would help to unify space operations, contributing to the development of space situational awareness and space control capabilities. The IAP strongly believes that essential operating relationships will not be undermined through the consolidation of the military space and intelligence space operational centers. To ensure this, the IAP advocates that existing operational tasking relationships be retained, and that any subsequent realignments in operational relationships be made only after careful study involving the customer communities and NSSO. Tasking for imaging would remain the responsibility of the National Geospatial- Intelligence Agency (NGA). Tasking for signals intelligence would remain with the National Security Agency. Tasking for military space would remain with U.S. Strategic Command by way of the Joint Force Component Command for Space. The structure of the NSSO and its key relationships are shown in Figure 3. The director would report to Air Force Space Command for organizing, training, and equipping and to the National Security Space Authority for policy, requirements, and acquisition. The NSSO would receive resources from Major Force Program 12, and associated space requirements would flow down from the National Security Space Authority. The organization would maintain relationships with the remaining NSS capability providers (e.g., NOAA, NASA, DARPA, and MDA). The organization would respond to operational tasking from the Intelligence Community and from U.S. Strategic Command. Operational tasking and priorities would be set collaboratively, and the responsibility for adjudicating disputes and establishing operational priorities would reside in the National Space Council, with staffing support from the National
Security Space Authority. The NSSO would establish liaison relationships with key user organizations, including the President, the National Security Council, the NGA, CIA, DIA, NSA, the combatant commands, the military departments, and other federal agencies. The staffing of the new organization will be the critical determinant of its eventual success. The IAP believes that the organization must have a strong Joint and interagency character consistent with its national mission. This will enable the organization to better understand and work with the broad range of customers who rely on space-based capabilities. At the same time, solid linkages and identification with the Air Force are essential to maintain strong connections with warfighters and to maintain the institutional support that only a military Service can provide. Thi s structure also provides a foundation for growth and evolution of the organization into a Corps or independent Service as necessary to adapt to future events. 24 The IAP’s recommendation to consolidate NRO, SMC, and other space capability providers goes substantially beyond the actions proposed by the 2001 Space Commission. We believe this fundamental restructuring is necessary and appropriate. We offer this recommendation fully understanding that it is likely to be highly controversial and challenging to execute. We are impelled, however, by the lesson of the failed experiment with the EA for Space to guide us. Confident in our conviction that it is essential to fix the problems with space acquisition and bridge the “cultural divide” between military space and intelligence space, we cannot in good conscience recommend half measures that would be circumvented or undermined.
The counterplan secures the weakening US leadership in spaceYoung et al 8 - former Director of NASA's Goddard Space Flight Center (July 2008, Lieutenant General Edward Anderson, Vice Admiral Lyle Bien, General Ronald R. Fogleman, Mr. Keith Hall, General Lester Lyles, Dr. Hans Mar, “Leadership, Management, and Organization for National Security Space,” Report to Congress of the Independent Assessment Panel on the Organization and Management of National Security Space, http://www.armyspace.army.mil/ASJ/Images/National_Security_Space_Study_Final_Sept_16.pdf)
Throughout its investigation, the IAP has interacted with many current and former NSS officials who share the concern that the current organizational structure and management system is not serving the Nation well. Today, the U.S. continues its leadership in space, but our advances have slowed at a time when other nations are investing heavily in advancing their space capabilities, and space technology is rapidly proliferating across the globe . Significant improvements are needed in the leadership and management of NSS programs, and lacking this the erosion of our leadership will continue . The IAP advocates a top-to-bottom overhaul to restore the vitality of National Security Space and regain and sustain the competitive advantages afforded the United States by our space programs . The proposed actions would foster a cohesive NSS effort by: • establishing a strategy at the national level, • consolidating leadership in the National Security Space Authority, and • integrating the organization, management, and operations of space capability providers in the National Security Space Organization . • increasing the numbers of technically competent, experienced government scientists, engineers, and acquisition managers who are “steeped in space ” and assigned to see programs through to completion. Our proposal is intended to establish focused, unified leadership for NSS at the national level as well as at the level of the National Security Space Authority . Under this unified structure for National Security Space the necessary leadership authority can be exercised and unity of action achieved. Strong leadership can reverse the current adverse trends in executing NSS programs and avert the loss of the U.S. competitive national security advantage . The resulting structure would better serve the needs of DoD, the Intelligence Community, and other users than does the system in place today. This call to action has the highest level of urgency.
Space Industry SolvencyCP solves uncertainty and stagnation in aerospace – the renewal of forums is keyBlakey 6/2 — Member of the NASA Advisory Council and administrator of the FAA(6/2/2011 Marion C. Blakey, “Aerospace Industrial Base Insight”, Speech to the AIAA Executive Symposium, http://www.aia-aerospace.org/newsroom/speeches_testimony/ , FS)
So, what can America do to overcome this risk to its critical aerospace and defense industrial base? There are several things. The American aerospace industrial base is a perishable national asset. Like any military asset, it requires well-synchronized planning and management to remain healthy and vital. We need a clear, coherent national industrial policy that ensures aerospace and defense companies can give U.S. warfighters the technological advantages required to meet our nation’s strategic goals. And that poses an interesting question. Going back to AIA’s panel last week, Linda Hudson, CEO of BAE Systems observed that before an industrial base strategy can be developed and implemented, there must be some clarity about the nature of future demand and the capabilities required to meet that demand. She used an example to illustrate her point, which I’ll share with you. During the peak of the Iraq war, the Bradley Fighting Vehicle was funded in the billions. Current plans for the program would take funding to $250 million in fiscal year 2012. It then drops to $25 million in fiscal year 2013 – clearly a “going out of business plan,” according to Linda. However, the story doesn’t end there. Funding is slated to jump back up to $500 million in fiscal 2014 and $850 million in fiscal 2015. How can a company sensibly plan around that type of trajectory? How do you put thousands of suppliers and employees on hold—and jeopardize troops counting on this equipment? Such considerations—how we retain manufacturing capability, skilled workers and suppliers—should be made integral parts of strategic processes, such as the National Security Strategy, the National Defense Strategy and the upcoming review prompted by President Obama’s call for a $400 billion reduction in defense spending. These strategic processes also should weigh the preservation and further development of the unique, highly creative design talent of the defense industrial base that are vital to both the military’s ability to carry out its missions and to the national economy. In addition to those steps, restoring the Secretary of Defense/industry CEO forums would provide an opportunity for face-to-face meetings between customer and supplier and result in better coordination and greater understanding of current and future needs on each side. Such meetings between customers and suppliers are regular features of the commercial business. The SecDef Forums have not been held regularly since 2001. Congress should get more involved by reinvigorating oversight and review by its Armed Services committees of defense industrial base issues. And the Defense Department also should continually assess the industrial base from a more strategic perspective. It should be more proactive in identifying cross-cutting industrial base issues that could potentially impact several current or future programs. This is particularly important as the defense budget begins a period of decline. Inevitably, if past cycles hold true, cuts will fall disproportionately on the modernization accounts, affecting the industrial base—something we must collectively work to prevent.
CP solves – it creates a better means of interagency communication and creates policy coordination to aid US space industryYoung et al 8 - former Director of NASA's Goddard Space Flight Center (July 2008, Lieutenant General Edward Anderson, Vice Admiral Lyle Bien, General Ronald R. Fogleman, Mr. Keith Hall, General Lester Lyles, Dr. Hans Mar, “Leadership, Management, and Organization for National Security Space,” Report to Congress of the Independent Assessment Panel on the Organization and Management of National Security Space, http://www.armyspace.army.mil/ASJ/Images/National_Security_Space_Study_Final_Sept_16.pdf)
Recommendation 1. The President should establish and lead the execution of a National Space Strategy that assures U.S. space preeminence, integrates the various participants, establishes lines of authority and accountability, and delineates priorities. To implement the strategy, the President should reestablish the National Space Council, chaired by the National Security Advisor , with the authority to assign roles and responsibilities and to adjudicate disputes over requirements and resources. Presidential leadership is needed to establish a common focus on space priorities across the organizations responsible for National Security Space. A national strategy with an oversight mechanism is needed to unify efforts, set priorities, establish roles and responsibilities, and adjudicate issues. Expert witnesses who met with the IAP observed that in the current executive branch structure, space lacks a coherent voice and leadership at the national level. They identified several reasons why efforts need to be better integrated at the national level . These may be addressed by assigning responsibilities such as the following to the National Space Council: • Foster needed interagency collaboration for space control and space situational awareness: Capabilities for space
control and space situational awareness will require collaboration among several federal agencies. • Adjudicate differences on requirements and resources: Because of the lack of a standing forum for addressing issues, the IAP was told, key resource issues are often resolved by the Office of Management and Budget, which is not the appropriate place to resolve such complex issues associated with roles and missions, technology, architecture, mission priorities, etc.. • Maintain the health of the U.S. space infrastructure and industry: There are many common sources of the underlying capabilities supporting NSS, commercial space, and scientific space, and it is in the nation’s best interest to collaborate across federal agencies in assessing capabilities and addressing shortfalls . National initiatives should be devised and coordinated through the National Space Council. In particular, the IAP advocates that this framework be engaged to address the recommendations on export controls related to satellite technology of the CSIS Group on the Health of the U.S. Space Industrial Base and Impact of the Export Controls, February 2008.9 • Ensure the effective execution of joint, interagency space programs: Important new programs such as NPOESS and Space Radar have been hamstrung in part by the inability to resolve interagency differences in setting achievable requirements and resource priorities. In the case of Space Radar, technical misjudgments contributed to delay and cancellation of the program of record. A second essential step is to create a position whose occupant is in charge of the entire National Security Space enterprise. The Director of the National Security Space Authority will report directly to the Secretary of Defense and to the Director of National Intelligence. The individual will also hold the rank of Under Secretary of Defense for Space and Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Space. The dual reporting structure proposed here continues the practice that has been in place since 1960. Recommendation 2. Establish a National Security Space Authority . The Director of NSSA should be assigned the rank of Under Secretary of Defense for Space in addition to being designated the Deputy DNI for Space, reporting to the SecDef and the DNI. The Director, NSSA will be the Executive Agent for Space and the NSS acquisition authority. The director will also be responsible for defining and formulating the Major Force Program -12 Budge t,10 be the focal point for interagency coordination on NSS matters, and be the single authority with responsibility and accountability for the planning and execution of the NSS program. Analytical and technical support from a National Security Space Office-like organization augmented with Intelligence Community expertise will be required to execute this responsibility effectively. A strong executive is needed to integrate user capability needs, set resource priorities, evaluate alternatives, develop and advocate investment plans and programs, and formulate and execute budgets for National Security Space. This executive must be responsive to DoD, the Intelligence Community, and other users for Space capabilities and must serve as a focal point for coordinating efforts across the federal government . Many of the experts who met with the IAP observed that within the DoD and Intelligence Community, the responsibilities for National Security Space are currently fragmented and unfocused because authorities and responsibilities are spread across numerous organizations. Although the Secretary of the Air Force is the DoD Executive Agent for Space, his authorities have been diminished from those envisioned by the 2001 Space Commission. Moreover, as perceived by many, USAF stewardship of space does not enjoy the same priority as other traditional Air Force missions. Customers of spacebased capabilities observe that there is no responsible official who looks across all the available resources and capabilities to seek the best solution, whether from the military, intelligence, civilian, or commercial sector.
Space Leadeship SolvencyCP solves – current bureaucratic inefficiencies hamstring our space programsYoung et al 8 - former Director of NASA's Goddard Space Flight Center (July 2008, Lieutenant General Edward Anderson, Vice Admiral Lyle Bien, General Ronald R. Fogleman, Mr. Keith Hall, General Lester Lyles, Dr. Hans Mar, “Leadership, Management, and Organization for National Security Space,” Report to Congress of the Independent Assessment Panel on the Organization and Management of National Security Space, http://www.armyspace.army.mil/ASJ/Images/National_Security_Space_Study_Final_Sept_16.pdf)
Today, U.S. leadership in space provides a vital national advantage across the scientific, commercial, and national security realms. In particular, space is of critical importance to our national intelligence and warfighting capabilities. The panel members nevertheless are unanimous in our conviction that, without significant improvements in the leadership and management of NSS programs, U.S. space preeminence will erode to the extent that space ceases to provide a competitive national security advantage. Space technology is rapidly proliferating across the globe, and many of our most important capabilities and successes were developed and fielded with a government technical workforce and a management structure that no longer exist. Our report details recommended actions in four areas. First, establish and execute a national space strategy. The President should lead this effort and reestablish the National Space Council chaired by the National Security Advisor to implement the strategy and coordinate activities for NSS across the DoD, Intelligence Community, NOAA, NASA, and other responsible agencies. This provides a standing forum for assigning responsibilities, setting priorities, and breaking the roadblocks to cooperation that have stymied progress on key space programs. Second, create a senior National Security Space Authority in support of the Secretary of Defense and Director of National Intelligence. Today, no one’s in charge. The authority and responsibilities for military space and intelligence space programs are scattered across the staffs of the DoD and the Intelligence Community. The proposed arrangement, while unusual, is critically needed to rectify crippling shortfalls in the current system, including the inability to reconcile budget priorities and the inability to ensure that new acquisition program requirements are integrated and affordable across military and intelligence space. Third, establish a National Security Space Organization that would consolidate the functions of the Air Force Space and Missile Systems Center, other parts of Air Force Space Command, and the National Reconnaissance Office. Under unified leadership, this organization could focus on employing the very limited available talent most effectively and on installing proven, successful engineering and acquisition practices, including early systems engineering and cost estimating. The persistent pattern of space acquisition program delays, cost overruns, and cancellations has drained resources and cause the nation to rely on satellite constellations that have aged well beyond their original design lives . This is unacceptable, and small modifications to the status quo will not suffice. Finally, each of the Military Departments and the Intelligence Community must adopt and implement strategies for Identifying, selecting, educating, training, and managing a core group of government professionals in sufficient numbers to support the nation’s space acquisition responsibilities. The careers of these space acquisition professionals must be managed such that they can provide continuity for program execution, while remaining eligible and competitive for career advancement. It is simply unrealistic to expect that we can succeed in developing and acquiring complex space systems without sufficient numbers of smart buyers – technically competent, experienced government scientists, engineers and acquisition managers who are “steeped in space” and assigned to see programs through to completion.
Current government fragmentation jacks any chance of an effective space programYoung et al 8 - former Director of NASA's Goddard Space Flight Center (July 2008, Lieutenant General Edward Anderson, Vice Admiral Lyle Bien, General Ronald R. Fogleman, Mr. Keith Hall, General Lester Lyles, Dr. Hans Mar, “Leadership, Management, and Organization for National Security Space,” Report to Congress of the Independent Assessment Panel on the Organization and Management of National Security Space, http://www.armyspace.army.mil/ASJ/Images/National_Security_Space_Study_Final_Sept_16.pdf)
Nevertheless, much of our success was realized with an NSS management and organization that was significantly different from what we observe today. NSS performance shortfalls, vulnerabilities, and potential gaps in capabilities are emerging, and the future is of grave concern. Many of our capabilities are thin and fragile. Important space-based capabilities are provided today by on-orbit assets that are well beyond their design lives, while many new generation satellites designed to replace them have experienced
unacceptable cost and schedule growth, technical performance problems, and cancellations. Many of the necessary actions to address these adverse trends, such as those identified by the 2001 Space Commission and the 2003 Defense Science Board Study on Space Acquisition, have not been taken. Indeed, recent DoD and Intelligence Community reorganizations have further diffused responsibilities for space . Leadership for strategy, budgets, requirements, and acquisition across NSS is fragmented, resulting in an absence of clear accountability and authority –“no one’s in charge.” Additionally, careermanagement practices are often counterproductive, and the limited technical talent pool is insufficient.
Inefficiencies in government structure destroy the effectiveness of new space policiesYoung et al 8 - former Director of NASA's Goddard Space Flight Center (July 2008, Lieutenant General Edward Anderson, Vice Admiral Lyle Bien, General Ronald R. Fogleman, Mr. Keith Hall, General Lester Lyles, Dr. Hans Mar, “Leadership, Management, and Organization for National Security Space,” Report to Congress of the Independent Assessment Panel on the Organization and Management of National Security Space, http://www.armyspace.army.mil/ASJ/Images/National_Security_Space_Study_Final_Sept_16.pdf)
There are insufficient numbers of experienced space acquisition personnel to execute the responsibilities of the Space and Missile Systems Center (SMC) and the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO). Both organizations suffer from the long-term ill effects of the reductions in government technical personnel made during the 1990s, and neither has instituted necessary career development and management practices. Strengthened management focus is needed to identify, develop, assign, and promote acquisition personnel who are “steeped in space.” Lack of requirements rigor, technical performance problems, cost growth, and schedule delays have plagued U.S. space programs. Programs such as the Future Imagery Architecture, Transformational Communications Satellite System (TSAT), and Space Radar exemplify the failures in existing leadership and management practices to define, fund, and execute new satellite programs. Strong management is needed to implement proven acquisition practices. This will require reinvigorating government capabilities for systems analysis, costing, and budgeting in order to define more realistic programs. Throughout the NSS enterprise, improved processes are needed to ensure that requirements are consistent with available resources. Continuity of key personnel is essential for program success. At the same time, the traditional focus of the NRO on innovation has been diverted by the need to keep aging on-orbit assets operating. The needed focus on innovation can be restored by rebalancing sustainment, operations, and routine production tasks within a unified organization.
Current NSS programs plague our ability to field new capabilities – multiple studies proveYoung et al 8 - former Director of NASA's Goddard Space Flight Center (July 2008, Lieutenant General Edward Anderson, Vice Admiral Lyle Bien, General Ronald R. Fogleman, Mr. Keith Hall, General Lester Lyles, Dr. Hans Mar, “Leadership, Management, and Organization for National Security Space,” Report to Congress of the Independent Assessment Panel on the Organization and Management of National Security Space, http://www.armyspace.army.mil/ASJ/Images/National_Security_Space_Study_Final_Sept_16.pdf)
The panel met with the heads of the major organizations responsible for National Security Space, along with numerous government, industry, and independent experts.2 The panel also considered the findings and recommendations of relevant studies, including the Commission to Assess United States National Security Space Management and Organization (referred to in this report as the 2001 Space Commission) and the 2003 Defense Science Board Task Force on Acquisition of National Security Space Programs. The panel members are unanimous in our conviction that the leadership and management of NSS programs must improve significantly, or the United States will lose space preeminence and the attendant national advantage . After decades of success and clear leadership in space, our ability to develop and field new capabilities is plagued by a persistent pattern of overruns, delays, and cancellations, while global space technology spreads and other nations are vigorously pursuing competitive space-based capabilities. From a military, intelligence, commercial, and scientific perspective, there can be no doubt that continued leadership in space is a vital national interest. However, the continuation of U.S. space leadership now requires a renewed national commitment to strong stewardship. We advocate top-to-bottom initiatives to strengthen leadership, management, and organizations for National Security Space. Over the last two decades, numerous space commissions/panels have reviewed the management and leadership of national security space, and we have tried a multitude of solutions. But the current state of National Security Space clearly indicates that a bold step is now required. The attempts to make refinements have failed because they have not attacked the fundamental need for an organizational structure that fosters rational decisions
and a technically competent and experienced workforce that can execute space acquisition programs. The fragile state of today’s on-orbit NSS architecture, the scale of the resources associated with NSS, and the ever-increasing importance of NSS to U.S. leadership—not just our military and intelligence communities—mandate aggressive action. As a nation, we must continue to have a strong, integrated space program.
Insufficient technically competent personnel, lax discipline, cost growth and schedule delays destroy any chance for the plan to solveYoung et al 8 - former Director of NASA's Goddard Space Flight Center (July 2008, Lieutenant General Edward Anderson, Vice Admiral Lyle Bien, General Ronald R. Fogleman, Mr. Keith Hall, General Lester Lyles, Dr. Hans Mar, “Leadership, Management, and Organization for National Security Space,” Report to Congress of the Independent Assessment Panel on the Organization and Management of National Security Space, http://www.armyspace.army.mil/ASJ/Images/National_Security_Space_Study_Final_Sept_16.pdf)
A major concern in the Congress that triggered the request for this review is the pervasive pattern of delays, overruns, and satellite system failures over the past decade. These acquisition problems have forced the United States to continue to rely on the previous generation of on-orbit satellites, many of which are operating beyond their original design lives. This has increased the fragility of our on-orbit constellations, not only posing a serious risk of compromising some capabilities, but causing unacceptable delays in the deployment of needed new technologies and capabilities. Billions of dollars have been lost and timely capability denied to our warfighter and the Intelligence Community in the past decade because of acquisition failures. The persistent space acquisition problems have been well documented by the Government Accountability Office and other independent studies.3 Taken together, the Future Imagery Architecture, Space-Based Infrared Satellite Network (SIBRS) High, Space Radar, and NPOESS programs exemplify the problems with cost overruns, delays, quantity reductions, and cancellations. As a rough generalization, several of the more troubled NSS acquisition programs are providing substantially reduced capability, at about twice the cost, about six years late. Based on the IAP’s visits to NRO and the Space and Missile Systems Center, and on the testimony of senior experts, the IAP finds that there is no lack of individual efforts to execute NSS acquisition programs effectively. But these good efforts are offset by fundamental problems that have hamstrung the acquisition of NSS systems. • There are insufficient numbers of technically competent and experienced space acquisition personnel to execute the responsibilities of the Space and Missile Systems Center (SMC) and the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO). Both organizations suffer from the long-term ill effects of the reductions in government technical personnel made during the 1990s. At the Space and Missile Systems Center, the number of educated and trained scientists and engineers was reduced by 40 percent. Both military and intelligence space programs have had remarkably poor track records in executing acquisition programs since that time. Neither has instituted the necessary career development and management practices to fully recover. The reduced availability of government personnel with the necessary technical competence has sharply reduced the government’s capability to acquire space systems and is believed by many experts to be a major cause of acquisition program failures. In addition, continuity of key personnel is essential for program success. It is critical that the available competent people be assigned with tour lengths sufficient to provide needed continuity. • Lax requirements discipline, technical performance problems, cost growth, and schedule delays have plagued U.S. space programs. As noted above, persistent program delays, overruns, and cancellations exemplify how existing leadership and management practices have failed to define, fund, and execute new satellite programs. Strong management is needed to implement proven acquisition practices.4 This will require reinvigorating government capabilities for engineering systems analysis, costing, and budgeting in order to define more realistic programs. Throughout the NSS enterprise, improved requirements processes are needed to ensure that acquisition requirements are consistent with available resources. In spite of the concerns expressed, the panel observed many pockets of excellence and positive trends in the course of its study. Among these, we note the long series of successful space launches, the growing employment and capability of space-based commercial communications and imagery, USSTRATCOM’s clearer and stronger focus on space, valuable support being provided everyday to our national leadership and warfighters, and tireless efforts by those implementing our NSS programs to achieve mission success. There are many dedicated leaders, managers, and personnel who must be credited for their dedication and good work across the NSS enterprise. Nevertheless, our current success was realized with an NSS management and organization that was significantly different from what we observe today.
Interagency inefficiencies hamstring new NSS programsYoung et al 8 - former Director of NASA's Goddard Space Flight Center (July 2008, Lieutenant General Edward Anderson, Vice Admiral Lyle Bien, General Ronald R. Fogleman, Mr. Keith Hall, General Lester Lyles, Dr. Hans Mar, “Leadership, Management, and Organization for National Security Space,” Report to Congress of the Independent Assessment Panel on the Organization and Management of National Security Space, http://www.armyspace.army.mil/ASJ/Images/National_Security_Space_Study_Final_Sept_16.pdf)
At the national level, the National Security Council’s Space Policy Coordinating Committee was established to coordinate national space policy matters that affect federal government agencies.Within DoD, the Information Operations and Space Executive Committee is the principal forum for addressing space activities and issues. There are other committees and councils, such as the Space Partnership Council (an informal group with representation at senior levels), that review interagency concerns. However, none of these organizations has provided the decision-framing forum necessary to support the Presidential leadership needed to establish a common focus on space priorities across the organizations responsible for National Security Space. This has greatly hindered progress in some areas. Essential NSS capabilities commonly rely on the coordinated efforts of a wide range of government and non-government organizations. • Military space responsibilities are shared among DoD components including the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Staff, Defense Agencies, Combatant Commands, the Military Services, MDA, and DARPA activities involving space-based capabilities for communications, early warning, weather, surveillance, space control, and precision navigation and timing as well as launch, space ranges, and R&D. • Intelligence space responsibilities include reconnaissance and related satellite system development, acquisition, and operations as well as R&D. • NOAA responsibilities include weather and remote sensing. • Commercial space forms the industrial base supporting government space programs as well as providing commercial services in the form of satellite communications and remote sensing systems.• NASA is primarily responsible for civil space activities; however, its overall technology efforts and project management support contribute significantly to NSS activities. • Other organizations with space responsibilities include the Department Of Energy and the National Labs; the Department of Agriculture (U.S. Geological Survey and LANDSAT); the Department of Homeland Security (National Applications Office); the National Science Foundation (Space Weather), and the satellite systems and activities of our allies. Lacking an effective national-level leadership mechanism, important new programs such as NPOESS and Space Radar have been hamstrung by an inability to resolve interagency differences in setting achievable requirements and resource priorities. Emerging requirements for new capabilities for Space Situational Awareness and Space Control will also require collaboration among several federal agencies. The current administration has established a U.S. National Space Policy, signed by the President on August 31, 2006. But an overarching space strategy is sorely needed to support the National Space Policy. This strategy needs to be accompanied by an oversight mechanism to assure implementation and funding, unify efforts, set priorities, establish roles and responsibilities, and adjudicate issues.
Interagency coordination solves US space leadership – Aerospace Industries Association 11 (2011, Aerospace Industries Association, “Robust Space Systems Require National Leadership”, http://www.aia-aerospace.org/issues_policies/space/robust/)
Many U.S. agencies play roles in our space programs. An interagency space management body, reporting directly to the White House, will provide efficient oversight and allow for crosscutting programs. Such leadership is needed to develop and maintain a cohesive national space strategy and establish a national architecture and budgets for meeting requirements. Congress must oversee a sound national space strategy and appropriate sufficient and stable funding to support this critical national resource. Interagency coordination at the highest level, a national space strategy and stable funding are all critical to preserving America’s global leadership in space.
---Propellant Depot CP EXTS.
Launch Costs SolvencyPropellant depots will substantially decrease launch costsFoust, 8 – aerospace analyst, journalist and publisher. He is the editor and publisher of The Space Review and has written for Astronomy Now and The New Atlantis, Ph.D in planetary sciences from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (Jeff, The Space Review, “Propellant depots: an idea whose time has (almost) come,” 5/12, http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1127/1)
One of the key factors driving the design of space projects of all shapes and sizes is propellant. The choice of propellants, and their quantities, drive everything from the size and performance of launch vehicles to the lifetimes or orbiting spacecraft. One of the reasons why this is such a critical factor is that, today, there’s no way to refuel spacecraft and upper stages once in space (an exception being the International Space Station, whose thrusters can be refueled by visiting spacecraft). As any mission designer will remind you, there are no gas stations in space.But what if there were? What if it were possible to top off the tanks of an orbiting satellite, or a vehicle headed towards the Moon or beyond? Not having to carry all of the propellant needed for the entire mission at the time of launch would have a major effect on the mission’s design, capabilities, and cost. For example, the Mars Direct architecture first promulgated in the early 1990s revolutionized concepts for human Mars missions by proposing to produce the propellant needed for the trip home on Mars, rather than carrying it all the way from Earth, permitting smaller and less expensive missions. Today, one of the key factors in siting a future human lunar base is access to any deposits of water ice that could be used not just for life support but also for propellant.In situ resource utilization isn’t an option for Earth orbit, but creating orbiting depots for propellants hauled up from Earth is an alternative. Such proposals have, in the past, been stymied by a lack of a clear market and business plan, as well as numerous technical issues. However, backers believe that conditions today, both technical and economic, merit a reexamination of the concept.The benefits of propellant depotsThe concept of the depot is straightforward: rather than launching a spacecraft with all the propellant it needs to carry out its mission, the spacecraft can, after launch, rendezvous with the depot and top off its tanks. Launching a spacecraft with empty tanks means that its “dry” mass can be heavier, increasing its useful payload, or it can use a smaller and therefore less expensive launch vehicle. Refueling existing spacecraft can, all other things being equal, extend their useful lifetimes.The depots, in turn, generate launch demand of their own, since their stocks have to be replenished from Earth. This, depot advocates argue, can help spur the development of new low-cost launch systems to meet this demand. Hauling propellant might be an ideal early market for new vehicles that are still demonstrating their reliability, or for vehicles that trade off reliability for lower costs, since propellant is easily replaceable and costs orders of magnitude less per kilogram than a typical satellite (see “Low-cost launch and orbital depots: the Aquarius system”, The Space Review, January 30, 2006).
Propellant depots solve the need for heavy liftBonin, 11 – aerospace engineer and co-founder of Consortium Technologies, LLC, a Virginia-based company developing innovative technologies for both terrestrial and space-based applications (Grant, The Space Review, “Human spaceflight for less: the case for smaller launch vehicles, revisited,” 6/6, http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1861/1)
An illustrative example of near-term exploration missions using existing launch vehicles, recently put forward by Alan Wilhite, Doug Stanley, Dale Arney and Chris Jones, presents a space exploration program that in no way requires SLS or anything comparable. Instead, this study and others like it rely on the use of propellant depots, which are perhaps the most enabling technology that can be developed for decoupling launch vehicle performance from exploration missions. A propellant depot doesn’t care how it gets refueled or by whom, and allows exploration spacecraft to be similarly indifferent. Propellant depots can be restocked continuously and asynchronously to the spacecraft that need them, thus allowing propellant launch to proceed on a parallel path to any particular mission. As a further benefit, the existence of propellant depots would allow spacecraft to be launched with their own tanks partially or completely empty, thus further reducing the performance requirements of both the spacecraft and its launch vehicle. Many propellant depots in the literature are designed to be launched with a single existing rocket themselves.
Propellant depots will bring down launch costsSimberg, 9 – former aerospace engineer (Rand, “Space Gas Station Would Blast Huge Payloads to the Moon,” Popular Mechanics, 12/18, http://www.popularmechanics.com/science/space/news/4224660
Because each post-shuttle era launch will cost billions of dollars, NASA is crunching the
numbers on how to get more lunar payload "bang" for its transport vehicle "buck." Boeing proposed what might be the ultimate problem solver at the AIAA (American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics) Space 2007 conference here last week: a low Earth orbit gas station, or propellant depot, to refill the lunar-injection vehicle tanks, fill up NASA's new lander and deliver dramatically more efficient payloads to the surface of the moon.
