Open Society Foundations 224 West 57th Street New York ... · 8/26/2015 · free of arbitrary...

Copyright © 2015 Open Society Foundations.

This publication is available as a pdf on the Open Society Foundations website under a Creative Commons license that allows copying and distributing the publication, only in its entirety, as long as it is attributed to the Open Society Foundations and used for noncommercial educational or public policy purposes. Photographs may not be used separately from the publication.

ISBN: 9781940983509

Published by:

Open Society Foundations224 West 57th StreetNew York, New York 10019 USAwww.OpenSocietyFoundations.org

For more information contact:

Eric WitteSenior Project Manager, National Trials of Grave CrimesOpen Society Justice [email protected]

or

Ina ZoonProject Manager, Latin AmericaOpen Society Justice [email protected]

Design and layout by Ahlgrim Design GroupPrinting by GHP Media, Inc.

Cover photo © Alejandro Gonzalez/AP

1 BROKEN JUSTICE IN MEXICO’S GUERRERO STATETABLE OF CONTENTS

2 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

3 ABBREVIATIONSUSEDINTHISREPORT

5 METHODOLOGY

7 EXECUTIVESUMMARY

11 I. INTRODUCTION:GUERRERO’SHISTORYOFATROCITY

19 II. JUSTICETHROUGHTORTURE?

23 III. ASYSTEMWITHOUTACCOUNTABILITY

23 A.LackofIndependentInvestigations

27 B.LackofProsecutorialAutonomy

30 C.LackofDefenseRights

32 D.LackofJudicialIndependence

34 E.NeutralizingtheHumanRightsCommission

36 F.CongressionalFootdragging

40 IV. WEAKCAPACITYANDMISALLOCATEDRESOURCES

41 A.ProsecutorsandPolice

43 B.Judiciary

44 C.PublicCommunicationandOutreach

45 V. LEGALFRAMEWORK

48 VI. MANIPULATIONOFJURISDICTIONALAMBIGUITY

51 VII. POORSECURITYFORLEGALPROCEEDINGS

51 A.WitnessProtection

54 B.HumanRightsDefenders,Activists,andJournalists

57 C.ProsecutorsandJudges

58 D.Prisons

60 VIII. CONCLUSIONSANDRECOMMENDATIONS

62 A.StrengthenSystemicAccountability

65 B.StrengthentheLegalFramework

66 C.StrengthenSecurity

68 D.UrgentlyCreateIntegratedTeamstoInvestigateDisappearances

69 E.UrgentlyLocate,Exhume,andInvestigateClandestineandMassGraves

70 ENDNOTES

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

ThisreportisbytheOpenSocietyJusticeInitiative,inpartnership

withtheCenterforHumanRightsMiguelAgustínProJuárez(Centro

deDerechosHumanosMiguelAgustínProJuárez)andtheCenter

forHumanRightsoftheMountainTlachinollan(CentrodeDerechos

HumanosdelaMontañaTlachinollan).

EricA.Witte,SeniorProjectManagerforNationalTrialsof

GraveCrimesattheOpenSocietyJusticeInitiative,authoredthe

report.XimenaSuárezwasitsprincipalresearcher,andDavidBerry

itseditor.InaZoon,theOpenSocietyJusticeInitiative’sMexico

ProjectManager,oversawtheprojectandfacilitatedcoordination

withpartners.

MarioPatrón,AdrianaGarcía,andDeborahRuizVerduzco

contributedadditionalresearch.AdrianaGreaves,AdiAssouline,

andGlenisPerezattheCardozoLawHumanRightsandAtrocity

PreventionClinicprovidedlegalresearchunderthesupervisionof

JocelynGetgenKestenbaum.

Anumberofindividualsprovidedsubstantialcontributionstoand

commentsondraftsofthetext:SantiagoAguirre,MariaLuisaAguilar,

MaribelGonzálezandHipólitoLugo,aswellasJusticeInitiativestaff

JamesA.Goldston,RobertVarenik,ChristianDeVos,RachelNeild,

ErikaDailey,MarionIsobel,ZazaNamoradze,EmiMacLean,

MartinSchönteich,andJonathanBirchall.AbelBarrera,Cristina

Ardaga,NicomedesFuentesGarcía,EnriqueGonzálezRuizandPilar

Noriegaprovidedimportantinput.ClaudiaRománandEditTurcsan

Bainensuredthateverythingstayedontrack.

TheJusticeInitiativewishestothankalloftheindividualswho

providedinformationusedinthisreport,includingvictimsof

atrocitiesandtheirfamilymembers,governmentofficials,and

representativesofcivilsociety.

TheOpenSocietyJusticeInitiativebearssoleresponsibilityforany

errorsormisrepresentations.

3 BROKEN JUSTICE IN MEXICO’S GUERRERO STATEABBREVIATIONS

CAT

CECOP

CETEG

CIDAC

CIDE

CNDH

CODDEHUM

DF

DNA

ENVIPE

FIDH

INEGI

NGO

OMCT

UN

UNDOC

PGJE

PGR

PRD

UnitedNationsCommitteeAgainstTorture

CouncilofCommunitiesAgainstthelaPortaDam

StateCoordinatorforEducationWorkersofGuerrero

ResearchCenterforDevelopment

CenterfortheInvestigationandTeachingofEconomics

NationalHumanRightsCommission

CommissionfortheDefenseofHumanRightsoftheStateofGuerrero

FederalDistrict

deoxyribonucleicacid

NationalPollonVictimizationandPerceptionofInsecurity

InternationalFederationforHumanRights

NationalInstituteofStatisticsandGeography

Non-GovernmentalOrganization

WorldOrganizationAgainstTorture

UnitedNations

UnitedNationsOfficeonDrugsandCrime

GeneralProsecutor’sOfficeofJusticefortheStateofGuerrero,nowtheFiscalíaofGuerrero

FederalOfficeoftheGeneralProsecutor

PartyoftheDemocraticRevolution

CONTINUEDONNEXTPAGE

ABBREVIATIONSUSEDINTHISREPORT

PRI

RedTDT

RENPED

RTI

SEGOB

SEIDO

SETEC

TSJ

UPR

InstitutionalRevolutionaryParty

NationalNetworkofHumanRightsCivilSocietyOrganizations“Alltherightsforallpeople”

NationalRegistryofInformationonMissingorDisappearedPersons

Right-to-informationrequest

FederalMinistryoftheInterior

FederalSpecializedProsecutionOfficeagainstOrganizedCrime

TechnicalSecretariatforJusticeSectorReform

SupremeCourtofJusticeoftheStateofGuerrero

UniversalPeriodicReview

4 BROKEN JUSTICE IN MEXICO’S GUERRERO STATEABBREVIATIONS

ABBREVIATIONS(CONTINUED)

5 BROKEN JUSTICE IN MEXICO’S GUERRERO STATEMETHODOLOGY

METHODOLOGY

THEOPENSOCIETYJUSTICEINITIATIVE,throughitsinternationalandMexican

staff,hasbeenworkingwithlocalpartnersonjusticereforminMexicosince

2004.Focusareashaveincludedtherighttopersonalliberty,therighttobe

freeofarbitraryand/orexcessivepretrialdetention,therighttoinformation,and

therighttotruth.Ourworkhasbeenconductedthroughintensivecollaboration

withgovernmententitiesandcivilsociety.In2012,anewJusticeInitiativeproject

undertookresearchintoatrocities*committedinMexicosince2006,whenthe

federalgovernmentdeployedarmedforcestofightorganizedcrime.Theaim

hasbeentounderstandthescaleofatrocities,namelykillings,disappearances,

andtorture;theextenttowhichperpetratorshavebeenheldaccountable;and

thereasonswhytherehasbeensolittlejusticeforthevictimsofthesecrimes.

Inconductingthiswork,theJusticeInitiativehassoughttomeldlocalexpertise

withitsexperiencegainedthroughconductingprevious,similarstudiesinthe

DemocraticRepublicofCongo,Uganda,andKenya.

Inadditiontothefederallevel,theJusticeInitiativeselectedfivestatesfor

research:Coahuila,NuevoLeón,Oaxaca,Querétaro,andGuerrero.Thefive

representacross-sectionofMexicangeography,levelsofviolence,economic

development,andpoliticalpartycontrol.Guerrero,whichisthefocusofthe

presentreport,stoodoutamongthefiveasthestatewiththegreatestpolitical

andstructuralchallengestosecuringredressforatrocitiesandmassivehuman

rightsviolations.Theseproblems,includingoneofthehighestratesofkillings

inMexico,haverootsinsuchlongstandingfactorsasthemarginalizationof

rural,poor,andindigenouspeople,andnewerfactors,includingGuerrero’s

centralplaceintheproductionandtraffickingofnarcotics.Thedisappearance

of43studentsonSeptember26,2014underscoredthelegacyofviolencein

Guerrero,thestate’sfailuretocrediblyrespond,andconcernsaboutitsfuture

stability.ThishaspromptedtheJusticeInitiativeandpartnerorganizations

topublishthisstand-alonereportonthechallengesfacingGuerrero.A

forthcomingreportwillexploresimilarissuesatthefederallevel,andinclude

informationfromresearchintheotherfourstates.

Throughoutthisproject,theJusticeInitiativehasworkedinconcertwith

Mexicancivilsocietypartners.InGuerrerothesearetheCenterforHuman

*“Atrocities”arecommonlyunderstoodtomeancrimesofterriblecruelty,butarenotdefinedinMexicanorinternationallaw.Thisreportusestheterminitsplainmeaning,andspecificallyfocusesonthecrimesofkillings,torture,andenforceddisappearance(disappearancesperpetratedbystateactors,orwiththeirinvolvement,acquiescence,orattheircommand).

6 BROKEN JUSTICE IN MEXICO’S GUERRERO STATEMETHODOLOGY

RightsMiguelAgustínProJuárez(CentrodeDerechosHumanosMiguel

AgustínProJuárez,CentroProdh),anNGObasedintheFedralDistrictthat

hasdocumentedhigh-profilehumanrightscasesinGuerrero,andprovided

assistancetovictims,andtheCenterforHumanRightsoftheMountain

Tlachinollan(CentrodeDerechosHumanosdelaMontañaTlachinollan),an

NGOwithdeeprootsinthestatethatworksinoneofthemostimpoverished

regionsofGuerrero,wherehumanrightsviolationsarecommonplace.These

partnersprovidedstrategicadvice,researchleads,andspecificdata.Forthe

JusticeInitiative,researchinthestatehasbeenconducted,atdifferentstages,

bythreeMexicanattorneyswithexperienceinlitigationandhumanrights.

InFebruary2013,theJusticeInitiative’sexecutivedirectorundertookan

exploratoryvisittoMexico,whichoverlappedwithintensiveresearchby

aMexicanlawyerwhoconducted52in-depthinterviews.Intheseand

subsequentinterviews,interlocutorswereprovidedtheoptionofspeaking

withfullattribution,orprovidinginformationwithoutfulldisclosureoftheir

identities,insomecasesduetosecurityconcerns,andinothersbecausethey

wereofficialsconcernedaboutpotentialretribution.

AJUSTICEINITIATIVERESEARCHTEAM,composedofMexico-basedand

internationalstaffandconsultants,conductedafirstvisittoChilpancingo

inDecember2013forinitialassessmentsandinterviewswithstateofficials

andcivilsocietyrepresentatives.Withkeyissuesidentified,theteam

undertookasecondresearchtriptoGuerrerointheweekpriortothe

studentdisappearancesofSeptember2014.Meanwhile,theJusticeInitiative

conductedlegalanalyses,includingassessmentsofthesituationinGuerrero

measuredagainstinternationalstandards.Theteamalsofileddozensof

officialrequestsforinformationwithvariousentitiesofthefederalandstate

governments,inaccordancewithfederalandstateright-to-information

laws.Answerstotheserequests,filedfrom2013into2015,togetherwith

answerstoinformationrequestsfiledbyCentroProdhandTlachinollan,

formanimportantbasisforthisreport’sfindings.Othersourcesinclude

governmentdocuments,Mexicanandinternationalacademicstudiesand

civilsocietyreports,mediaarticles,andrecommendationsoftheGuerrero

StateCommissiononHumanRightsandtheNationalCommissionfor

HumanRights.InApril2015,staffoftheJusticeInitiative,CentroProdh,and

TlachinollanspentadayinChilpancingoreviewingadraftofthisreportand

formulatingitsrecommendationstogether.Thereportwasthenfinalizedon

thebasisofthisfeedback,extensiveinternalreview,andadditionalresearch.

7 BROKEN JUSTICE IN MEXICO’S GUERRERO STATEEXECUTIVE SUMMARY

EXECUTIVESUMMARY

FORPARENTS,SIBLINGS,ANDFRIENDS,thedisappearanceofeachof43

AyotzinapastudentsonSeptember26,2014causedunfathomablepainand

tremendoussuffering.ForthebroaderpopulaceofthestateofGuerrero,

thatday’sdisappearancescausedshock,pain,andanger—butperhapsnot

surprise.AtrocitiesandviolentcrimeinGuerrerohavebeencommonplace

atleastasfarbackasMexico’s1969-1979DirtyWar.1Anofficialstatetruth

commissionhasdeterminedthatcrimescommittedbyfederalforcesand

othersinGuerreroduringthatperiodconstitutedcrimesagainsthumanity.

Withtheriseofdrugcartelsandthelaunchofanewfederalsecuritypolicy

tocounterorganizedcrimein2006,residentsofGuerrerohavebeen

increasinglycaughtinthecrosshairsofstateandcartelviolence.

Evidencestronglysuggeststhatsomestateinstitutions,includingthepolice,

havebeeninfiltratedbyorganizedcrime.Meanwhile,elitefamiliesmaintain

powerfulcontroloverpublicinstitutionsthathaveneglectedpoor,rural,

andindigenouspopulations,feedingbothcartelrecruitmentandpopular

discontent.IfGuerrero’scitizensarenolongersurprisedbytheregularitywith

whichatrocitiesarecommitted,bynowtheyarealsousedtothestatejustice

system’snearlycomprehensivefailuretoholdperpetratorstocriminalaccount.

TheOpenSocietyJusticeInitiative,inpartnershipwiththeCenterforHuman

RightsMiguelAgustínProJuárez(CentrodeDerechosHumanosMiguel

AgustínProJuárez)andtheCenterforHumanRightsoftheMountain

Tlachinollan(CentrodeDerechosHumanosdelaMontañaTlachinollan),set

outtounderstandthedimensionsofGuerrero’sseriouscrimeproblem—

specificallykillings,enforceddisappearances,andtorture—andtoidentify

thereasonsthatGuerrero’scriminaljusticesystemhassobadlyfailedthe

victimsofthesecrimes.Theresultingreportprovidesthefirstcomprehensive

analysisofthepoliticalwillandtechnicalcapacityinthestatetoinvestigate,

prosecute,andholdfairtrialsforallegedperpetratorsofkillings,enforced

disappearances,andtorture.

THISPUBLICATIONPRECEDESAFORTHCOMINGREPORTbytheJustice

InitiativeinpartnershipwithMexicanhumanrightsorganizationsthatwill

examinethesamequestionsatthelevelofMexico’sfederalgovernment.The

findingsonGuerreroarebeingpublishedseparatelyinordertoinformpublic

debateaheadofthefirstanniversaryoftheAyotzinapadisappearances,and


beforethestate’sinaugurationofanewly-electedCongressonSeptember13,

2015;inaddition,anewlyelectedgovernorwilltakeofficeonOctober27,2015.

ThenewCongressandincomingGovernorHéctorAstudilloFlorestake

chargeofastateinwhich19,434homicideswerereportedtoprosecutors

between2005and2014—astaggeringtotalinastatewithapopulation

ofonly3.4million.2Alandscapeofuninvestigatedclandestineandmass

graves,manyofwhichwerediscoveredfollowingthe2014Ayotzinapa

disappearances,stronglysuggeststhattheactualrateofkillinghasbeenfar

higher.Fromthebeginningof2005throughApril2015,stateprosecutors

opened7,965preliminaryinvestigationsforintentionalhomicide,leading

to1,601indictments(20%ofinvestigations)and764convictions(9.6%of

investigations).3AlthoughthestateHumanRightsCommission4documented

90involuntaryandenforceddisappearancecasesbetween1990and

2014—two-thirdsofthesesince2006—andstateprosecutorshaveopened

investigationsinto44additionalcases,theyhaveneverindictedanyonefor

theseenforceddisappearances.5Likewise,despite54casesoftorturethat

thestateHumanRightsCommissiondocumentedfrom1994through2014,

notasinglearrestwarrant,letaloneanindictment,haseverbeenissued

foranyperpetratorofthesecrimes.6Statisticsandinterviewssuggestthat

prosecutorsandprosecutionpoliceinGuerreroroutinelyengageintorture

andotherill-treatmentinordertometeoutextrajudicialpunishmentand

obtaincoercedconfessionsasabasisforcriminalinvestigations.

WhyhastherebeensolittlejusticeforatrocitiesinGuerrero?Thisreport

identifiestheprimarycauseaspolitical.UnderGovernor-electAstudillo’s

predecessors,thejusticesystemhasbeenundulyinfluencedbyanauthoritarian

executivethathasnotrespectedthelegalautonomyorindependenceof

institutions,andhassoughttomanipulatethemthroughinappropriateand

irregularmeans.Further,thesameinvestigativepoliceforceheavilyimplicated

incommittingseriouscrimeshasbeentaskedwithinvestigatingthem.Until

recently,theprosecutor’sofficewasanappendageoftheexecutive,and

appearedmoreinterestedinminimizingtheincidenceofseriouscrimethan

prosecutingit.Defensecounselcapacitiesandinfrastructureareweak,withtoo

fewdefenders,especiallyinpoor,rural,andindigenousareas.Thishaspresented

akeyobstacletothepreventionandpunishmentoftorture.Thejudiciaryis

insufficientlyindependentoftheexecutive,illustratedbyaninteriorministerwho

wassimultaneouslyontemporaryleaveaspresidentofthestatejudiciary.The

stateCongresshasfailedtoadequatelyscrutinizethepoweroftheexecutive

and,in2014,wascomplicitinformerGovernorAngelAguirre’sirregular

neutralizationoftheonestateinstitutionthathadservedasacheckonimpunity

forgraveviolationsofhumanrights:thestateHumanRightsCommission.


AlthoughthemainsourcesofseriouscrimeandimpunityinGuerreroare

political,thenewgovernorwilltakethereinsofastatewithothergrave

shortcomings.Manyprosecutorsandpolicelackbasicskillsneededto

preventandsolvecrimes.Thejudiciaryislargelyuntestedindealingwith

atrocities,andstilladaptingtotheadversarialsystem.InGuerrero,the

federally-mandatedtransitiontotheadversarialsystemhasbeenslow.7The

substantivelegalframeworkisadequatefortheprosecutionofenforced

disappearance,butfallsshortinitsdefinitionoftortureandinother

respects.Thestatehasjurisdictionoverthecrimesofkillings,enforced

disappearance,andtorture,but,underoftenill-definedcircumstances,

federalprosecutorsmayassertjurisdictionoverthesesamecrimes.This

oftenresultsinthemanipulationofjurisdictionalambiguity.Securitypresents

amajorchallenge.Althoughasatisfactoryframeworkforwitnessprotection

existsonpaper,witnesses—especiallywitnessestohumanrightsviolations—

remainendangered.Thewitnessprotectionsystemreliesonindividualsand

institutionsthathavebeenimplicatedinseriouscrime,lacktraininginthe

properprotectionofwitnesses,andarenotadequatelyheldaccountable

fortheirperformance.Humanrightsdefenders,activists,andjournalists

whohavepressedfororinquiredaboutjusticeforseriouscrimeshavecome

underattack.Overcrowdedstateprisonsaredensoftortureandkilling.

Prosecutorsandjudgesfacethreatsfromcriminalcartels.

Theelectionofanewgovernorprovidesanopportunitytoacknowledgethe

scaleandnatureofthecrisis,appraisepastfailings,andchartboldactions

toinvestigateandprosecutekillings,enforceddisappearances,andtorturein

Guerrero.Thiswouldbegintobuildtrustwithadisaffectedcitizenry.Todo

so,GovernorAstudilloandGuerrero’snewlyelectedCongressshouldtake

actionsinfivekeyareas:8

1. STRENGTHENSYSTEMICACCOUNTABILITYINTHEJUSTICESECTOR.Thenewgovernmentshouldensureanindependent,strong,well-

resourced,andtransparentHumanRightsCommission;improvethe

collectionandtransparencyofdataonthejusticesystem;createan

independentdeputyprosecutorforhumanrightsabusesandatrocities;

makeforensicservicesindependentofpoliticalauthoritiesandthe

prosecutor;strengthendefenserights;strengthenthe“Technical

CommitteeforAnalysisandEvaluation”createdunderthetorturelaw;

strengthenjudicialindependence,includingbybarringjudges“onleave”

fromservingintheexecutivebranch;andensureinvestigationand

prosecutionofDirtyWarcrimes,includingthoseidentifiedbytheTruth

CommissionofGuerrero.


2. STRENGTHENTHELEGALFRAMEWORK.ThenewCongress

should:amendthestatetorturelaw,bringingitintolinewith

internationalstandardsbyadoptingthedefinitionoftorturein

theInter-AmericanConventiontoPreventandPunishTortureand

incorporatingprovisionsonthecriminalliabilityofseniorofficials

whofailtoexercisetheirauthoritytopreventtorture;formallyinclude

thecriminaloffensesoftortureandenforceddisappearanceinthe

statecriminalcodeinordertoremoveanyexcuseprosecutorsuse

toavoidenforcingspeciallaws;makeperpetrationbystateactors

anaggravatingcircumstanceforhomicide;andacceleratethe

implementationoftheadversarialsystem.

3. STRENGTHENSECURITY.ThenewgovernmentandCongressshould

redefinepolicingandrestructurepoliceforceswithgreateremphasison

communitypolicing,criminalinvestigation,judicialpluralismandgreater

accountability;strengthenwitnessprotection;acttoreduceprison

violenceandovercrowding;providesecurityguaranteesforhumanrights

defenders;andstrengthensecurityprotocolsatjusticeinstitutions.

4. CREATEINTEGRATED,MULTI-DISCIPLINARYTEAMSTOINVESTIGATEDISAPPEARANCES.Thenewgovernmentshould

createintegratedunits,includingprosecutors,investigators,and

socialworkers,tosearchfordisappearedpersonsandconductrelated

criminalinvestigations.

5. LOCATE,EXHUME,ANDINVESTIGATECLANDESTINEANDMASSGRAVES.TheFiscalíashould:coordinatewithfederalauthoritiesto

produceapubliclyavailablemapofallclandestineandmassgraves

foundinGuerrero;deploynewtechnologytolocateclandestineand

massgraves;andseeknationalandinternationalassistanceforthe

timelyexhumationandinvestigationofsuchgraves.

11 BROKEN JUSTICE IN MEXICO’S GUERRERO STATEINTRODUCTION: GUERRERO’S HISTORY OF ATROCITY

I.INTRODUCTION:GUERRERO’SHISTORYOFATROCITY

AS WORD SPREAD ABOUT THE MASS GRAVES, DOZENS OF

FAMILIES OF THE DISAPPEARED RUSHED FROM AROUND

GUERRERO AND NEIGHBORING STATES TO THE RURAL

TEACHERS’ COLLEGE ON THE OUTSKIRTS OF GUERRERO’S

CAPITAL, CHILPANCINGO, IN LATE SEPTEMBER 2014. IN

THE COUNTRYSIDE SURROUNDING THE NEARBY CITY OF

IGUALA, FEDERAL AND STATE AUTHORITIES HAD LOCATED

PITS CONTAINING THE CHARRED REMAINS OF AT LEAST 28

BODIES, SOME OF THEM DISMEMBERED.9 THE MASS GRAVES

WERE AMONG THE MANY DISCOVERED IN GUERRERO IN

RECENT YEARS, BUT THEY WERE THE FIRST TO GARNER

SIGNIFICANT ATTENTION OUTSIDE THE STATE, BECAUSE OF

WHAT THEY WERE THOUGHT TO HOLD.10

Abouttendayspriortothediscovery,sixpeople,includingthreestudents

fromaruralteachers’collegerenownedforitsactivism,wereshotand

killedinIguala.Videodocumentedsomestudentactivistswhosurvived

theshootingbeingdrivenawayinpolicetrucks.11Inall,43studentswere

missing.Statepoliceinitiallyarrested22municipalpoliceallegedlyinvolved

inthedisappearancesandkillings.12TheNationalHumanRightsCommission

announcedthatitwouldinvestigate.Desperatefamiliesofthe43disappeared

students—aboutathirdofthefirst-yearclassatRaulIsidroBurgosTeachers’