Propellant depots will stimulate the private sector launch market to refuel itSimberg, 9 – former aerospace engineer (Rand, “Space Gas Station Would Blast Huge Payloads to the Moon,” Popular Mechanics, 12/18, http://www.popularmechanics.com/science/space/news/4224660
Of course, there's no such thing as a free launch. In order for the propellant depot to become a reality, it has to reach orbit—and, more important, so does the gas. Boeing's plan is to build the depot in pieces like a stripped-down International Space Station, only in modules based on the upper stage of the Delta launch vehicle. Two depots would provide redundancy, each one with a total capacity of 175 tons of liquid oxygen/liquid hydrogen (25 tons for the lander, 125 for the rocket, with margins for boil-off and other contingencies). And while many of the necessary parts and operations (i.e., orbital cryogenic storage and transfer) still have to be developed and matured, they're plausible—and critical for a space-faring civilization anyway. How the propellant would reach such a pitstop in the sky is really the beauty of Boeing's concept. NASA has been seeking ways to involve both international partners and the commercial sector—Michael Griffin, the agency's administrator, told PM recently that such a "private/public synergy" was "crucial for the future"—but NASA has been reluctant to put any partner on the critical path. The good news? Anyone can make propellant, and anyone can deliver it. The orbital reservoir will allow for different quantities from tanker vehicles both small and large. The payload itself is cheap, so even low-reliability launchers could potentially be used. If one provider doesn't deliver, another can pick up the slack, whether it's based in the U.S. or overseas. It's an ideal means to provide a large market for a variety of launch providers, driving the competition necessary to reduce launch costs. And the lower the propellant costs get, the lower the cost of per-pound lunar payload delivery gets—space economics at its finest. Down the road, Boeing's gas station could provide even more benefits than an improved lunar payload. Communications companies could improve their satellite payloads to geostationary orbit and beyond. NASA might be able to combine the dual launches in its moon program, or make its lunar landing vehicle reusable, with another depot using propellants produced on the moon. Because most of the mass necessary to get to the moon is propellant (though Boeing would never say so), a space gas station might even eliminate the need for a heavy-lift launcher altogether, increasing the launch rate of smaller, cheaper vehicles, which in turn could cut costs for getting to the moon and, eventually, Mars.
---NASA CP EXTS.
NASA can act alone NASA has authority to act on its ownFaith, 10 - independent technology consultant and Adjunct Fellow for Space Initiatives at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, (April 26, G. Ryan, “President Obama’s Vision for Space Exploration (part 2)”, “The Space Review”, http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1616/1)Regardless of how much Presidential support NASA can count on at home or abroad, the success of the current space exploration plan will depend most heavily on NASA’s leadership. Globally, pursuing a “first among equals” leadership strategy hedges against both political and technological risk in the space program. Domestically, NASA can improve its viability by taking a more proactive leadership role in setting its own agenda, rather than throwing themselves to the mercy of other actors in government. Finally, given the perceived perennial lack of a clear and actionable mission for NASA in general and human spaceflight in particular (see “Giving NASA a clear mission”, The Space Review, August 31, 2009), new NASA administrator Charles Bolden must declare and articulate a very clear and well-defined mission in order to guide the agency that he oversees, the broader government to whom he reports, and ultimately to the American people on whose behalf he explores.
---Politics Links
-Plan Unpopular
1NC Political Capital Expanding Constellation is perceived as controversial new spendingHandberg, 11 - Professor and Chair of the Department of Political Science at the University of Central Florida (Rodger, “Small ball or home runs: the changing ethos of US human spaceflight policy,” The Space Review, 1/17, http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1759/1)
The US space program remained focused, not on duplicating Apollo, but on achieving another difficult goal such as going to Mars, a logical extension truly of the Apollo effort. Twice, the presidents Bush provided the presidential rationale, if not support, for achieving great things. The Space Exploration Initiative (SEI) in 1989 and the Vision for Space Exploration (VSE) in 2004 were announced with great fanfare but neither survived the realities of congressional and presidential budgeting . The VSE appeared on paper more realistic about funding, but its choices were draconian: the ISS and space shuttle were both to be sacrificed on the altar of the new program. The earlier SEI died quickly, so hard choices were not required, while the VSE in the form of the Constellation Program lingers on although its effective demise appears certain . The Obama Administration prefers another approach while the new Congress is likely more hostile to big ticket discretionary spending. If the Tea Party faction in the Republican House caucus means what it says, the future for Constellation or any other similar program is a dim one.The reality is that the Apollo program, the SEI, and the VSE are examples in space terms of the home run approach. Such efforts confront the cruel but obvious reality that the human spaceflight program is considered by the public and most of Congress to be a “nice to have,” but not a necessity when compared to other programs or national priorities. Congressional support is narrow and constituency-driven (i.e. protect local jobs), which means most in Congress only support the space program in the abstract. Big ticket items or programs are not a priority for most, given other priorities. What happens is what can be loosely termed normal politics: a situation where human spaceflight remains a low priority on the national agenda. Funding for bold new initiatives is going to be hard to come by even when the economy recovers and deficits are under control. The home run approach has run its course at least for a time; now the small ball approach becomes your mantra.
2NC HLLVs UnpopularHeavy lift undermines political support for subsequent exploration programsFoust, 4 – editor and publisher of The Space Review (5/17/04, Jeff, The Space Review, “The myth of heavy lift,” http://www.thespacereview.com/article/146/1)RK
One advantage that heavy-lift vehicles have is that they would make it easy, from an operational standpoint, to mount human missions to the Moon: a single mission could be carried out with one or two launches, just as the Apollo missions required a single Saturn 5 launch. This advantage, though, could ultimately become a disadvantage. Heavy-lift vehicles would require little in the way of in-space infrastructure to mount a mission: no space stations, propellant depots, or other facilities, just launch and go. Given that this would be supplied by an expensive heavy-lift vehicle with no other applications, it would be easy for a future Administration or Congress to terminate the program and leave virtually nothing left of government manned spaceflight. This is hardly the hallmark of a program that is supposed to be affordable and sustainable. Instead, it would simply be Apollo redux.
2NC CongressRhetorical support for Constellation doesn’t translate into budgetary supportDelgado, 11 - Space Policy Institute, George Washington University (Laura, “When inspiration fails to inspire: A change of strategy for the US space program,” Space Policy 27 (2011) 94e98, Science Direct)
These challenges led the Augustine Committee in 2009 to conclude that the Constellation Program, the main component of the VSE, would not meet its requirements on time without a significant boost of resources [10], a point that led the Obama administration to eventually cancel it. During the summer of 2010, when the administration’s plans were being hotly debated, inspiration was yet again touted as a key issue. The administration ’ s proposal – which hinged on transforming NASA into a technology development and research agency and which transferred crew and cargo transport to the ISS, the commercial sector – was criticized for killing the space program, and relinquishing US leadership. It also called for ISS continuation past 2016, which, despite being widely supported, was still found uninspiring for some.Interestingly enough, the reaction from Congress - although aggressive in changing key policy provisions - did not add one cent to this proposed budget , and instead kept it at $19 billion.5 In the context of economic challenges, members of Congress were hard put to argue for double digit increases for a space program that was vehemently defended as a way to keep America being the best. At the end of the day, with growing unemployment, a monstrous de fi cit, two seemingly never-ending wars, and a myriad of issues facing the country, arguments appealing to space for discovery, leadership, and prestige alone just do not cut it.
Congress opposes funding increases despite rhetorical support for space.Handberg, Professor and Chair of the Department of Political Science at the University of Central Florida, 11 (April 25, Roger, “Post-Constellation blues”, “The Space Review”, http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1620/2)Taking another pathway to the future is disturbing when you have a particular model of how to do human exploration in your head.What is happening now is that the United States is being forced to adapt to a situation where it no longer dominates events at least until the United States returns to routine human spaceflight. The reality, not always understood, is that this situation would have arisen even if the Constellation program continued on its projected, albeit delayed, path. Regardless of President Obama’s choices, the US confronted a new situation due to the Constellation program’s failure to keep on track and on budget. Advocates ignore the reality that the bulk of Congress is not terribly driven or excited about the space program because its linkages to their constituents are not concrete and immediate. As a general proposition, most would support an American space program, but the reality is that support is not strong enough to drive them to significantly increase NASA’s budget without some greater sense of where the program is going. Prematurely killing the ISS was a perplexing decision from their perspective since NASA seemed to be throwing away a generation of its work and saying, in effect, “Let’s start over.” The Vision for Space Exploration in one sense was a clean-sheet concept despite the obvious carry forward aspects of the Apollo program, but Congress and the American people seem reluctant to start over without first exploiting what has taken several decades to build.
Support has shifted against the Constellation programMorring 10 (June 28, Frank, “Heavy Lift Gains Support, But CR Remains Likely”, Lexis)«I also am exploring the idea of authorizing a mechanism to provide long-term strategic guidance on human space flight,» he wrote.Despite the coalescing support for a compromise that would allow NASA to terminate most of the Constellation Program in Fiscal 2011, a continuing dispute between Congress and the Obama administration over what can be done to terminate the program in the current Fiscal Year makes a compromise unlikely before the midterm elections this fall.That increases the likelihood that NASA will be funded under a continuing resolution (CR) that extends current programs and funding levels beyond the end of this fiscal year on Sept. 30. And House Democrats, with an eye on both the federal deficit and the November elections, say they won’t adopt a budget resolution until after the midterm elections this fall, and will try to tighten spending below Obama’s budget requests as a general principle.The White House, which already has asked all federal agencies—including NASA—to identify an additional 5% in spending cuts for its Fiscal 2012 budget planning, has added to the near-term squeeze on space spending by amending its Fiscal 2011 NASA request to shift $100 million from exploration to the Commerce and Labor departments to help shuttle and Constellation workers affected by the budget request find new work. Congress opposes the planSmith, 11 – Space and Technology Policy Group, LLC, Arlington, VA, USA (Marcia, “President Obama’s National Space Policy: A change in tone and a focus on space sustainability,” Space Policy 27 (2011) 20-23, science direct)Congress has not yet provided the funds necessary to implement the 2010 NASA Authorization Act. The US Congress has a very complex system for funding agencies that involves “authorizations” and “appropriations”. Authorization acts set policy and recommend funding, but do not actually provide any money. Money is provided to agencies only
through the appropriations process. Congress has not passed any of the appropriations bills for FY2011, which began on 1 October 2010 [10]. The US government is currently operating on what is called a Continuing Resolution at FY2010 funding levels until 3 December 2010 and it would not be surprising if that gets extended into 2011. The Republican Party won control of the US House of Representatives in the November 2010 elections largely on promises to cut federal spending and tame the budget deficit. All government agencies, including NASA, are likely to have dif fi culty convincing Congress of the need for new, expensive programs. Yet Congress voted on a bipartisan basis to require that NASA builds a new crew transportation system in addition to supporting the commercial sector. How the appropriators will reconcile these varying forces remains to be seen. Even if the appropriators provide all the money that was recommended in the authorization act, it may not be enough to attract the private sector to take the White House up on this offer. Thus the future of the US human spaceflight program remains unclear today despite the new space policy.
Congress likes spending cuts on space. Moskowitz 11 (April 15, Clara, “NASA's 2011 Budget Should Allow Flexibility Despite Cuts”, Space, http://www.space.com/11411-nasa-2011-budget-cuts-constellation-funding.html) A new federal spending bill represents a cut to NASA's funding, but a lessening of restrictions on how the agency spends that money for the rest of this year.The new measure is a political compromise between democrats and republicans, and includes significant spending cuts in the 2011 federal budget. NASA will have to make do with about $18.5 billion, putting its budget roughly $240 million below last year's funding level.NASA and the rest of the federal government had been in limbo while lawmakers haggled over the budget. But on Thursday (April 14), Congress passed a spending measure called a continuing resolution that will cover the last five months of the year 2011. The new budget compromise followed a series of stopgap measures Congress had used to fund the government in lieu of agreeing on an official fiscal year 2011 budget.Experts said NASA will likely be able to accomplish most of the plans on the table under the new bill."NASA will be able to do what it has to do until the next budget," space policy expert Roger Handberg, a political science professor at the University of Central Florida, told SPACE.com. "NASA has been survival mode since last fall when the first continuing resolution was put in place."
Congress won’t support increasing NASA funding.Dinerman, senior editor at the Hudson Institute’s New York branch, 11 (April 18, Taylor, “NASA’s continuing problems”, “The Space Review”, http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1824/1)Liberty is hardly the only problem NASA is facing today. The agency is lucky that the GOP-controlled House of Representatives managed to cut only $250 million from its 2011 budget. After all NASA’s leaders have done nothing to convince the Republicans—or, for that matter, many Democrats—that they can be wise stewards of taxpayer money. They killed the Constellation Moon exploration program using dubious assumptions about future funding. They show no sign of being any better at keeping the costs of major space science programs like the James Webb Space Telescope or the Mars Science Laboratory under control than previous NASA administrators.President Obama’s new plan to freeze annual NASA spending at $18.7 billion per year for the next five years may be the agency’s best case scenario. Instead of the Bush-era Constellation Moon-Mars program, NASA now has Obama’s goal of getting to a near Earth asteroid. Yet the new NASA proposal does not include any money for this specific mission.
Congress hates the expenses of the plan. Chang, science reporter for The New York Times, covering chemistry, geology, solid state physics, nanotechnology, Pluto, plague, 10 (May 26, Kenneth, “NASA Finds New Criticism and Skepticism Before Congress”, New York Times, Lexis) The head of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration was buffeted with more criticism and skepticism before Congress on Wednesday as he sought to defend the Obama administration’s proposal to revamp the space agency.RelatedFor Atlantis, a Flight Path to Retirement (May 27, 2010)Representative Bart Gordon of Tennessee, the Democrat who is chairman of the House Committee on Science and Technology, said Congress had still not been told enough to make informed decisions about the president’s plan to cancel the space agency’s Constellation program that would send astronauts back to the moon and turn, instead, to private companies for transportation into orbit.“So far we have not seen any hard analysis from the administration that would give us confidence that it can be done for the amount budgeted,” he said.In President Obama’s budget request for the 2011 fiscal year, which begins Oct. 1, he called the Constellation program too expensive. The spending request added $6 billion over five years to NASA’s budget, but the increase was directed to other areas of NASA like aeronautics research, climate research and robotic science missions.In a speech last month, Mr. Obama described ambitious goals for NASA: to send astronauts to an asteroid by 2025 and then to Mars a decade later.But Mr. Gordon noted that the administration’s budget projections for what would be spent through 2025 on human spaceflight were far below what a blue-ribbon panel said last year was necessary for any program sending astronauts beyond low Earth orbit.
“It does no good to cancel a program that the administration characterizes as ‘unexecutable’ if that program is simply replaced with a new plan that can’t be executed either,” Mr. Gordon said.Additional turmoil surrounded the Constellation program on Wednesday when its program manager, Jeffrey M. Hanley, was removed. In an e-mail message to his team, he said NASA headquarters had told him his services “are no longer required, effective immediately.”The deputy program manager, Dale Thomas, was named acting program manager, and Mr. Hanley’s new position is as associate director for strategic capabilities at NASA’s Johnson Space Center.At the hearing, Representative Gabrielle Giffords, Democrat of Arizona, said the reassignment of Mr. Hanley made her “personally very dubious” of the pledge by NASA’s head, Maj. Gen. Charles F. Bolden Jr., that the agency would diligently continue work on Constellation until Congress approves any changes.In his April speech, Mr. Obama tried to assuage criticism that he was not interested in human spaceflight by announcing the continued development of the Constellation program’s Orion crew capsule. It was to take astronauts to the moon, but is now envisioned as a lifeboat for the International Space Station.General Bolden said at the hearing that the Orion lifeboat would cost $4.5 billion over five years to develop, not including the cost of launching it to the space station.A NASA spokeswoman said later that none of the financing for the Orion lifeboat would come from the $6 billion allocated to the commercial crew program, and that the offsetting funds would come from elsewhere in the human spaceflight program.
Congress supports Constellation cuts. Simberg 11 (March 14, Rand, “Space isn't a jobs program; Let NASA focus on mission, not pork politics and landscaping”, The Washington Times, Lexis) In the most austere fiscal climate in memory, Congress refuses to be serious about space policy. When the Obama administration, based on recommendations from a blue-ribbon panel in 2009, proposed cancellation of the overbudget, behind-schedule, underperforming Constellation program a year ago, its decision was hamstrung by wording that Congress had added to legislation that prevented NASA from shutting down any aspect of it. As a result, the space agency, like other government programs, has been forced to continue spending hundreds of million dollars on a program that most, including many in Congress, now agree will not move forward in its present form.And now, while struggling on under the uncertainty of consecutive continuing resolutions, its budget, less than one-half of 1 percent of the total federal budget, the agency is being picked at like a wounded animal on the savannah by the jackals on the Hill. Last month, the new Republican House voted to shift about $300 million from NASA's overhead budget to fund community policing, with no apparent regard for the effect this might have on the agency's operations. One might have expected the previous Democratic House to do such a thing, but one would have thought that Republicans, particularly those claiming to be conservative, would have realized that community policing is a local, not federal responsibility. Yet 70 of them voted to raid the NASA piggy bank.Last week, the Senate decided to cut almost half-a-billion dollars in funding from NASA's request for money that would develop technologies needed to make deep-space exploration affordable, while ensuring that janitorial and landscaping services at various NASA centers would survive, thus preserving middle-class jobs.As it happens, there is nothing in the Space Act, NASA's charter, either as originally passed over half-a-century ago or as more recently amended, about preserving jobs of any kind, let alone middle-class ones. But unfortunately, since the end of Apollo, the agency has been largely viewed as a jobs program by the only people on the Hill who really care about it - the representatives and senators in whose districts or states NASA centers and contractors reside, and they generally get themselves assigned to the committees who make the budget decisions.This dynamic has played out a great deal in the past year, when objections to the Constellation cancellation were driven primarily by the concern over job losses in places like Florida, Alabama and Utah. Congress responded last fall by passing a NASA authorization bill that demanded NASA build a heavy-lift vehicle with no missions specified or funded, and whose primary requirement was that it utilize "legacy" (i.e., shuttle) components built in those states, and that it work on a "multi-purpose crew vehicle," which was simply another name to keep the expensive Orion capsule going in Colorado.That these programs will cost many times more than multiple, redundant fixed-cost commercial providers and that the technology budget that could reduce future costs of actual space exploration will be savaged is irrelevant to those directing NASA money. It is jobs and votes that is foremost in their minds. If they get space accomplishments as well, it is viewed as gravy.But if heavy lift is truly needed, there are much more cost-effective ways to achieve it. Modern vehicles like Delta, Atlas or Falcon would provide a better basis than maintaining the unaffordable and unreliable 1970s-era shuttle infrastructure, which has already been partly dismantled as the program winds down to its last one or two flights later this year. And the Orion was never a very good vehicle for true deep-space operations - it is designed for a repeat of the Apollo missions to the moon. NASA has developed much more innovative concepts for exploration beyond the earth-moon system that can be used in conjunction with much more cost-effective capsules from Boeing and other companies.If Congress is serious about both trimming the NASA budget and vastly improving our prospects for space progress, there is no better target than these two programs, which would allow a reduced overall budget and an increase in those projects that are truly important to maintaining our leadership in space. In the long run, with a vibrant, new space industry that generates actual wealth, the jobs will be real, productive and sustainable, no longer reliant on a broken budget and a fickle Congress for the opening of a new frontier.
Plan unpopular---Congress loves to cut its funding. Morring 10 (June 14, Frank, “Space Policy Fight May Have No Winners This Year”, Lexis)
There’s no joy in the U.S. space industry this summer, as the Obama administration and Congress skirmish over the proposal to kill NASA’s Constellation Program and follow the space shuttle with a fleet of commercial «space taxis» to take astronauts to the International Space Station (ISS).Constellation contractors are losing a bitter game of legal hardball over congressional appropriations requirements that stipulate no Fiscal 2010 funds be spent to kill the program. But the so-called «merchant seven»—companies that have funding to pursue the commercial route—are nervous about the near-term prospects for their funding as well.After conceding that the $2.5 billion in the Fiscal 2011 budget request for its own Constellation termination costs is «oversubscribed,» NASA bigwigs have been warning contractors that they, too, «must abide by provisions of their contracts with respect to termination costs,» in the words of NASA Administrator Charles Bolden.In a letter to congressional leaders of both parties, Bolden argues that NASA cannot keep Constellation going because of restrictions in the Anti-Deficiency Act that prohibit agencies from spending money Congress has not appropriated. Claiming a $991-million shortfall in the overall $4.2-billion Fiscal 2010 Constellation appropriation, Bolden says NASA will focus Constellation spending on an ISS-lifeboat version of the Orion crew exploration vehicle, and the J-2X engine that would have powered the upper stage of its Ares I launcher. Otherwise, for Ares NASA «will provide no additional funding for the first-stage contract, descope remaining contracts, and reduce support contractor levels.»That is a huge hit for first-stage prime contractor ATK, and other Constellation contractors will not be spared either. Bolden says «most of these reductions will be implemented via reductions in workforce» in the weeks ahead, «beginning immediately» and totaling an estimated «30-60% of the current population, or 2,500-5,000, for the balance of the year.»But the merchant seven—Orbital Sciences and SpaceX, which hold milestone-driven multi-billion-dollar contracts to deliver cargo to the ISS, and the five companies awarded stimulus-package funding to develop commercial crew transport technology—also are feeling the crunch. Their funds depend to one degree or another on passage of a Fiscal 2011 NASA budget at least somewhat like the one President Barack Obama requested, and so far it looks like the best they will get is a continuing-funding resolution this fall. Beyond that, the view is even murkier.For Fiscal 2012 the White House wants most federal agencies, including NASA, to identify as potential budget cuts «programs and subprograms that have the lowest impact on your agency’s mission and constitute at least 5% of your agency’s discretionary budget.» That is sure to set off fireworks in the congressional appropriations panels, which created most of the pork barrel programs likely to be targeted. The lack of funding continuity makes it hard to attract private investment to commercial spaceflight and retain the workforce able to make it happen, contractors say.
New GOP Congress shifts the political wind against NASALogsdon, 11 - Space Policy Institute, Elliott School of International Affairs, George Washington University (John, “A new US approach to human spaceflight?,” Space Policy, February, Science Direct)
To complicate matters even further, the November elections resulted in a shift of party control to Republican leadership in the House of Representatives and a reduced Democrat majority in the Senate. Many Republicans are making reduction in government spending a top priority issue. If the NASA appropriation is not approved until the new Congress convenes in January 2011, NASA could face budget reductions below what the Congress has authorized, making it even more difficult to move forward with what remains of the new human spaceflight strategy.
2NC NASANASA likes Constellation cuts---frees up resources. Moskowitz 11 (April 15, Clara, “NASA's 2011 Budget Should Allow Flexibility Despite Cuts”, Space, http://www.space.com/11411-nasa-2011-budget-cuts-constellation-funding.html)The new budget at least frees NASA from a stifling provision under its 2010 budget that prevented it from cutting funding to the moon-bound Constellation program. Yet that program was canceled by President Barack Obama in early 2010, and NASA has been targeting new goals ever since. [NASA's Shuttle Program in Pictures]Now the space agency will finally be free to stop spending money on canceled Constellation projects."The elimination of the Constellation provision will free up resources otherwise committed," Handberg said, saving NASA some of the money that it loses in the reduction of its annual budget.NASA leaders expressed gratitude that the agency can now move forward fully toward its new direction."This bill lifts funding restrictions that limited our flexibility to carry out our shared vision for the future," NASA administrator Charles Bolden said in a statement. "With this funding, we will continue to aggressively develop a new heavy lift rocket, multipurpose crew vehicle and commercial capability to transport our astronauts and their supplies on American-made and launched spacecraft."
2NC NelsonNelson hates the plan.Aerospace Daily & Defense Report 11 (January 18, Aerospace Daily & Defense Report, “Senators Square Off Over NASA Funding Restriction”, Lexis)Sen. Bill Nelson (D-Fla.) plans an attempt to free NASA from a requirement that it fund the moribund Constellation Program of exploration spacecraft, which was killed in the new NASA authorization act Nelson helped draft. Under current appropriations language, NASA must fund Constellation until a new appropriations bill for the agency passes Congress. NASA’s inspector general finds the agency will spend as much as $575 million by Sept. 30 on Constellation projects it otherwise would have scrapped. If Nelson is successful, Boeing, the upper-stage contractor on the Ares I crew launch vehicle, probably would take the biggest hit, since that hardware is no longer needed. ATK, building the first stage for Ares I, and Pratt & Whitney Rocketdyne, building its J-2X upper-stage engine, should be unaffected, since that work is also needed for NASA’s new heavy-lift reference design vehicle under the authorization act.
2NC President Involvement NeededPlan requires presidential involvement – means Obama gets the blame Marcia Smith ’11 Smith is President of the Space and Technology Policy Group, LLC, which specializes in news, information and analysis of civil, military and commercial space programs and other technology areas. From March 2006-March 2009, Ms. Smith was Director of the Space Studies Board (SSB) at the National Research Council (NRC), “Last Man on Moon and Space Policy Expert Dismayed at State of U.S. Human Spaceflight Program” 5/25 http://spacepolicyonline.com/pages/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1591:last-man-on-moon-and-space-policy-expert-dismayed-at-state-of-us-human-spaceflight-program&catid=67:news&Itemid=27
Apollo 17 astronaut Gene Cernan, the last man on the Moon, and Dr. John Logsdon, the "dean" of space policy experts and an authority on John F. Kennedy's role in the Apollo program, agree that the U.S. human spaceflight program today is in disarray.In separate op-eds today and at a lecture this evening sponsored by the National Air and Space Museum at its Udvar-Hazy Center to commemorate the 50th anniversary of JFK's "moon speech," Cernan and Logsdon painted a picture of a space program "on a mission to nowhere" as Cernan described it.At the lecture, Cernan made clear that he never thought that he would be the "last man on the Moon" and resists the characterization. He considers himself the last man on the Moon "in the 20th century" or, even more optimistically, the "most recent man on the Moon." Describing his thoughts as he climbed the ladder into the Lunar Excursion Module to take him back to lunar orbit and then back home, he said he felt as though he was sitting on "God's front porch" as he looked back at Earth. The experience was "just too beautiful to have happened by accident." Those comments followed a heartfelt commentary on the current state of the space program, where he believes the U.S. has "ceded the leadership in space" grasped from the Soviet Union during the 1960's . Decrying the imminent loss of a U.S. capability to launch people into space -- only one more space shuttle mission remains and what lies beyond is uncertain -- Cernan sanguinely predicted that "wiser heads" would prevail in Washington. Logsdon recounted the key points of his new book, John F. Kennedy and the Race to the Moon, emphasizing that JFK was not a space visionary, but a President coping with Cold War realities. In his op-ed for the Orlando Sentinel today, Logsdon suggested that JFK could be a role model for President Obama in remaining closely involved in space program decisions. "If President Obama hopes for a positive space legacy, he needs to emulate John Kennedy; without sustained presidential leadership, NASA will continue to lack the focus required for a space effort producing acknowledged international leadership and national pride in what the United States accomplishes," Logsdon wrote.
Their leadership arguments require Obama to push the planG. Ryan Faith ’10 G. Ryan Faith is an independent technology consultant and Adjunct Fellow for Space Initiatives at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, (CSIS). “President Obama’s Vision for Space Exploration (part 2)” 4/26 http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1616/1
One thing that President Obama can learn from the fate of his predecessor’s plan for space exploration is that continued, periodic political support at the Presidential level is of great importance—or is perceived to be within the space community—because of the sentiment that the national space exploration program is a tool to be used by and within the prerogative of the executive. Should international cooperation play a greater role in American plans in the near future, engagement by the President and State Department on behalf of NASA will be quite valuable.
2NC Unpopular w/ Public Staffed space missions are unpopular with the publicKaufman 8(7/9/08, Marc, Washington Post, “US Finds It’s Getting Crowded out There”, Global Policy Forum, http://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/152/25824.html)At the same time, the enthusiasm for space ventures voiced by Europeans and Asians contrasts with America's lukewarm public response to the moon-Mars mission. In its assessment, Futron listed the most significant U.S. space weakness as "limited public interest in space activity." The cost of manned space exploration, which requires expensive measures to sustain and protect astronauts in the cold emptiness of space, is a particular target. "The manned space program served a purpose during the Apollo times, but it just doesn't anymore," says Robert Parks, a University of Maryland physics professor who writes about NASA and space. The reason: "Human beings haven't changed much in 160,000 years," he said, "but robots get better by the day."
AT: Winners winRestoring Constellation funding will be a political loss for Obama – he opposes the plan and would be perceived as very weak if it went throughMahoney, served as a spaceflight instructor at the Johnson Space Center and is now a freelance writer, 10 (March 29, Bob, “Prognosticating NASA’s future”, “The Space Review”, http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1594/1) So what are the most obvious boundary scenarios here? “Worst” and “best” case (depending on your views) would be either complete cancellation as defined in the budget submission, or Congress balks and restores full funding to all Constellation components, perhaps even adding the billions supposedly needed to make it work.But those boundary scenarios obviously don’t help us much. For the former, the likelihood of Congress rolling over completely is slim, and for the latter, Constellation’s mounting budget and schedule troubles can’t be ignored, and such a move would be a slap in the face to the President . Members of Congress are bound to do something though because, well, that’s what Congress does: it’s part of their nature to either allocate funds or impose restrictions. (Sometimes, as we all know, the best thing to do is nothing, but persons elected to Congress always seem to forget this.)
Obama hates the plan. Morring 10 (May 11, Frank, “NASA Managers Push Plan In Congress, Academia”, Aerospace Daily & Defense Report, Lexis) The upshot of closed-door talks between top NASA officials and various congressional and academic opinion leaders will get a public airing this week, when the Senate Commerce Committee hears testimony on «the future of U.S. human space flight.»The May 12 hearing will include testimony from NASA Administrator Charles Bolden; John Holdren, director of the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy; Apollo astronauts Neil Armstrong and Eugene Cernan; and Norm Augustine, chair of the U.S. Human Space Flight Plans Committee.So far it does not appear the Obama administration’s plan is winning many hearts and minds. A session with a range of space organizations produced a few tidbits, like word that the Exploration Systems Mission Directorate plans to release a bunch of requests for information in the next couple of weeks to get industry input as a Houston-based NASA study panel prepares road maps for human space exploration.Those would replace the Constellation Program, which refuses to lie down and die on Capitol Hill even though President Barack Obama wants to kill it. Deputy Administrator Lori Garver and other agency officials asked a gathering of mostly academic space organizations for help with the plan in Congress, after barring reporters from the meeting. But the groups decided not to form a coalition for that purpose, and as of the end of last week were still hammering out details of a joint statement that will endorse some — but not all — of the space policy changes embodied in NASA’s Fiscal 2011 budget request.
AT: We tradeoff, not a new appropriationBudget tradeoffs for space will be a huge political fightHandberg, 11 - Professor and Chair of the Department of Political Science at the University of Central Florida (Rodger, “Small ball or home runs: the changing ethos of US human spaceflight policy,” The Space Review, 1/17, http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1759/1)
NASA Administrator Charles Bolden alluded to that reality recently: “Future NASA space programs must be affordable, sustainable and realistic to survive political and funding dangers that have killed previous initiatives.” This is harsh talk but it reflects the reality confronting all US discretionary programs in the federal budget. The new Republican House majority is determined to cut federal expenditures and appear to have little concern for where the cuts occur. The budget struggles this year and next will find all discretionary programs mobilizing their supporters. Competing agencies like the National Institutes of Health (NIH) and National Science Foundation (NSF) have constituencies who are savvy veterans of getting their way even when budgets are tight. The cure for some disease is always just another appropriation away from happening.
1NCCancelling Constellation Program is politically contentious. Dinerman, senior editor at the Hudson Institute’s New York branch, 10 (February 1, Taylor, “If Constellation Dies”, author and journalist, “The Space Review”, http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1554/1)The lesson is simple: when it comes to funding, Congress has the last word. Senators and Representatives of both parties are not going to allow NASA’s Constellation program to go down without a fight. They will start by pointing out the contradictions between the President’s stated desire to protect jobs and the tens of thousands of jobs that this move will destroy. They could also point out the way that this hurts the goal of promoting education in STEM (science, technology, engineering, and math) field. Why should anyone be will to spend 10 or 15 years getting an advanced degree in these fields only to be told that their efforts were wasted and that they can go and drive a cab? This decision also cuts strongly against the President’s claims during the 2008 campaign to want to support “science”. In political terms this can be described as one more broken promise. It will be difficult for him and his supporters to continue to say with a straight face that the GOP is somehow “anti-science”. If the budget increases for Earth science do materialize they will be subject to a whole new level of scrutiny. Under these circumstances the budgets for space science and particularly for planetary science will be under more pressure than ever before. After all, if we are not going to the Moon, and if future exploration programs along the lines of the so-called Flexible Path are more uncertain than ever, why bother to invest in precursor missions? For Republicans and even for some Democrats, canceling the Moon program is yet another slap in the face to the idea of American exceptionalism. When asked about it last April, President Obama subtly dismissed the idea, saying, “I believe in American exceptionalism, just as I suspect that the Brits believe in British exceptionalism and the Greeks believe in Greek exceptionalism.” Yet the idea that America is a special, perhaps extraordinary nation is at the core of our national identity. Last year this country celebrated the anniversary of the Apollo landing as a very specifically American triumph.
2NC CongressCancellation of Constellation makes Obama look weak—drains political capital inevitable. Dinerman, senior editor at the Hudson Institute’s New York branch, 10 (February 1, Taylor, “If Constellation Dies”, author and journalist, “The Space Review”, http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1554/1)Now this is going to change, and this decision is already being played overseas as an American humiliation: a sign of decline and of a lack of will, a self-inflicted defeat. The opposition will not hesitate to use this to feed the narrative of the President and his party as being weak. It will be combined with the cancellation of the European missile defense installation, the cuts to the various defense programs, and the apologies and the bows. This is a fight the Republicans are going to be eager to engage in and that the Democrats will try to avoid.
Constellation has widespread support in Congress and cancelling it weakened ObamaDinerman ’10 - well-known and respected space writer regarding military and civilian space activities (2/15/10, Taylor Dinerman, The Space Review, “Will NASA’s embrace kill NewSpace?” http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1564/1)Whatever her motives were, when Senator Barbara Mikulski (D-MD) destroyed the George H.W. Bush Space Exploration Initiative in 1992, she demonstrated how a single powerful senator could wreck any president’s proposals, especially on a seemingly marginal issue like civil space policy. She went through the NASA budget and zeroed out anything that even remotely resembled funding for SEI. It took NASA many years to recover from those drastic cuts to the human space exploration technology program. If the Moon program could be described as belonging to the 20th century, the NewSpace industry is beginning to look as if they belong to the 18th century. The resentment aimed at SEI is nothing compared to what the NewSpace industry now faces on Capitol Hill. The cancellation of the Constellation program proposed in the 2011 budget is facing a bipartisan firestorm in Congress. It is doubtful that the President will want to make a special effort to support the new NASA program. His threat to veto the 2010 defense budget if it included money for the alternative F-35 engine turned out to be empty. The thousands of jobs and the irreplaceable expertise that this new plan throws away are far more i\mportant to the members of Congress, especially in the current economic climate, than are the arguments and promises from the new team at NASA. In spite of its flaws—and if anyone says there is such a thing as a flawless government program ask them what they’ve been smoking—Constellation balanced the technological, political, and legal realities of today’s government environment. The new program is the product of a philosophy that, while it may be promising in the very long term, is simply not ready for prime time. If the Moon program could be described as belonging to the 20th century, the NewSpace industry is beginning to look as if they belong to the 18th century. Like French courtiers wandering the halls of Versailles looking for a favor from the King, individuals who used to be regarded as brave entrepreneurs will now haunt the corridors of power looking for a subsidy or an earmark. They will prove their technical expertise by writing proposals that are perfectly adapted to the prevailing bureaucratic winds. It may be good business, but it does not have much to do with 21st century market capitalism. Now that the NewSpace industry is in a direct fight with the powerful members of Congress they may find that in spite of support from NASA’s leadership, they lack the political strength overcome the opposition. If the men and women who sit on the appropriations committees feel their interests and even their political survival are threatened, they will strike back, and strike back hard. Some firms that have no government contracts will be immune to this backlash, but others, particularly the small and medium-sized ones that depend on SBIRs, will be vulnerable to the appropriators’ scalpel. The poster child for NewSpace, SpaceX, which once had a number of military launch deals, may find them harder to come by at least in the near future. Since the USAF switched the TacSat missions away from the Hawthorne, California, firm, probably due to the delay’s involved with Falcon, it is hard to see them giving the company more business until it has a much better track record than it does now. It will also be fairly easy to paint NewSpace CEOs as “rent seekers”. Elon Musk’s ability at another company, Tesla, to collect government subsidies for selling very expensive luxury cars to millionaires should raise more than a few eyebrows. Spending a few billion on “technology development” programs is not going to do anything to spread human civilization into the solar system. The claim that one type of government contractor represents “free enterprise” and another group somehow represents “big government” is ludicrous. It’s all taxpayers money; the only difference is that the big aerospace firms long ago paid back (or lost) the money their founders invested in them. The Obama Administration’s attempt to buy off the opposition by spreading around $50 million in contracts under the Commercial Crew Development (CCDev) program is as transparent as their effort to defuse opposition to their health care bill by offering goodies to the insurance and pharmaceutical industries. Giving a few million to everyone from the giant ULA to the tiny Sierra Nevada may seem like a smart move, but it will do nothing to stop the broad public recognition that abandoning the Moon mission is a humiliating national defeat. The president’s political foes will not let this pass. The bitterness and anger that so many Americans feel over the end (or the proposed end) of Moon program will only grow. This fall, as the final shuttle flights take place and the mid-term elections loom, they will pull out all the stops. In some places the rhetoric will get white hot. Constellation was an all-too-rare US Government program with deep bipartisan support. Throwing it on the ash heap is a sign of just how little this administration really values the idea of working across party lines. Democrats who want to differentiate themselves from the president on an important symbolic issue will reject NASA’s new direction. Republicans will emphasize the death of a uniquely American vision. If the administration now tries to subordinate the US civil space program to an international collective of some sort, it will simply reinforce the perception that Barack Obama is a “post-American” leader. NASA’s leaders may say that they are committed to sending explorers
beyond low Earth orbit, but since they are trying to kill the one program that was actually building systems capable of doing so, their credibility is, shall we say, imperfect. Spending a few billion on “technology development” programs is not going to do anything to spread human civilization into the solar system. No matter what they say, the Obama Administration is going nowhere in space.
Constellation program is popular---support outweighs any opposition. Ellegood, Space Policy Analyst at Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University, 10 (March 29, Edward, “Looking forward to Tax Day”, “The Space Review”, http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1597/1) The controversy surrounding President Obama’s plan for NASA is becoming toxic. Calls to resurrect Constellation and to extend the Space Shuttle are drowning out support for a plan that has substantial merit and is consistent with over a decade’s worth of thoughtful study. The most vocal proponents of saving Constellation and extending the Shuttle are mostly from states and communities with much to lose from their demise. These proponents tend to ignore the facts that Constellation would never reach its goals on time or within budget, and extending the Space Shuttle is entirely inconsistent with Constellation’s goals and budget.That’s not to say there isn’t a pony in there somewhere. There’s much speculation about what President Obama will reveal during his April 15 visit to Florida, and plenty of people willing to offer advice on what he should say. After working closely with many of Florida’s players on these issues, I’d like to give my interpretation of what folks here hope President Obama should announce during his trip to the Space Coast.
The Constellation program is politically popular—job creation. Dinermam, senior editor at the Hudson Institute’s New York branch, 10, (Janury 4, Taylor, “NASA’s dangerous new year”, “The Space Review”, http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1538/1)If the Constellation program is killed—and make no mistake, if Ares 1 is killed Constellation dies as well—then the result will not be a smooth transition to a new “Flexible Path” program.The supposed White House leak last month of what was purported to be the Obama Administration’s new space policy, and the way it was quickly shot down, is a sign that there is an ongoing struggle over civil space policy within the White House. The President has not yet made up his mind on how he should respond to the Augustine committee’s report. The political dangers involved in making a change in the current policy are evident. Jobs losses in the tens of thousands in Florida, Alabama, Texas, and California are certainly a consideration when making any major changes in what the committee called the “Program of Record”, i.e., the Constellation program.
Congress will fight for the insurance of Constellation. Madirgal 10 (February 1, Alexis, “Obama Gives NASA More Money, Cuts Manned Trip to Moon”, Wired Science, http://www.wired.com/wiredscience/2010/02/nasa-budget/)
The Obama administration has officially decided to end the Constellation mission back to the moon, although the replacement plan faces a tough route through Congress.The new plan, which had been rumored for months, was announced today with the release of the Obama administration’s NASA budget request, which despite the axing of the moon plan delivers a $6 billion funding increase over the next five years.“NASA’s Constellation program — based largely on existing technologies — was begun to realize a vision of returning astronauts back to the Moon by 2020. However, the program was over budget, behind schedule, and lacking in innovation due to a failure to invest in critical new technologies,” the budget summary concluded. “Using a broad range of criteria, an independent review panel determined that even if fully funded, NASA’s program to repeat many of the achievements of the Apollo era, 50 years later, was the least attractive approach to space exploration as compared to potential alternatives.”As anticipated, the independent Augustine Panel’s work was used as the basis for the new NASA direction. Though the blue-ribbon panel did not officially take a position on which future plan made the most sense for NASA, statements made by members and the tone of their report made it clear that a continuation of the Constellation mission was not the group’s favored choice.Constellation had been heavily criticized since it was unveiled in 2005 by President George W. Bush. Even before the plan was announced, some scientists pointed out that manned exploration has drawbacks, such as high costs, extreme safety requirements, and humans’ biological sensitivity to radiation. Scientists such as Ronald Arkin of the Mobile Robot Laboratory asked whether robots could do exploration better. The high-profile success of the Mars Rovers, Cassini, and Mars Phoenix mission suggested that robotic exploration was viable, at the very least.Even among those who supported blasting humans out of the atmosphere, the details of the Constellation program were subject to attack. Many criticized the Bush administration for not providing enough money to back its grand Vision for Space Exploration.In commenting on the Augustine report, David Mindell, a science and technology historian at MIT, called it, approvingly, “an utter rejection of the Bush plan because it’s unfundable, unbuildable and dangerous. ”NASA administrator Charles Bolden made measured statements, ultimately noting that regardless of Constellation’s merits, it was not going to put humans back on the moon as envisioned.“We were not on a sustainable path back to the moon’s surface,” Bolden said.The Obama administration’s budget also knocked the Constellation program for siphoning money “away from other NASA programs, including robotic space exploration, science, and Earth observations.”While Bolden painted a sweeping portrait of positive change, several key congressional representatives are spoiling for a fight over the loss of programs in their districts.
Richard Shelby, a Republican from Alabama, whose district includes the Marshall Space Flight Center, lashed out against the administration plan.“The President’s proposed NASA budget begins the death march for the future of U.S. human space flight. The cancellation of the Constellation program and the end of human space flight does represent change — but it is certainly not the change I believe in,” Shelby wrote in a statement. “Congress cannot and will not sit back and watch the reckless abandonment of sound principles, a proven track record, a steady path to success, and the destruction of our human space flight program.”Shelby harped on the need for safety in manned missions and held that commercial companies could not provide the low levels of risk that NASA could. Bolden, though, in his statements to the press, provided a personal guarantee that he’d protect astronaut lives.“I flew on the space shuttle four times,” he said. “I lost friends in two space shuttle tragedies, so I give you my word that these vehicles will be safe.”Predictably, commercial spaceflight companies were ecstatic at the news.“Working with NASA, the industry can develop the capabilities to safely launch U.S. astronauts just as commercial spaceflight providers are already trusted by the U.S. government right now to launch multi-billion dollar military satellites, upon which the security of our nation and lives of our troops overseas depend,” wrote Bretton Alexander, president of the Commercial Spaceflight Federation, in a prepared statement. “Investing $6 billion will fund a full program of multiple winners for commercial crew, so that robust competition in the marketplace can reduce costs and generate innovation.”
Congress was furious when Constellation got cancelled. Dinerman 10 (February 15, Taylor, “Will NASA’s embrace kill NewSpace?”, The Space Review, http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1564/1)If the Moon program could be described as belonging to the 20th century, the NewSpace industry is beginning to look as if they belong to the 18th century.The resentment aimed at SEI is nothing compared to what the NewSpace industry now faces on Capitol Hill. The cancellation of the Constellation program proposed in the 2011 budget is facing a bipartisan firestorm in Congress. It is doubtful that the President will want to make a special effort to support the new NASA program. His threat to veto the 2010 defense budget if it included money for the alternative F-35 engine turned out to be empty. The thousands of jobs and the irreplaceable expertise that this new plan throws away are far more important to the members of Congress, especially in the current economic climate, than are the arguments and promises from the new team at NASA.
Bipartisan support---authorization votes prove. Morring 10 (May 11, Frank, “NASA Managers Push Plan In Congress, Academia”, Aerospace Daily & Defense Report, Lexis)Meanwhile, work on the Constellation Program continues with Fiscal 2010 money, including a $200 million test of the launch abort system for the Orion crew exploration vehicle and planning for more tests, according to Doug Cooke, associate administrator for exploration systems. Still unsolved is the problem of what to do with the program, which has twice won strong bipartisan support in authorization votes. «We’re working right now between the administration and Congress on what resolution is on the path forward,» says Cooke, who joined Garver on her Capitol Hill rounds last week. «That’s yet to be seen.»
Congress supports ConstellationLogsdon, 11 - Space Policy Institute, Elliott School of International Affairs, George Washington University (John, “A new US approach to human spaceflight?,” Space Policy, February, Science Direct)
4. Congress objectsIt should have come as no surprise to advocates of the new strategy that the relevant members and committees of Congress were skeptical, if not directly hostile, to the new strategy. Even in September 2009, when Norm Augustine had testified before both the House Committee on Science and the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, almost all members had pushed Augustine to explain why his committee had not recommended increasing the budget for Constellation to get the program back on schedule, or close to it, rather than suggesting alternatives to the “program of record”. Many members were more interested in making statements in support of their constituents’ interests than they were in listening to Augustine’s explanations.So when a new strategy reflecting the conclusions of the Augustine Committee’s findings came before those same two committees after the release of the president’s budget, there was a great deal of hostility evident among some members, such as Senators Richard Shelby (R-AL) and David Vitter (R-LA) and Representatives Bart Gordon (D-TN), Gabrielle Giffords (D-AZ) and Ralph Hall (R-TX). Gordon was chair of the House Committee on Science and Giffords the Chair of its Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics. Senator Shelby was able to get written into law a prohibition against NASA cancelling any Constellation contracts. One sticking point among many members was that some $9 billion had already been spent on the program, and it seemed prudent not to write off that investment. Trying to find some form of compromise
between the congressional concerns and the White House proposal were Senators Bill Nelson (D-FL) and Kay Bailey Hutchinson (R-TX). They were the chairman and ranking minority member of the Senate Science and Space Subcommittee, and were looked to by other senators without direct space interests for leadership in crafting the Senate reaction to the White House.Although many of those who had crafted the new space strategy were veterans of Washington politics, in developing the new approach there seems to have been little attention paid to its political feasibility - or at least, if political impacts were considered, they were not given much importance. Cancelling Constellation would mean terminating contracts worth billions of dollars and would influence the job prospects of thousands of NASA and contractor workers. The firms who would suffer from cancelled contracts quickly organized lobbying efforts against the president’s proposal; they found allies among senators and representatives whose constituents would be most affected by the proposed changes. They were able to convince such revered figures as Apollo astronauts Neil Armstrong, James Lovell, and Eugene Cernan to testify against the president’s proposals. Former administrator Griffin spoke skeptically about the changes to Constellation. The supporters of the new strategy were handicapped by the inability, or unwillingness, of NASA leaders to provide a coherent defense of the president’s proposals and by the fact that those in the private sector who most stood to benefit from the new approach were relatively uninfluential politically. Thus the first round of congressional hearings on the new strategy and the NASA budget during the February-March period did not bode well for the initiative’s success.
Large Congressional majorities support Constellation.Dinermam, senior editor at the Hudson Institute’s New York branch, 10, (Janury 4, Taylor, “NASA’s dangerous new year”, “The Space Review”, http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1538/1)If Congress were to go along with the Flexible Path option, they would be openly admitting that they made big mistakes in 2005 and 2008 when they endorsed the Constellation architecture by large bipartisan majorities. Not only that, but they would be asked: if NASA got it wrong last time, how do we know that they will get it right this time?
Congress loves the plan---they prohibit the ending of it.Chang, science reporter for The New York Times, covering chemistry, geology, solid state physics, nanotechnology, Pluto, plague, 10 (May 15, Kenneth, “Senate Panel Acts To Bar Changes To Human Spaceflight Program”, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/15/us/politics/15brfs-SENATEPANELA_BRF.html?partner=rss&emc=rss)
President Obama’s effort to reshape the nation's human spaceflight program encountered another obstacle Friday as a Senate committee sought to block any changes to the program through the end of the current fiscal year, Sept. 30. The Senate Appropriations Committee has added the clause to a supplemental budget package that includes money for troops in Afghanistan, and Senate staff members doubt that the House will make any changes or that Mr. Obama would reject the bill. Last year, Congress passed a measure that prohibited ending or changing NASA's Constellation program to return astronauts to the moon. The new clause affirms that prohibition and adds that the money allocated to the Constellation program ''shall be available to fund continued performance of Constellation contracts.''
Tremendous congressional support for Constellation.Space Politics, 10 (June 10, Space Politics, “Congress reacts to NASA Constellation announcement”, http://www.spacepolitics.com/2010/06/10/congress-reacts-to-nasa-constellation-announcement/) When the Orlando Sentinel noted in its article about NASA’s memo about cutting back work on Constellation that the announcement “caps a bitter, three-month behind-the-scenes battle”, the first thought that ran through my mind on how Congress would react was a line from Animal House: “Over? Did you say ‘over’? Nothing is over until we decide it is!” And sure enough, members of Congress are making clear this decision does not “cap” this debate at all.In a statement late today, Sen. Kay Bailey Hutchison (R-TX) said NASA was “skirting the law” with its plan to cut back work on Constellation to comply with the Antideficiency Act. She cited the memo as the latest evidence that NASA was “working to subvert Constellation”, along with letters sent to contractors about termination liability and the reassignment of Constellation program manager Jeff Hanley. Hutchison also released a copy of an email sent to Hanley on May 21 that contained direction and even language similar to Bolden’s letter to Congress this week (although Bolden’s letter contained additional specifics about the impact of the plan on each element of Constellation.)“At best, this demonstrates that, at least three weeks before briefing members of Congress about issues related to funding challenges, NASA’s leadership had already taken steps to implement a course that today leads to the loss of hundreds, perhaps thousands, of jobs,” she said, comparing this week’s letter with last month’s email. “At worst, it shows an agency that is willfully subverting the repeatedly expressed will of Congress. In either case, the result is the same. The leadership of the world’s preeminent space agency has strained its credibility to the breaking point and something has to change.”
Sen. Richard Shelby (R-AL) also provided a statement to Huntsville TV station WAFF, included in an article about Constellation-related layoff notices Boeing plans to issue next month. “NASA is reprioritizing funding based on a future budget that has not been supported, or approved, by Congress,” Shelby said, adding that language included in a supplemental appropriations bill the Senate approved last month is a “reaffirmation of Congressional intent to continue Constellation funding”.Rep. Rob Bishop (R-UT) also made a brief statement about the Bolden letter prepended to a copy of the Sentinel article (which, I’m sure, Bishop’s office got permission to reprint.) The decision to cut back work on Constellation, he said, “is nothing more than a disingenuous legal maneuver to circumvent statutory language that was put in place to prevent this very type of action.Bishop also issued a separate statement Thursday reacting to a comment in an interview with Elon Musk where the SpaceX CEO said that Utah is the “one state that is going to suffer from the Obama plan”. “Elon Musk is right that Utah will suffer under the Obama plan, but so will the rest of the country” because, among other things, the plan “severely handicaps our security and missile defense,” Bishop said. “In the end, all of us in America suffer under that scenario, and that is unacceptable.”
Congress has fought to keep Constellation.The Washington Post, 10 (September 29, The Washington Post “Congress's budget battle leaves NASA without a clear mission”, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/09/28/AR2010092805201.html)
AMERICA'S SPACEFLIGHT program is about to enter a vacuum: a vacuum of vision. Even with expected passage of a resolution to provide NASA with its annual operating budget, it appears increasingly unlikely that Congress will be able to provide a guiding mission for NASA before it adjourns.Congressional objections have sidelined President Obama's space proposal. He wanted to end the Constellation manned spaceflight program, focus on research and international cooperation, encourage commercial spaceflight with a $3 billion investment -- and pursue more far-fetched plans to visit Mars. In place of that are two competing visions from the House and Senate.The Senate version of the NASA appropriations bill, now under consideration by the House, preserves elements of the Constellation program and allocates $1.6 billion to encourage private space-launch capacity. A compromise bill that failed to make it to the floor highlighted the problems of the Senate bill, an oddly specific plan in which members of Congress took it upon themselves to specify the exact contours of the U.S. plan for space -- contours that often seem to conform to district and state lines. Among other concerns, the Senate bill mandates that the shuttle program be continued through the remainder of 2011 without setting aside funds for this purpose and specifically insists on the development of heavy-lift rockets.This flawed bill only proves that the biggest challenges now facing NASA are on the ground. Members of Congress, hoping to protect jobs in their districts, have fought against the shutdown of the Constellation manned spaceflight program, which a blue-ribbon commission on the future of human spaceflight found to be doomed by excessive ambition and insufficient funds.Without further funding, the commission warned, such a program was not feasible. More funding, in the current economic climate, will not be forthcoming. And simply continuing to provide funding at a level already determined to be inadequate is wasteful.In these straitened economic times, there is little logic to support an ambitious -- and ambitiously underfunded -- plan for NASA that continues its heavy-lift rocket programs, allocates a limited amount of funding for commercial spaceflight and keeps NASA's eyes lifted to the dream of manned flight beyond low-Earth orbit.A better compromise would allow NASA to invest in research and aeronautics and to salvage technology, expertise and resources from the Constellation program, and use them to develop capacity for a time when America is in a better position to aim upward.
Obama killed Constellation---Congress endorses it. Moskowitz 11 (April 15, Clara, “NASA's 2011 Budget Should Allow Flexibility Despite Cuts”, Space, http://www.space.com/11411-nasa-2011-budget-cuts-constellation-funding.html)President Obama encouraged the Constellation program to be canceled because of its multi-billion dollar cost. In October 2010, Obama signed the Reauthorization Act of 2010, canceling the program.“It was this administration that killed the Constellation program, which Congress had repeatedly endorsed,” Hall said. “Instead of providing the resources that the Augustine Committee said were necessary to have a program worthy of a great nation, this administration simply said it was unaffordable.”Despite the program’s cancellation, some big-ticket items within the Constellation program continue to receive funding, despite uncertainty of their future.One massive expenditure is the Ares I rocket program, which continues to be funded despite unlikely future use. Due to the continuing resolution passed in December to keep the government running in lieu of a 2011 budget, funding for the program must continue under the 2010 budget until at least March.
The Obama administration may have found a back door way to kill the Constellation space exploration program, even while Congress is mulling over ways to continue it. The move to kill Constellation involves the 120-year-old Anti-Deficiency Act.According to the Orlando Sentinel:
"At issue is the federal Anti-Deficiency Act that requires all federal contractors to set aside a portion of their payments to cover costs in case the project is ever cancelled."New NASA calculations say contractors are $991 million short of what they must withhold - and the agency has ordered the companies to find that money from the roughly $3.5 billion they're budgeted to get for Constellation projects this year."In a letter to Congress released Wednesday, NASA Administrator Charlie Boldensaid: 'Given this estimated shortfall, the Constellation program cannot continue all of its planned ... program activities [this year] within the resources available. Under the Anti-Deficiency Act (ADA), NASA has no choice but to correct this situation.'"NASA contractors had hitherto expected NASA to cover termination costs for Constellation. The Obama space budget proposal allocates over $2 billion for that purpose.The immediate effect of the order is that all but certain parts of the Constellation program that are slated to be preserved under the Obama space plan will be effectively canceled. Those parts of Constellation that would remain "--include advanced technology work on the Orion space capsule, the J2X rocket engine that was to power the Ares I second stage and any hardware that could be used for other programs."Also, incidentally, five thousand aerospace contractors in states stretching from Florida to Utah will be terminated within the next 30 days. The move by the Obama administration to invoke the Anti-Deficiency Act represents a kind of high stakes poker move, with the administration betting that it can, for all intents and purposes, kill the Constellation program before Congress can find a way to preserve it. It sets up a strange situation in which Constellation must continue by law, thanks to legislative language inserted last year, but has no money to continue.The Obama administration is also betting that it will have crippled NASA's ability to even conduct a high-profile program of exploration for the foreseeable future. The aerospace contractors, once put out on the street, will be unlikely to come back, even if the funding for Constellation is restored several months from now. They have families to feed and bills to pay, and will need other employment immediately. Also, young engineering and science college graduates will not be well-motivated to take jobs at NASA or any aerospace contractor in view of the constant political turmoil surrounding NASA's programs. One can hardly expect to plan one's career in such an environment. Without trained and experienced people, NASA could not conduct a space exploration program, even if mandated to.As of this writing, Constellation defenders in the Congress have not responded. But, when they do, things are expected to get very ugly indeed. It is clear that it is the will of Congress that Constellation continue in some fashion. The Obama administration, in ignoring that will, is playing with fire at a time when its own standing is rapidly deteriorating due to the mishandling of the BP oil leak disaster and continuing economic malaise.
Congress perceives Constellation as key to moon missions---draws support. Hartenstein, staff writer, 10 (June 14, Meena, “NASA halts Constellation program to put man back on the moon”, Daily News, http://articles.nydailynews.com/2010-06-14/news/27067105_1_nasa-constellation-earth-orbit) Houston, we have a problem.NASA is working to shut down the program designed to put a man back on the moon, reports the Times Online, angering members of Congress and former astronauts.Constellation, the system of rockets and hardware being developed to replace the aging space shuttle, was supposed to put astronauts back into orbit by 2020. But due to ballooning costs and unforeseen delays, NASA has determined the program is too costly and unreliable to continue."The truth is, we were not on a sustainable path to get back to the moon's surface," NASA chief Charles Bolden has said.
Constellation popular---scared of losing the race to space. Space Travel 3/11/10 (“Bipartisan Legislation Introduced To Close The Space Gap”, http://www.space-travel.com/reports/Bipartisan_Legislation_Introduced_To_Close_The_Space_Gap_999.html, Hemanth)A group of US lawmakers Thursday urged the US administration to save NASA's Constellation project aimed at returning Americans to the moon in the next generation of space travel. "Space exploration has been the guiding star of American innovation," the lawmakers -- 10 Republicans and five Democrats -- said in a letter to the NASA administrator Charles Bolden. "It is imperative that the United States remain the world's leading spacefaring nation," they added. They urged Bolden to assemble a team of NASA experts to review how exploration spacecraft and launch vehicle development can be kept within the existing budget to ensure "uninterrupted, independent US human space flight access to the International Space Station and beyond." The team should report back within 30 days on its findings, the lawmakers urged. Seeking to cut the massive US budget deficit, President Barack Obama's administration has proposed scrapping the costly and over budget Constellation rocket program designed to return Americans to the moon by 2020. Instead, NASA would concentrate on research and development that could, over a longer time-frame, eventually see astronauts travel outside low Earth orbit and even aim for Mars. The US space agency would also be encouraged to develop operations with commercial partners to fly astronauts to the ISS. But the 15 lawmakers, most of them from Texas and Florida where much of the US space industry is based, were heavily critical of the plan. "I am concerned that the Russians and the Chinese will get ahead of us... that English won't be the dominant language in space," Republican Representative Michael McCaul from Texas told a House hearing. The United States is due to retire its aging shuttle fleet this year, and from then on will depend on Russian Soyuz flights to transport its astronauts to the ISS until the Ares 1 rocket and its Orion capsule are operational in 2015. "By the time commercial low-Earth orbit vehicles are cleared for flight, US astronauts may have nowhere to go," the lawmakers said in the letter.
"NASA will no longer have a clear vision on its direction and ultimately the US will no longer be a spacefaring nation." Obama is to host a space conference on April 15 in Florida to chart his vision for the future of human spaceflight, the White House revealed at the weekend. Obama has proposed dropping the massively over-budget Constellation program launched by his predecessor, George W. Bush, because it was too costly, used outdated technology and would not be ready to ferry humans to the moon before 2028. "The president's ambitious new strategy pushes the frontiers of innovation to set NASA on a more dynamic, flexible, and sustainable trajectory that can propel us on a new journey of innovation and discovery," the White House said in a statement Sunday. "After years of underinvestment in new technology and unrealistic budgeting, the president's plan will unveil an ambitious plan for NASA that sets the agency on a reinvigorated path of space exploration," the statement added.
Constellation has unanimous Congressional supportArmstrong et al, 11 – all commanded Apollo missions (Neil, “Column: Is Obama grounding JFK's space legacy?,” USA Today, 5/24, http://www.usatoday.com/news/opinion/forum/2011-05-24-Obama-grounding-JFK-space-legacy_n.htm
A half century has passed since Kennedy challenged our citizenry to do what most thought to be impossible. The subsequent American achievements in space were remarkable: Mercury, Gemini, Apollo and Skylab. Our efforts enhanced international cooperation with Apollo-Soyuz, the space shuttle and the International Space Station. The compelling fascination of our space achievements among young people spurred their interest in education.By 2005, in keeping with President Kennedy's intent and America's resolve, NASA was developing the Constellation program, focusing on a return to the moon while simultaneously developing the plans and techniques to venture beyond, and eventually to Mars.The program enjoyed near-unanimous support, being approved and endorsed by the Bush administration and by both Democratic and Republican Congresses. However, due to its congressionally authorized funding falling victim to Office of Management and Budget cuts, earmarks and other unexpected financial diversions, Constellation fell behind schedule. An administration-appointed review committee concluded the Constellation program was "not viable" due to inadequate funding.
2NC SenatorsPlan popular with McCain—election proved. Foust, aerospace analyst, journalist and publisher, 08 (August 18, Jeff, “Space policy heats up this summer”, “The Space Review”, -http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1192/1) McCain will “commit to funding the NASA Constellation program to ensure it has the resources it needs to begin a new era of human space exploration” and “review and explore all options” to minimize the gap between shuttle and Constellation.The revised document replaces that single paragraph with eight paragraphs of space policy discussion, primarily offering background on the topic and McCain’s philosophy on the issue. That section includes discussions on topics ranging from international competition to the growth of commercial space ventures, including space tourism and the Google Lunar X Prize. It also notes that human spaceflight “goes well beyond the issue of scientific discovery and is reflection of national power and pride”, citing a 1971 memo by OMB deputy director Casper Weinberger that convinced President Nixon to approve the shuttle program and keep NASA in the human spaceflight business (see “Negative symbolism, or why America will continue to fly astronauts”, The Space Review, January 16, 2006).That discussion is followed by a number of bullet points outlining what a President McCain would do in regards to space issues. Those plans include a statement that McCain will “commit to funding the NASA Constellation program to ensure it has the resources it needs to begin a new era of human space exploration” and “review and explore all options” to minimize the gap between shuttle and Constellation. The policy also includes language about both completing the ISS and maximizing its research capability. There are also brief mentions about Earth science and aeronautics work, as well as a desire to “seek to maintain the nation's space infrastructure.”