CollegeofAyotzinapa—weredemandingthatGovernorÁngelAguirrefind

theirchildren.13PresidentEnriquePeñaNietoaddressedthecountry,promising

federalparticipationin“[…]fullysolvingthiscase,findingthoseresponsible

andstrictlyapplyingthelaw.”14Butbythetimefederalprosecutorsasserted

jurisdiction,thestudentshadbeenmissingfor10days.15


Thedaysthatfollowedweremarkedbycontinuousrevelationsofatrocity

andaheighteningofsocialtensions16asoneclandestinegraveafteranother

failedtoyieldthebodiesofthe43studentsandauthoritiesfailedtoprovide

informationontheirwhereabouts.Afterthegovernmentannouncedthat

therewerenoDNAmatcheswithanyofthedisappearedstudents’relatives

amongthebodiesfoundinthefirstgraves,officials,vigilanteorganizations

(autodefensas),andthefamiliesthemselvescontinuedthesearch.Whatthey

discoveredinthehillssurroundingIgualawasalandscapeofclandestine

graves,somecontainingmultiplebodies.17

Astheunearthingoftheseunrelatedgravessuggests,thecrimesof

September2014werejustthelatestinalongerhistoryofatrocitiesin

Guerrero.Whentheycameunderattack,theAyotzinapastudentswerein

IgualatoraisefundsandcommandeerbusestotakethemtoMexicoCityfor

acommemorationofaninfamousmassacreofstudentsonOctober2,1968,

duringMexico’s“DirtyWar”ofthe1960sand70s.18

TheDirtyWar’stollwasheavyinGuerrero.Betweenthelate1960sand1979,

stateagentsperpetratedcrimesagainsthumanity,includingextrajudicial

killing,enforceddisappearance,torture,inhumantreatment,displacement,

andothergravehumanrightsviolationsinGuerrero.19TheDirtyWarwas

anexerciseinwidespreadandsystematicrepression,inwhichthestate

pursuedapolicyofexterminatingthoseittermed“guerillas.”Accordingly,

thestategrantedsecurityforcesvirtuallyunlimitedpowerstocounter

guerillaactivitiesandsubdueandcontrolcivilianpopulationssuspectedof

supportingguerrillaorsubversivemovements.

EvenwiththeDirtyWar’send,andthentheendofone-partyrulebythe

PartidoRevolucionarioInstitucional(PRI)atthefederallevelin2000,

governmentcorruption,neglect,andoppressioncontinued.20Theguerilla

movementinGuerreroandelsewhereinsouthernMexicohadarisenlargely

inresponsetothepovertyandfeudalcharacteristicslongpresentinthe

region.21Asmallgroupofelites—thecaciques—haveconcentratedwealthin

theirhands,passingdowntheirfortunesandthereinsofstatepowerthrough

thegenerations.22Thrivingattheexpenseofthemajorityofthepopulation,

thecaciquesremainedthelocusofpowerinGuerrero,butnowfrequently

exerciseditthroughavarietyofpoliticalparties.Statedisregardfortheneeds

ofvulnerablecommunitiescontinuedtorepresentafailureofdemocratic

accountabilityinGuerrero,anditcontinuedtofosterpoliticaldiscontent.


SEPTEMBER 2014 WAS NOT THE FIRST TIME THAT

AYOTZINAPA STUDENTS DIED AT THE HANDS OF

GOVERNMENT FORCES. AT A PREVIOUS PROTEST AGAINST

INSUFFICIENT STATE SUPPORT FOR THE SCHOOL IN

DECEMBER 2011, SOME 300 STUDENTS BLOCKED PART

OF THE HIGHWAY FROM CHILPANCINGO TO THE RESORT

TOWN OF ACAPULCO.23 FEDERAL AND STATE POLICE

RESPONDED WITH EXTREME FORCE, ULTIMATELY FIRING

LIVE AMMUNITION AT STUDENTS THROWING STONES AND

MOLOTOV COCKTAILS. THREE PERSONS, INCLUDING TWO

STUDENTS, WERE EXTRAJUDICIALLY KILLED, AT LEAST ONE

WAS TORTURED, AND DOZENS MORE WERE INJURED.

Giventhepowerofthecaciquesandthegovernmentsecurityforces’

penchantforviolence,expressingdemandsinthestreetanddefending

humanrightshaslongbeendangerousforthepeopleofGuerrero.But

protestingbecameevenmoredangerouswiththeriseofdrugcartelsinthe

region.Guerrero’sclimate,topography,andlocationmakeitwell-suitedto

marijuanaandpoppycultivation.Thestateisresponsibleforanestimated

50-70%ofallheroinproducedinMexico.24Thebusinesshasbecome

increasinglylucrativeasdemandhasincreasedintheUnitedStates.From

themid-1990suntil2008,theBeltránLeyvaCartelhadanearmonopoly

ondrugproductionandtraffickinginGuerrero.Itsplinteredintosmaller

groupsin2008-9,andcededgroundtoencroachingcompetitorcartelsfrom

otherstates.Atthesametime,thesecartels—builtarounddrugcultivation,

production,andtrafficking—havediversifiedintoawidearrayoforganized

criminalactivities,includingextortionandkidnapping.25

The2014Ayotzinapadisappearancesbroughtoutsideattentiontowhat

wasalreadywellknownwithinthestate:thatmanyauthoritieshavebeen

infiltratedbyorganizedcrimeorganizations.26Accordingtoaleaked

reportfromtheOfficeoftheFederalProsecutor,26outof80identified

criminalgroupsinMexicoaresettledinGuerrero.27Governmentintelligence

documentsstatethatatleast12mayorsinGuerrero—eightofthemfrom

thegoverningPartyoftheDemocraticRevolution(Partido de la Revolución Democrática,PRD)—weresuspectedofhavingconnectionstodrugcartels.28

FollowingtheAyotzinapadisappearances,theArmytookcontrolof13

municipalitiesinGuerrero“duetolackoftrustinmunicipalsecurityforces.”29


Oneanalystclaimsthatorganizedcrimehasa“permanentpresence”inat

least65ofthestate’s81municipalities.30

EvenasthestateofGuerreroitselfwasbeingextensivelyinfiltratedby

criminalorganizations,stateofficialswereechoingthefederalgovernment’s

portrayalofviolenceascausedbyorganizedcrime,andalsoasignthatthe

securitystrategylaunchedbyPresidentFelipeCalderóninlate2006was

succeeding.Stateandfederalgovernmentshaveoftenportrayedthevictims

ofviolenceascriminals—especiallywhenthosevictimswerefoundtohave

beenkilledbystateagents.

TheSeptember2014killingsanddisappearancesoftheAyotzinapastudents

resonatedtosuchagreatextentinGuerreroandacrossMexicoinpart

becausetheysoclearlyrefutedthislongstandinggovernmentnarrative.The

43studentswereclearlynotmembersoforganizedcrime,butratherthe

embodimentoftheirfamilies’sacrificesandhopesforabetterfuture.The

countryandtheworldlookedonasdistraught,outragedfamiliesdemanded

answersfromthestateandfederalgovernments.Refusinggovernment

paymentsthatlookedlikeadesperateattempttocontaintheprotests,

thesefamiliesfromrural,largelyindigenousareasabandonedtheirjobsand

farmstocombthehillsforcluestotheirboys’disappearance,speaktothe

media,anddemandaccountability.31Intheweeksfollowingthekillingsand

disappearancesinGuerrero,studentsandaveragecitizensacrossMexico

tooktothestreetstoexpresstheirdisgustanddemandchange.

Politiciansscrambledtorespond.Morethanamonthaftertheattackon

thestudents,PresidentPeñaNietoagreedtomeetwiththefamiliesofthe

disappeared.Duringthatmeeting,healsoagreedtoa10-pointplanfor

investigatingthecase,asrequestedbyvictims.32Finally,headdressedthe

nationtopromisearaftofreformsonsecurityandjusticeissues.33Facing

mountingstreetprotestsinGuerrero,GovernorAguirrewasforcedtotake

aleaveofabsence,whichlaterbecamepermanent.34Membersofvarious

politicalparties,includingthePRDmayorofIguala,hadbeendeeply

implicatedinthedisappearancesandtiedtoorganizedcrime.35

Withallofthepromisesofreformsparkedbynewattentiontooldproblems,

couldGuerrerofindawaytodeliverjusticeforatrocities,includingthoseof

September2014?Therecordwasnotencouraging.Guerrerohasamongthe

highesthomicideratesinMexico.AccordingtodatafromthefederalMinistry

ofInterior,therewereatotalof19,434homicidesreportedtoGuerrero

prosecutorsfrom2005through2014.36DatafromtheFiscalía(asGuerrero’s

stateprosecutor’sofficehasbeencalledsinceAugust2014),37showhow

littleaccountabilitytherehasbeenforthesekillings.38Ofallhomicides

69 77 58 79 70 71 87 84 75 79


HOMICIDEINGUERRERO

TOTALNUMBEROFREPORTEDHOMICIDES

NUMBEROFHOMICIDEINVESTIGATIONS

NUMBEROFHOMICIDEINDICTMENTS

NUMBEROFHOMICIDECONVICTIONS

n INTENTIONALn UNINTENTIONAL



TOTALNUMBEROFHOMICIDECONVICTIONSASAPERCENTAGEOFREPORTEDKILLINGS

2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014

1,141 1,284 1,336 1,449 1,980 2,009 2,703 2,754 2,581 2,197

2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014

2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014

2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014

423

184

532

180

564

161

692

171

911

163

843

142

957

144

930

128

923

156

835

127

244

96

44

274

97

52

309

92

42

341

78

61

342

90

69

353

84

56

336

68

44

372

79

57

369

86

49

371

65

46

9.9% 10.0% 7.5% 9.7% 7.0% 6.3% 4.6% 5.1% 4.8% 5.7%

0

0

0

0

2,000

1,000

500

500

500


reportedtostateprosecutorseachyearfrom2005-2014,thepercentageof

totalreportedkillingsresultingincriminalconvictionforintentionalhomicide

(homicidiodoloso)orunintentionalhomicide(homicidioculposo)hasnever

risenabove10%—andfelltohalfthisrateinthethreeyearswiththehighest

reportednumbersofhomicides(2011through2013).

WhileimpunityforhomicideinGuerrerohasbeenwidespread,impunity

forenforceddisappearancehasbeentotal.Byitsnature,establishinga

numberoftotalcasesofenforceddisappearancedepends,amongother

things,uponfamilymembersorfriendsfeelingconfidentenoughtoreport

adisappearancetotheauthorities,andupontheresourcingofthestate

HumanRightsCommissionandotheractorstoindependentlydocument

crimes.GiventhelowleveloftrustinGuerrero’scriminaljusticesystem

(seedatabelow),andthelimitedresourcesavailabletotheHumanRights

Commissionorindependentcivilsocietyorganizations,thetotalnumberof

reportedcasesverylikelyunderestimatesthetotal.

Howmanyenforceddisappearanceshavebeendocumented?Alocalcivil

societyorganization,ComitédeFamiliaresyAmigosdeSecuestradosy

DesaparecidosyAsesinadosenGuerrero,documented293disappearances

betweenApril2005andMay2011,withindicationsofstateactors’

involvementinabout200cases,ornearly70%.39ThestateHumanRights

Commissiondocumented90involuntaryandenforceddisappearancecases

between1990and2014,andrelatedtothese,between1990and2013made

21formalrecommendationstostateauthoritiesitdeemedresponsiblefor

humanrightsviolations.40For87ofthesecases,abreakdownoftheauthority

allegedresponsibleisavailable:investigativepolice(whoworkwiththe

prosecution):38cases;MexicanArmy:17cases;FederalPolice:15cases;state

securitypolice:15cases;municipalpolice:16cases;and“others”:9cases.41


AS OF DECEMBER 2014, PROSECUTORS HAD OBTAINED

RESULTS IN NONE OF THESE CASES, AND INDEED HAD

NOT EVEN OPENED INVESTIGATIONS INTO THEM.42 THE

FISCALÍA HAS REPORTED THE OPENING OF 44 CRIMINAL

INVESTIGATIONS FOR ENFORCED DISAPPEARANCE INTO

CASES THAT WERE NOT REFERRED FROM THE STATE

HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, BUT NONE OF THOSE HAVE

RESULTED IN INDICTMENTS OR ARREST WARRANTS. AS OF

FEBRUARY 2015, NINE CASES HAD BEEN CLOSED WITHOUT

ACHIEVING INDICTMENTS AND 35 CASES REMAINED OPEN.43

WITHOUT ANY TRIALS OR JUDGMENTS FOR GUERRERO’S

MANY ENFORCED DISAPPEARANCES, ABUSIVE POLICE,

PROSECUTORS, AND OTHER STATE AGENTS HAVE A GREEN

LIGHT TO DISAPPEAR MORE VICTIMS.