Colorado congress members pushed for continuation of Constellation.Denver Business Journal, 10 (February 18, Denver Business Journal, “Four Colorado Congress members ask Obama to save NASA’s Constellation/Orion program”, http://www.bizjournals.com/denver/stories/2010/02/15/daily55.html) Members of Congress are sending another letter urging the Obama administration to continue funding for the Constellation space-exploration program, which means billions of dollars and hundreds of jobs for Jefferson County-based Lockheed Martin Space Systems .This time, the letter is from four members of Colorado’s congressional delegation and is addressed directly to President Barack Obama.The letter to Obama, sent Thursday, says the Congress members “are concerned with changes in the direction of [NASA] in your administration’s Fiscal Year 2011 budget. In particular we support continued funding for Constellation, the next generation in human spaceflight as the shuttle program is retired this year. Our nation — and Colorado in particular — has much at stake in deciding the future of our space program.”The letter is signed by U.S. Reps. Ed Perlmutter, D-Golden; Doug Lamborn, R-Colorado Springs; Betsy Markey, D-Fort Collins; and Mike Coffman, R-Aurora.NASA, under Obama’s 2011 budget, proposes canceling the four-year-old Constellation program, for which a rocket and Orion crew capsule are being developed, to take U.S. astronauts into space and replace the space shuttle fleet.NASA plans, instead, to have companies develop new space craft technologies and put the country’s human space flight program on a more flexible trajectory.Lockheed Martin Space Systems is overseeing the $8 billion project of developing the four-person Orion crew capsule for Constellation. About 600 people locally work on the project for the local company, a division of Bethesda, Ma.-based defense and aerospace giant Lockheed Martin Corp.It and its rockets, the Ares I and Ares V, will be canceled if NASA’s shift is approved.Earlier, Coffman joined more than two dozen members of Congress in signing a separate letter warning NASA not to halt spending for ongoing space programs such as Constellation while the agency’s budget remains unapproved by Congress.The earlier letter was signed by several Republicans representing Florida and Texas, states home to large NASA space flight centers, and was sent to NASA Administrator Charles Bolden.There’s been some concern NASA will divert funds intended for Constellation before Congress authorizes the space program change. Work is being done on the Constellation project in several states.Here is the full text of the latest letter:President Barack Obama:As members of the Colorado Congressional Delegation we are strongly committed to supporting the success of National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and are concerned with changes in the direction of the agency reflected in your administration’s Fiscal Year 2011 Budget. In particular we support continued funding for Constellation, the next generation in human spaceflight as the Shuttle program is retired this year. Our nation - and Colorado in particular - has much at stake in deciding the future of our space program.As you know, NASA is supported by skilled civil servant and private contractor workers across the country. Colorado is proud of its robust aerospace industry, ranking third in the nation in private aerospace employment. Over 300 Colorado aerospace companies employ thousands of workers in our state. In Fiscal Year 2008, over $780 million was obligated to the Colorado aerospace industry,
in addition to $85 million going to educational institutions. Constellation’s Orion crew exploration vehicle alone contributes an estimated 1,000 high tech and high paying jobs to Colorado, supporting 22 companies across the state. The Constellation program is a critical engine of technological innovation, job creation, and economic growth especially during this economic downturn.
Cochran and Wicker are advocators of Constellation. Northway 10 (March 29, Wally, “Senators fighting Constellation suspension”, Mississippi Business Journal, http://msbusiness.com/2010/03/senators-fighting-constellation-suspension/)
Sen. Thad Cochran (R-Miss.) and Sen. Roger Wicker (R-Miss.) have cosponsored a measure to prohibit NASA from suspending work on the Constellation Program without justification.The Constellation Program was established in 2004 to be the human space exploration program to replace the Space Shuttle.The legislation reaffirms language in the FY2010 Omnibus Appropriations Bill that directs NASA to continue moving forward with Constellation and prohibits termination or modification of existing contracts unless separate legislation is passed by Congress. “The Congress should continuously reexamine the roles and strategies of all federal agencies, but the Senate and House have not had sufficient time to study, much less adopt, the administration’s ideas about the future of NASA or U.S. manned space missions. Prematurely shutting down existing projects like Constellation before Congress has determined the policies and funding for NASA is ill-advised and irresponsible. It should be up to the federal taxpayers, who are represented by Congress, to ultimately shape our nation’s future in space,” Cochran said.The legislation would also waive Anti-deficiency Act provisions cited by the Administrator as justification for setting aside funding and stalling additional work on Constellation. It also requires a study to review the contracts and prohibits any efforts to cancel contracts necessary for the support of the remaining shuttle flights.The measure was introduced by Sen. George LeMieux (R-Fla.) and is also cosponsored by Senators Richard Shelby (R-Ala.), Jeff Sessions (R-Ala.), Orrin Hatch (R-Utah) and Bob Bennett (R-Utah).
Senator Shelby loves the plan.Shelby, Senator of Alabama, 10 (February 1, Richard, “Shelby: NASA Budget Begins Death March for U.S. Human Space Flight”, Space Ref, http://www.spaceref.com/news/viewpr.html?pid=30119, http://www.spaceref.com/news/viewpr.html?pid=30119) U.S. Senator Richard Shelby (R-Ala.), ranking member of the Commerce, Justice, Science (CJS) and Related Agencies Appropriations Subcommittee, today issued a statement sharply criticizing the Obama Administration's proposed NASA budget for fiscal year 2011. NASA's budget is under the jurisdiction of the CJS Subcommittee. Constellation is NASA's current human space flight program. A critical component of Constellation, the Ares I rocket, completed a successful test flight in October of 2009. Disregarding Constellation's progress, the Obama Administration's proposed fiscal year 2011 budget for NASA, released today, would cancel the program and instead fund "commercial" providers who have failed to fulfill current contracts with NASA to deliver even cargo to the International Space Station.Despite an attempt to drastically cut funding for Constellation in the House version of the fiscal year 2010 omnibus appropriations bill, Shelby was successful in restoring $600 million to the program, funded at $3.46 billion total. Shelby was also instrumental in including language that limits NASA's ability to terminate or alter the current Constellation program. This requires the Administration to work with Congress and wait for approval prior to changing any current human exploration plans.The President's annual budget request is a proposal. Congress determines final funding levels for departments, agencies, and programs. Shelby's statement on the Obama Administration's fiscal year 2011 NASA budget proposal is as follows:"The President's proposed NASA budget begins the death march for the future of US human space flight. The cancelation of the Constellation program and the end of human space flight does represent change - but it is certainly not the change I believe in. Congress cannot and will not sit back and watch the reckless abandonment of sound principles, a proven track record, a steady path to success, and the destruction of our human space flight program."Constellation is the only path forward that maintains America's leadership in space. The successful test launch of the Ares I rocket in October represented years of work and great advancement in our Nation's human space flight program. To discard Ares I as the foundation of space exploration without demonstrated capability or proven superiority of an alternative vehicle, is irresponsible and not cost-effective. There is no other rocket today that is as safe, or that has successfully demonstrated it can meet the country's needs for the exploration of space.
"We cannot continue to coddle the dreams of rocket hobbyists and so-called 'commercial' providers who claim the future of US human space flight can be achieved faster and cheaper than Constellation. I have consistently stated the fallacy of believing the cure-all hype of these 'commercial' space companies, and my position has been supported time and again by both the experts and the facts. Those who believe that it is in our nation's best interest to rely on 'commercial' space companies need only examine their current track record. Of the companies enlisted to deliver only cargo to space, not humans, one company failed to move beyond paper drawings, another is years behind schedule, and a replacement company for the first failure will not even be ready for test flights for years to come."As a resounding rebuke to the Augustine Commission Report, the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel, whose sole focus is on ensuring lives are not needlessly lost in our space program, stated in their 2009 report, that no commercial manufacturer 'is currently human-rating requirements qualified, despite some claims and beliefs to the contrary.' This is after their 2008 report, written in part by the current NASA Administrator, declared that commercial vehicles 'are not proven to be appropriate to transport NASA personnel.' NASA's safety experts agree that current commercial vehicles are untested and unworthy of carrying our most valuable assets - our nation's astronauts."It is unfortunate that on the anniversary of the loss of the Columbia crew this Administration is choosing to abandon our nation's only chance at remaining the leader in human space flight. It is ironic that Constellation, a program borne out of the recommendations of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board, would be eliminated in lieu of rockets repeatedly deemed unsafe for astronauts by NASA's own Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel."Rocket science is not simple and it is not easy. Newcomers to this arena are continuing to learn this lesson as they struggle with repeated delays in getting their operations off the ground. It makes little sense for NASA to establish yet another social welfare program for these 'commercial' companies. It is simply not 'commercial' when the development work for your company is funded by the Government. That may be the General Motors model, but it should certainly not be considered the commercial model."On Friday, India announced they will be ready for their first manned space flight by 2016. With this administration's nonsensical NASA budget request, the US will still be working on launching people on rockets that do not exist while Russia, China, and India are actually doing it. If this budget is enacted, NASA will no longer be an agency of innovation and hard science; it will be the agency of pipe dreams and fairy tales."I will never support a NASA budget that does not have a robust human space exploration program grounded in reality. New commercial space companies do have a chance at being successful, but that time is still too far in the future. Now is not the time to turn human space flight over to inexperience and hopeful aspirations. Instead, it is the time to cement our leadership in space with a program we know will keep America at the forefront of space exploration. Constellation as envisioned successfully delivers that objective."
2NC Florida
Florida wants the Constellation program. Foust, aerospace analyst, journalist and publisher, 08 (August 18, Jeff, “Space policy heats up this summer”, “The Space Review”, http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1192/1) “Adding one more [shuttle] launch isn’t going to do diddly for either the workers or the space program or Florida, but it might buy a few votes from those people who are down there,” said Cunningham.There is also the question of why the candidates are suddenly devoting so much attention to space. Part of it might be a desire to win votes in Florida, a large and hotly-contested state in the general election. Recent events, including a deterioration in relations with Russia because of its conflict with Georgia, may have also spurred the campaigns to take a stronger stand on issues like the gap and reliance on Russian vehicles to access the ISS. Or, as one observer pointed out in the case of Obama’s six-page policy, it’s no more detailed than any other policy paper the campaign issues on other topics.
2NC HLVs Popular
Bipartisan support for heavy launch vehicles. Morring 10 (June 28, Frank, “Heavy Lift Gains Support, But CR Remains Likely”, Lexis) Bipartisan support is growing in both houses of Congress for a faster start on the heavy-lift launch vehicle President Barack Obama said he wants regardless of what happens to his plan to scrap the Constellation Program.A bipartisan group of 62 House members is urging Obama to initiate «the immediate development and production of a heavy-lift launch vehicle that, in conjunction with the Orion crew exploration vehicle, may be used for either lunar or deep-space exploration to an asteroid and beyond.»Their June 22 letter to Obama, circulated by Rep. Frank Wolf (R-Va.), follows word from Sen. Bill Nelson (D-Fla.) that a new NASA authorization with at least some bipartisan support in the Senate would include both a heavy lifter and a crew exploration vehicle leveraging «the workforce, contracts, assets and capabilities of the shuttle, Ares I and Orion efforts.»Nelson told Sen. Barbara Mikulski (D-Md.), chairman of the Senate appropriations panel that funds NASA, that he also wants a crew exploration vehicle to go with the heavy lifter, although he does not specify that it must be the Orion.«Our space program must have mission-driven goals,» Nelson told Mikulski. «With that in mind, I am proposing that NASA embark immediately on an international effort to define near-term missions in the lunar and high Earth orbits of space. These missions would incorporate both robotic capabilities and the development of on-orbit capabilities, technology and infrastructure.»Nelson’s outline follows at least in part the broad objectives of the Fiscal 2011 NASA budget request, with its «flexible path» approach to Solar System exploration, and a call for safety studies in support of a commercial route for astronauts to the International Space Station. He also calls for one more space shuttle flight beyond the two remaining, using the Discovery orbiter now being prepared as a rescue vehicle for the final mission early next year.
2NC SLS PopularSpace Launch System has congressional support. Space Politics 11 (June 15, Space Politics, “Shelby calls for SLS competition”, http://www.spacepolitics.com/2011/06/15/shelby-calls-for-sls-competition/) What does Sen. Richard Shelby (R-AL) have in common with California’s two Democratic senators? He, like Sens. Barbara Boxer and Dianne Feinstein, is now calling on NASA to hold an open competition for the development of the Space Launch System (SLS). In a letter to NASA administrator Charles Bolden last Friday, Shelby said that while he wants the SLS developed as quickly as possible, he does not want “to foreclose the possibility of utilizing competition, where appropriate”, noting that the language in the NASA authorization act passed last year calls for the use of existing contracts and other resources “to the extent practicable”.Shelby was particularly critical in the letter to the possibility of basing the SLS on shuttle hardware. “Designing a Space Launch System for heavy lift that relies on existing Shuttle boosters ties NASA, once again, to the high fixed costs associated with segmented solids,” Shelby writes.“I have seen no evidence that foregoing competition for the booster system will speed up development of SLS or, conversely, that introducing competition will slow the program down,” Shelby concludes in his letter to Bolden. “I strongly encourage you to initiate a competition for the Space Launch System booster. I believe it will ultimately result in a more efficient SLS development effort at lower cost to the taxpayer.”Shelby’s conclusion is similar to the one in another letter to Bolden from Boxer and Feinstein in late May, where the two also called for “a competitive bidding process” for the SLS. In some respects, though, it’s not that surprising: when Aerojet and Huntsville-based Teledyne Brown Engineering announced a joint venture earlier this month to develop rocket engines for various projects, including SLS, it got an endorsement from Shelby. “Congress directed NASA to develop a 130-metric ton Space Launch System with a first and second stage that leverage our Ares investments. The Teledyne-Aerojet team could have a critical role to play designing additional elements of the system, and I hope NASA looks at their capabilities carefully,” Shelby said in a comment provided to the Huntsville Times when the joint venture was announced.
---Disad Links
Earth Science – Climate ChangeConstellation fails and the aff trades off with climate change solutions. Fang 10 (Janet, Contributing Editor at SmartPlanet, Columbia University - Graduate School of Journalism, “Obama budget backs basic science”, Nature News, Nature online database)
NASA - NASA's overall budget would rise by 1.5% to $19 billion. But in a radical shift, Obama's administration would give up a government-developed replacement for the space shuttle and would abandon the goal of returning humans to the Moon. Constellation was deemed to be too far behind schedule and too expensive to justify adding to the $9 billion that has already been spent on it. "We are not on a sustainable path to get back to the Moon's surface," said NASA administrator Charles Bolden in a briefing on 1 February. Instead, NASA would spend $6 billion over five years to stimulate the development of commercial rockets that would ferry not just cargo but also crew up to the International Space Station. These rockets could be ready by 2016, says the agency's deputy administrator Lori Garver. Marcia Smith, a former director of the Space Studies Board at the US National Research Council, says the shift is another "topsy turvy" change in NASA's goals. "The big challenge for NASA is to convince everyone that, now, they have the right plan," says Smith. Bolden has vowed to leave NASA science untouched by the shifting winds in the human-exploration programme, and in 2011, the agency's science budget would grow by 11% to $5 billion. Earth-science programmes would reap most of the gains, including more money to rebuild the Orbiting Carbon Observatory, a failed satellite that would have tracked global carbon dioxide levels. The astrophysics division saw a 2.6% decrease, which will hurt all the more because its biggest project, the James Webb Space Telescope due for launch in 2014, is vastly over budget. Science may also benefit from the billions to be devoted to technology development in the human programme. Bolden says that $3 billion over five years would be spent on robotic precursor missions such as a Moon rover or an unmanned factory to mine the Moon or asteroids. Smith says these missions could be similar to the Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter (LRO), whose costs have been shared by the human programme and the science division. However, she notes, most scientific destinations are chosen by peer review, whereas missions such as the LRO were dictated by the policy to return humans to the Moon.
Constellation cancellation solves climate changeBerger and Klamper 10 (Brian, correspondent for Space News and Amy, correspondent for Space News and political commentator for Fox News, “NASA Budget Beneficiaries: Science, Research and Technology”, Space News, February 2, http://www.spacenews.com/policy/100205-nasa-budget-beneficiaries-science.html)
WASHINGTON — U.S. President Barack Obama’s decision to scrap the Constellation program and rely on commercial firms to deliver astronauts to low Earth orbit leaves the agency’s science and technology research and development programs big winners in his 2011 budget request. Obama is asking the U.S. Congress for $19 billion for NASA for the year ahead, a 1.5 percent increase over the agency’s 2010 budget. While Congress approves federal spending only on an annual basis, Obama’s proposal lays out a five-year budget for NASA that totals $100 billion, some $6 billion more than he included in the budget he sent Congress last year. White House officials said the president’s budget provides for a renewed commitment to Earth observation, expands commercial space initiatives and enhances utilization of an international space station the United States intends to keep supporting through at least 2020. It also includes sustained investments in new technology programs, robotic missions, propulsion research and so-called green aviation. Science Earth observation fared best in Obama’s budget for NASA’s Science Mission Directorate, which also manages the agency’s robotic planetary probes and space-based astronomy telescopes. Obama is asking Congress for $5 billion for NASA science programs in 2011, an 11 percent increase over this year’s budget of $4.49 billion. The biggest chunk of the $512 million increase would be used to boost the Earth Science Division’s budget to $1.8 billion, a 27 percent increase over 2010. The Planetary Science Division would get the second-biggest increase, 11 percent, to $1.485 billion. NASA’s heliophysics budget would grow by around 2 percent to $641.9 million, while the agency’s astrophysics budget — which funds the Hubble Space Telescope and other space-based observatories — would see its $1.1 billion budget shrink by about $28 million. Ed Weiler, NASA’s associate administrator for science, said the budget request includes an additional $2 billion for the Science Mission Directorate over the next five years, compared with Obama’s previous budget projections. “It’s a major increase to the science budget,” Weiler told reporters during a Feb. 2 teleconference, adding that the boost for Earth Science in particular makes up for years of declining budgets over the last decade at a time when scientists were learning how important Earth monitoring is to climate research. NASA’s planetary science budget, in contrast, fared slightly better in last year’s budget, with about $60 million more between 2011 and 2014 than the division stands to receive now. Weiler said the additional Earth science money, meanwhile, would accelerate new climate monitoring satellites and expand a recently initiated Venture-
class program of modestly priced, scientist-led missions. The 2011 budget proposal also includes money for building a duplicate of the Orbiting Carbon Observatory satellite destroyed in a February 2009 launch failure.
Cancelling Constellation frees up money for science and new technologyMervis 10 (Jeffrey, deputy news editor for Science magazine, “Science Spared From Domestic Spending Freeze—for Now”, Science AAS Journal, http://www.sciencemag.org.proxy.lib.umich.edu/content/327/5966/628.full?maxtoshow=&HITS=10&hits=10&RESULTFORMAT=&author1=Mervis&title=Science+Spared+From+Domestic+Spending+Freeze+for+Now&andorexacttitle=or&searchid=1&FIRSTINDEX=0&volume=327&firstpage=628&resourcetype=HWCITNASA: The White House has eliminated the Constellation program—a $3.5-billion-a-year initiative aimed at building rockets, spacecraft, and other systems for the moon mission. Although the moon mission would be zeroed out under the Administration's proposal, NASA's overall budget would increase by $6 billion over the next 5 years, including a $300 million rise to $19 billion in 2011. NASA officials say Constellation's end could accelerate space exploration by freeing up money for science and letting the private sector take the lead in developing new technologies. The Augustine commission found that “key milestones” of Constellation “were slipping, and that the program would not get us back to the moon in any reasonable time or within any affordable cost,” explained NASA Administrator Charles Bolden Jr. at a media briefing.
NASA science is vital to preventing climate change – earth science is key to geo-engineeringWhitesides, 8 – Executive Director of the National Space Society (George, CQ Congressional Testimony on NASA reauthorization, 5/7, lexis)
Global Climate ChangeNASA may be the most well-equipped agency in the world to help to solve the monumental challenge facing our generation: climate change. NASA was instrumental in diagnosing the problem, and now is well equipped to help ameliorate it. The connections between NASA and the Earth's environment are deep and powerful. NASA is one of the world's foremost climate change research organization, producing more climate data than any institution on Earth. It also possesses world-class engineering capabilities. There is growing agreement that NASA must make climate and energy research more central to its mission and purpose, and that NASA can play a central global role connecting scientific results with solutions for the planet.Modeling, Simulation, VisualizationNASA plays a leading role in the international community by analyzing the earth observation data forecasting potential futures. Modeling and simulation can help to understand how quickly the climate is changing and assist with sustainable agriculture, urban planning and disaster response.Systems EngineeringNASA has a long history of successfully executive major engineering efforts such as the Apollo moon program, the Space Shuttle, and the International Space Station. In order to architect such large efforts, a mastery of systems engineering is employed. Moreover, in the case of the International Space Station, these engineering solutions have been created in an international context. The next step is to task NASA to conduct system engineering of the planet, organizing global efforts to understand and mitigate the drivers of climate change.
Constellation fails and trades off with earth science – cancellation key. Thorton 10 (Paul, correspondent for the LA Times, “Poll: Constellation cancellation (and more on spaceflight)”, Opinion LA: LA Times, http://opinion.latimes.com/opinionla/2010/02/poll-president-obamas-cancellation-of-nasas-constellation-program.html?cid=6a00d8341c7de353ef012877588858970c0)
When NASA does it, it's good for the country. That's the guiding philosophy I can glean from those throwing temper tantrums over President Obama's proposal to kill NASA's 4-year-old Constellation program, the onetime successor to the retiring space shuttle that was to eventually return astronauts to the moon (and cost us more than $100 billion in the process). Critics of Obama's plan -- including senators whose states have the most to lose from Constellation's stillbirth -- accuse the president of dealing a crushing setback to American manned space exploration and ceding our leadership in the field to those dastardly Chinese and Indian boogeymen. Wrong; in fact, I would assert the opposite. Sure, Obama's budget would shut down Constellation, but it also offers more support for private-sector spaceflight, which could reap major dividends well into the future. It directs NASA to leave the small stuff -- ferrying astronauts and cargo into low-Earth orbit -- to rockets built by contractors and focus on developing technologies that can help supersede the achievements in manned spaceflight made by the Apollo program more than 40 years ago. It also restores to NASA a crucial mission neglected during the George W. Bush years: Earth science, including monitoring the levels of carbon dioxide in our atmosphere from
space. Most important, Obama proposes to increase NASA's budget by $6 billion over the next five years -- hardly the action of a president so hostile to space science. I would go so far as to say that Obama's order for NASA to make fundamental changes is long overdue. Over the last three decades, no president took the political risk of hitting the pause button on NASA while the agency poured its manned space exploration dollars into a program that killed 14 astronauts and was far too costly to truly be called a shuttle. Sure, there have been two multiyear flight interruptions over the program's history, but those involved returning the shuttle to flight after major disasters, not a fundamental reexamination of NASA's programs.
Space ActivitiesConstellation trades off with all other space activitiesPeltona, 10 - Space & Advanced Communications Research Institute, George Washington University (May 2010, Joseph N., Space Policy, “A new space vision for NASA—And for space entrepreneurs too?” Vol. 26, Is. 2, ScienceDirect)RK
With much less invested in a questionable Project Constellation enterprise we can do much more in space astronomy. We can invest more wisely in space science to learn more about the Sun, the Earth and threats from Near Earth Objects. David Thompson, Chairman and CEO of Orbital Sciences said the following in a speech that endorsed the new commercial thrust of the NASA space policies on Nine February 2010:“Let us, the commercial space industry, develop the space taxis we need to get our Astronauts into orbit and to ferry those wanting to go into space to get to where they want to go. We are in danger of falling behind in many critical areas of space unless we shift our priorities” [10].With a change in priorities we can deploy far more spacecraft needed to address the problems of climate change via better Earth observation systems. We can fund competitions and challenges to spur space entrepreneurs to find cheaper and better ways to send people into space. We can also spur the development of solar power satellites to get clean energy from the sun with greater efficiency. We can deal more effectively with finding and coping with “killer” asteroids and near earth objects. We may even find truly new and visionary ways to get people into space with a minimum of pollution and promote the development of cleaner and faster hypersonic transport to cope with future transportation needs.
---CP Solvency
PrivatizationPrivate companies are superior to NASA – Constellation provesPelton, 10 - Space & Advanced Communications Research Institute, George Washington University (Joseph, “A new space vision for NASA - And for space entrepreneurs too?,” Space Policy, May, Science Direct)
NASA - now past 50 - is well into middle age and seemingly experiencing a mid-life crisis. Any honest assessment of its performance over the past two decades leads to the inexorable conclusion that it is time for some serious reviewdand even more serious reform. National U.S. Space Study Commissions have been recommending major reform for some years and finally someone has listened. President Obama has had the political and programmatic courage to make some serious shifts in how NASA does its business. It is no longer sufficient to move some boxes around and declare this is the new and improved NASA.One of the key messages from the 2004 Aldridge Commission report, which was quickly buried by NASA, was words to this effect: “Let enterprising space entrepreneurs do what they can do better than NASA and leave a more focused NASA do what it does best - namely space science and truly long range innovation” [1]. If one goes back almost 25 years to the Rogers Commission [2] and the Paine Commission [3] one can find deep dissatisfaction with NASA productivity , with its handling of its various space transportation systems, and with its ability to adapt to current circumstances as well as its ability to embark on truly visionary space goals for the future. Anyone who rereads the Paine Commission report today almost aches for the vision set forth as a roadmap to the future in this amazing document. True there have been outstanding scientific success stories, such as the Hubble Telescope, but these have been the exception and not the rule.The first step, of course, would be to retool and restructure NASA from top to bottom and not just tweak it a little around the edges. The first step would be to explore what space activities can truly be commercialized and see where NASA could be most effective by stimulating innovation in the private sector rather than undertaking the full mission itself. XPrize Founder Peter Diamandis has noted that we don't have governments operating taxi companies, building computers, or running airlines - and this is for a very good reason. Commercial organizations are, on balance, better managed, more agile, more innovative, and more market responsive than government agencies. People as diverse as movie maker James Cameron and Peter Diamandis feel that the best way forward is to let space entrepreneurs play a greater role in space development and innovation. Cameron strongly endorsed a greater role for commercial creativity in U.S. space programs in a February 2010 Washington Post article and explained why he felt this was the best way forward in humanity's greatest adventure: “I applaud President Obama's bold decision for NASA to focus on building a space exploration program that can drive innovation and provide inspiration to the world. This is the path that can make our dreams in space a reality” [4].One of the more eloquent yet haunting calls for change came some six years ago. The occasion was when Space X founder Elon Musk testified before the US Senate in April, 2004 at a Hearing on The Future of Launch Vehicles:“The past few decades have been a dark age for development of a new human space transportation system. One multi-billion dollar Government program after another has failed..When America landed on the Moon, I believe that we made a promise and gave people a dream. It seemed then that.someone who was not a billionaire, not an Astronaut with the “Right Stuff”, but just a normal person, might one day see Earth from space. That dream is nothing but broken disappointment today. If we do not now take action different from the past, it will remain that way” [5].One might think that, since Musk was seeking to develop his own launch capability, he was exaggerating; but a review of the record suggests otherwise. Today nearly 25 years after the Rogers and Paine Commission reports that followed the Challenger disaster, we find that the recommendations for NASA to develop a reliable and costeffective vehicle to replace the Shuttle is somewhere between being a disappointment and a fiasco . Billions of dollars have gone into various spaceplane and reusable launch vehicle developments by NASA over the past 20 years. Spaceplane projects have been started by NASA time and again amid great fanfare and major expectations and then a few years later either cancelled in failure or closed out with a whimper. The programs that NASA has given up on now include the Delta Clipper, the HL-20, X-33, the X-34, X-37, X-38, and X-43 after billions of US funds and billions more of private money have been sacrificed to the cause [6].In the field of space research NASA has a long and distinguished career. In the area of space transportation and space station construction its record over the past 30 years has largely been a record of failure. The Space Shuttle was supposed to have been an efficient space truck that would fly every two weeks and bring cargo to orbit at a fraction of the cost of early space transportation systems - perhaps a few thousand dollars per pound to low-Earth orbit. In fact, the fully allocated cost of the Shuttle is over $1 billion a flight and it is by far the most expensive space transportation system ever. After the Columbia accident NASA spent years and billions more dollars to correct serious safety problems with the Space Shuttle and still was never able to fulfill the specific recommendations of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board. Yes, that's correct. After grounding the Space Shuttle for some 2.5 years (from February 2004 to August 2006) and expending $1.75 billion dollars in the wake of the CAIB report, NASA was not able to correct the identified problems and complete the tasks asked of it. Then, after the foam insulation problem re-emerged with Discovery and STS flight 114, hundreds of millions more dollars were spent to solve the problem again, bringing the grand total to over $2 billion [7].
The first rendition of a space station was scheduled during the Reagan years to have been completed in 1991 for several billions of dollars. The projected completion date extended to 1994 when the project was redesigned and it became the International Space Station (ISS). Today the ISS is not only late, but its total cost has ballooned to over $100 billion [8].Project Constellation, with a projected cost of over $100 billion until its recent cancellation by President Obama, seemed to loom as an eerie repetition of the ISS - another mega-project always over budget, always late, and with constantly lowered expectations. Henry Spencer, writing for the New Scientist, has characterized Project Constellation as an “Illusion, Wrapped in Denial.” His specific observations about the NASA Moon/Mars program were as follows:First, it probably wasn't going to work. Even so early in its life, the programme was already deep into a death spiral of “solving” every problem by reducing expectation of what the systems would do. Actually reaching the moon would probably have required a major redesign, which wasn't going to be funded [9].Any private company with NASA's record on the Space Shuttle, the ISS deployment and spaceplane development, would have gone bankrupt decades ago . In all three cases the US Congress has been told by NASA essentially what it wanted to hear rather than the grim facts as to cost, schedule and performance. I personally remember when Congress was being told quite unbelievable things about the cost and expected performance of the Space Shuttle. We at Intelsat presented testimony that strongly contradicted NASA's statements on cost and performance.There are dozens of examples of entrepreneurial space enterprises that have generated innovative ideas that seemed to show ushow we could have gotten ourselves into space faster, cheaper and better.- A private, Boulder, CO-based company called the External Tanks Corporation (ETC) suggested in the 1980s that we could just add a little more thrust to the External Tanks for the Space Transportation System (i.e. the Space Shuttle) and lo and behold we could put them into Low-Earth Orbit. Dr. Randolph “Stick” Ware of the ETC explained that one could then strap these tanks together and create the structure of a space station at a fraction of the cost of the ISS, and much more quickly as well.- Bob Zubrin has for years championed the idea of sending methane generators to Mars to produce the fuel for the astronauts' return trip. The cost of a Mars mission with a refueling station on Mars would be dramatically lower.- Burt Rutan's Scaled Composites took a few million dollars of backing from Microsoft's Paul Allen and developed the White Knight carrier craft and the SpaceShipOne spaceplane. This vehicle system, which won the X Prize, set the stage for a space adventures industry that will begin launches in 2011. When this experimental spaceplane landed at Edwards Air Force Base in 2004, a spectator's sign said it all: “SpaceShipOne - NASA Zero”.Some have suggested that President Barack Obama's cancellation of the unwieldy and expensive Project Constellation to send astronauts back to the Moon for a few exploratory missions was a blow to NASA and the start of the end of the US space program. The truth is just the reverse. Project Constellation, accurately described by former NASA Administrator Michael Griffin as “Apollo on Steroids” prov ided little new technology or innovation and had an astronomical price tag. It was clearly too much for too little. If the opportunity costs of Project Constellation are examined (i.e. if we think what could have been done with an extra $100 billion of space funds), dumping it defies argument.
CP solves – the commercial sector is key to independent American space access and overhauling the current NASA deficiencies – Constellation provesGingrich and Walker ‘10Newt Gingrich is a senior fellow at AEI. Robert S. Walker was chairman of the Commission on the Future of the United States Aerospace Industry. AEI Online “Obama's Brave Reboot for NASA” 2/12 http://www.aei.org/article/101651)
Newt Gingrich and Robert S. Walker applaud the Obama Administration's 2011 spending plan for NASA, and view the White House vision for the space program as an excellent opportunity for bipartisan cooperation. The Obama plan echoes the opinion of many experts that greater commercial activity in space is the proper way forward for the United States to remain the dominant force in space exploration . For example, getting the agency out of the low-earth-orbit launch business--where the technology is developed but operational costs are still high--frees up the NASA budget so that the program can go back to its roots in advanced technology development, experimentation and exploration. Despite the shrieks you might have heard from a few special interests, the Obama administration's budget for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration deserves strong approval from Republicans. The 2011 spending plan for the space agency does what is obvious to anyone who cares about man's future in space and what presidential commissions have been recommending for nearly a decade. The Commission on the Future of the United States Aerospace Industry in 2002 suggested that greater commercial activity in space was the proper way forward. The Aldridge Commission of 2004, headed by former Secretary of the Air Force Edward C. "Pete" Aldridge, made clear that the only way NASA could achieve success with President George W. Bush's Vision for Space Exploration was to expand the space enterprise with greater use of commercial assets. Most recently, the Augustine Commission, headed by Norman R. Augustine, former chief executive of Lockheed Martin, made clear that commercial providers of space-launch services were a necessary part of maintaining space leadership for the United States. NASA consistently ignored or rejected the advice provided to it by outside experts . The internal culture within the agency was actively hostile to commercial enterprise. A belief had grown from the days when the Apollo program landed humans on the moon that only NASA could do space well and therefore only NASA projects and programs were worthy. To his credit, former NASA Administrator Michael Griffin adopted a program to begin to access commercial companies for hauling cargo to the International Space Station. That program existed alongside the much larger effort to build a new generation of space vehicles designed to take us back to the moon. It has been under constant financial pressure because of the cost overruns in the moon mission, called Constellation. With the new NASA
budget, the leadership of the agency is attempting to refocus the manned space program along the lines that successive panels of experts have recommended. The space shuttle program, which was scheduled to end, largely for safety reasons, will be terminated as scheduled. The Constellation program also will be terminated, mostly because its ongoing costs cannot by absorbed within projected NASA budget limits. The International Space Station will have its life extended to at least 2020, thereby preserving a $100 billion laboratory asset that otherwise was due to be dumped in the Pacific Ocean by middecade. The budget also sets forth an aggressive program for having cargo and astronaut crews delivered to the space station by commercial providers. The use of commercial launch companies to carry cargo and crews into low earth orbit will be controversial, but it should not be. The l aunch-vehicle portion of the Constellation program was so far behind schedule that the United States was not going to have independent access for humans into space for at least five years after the shutdown of the shuttle. We were going to rely upon the Russians to deliver our astronaut personnel to orbit. We have long had a cooperative arrangement with the Russians for space transportation but always have possessed our own capability. The use of commercial carriers in the years ahead will preserve that kind of independent American access. Reliance on commercial launch services will provide many other benefits. It will open the doors to more people having the opportunity to go to space. It has the potential of creating thousands of new jobs, largely the kind of high-tech work to which our nation should aspire. In the same way the railroads opened the American West, commercial access can open vast new opportunities in space. All of this new activity will expand the space enterprise, and in doing so, will improve the economic competitiveness of our country.
CP solves – it’s crucial to solve the decreasing US launch capacityAckerman 11 (March 2011, Robert K., Signal Magazine, Vol. 65, Iss. 7; pg. 40 , “Commercial Manned Launch Services Awaken”, Proquest, FS)
The end of the space shuttle program is the signal for NASA to turn to the private sector for human access to orbit. The space agency that built a series of manned spacecraft to blaze a trail to the moon now is placing its bets on several commercial space technology companies to provide entry for humans into low earth orbit. This new direction for the government space agency has several goals. First, it seeks to establish a domestic manned orbital capability to reach the International Space Station. After the shuttle program ends this year, the only way for spacefarers to reach the space station for the next few years will be through Russian space agency launches. Another goal is to spur commercial development of space utilization. With two or more commercial firms offering manned orbital access, other space-based industries could begin operation in orbit, secure in the knowledge that their access is not limited to government launch vehicles and spacecraft. Several companies already are planning space-based faculties with functions ranging from research and development to tourism. With more than one company offering manned orbital access, competition would keep prices down and spur further development. Ultimately, space travel could assume the status of airline travel in the early 1930s - an industry emerging from serving only government or elite needs to become a mainstay of the public. NASA had planned to build its manned space access around the Constellation program and its Orion spacecraft, designed to be a multipurpose vehicle capable of a variety of near- and deepspace missions. However, the Obama administration called for bypassing the Orion program in favor of commercial space access. This approach builds on the recommendations of the Review of U.S. Human Space Flight Plans Committee, headed by former Lockheed Martin Chief Executive Officer and onetime Defense Science Board Chairman Norman R. Augustine. With the Orion program not likely to produce a usable spacecraft until 2015 at the earliest, the committee recommended "turning this transport service over to the commercial sector," adding the goal of "... establishing a new competition for this service in which both large and small companies could participate." Brendan Curry, vice president for Washington operations at the Space Foundation, points out that this commercial space initiative was not met by a plethora of companies routinely shuttling cargo or people into space, NASA had to do more than just issue a bid and begin flying these providers. This new initiative required many companies to enter realms in which they had no proven track record. But since its beginning, the initiative has spawned considerable activity among several companies. The space agency's role will be to establish standards and facilitate development of functioning craft.
Lack of market demand empirically kills the counterplan’s solvency – there is no conclusive evidence that demand would exist. Developing private human space flight will be massively expensive, and can’t generate investmentHomans, 10 – an editor of the Washington Monthly (May/June 2010, Charles, The Washington Monthly, “The Wealth of Constellations,” vol. 42, is. 5/6, ProQuest)RK
The biggest hurdle Musk and others have to clear, however, isn't technical. After all, aerospace companies have known how to build rockets for half a century - they just haven't found people to pay for them. Although its plans are still unsettled, NASA is unlikely to need more than a few flights a year to bring astronauts to the International Space Station, and a few more to bring cargo there. A single commercial launch company, however, needs more - possibly many more - launches than that each year to stay in the black. That means it will have to find other customers.What else could these rockets do besides fly stuff to the space station? The only option that really exists today is satellites. The market for launching them is worth somewhere in the neighborhood of $2.5 billion, but it's barely growing. "It's a very, very conservative market," Caceres says. "It's not one you can say is going to double or triple a few years from now." To grow demand, a start-up would have to offer something radically cheaper than what's available today - for instance, the price of launching a small satellite, Caceres says, would have to fall from the going rate of about $10 million to something on the order of $6 to $8 rnilhon- something no aspiring commercial provider can seriously promise.If the new providers can't offer the bargain-basement prices necessary to expand the satellite market, they'll be stuck trying to undercut the existing players - which isn't much easier. The market is dominated by foreign companies that are subsidized, in fact or in practice, by foreign governments. And because satellites are expensive and there are reliable operators available to send them heavenward, few of their owners are willing to stick with a newcomer through the steep learning curve of its early years - which invariably involve blowing up a lot of rockets - unless it's really cheap. (Three of the five Falcon ? rockets that SpaceX has launched to date have crashed into the ocean - including one that was carrying the ashes of James Doohan, the actor who played Scotty on Star Trek.) Sea Launch, a Boeing spinoff that succeeded briefly as a freestanding commercial enterprise, filed for bankruptcy protection last summer, after the cost of its rockets increased and one of them blew up on the launch pad. Customers fled en masse.Aside from satellites, the other option is the holy grail of the commercial spaceflight industry: flying people to space. But beyond the taxi trips to the space station, the pickings are pretty slim, and mostly theoretical. It's possible that other countries' astronauts would want to buy seats on flights to the space station, but NASA hasn't gauged the extent of the interest. Another option is space tourism. This notion has generated enthusiasm among entrepreneurs; a company called Bigelow Aerospace wants to launch its own inflatable space modules into orbit, which could function as zero-gravity laboratories or even space hotels. And there are mklings of a market here: Richard Branson's Virgin Galactic has done a brisk business selling tickets on future flights aboard the sleek, otherworldly space plane the company has in development.The problem, though, is that the experience Branson is offering tourists is far cheaper and simpler than the sort of thing that the companies hoping to contract with NASA will be doing with their rockets. Virgin Galactic s aircraft will travel sixty-some miles to the edge of the atmosphere and back, what's known as suborbital flight - it technically qualifies as space travel, but it's orders of magnitude less difficult and expensive than reaching orbit, a several-hundred-mile proposition requiring forty times the energy of Branson's day trips. Seats on a Virgin Galactic flight go for $200,000, sailing-around-the-world-on-ayacht money But a slot on a commercial flight to the space station would cost $20 million. In fact, you can already fly there at that price the way that Lori Garver intended to, with the Russian Federal Space Agency - space tour packages have been available for a decade, and so far there have been only eight takers.If other customers fail to materialize for the companies that NASA is betting on, the agency finds itself in an awkward spot. The whole point of paying for launch services, rather than bankrolling contractors' ever-metastasizing costs for entire projects, is that it's supposed to be cheaper. But if a company can't find other work, it has to spread its costs out over fewer launches to make its budget - which means the individual launches become more expensive. And if NASA wants to send anything into orbit at all, it has to pay the new prices, whatever they are.That was how events played out for the Department of Defense fifteen years ago, when it embarked on a strategy similar to NASA's. The military was in the market for a new fleet of
rockets to launch defense satellites, to replace its aging Titan IV. At the time, analysts were projecting a huge boom in the demand for commercial satellites, largely driven by an anticipated explosion in the satellite phone market. The Pentagon figured that if it awarded start-up grants to the most promising companies, it could hasten the arrival of a bona fide commercial launch business in the United States; once the rocket builders were up and running, they would have hordes of new customers from the satellite phone industry, and the military could buy their services on a per-launch basis at a reasonable price. Lockheed Martin and McDonnell Douglas (which was acquired by Boeing shortly thereafter) won the contract, and were handed $2.5 billion over the first three years of the project to get the job done.Over the following years, however, cellular phone companies, the satellite phone providers' rivals in the mobile phone market, began extending the reach of their signals with cheap and easy-to-build repeating towers. The market for cell phones began to grow exponentially, while the one for the far pricier satellite phones all but vanished - along with the demand for satellites. By the time Boeing and Lockheed Martin had actual rockets ready for testing, no one required their services but the military. "The lesson that we learned is that there's market risk, technical risk, and operational risk," says Michael Gass, the president and chief executive officer of United Launch Alliance, the BoeingLockheed Martin joint venture that completed the contract. "The companies are good at the technical and operational risks. The market side is something that might be too hard to forecast."Because the Pentagon needed the rockets, it had no choice but to cover the rocket builders' expenses, which soon grew enormous. The projected cost of a launch jumped 77 percent from 2002 to 2003 alone, and another 29 percent the following year - an increase so great that Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld had to formally vouch for the program's necessity to national defense just to make it kosher with defense contracting laws. In 2005 the Defense Department called a spade a spade and quietly redrew the program as the standard cost-plus contracting arrangement that in practice it had already become, and later changed its status to make it subject to fewer budgetary oversight requirements. As of late 2008 the Government Accountability Office calculated its total price tag to date at $8.2 billion - and the rockets were still in the test-launching stage. Even without considering the cost of program development, the price per launch, originally budgeted at a little under $73 million, had grown to $170 million.If there's a lesson to be drawn from this saga it's that the difference between a government contractor and a commercial company whose only customer is the government is academic at best. And in fact, the Pentagon's experience is already repeating itself at NASA, which in 2006 began a similarly structured $500 million program to commission rockets that could deliver cargo to the space station. SpaceX, the contract recipient that is furthest along in development, was supposed to have tested three Falcon 9 rockets by last September; as of this writing, it was about to test its first. NASA, meanwhile, is asking for an extra $312 rnillion for the companies in its fiscal year 2011 budget to speed things along. And in spite of the risk the agency faces if its launch companies can't find other customers, the agency hasn't commissioned any studies of the potential market for their services - instead, it's relied on the predictions of the companies themselves.Rocket makers also face a whole new challenge if they want to go from launching satellites and cargo to launching people: namely, not killing them. NASA has said that whatever the next vehicle it entrusts with astronauts' lives is, it should have less than a one in a thousand chance of a fatal accident (the odds on a round-trip space shuttle mission are about one in eighty-five). Commercial providers claim that they can do this without intrusive or expensive NASA oversight. But the fact is that for decades NASA has been experimenting with letting contractors monitor themselves, and the results haven't been good.The reason for this is that while most rocket-building expertise resides in the private sector - 12,000 companies were involved in Apollo 11 alone - most of the institutional knowledge of how to pull off a manned spaceflight safely remains inside NASA. The less the two overlap, the more crucial information falls through the cracks. Both the Challenger and Columbia disasters were the result of seemingly minor technical problems whose significance wasn't appreciated up the shuttle program's chain of command. In both cases investigators pinned the blame in part on communication failures between NASA and its contractors, and NASA's diminished oversight over them. Put simply, NASA knew too little about the spacecraft it was flying.
The panel investigating the Challenger accident recommended "the total combination of NASA and contractor organizations, working more effectively on a coordinated basis at all levels" in order to avoid repeating the tragedy. At first NASA heeded the investigators' advice, but the inquiry into the subsequent Columbia disaster found that once budget pressures reasserted themselves, the shuttle program had gone back to cutting corners. "The change was cost-efficient," the Columbia investigators wrote, "but personnel cuts reduced oversight of contractors at the same time that the agency's dependence upon contractor engineering judgment increased." Miscommunication between an oversight-deprived NASA and its contractors has also been blamed for less tragic, more farcical failures. Ln 1999, the agency lost a $125 million unmanned Mars probe somewhere in the Red Planet's atmosphere due to a navigational failure. The problem, it turned out, was that the contractor, Lockheed Martin, had given NASA all of its data on the program in Imperial units. The space agency used the metric system.Safely overseeing the development of a commercial venture's human-ready vehicle is possible, of course, but it costs money. How much, exactly, is the multibillion-dollar question. Would-be taxi providers have thrown out numbers, ranging from a highly unlikely low end of $300 million to an only slightly less unlikely high end of $1.5 billion. But the truth is that no one really knows - NASA hasn't figured out yet what its requirements will be. The agency has spoken of doing less oversight and more "insight" - that is, working with the commercial ventures to come up with a safety code and trusting them to follow it. But it's not hard to see the huge problem that this sets up: would you trust a company whose business is entirely dependent on fixed-price government contracts not to cut corners when nobody's looking?There's also the question of liability: if something does happen, who's on the hook? Recovering the remnants of Columbia and investigating its last flight cost $454 million - enough to sink a fledgling company, which would almost certainly have to put its operations on hold throughout a lengthy investigation. Similarly, a serious problem with the space station could obliterate a company's customer base for months or years. Would-be commercial providers say they wouldn't even get into the business unless the government provided an assurance of bailing them out in the event of a disaster.All in all, these are not terms that make investors salivate: initial capital in the high hundreds of millions, wildly unpredictable long-term costs, an unproven and possibly nonexistent market, the threat of gargantuan liabilities, and reliance on a single customer that is subject to the whims of Congress and the White House, and might not need the services for more than the next ten years - after all, there's no guarantee that the International Space Station will stay in orbit beyond 2020. Which may be why, for all of NASA's optimism, the people who are willing to sink money into commercial spaceflight are the same as they've always been: existing contractors assured of government backing, and idealistic billionaires. SpaceX, the only serious contender that aspires to be a true freestanding commercial venture, is supported almost entirely by NASA and Musk's own money - although the company is privately held, it lists just two outside investors (including a fund run by Musk's PayPal cofounders), and press reports have pegged their stake in the company at about $35 million, about a tenth of what NASA and Musk are collectively betting on the venture.
Competition generates the best safety practices – overregulation kills the private sectorCrews, 6/23/11 – Clyde Wayne, vice president for policy and director of technology studies at the Competitive Enterprise Institute (Competitive Enterprise Institute, “Catching Air Without NASA: How Will We Regulate Commercial Space Flight?” http://cei.org/op-eds-articles/catching-air-without-nasa-how-will-we-regulate-commercial-space-flight?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+cei-issues-regulatory-reform+(CEI+Issue+Feeds+-+Regulatory+Reform))RK
Subsidies should be discouraged, though, as is overemphasis on business-government partnerships like that between Elon Musk’s SpaceX and NASA. Dependence on government will mean cronyism and stagnation, as well as potentially more pointless experiments
in zero-gravity. Technologies need to advance in a logical supply-and-demand-driven order rather than the fits and starts of porkbarrel science.Commercial space’s real hurdle, if it can avoid entangling alliances with government, is dealing with inevitable dangers in a grown-up way by fostering the right risk-management institutions.Basically, industries that don’t exist yet aren’t over-regulated yet, and thus have the potential to create extraordinary wealth. We must lay the groundwork for the fundamental risk-management-market institutions that enhance safety better than tossing everything to regulators. Indeed, succumbing to or encouraging eager NASA or FAA intervention is not “regulation” at all, but undermines it.Over-regulation can easily cripple this industry while making it more risky. Political “regulation” can undermine actual regulation and governance — the as-yet-nonexistent market risk control institutions the industry most desperately needs — and hobble the commercial space industry for generations to come. So the industry will need to work with advocates of free enterprise to articulate an alternative model.Many values we want — privacy, safety, security, access, environmental amenities, cleanliness — are actually forms of wealth that must remain within the competitive rubric to advance. We need to create “safety wealth” in commercial space endeavors like low earth orbit, and foster the institutions like insurance and liability standards that escalate that value over time and allow for maximum innovation and wealth.Don’t call it “self-regulation” though; that term has no place in debate. It is a misnomer in free markets since business partners and suppliers, investors, insurance companies and Wall Street all regulate and discipline errant behavior if their role is not otherwise dampened by “regulation.”Regulators also likely will attempt to “help” the industry with waivers of liability (or conversely, undermine the ability to contract away liability like the waiver I had to sign to fly a powered parachute). Taking that path means the commercial space industry future shall be one of regulation of the kind that doesn’t actually regulate and discipline and that hampers progress, and leaves us with a few big players who capture the regulators. Thanks to the immunity granted by the Price Andersen Act, we have no way of knowing whether nuclear power is viable in a free market, and one cannot envision that industry’s emergence from hyper-regulation; let’s not do that to the space industryThe right kinds of “immunity” instead emerge from contracts between the informed passenger and the flight company, for example. New kinds of business insurance/liability products as well as safety engineering itself should emerge more aggressively if not given an out with careless immunity.A recent Washington Post story noted that the first colonists of Mars would likely agree to never return — that they’d remain as permanent settlers. This represents the extreme case, but we can handle it. Still, the legal institutions required to allow someone to contract to embark on such a trip and likely fatal endeavor seem not to exist and need to be bolstered. No one wants any injury whatsover, and we certainly will not tolerate what society used to withstand in the late 1890s when one lineman in two were killed on the job. But we can cope with and allow adventure and the right to explore new frontiers.So we have much work to do. One hopeful notion is that the industry will come to recognize it can manage risks by extension from the management of traditional aviation risks; there are insurance instruments (and future hybrids) available there. This represents an entirely new business opportunity and engine of wealth, rather than the problem some perceive it as. And investors and firms will likely join together in pools to cover costs if insurance is initially prohibitive.Let’s try to remember that competition works to create wealth not just in the engineering innovations and products, but in the contractual, insurance, and liability instruments by which we govern the inevitable risks of of world-changing innovations.
Treaties Sadeh 08-Associate Director for the Center for Space and Defense Studies at the United States Air Force Academy, Research Associate with the Space Policy Institute at George Washington University (Eligar Sadeh, June 9, 2008, “Space policy questions and decisions facing a new administration”, The Space Review, http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1146/1, DMintz)
Policy ChoiceEstablish more effective international governance of the space environment by supporting voluntary approaches or by formal institutional means.
International governance of the space environment is based on voluntary approaches to avoid interference with space assets, to deal with orbital debris, and to share space situational awareness data. The President needs to support codification of these voluntary approaches. This entails a renewed commitment to adhere to the orbital debris guidelines published by the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space and by the Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee, and to continue to advance the Commercial and Foreign Entities program. Voluntary approaches do impose limitations on effective international governance of the space environment in that there is uncertainty on the expected behavior in space, such as no rules of the road, that make international governance of electronic encroachment of satellite data and space traffic management more difficult. This difficulty supports the view that space is contested and that the United States retain the right to deny others the use of space.Presidential support for formal institutional approaches to international governance of the space environment facilitates a number of positive developments. Internationally agreed upon rules of road allow for more effective governance since spacefaring states mutually agree on how to behave in the space environment and realize a consensus view on what is peaceful and what is not. This addresses the challenges of electronic encroachment and international space law that spacefaring states are not to interfere with the space asserts of others. Formal approaches to orbital debris and space traffic management alleviate how to govern these issues, and overcome the limitations that voluntary ways forward encounter. A formal political commitment to international governance brings with it political value, such as collective regimes for space security and United States Space leadership through soft power elements associated with spacepower and smart power. Concomitantly, there are operational constraints in what the United Sates can do in space with multilateral means to space governance.
Status Quo SolvesNASA has plans that solve deep space exploration while private sector and Russia fill in for ISS Terdiman 11; (Daniel Terdiman, reporting for CNET News; “NASA unveils new deep-space exploration vehicle”; 5/24/11; http://news.cnet.com/8301-13772_3-20065812-52.html#ixzz1TcDz15T0) NASA today announced its plans for its next-generation deep space crew exploration vehicle. President Barack Obama last year pulled the plug on the space agency's long-planned and multibillion dollar Constellation program. That system, which was expected to replace the Space Shuttle after its retirement this year, was thought to be central to bringing humans back to the moon, and possibly even to Mars. But today, the space agency unveiled its plans for what it called the Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle (MPCV), a new spacecraft based on the Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle that was related to the Constellation program. While Obama's 2010 order essentially handed control of launches to the International Space Station to private industry--or to the Russians--NASA said today that it intends to "aggressively" pursue options for a new heavy lift launch vehicle capable of taking humans to deep space. The MPCV would presumably be placed atop any such rocket. "We are committed to human exploration beyond low-Earth orbit and look forward to developing the next generation of systems to take us there," said NASA administrator Charles Bolden in a release. "The NASA Authorization Act (Obama's 2010 order) lays out a clear path forward for us by handing off transportation to the International Space Station to our private sector partners so we can focus on deep space exploration." According to NASA, Lockheed Martin has the contract to develop the MPCV. The new spacecraft should be capable of ferrying four astronauts on 21-day missions. It is expected to offer 316 cubic feet of "habitable space," NASA said, as well as a pressurized volume of 690 cubic feet. "It is designed to be 10 times safer during ascent and entry than its predecessor, the Space Shuttle," NASA said.
Status Quo Solves – LEO
Status quo solves alternatives to Constellation measures—they’re reliable and more cost-effectiveFoust 11; (Jeff Foust, editor for The Space Review; “Commercial crew and NASA’s tipping point’; 2/14/11; http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1780/1)
Another high profile program likely to be scrutinized in the budget proposal is the agency’s commercial crew development efforts, a topic that was one of the flash points of last year’s budget and policy debate. This time around, though, the debate may very well be different. Last year the question was whether there should be a commercial crew development program at all, one that was answered by its inclusion in the authorization act, although at lower funding levels than the administration’s request. Now, though, developments both in government and in the private sector suggest commercial crew is increasingly not a question of if it will exist, but how big of a program it will be and how soon it can field systems. Commercial readiness One of the key issues of last year’s debate was the readiness of commercial providers to develop crew transportation systems, something that previously had been done only as government programs with very different contracting relationships with aerospace firms. Those worries were at least partially ameliorated with the successful demonstration flight in December of SpaceX’s Dragon spacecraft, developed to carry cargo but intended to eventually carry crew as well (see “2010: the year commercial human spaceflight made contact”, The Space Review, December 13, 2010). “The December 8th flight of the Falcon 9/Dragon, for us, demonstrated that the United States commercial sector is prepared to meet the needs of NASA to carry crew to orbit,” said Tim Hughes, vice president and chief counsel of SpaceX, during a panel session at the 14th Annual FAA Commercial Space Transportation Conference in Washington last week. Such a system could carry astronauts, he said, at less than half the cost of what Russia is currently charging for seats on Soyuz spacecraft. SpaceX has submitted a proposal for NASA’s second round of Commercial Crew Development awards (known as CCDev-2) to work on what Hughes called the “long pole in the tent” for a commercial crew capability, a launch escape system. If funded, he said that “ideally” the company could have an operational crew capability within three years. SpaceX is hardly the only company showing an interest in commercial crew development. Several other companies have been developing concepts for spacecraft and/or launch vehicles, either under the first round of CCDev awards made last year or in CCDev-2 proposals now being evaluated by NASA. That interest was evidenced by the standing room only crowd that gathered to attend the panel, which also featured representatives of Boeing, Orbital Sciences Corporation, Sierra Nevada Corporation, and United Launch Alliance (ULA). “I think a few years ago we would have been talking to ourselves,” said Mark Sirangelo, chairman of Sierra Nevada Space Systems. Boeing, Sierra Nevada, and ULA all received first-round CCDev awards last year, and have either completed or are wrapping up work associated with those awards. That work has ranged from completing a system definition review by Boeing of its CST-100 capsule, along with associated subsystem development, to drop tests by Sierra Nevada of a subscale model of its Dream Chaser vehicle, to ULA’s work simulating launch failures to test an emergency detection system critical to human-rating its launch vehicles. (ULA also simulated the ascent profile of its Atlas 5 402 rocket using the centrifuge at the NASTAR Center near Philadelphia, with former astronaut Jeff Ashby testing his ability to operate a notional vehicle at accelerations of up to 4 g.) Orbital, currently developing the Cygnus cargo vehicle for servicing the ISS, jumped into the commercial crew sector in December when it announced it had submitted a CCDev-2 proposal for a lifting body vehicle subsequently named Prometheus. Frank Culbertson, senior vice president at Orbital, said Prometheus is based on design work the company did on NASA’s Orbital Space Plane program in the early 2000s. “We think it’s going to be a very exciting vehicle for NASA to evaluate and eventually procure,” he said. Perhaps the biggest recent sign of commercial interest in crew transportation development, though, took place last week when ATK announced it had submitted its own CCDev-2 proposal for a new launch vehicle it called Liberty. The vehicle, strikingly similar to the now-cancelled Ares 1, uses the same five-segment solid rocket booster for its first stage. However, the Boeing-built Ares 1 second stage, powered by a J-2X engine, has been replaced by a version of the Ariane 5 core stage, provided by ATK’s partner on the project, EADS Astrium. The Liberty would be able to put to up 20,000 kilograms into an ISS orbit, enough to handle any of the crewed vehicle concepts under study. ATK and Astrium played up the heritage and reliability of Liberty’s components while also claiming the vehicle would be cost effective compared to unnamed alternatives. “We will provide unmatched payload performance at a fraction of the cost, and we will launch it from the Kennedy Space Center using facilities that have already been built,” said Charlie Precourt, vice president and general manager of ATK Space Launch Systems, in a statement announcing the Liberty proposal. “This approach allows NASA to utilize the investments that have already been made in our nation's ground infrastructure and propulsion systems for the Space
Exploration Program.” ATK did not present at the FAA conference last week, but its presence was felt. In his presentation about the CST-100 a day after the ATK announcement, Boeing’s John Elbon included an illustration of the Liberty vehicle alongside those of the Atlas 5, Delta 4, and Falcon 9 on a slide emphasizing the capsule’s compatibility with various launch systems.
Status Quo Solves – Deep Space (MPCV)
Status quo solves to go beyond LEO – MPCV is OrionWall 11; (Mike Wall; reporter for Space.com; “NASA unveils plan to reach deep space”; 5/24/11; http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2011/05/24/scitech/main20065786.shtml) (Space.com) NASA on Tuesday announced a plan to develop a new deep space vehicle, one based on an earlier capsule concept, in order to send astronauts on expeditions to an asteroid, and then on to Mars. The spaceship, known as the Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle (MPCV), will be based on designs originally planned for the Orion spacecraft, NASA officials announced today (May 24). Orion was part of NASA's now-canceled Constellation program, which aimed to return astronauts to the moon by the 2020s. (Photos: NASA's MPCV for Deep Space Flights) President Barack Obama shut down the Constellation program last year, tasking NASA instead with sending people to an asteroid by 2025, and then to aim for crewed Mars missions by the 2030s. Modifying the Orion capsule design — rather than drawing up plans for an entirely new spaceship — should help make that feasible, agency officials said. "We are committed to human exploration beyond low-Earth orbit and look forward to developing the next generation of systems to take us there," NASA adminstrator Charlie Bolden said in a statement.
MPCV is Orion but better—best approach to go beyond LEOHarwood 11; (William Harwood, reporting for CNET news; “ NASA picks Orion-type capsule for deep space missions”; 5/24/11; http://news.cnet.com/8301-19514_3-20065857-239/nasa-picks-orion-type-capsule-for-deep-space-missions/#ixzz1TcNqsPjQ)
Douglas Cooke, associate administrator of NASA's Exploration Systems Mission Directorate, told reporters the Orion concept, described by former NASA Administrator Mike Griffin as "Apollo on steroids," is the most capable spacecraft currently on the drawing board for meeting the Obama administration's "flexible path" approach to deep space exploration. "This is the Orion-based concept that was designed for deep space missions and had the appropriate accommodations and design requirements for that type of mission," he said. "We did look at alternatives in some of the systems designs we're seeing in the various concepts that are being proposed, for instance, for commercial (vehicles)...And after studying those, we found the design approach we've got is really the best for this type of mission beyond low-Earth orbit." Developed by Lockheed Martin, the solar-powered Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle, or MPCV, would carry four astronauts on missions lasting up to three weeks, much longer when attached to a larger interplanetary habitation module of some sort. The capsule would have a pressurized volume of 690 cubic feet, weigh approximately 23 tons at launch and end its missions with splashdown in the Pacific Ocean. Using an advanced abort system and a high-performance heat shield, the MPCV is expected to be 10 times safer than the space shuttle.