Asisthecasewithenforceddisappearances,establishingaccuratenumbers

ontheuseoftorturebypolice,army,andprosecutorsinGuerreroisdifficult,

giventhepresumedbiasagainstreportinginanenvironmentofdistrustof

stateofficials.Butthelackofaccountabilityforcasesthatarereportedis

clear.Ofsome54casesoftorturedocumentedbythestateHumanRights

Commissionfrom1994through2014,noonehaseverbeenheldaccountable.

Therewereonlysixcriminalinvestigationsfortorturebetween2006and

2014.TheFiscalíaofGuerrerohasneitherissuedindictments,norobtained

asinglearrestwarrantforchargesoftorture.44InGuerrero,itseemsyoucan

literallygetawaywithmurder—orenforceddisappearance,ortorture.

IntheimmediateaftermathoftheSeptember2014Ayotzinapa

disappearances,beforehetook“leave,”GovernorAguirrepromisedthat

theperpetratorsofthestudentdisappearanceswouldbe“punishedwith

thefullweightofthelaw.”45Evenbeyondthestate’srecordofimpunity,this

promiseranghollowgiventhemanysystemicobstaclestoeffectiveandfair

justiceinGuerrero.Thestate’sjusticesystemhasneverfunctionedwell.With

theriseoftheBeltránLeyvaCartel,itssuccessorsandcompetitors,police,

prosecutors,andotherofficialswereoftenpaidtoaverttheireyesoractively

facilitateillicitbusinessaims.Astherelativepeaceofacartelmonopolygave

waytomorechaoticcompetition,justicesectorofficialsfoundthemselves

bothinducedandpressuredtocollaborate,andalsovulnerabletoretaliation

fromrivalorganizations.Formanyofficialstheanswerhasbeentosimply


abandontheirresponsibilitiesandcedecontroloverentirecommunitiesto

criminalorganizations,oralternativelytofed-upcivilianswhohaveformed

theirowncommunitydefenseforces(policíascomunitarias).46

Afteryearsofbeingwarpedbythecaciques,thecartels,andcorrupt

officials,Guerrero’sjusticesystempresentsalengthylistofchallenges.

Asthisreportwilldocument,themanyobstaclestojusticeforatrocities

inGuerreroincludethewidespreaduseoftorture;apervasivelackof

accountability;weakcapacityandmisallocatedresources;aflawedlegislative

frameworkill-suitedtoprosecutingatrocitiesbydirectperpetrators,let

alonepatterncrimesthatmightbetiedtohigherauthorities;manipulationof

jurisdictionalambiguity;andlackofsecurityforlegalproceedings.

Guerrero’sjusticesystemhaslongbeenfrayed.TheeventsofSeptember

2014pulledatitsloosethreadsoffeudalism,authoritarianism,criminality,

corruption,blatantimpunity,andincompetence.Thesystem’ssudden

unraveling,forallMexicoandtheworldtosee,sparkedprotestandraised

theprospectofpoliticalinstability.Itmayalsohaveopenedanopportunity.

Guerreroriskssinkingintodeepercrisisanddysfunctionunlessnewleaders

arewillingtoacknowledgefundamentalfailings,thenembarkonareform

pathrequiringthemtochallengeentrenchedcriminalandpoliticalinterests.

OnlysuchadramaticshiftcouldonedayresultinanendtoGuerrero’slong

historyofatrocity.

19 BROKEN JUSTICE IN MEXICO’S GUERRERO STATEJUSTICE THROUGH TORTURE?

II.JUSTICETHROUGHTORTURE?

IN THE VIDEO, A HALF-NAKED, BLINDFOLDED MAN COWERS

AGAINST A BARE WALL, BEGGING “PLEASE STOP,” AS THREE

LAUGHING OFFICERS OF THE ACAPULCO TOURIST POLICE

TAKE TURNS BEATING HIM WITH A NIGHT STICK, AND ONE

GRABS THE MAN’S GENITALS. THE INCIDENT IS SURELY NOT

HOW STATE AUTHORITIES WOULD LIKE TO PORTRAY LAW

AND ORDER IN THE FAMOUS RESORT, WHICH HAS ALREADY

SUFFERED FROM PERCEPTIONS THAT STATE AND MUNICIPAL

POLICE COLLUDE WITH ORGANIZED CRIME.

Anditwouldhavegoneunnoticedbythepubliciftheofficers’supervisor—

JuanCarlosAlvaradoCoronado,thechiefoperatingofficerofthemunicipal

policeofAcapulco—hadn’trecordedtheabuse,whichallegedlyoccurredin

December2013.Alvaradodisappearedtwoweekslater;hisbodywasfound

inMarch2014.47Thenextmonth,someoneuploadedthevideotoYouTube.48

AsecondvideoappearedonYouTubethefollowingday,onApril4,2014.

ItwaspurportedlyrecordedonApril2,2014inthe“OfficeoftheSecretary

ofSecurity.”49Itshowsthethreeofficersfromthefirstvideoexplaining

toaninterrogatoroff-camera—inaninterviewandcontextthatdonot

appeartocomplywithlegalstandardsorrespectfordueprocess—thatthe

beatingsinthefirstvideooccurredbeforeAcapulcoPoliceChiefAlfredo

ÁlvarezValenzuelahadtakenoffice.Fromthecontext,itappearsthatthe

interrogatorisÁlvarezhimself.50

Whywouldpolicedocumenttheirowncrimeswiththefirstvideo,andthen

uploadasecondvideosoquicklytodenytheinvolvementofPoliceChief

AlfredoÁlvarez?Athirdvideoheldthekey.51UploadedonApril3,2014,the

samethreeofficersareseenagain,thistimeinaninterviewwiththemedia.In

it,theyexplainthattheyescapedfromdetentionafterthefilmingofthesecond

video,andtheyalsoofferadamningaccountofthefirst.Accordingtothethree,


thebeatingoccurredafterÁlvareztookoffice.Álvarezhimselfhadcometo

thedetentionfacilitywithhisbodyguardsandpersonallybeatenthedetainee.

AsÁlvarezleftthedetentionfacility,theysaid,heinstructedtherecordingto

bemadesothathecouldchecklatertoensuretheofficersfollowedhisorders

tocontinuetheabuse.Thevictim,ahomelessman,hadallegedlymolesteda

girlonthebeach,butthefamilydidn’twanttopresscharges.Accordingtothe

officers,Álvareztoldthemthatbeatings“arethewaytotreatsuchpersons,”

andtheysaidÁlvarezhadhis“ownschoolandmethods.”Further,thethree

officerstoldthereporterstheyfearedthattheywouldbedisappearedjustlike

theircolleagueAlvaradoandsaidthattheyhadbeenobligedtosignstatements

falselystatingthattheincidenttookplacebeforeÁlvarezcameintooffice.The

samedaythethirdvideowasposted,Álvarezconvenedapressconferenceto

denyanyinvolvementinthetorture,andtoannouncetheopeningofacriminal

investigationagainstthethreeofficers.52

Withthebeatingontheinternetforalltosee,thestateprosecutor’soffice

pursuedacaseagainstÁlvarezandanotherofficerappearinginthefirst

videoonchargesofenforceddisappearanceandabuseofauthorityagainst

thevictim,whoprosecutorssaytheyareunabletolocate.OnJuly25,2014,

theNavyarrestedÁlvarezinMexicoCity,53butwhenthecaseagainsthim

cametocourtdayslater,thejudgedismissedit,sayingthattheprosecution

lackedevidencetoprovetheelementsoftheallegedcrimes,andthatthe

torturewasperpetratedbeforeÁlvarezbecameAcapulcoPoliceChief.54The

rulingaddedtothemurkinessofacasethatprosecutorssaidtheywould

appeal.Whateverthemotivationsofthemunicipalofficialsmakingthe

complaints,thecase’sdismissaldidnothingtodampenpublicsuspicions

thatonceagainapowerfulofficialhadevadedthelawunderdubious

circumstances.

TortureandabusebystateauthoritiesarecommoninGuerrero.From

2008throughApril2014,thestateHumanRightsCommissionreceived101

complaintsofpresumedactsoftortureorcruelordegradingpunishment

perpetratedbystateauthorities.55From1994throughJanuary2013,the

bodyissuedatotalof54recommendationsontorturetoGuerrerostate

authoritiesdeemedresponsible;48ofthosewereaddressedtotheGeneral

Prosecutor’sOffice(laterknownastheFiscalía)becausethestateHuman

RightsCommissionfoundthatitsofficershadperpetratedtorture.

TheAcapulcoincidenthelpstoillustratetworeasonswhymanypolice

andprosecutorshaveengagedinsuchabroadpracticeoftorture,ill-


treatment,andotherabuses,sometimeswiththecomplicityoftheirfederal

counterparts.56Theyappeartobepursuingtwopervertednotionsof

“justice,”bothoftheminviolationofstate,national,andinternationallaw.

First,theepisodeillustratesalongstandingpracticeofpoliceand

prosecutorsinGuerreropunishingperceivedcriminalsandpolitical

opponentswithoutformalchargesoranyformofjudicialscrutiny.

ACCORDING TO A 2012 REPORT FROM THE NATIONAL HUMAN

RIGHTS COMMISSION, THE SAME DYNAMIC WAS APPARENT IN

THE AUTHORITIES’ DECEMBER 2011 CLASH WITH PROTESTING

AYOTZINAPA STUDENTS. AFTER FIRING ON THE STUDENTS,

FEDERAL AND STATE POLICE DRAGGED AWAY 42 OF THEM

TO DIFFERENT LOCATIONS AND SUBJECTED THEM TO

BEATINGS AND TORTURE.57 ONE OF THE SENIOR OFFICERS

INVOLVED IN THE ATTACK AGAINST THE STUDENTS WAS

NONE OTHER THAN ALFREDO ÁLVAREZ. ÁLVAREZ WAS

AT THAT TIME A COMMANDER OF THE FEDERAL POLICE,

IN CHARGE OF A FEDERAL SECURITY OPERATION CALLED

“GUERRERO SEGURO.”58

Inaninstitutionalculturewherepoliceareexpectedandencouragedto

meteoutextrajudicialpunishmentthroughbeatingsandtorture,itcanbeno

surprisewhenauthoritiesgoastepfurtheranddisappearormurderperceived

troublemakers.ThiswasanobviousproblemwellbeforetheSeptember2014

disappearanceof43Ayotzinapastudentsatthehandsofpolicebrought

worldwideattentiontotheissue.Asnotedabove,in38of87casesofenforced

orinvoluntarydisappearancedocumentedbythestateHumanRights

Commissionfrom1990through2014,theauthoritiesitdeemedresponsible

wereinvestigativepolice,workingundertheprosecution.59

Second,thethreesurvivingpoliceofficersexpressedfearofbeing

disappearedjustliketheirsupervisor,andexplainedthattheywereforced,

throughphysicalandpsychologicalthreats,tobeinterrogatedintheoffice

ofMr.Álvarez,andsignadocumentinhispresencestatingthattheincident

happenedbeforehetookoffice.60Suchtreatmentcouldamounttotorture.61

Iftrue,thiswouldnotbeexceptionalinastatewheretherearestrong

indicationsthatprosecutorsandpoliceregularlyusetortureandotherforms

ofill-treatmenttogenerate“evidence.”


TheNationalCommissionofHumanRights(ComisiónNacionaldelos

DerechosHumanos,CNDH)documentedthisdynamicinrelationtothe2011

Ayotzinapacase,afterstudentspartiallyblockedahighway.Accordingto

theCNDHreportontheincident,stateinvestigativepolicetookonestudent,

GerardoTorresPérez,tothestateprosecutor’soffice,andfromthereto

alocationwherehewasbeaten,threatened,andforcedtofireagunand

handlespentshellcasings.62Onthebasisofthosefingerprints,thepolice

chargedTorreswithusingfirearms(althoughfollowinganuproar,hewas

releasedthefollowingday).63

ThepresidentoftheJusticeCommissioninGuerrero’sstateCongresssays

thatmanyinvestigatorshave“entrenchedbadpractices,”andshouldbe

replaced.Accordingtohim,ProsecutorIñakiBlancoCabrera(whoresigned

inthewakeofthe2014Ayotzinapadisappearances)hadinformallyengaged

indiscussionsaboutmovinginvestigativepoliceintoadministrativepositions

andrecruitingnewones.64

Evenifnewinvestigatorsreplacedtheold,littleislikelytochangewithout

anewincentivestructure.Aslongasprosecutorsandpolicethinktheycan

getawaywithpunishingopponentsoutsidethelaw,orobtainconvictions

throughcoercedconfessions,fewarelikelytolearnandapplyprofessional

legalandinvestigativeskills.Onekeytochangingincentiveswouldbea

functioningsystemofaccountabilityforprosecutorandpoliceactions.