MPCV solves translunar exploration Harwood 11; (William Harwood, reporting for CNET news; “ NASA picks Orion-type capsule for deep space missions”; 5/24/11; http://news.cnet.com/8301-19514_3-20065857-239/nasa-picks-orion-type-capsule-for-deep-space-missions/#ixzz1TcNqsPjQ)
In a statement, NASA Administrator Charlie Bolden said the agency is "committed to human exploration beyond low-Earth orbit and look forward to developing the next generation of systems to take us there...As we aggressively continue our work on a heavy lift launch vehicle, we are moving forward with an existing contract to keep development of our new crew vehicle on track." As currently envisioned, the MPCV would support four astronauts on short-duration flights of less than 21 days. For longer missions to asteroids or even Mars, the capsules would dock with a larger spacecraft of some sort that would provide more room for the crew while in transit. "The approach on this vehicle is primarily for launch and entry with in-space capabilities for certain periods of time," Cooke said. "Generally, for long-term missions that are much longer than 21 days, we would assume we have in-space habitation in a larger module just because the crew needs more space for a longer period of time.
Solvency F/L
Technical issues stand in the way of NASA’s proposed deadlineGAO ‘9 [“Constellation Program Cost and Schedule Will Remain Uncertain Until a Sound Business Case is Established,” Report to the Chairman, Committee on Science and Technology, House of Representatives, pdf]
NASA is still struggling to develop a solid business case – including firm requirements, mature technologies, a knowledge-based acquisition strategy, a realistic cost estimate, and a sufficient funding and time – needed to justify moving the Constellation program forward into the implementation phase. Gaps in the business case include: significant and technical design challenges for the Orion and Ares I vehicles, such as limiting vibration during launch, elimination the risk of hitting the launch tower during lift off, and reducing the mass of the Orion vehicle, represent considerable hurdles that must be overcome in order to meet safety and performance requirements; and a poorly phased funding plan that runs the risk of funding shortfalls in fiscal years 2009 through 2012, resulting in planned work not being completed to support schedules and milestones. This approach has limits NASA’s ability to mitigate technical risks early in development and precludes the orderly ramp up of workforce and developmental activities. In response to these gaps, NASA delayed the date of its first crewed-flight and changes its acquisition strategy for the Orion project. NASA acknowledges that funding shortfalls reduce the agency’s flexibility in resolving technical challenges. The program’s risk management system warned of planned work not being completed to support schedules and milestones. Consequently, NASA is now focused on providing the capability to service the International Space Stated and has deferred the capabilities needed for flights to the moon. Though these changes to the overarching requirements are likely to increase the confidence level associated with a March 2015 first crewed flight, these actions do not guarantee that the program will successfully meet that deadline. Nevertheless, NASA estimates that Ares I and Orion represent up to $49 billion of the over $97 billion estimated to be spent on the Constellation program through 2020. While the agency has already obligated more than $10 billion in contracts, at this point NASA does now know how much Ares I and Orion will ultimately cost, and will now know until technical and design challenges have been addressed.
Despite progress, large technological gaps still remain GAO ‘9 [“Constellation Program Cost and Schedule Will Remain Uncertain Until a Sound Business Case is Established,” Report to the Chairman, Committee on Science and Technology, House of Representatives, pdf]
The Constellation program has not yet developed all of the elements of a sound business case needed to justify entry into implementation. Progress has been made; however, technical and design challenges are still significant and until they are resolved NASA will not be able to reliably estimate the time and money needed to execute the program. In addition, cost issues and a poorly phased funding plan continue to hamper the program. Consequently, NASA is changing the acquisition strategy for the Orion project as the agency attempts to increase confidence in its ability to meet a March 2015 first crewed launch. However, technical design and other challenges facing the program are not likely to be overcome in time to meet the 2015 date, even with changes to scope and requirements. Technical and design challenges within the Constellation are proving difficult, costly, and time intensive to resolve. The Constellation program tracks technical challenges in its Integrated Risk Management Application (IRMA). NASA procedures recommend that programs identify and track risks as a part of continuous risk management. As of June 9, 2009, IRMA was tracking 464 risks for Ares I and Orion – 207 high risks, 206 medium risks, and 51 low risks. We have reported on some of these areas of technical challenge in the past, including thrust oscillation, thermal protection system, common bulkhead, and J-2X nozzle extension. In addition to these challenges, our recent work has highlighted other technical challenges, including Orion mass control, vibroacoustics, lift-off
drift, launch abort system, and meeting safety requirements. While NASA has made progress in resolving each of these technical challenges, significant knowledge gaps remain in each of these areas. Descriptions of these technical challenges follow.
Poorly phased funding limits funding for the plan GAO ‘9 [“Constellation Program Cost and Schedule Will Remain Uncertain Until a Sound Business Case is Established,” Report to the Chairman, Committee on Science and Technology, House of Representatives, pdf]
The Constellation program’s poorly phased funding plan has affected the program’s ability to deal with technical challenges. In our October 2007 report, we noted that NASA initiated the Constellation program recognizing that the agency’s total budget authority would be insufficient to fund all necessary activities in fiscal years 2009 and 2010. NASA’s funding strategy relied on the accumulation of a large rolling budget reserve in fiscal years 2007 and 2007 to fund Constellation activities in fiscal years 2008, 2009, and 2010. Thereafter, NASA anticipated that the retirement of the space shuttle program in 2010 would free funding for the Constellation program. In our October 2007 report, we noted that NASA’s approach to funding was risky and that the approved budget profile as that time was insufficient to meet Constellation’s estimated needs. The Constellation program’s integrated risk management system also identified this strategy as high risk and warned that funding shortfalls could occur in fiscal years 2009 and 2012, resulting in planned work not being completed to support schedules and milestones. According to project officials, these shortfalls limited NASA’s ability to mitigate technical risks early in development and precluded the orderly ramp-up of workforce and developmental activities.
Even with political consensus, Constellation fails Carroll ‘11 – works at the International Institute for Strategic Studies [Chris, “End of shuttle leaves future of manned spaceflight unclear,” July 6, 2011, Stars and Stripes, http://www.stripes.com/end-of-shuttle-leaves-future-of-manned-spaceflight-unclear-1.148536]
“You had a consensus on space that was bipartisan, bicameral — something extremely rare in Washington,” said Eric Sterner, an analyst for the conservative George C. Marshall Institute who served as NASA deputy administrator of policy and in the Bush administration. “And the current administration came in and blew it up.” New direction Just over a year into his first term, President Barack Obama told NASA to refocus its human spaceflight efforts on distant exploration and drop the idea of building a manned vehicle to replace the space shuttle in low-Earth orbit. Political consensus or no, the Constellation program was a loser, said the White House Office of Management and Budget — “over budget, behind schedule and lacking in innovation due to a failure to invest in critical new technologies.” The Augustine Commission, appointed by Obama to study national space policy, had reported in late 2009 that Constellation’s Ares 1 rocket would miss the 2014 launch goal by years. Meanwhile the program was spending billions of dollars in the midst of a serious financial downturn.
Constellation ended up with a political stalemate – it’s not viable in the futureHandberg ‘11 – Department Chair of UCF, Pre-law advisor [Roger, “The beginning of an end or the end of a beginning? Facing the shuttle’s demise and the future,” July 25, 2011, The Space Review, http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1890/1]
The resulting Constellation program included new launch vehicles, the Ares 1 for crew launch and a later heavy lifter, the Ares 5, with the crew exploration vehicle, the Orion, being in appearance an Apollo capsule “on steroids”. The goal was a return to the Moon by 2018 where bases would be established to allow for long duration expeditions that could be, in principle, generalized to future operations on the Martian surface. Difficulties arose in Ares 1 development with delays in scheduled tests and the prospect of heightened costs. In a fashion, the objections to Ares 1 were a continuation of the objections that ended the X-33 program, schedule, and cost. President Obama’s forays into the space program confronted this ongoing
debate over the Constellation program with its purported difficulties. In response, the Obama administration established a committee to examine the Constellation program and possible fixes or alternative routes forward. The Committee report in the fall of 2009 declared in effect the Constellation Program was undoable given existing budget projections along with technology issues. The committee suggested a “flexible path” approach might be more useful and doable under existing present and future fiscal constraints as this chart from the final report’s executive summary illustrations: Augustine Committee chart The Committee’s report was partially rolled into the Obama administration’s approach to the question of future human missions by NASA. The showstopper became the fact that there was no consensus on what launch vehicle was required to continue human exploration of outer space. When the Apollo program went dark, there was the space shuttle coming along to ensure the future. Now, the result has been effectively a stalemate with powerful legislators imposing restrictions on NASA’s policy options going forward while protecting current employment by delaying the cancelation of the Constellation Program. The program effectively died, but the funding continued through several iterations of continuing resolutions to fund the federal government. In addition, NASA is prohibited from interacting with the Chinese, one of three nations to operate a human spaceflight program—now down to two programs, the Chinese and the Russians. A budget agreement was finally reached for FY2011 but that merely pushed NASA’s crisis forward into the FY2012 legislative wars, where the issues are broader and clearly more dangerous for NASA’s programs, especially new and controversial ones.
______DA Stuff
EU Relations GoodEuropean Union relations must be revamped from U.S. policy—EU is healthy and critical to maintaining peaceHockenos 9; (Paul Hockenos is editor of Internationale Politik-Global Edition. His most recent book is "Joschka Fischer andthe Making of the Berlin Republic: An Alternative History o fPostwar Germany"; “Is the EU Better for Obama than NATO?”; 3/9/9; http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,612105-2,00.html) -Foreign aid to developing countries-K2 global economy-Strong diplomatic leader-Stops breeding grounds for terror
As great as the gap across the Atlantic has been in recent years, the United States still has much more in common with the Europeans than it does with new powers China or Russia. Europe could and should be America's closest partner in world affairs. But this relationship would be immensely different than the current one. It must be a partnership of equals across the Atlantic and this will require real compromises from the United States as well as the Europeans. To make this possible, the Obama administration must begin to think anew about the European Union. For one, the Union is not teetering on the brink of disintegration, regardless of how some American commentators interpret its disunity on many issues and the recent failures to pass a constitution. Though institutional reform is absolutely necessary, even in its current condition the European Union is healthy, admired by the overwhelming majority of Europeans, and will continue to perform as it has in the recent past -- but no better than that until a constitution or new reform treaty is approved. The European Union is already a major, capable power in world affairs. It has global interests and a sense of responsibility that goes beyond narrow self-interest. Its size and international economic might alone make it globally relevant, especially since much of the Union's power comes from its conditionally linked trade policies. The single market includes 450 million people, and ranks as the world's largest exporter of goods and the second leading importer worldwide behind the United States. When the ongoing financial crisis peaked this fall, President Bush's first call of help abroad was to the European Union. The Europeans also contribute over half the world's foreign aid to developing countries, including €300 million a year to the Palestinian Authority, triple the resources the United States provides. Diplomatically, the European Union has led international negotiations with Iran over its nuclear program since 2003. In 2004 European diplomacy helped bring about a peaceful resolution to Ukraine's Orange Revolution and, more recently, European negotiators brokered a peace in Georgia that sent peacekeeping troops and monitors to the Caucasus. Its greatest success by far has been to stabilize the Western Balkans in the aftermath of the wars of the 1990s. Thus, even though European Union foreign policies are in their infancy, they already make a significant contribution to global security. Although the European Union in its various incarnations has long been involved in matters beyond its borders, this took new form in 1992 with the Common Foreign and Security Policy. Since then, its ability to engage in the wider world was boosted significantly, first with the 1999 European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) and then with the 2003 adoption of the European Security Strategy. ESDP endowed the European Union with military capabilities, enabling it to launch its first mission in Macedonia in March 2003. For the first time in the Union's history, the European Security Strategy defined a strategic orientation for the European Union to engage in the world's trouble spots by combining aid, diplomacy, trade, and force. Some of the programs and missions that have emerged from the European Security Strategy include police force training in the Palestinian territories and Afghanistan, the rule of law mission in Kosovo, training Iraqi judges, and security sector reform in Congo. There is the common misperception among Americans that Europe is somehow pacifist -- at best a check-writer and post-conflict rebuilder for US-led interventions. Though not pacifist at all, Europe does indeed think about military force differently than the United States. The point of intervening in crises is to restore security and then reconstruct conflict-ravaged societies, providing them with sustainable economies and adequate governance. This approach is aimed at preventing crisis-prone countries from failing and, among other unwanted byproducts of instability and poverty, from becoming breeding grounds for terrorism.
EU soft power effectively minimizes instability and terrorismHockenos 9; (Paul Hockenos is editor of Internationale Politik-Global Edition. His most recent book is "Joschka Fischer andthe Making of the Berlin Republic: An Alternative History o fPostwar Germany"; “Is the EU Better for Obama than NATO?”; 3/9/9; http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,612105-2,00.html) -Leverage economic incentives to keep country’s’ in sync with EU
Although it now has global reach -- and a handful of successes in faraway trouble spots -- the European Union is still most effective in its own neighborhood and periphery. This is where it exercises its legendary soft power best. With the leverage of incentive and reward, the European Union has nurtured democracy in former right-wing dictatorships on the Mediterranean and formerly communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe. This transformative power is presently the driving force of reforms across the Western Balkans and in Turkey as well. In the process of aligning their policies with European criteria, all the Western Balkans states including Serbia have made enormous strides since the wars of the 1990s. Despite powerful domestic opposition, Turkey passed a spate of constitutional reform packages designed to bring its policies into conformity with European standards: Ankara's military budgets are now under civilian control, capital punishment is outlawed, and torture in prisons has been halted. EU parliamentarian Daniel Cohn-Bendit calls the EU-led process of Turkey's liberalization "the miracle on the Bosporus." The European Union's soft power also reaches into a vast periphery stretching from Morocco and Egypt through Jordan to Armenia, Moldova to Ukraine. These countries may never join the European Union, but are nevertheless willing to make compromises and meet basic European Union norms to take advantage of aid and preferential trade, as well as the perks of training for justice officials, environmental projects, and new roads and infrastructure. These projects that fall under the umbrella of the European Neighborhood Policy are not philanthropy, but rather hard-boiled security policy. At a cost of $12 billion dollars since 2004 (and another $18 billion over the next six years), the logic is that by bringing these countries into its orbit and transforming them into well-governed allies, the European Union helps create conditions that keep terrorists -- as well as immigrants -- at bay. It simultaneously ensures that its energy corridors in Eastern Europe, the South Caucasus, and the Mediterranean remain open and governed by friendly nations. The dozen current European Neighborhood Policy countries include problem states that are generally high on the West's watch-list such as Lebanon and Algeria, and could in the future include the likes of Syria, Libya, and Belarus.
EU-U.S. relations are critical to addressing climate change—plan has no spill over solvency absent a strong allianceHockenos 9; (Paul Hockenos is editor of Internationale Politik-Global Edition. His most recent book is "Joschka Fischer andthe Making of the Berlin Republic: An Alternative History o fPostwar Germany"; “Is the EU Better for Obama than NATO?”; 3/9/9; http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,612105-2,00.html)
There are a number of security-related fields where Europeans have something to offer the United States in a new trans-Atlantic alliance. The first is climate policy, which the Europeans place firmly in the category of geosecurity. The European Union has proactively taken the world lead in efforts to curb global warming, and the Obama administration must catch up with and join the Europeans in accepting drastic and mandatory cuts in emissions. The EU targets include a 20 percent reduction in European greenhouse gas emissions by 2020, compared with 1990 levels, or a 30 percent reduction if other developed nations (like the United States) agree to take similar action. European objectives also include increasing the use of renewable energy to 20 percent of all energy consumed. If the United States throws in its lot with the Europeans, the partners would have that much more leverage to convince the world's other leading polluters, the "dirty dozen" who account for 80 percent of the world's carbon emissions, to do the same. The United States could work hand-in-glove with the European Union to design a successor treaty to Kyoto, which expires in 2012.
U.S.-EU relations solve energy consumption—I/L to resource warsHockenos 9; (Paul Hockenos is editor of Internationale Politik-Global Edition. His most recent book is "Joschka Fischer andthe Making of the Berlin Republic: An Alternative History o fPostwar Germany"; “Is the EU Better for Obama than NATO?”; 3/9/9; http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,612105-2,00.html)
Energy security is another domain where the United States could partner effectively with Europe. The United States and Europe together account for 40 percent of worldwide energy consumption and have already pledged better coordination to manage energy sources. Europe has set an ambitious goal to reduce its overall energy use by 20 percent by the year 2020. EU Commission president José Manuel Barroso has called for a Strategic Energy Dialogue between Europe and America. He has underlined the potential for increased EU-US energy collaboration across the globe, including development of hydrocarbon resources in the Caspian and Central Asian regions, and cooperation to improve energy efficiency.
EU-U.S. relations are critical to curbing middle east prolif and pre-requisite to CTBT ratification
Hockenos 9; (Paul Hockenos is editor of Internationale Politik-Global Edition. His most recent book is "Joschka Fischer andthe Making of the Berlin Republic: An Alternative History o fPostwar Germany"; “Is the EU Better for Obama than NATO?”; 3/9/9; http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,612105-2,00.html)
A third place where the new Obama administration should seek trans-Atlantic cooperation is in arms control and nuclear disarmament. The goal of eliminating all nuclear weapons is etched in the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and has recently been pushed by an unlikely group of former US defense and state department officials including Henry Kissinger, George Shultz, William Perry, and Sam Nunn. They have urged the United States to lead the world toward nuclear disarmament by ratifying the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), which would halt all testing of nuclear weapons, render nuclear forces less ready to launch on short notice, and eliminate tactical nuclear weapons, including US bombs stationed in Europe. The European Union would be the perfect interlocutor to engage Russia in this process, a country to whom this idea would be a particularly hard sell. Progress on scrapping nuclear arms -- or at least making deep cuts in global stockpiles --would also give the ongoing EU-US negotiations with Iran additional leverage to convince Tehran to halt its nuclear program. A first step would be to rejuvenate the NPT, one of the arms control mechanisms lamed by the Bush administration. This, together with the ratification of the CTBT might encourage India and Pakistan to step back from their nuclear arms race. There will have to be a new agreement to extend or replace START I (the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty) which runs out in December 2009. Although much of the original pact mandating cuts in United States and Russian nuclear arms is now outdated or redundant, a new accord could institutionalize strict verification requirements and impose other weapon limits.
And, NATO isn’t sufficient—only a EU-U.S. relationship will solve future problemsHockenos 9; (Paul Hockenos is editor of Internationale Politik-Global Edition. His most recent book is "Joschka Fischer andthe Making of the Berlin Republic: An Alternative History o fPostwar Germany"; “Is the EU Better for Obama than NATO?”; 3/9/9; http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,612105-2,00.html)
The truth is that NATO is just one of the post-World War II institutions that no longer meets the needs of today's world. The last decade has witnessed a striking displacement of power, away from the United States but also away from the West as a whole. The current implosion of the western-led financial system has only expedited this shift. When the new global powers begin to assert themselves, as indeed they are increasingly doing now, the United States and the Europeans will realize how much they still have in common. They will thus have to think innovatively about questions like security in a way that they failed to do in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War. If the Euro-Atlantic relationship is going to continue to be a special one, then it has to be on the basis of a partnership of equals, with the United States making important concessions to the Europeans and the Europeans finally stepping up to take care of their own security requirements. One thing is certain: Given the daunting challenges of the 21st century, the United States and Europe are going to need one another more than ever.
Politics DA – Link XTThe plan sparks negative reactions from CongressMorring ’11 -Senior Editor, Space at Aviation Week, Honored with Media Award from National Space Club-Huntsville [Frank, “What Next for U.S. Human Spaceflight?” July 19, 2011, Aviation Week, http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/story.jsp?channel=awst&id=news/awst/2011/07/18/AW_07_18_2011_p68-000001.xml&headline=What%20Next%20For%20U.S.%20Human%20Spaceflight?&next=0]
Once the smoke clears from the three-year debate over U.S. space policy ushered in by the return of a Democratic administration to the White House, NASA’s human-spaceflight activities will look a lot like those planned and started under the preceding Republican administration. As was the case then, astronauts will fly to the International Space Station (ISS) on Russian Soyuz vehicles while they wait for a new capsule/launch vehicle combination that owes more in basic design and operation to Apollo and its predecessors than to the space shuttle. And NASA will be working on a heavy-lift rocket comparable to the Saturn V, hopeful that it will take humans beyond low Earth orbit (LEO) someday. Perhaps the biggest difference in the old approach and the new will be the time lost while the politicians and contractors sorted out the details. And only time will tell if the new approach is faster—and cheaper, as NASA’s leaders promise. The initial operational capability of the Constellation program’s Orion/Ares I crew-launch stack endorsed by former President George W. Bush was a moving target. Its ambitious schedule slipped as the inevitable technical issues arose without adequate funding to fix them. To date, the commercial replacements for Orion/Ares I favored by President Barack Obama have not hit major technical challenges like the thrust-oscillation issue that slowed Ares I. But that could be because they have not gotten far enough along in development to run into real trouble. Like Constellation, they are working to optimistic time lines, but they started later. After Obama took office in 2009, his space-policy team surprised Congress with a budget request that terminated the Constellation program outright, including both the Ares I crew launcher and the planned Ares V heavy-lifter. The new plan handed to the private sector the job of transporting cargo and crew to the ISS. The budget request, delivered without preamble or detail to lawmakers accustomed to a more collaborative approach to working with the executive branch, triggered a strong negative reaction from senators and representatives. Among them were influential members such as Sens. Bill Nelson (D-Fla.), Kay Bailey Hutchison (R-Texas) and Richard Shelby (R-Ala.) and Rep. Ralph Hall (R-Texas) with serious constituent interests in maintaining the publicly backed jobs Constellation provided, and other members from both parties who had given their good-faith endorsement to the old program. The 2011 NASA budget request, and the administration’s ham-handed approach to dealing with the negative congressional reaction, added to the “gap” in U.S. human spaceflight capabilities that already was an issue on Capitol Hill. The dispute culminated in the compromise NASA Authorization Act of 2010, a three-year measure enacted and signed by Obama in December 2010. Under the legislative process, funding would be covered in a separate appropriation. The reauthorization legislation essentially called for a shift of funds from the open-ended technology-development program NASA wants to fast-track development of a heavy-lift rocket able to launch 130 metric tons. The technology program, part of Obama’s original request, is designed to advance readiness levels for a wide range of technologies that will be needed to send humans on exploration missions beyond LEO. The heavy-lift Space Launch System (SLS) and a Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle (MPCV) derived from Constellation’s Orion capsule are intended to place enough hardware into LEO to move beyond it. That is pretty much where the government side of human spaceflight remains today. Funding for the authorization act lagged as Congress fought out larger issues before handling fiscal 2011 appropriations in a series of continuing resolutions that essentially maintained spending at fiscal 2010 levels. As a result, the Constellation program was not officially terminated until June 10.
Sanz ’11 - covers government for KHOU-TV in Houston, Texas, award-winning broadcast journalist, eyewitness news reporter [Alex, “Insider: NASA future ambitious, but ambiguous,” KHOU, July 6, 2011, http://www.khou.com/news/Insider-NASA-future-ambitious-but-ambiguous-125108749.html]
Last year, President Barack Obama cancelled the space agency's Constellation Program, which would have returned Americans to the moon, and ordered NASA to chart a course beyond low Earth orbit to an asteroid or Mars. The plan came under fire by some members of Congress, and many in the space agency, as being too vague and inadequately funded. "The obligation, of course, continues to fall on the administration and Congress to reach a consensus and to set a mandate for what it is the agency will do in the future," Norbraten said. Norbraten, who joined NASA in 1967 and has been a part of some of its greatest successes, said the transition at Johnson Space Center would be similar to the one it saw in the 1970s after the conclusion of the Apollo program. "The lead time for most major developments in human spaceflight is typically five to seven years," he said. "It would be difficult given the period of uncertainty that we've had to have a viable program fully developed by 2016."
Politics DA – a2 NelsonNelson and Obama agree that MPCV solves the lack of Constellation jobs—plan is a flip flop for bothHarwood 11; (William Harwood, reporting for CNET news; “ NASA picks Orion-type capsule for deep space missions”; 5/24/11; http://news.cnet.com/8301-19514_3-20065857-239/nasa-picks-orion-type-capsule-for-deep-space-missions/#ixzz1TcNqsPjQ) -At worst, it non-uniques their link turn that indicates Nelson wants/will push for Constellation
The Obama administration canceled the Constellation program and ordered NASA to adopt a two-pronged approach to space flight that depends on the destination. For flights to and from the space station in low-Earth orbit, NASA will rely on private industry to develop the necessary rockets and spacecraft. The administration told NASA to concentrate on developing new technology and systems that could eventually be used for deep space exploration. No firm timetables or specific targets were set. Faced with widespread criticism, the president later said he would support continued development of Orion as a lifeboat for the International Space Station to help end NASA's post-shuttle reliance on Russia's Soyuz spacecraft. And the president said NASA should start working on a new heavy lift rocket
to launch deep space missions in the 2015 time frame. Sen. Bill Nelson, D-FL, and other key lawmakers successfully lobbied for appropriations language calling for immediate work on the new rocket, with initial test flights starting around 2016. With the decision to proceed with development of an Orion derivative, NASA is expected to announce what sort of rocket will be built to launch it later this summer. The decision to proceed with development of the MPCV "is a good thing," Nelson said in a statement. "It shows real progress toward the goal of exploring deep space and eventually getting to Mars. And it's good for Florida, too, because hundreds of Kennedy Space Center employees will have jobs assembling the new crew capsule at the center's Operations and Checkout building."
Weapons DA – Links Quick development of HLVs would be perceived as a weapon internationallyBrown 6 – PhD, USAFR, technical analyst at the Airpower Research Institute, College of Aerospace Doctrine, Research and Education, Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama(Lt Col Kendall K, June 1, Air & Space Power Journal - Summer 2006, “Is Operationally Responsive Space the Future of Access to Space for the US Air Force?”, http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj06/sum06/brown.html) RAInclusion of a global strike capability might have a destabilizing effect on world affairs in times of heightened geopolitical tensions. Given an HLV that can deliver either a satellite payload to orbit or a common aero vehicle with a strike weapon to a terrestrial target, a third-party nation might detect the launch and fear a nuclear attack by the United States. Regardless of whether such fears have any foundation, the Cold War forged a paradigm that ICBMs deliver nuclear weapons, and a US adversary or a nation not friendly to the United States could have difficulty distinguishing the launch of an HLV from that of an ICBM with strategic weapons, despite the fact that the trajectories might differ. The world community would have to accept the uncertainty that a reentry vehicle could deliver a conventional precision-guided munition—in essence, we would be asking the world to trust us in a time of hostilities. The political environment in a time of such uncertainty could restrict the operational usefulness of the ORS system’s force-application capability. For example, if we determined that, in response to our planned delivery of a weapon by means of an HLV, a nation with theater or intercontinental nuclear capabilities might increase its readiness posture and thus amplify the risk of a launch on US forces or the United States itself, we would not execute the mission. Advocates of global strike dismiss such concerns, however, arguing that communications with the regional nations would prove sufficient to mitigate the risk. Nevertheless, would such communications affect the responsiveness and strategic surprise of the ORS system? Probably so. In summary, these concerns indicate that the Air Force’s operationalization of space is moving too fast. To date, primarily technologists—within the space community—have conducted ORS studies and planning. We may or may not need the capabilities derived from those studies to support the theater combatant commander. For example, we could make improvements in the responsiveness of existing expendable launch vehicles to sustain and supplement space assets without developing a new vehicle. Failure to meet low-cost goals and the detrimental effects of cost overruns and schedule delays will surely doom the ORS program, especially in light of strains on the Air Force budget caused by aircraft-recapitalization needs.
Launch vehicles are associated with a space arms race – they can be used to deliver weaponsTyson & Clark 1 - * Director of Business Development of Space Frontier Operations, Inc, **Director and CEO of Space Frontier Operations, Inc(George R & Andrew V.W., “Innovative Financing of a Large Space Project”, http://www.orbitalcommerceproject.com/refdocs/InnovativeFinancing.pdf) RAHowever, like any other enterprise, the exploration of space cannot be approached without excellent planning, considerable knowledge and a constituency of support from a fairly broad cross-section of the population. While knowledge and good planning exist; the exploration of space fails to generate the requisite constituency of support because it has so far been considered the purview of governments and the government’s concerned have done nothing to change this perception. Governments do not generally have an exploration mandate and are only in the business of space exploration as a byproduct of the cold war. In fact, in the USA and Russia the major Expendable Launch Vehicles are derived from Ballistic Missiles first constructed as weapon delivery vehicles. Several other nations are busily developing rockets but only as a means of delivering various types of weapons of mass destruction. Indeed these programs parallel the development of rocketry in both the USA and the old Soviet Union. So, we may postulate that the development of rocketry is still dependent on a healthy arms race. This appears to be as true today for the USA as it is for the smaller nations just getting into the business.
Launch vehicles can be used to deploy weaponsBrown 6 – PhD, USAFR, technical analyst at the Airpower Research Institute, College of Aerospace Doctrine, Research and Education, Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama(Lt Col Kendall K, June 1, Air & Space Power Journal - Summer 2006, “Is Operationally Responsive Space the Future of Access to Space for the US Air Force?”, http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj06/sum06/brown.html) RAAdmittedly, the United States needs many of the capabilities that an ORS system would purportedly provide, such as responsive replenishment of on-orbit space assets. However, attempting to do so with a single, partially reusable launch vehicle is a mistake. Several times in the past, we have attempted to create one aircraft platform to perform multiple mission roles (e.g., the F-4, F-111, A-12, etc.) with only limited success. Redeveloping an existing platform (e.g., the F-16) to conduct a different role has produced better results. Many ideas concerning responsive
launch within the ORS construct have their origins in Air University’s Spacecast 2020 study of 1994, which postulated a military space plane known as Black Horse that not only delivered satellites to orbit but also launched strike weapons.9 When the National Space Policy of 1996 gave NASA responsibility for developing reusable launch vehicles, the Air Force could only participate in NASA’s concept development; it also either monitored or became actively involved in that organization’s DC-X, X-33, X-34, X-37, Integrated System Test of an Air-Breathing Rocket, and other technology and launch-vehicle demonstrator projects.10
The boost phase of the HLVs can deliver weaponsMcKinney 6 – Northrop Grumman Integrated Systems(Brooks, April 4, “Photo Release -- Northrop Grumman Proposes Space Missions to Go ... in 48 Hours or Less”, http://www.irconnect.com/noc/press/pages/news_releases.mhtml?d=96718) RAThe U.S. Air Force would be able to launch satellites or deliver special purpose payloads in as little as 48 hours using a new, rapid-turnaround launch system proposed by Northrop Grumman Corporation (NYSE:NOC). The new concept, called a Hybrid Launch Vehicle (HLV), would also reduce launch costs by approximately two-thirds compared to the cost of using a medium evolved expendable launch vehicle. Photos accompanying this release are available at: http://media.primezone.com/noc/ "The HLV concept offers the Defense Department a relatively simple, affordable way to put standardized, tactical satellites into orbit quickly after receiving a request for support," explains Dennis Poulos, Northrop Grumman's HLV project manager. The HLV derives its name and operational benefits from the fact that it combines a reusable, airplane-like first stage with expendable upper stages. Launched vertically, the vehicle's winged first stage boosts the upper stages to speeds approaching seven times the speed of sound (Mach 7) before releasing them at an altitude of approximately 150,000 feet. The upper stages then boost the satellite payload to orbit or deliver a conventional weapon to a distant target. Meanwhile, the first stage flies back and lands at its home base like an autonomous, unmanned aircraft. The first stage of the HLV will use a rocket engine during the boost portion of its mission, and an integrated set of air-breathing jet engines for its return flight.