23 BROKEN JUSTICE IN MEXICO’S GUERRERO STATEA SYSTEM WITHOUT ACCOUNTABILITY

III.ASYSTEMWITHOUTACCOUNTABILITY

IN THEORY, THERE ARE MULTIPLE TYPES OF ACCOUNTABILITY

FOR THE PERFORMANCE OF PROSECUTORS AND POLICE

IN GUERRERO THAT SHOULD PREVENT ABUSES OF POWER

WHILE ALSO ALLOWING THEM TO CREDIBLY INVESTIGATE

AND PROSECUTE ATROCITIES. THESE LAYERS OF

ACCOUNTABILITY INCLUDE FORMAL LEGAL RESTRICTIONS

ON THE PROSECUTION, FORMAL INDEPENDENCE OF THE

PROSECUTOR, THE POSSIBILITY FOR THE DEFENSE TO

CHALLENGE PROSECUTORIAL ACTIONS, AN INDEPENDENT

JUDICIARY, AN INDEPENDENT HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION,

AND OVERSIGHT BY THE STATE CONGRESS. YET IN

GUERRERO, MANY OF THESE POTENTIAL CHECKS HAVE

LONG BEEN MERE FICTIONS OF AN AUTHORITARIAN SYSTEM

THAT HAS SOUGHT TO NEUTRALIZE POTENTIAL SOURCES OF

SCRUTINY, SILENCE CRITICS, REPRESS CHALLENGERS, AND

USE PROSECUTORIAL AND POLICE MANDATES TO SERVE THE

POWERFUL AND CONNECTED.

III.A. LACK OF INDEPENDENT INVESTIGATIONS

DespitetheNationalHumanRightsCommission’sexplicitrecommendation

toGuerreroauthoritiestoinvestigatethewell-documentedcasesoftorture

andothergravehumanrightsviolationscommittedduringtheDecember

2011Ayotzinapaconfrontation,Guerreroauthoritieshavefailedtoholdthose

perpetrators,oranyothers,accountablefortorture.


Purportedly,thefailuretoinvestigatetortureassuchislargelybecause

untilJanuary2014,thedefinitionofthecrimeoftortureinGuerrerowas

setforthinthelawoftheHumanRightsCommissionofGuerrero65andnot

inthestatecriminalcode.Authoritiescitedthistechnicalityinrefusingto

prosecutetorture.66WhenthestateHumanRightsCommissionissuedtorture

recommendationsthatobligatedtheprosecutor’sofficetoinvestigate,the

deputyprosecutorforhumanrightsoftheFiscalíaofGuerrerowastheone

responsiblefor“reclassifying”tortureasillegaldeprivationofliberty,illegal

detention,injuries,abuseofpowerorthe“closest”crimeinthecriminalcode

thatwouldallowtheopeningofaninvestigation.67Yet,basedonthelimited

natureofinformationprovidedbytheFiscalíaabouttheextentofjustice

insuch“reclassified”cases,itwouldappearthatitisreluctanttorevealthe

extenttowhichtheseotheroffenseshavebeenprosecuted.68Inconjunction

withtheverylownumberofinvestigationsoftortureitself,thisraisesserious

questionsaboutwhethereventheselesserchargesarebeingpursued.Of

thestateHumanRightsCommission’srecommendationsontorture,88%

havebeenaddressedtothestateprosecutor’soffice.69Thus,itappearsthat

prosecutorshavebeenunwillingtopursueinvestigationsagainstthemselves

andtheircolleagues.

Furthersuggestingthatreluctanceratherthanthelegalgapwasresponsible

forthelackofinvestigationsintoallegedtorture,therewasnoapparent

uptickininvestigationsevenafterJanuary2014,whentorturewasdefined

outsideofthelawoftheHumanRightsCommissionofGuerrerothrougha

specialtorturelawpassedinJanuary2014(seediscussioninthefollowing

section).Oneyearlater,inJanuary2015,prosecutorshadopenedonlyone

investigationintotorture.70Othercomplaintswereignored.Forexample,

afterthepolicearrestedMarcoAntonioSuásteguiMuñoz,acommunity

activistleadingoppositiontotheconstructionofadam,heclaimedhe

wasbeatenandthreatenedduringhisarrest,beforebeingchargedwith

attemptedmurder.71Despitehiscomplaintoftorture,asofJanuary2015the

prosecutor’sofficehadfailedtoopenacriminalinvestigationintothetorture

accusation.72Rather,inviolationofhisrighttoanadequatedefense,Guerrero

authoritiestransferredhimtoaprisoninNayaritstate,wherehewasunable

toconsultanattorneyofhischoice.73

Thenear-absoluteimpunityforhumanrightsabusesandatrocities

committedbymanypoliceandprosecutorscomesasnosurprise,inpart

becausethosetaskedwithinvestigatingtheoffensesworkintheimplicated

institutions.74Whilethereexistsaspecialunitwithinthestateprosecutor’s

officemandatedtoprosecutehumanrightsviolationscommittedby

publicservants,housedunderadeputyprosecutorforhumanrights,75this


unitconsistsofofficersfromthesameinvestigativepoliceforce(Policía

InvestigadoraMinisterial)againstwhichmultipleaccusationsoftortureand

otherrightsabuseshavebeenlodged.

Anewtorturelaw,adoptedinJanuary2014,offeredsomepromiseofchange.

Itcreateda“TechnicalCommitteeforAnalysisandEvaluation”toadviseon

theinvestigationofallegedcasesoftortureandmonitortheirprogress.76

Onpaper,thenewcommitteepromisessomemeasureofoversighttospur

investigationsintotortureallegationsandmonitorfollow-through.Italso

hashumanandmaterialresourcesavailabletoit.77Basedonitsdateofentry

intoforce,thelawestablisheddeadlinesfortheinstallationofthecommittee

(March30,2014),theapprovalofaspecialprotocolfortheinvestigationof

torturetobeproposedbytheprosecutor’soffice(May29,2014),andthe

issuanceofregulationstothetorturelaw(July28,2014).However,asof

July2015,noneofthesestepshadbeentakenandthecommitteehadnot

convenedonce.78

Intheabsenceofanysemblanceofanindependentinstitutiontooversee

tortureinvestigations,allegedcasesoftorture(andotheratrocities

committedbyauthorities)arelefttothediscretionoftheFiscalía.Ithas

soughttojustifyitsinactionthroughinsistenceonnarrowinterpretations

oflawandviableevidence.Withoutregardtointernationalstandards,or

evenGuerrero’sownlaw,79officersinvolvedintortureinvestigationstakean

artificiallynarrowviewofwhatconstitutestorture.Asonestategovernment

officialexplained:“Ifatall,torturecanonlybecommittedbyinvestigative

policeduringtheperiodofinvestigation.It’sonlytortureforpurposesof

confession.[…]Afterthearrestwarrantisissued,youcan’tspeakoftorture,

butabuseofauthorityorothercharges.”80Accordingtoonegovernment

official,theprosecutiontakesanarrowinterpretationofhowallegationsof

torturecanbeproved,withtheIstanbulProtocol81consideredtheonlymeans

ofobtainingevidence.Buttheprosecutionhasnocapacitytoconduct

IstanbulProtocols.ItmustrelyonrecommendationsfromthestateHuman

RightsCommission,whichmayconducttheIstanbulProtocol.Itcanalso

proactivelyturntothefederalOfficeoftheGeneralProsecutor(Procuraduría

GeneraldelaRepública,PGR)andtheNationalCommissionofHuman

Rights(CNDH)toconducttheprotocol.82In2014,thePGRassistedtheState

Prosecutor’sOfficeofGuerrerointheperformanceof12IstanbulProtocols,

resultinginonlyonepositivefindingofphysicaltorture.83

IntheJune2014caseofanti-damactivistMarcoAntonioSuástegui

Muñoz,whoclaimshewastortured,officialssaythatforensicexpertshad

determinedthattherewasnotorture,sotherewasnocriminalinvestigation


oftheallegation.84However,sucha“forensic”determinationconsistedof

onlyacursorymedicalexaminationconductedbyfederalandstateofficers.85

Indeedthereareforensicdoctorsavailabletoconductexaminations,as

wellasdoctorsintheprisons,86butdespitetheirformallegalautonomy,in

practicetheyallanswertotheprosecutor’soffice.87Sodoforensicexperts

(peritosoficiales).Officialsinbothserviceswithintheprosecutor’soffice

arepoorlypaid,andseenbymanyasbeingsusceptibletocorruption.88

Accordingtoonelegislator,ProsecutorBlancocameintoofficepromising

toimproveworkingconditionsforpoliceandforensicexpertssothat

theywouldnottakebribes,butthendidnothinginthisregard.89When

thestateHumanRightsCommissionsentadraftlawforthecreation

ofan“AutonomousInstituteofLegalMedicineandForensicSciences”

(InstitutoAutónomodeMedicinaLegalyCienciasForenses)toformer

GovernorZeferinoTorreblancaheapparentlyreferredittoCongress,but

representativesfailedtodebateorvoteontheproposal.90

ProsecutorsinGuerrerocanpointtoformalchecksontheiractions,and

claimthatthereisadequateoversight.Withintheoffice,decisionsnotto

filechargesmustbereviewedbytheprosecutorandDeputyProsecutor

ofRegionalControlandCriminalProcedures.91Ifprosecutorsdodecideto

proceedwithacase,theymustseekjudicialconfirmationoftheindictment.

However,itremainsunclearhowoftenthesemechanismshavebeenused.92

Finally,thereisaninspectorgeneral(visitador)inthestateprosecutor’s

office,whoismandatedtoexercisesupervisionandcontrol,andconduct

inspectionandevaluationvisitsattheunitsandofficesoftheprosecution.

However,thegeneralinspectorcanonly“formulateobservationsand

recommendationstotheprosecutor”forthefunctioningoftheinstitution.93


III.B. LACK OF PROSECUTORIAL AUTONOMY

WHEN A SYSTEM OPERATES WITHOUT FUNCTIONING LEGAL

CHECKS, IT STRAYS EASILY FROM SERVING ITS INTENDED

PURPOSE. WHO CONTROLS SUCH A SYSTEM WHEN IT IS NOT

PROPERLY ACCOUNTABLE TO DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS?

TYPICALLY, THE ANSWER IS: THOSE WHO CONTROL

APPOINTMENTS, METE OUT DISCIPLINE, AND CAN OFFER OR

WITHHOLD REWARDS. THAT COULD BE THE EXECUTIVE, BUT

COULD ALSO BE OUTSIDE ACTORS WHO OFFER GREATER

COMPENSATION OR POSE GREATER THREATS. THIS HAS BEEN

THE CASE IN GUERRERO. FAILURE TO IMPLEMENT PROPER

INTERNAL CONTROLS IN THE PROSECUTOR’S OFFICE HAS

OPENED THE DOOR TO CORRUPTION, DOMINATION BY THE

EXECUTIVE, AND INFILTRATION BY ORGANIZED CRIME.

UntilAugust2014,theProsecutor’sOfficeofGuerrerowasformallyapartof

thestateexecutive.94Thegovernorproposedashortlistofthreecandidates

tothestateCongress,whichselectedtheprosecutor.However,thegovernor

coulddismisstheprosecutoratanytime,andwasalsoresponsible

forappointinganddismissingdeputyprosecutorsattheprosecutor’s

recommendation.Theprosecutorcoulddismissprosecutionagentsand

“trustedemployees”(trabajadoresdeconfianza)onlywiththegovernor’s

priorconsent.95

Inpractice,thegovernorhashadevenstrongercontroloverappointmentsthan

thoseformallyforeseeninlaw.Guerrerogovernorshavefilledkeypositionswith

“officersincharge”forprotractedperiodsoftimeinsteadofthroughformal

appointmentsthatrequirecongressionalapproval.96Itcanbenosurprisethat

officialsappointedtohighofficeduetotheirpoliticalconnectionsratherthan

substantiveexpertiseareloyaltotheagendasofthepoliticianstowhomthey

owetheirjobs.Intheabsenceorlackofimplementationofcivilservicelaws

andprofessionaltracksforprosecutorsandpolice,thisdynamichasextended

tomorejuniorofficials,whosehiring,promotion,andpotentialdismissalhave

hingedonadherencetotheagendasoftheirbosses.

Strongexecutivecontroloverprosecutionshashadconsequences.The

stateprosecutor’sfailuretoprosecuteperpetratorsofcrimesrelatedto


theDecember2011Ayotzinapaincident,inlinewiththerecommendation

oftheNationalHumanRightsCommission,appearstofitwithformer

GovernorÁngelAguirre’spreferences.97AfterAlfredoÁlvarez(atthetimea

federalpoliceofficer)failedtoappearbeforeastatecongressionalhearing

onthematter,GovernorAguirrefailedtoinsistonjusticeinthecase.98To

thecontrary,heappointedÁlvareztothepositionofpolicechiefofthe

municipalityofAcapulco—thepositionfromwhichhewouldallegedlyorder

newactsoftorture—disregardingtheautonomyofmunicipalofficersto

appointthechiefofmunicipalpolice.99

Inadditiontopoliticalmeddling,securityandcriminaljusticeinstitutionsare

vulnerabletoinfiltrationbyorganizedcrime.Ashestruggledtofendoffhis

impendingousterfollowingthedisappearanceof43Ayotzinapastudentsin

2014,GovernorAguirrehimselfstatedthatthemajorityofpoliceforcesinthe

statehadbeeneithercooptedorinfiltratedbyorganizedcrime.100Further,

withintheprosecutor’soffice,theinvestigativepolicearewidelyperceivedto

serveorganizedcrimeinterests.101

InApril2014,theCongressofGuerreroamendedthestateConstitutionand

inAugust2014passedaneworganiclawoftheprosecutiontoenhance

theindependenceoftheprosecutor’soffice.Thenewoffice(Fiscalía)

issupposedtobeautonomousfromtheexecutive,enjoyingfinancial

independenceandansweringtoafive-membercouncil.Fourofthefive

members,includingtheFiscal,willbedrawnfromprosecutorsandpolice,

withthefifthtobeappointedbyGuerrero’sbarassociations.102

Theprocessofselectingaprosecutorunderthenewsystembeginswithan

opencallforapplications.103TheCongresssendsalistofqualifiedapplicants

tothegovernor,whoreturnsashortlistofthreeindividualstotheCongress.It

appointstheprosecutorbytwo-thirdsmajority.Thegovernormaystilldismiss

theprosecutor,althoughtheCongresscanobject.Thegovernoralsoappoints

deputyprosecutorsnominatedbytheprosecutor.Theprosecutorappoints

allotherofficers.Thenewlawalsoestablishesacivilservicemechanismfor

promotionsalongcareertracks.Accordingtoalawmakerinvolvedintheplan,

thenewofficewillhavemorerespectforthepresumptionofinnocence,have

greaterresponsibilityandauthorityininvestigatingcrimes,andwillbenefit

frommoretraining.104However,thelawhasnoprovisionforlustrationof

officersimplicatedinpasthumanrightsabuses.

ThereformcameintoeffectonSeptember30,2014,105althoughtransitional

provisionsmeantthatanewprosecutor(Fiscal)wasnotsupposedtobe

appointeduntilafteranewgovernortookofficein2015.106Bychance,

however,thelawtookeffectjustasunprecedentedworldattentionwas


focusingonGuerrero’scrisisofdisappearance,murder,corruption,and

impunity.FollowingtheresignationsofGovernorAguirreandProsecutor

IñakiBlanco,thewholeprocesswasinitiatedearly,inNovember2014.It

culminatedonDecember20,2014intheappointmentofMiguelÁngel

GodinezMuñozasthenewFiscalofGuerrero.107Thenewstructureoffers

somehopeofimprovementandamoreindependentprosecutor.Time

willtellwhetherGodinezandhissuccessorsarewillingtoasserttheir

independencefromtheexecutive.

Untilnow,theprosecutionhastakenpoliticalcuesfromtheexecutive,and

accordinglyshowngreatreluctancetoadmittoproblemsofatrocitiesand

humanrightsabusesinthestate.Forexample,onestateofficialtoldtheOpen

SocietyJusticeInitiativeinSeptember2014that,“tortureanddisappearances

arenotaprobleminGuerrero.”108Hefurtherexplainedthatallegedenforced

disappearancesofhumanrightsdefendersoractivistsareactuallyjustrelated

to“internalquarrels,”andinsomecasesofdisappearance,“itturnsoutthat

thedisappearedjustwentawaywithafriend.”109

Suchattitudesfindparallelsamongpowerfulcongressionalleadersinvolved

injusticeissues.JorgeCamacho,presidentoftheJusticeCommission

inGuerrero’sstateCongress,saidthatdespitedozensofenforced

disappearancecasesdocumentedbythestateHumanRightsCommission,

tohisknowledgetherehadbeennoreportsofenforceddisappearancesin

Guerrero.Henotedthattherehadbeenanincreaseinkidnappingsinthe

state,attributingthistosuccessfulgovernmentstrategiestotakeondrug

traffickingbyorganizedcrime,whichinturnforcedtheseorganizations

todiversifytheiractivities.InterviewedeightdaysbeforetheSeptember

2014Ayotzinapakillingsanddisappearancesthatexposedtotheworlda

startlingdepthoforganizedcrimeinfiltrationofstateinstitutions,helauded

theprosecution’ssuccessinfindingmissingpersonsandtakingapart

organizedcrimegroups.“Whencriticizedbyinternationalorganizations,the

prosecutioncanpointtoresults.”110


III.C. LACK OF DEFENSE RIGHTS

WHERE TECHNICALLY COMPETENT AND ADEQUATELY

RESOURCED, DEFENSE COUNSEL INSISTING ON THE RIGHTS

OF SUSPECTS AND ACCUSED PERSONS CAN ACT AS ONE

IMPORTANT CHECK ON PROSECUTION ABUSES. YET IN

GUERRERO THERE HAS BEEN A BROAD FAILURE TO PROVIDE

ADEQUATE DEFENSE, INCLUDING THROUGH CHALLENGING

EVIDENCE OBTAINED THROUGH TORTURE. THE HIGH

NUMBERS OF PRETRIAL DETAINEES HELD IN GUERRERO’S

PRISONS—REPRESENTING 60% OF THE TOTAL INMATE

POPULATION AS OF SEPTEMBER 2014111—MAY, IN PART, BE A

REFLECTION OF THE POOR STATE OF DEFENSE RIGHTS.112

Publicdefendersarepoorlypaidandworkunderdifficultconditions,with

fewmaterialresources.Accordingtoonestatelegislator,“Publicdefenders

earntheleastandworkthemost.”113Publicdefendershaveheavyworkloads

ofaround100caseseach,andtheyarecalledupontorepresentclientsin

criminal,familylaw,andcivilcases,whichimpedestheirabilitytoprovide

aqualitydefense.114Thesituationismuchworseinruralareas.Inoneofthe

state’sjudicialdistricts,Morelos,therearejustthreepublicdefendersto

serveeightmunicipalities.115Thedearthoflegalassistanceisparticularly

acuteinindigenouscommunitiesduetoalackofbilingualpublicdefenders,

translationservices,oradequateinfrastructure.116Theseproblemsare

exacerbatedbyprosecutors’lackofrespectforadherencetojurisdictions;

insomecases,theyhavebroughtchargesagainstindividualsfarfromthe

locationwhereallegedcrimeswerecommitted.117

BeforeAugust2014,theInstituteofPublicDefense(InstitutodeDefensa

PúblicadelEstadodeGuerrero)wasatheoreticallyautonomousoffice

(OrganismoPúblicoDescentralizado),butGuerrero’sgovernorwasthe

presidentofitsgoverningboardandtheinstitute’sadvisorycouncilincluded

arepresentativeoftheexecutive.118Inpractice,theinstituteisdependent

ontheMinistryofInterior,119andultimatelyreliesonthewillofthegovernor

andtheCongressforfunding.120Sucharrangementsarecommon,but

problematic,intheWesternHemisphere.121Theyaremoreproblematicin

placessuchasGuerrero,wheretheexecutivehasbeensoextensivelylinked

toviolationsofdefenserights,includingtheuseoftorture.Anypotential

forbarassociationstoassistinprovidingdefenseisunderminedbytheir


fracturednatureandrivalries.122AsofSeptember1,2014,theInstituteof

PublicDefenseisundertheauthorityoftheJudicialCouncilandhasafive-

memberadvisorycouncilappointedbytheJudicialCouncil.123

WhenaskedaboutthepoorstateoflegalaidinGuerrero,thepresident

oftheJusticeCommissioninGuerrero’sstateCongresssaidthatthe

bodywouldprovideadditionalfundsfordefensein2015.124However,his

counterpartontheHumanRightsCommissionsaidthatCongresshadno

pendingproposalstoaddresstheproblem.125

Beyondthestate’sfailuretoprovideadequateresourcesforlegalaid,many

defensecounselinGuerreroaredeficientinbasiclegalskills.126Theyarenot

familiarwithinternationalcriminallawandhavenoexperiencedefending

complexcases.Theproblemisintertwinedwiththelackofadequate

resources,includingthelackoflegaltrainingsforthedefensethatcould

increasetheircomfortwithinternationallawandcomplexcases.

Threechangesatthefederallevelcanbeexpectedtoleadtosomeenhanced

protectionsfordefenserights.Mexico’sgradualintroductionofanadversarial

system—theNewCriminalJusticeSystem(NuevoSistemadeJusticia

Penal,orNSJP)—inconjunctionwithanew,unifiedcriminalprocedurecode

adoptedbythefederalCongressinMarch2014,shouldstrengthenthe

presumptionofinnocenceandintroducenewsafeguards.127Theycreatea

rightofaccesstodefensecounselfromthemomentofdetention,andrender

inadmissibleconfessionsthataremadeintheabsenceofdefensecounsel,or

inviolationoffundamentalrights.AndinFebruary2014,Mexico’sSupreme

CourtofJusticeruledthatstatescouldnolongerapplyaprolongedformof

pretrialdetentioncalledarraigo,whichhasbeenassociatedwithtortureand

otherill-treatment.128


III.D. LACK OF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE

EVEN IF THERE WERE A PROSECUTOR’S OFFICE WILLING TO

BRING CASES OF TORTURE, DISAPPEARANCE, AND KILLINGS

TO COURT, AND EVEN IF THERE WERE SUFFICIENT DEFENSE

COUNSEL WITH ADEQUATE RESOURCES TO PROTECT

AGAINST PROSECUTORIAL ABUSES, FAIR AND EFFECTIVE

TRIALS FOR ATROCITIES WOULD STILL REQUIRE THE VITAL

ELEMENT OF AN INDEPENDENT JUDICIARY.

Indeed,Guerrerodoeshavesomeofthesafeguardsimportanttoan

independent,honestjudiciary.TheOrganicLawoftheJudicialBranch(Ley

OrgánicadelPoderJudicialdelEstadodeGuerrero)establishesasystemof

randomassignmentofcasestojudges,aswellasdisciplinaryprocedures.129

Thejudicialbranchhasanethicscode,130andalljudiciaryofficialsmust

disclosetheirfinancialassets.131Furthermore,atrequestoftheplenaryof

localcourts,thepresidentofthelocalcourts,andthestateJudicialCouncil

(ConsejodelaJudicatura),ageneralinspectorcarriesoutregularand

randominspectionsofcourtsandjudicialdockets.132Nevertheless,theresult

ofsuchvisitsislimitedtodeliveryofreportsandrecordstotheJudicial

Council,whichshallproceed“asappropriate.”133

JorgeSalazarMarchán,thepresidentoftheHumanRightsCommissionin

thestateCongressdescribedthejudiciaryasperhaps“themostcorrupt

institutioninGuerrero,”andexpressedtheviewthat“theframeworkof

thejudiciarywouldhavetochangeinordertocountertheproblem.”134

Othersagreeandsaythatsuchcorruptionisseenintheeveryday,routine

functioningofthejudiciary,withjudicialofficersexpectingpersonal

paymentsforcopyingfilesorperformingotherservices,andlocallawyers

routinelyobliging.135Theseassessmentsmirrorpopularsentiment.According

tothe2014NationalSurveyofVictimizationandPerceptionofPublic

Security,53.4%ofGuerrero’scitizenshadnoorlittletrustinlocaljudges,

and62.7%believethemtobecorrupt.136Nepotisminthejudiciaryis

rampant.Strikingjudiciaryworkershavecomplainedthatintheabsenceof

aqualificationsandacareertrackdefinedincivilservicelaws,judgeshave

hired30-50familymembers.137

Theexecutivebranch’scontrolofthejudiciaryinGuerrerocanbeseenin

thestoryofMinisteroftheInteriorJesúsMartínezGarnelo.138WhenMartínez

joinedtheexecutivebranchbybecominginteriorministerinJune2013,he


managedtoretainhispositionaspresidentofthestatejudiciary,onleave.