A2 Pew Research Center Their Pew evidence is too generic, doesn’t specify what being a leader in space exploration means. Space Politics 7-6 (Space Politics, July 6, 2011, “Americans want to be leaders in space exploration. But what does that mean?”, http://www.spacepolitics.com/2011/07/06/americans-want-to-be-leaders-in-space-exploration-but-what-does-that-mean/)The Pew Research Center released poll results yesterday that concluded that Americans wants the US to remain leaders in space exploration. Fifty-eight percent of those polled said they agreed it was “essential” that the US “continue to be a world leader in space exploration”. Slightly higher positive responses came from people with family incomes in excess of $75,000, and somewhat more Republicans said yes than Democrats or independents; there was little differentiation based on education.
This is the first time that Pew has asked this question, so there are no comparable previous poll results. (Pew asked in the same poll if the shuttle program had been a good investment for the country, and 55% said yes; that sounds good until you see that in previous polls in the 1980s that number had been as high as 73%.) However, one problem with the question is that the poll doesn’t define what it means for the US to be a “world leader” in space exploration. Does it mean having any kind of human spaceflight program? One that is oriented to going to the Moon? to Mars? to a near Earth asteroid? One that relies exclusively on its own government-owned and -operated crewed spacecraft, or one that purchases flights to at least low Earth orbit? Or, perhaps, one that places a much greater emphasis on robotic planetary exploration over human spaceflight altogether? Different people can have very different reasons for answering yes. Perhaps more telling, though, is that no matter how you define leadership in space exploration, nearly two in five Americans polled don’t think it’s essential.
***Solvency
Squo Solves Status quo solves—Space X is building heavy lift now. Klotz 4/5 (Irene Klotz, April 5, 2011, Reuters, “SpaceX to build heavy-lift, low-cost rocket”, http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/04/05/us-space-business-rocket-idUSTRE73468B20110405)
(Reuters) - Space Exploration Technologies is building a rocket with twice the lift capacity of NASA's space shuttle that will also cut launch costs , the company's chief executive said on Tuesday.The new booster, called Falcon Heavy, is based on the company's Falcon 9 rocket, which has made two successful flights and which NASA has purchased to fly cargo to the International Space Station after the shuttle program ends this summer.A test flight of Falcon Heavy is planned for 2013 from Vandenberg Air Force Base in California, Elon Musk told reporters in a news conference broadcast over the Internet.Falcon Heavy can put about 117,000 pounds (53,071 kg) into orbit, twice the shuttle's 50,000-pound (22,680-kg) lift capability.Flights also would take place from the company's launch complex at Cape Canaveral Air Force Station in Florida, and possibly from nearby Kennedy Space Center, which is soliciting proposals from companies and agencies interested in taking over the space shuttle's launch pads.The shuttle program is ending after two more flights because of high costs and to free up funds to develop rockets that can travel beyond the space station's 220-mile (354-km) high orbit.With a price tag of about $100 million per launch, Falcon Heavy is about half the price of existing heavy-lift U.S. rockets built by Boeing Co and Lockheed Martin Corp."I think we can realistically start to contemplate missions like a Mars sample return, which requires a tremendous amount of lift capability because you have to send a lander to Mars that still has enough propellant to return to Earth," Musk said. "If you try to do a mission like that with a smaller vehicle, you have to have several launches and either do orbital rendezvous or do some sort of much more complex mission."Currently, it costs about $10,000 per pound to reach orbit. Falcon Heavy would cut that price to about $1,000 per pound, Musk said."We're very, very confident of being able to maintain those prices," said Musk, co-founder of PayPal and chairman and chief executive of electric car maker Tesla Motors.Falcon Heavy, like Falcon 9, has been designed to meet NASA's requirements for human space vehicles, Musk said.He said the company, based in Hawthorne, California, was ramping up for mass production of its proprietary Merlin engine, which powers the Falcon rocket family.
Ares I Bad Ares I will exceed the budget and further the “heavy-lift gap”. Ellegood 09-Space Policy Analyst at Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University (Edward Ellegood, October 5, 2009, “Is Ares 1 too little, too late?”, The Space Review, http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1481/1, DMintz)
Is NASA’s much-maligned Ares 1 rocket program getting a bad rap? Many at the agency think so. I tend to agree with NASA engineers who say problems like thrust oscillation and liftoff drift are being blown out of proportion. I also agree with former NASA chief Mike Griffin’s comments that problems with Ares 1 are being encountered precisely because there is actual work being done on the vehicle. (He suggested that design problems are par-for-the-course with rocket development programs, while “paper rockets” will always be problem-free.) Oddly enough, by criticizing Ares 1’s technical problems, its detractors may actually be boosting its credibility in Washington.Originally envisioned as a simple and low-cost reuse of Space Shuttle hardware, Ares 1 has become increasingly complex and expensive while its scheduled availability slides farther and farther to the right. Adding to Ares 1’s complexity and cost are challenges with the upper-stage “common bulkhead” and the J-2X engine, which have been cited by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) in a recent report as adding significant risk to the program. Efforts to mitigate these and other risk factors have contributed to the Aerospace Corporation’s finding that we shouldn’t expect an operational Ares 1 until 2017, five years beyond the 2012 target originally put forward by NASA in 2005.As Dr. Griffin might point out, big aerospace programs are no strangers to cost overruns, technical problems, and schedule delays. It seems to me, however, that the problems with Ares 1 are more fundamental. According to the GAO report released on September 25, the development costs for Ares 1 and its Orion crew capsule are likely to reach $49 billion, nearly double the $28 billion originally proposed. That’s billion with a “B” for a limited-mission rocket whose lift capacity is similar to already-developed Atlas and Delta rockets—vehicles that could be human-rated and ready sooner than Ares 1 and at a lower cost, according to the Aerospace Corporation study.While Dr. Griffin and others may be able to argue that Ares 1 costs are on track, and provide reasons against relying solely on commercial rockets for crew flights, it is harder to deny that Ares 1 is becoming a too-little/too-late solution as scenarios for Constellation and the International Space Station (ISS) evolve. The Augustine committee’s eight human space exploration options, as presented in their Summary Report to the White House, bear this out.Specifically, Ares 1 and the International Space Station (ISS) do not operationally or fiscally coexist in any of the options presented in the Summary Report, rendering the vehicle useless for ISS crew carriage. In other words, the Augustine Panel believes NASA can fund Ares 1 or the ISS, but not both.Furthermore, with its limited performance, the operational Ares 1 would be all dressed up with nowhere to go, waiting several more years for a heavy-lift partner to enable exploration missions beyond low Earth orbit. This “heavy-lift gap” is my biggest problem with Ares 1. The Augustine committee correctly asserts that a heavy-lift rocket is required for any meaningful exploration program, whether to the Moon, Mars, or other destinations. However, by sticking with Ares 1, NASA would actually prolong that gap until the mid- to late-2020s.So, although I too am concerned about changing rockets mid-flight, I believe Ares 1 has become a solution in search of a problem and a symbol of the government’s role as a gatekeeper for space. Unless the Augustine committee’s conclusions change significantly in their final report, it seems NASA should focus its efforts on developing a heavy-lift vehicle and give the private sector more responsibility for servicing the ISS.
Long Term Consequences to Heavy Launch Using heavy launch will have multi-decade consequences. Logsdon 7-6- professor emeritus at the Space Policy Institute and George Washington University, (John M. Logsdon, July 6, 2011, “Was the Space Shuttle a Mistake?”, Technology Review, http://mobile.technologyreview.com/computing/37981/, DMintz)
Today we are in danger of repeating that mistake, given Congressional and industry pressure to move rapidly to the development of a heavy lift launch vehicle without a clear sense of how that vehicle will be used. Important factors in the decision to move forward with the shuttle were the desire to preserve Apollo-era NASA and contractor jobs, and the political impact of program approval on the 1972 presidential election. Similar pressures are influential today. If we learn anything from the space shuttle experience, it should be that making choices with multidecade consequences on such short-term considerations is poor public policy.
No Military Use for Heavy LaunchThe military has no use for heavy liftFoust, 4 – editor and publisher of The Space Review (5/17/04, Jeff, The Space Review, “The myth of heavy lift,” http://www.thespacereview.com/article/146/1)RK
The costs of heavy-lift vehicle development would be less of an issue if there were other uses—and other paying customers—for such a vehicle. Outside the exploration program, though, there is unlikely to be much interest for any vehicle much larger than those available today, even at fairly modest launch costs. The US military’s plans for space for the foreseeable future assume nothing larger than a heavy EELV will be available; indeed, the Defense Department has turned its attention more recently to smaller, potentially more responsive vehicles. Even if a new heavy-lift vehicle was available, it’s unclear what use the military would have for it other than possibly some missile defense applications that have yet to be fleshed out.
Heavy Launch Unnecessary for Commercial SectorThe commercial sector doesn’t need heavy liftFoust, 4 – editor and publisher of The Space Review (5/17/04, Jeff, The Space Review, “The myth of heavy lift,” http://www.thespacereview.com/article/146/1)RK
The costs of heavy-lift vehicle development would be less of an issue if there were other uses—and other paying customers—for such a vehicle. Outside the exploration program, though, there is unlikely to be much interest for any vehicle much larger than those available today, even at fairly modest launch costs. The US military’s plans for space for the foreseeable future assume nothing larger than a heavy EELV will be available; indeed, the Defense Department has turned its attention more recently to smaller, potentially more responsive vehicles. Even if a new heavy-lift vehicle was available, it’s unclear what use the military would have for it other than possibly some missile defense applications that have yet to be fleshed out.On the commercial side, the largest customer is the satellite communications industry. While there has been a trend towards larger satellites, that trend has tailed off in recent years, given both overcapacity among existing satellites as well as a rash of problems with a new generation of large communications satellites. Even if that trend was to continue unabated, existing vehicles are large enough to accommodate these satellites for the foreseeable future. Other commercial applications, from remote sensing to emerging markets like space tourism, can get by mostly with smaller, possibly reusable vehicles.
Private Sector BetterRelying on private sector launch is superior to heavy lift – it’s cheaper and the private sector is well over capacity and increasing use lowers launch costsFoust, 4 – editor and publisher of The Space Review (5/17/04, Jeff, The Space Review, “The myth of heavy lift,” http://www.thespacereview.com/article/146/1)RK
Various alternativesIf a new heavy-lift launch vehicle is so unattractive, what are the alternatives? There are, in fact, several options NASA could explore to provide launch services for the exploration initiative that are, in the long run, more affordable and sustainable. Indeed, some or all of these options could be pursued to provide a long-term solution.One alternative is to take advantage of the existing overcapacity in the launch market today. Many of the new vehicles that have entered service in recent years were developed when companies and governments anticipated much higher launch rates than what has materialized, primarily because of a weak commercial market. This means that many vehicles are operating at a fraction of their launch and manufacturing capacity. This excess capacity could be utilized by the exploration program without the need to spend a dime on development.A good example is the Delta 4. When Boeing built its manufacturing facility in Alabama in the 1990s for the Delta 4, it was designed to produce as many as 40 “common booster cores” (CBCs) a year. Currently, though, the Delta 4 is used only by US government customers, primarily the Defense Department. For the foreseeable future, the Delta 4 might be called upon for, on average, perhaps two Delta 4 Heavy launches a year and four Delta 4 Medium/Medium-Plus launches. At three CBCs per Heavy launch and one CBC for each “single-stick” Medium vehicle, that amounts to only ten CBCs a year. That offers—theoretically, at least—an excess capacity of up to 30 CBCs a year, enough for ten Heavy launches. The same approach can be used for the Atlas vehicle.Given that international cooperation has been said to be a major aspect of the exploration program, creating international partnerships with Europe, Japan, and Russia would allow the use of excess capacity on the Ariane 5, H 2A, Proton, and Zenit launch vehicles, as well as Russia’s Angara booster under development. Higher launch rates of existing domestic and international vehicles could reduce per-launch costs by allowing operators to amortize costs over a larger number of launches. Moreover, the additional launches would reduce, if not eliminate, the need for government subsidies for these vehicles: the additional government-purchased launches for the exploration program would in effect become the subsidies, albeit for a more constructive purpose.
***Solvency
Can’t lower launch costsRockets are incapable of lowering launch costs – technological advancement occurs at a snail’s paceCoopersmith, 11 - Texas A&M University (Jonathan, “The cost of reaching orbit: Ground-based launch systems,” Space Policy 27 (2011) 77-80, Science Direct)
2. Why chemical rockets?Since Sputnik launched the Space Age on 4 October 1957, chemical rockets have propelled every payload into orbit, a monopoly that will continue for the foreseeable future. Rockets have two major problems: cost and reliability. Reaching orbit today costs about $20,000/ kg, a daunting barrier.2 While very reliable, rockets are not fully reliable even after fi ve decades of experience: the failure rate of rockets carrying communications satellites to geosynchronous orbit (GEO) in 1997 - 2006 was 8% . One consequence is insurance rates of 11-20%, two orders of magnitude greater than for a Boeing 747.3The high cost of reaching orbit means satellites are built to maximize yield per kilogram with the tradeoff of high costs to develop, assemble, and test them. The ISS cost $115,000 a kg and NEAR $181,000 in 2009 dollars, while the scores of Iridium satellites cost only $7300 a kg 4.If chemical rockets cost so much and are unreliable, why use them? The reality is that they work well enough and the entire infrastructure for space exploration and exploitation has developed around rockets. Nor is the technology static. Rockets and satellites have improved greatly in capability while the cost/kg has dropped. A 2010 Tauri Group study found that sending a kg to GEO dropped from $32,000 to $21,000 (in inflation-adjusted 2008 dollars) or by 34% from 1999 to 2008.5 New generations of rockets will lower costs, but not radically. The SpaceX Falcon 9 will cost some $5000 a kg to low-Earth orbit (LEO), almost twice the $2850 per kg expected in 2003 for its cancelled Falcon 5.6 Similarly, the 1997 Cassini cost $300,000 a kg in 1999 dollars compared with $480,000 for the 1975 Viking and $935,000 for the 1962 Mariner 4.7What rockets have not done and cannot do is radically reduce the cost of reaching orbit. Lack of effort is not the problem. Billions of dollars have been spent over the past decades in exploring rocket-based alternatives such as single-stage-to-orbit (SSTO), reusable launch vehicles (RLVs), and other unsuccessful lines of development.8 As Jim Maser, President of Pratt & Whitney Rocketdyne, stated in 2009, the technological base for reaching orbit in 2020 will be “ Much like it is today. And that is not much different from what we were doing 50 years ago.”9
Low Launch Costs key to Space Exploration/DevelopmentHigh launch costs block increased exploration or developmentCoopersmith, 11 - Texas A&M University (Jonathan, “The cost of reaching orbit: Ground-based launch systems,” Space Policy 27 (2011) 77-80, Science Direct)
1. IntroductionWhen I fly from North America to Europe, I pay $6-12/ kg of me. When a satellite is launched into space, the customer (or taxpayer) pays roughly $20,000/kg. That fi gure is the major challenge facing space fl ight: until the cost of reaching orbit drastically decreases, the large- scale exploration and exploitation of space will not occur. These high launch costs have restricted access to space to those governments, corporations and organizations which can afford millions of dollars to launch a satellite. As a result, half a century after Sputnik, the annual total of all satellite launches is only a few hundred tons, the equivalent of two 747 freighter fl ights .1 Ground-based alternatives to chemical rockets exist, such as beamed energy propulsion and space elevators. While promising, they are all technically immature and will not develop without a substantial government investment. Just as it pushed the development of rocket technology in the 1940s and 1950s, the US government should set a grand challenge to radically reduce the cost of reaching orbit to $200 a kg by 2020. Meeting this goal must be accompanied by resources and institutional support to move the Technology Readiness Levels (TRLs) of these technologies from the laboratory to commercial fruition.
Ground Based key to Lowering CostsGround based launch systems are the only feasible way of dramatically lowering launch costs – it requires a sustained commitment to moving those technologies out of the laboratoryCoopersmith, 11 - Texas A&M University (Jonathan, “The cost of reaching orbit: Ground-based launch systems,” Space Policy 27 (2011) 77-80, Science Direct)
3. Alternatives to chemical rocketsOnly non-rocket ground-based systems (GBS) can drastically reduce the cost of reaching orbit. GBS keep the engine and most of the fuel on the ground so the spacecraft is almost all payload, not propellant. As well as being more efficient, GBS are inherently safer than rockets because the capsules will not carry liquid fuels and their complex equipment, eliminating the danger of an explosion. A large GBS system could launch thousands of tons a year, an order of magnitude more than current launchers. Unlike a rocket launch pad, ground systems would launch hundreds of payloads annually, payloads weighing tens or hundreds of kilograms instead of tons. Most importantly, the cost/kg should drop by two orders of magnitude to $200.10Like any technology in its formative phase, a range of possibilities exists, including beamed energy propulsion (BEP), space elevators, light gas guns, and magnetic levitation. The good news is that concepts for these ground-based systems exist; the bad news is that these concepts remain in the laboratory.In BEP a microwave or laser beam from the ground station strikes the bottom of the capsule. The resultant heat compresses and explodes the air or solid fuel there, providing lift and guidance. The concept is more than theoretical. In October 2000 a 10-kW laser boosted a 50-g lightcraft over 70 m at White Sands Missile Range in New Mexico, proving the underlying feasibility of the concept.11 Researchers at the University of Tokyo demonstrated the feasibility of microwave transmission in 2010.12Space elevators employ a thin tether attached to a satellite serving as a counterbalance thousands of kms above the Earth. A platform would crawl up the elevator. Generating more publicity than BEP, this concept depends on advances in materials strong and light enough to serve as the tether. Magnetic levitation and magnetic propulsion systems would provide a high initial velocity for capsules which would then propel themselves into orbit.13 The idea of employing a gigantic gun to launch space capsules received a very public unveiling from Jules Verne in his 1865 From the Earth to the Moon. Serious development occurred a century later with the American and Canadian governments funding the High Altitude Research Project (HARP) by Gerald Bull in the 1960s and the Super High Altitude Research Project (SHARP) at Lawrence Livermore Laboratory in the 1980s and 1990s.14If these systems are so promising, why have they not been developed? First, rockets have fulfilled existing demand adequately. Why invest in radically different technologies if the existing technology works sufficiently well? Second, although tests have demonstrated proof of concept, these technologies remain in the laboratory. On the nine-stage TRLs used by NASA and the US Air Force to plot how close to practical application a technology is, GBS technologies are at TRL 1e2, still in the early stages of proving their practicality and worth.15In 2003, LiftPortwas formed to produce a working space elevator by 2018. In 2006 that deadline was changed to 2031; 2035-45 may now be a more realistic guess. As Michael Laine, the founder of LiftPort, stated, “I really do believe that we haven’t even scratched the surface of all the potential problems out there. We just don’t know enough to ask the right questions yet, so it’s clear we couldn’t possibly have all the answers.”16All these areas have shown progress, as the papers at the six International Symposia on Beamed Energy Propulsion indicate. More concretely, in November 2009, NASA awarded LaserMotive $900,000 for meeting a space elevator challenge, and a startup, Quicklaunch, Inc., is trying to commercialize the SHARP-based gas gun.17Such progress, however, is limited by lack of sustained support and patrons. For GBS to rise up the TRL scale and move from the laboratory to a mature functioning system will require a sustained commitment of billions of dollars over many years. While launch costs will be low, the R&D, testing and infrastructure construction will demand significant resources. Let’s not delude ourselves, the public, or Congress. Turning GBS into a reality will be expensive. The issue is whether the benefits will be worth the costs.
Ground Based key to SSPDecreasing launch costs will stimulate the launch market for SSPCoopersmith, 11 - Texas A&M University (Jonathan, “The cost of reaching orbit: Ground-based launch systems,” Space Policy 27 (2011) 77-80, Science Direct)
4. Creating demand: if you build it, will they come?At the current level of payloads, developing GBS is not viable. GBS makes economic sense only if demand greatly increases, but demand will increase only if launch costs drop drastically. Where will new payloads come from? How can space cargoes expand from the hundreds to thousands of tons annually to justify developing a new system? The number of satellites providing existing services like observation and communications will certainly increase. Providing propellents, water and other supplies may create a new market. Quicklaunch has based its business plan on launching propellent.18 Other markets will clearly emerge by themselves, attracted by the lowered cost of reaching orbit.Radically reduced cost creates radically new markets. The capability to launch thousands of tons inexpensively every year provides opportunities for applications previously considered impossible. Two potential markets with annual demand in the thousands of tons could prove the “killer app” that justifies developing GBS: space-based solar power generation and nuclear waste disposal in solar orbit.4.1. Space-based solar powerSpace-based solar power (SBSP) promises GWof electric power with minimum environmental damage. While it was too ambitious when proposed in 1968, technological advances and growing concern about providing environmentally friendly electricity have renewed interest in collecting solar energy and transmitting it to Earth.19 A 2007 study by the National Space Security Office (NSSO) of the Department of Defense stated building a 1-GW solar power station in geosynchronous orbit was technically feasible.20 The major economic challenge will be launching the 3000 metric tons of material and equipment to construct an SBSP station. The NSSO study concluded, “ the nation ’ s existing EELV [Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle]-based space logistics infrastructure could not handle the volume or reach the necessary cost ef fi ciencies to support a cost-effective SBSP system“.21 Only drastic reductions in launch costs will make SBSP economically feasible, as Table 1 indicates. For SBSP to become a reality, reducing the cost of reaching orbit is as important as the SBSP technology.
Ground Based key to Disposing Nuclear Waste Ground based launch systems are vital to disposing nuclear waste in the SunCoopersmith, 11 - Texas A&M University (Jonathan, “The cost of reaching orbit: Ground-based launch systems,” Space Policy 27 (2011) 77-80, Science Direct)
4.2. Nuclear waste disposalSafely disposing of its waste continues to challenge the nuclear energy industry. The USA alone has produced 45,000 tons and 380,000 cu m of high-level spent fuel and waste, an amount expected to rise to over 77,000 tons by 2020. The Department of Energy’s (DoE) Yucca Mountain disposal site in Nevada will cost more than $96 billion over the next three decades, assuming it proceeds.22 The Nuclear Waste Management Organization of Japan (NUMO) estimates that disposing of 40,000 canisters of nuclear waste will cost three trillion yen ($36 billion), although it will not select an underground disposal site until 2028.23GBS could make disposing of nuclear waste in space feasible. Proposals for disposing of radioactive waste in space are slightly younger than proposals for SBSP.24 The concept is simple: a GBS system would launch capsules either directly to their destination (solar orbit or into the Sun) or into LEO. A solar sail or electric engine would then propel the capsule to its destination. Historically garbage has been buried or recycled. The idea of launching garbage up into space instead of placing it down seems counterintuitive. From an aerospace perspective, space is for satellites, not garbage. Neither engineering community has an inherent constituency for nuclear waste disposal in space, but GBS could change that.The attraction of space-based disposal is not only that of permanently solving a problem which threatens the future of nuclear energy, but also access to funding. The tens of billions of dollars destined for underground disposal could fund GBS development and deployment. Although it has not been expressed in these terms, the US government will spend over $1200 to store a kg of waste underground. If the cost of reaching orbit is suf fi ciently low, space-based waste could prove more attractive economically as well as politically and technically than underground storage.
DOE R&D key to Ground BasedDOE R&D support is vital to ground based launch systemsCoopersmith, 11 - Texas A&M University (Jonathan, “The cost of reaching orbit: Ground-based launch systems,” Space Policy 27 (2011) 77-80, Science Direct)
5. The challengeAt this point in its evolution, GBS is only a promising technology. No private corporation could dedicate the billions of dollars for a return that will not occur for years. Developing GBS into a usable technology is an appropriate and necessary role of government. Such long-term state support is common in the history of technology. The Space Race of the 1960s was propelled by the large investments -- over $12 billion (over $90 billion in 2011 dollars) by 1957 – by the US military in rockets and other space technology during the 1940s and1950s.25 The development of the computer may offer a good analogy. Government funding, mostly from the military, intelligence community, and NASA, greatly accelerated research, development and diffusion of computers from the 1940s on. The federal government did this to conduct projects of national significance such as the census, social security, weapons research (especially nuclear explosions), cryptoanalysis, and space exploration. Not until the 1970s did the civilian market grow large enough to seize the technological initiative.26The Obama administration and Congress should declare a national challenge of providing access to space by 2020 at $200/ kg or less. The timeframe is challenging, but should be achievable via a methodical, low-cost marathon rather than an Apollo-style sprint.Because there are so many promising approaches whose technologies are still immature, the fi rst few years should fund a wide array of projects to determine the better candidates . The cost of these early years should be fairly small because this research will be primarily in the laboratory. Some GBS are scalable, so demonstration projects could launch small payloads. Quicklaunch has proposed an eight-year evolution of its SHARP-based gas gun system from launching 1-kg cubesats to lofting 450-kg packages of propellent for less than $600 million.27New technologies have the greatest chance of success when users are involved in their design and development. Even as GBS is developing, so too should potential customers be cultivated both to expand the launch market and to educate the GBS community. What, for example, is the minimum payload weight that SBPS builders consider useful? Is it 1000 kg? 100 kg? 10 kg? What are the constraints such as acceleration and vibration for payloads? GBS needs an agency to nurture it until ready for commercialization.As part of its restructuring, NASA has revived its NASA Innovative Advanced Concepts (NIAC) program (cancelled in 2007 to help fund the Vision for Space Exploration). The agency’s Space Technology Roadmaps (STR) Technology Area Breakdown Structure (TABS) only has “ground launch assist” as part of possible future launch propulsion systems, indicating a lack of deep institutional support for GBS.28The DoE may offer a more inviting home, especially if its new Advanced Research Projects Agency - Energy (ARPA-E) administers the research to move GBS up the TRL ladder. Because DOE has less invested institutionally in rockets, it may prove a stronger sponsor. Furthermore, many GBS technologies are electrical in nature, necessitating a different skill- and mind-set than that of NASA ’ s rocket engineers and scientists . Indeed, changing launch systems will demand changing existing ways of organization, funding, thinking and acting.While this paper has focused on the USA, the search for alternatives to rockets is not exclusively an American endeavor. The International Symposiums on Beamed Energy Propulsion (ISBEP) have attracted engineers and scientists from Japan, China, Russia, Brazil, Korea, and other countries. Because the level of investment is so low at this stage, international cooperation in exploring GBS alternatives may easily be accomplished. A bit of friendly national competition (“Look what the Americans are doing - we must do the same!”) might accelerate GBS development.6. ConclusionReducing the cost to reach orbit will have, as the 2007 NSSO report proclaimed, “ a transformational, even revolutionary effect on space access.”29 Yet a good idea is only the first of many necessary steps for a successful technology. To develop GBS ’ potential - and distinguish its fate from the many promising technologies that are never developed - will demand a dedicated effort. Just as government funding developed the technology to extend our fi rst tentative footsteps into space, so too can a dedicated government program provide the technology to truly enable the large-scale exploration and exploitation of space.As Walter Faulconer, the former chief scientist of the Applied Physics Laboratory, stated in 2010, reducing the cost of access to space “is to me one of the biggest game-changers out there.”30 By vastly extending the range of the possible, low-cost launches will make the second half-century of the Space Age even more exciting than the first half-century.
***Industrial Base Adv
AT: Aerospace This is not an advantage. The World’s Forum For Aerospace Leadership 7-8 (The World’s Forum For Aerospace Leadership, July 8, 2011“AIAA PUBLIC POLICY COMMITTEE STATEMENT ON LAST LAUNCH OF SPACE SHUTTLE ATLANTIS”, http://intranet.aiaa.org/industryresources/PDF/AIAA_PPC_Statement_on_Final_Launch_of_Shuttle_Program.pdf, DMintz)
The launch of space shuttle Atlantis on 8 July closes an important epoch in American science, but does not signal the end of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration [NASA]. Nor, does the launch of Atlantis signal the end of American leadership in aerospace. Today, the United States is better positioned to continue leading the world in space exploration, understanding our planet’s environment, and making discoveries which benefit all of humankind. Just as in aviation, where in one hundred years we have seen the creation of hundreds of thousands jobs in small and large businesses across America selling products globally, in the next fifty years we will see the same in the field of space exploration. America remains the most capable nation serving humanity and spearheading discovery through aerospace science and technology. The launch of Atlantis is an opportunity to reflect on our achievements in aerospace and to welcome a bright future, destined to benefit from a continuation of America’s contributions driven by advances in aerospace science and engineering. The launch of space shuttle Atlantis neither erodes nor imperils America’s leadership in discovery in space. Our capacity to expand human knowledge of space, including looking back to the beginning of time, remains strong. For example, America’s outward focused eyes in the form of the Hubble Space Telescope [HST] and the Stratospheric Observatory for Infrared Astronomy [SOFIA] continue to lead the world in discovery in space. The ideas, creativity, and technology that produced HST and SOFIA have not disappeared with the last shuttle flight. It is the ideas, creativity, and technology in the capable hands of the aerospace workforce that constitute the engine of America’s strength and leadership in space discovery. That engine is strong and is growing stronger. Our follow-on to Hubble, the James Webb Space Telescope [JWST], will be the next great engine of discovery. HST, SOFIA, and JWST are useful eyes in the sky and remind us that international collaboration is a necessity for continued space discovery. Closer to Earth, NASA’s current and planned discovery activities related to neighboring planets, asteroids, and the moon continue to produce new knowledge that excites humankind. This NASA generated activity is robotic based and also builds a foundation for human involvement in space discovery beyond the moon. Any chance for humanity to fully understand Earth’s environment depends in large part on NASA’s Earth Observing System [EOS]. Through a series of polar-orbiting and low inclination satellites, EOS continuously provides new knowledge of Earth as an integrated system. This knowledge impacts our lives in various ways from food production to weather to effective management of natural resources. EOS will continue beyond the last Atlantis shuttle mission this week. Although EOS satellite launches were enabled by the space shuttle, retirement of the space shuttle fleet will not terminate EOS. NASA’s need for future EOS satellites may be launched on existing rockets. After Atlantis returns to earth, and the space shuttle era ends, NASA and industry research, will continue to provide safe air travel, strength in defense, expanded commerce, steady growth in manufacturing know-how, advances in materials, and high wages form high-skilled jobs. Right now, America’s aeronautics enterprise is stronger than it has been in decades. With vision and support provided by the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics [AIAA] and other professional societies, the federal government and industry generate exceptional returns [billions of US dollars] in international trade through the sale and maintenance of aircraft and aircraft engines. America continues to produce the highest quality and most efficient civil and military aircraft and rotorcraft in the world. All economic indicators point to future growth and leadership of America’s aeronautics enterprise. The US aeronautics workforce is rated number one in the world. Our aeronautics designers and manufacturers lead in aircraft advancement. We are well positioned to continue the production of true national wealth through aeronautics. More than the production of national wealth, our way of life and our form of government depend upon our leadership in aeronautics. The launch of Atlantis this week will not change this. The nation’s leading schools of aerospace engineering are currently experiencing unprecedented growth in student enrollment and increase in government and industry research funds. Outstanding faculty, useful facilitates, and a focus on quantum leap research problems covering the spectrum of aerospace science and technology characterize these leading US schools of aerospace science and engineering. The US is continuing to produce a aerospace workforce that is creative, innovative, well-educated, and prepared to maintain and to enhance America’s leadership in aerospace.