Whatwastohavebeenatwo-month,temporaryarrangementwasextended

indefinitelyinSeptember2013.ÁngelAguirreHerrera,alocaldeputyand

sonofthen-GovernorAguirre,wasinchargeofthelegislativeprocedureto

approveMartinez’sindefiniteleave.139Martínezwaswidelybelievedtostill

controlthereinsofjudicialpowerinGuerrerofromhispositionasGovernor

Aguirre’spowerfulinteriorminister.140Hereportedlystillhadfamilymembers

workingwithinthejudiciary.141

WhenAlbertoLópezCelis,thenewpresidentoftheGuerrerostatejudiciary,

resistedthisarrangement,MartínezallegedlypressedLópeztoapplyfor

aleaveofabsencefromhispositionsaspresidentoflocalcourtsandas

magistrate.Anactingjudge,LambertinaGaleana,tookLópez’splace.142

ManysuspectedthatitwasnotGaleanawhotookcontrolthejudiciary’s

administrationandfinances,butratheritsonce-and-futurepresident,Interior

MinisterJesúsMartínezGarnelo.143

ItwastheAyotzinapadisappearancesayearlaterthatultimatelyledto

anendtothearrangement.When,underimmensepressure,Governor

Aguirrehimselftookaleaveofofficeinthewakeofthedisappearances,

Martínezbrieflyservedasofficerincharge(encargadodedespacho)of

stateexecutiveauthority144beforethestateCongressnamedRogelioOrtega

MartínezasgovernoronOctober26,2014.145Theexecutivebranch’scontrol

ofthejudiciarythroughMartínez’sdualpositionasseniormemberofthe

executiveandjudiciarypresidentin-waitingfinallyendedwhenOrtega

namedanewinteriorministerdayslater.146

Inadditiontothelocalfactorsthatunderminejudicialindependencein

Guerrero,thereremainformalchannelsforpotentialexecutivebranch

influencethatmirrorthosefoundinotherjudicialsystemsaroundtheworld.

UnderthestateConstitutionandtheOrganicLawoftheJudicialBranch

oftheStateofGuerrero(LeyOrgánicadelPoderJudicialdelEstadode

Guerrero),thegovernorretainsaroleintheappointmentofmanyjudgesand

judiciarystaff,someofwhicharesubjecttoratificationbytheCongress.147

Thejudiciarymustalsosubmititsproposedannualbudgettothegovernor,

whoincludesitaspartofhisoverallgovernmentfundingproposaltothe

Congresseachyear.148

Finally,whentheexecutivebranchcannotcontrolthejudgesinGuerrero,it

ignoresthem.InthecaseofMarcoAntonioSuásteguiMuñoz,thecommunity

leaderarrestedafteropposingadamproject,thestategovernmentmoved

himfromastateprisontoafederalmaximumsecurityprisonwithout

botheringtoconsultajudge.149Suásteguihadtofileanamparowithafederal


judgetochallengehistransfer,whichthefederaljudgedeterminedwas

illegalduetoalackofjudicialorder.150

IftheyaretoplaytheircrucialroleinensuringthatGuerrerocaneffectively

andfairlyhandlecasesoftorture,disappearances,killings,andother

atrocities,thestate’sjudgesandjudicialbodieswillneedtobeginasserting

anddefendingtheirindependence.

III.E. NEUTRALIZING THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION

HipólitoLugoCortéswasthechiefinvestigatorofthestateHumanRights

Commissionwhenthebody’sfoundingpresident,JuanAlarcónHernández,

diedinDecember2013.Underapplicablelaw,theCounciloftheHuman

RightsCommissionpromptlyappointedLugoasinterimpresident.151Lugo,

however,hadalreadyraisedgovernmenthacklesbydoingtheforbidden:

discussingincivilsocietyforumswhetheratrocitiesinGuerrerocouldqualify

ascrimesagainsthumanityunderinternationalcriminallaw.152Then,following

thedeathsof15inmatesatthreeGuerreroprisonsinJanuary2014,hemade

commentstothemediaaboutdireprisonconditionsinthestate,153which

promptedtheNationalHumanRightsCommissiontoissueapressrelease

onthematter.154ThesamedaythatLugo’scommentsappearedinthemedia,

GovernorAguirre—inviolationofthelegallydefinedprocedure—informed

thestateHumanRightsCommissionthatLugowastoberemovedasinterim

presidentandthatRamónNavarreteMagdalenoshouldbemadeofficerin

charge(encargadodedespacho).TheHumanRightsCommission’stechnical

committeegrudginglyapprovedNavarrete’sappointmentaweeklater,also

withoutfollowingtheestablishedlegalprocedure.155

Withthisirregularaction,GovernorAguirreguttedtheeffectivenessofthe

lonestateinstitutiontochallengegovernmentactors’involvementinthe

commissionofgraveviolationsofhumanrightsandthejusticesector’s

neartotalfailuretodeliverjusticeforatrocitiescommittedbyanykindof

perpetrator.Bymultipleaccounts,thatwaspreciselyhisintent.156

TheeffectivenessofthestateHumanRightsCommissionwasalreadycramped

throughalackoffundsprovidedbythegovernorandCongress.157Budget

constraintshavelimitedthecommission’sabilitytoconductinvestigationsin

accordancewiththeIstanbulProtocolincasesofallegedtorture.158Budget

constraints—andthelackofpoliticalwilltheyrepresent—havealsolimited

theeffectivenessofthecommission’sCommitteefortheInvestigationof


InvoluntaryDisappearancesofPersons.159Thecommitteeismandatedto

collectandcoordinateinformationincasesofinvoluntarydisappearance,and

followuponinvestigationswithvariousgovernmentagencies.In2007,the

committeeproposedtothen-GovernorZeferinoTorreblancathecreationofa

specialprosecutortoinvestigate537criminalcomplaints(denuncias)between

1961and1979,andevidencesufficienttoprosecute255oftheseDirtyWar

cases.160Theexecutiveneverreactedtotheproposal.

ThestateHumanRightsCommissionhasactuallybeeneffectiveinthepast,

investigatingandmakingrecommendationsonmanyatrocitiesallegedly

perpetratedbyGuerrerostateagentsovertheyears:101investigationsinto

presumedcasesoftortureorcruelanddegradingtreatmentfrom2005through

early2014;54recommendationsfortorturebetween1994andearly2013;and90

investigationsintodisappearancesfrom1990throughearly2014.161Ithasspoken

outonissuesofcrimeandcorruptioninprisonsandotherstateinstitutions,and

alsopressedforrelevantreforms.In2005,thecommissionengagedwithcivil

societyorganizationsinsuccessfullyproposingandadvocatingpassageofaLaw

onEnforcedDisappearancesthatconformstointernationalstandards.162

BUT AFTER AGUIRRE INSTALLED NAVARRETE, THE STATE

HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION WAS NEUTERED. AFTER

NAVARRETE TOOK OVER, REMAINING COMMISSIONERS

STOPPED SHARING INFORMATION OR EVEN GOING TO

MEETINGS FOR FEAR OF SENSITIVE INFORMATION FINDING

ITS WAY TO THE GOVERNOR. FOR SIMILAR REASONS,

THE COMMISSION’S COUNCIL FOR THE PROTECTION

OF HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDERS WAS COMPLETELY

PARALYZED.163 PREVIOUSLY, WHEN THE COMMISSION MADE

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR TORTURE, IT HAD SOME CAPACITY

TO CONDUCT INVESTIGATIONS IN ACCORDANCE WITH

THE ISTANBUL PROTOCOLS, PROVIDING AN IMPORTANT

EVALUATION OF THE ALLEGATIONS, INDEPENDENT FROM

THE PROSECUTION. BY ONE ACCOUNT, HOWEVER, AS

OF SEPTEMBER 2014 THE COMMISSION HAD MADE NO

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR TORTURE DURING THE TERM

OF PROSECUTOR IÑAKI BLANCO (WHO TOOK OFFICE IN

JANUARY 2013).164


Stateofficialscouldstillmakeboldstatementsaboutjusticefortorture:“I

wanttobeveryclearthatweareobligatedtoinvestigateallreportedcrimes

oftorture.”165Butsuchbravadoischeapwhenthebodythatinthepastmade

suchreferralstotheprosecutionisallbutdefunct.AsofApril2015,Navarrete

had,contrarytothenewtorturelaw,failedtoconveneevenoncethe“Technical

CommitteeforAnalysisandEvaluation”thatheissupposedtochair.Then,

inresponsetothedisappearanceof43AyotzinapastudentsinSeptember

2014—arguablythegreatestsinglehumanrightscrisisinthestate’srecent

history—thestateHumanRightsCommissionundertooklittlemorethanposting

avaguecallforjusticeonitswebsite.166Behindthescenes,whenHipólitoLugo

beganinvestigatingtheAyotzinapaincidentasacaseofgravecrimeand

enforceddisappearance,Navarreteremovedhimfromthecase.167Although

Lugohadservedatthecommissionfor21years,includingseveralyearsaschief

investigator,itwasfinallyNavarrete’sinactionandobstructiononAyotzinapa

thatpromptedLugotoresignfromthestateHumanRightsCommission.168

ThestateHumanRightsCommissionwasformallyapartoftheexecutive

branch,eventhoughthereweresupposedtobelegalconstraintsontheability

oftheexecutivetoexertdirectcontroloverthebody.169Congressamended

theConstitutioninApril2014tomakethehumanrightscommission(no

longercalledCODDEHUM)anautonomousentity.170Thenewbody,simply

calledtheHumanRightsCommissionoftheStateofGuerrero(Comisiónde

losDerechosHumanosdelEstadodeGuerrero)willhaveapresidentand

five-memberAdvisoryCouncil,recruitedthroughopencallsandappointed

byCongressforsingletermsoffouryears.171Forthesereformstotake

effect,theCongressandCODDEHUMweretodraftaneworganiclawofthe

humanrightscommission.172InNovember2014,Congressissuedastatement

(exhorto)criticizingRamónNavarreteforfailingtofileadraftofthenew

organiclaw.173OnMarch20,2015,theCongresspassedlegislationcreatingthe

newinstitution.174AndinJuly1,2015thestateCongressofficiallyappointed

NavarreteaspresidentoftheHumanRightsCommissionofGuerrero.175

III.F. CONGRESSIONAL FOOTDRAGGING

Astheprecedingpageshaveshown,therearemanychallengestothepursuit

ofjusticeinGuerrero,includinglackofindependentinvestigations,lackof

prosecutorialautonomy,lackofdefenserights,ajudiciarytoocloselyaligned

withthegovernment,andaneuteredHumanRightsCommission.One

additionalchallengecanbefoundinthestate’sCongress,whichhaslargely

failedtodoitspartinensuringthatGuerrerocandeliverjusticeforatrocities.


Thisfailureismanifestinthreeways:Congress’sreluctancetoproperly

defineatrocitiesinthelegalframework;itsfailuretoinsistonaccountability

injusticesectorinstitutions;anditsdelaysinpassingreformsandproviding

fundingforGuerrero’stransitiontoanadversarialjusticesystem,withits

greatersafeguardsfordefenserights.

TherearereasonstodoubtthestateCongress’scommitmenttoimproving

Guerrero’scapacitytoinvestigateandprosecuteatrocitiesthatimplicatestate

agents.Althoughin2005thestateCongresspassedalawdefiningthecrimeof

enforceddisappearanceinaccordancewithinternationalstandards,itapproved

thedefinitioninaspeciallawinsteadofincludingitdirectlyinthecriminalcode.

Asaresult,prosecutorshavesaidthismakesitimpossibleforthemtoapplythe

definition,176eventhoughthecriminalcodeexpresslyreferstothedisappearance

law.177Evenifprosecutorsweremakingspeciouslegalarguments,itwasn’t

untilAugust2014thatCongressremovedtheprosecutors’excusebyexpressly

acknowledgingthatcrimessetforthinspeciallawsaretobeinvestigatedunder

aspecialstatute,complementedbythecriminalcode.178AsofSeptember2014,

aproposalwaspendingintheCongresstoofferadditionalclaritybyamending

thecriminalcodetoincludeenforceddisappearanceasareplacementtothe

speciallaw.Butbyoneinsideaccount,therewasstrongresistancefromthe

advisortoonelegislatorwhofeltthathewasprotectingtheinterestsofjudges

andprosecutorsbyblockingthereform.179AsofJune2015,thereformproposal

wasstillawaitingcongressionalaction.