Over the last several decades since the Apollo program landed a human on the moon, NASA has produced more than the shuttle fleet. NASA has been the leader in the federal government in building a foundation that is alive and well, a foundation that enables American leadership in aerospace science and technology. The final Atlantis shuttle flight opens the door for continued growth in aerospace. We are just beginning our discovery in space and advances in aeronautics. America’s creativity, innovation, industry, and universities form a foundation that will propel us to higher level of achievement in aerospace. The post Atlantis world calls for more leadership, discovery, innovation, and creativity from NASA, not less.
Space shuttle ending won’t have a lasting effect on space leadership. Singla 7/8 (Vinita Singla, July 8, 2011, “NASA Takes a New Route in Space Leadership”, CNBC, http://www.cnbc.com/id/43470129/NASA_Takes_a_New_Route_in_Space_Leadership, DMintz)
The end of NASA’s space shuttle program will limit U.S. manned flight in the short term but is unlikely to threaten the country's long-term competitiveness in the space sector.Washington is actively promoting the privatization of lower orbital space flight as it redirects billions of dollars on next generation projects to explore deep, or outer, space, while counting on a continuation of international cooperation on big-budget, R&D projects as the International Space Station, or ISS."NASA feels strongly that it is time to do things differently and get out of owning and operating low-Earth orbit transportation and hand that off to the private sector," says NASA spokesperson Stephanie Schierholz. "As we move forward, we will continue the United States' leadership in space and derive all the benefits that flow from it. Tomorrow's space program is taking shape right now."President Obama is an outspoken booster of the space program and supports a 2011 NASA budget close to its 2010 level; he has challenged NASA to duplicate past glory and prowess by exploring deep space and reaching Mars by the 2030s.Current U.S. space spending, including the proposed $19 billion NASA budget, dwarfs that of other countries. At the same time, however, existing and potential rivals such as Russia, China, India and the U.K. are ratcheting up spending as America's budget flattens.That disparity is causing concern in some quarters, as is other countries' willingness to share technology and an over-reliance on the privatization strategy.For one, skeptics point out that it will be several years before the private sector has built a craft capable of taking U.S. astronauts to the ISS. In the meantime, the U.S. will pay for rides on Russia's Soyuz craft, as it has been doing since 2009."We will be buying seats on Soyuz and are temporarily out of competition. Down the line when new technologies and new spacecraft are approved and implemented we could conceivably jump ahead again," says Janet Stevens of the Space Foundation. “From a national pride perspective, it’s a blow."NASA's position on the space station transportation issue is simply that the U.S. needs to stop "outsourcing this work to foreign governments," says Schierholz.Contracts between NASA and private companies are already in place.SpaceX, for instance, is building a manned spacecraft called Dragon Capsule and has a $1.6 billion deal for 12 ISS missions, while Orbital Sciences [ORB 16.97 -0.34 (-1.96%) ]has a $1.9 billion contract for eight ISS flights. Other companies are also in the mix. Obama says the competition between corporations will drive safety standards, innovations and lower transportation costs.Again, critics disagree.
America will hold its space leadership—moon landing sealed it. Wu 7/8- a member of the Space and on the House Committee on Science, Space, and Technology (David Wu, July 8, 2011, “Pursuing the next giant leap in space exploration”, The Hill, http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/technology/170401-pursuing-the-next-giant-leap-in-space-exploration-, DMintz)
America’s founders were pioneers who risked everything to travel across unknown territories and oceans in pursuit of new frontiers. The generations of Americans who inherited this pioneering spirit embraced the idea that hard work and innovation make the impossible a reality: from establishing a lasting democracy out of a diverse people to landing a human being on the moon. Every day, thousands of visitors from across the globe walk the halls of the Smithsonian Air and Space Museum in Washington, DC to celebrate that very spirit. The museum not only provides young minds with a window into space exploration; it also inspires them to create broader vistas for themselves and for our nation.But our space heritage should not be condemned to surviving only in a museum. We must not only continue to educate and inspire future generations with the great space achievements of the past. We must set new national goals for future achievements in human space exploration.In 1960, Americans were worried about Russians winning the space race. The implications of Russian dominance were not limited to control of space, but included potentially devastating effects on our economic and military competitiveness. But then-President Kennedy challenged the nation to "achiev[e] the goal, before this decade is out, of landing a man on the moon and returning him safely to the Earth." In 1969, the world watched the first human, an American, take that now famous one small step into history. The moon landing not only sealed American leadership in space, but also unleashed a generation of mathematicians, scientists, and engineers who saw firsthand the results of American ingenuity and launched our nation into an era of unparalleled economic prosperity.In a time of growing debt, people question the value of taxpayer funded federal research. I passionately believe that federal investment in research and development grows our economy, creates jobs and shrinks the federal deficit. Economists say that between 65 and 90 percent of growth in U.S. per-capita income stems from innovation, defined broadly as new products, processes and business models. But we face increased international competition from countries that are investing more in science, technology and education than we are. If we are to once again have a stable economy, we must rededicate ourselves to the investments that make us strong: small business, education, and research and development. Research and development at NASA have resulted in an array of successful products and technologies that touch our daily lives, including heart rate monitors, wireless headsets, and water purification systems. In short, NASA's space program has helped our country become an economic powerhouse. Governments have an important and appropriate role to play in growing our science and technology capabilities and fostering innovation in our economy. The end of NASA’s shuttle program should not mean the end of our national commitment to exploration, innovation, research and education. While the program has not been without its shortfalls, the privatization of human space flight is simply too risky for an enterprise of national significance. There is certainly a place for the private sector in space flight. Where a market exists or can be created, such as carrying cargo or launching satellites, the private sector can and should predominate. But by privatizing all of current human space flight, we are jeopardizing our nation's leadership in space exploration and we are jeopardizing our children's future. Few people realize that the innovations that brought us vehicles capable of launching into space and returning safely were breakthroughs on par with the microchip: breakthroughs that are not likely to be equaled for a long time. Despite human sacrifices and budget pitfalls, the shuttle program established the United States as the leader in space exploration. It encouraged us to reach for the stars in both our dreams and our actions. It drove innovation and it challenged us to find creative solutions to technological challenges. As we move to the next chapter, it is imperative that we maintain a national role in space exploration. Our children deserve to live in a nation with a vision of the future that matches the dreams of our forbears: a vision that sees a solution to every problem, even if it lies beyond the stars.
This is only a transition; Bolden confirms space leadership is still ours. Sulkowicz 7/11-NYU Professor (Kerry Sulkowicz, July 11, 2011, “Saying good bye to the last space shuttle”, Washington Post, http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/saying-good-bye-to-the-last-space-shuttle/2011/07/11/gIQAzH7E9H_story.html, DMintz)
In a speech delivered to the National Press Club on July 1, Bolden did what a good leader should do under such circumstances: He made an emotional connection to his people, was honest about the facts, acknowledged the loss they’ve just experienced while putting it into larger context, and painted a vision that realistically yet reassuringly connects the past with the future.Bolden, himself a retired Marine Corps major general and a four-time shuttle flight veteran, has instant credibility with NASA's employees. And in his speech to the National Press Club, he drew on his own career to establish that emotional connection. “I spent 14 years at NASA before leaving and then returning to head the agency. Some of the people I respect most in the world are my fellow astronauts. Some of my best friends died flying on the shuttle. I'm not about to let human spaceflight go away on my watch. I'm not going to let it flounder because we pursued a path that we couldn't sustain.”Early in his remarks, he addressed head-on the concern that last week’s final shuttle flight marks the end of America’s dominance of spaceflight. Naysayers, he said, “must be living on another planet.” While he didn’t dwell on the sense of loss that some NASA employees must be feeling, he did add, “We are not ending human space flight, we are recommitting ourselves to it and taking the necessary – and difficult – steps today to ensure America’s pre-eminence in human space exploration for years to come.”
***Leadership Adv
China won’t cooperateChina is rapidly expanding into space now and is posed to rival the US in space capabilities – it rejects all cooperationDinerman, 7/7/11, Space Journalist and Senior Editor at the Hudson Institute, [“China's Continuing Drive For Space Power”, http://www.hudson-ny.org/2242/china-space-power, liam]Sometime between now and the end of this year, China plans to launch the first module of its new space station, confirming that China is determined to become a full-fledged, independent, comprehensive, world class power in outer space. China's methodical strategy of pursing mutually-supporting civil, commercial and military space activities is beginning to pay off. Space launch rockets can lift both civilian and military satellites; sensor technology can be adapted for both science and spying; communications systems are equally able to transmit orders to go to war or orders for children's toys. China's civil space projects include not only the space station and the manned Shenzhou capsules that will carry its Taikonauts to it and back, but also deep space probes such as the Chang'e 2 probe, which has now been dispatched from lunar orbit to a point almost a million miles from Earth. Its commercial activities until now have been limited to communications satellites and occasionally selling low-cost space launch services. US ITAR (International Trade in Armaments Regulations) technology export rules have, effectively prevented China from becoming a major player in the commercial space field. This has occurred in spite of efforts by some European aerospace firms to circumvent US restrictions by building so-called "ITAR Free" satellites. China's new comprehensive military space activities include intelligence gathering and early warning satellites, military communications satellites, a new space based navigation system similar to America's GPS. Last but not least, they have developed and tested a kinetic anti-satellite weapon that they used to blow up one of their old weather satellites in January 2007. Although in 1971, the devastating effects of Mao's Cultural Revolution were still all too evident, over the last 40 years China has changed out of all recognition. The country was impoverished, and its principal export a form of violent revolutionary ideology absorbed principally by gullible Western students, hippies and Intellectuals. In the late 1970s, China began slowly to dump most of Mao's ideology, and substitute Deng Xiaoping's concept: "To get rich is glorious." Today China exports, among other things; computers, solar panels, car parts, toys and a comprehensive array of semi-sophisticated weapons. It is the second-largest economy in the world, and has just overtaken the US as the world's largest energy user. There is, however, one policy from the Mao era that has not changed: China insists on maximizing its strategic independence. In his new book, "On China," Henry Kissinger explains that "The Chinese almost obsessive self-reliance was not always fully understood on the American side." This explains, in part, why US efforts to engage China in a mutually cooperative space exploration relationship, has been so frustrating and has lead nowhere. * * * Many Americans imagined that China would be eager to join the International Space Station partnership, along with Russia, Japan and Europe. Leaders at NASA and elsewhere imagined that China would see its role in the ISS partnership as a way of certifying its status as one of the world's primary spacefaring nations. Instead, China has chosen to build its own space program, on its own schedule. If China is using its space programs to bolster the political legitimacy of the ruling party, then it is certainly not the first, or the last, government to do so. What is more important than any propaganda dividend is the way China's overall technological level is enhanced by its successes in space. Space operations and exploration are inherently difficult: spacecraft must be able to operate with lack of atmosphere, lack of gravity, boiling heat, freezing cold and deadly radiation, and still perform their missions. Any nation that can master this can automatically master other strategically significant technologies – for instance, robotics, unmanned aircraft, communications and missile guidance, sensors. This ability, in turn, teaches China's aerospace engineers to do perhaps the hardest thing of all - to build software that can make a complex system work reliably under adverse circumstances. China's pursuit of what US space expert Dean Cheng of the Heritage Foundation calls "indigenous innovation" makes perfect sense from Beijing's point of view. The question for America is: Will we cling to our illusions about cooperation, or will we concentrate our efforts on building up our own native space power?
PLA control of China’s space program blocks cooperationMann, 7/10/11 [Simon, Sydney Morning Herald “Up, Up, And Away” http://www.smh.com.au/technology/sci-tech/up-up-and-away-20110709-1h7ze.html, liam]
''Many of us, including the President, including myself, including [NASA Administrator Charles] Bolden, believe that it's not too soon to have preliminary conversations about what involving China in that sort of co-operation might entail,'' Holdren told the committee. ''If China is going to be, by 2030, the biggest economy in the world … it could certainly be to our benefit to share the costs of such an expensive venture with them and with others.'' But the Republican-dominated committee, which characterised Beijing as a ''fundamentally evil'' regime, warned that any collaboration would violate US law. ''What concerns me most about the Chinese space program is that, unlike the US, it is being led by the People's Liberation Army,'' responded Virginia Republican Frank Wolf. ''There is no reason to believe that the PLA's space program will be any more benign than the PLA's recent military posture.'' Though well behind the US, Beijing is pushing an aggressive program to put an unmanned craft on the moon by 2013 and humans by 2020. It also aims to have its own space station orbiting Earth by as early as 2020. More immediately, China is launching a global navigational system for the Asia-Pacific region as a forerunner to delivering the satellite service globally in a direct challenge to America's global positioning system, technologies as vital for waging war as much as they are for managing traffic. Though Beijing's vaulting ambition rankles with some in Congress, Alanna Krolikowski, of George Washington University's Space Policy Institute, told the May hearing: ''As China invests in and derives greater benefit from space, it will acquire the same stake in creating a predictable, stable, safe and sustainable space environment that the US … and other countries already share.'' China's space ambitions ''are about prestige and about security and having a voice on the international stage'', says Ben Baseley-Walker, of the Secure World Foundation, which advocates for the peaceful development of space. He says the interest among many nations is opening myriad partnership possibilities. ''The US is no longer the one-stop shop if you want to get into space. There are other options, and I think that has shifted the power balance in how things are done. It's no longer the Americans and the Russians saying, 'This is the way it has to be'. It's more nuanced than that and it's very much in a state of flux.''
Space Activities Tradeoff Link Constellation trades off with all other space activitiesPeltona, 10 - Space & Advanced Communications Research Institute, George Washington University (May 2010, Joseph N., Space Policy, “A new space vision for NASA—And for space entrepreneurs too?” Vol. 26, Is. 2, ScienceDirect)RK
With much less invested in a questionable Project Constellation enterprise we can do much more in space astronomy. We can invest more wisely in space science to learn more about the Sun, the Earth and threats from Near Earth Objects. David Thompson, Chairman and CEO of Orbital Sciences said the following in a speech that endorsed the new commercial thrust of the NASA space policies on Nine February 2010:“Let us, the commercial space industry, develop the space taxis we need to get our Astronauts into orbit and to ferry those wanting to go into space to get to where they want to go. We are in danger of falling behind in many critical areas of space unless we shift our priorities” [10].With a change in priorities we can deploy far more spacecraft needed to address the problems of climate change via better Earth observation systems. We can fund competitions and challenges to spur space entrepreneurs to find cheaper and better ways to send people into space. We can also spur the development of solar power satellites to get clean energy from the sun with greater efficiency. We can deal more effectively with finding and coping with “killer” asteroids and near earth objects. We may even find truly new and visionary ways to get people into space with a minimum of pollution and promote the development of cleaner and faster hypersonic transport to cope with future transportation needs.
***Politics
HLLVs UnpopularHeavy lift undermines political support for subsequent exploration programsFoust, 4 – editor and publisher of The Space Review (5/17/04, Jeff, The Space Review, “The myth of heavy lift,” http://www.thespacereview.com/article/146/1)RK
One advantage that heavy-lift vehicles have is that they would make it easy, from an operational standpoint, to mount human missions to the Moon: a single mission could be carried out with one or two launches, just as the Apollo missions required a single Saturn 5 launch. This advantage, though, could ultimately become a disadvantage. Heavy-lift vehicles would require little in the way of in-space infrastructure to mount a mission: no space stations, propellant depots, or other facilities, just launch and go. Given that this would be supplied by an expensive heavy-lift vehicle with no other applications, it would be easy for a future Administration or Congress to terminate the program and leave virtually nothing left of government manned spaceflight. This is hardly the hallmark of a program that is supposed to be affordable and sustainable. Instead, it would simply be Apollo redux.
***Counterplans
Privatization Lack of market demand empirically kills the counterplan’s solvency – there is no conclusive evidence that demand would exist. Developing private human space flight will be massively expensive, and can’t generate investmentHomans, 10 – an editor of the Washington Monthly (May/June 2010, Charles, The Washington Monthly, “The Wealth of Constellations,” vol. 42, is. 5/6, ProQuest)RK
The biggest hurdle Musk and others have to clear, however, isn't technical. After all, aerospace companies have known how to build rockets for half a century - they just haven't found people to pay for them. Although its plans are still unsettled, NASA is unlikely to need more than a few flights a year to bring astronauts to the International Space Station, and a few more to bring cargo there. A single commercial launch company, however, needs more - possibly many more - launches than that each year to stay in the black. That means it will have to find other customers.What else could these rockets do besides fly stuff to the space station? The only option that really exists today is satellites. The market for launching them is worth somewhere in the neighborhood of $2.5 billion, but it's barely growing. "It's a very, very conservative market," Caceres says. "It's not one you can say is going to double or triple a few years from now." To grow demand, a start-up would have to offer something radically cheaper than what's available today - for instance, the price of launching a small satellite, Caceres says, would have to fall from the going rate of about $10 million to something on the order of $6 to $8 rnilhon- something no aspiring commercial provider can seriously promise.If the new providers can't offer the bargain-basement prices necessary to expand the satellite market, they'll be stuck trying to undercut the existing players - which isn't much easier. The market is dominated by foreign companies that are subsidized, in fact or in practice, by foreign governments. And because satellites are expensive and there are reliable operators available to send them heavenward, few of their owners are willing to stick with a newcomer through the steep learning curve of its early years - which invariably involve blowing up a lot of rockets - unless it's really cheap. (Three of the five Falcon ? rockets that SpaceX has launched to date have crashed into the ocean - including one that was carrying the ashes of James Doohan, the actor who played Scotty on Star Trek.) Sea Launch, a Boeing spinoff that succeeded briefly as a freestanding commercial enterprise, filed for bankruptcy protection last summer, after the cost of its rockets increased and one of them blew up on the launch pad. Customers fled en masse.Aside from satellites, the other option is the holy grail of the commercial spaceflight industry: flying people to space. But beyond the taxi trips to the space station, the pickings are pretty slim, and mostly theoretical. It's possible that other countries' astronauts would want to buy seats on flights to the space station, but NASA hasn't gauged the extent of the interest. Another option is space tourism. This notion has generated enthusiasm among entrepreneurs; a company called Bigelow Aerospace wants to launch its own inflatable space modules into orbit, which could function as zero-gravity laboratories or even space hotels. And there are mklings of a market here: Richard Branson's Virgin Galactic has done a brisk business selling tickets on future flights aboard the sleek, otherworldly space plane the company has in development.The problem, though, is that the experience Branson is offering tourists is far cheaper and simpler than the sort of thing that the companies hoping to contract with NASA will be doing with their rockets. Virgin Galactic s aircraft will travel sixty-some miles to the edge of the atmosphere and back, what's known as suborbital flight - it technically qualifies as space travel, but it's orders of magnitude less difficult and expensive than reaching orbit, a several-hundred-mile proposition requiring forty times the energy of Branson's day trips. Seats on a Virgin Galactic flight go for $200,000, sailing-around-the-world-on-ayacht money But a slot on a commercial flight to the space station would cost $20 million. In fact, you can already fly there at that price the way that Lori Garver intended to, with the Russian Federal Space Agency - space tour packages have been available for a decade, and so far there have been only eight takers.If other customers fail to materialize for the companies that NASA is betting on, the agency finds itself in an awkward spot. The whole point of paying for launch services, rather than
bankrolling contractors' ever-metastasizing costs for entire projects, is that it's supposed to be cheaper. But if a company can't find other work, it has to spread its costs out over fewer launches to make its budget - which means the individual launches become more expensive. And if NASA wants to send anything into orbit at all, it has to pay the new prices, whatever they are.That was how events played out for the Department of Defense fifteen years ago, when it embarked on a strategy similar to NASA's. The military was in the market for a new fleet of rockets to launch defense satellites, to replace its aging Titan IV. At the time, analysts were projecting a huge boom in the demand for commercial satellites, largely driven by an anticipated explosion in the satellite phone market. The Pentagon figured that if it awarded start-up grants to the most promising companies, it could hasten the arrival of a bona fide commercial launch business in the United States; once the rocket builders were up and running, they would have hordes of new customers from the satellite phone industry, and the military could buy their services on a per-launch basis at a reasonable price. Lockheed Martin and McDonnell Douglas (which was acquired by Boeing shortly thereafter) won the contract, and were handed $2.5 billion over the first three years of the project to get the job done.Over the following years, however, cellular phone companies, the satellite phone providers' rivals in the mobile phone market, began extending the reach of their signals with cheap and easy-to-build repeating towers. The market for cell phones began to grow exponentially, while the one for the far pricier satellite phones all but vanished - along with the demand for satellites. By the time Boeing and Lockheed Martin had actual rockets ready for testing, no one required their services but the military. "The lesson that we learned is that there's market risk, technical risk, and operational risk," says Michael Gass, the president and chief executive officer of United Launch Alliance, the BoeingLockheed Martin joint venture that completed the contract. "The companies are good at the technical and operational risks. The market side is something that might be too hard to forecast."Because the Pentagon needed the rockets, it had no choice but to cover the rocket builders' expenses, which soon grew enormous. The projected cost of a launch jumped 77 percent from 2002 to 2003 alone, and another 29 percent the following year - an increase so great that Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld had to formally vouch for the program's necessity to national defense just to make it kosher with defense contracting laws. In 2005 the Defense Department called a spade a spade and quietly redrew the program as the standard cost-plus contracting arrangement that in practice it had already become, and later changed its status to make it subject to fewer budgetary oversight requirements. As of late 2008 the Government Accountability Office calculated its total price tag to date at $8.2 billion - and the rockets were still in the test-launching stage. Even without considering the cost of program development, the price per launch, originally budgeted at a little under $73 million, had grown to $170 million.If there's a lesson to be drawn from this saga it's that the difference between a government contractor and a commercial company whose only customer is the government is academic at best. And in fact, the Pentagon's experience is already repeating itself at NASA, which in 2006 began a similarly structured $500 million program to commission rockets that could deliver cargo to the space station. SpaceX, the contract recipient that is furthest along in development, was supposed to have tested three Falcon 9 rockets by last September; as of this writing, it was about to test its first. NASA, meanwhile, is asking for an extra $312 rnillion for the companies in its fiscal year 2011 budget to speed things along. And in spite of the risk the agency faces if its launch companies can't find other customers, the agency hasn't commissioned any studies of the potential market for their services - instead, it's relied on the predictions of the companies themselves.Rocket makers also face a whole new challenge if they want to go from launching satellites and cargo to launching people: namely, not killing them. NASA has said that whatever the next vehicle it entrusts with astronauts' lives is, it should have less than a one in a thousand chance of a fatal accident (the odds on a round-trip space shuttle mission are about one in eighty-five). Commercial providers claim that they can do this without intrusive or expensive NASA oversight. But the fact is that for decades NASA has been experimenting with letting contractors monitor themselves, and the results haven't been good.
The reason for this is that while most rocket-building expertise resides in the private sector - 12,000 companies were involved in Apollo 11 alone - most of the institutional knowledge of how to pull off a manned spaceflight safely remains inside NASA. The less the two overlap, the more crucial information falls through the cracks. Both the Challenger and Columbia disasters were the result of seemingly minor technical problems whose significance wasn't appreciated up the shuttle program's chain of command. In both cases investigators pinned the blame in part on communication failures between NASA and its contractors, and NASA's diminished oversight over them. Put simply, NASA knew too little about the spacecraft it was flying.The panel investigating the Challenger accident recommended "the total combination of NASA and contractor organizations, working more effectively on a coordinated basis at all levels" in order to avoid repeating the tragedy. At first NASA heeded the investigators' advice, but the inquiry into the subsequent Columbia disaster found that once budget pressures reasserted themselves, the shuttle program had gone back to cutting corners. "The change was cost-efficient," the Columbia investigators wrote, "but personnel cuts reduced oversight of contractors at the same time that the agency's dependence upon contractor engineering judgment increased." Miscommunication between an oversight-deprived NASA and its contractors has also been blamed for less tragic, more farcical failures. Ln 1999, the agency lost a $125 million unmanned Mars probe somewhere in the Red Planet's atmosphere due to a navigational failure. The problem, it turned out, was that the contractor, Lockheed Martin, had given NASA all of its data on the program in Imperial units. The space agency used the metric system.Safely overseeing the development of a commercial venture's human-ready vehicle is possible, of course, but it costs money. How much, exactly, is the multibillion-dollar question. Would-be taxi providers have thrown out numbers, ranging from a highly unlikely low end of $300 million to an only slightly less unlikely high end of $1.5 billion. But the truth is that no one really knows - NASA hasn't figured out yet what its requirements will be. The agency has spoken of doing less oversight and more "insight" - that is, working with the commercial ventures to come up with a safety code and trusting them to follow it. But it's not hard to see the huge problem that this sets up: would you trust a company whose business is entirely dependent on fixed-price government contracts not to cut corners when nobody's looking?There's also the question of liability: if something does happen, who's on the hook? Recovering the remnants of Columbia and investigating its last flight cost $454 million - enough to sink a fledgling company, which would almost certainly have to put its operations on hold throughout a lengthy investigation. Similarly, a serious problem with the space station could obliterate a company's customer base for months or years. Would-be commercial providers say they wouldn't even get into the business unless the government provided an assurance of bailing them out in the event of a disaster.All in all, these are not terms that make investors salivate: initial capital in the high hundreds of millions, wildly unpredictable long-term costs, an unproven and possibly nonexistent market, the threat of gargantuan liabilities, and reliance on a single customer that is subject to the whims of Congress and the White House, and might not need the services for more than the next ten years - after all, there's no guarantee that the International Space Station will stay in orbit beyond 2020. Which may be why, for all of NASA's optimism, the people who are willing to sink money into commercial spaceflight are the same as they've always been: existing contractors assured of government backing, and idealistic billionaires. SpaceX, the only serious contender that aspires to be a true freestanding commercial venture, is supported almost entirely by NASA and Musk's own money - although the company is privately held, it lists just two outside investors (including a fund run by Musk's PayPal cofounders), and press reports have pegged their stake in the company at about $35 million, about a tenth of what NASA and Musk are collectively betting on the venture.
Competition generates the best safety practices – overregulation kills the private sectorCrews, 6/23/11 – Clyde Wayne, vice president for policy and director of technology studies at the Competitive Enterprise Institute (Competitive Enterprise Institute, “Catching Air Without
NASA: How Will We Regulate Commercial Space Flight?” http://cei.org/op-eds-articles/catching-air-without-nasa-how-will-we-regulate-commercial-space-flight?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+cei-issues-regulatory-reform+(CEI+Issue+Feeds+-+Regulatory+Reform))RK
Subsidies should be discouraged, though, as is overemphasis on business-government partnerships like that between Elon Musk’s SpaceX and NASA. Dependence on government will mean cronyism and stagnation, as well as potentially more pointless experiments in zero-gravity. Technologies need to advance in a logical supply-and-demand-driven order rather than the fits and starts of porkbarrel science.Commercial space’s real hurdle, if it can avoid entangling alliances with government, is dealing with inevitable dangers in a grown-up way by fostering the right risk-management institutions.Basically, industries that don’t exist yet aren’t over-regulated yet, and thus have the potential to create extraordinary wealth. We must lay the groundwork for the fundamental risk-management-market institutions that enhance safety better than tossing everything to regulators. Indeed, succumbing to or encouraging eager NASA or FAA intervention is not “regulation” at all, but undermines it.Over-regulation can easily cripple this industry while making it more risky. Political “regulation” can undermine actual regulation and governance — the as-yet-nonexistent market risk control institutions the industry most desperately needs — and hobble the commercial space industry for generations to come. So the industry will need to work with advocates of free enterprise to articulate an alternative model.Many values we want — privacy, safety, security, access, environmental amenities, cleanliness — are actually forms of wealth that must remain within the competitive rubric to advance. We need to create “safety wealth” in commercial space endeavors like low earth orbit, and foster the institutions like insurance and liability standards that escalate that value over time and allow for maximum innovation and wealth.Don’t call it “self-regulation” though; that term has no place in debate. It is a misnomer in free markets since business partners and suppliers, investors, insurance companies and Wall Street all regulate and discipline errant behavior if their role is not otherwise dampened by “regulation.”Regulators also likely will attempt to “help” the industry with waivers of liability (or conversely, undermine the ability to contract away liability like the waiver I had to sign to fly a powered parachute). Taking that path means the commercial space industry future shall be one of regulation of the kind that doesn’t actually regulate and discipline and that hampers progress, and leaves us with a few big players who capture the regulators. Thanks to the immunity granted by the Price Andersen Act, we have no way of knowing whether nuclear power is viable in a free market, and one cannot envision that industry’s emergence from hyper-regulation; let’s not do that to the space industryThe right kinds of “immunity” instead emerge from contracts between the informed passenger and the flight company, for example. New kinds of business insurance/liability products as well as safety engineering itself should emerge more aggressively if not given an out with careless immunity.A recent Washington Post story noted that the first colonists of Mars would likely agree to never return — that they’d remain as permanent settlers. This represents the extreme case, but we can handle it. Still, the legal institutions required to allow someone to contract to embark on such a trip and likely fatal endeavor seem not to exist and need to be bolstered. No one wants any injury whatsover, and we certainly will not tolerate what society used to withstand in the late 1890s when one lineman in two were killed on the job. But we can cope with and allow adventure and the right to explore new frontiers.So we have much work to do. One hopeful notion is that the industry will come to recognize it can manage risks by extension from the management of traditional aviation risks; there are insurance instruments (and future hybrids) available there. This represents an entirely new business opportunity and engine of wealth, rather than the problem some perceive it as. And
investors and firms will likely join together in pools to cover costs if insurance is initially prohibitive.Let’s try to remember that competition works to create wealth not just in the engineering innovations and products, but in the contractual, insurance, and liability instruments by which we govern the inevitable risks of of world-changing innovations.
Treaties Sadeh 08-Associate Director for the Center for Space and Defense Studies at the United States Air Force Academy, Research Associate with the Space Policy Institute at George Washington University (Eligar Sadeh, June 9, 2008, “Space policy questions and decisions facing a new administration”, The Space Review, http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1146/1, DMintz)
Policy ChoiceEstablish more effective international governance of the space environment by supporting voluntary approaches or by formal institutional means.
International governance of the space environment is based on voluntary approaches to avoid interference with space assets, to deal with orbital debris, and to share space situational awareness data. The President needs to support codification of these voluntary approaches. This entails a renewed commitment to adhere to the orbital debris guidelines published by the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space and by the Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee, and to continue to advance the Commercial and Foreign Entities program. Voluntary approaches do impose limitations on effective international governance of the space environment in that there is uncertainty on the expected behavior in space, such as no rules of the road, that make international governance of electronic encroachment of satellite data and space traffic management more difficult. This difficulty supports the view that space is contested and that the United States retain the right to deny others the use of space.Presidential support for formal institutional approaches to international governance of the space environment facilitates a number of positive developments. Internationally agreed upon rules of road allow for more effective governance since spacefaring states mutually agree on how to behave in the space environment and realize a consensus view on what is peaceful and what is not. This addresses the challenges of electronic encroachment and international space law that spacefaring states are not to interfere with the space asserts of others. Formal approaches to orbital debris and space traffic management alleviate how to govern these issues, and overcome the limitations that voluntary ways forward encounter. A formal political commitment to international governance brings with it political value, such as collective regimes for space security and United States Space leadership through soft power elements associated with spacepower and smart power. Concomitantly, there are operational constraints in what the United Sates can do in space with multilateral means to space governance.