Similarly,CongressignoredthestateHumanRightsCommissionandhuman

rightsNGOswhosaidthatthetorturedefinitionwouldhavetobeincludedin

thecriminalcode,andnotpassedasaspeciallaw,ifprosecutorsweretouse

it.180RaymundoDíaz,fromthehumanrightsorganizationColectivocontrala

Torturatoldreporters,“Idonotrecallanyinvitation(fromthelocalCongress)

toapublicenquiry;theydidnotevenshowusthefinalversionofthelaw

beforeapprovingit.”181

Guerrero’sCongresshasallowedbaselessprosecutionobjectionstodelay

codificationofthecrime,limitthescopeofthedefinition,andithasincluded

thissamein-builtexcusefortheprosecution’sfailuretoapplythelaw.Until

2014,torturewasonlydefinedinthelawcreatingthestateHumanRights

Commission,whichhadamandatetoinvestigateallegedtortureandrefer

casestotheprosecution.182However,underanarrowinterpretationof

thatlaw,ifprosecutorswantedtoopenaninvestigation,theyfirsthadto

reclassifycasestotheclosestanaloguesinthecriminalcode,typicallyillegal

deprivationofliberty,illegaldetention,injuries,orabuseofpower.Asone

prosecutorexplained,therewasnoneedtochangethelegalframeworkto


includeadefinitionoftortureitself.Doingso,theprosecutorsaid,“would

onlybetocomplywithinternationalstandards.”183

InJanuary2014,thestateCongresspassedtheLawonthePrevention,

PunishmentandEradicationofTortureintheStateofGuerrero(Leyparaprevenir,

sancionaryerradicarlatorturaenelEstadodeGuerrero),184butthenewlawdoes

notcomplywithinternationalstandards,oreventhestandardsestablishedinthe

federallawontorture.185Humanrightsactivistsclaimthatgovernmentrushedto

adoptastuntedlawontortureinordertodivertattentionfromalargenumbers

ofkillingsinstateprisonsthatsamemonth.186ThepresidentoftheJustice

CommissioninthestateCongressinsiststhatthetorturelawpassedasaspecial

lawinordertounderscoreitsimportance,andimplicitlyplacesblameforitslack

ofapplicationonprosecutors,notingthatthenewcriminalcodereferencesall

speciallaws,includingthelawsontortureandenforceddisappearance.187But

askedabouttheshortcomingsthatareclearlycongressionalresponsibilities—for

example,whythetorturelawdoesn’tadheretointernationalstandards—hesaid

hehad“noexplanation,”andalsonoplantorevisitthewording.188

Inotherways,too,congressionalinactionhasleftuncheckedprevious

governors’abilitytoexertimpropercontroloverjusticesectorinstitutions.Ithas

madenoefforttoreininextensiveimmunitiesforpublicofficials.Whenasked

aboutthedouble-hattingofJesúsMartínezGarneloasinteriorministerwhile

onleaveaspresidentofthejudiciaryandpresidentoftheSupremeCourtof

Justice,CongressmanJorgeCamacho,thepresidentofthestateCongress’s

JusticeCommission,saidhesawnoproblems,insistingthattheministerhadno

influenceoverthejudiciary.189Further,theCongressdidnotmeaningfullyobject

whenGovernorAguirreappointedhisallytoheadthestateHumanRights

Commission.WhileCamachosaysthatrepresentativessentaletterofprotestto

thegovernor,healsobelievesthatthegovernor’shand-pickedofficerincharge

ofthecommission,RamónNavarrete,“istherightpersonfortheposition,”and

thattheCongresshadnochoicebuttoaccepttheirregularappointmentafter

thefact,whiledocumentingthatthegovernor“exceededhisauthority.”190Inthe

future,suchwrongdoingbytheexecutivecouldbeaddressedthroughanew

liabilitylawforpublicservants:inFebruary2015,Congresspassedabillsetting

standardsforcriminal,civil,andotherformsofliability.191Butitremainstobe

seenifthelawwilleverbeapplied.

WhilestillactivelyservingaspresidentoftheSupremeCourtofJustice

inOctober2012,JesúsMartínezGarnelocriticizedthestateCongressfor

itsfailureinadvancingGuerrero’stransitiontothenewadversarialjustice

system.Thatreformwasrequiredbya2008constitutionalreformatthe

federallevel,whichrequiresthatthetransitionatthefederallevelandin


everystatebecompletedbyJune2016.Hespecificallycomplainedthat

Guerrero’sstateCongresshadletatleastsevendifferentimportantelements

ofthereformlapseintoinactivefiles(archivomuerto).192Indeed,bythat

timeGuerrerohaddoneverylittleatalltomakethetransition.193In2013,

theResearchCenterforDevelopment(CentrodeInvestigaciónparael

Desarrollo—CIDAC),anorganizationmonitoringthetransitionfromalargely

paper-based,inquisitorialsystemtotheoral,adversarialsystemnationally,

foundthatGuerrerowaslastofallMexicanstatesinimplementation.194

Allstates,includingGuerrero,havereceivedfederalfundstosupporttheir

transitiontotheadversarialsystemthroughtheTechnicalSecretariatfor

JusticeSectorReform(SecretaríaTécnicadelConsejodelaCoordinación

paralaImplementacióndelSistemadeJudiciaPenal—SETEC)withinthe

federalInteriorMinistry.However,inGuerrero,theCongressearmarkedthose

fundsforotherpurposes.195Accordingtooneaccount,onceJesúsMartínez

Garnelotookaleaveofabsencefromthejudiciaryinmid-2013toserveas

GovernorAguirre’sinteriorminister,hispreviousimpatiencewiththeslow

transitiontotheadversarialsystemcooled.196Thepresidentofthestate

Congress’sJusticeCommissionallowsthattherehasbeenbadplanningfor

theimplementationoftheadversarialsysteminGuerrero,butalsoclaims

that,inpart,thedelayshavebeenintentional,andthatGuerrero’sCongress

hasconsciouslyavoidedarushtoimplementthesystemsothatitcould

watchsuchforerunningstatesasChihuahuaandlearnfromtheirmistakes.197

ThepresidentoftheCongressionalJusticeCommitteefurtherstatedthat

Congresswillallocatefundsin2015tosupportimplementationofthetransition,

pledgingthatGuerrerowillmeettheJune2016deadline,andnotbethelast

statetodoso.198Butevenifthishappens,thecostsofpreviousdelaysby

Congresswillbesubstantial.Whereverthenewsystemisnotinplace,crimes

willcontinuetobechargedundertheoldsystemandneedtobehandled

accordinglyuntiltheirresolution.Combinedwithalargejudicialbacklog,

especiallyinmurdercases,thismeansthatGuerrerowillbeprocessingcases

usingparallelsystemsforyearstocome.199Beyondtheproblemofexacerbated

judicialinefficiencies,thismeansthatthosechargedundertheoldsystemwill

nothavebenefitfromtheadversarialsystem’sbettersafeguardsfordefense

rights,andmaybemorepronetotortureandill-treatment.

Clearly,thepursuitofjusticeforatrocitiesinGuerreroishamperedbyanoverall

absenceofaccountability,includingthelackofindependentinvestigations,

prosecutorialautonomy,defenserights,andjudicialindependence,among

othershortcomings.Butthereareadditionalhurdlesrelatedtotheshortageand

misallocationofresources,asthenextsectionindicates.

40 BROKEN JUSTICE IN MEXICO’S GUERRERO STATEWEAK CAPACITY AND MISALLOCATED RESOURCES

IV.WEAKCAPACITYANDMISALLOCATEDRESOURCES

THE MOST FUNDAMENTAL OBSTACLES TO ACHIEVING JUSTICE

FOR ATROCITIES IN GUERRERO ARE POLITICAL IN NATURE. A

POWERFUL EXECUTIVE HAS SHOWN NO WILL TO PROPERLY

INVESTIGATE AND PROSECUTE STATE AGENTS INVOLVED

IN TORTURE, DISAPPEARANCES, KILLINGS, AND OTHER

GRAVE VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS. THE JUDICIARY

LACKS INDEPENDENCE AND IS TOO CLOSELY ALIGNED

WITH THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH. THE STATE’S HUMAN RIGHTS

COMMISSION HAS BEEN RENDERED LARGELY TOOTHLESS AND

ITS CONGRESS DRAGS ITS FEET ON IMPORTANT REFORMS.

Inthiscontext,thequestionofwhetherGuerrero’sjusticesystemhasthe

capacitytohandlethecomplexitiesofaddressingatrocitycrimehaslargely

goneunanswered.Totheextentthatthesystemhasbeentested,ithasbeen

almostentirelyinproceedingsagainstnon-stateactorsthathavebeendeeply

taintedbytheprosecution’sroutinerelianceontorturetoproduceforced

confessions.Whatwouldhappenifthepoliticalsituationweretochange?There

aremanyindicationsthatevenifprosecutors,police,judges,andotherjustice

sectoroperatorswantedtopursueseriousviolentcrimecasesappropriately,

theywouldnonethelesslackthecapacityandresourcestodoso.

InexaminingcapacitiesandresourcesinGuerrero,itisimportanttonotethat

thesituationvariesindifferentpartsofthestate.Attheoperationallevel,

thereareresourceshortfallsacrossthestate,andwagesareloweverywhere,

butnorthernpartsofthestatehavebetterinfrastructureandequipment,

andarebetterpreparedtoaccommodatethetransitiontotheadversarial

system.200Other,ruralregionslackbasicjusticesectorstaff,infrastructure,

andequipment.Evidencesuggeststhatorganizedcrimeorganizations


controlnumerousmunicipalitiesandregions,whichmakesinvestingin

justicesectordevelopmentallthemorefraught.Thelackofcapacityand

misallocationofscarceresourcesaffectthestate’sprosecutorsandpolice,its

judiciary,andevenitsinteractionswiththepublic.

IV.A. PROSECUTORS AND POLICE

IN GUERRERO, MANY PROSECUTORS AND POLICE STRUGGLE

TO DEAL APPROPRIATELY EVEN WITH COMMON CRIME, IN

LARGE PART BECAUSE THEY SIMPLY HAVE THE WRONG

SKILL SETS AND BACKGROUNDS. THE WHOLE CONCEPT

OF POLICING IN THE STATE, AS IN MEXICO AS A WHOLE,

REVOLVES AROUND REACTING WITH FORCE TO INCIDENTS

(INCLUDING LEGAL MANIFESTATIONS OF POLITICAL DISSENT),

RATHER THAN PREVENTING OR INVESTIGATING CRIME.

Manyseniorprosecutorsandpolicehavemilitarybackgrounds,andwere

shapedbydistinctdoctrines,legalcultures(disciplinamilitar),andrulesonuse

offorce—oralackofthem.201WiththeApril2014transformationofthestate

prosecutor’sofficetoatheoreticallymoreindependentFiscalía,thepatternis

continuing.Further,bymanyaccounts,prosecutorsarefrequentlyhiredonthe

basisnotonlyofamilitarybackground,butpersonalconnections.

Totheextentthatprosecutorsandpolicearehiredforsuchreasons,and

nottheirskills,itcanbenosurprisewhenitturnsouttheylacktheability

toinvestigateandprosecuteproperly.Forexample,whenpressedonwhy

theyhaven’tsolvedanyofGuerrero’smanyenforceddisappearancecases,

stateprosecutorsalternatelysaythatthatit’sbecausethelegalframework

isinadequate,orbecausetheysimplycan’tfindthedisappearedpersons.202

Settingasidetheprosecution’strackrecordofreluctancetopursuecases

againststateagents(insomecases,individualsfromtheirownranks),itis

notclearthatprosecutorswouldevenknowwhatstepstotakeinsuchan

investigation.Theyhaveoftenreliedonthefamiliesofthedisappearedto

taketheleadininvestigations.203


INTERVIEWS IN GUERRERO WITH STATE OFFICIALS AND CIVIL

SOCIETY ACTORS REVEALED THAT MANY PROSECUTORS

AND THEIR INVESTIGATORS LACK SOME OF THE BASIC SKILLS

AND KNOWLEDGE NECESSARY FOR THE INVESTIGATION OF

COMMON CRIME—LET ALONE MORE COMPLEX CRIMES.204

MANY LACK POLICIES ON CASE SELECTION TO GUIDE

PROSECUTORS IN PRIORITIZING CASES. THEY DON’T KNOW

HOW TO PLAN AN INVESTIGATION IN COMPLEX CASES,

AND LACK SPECIFIC POLICIES AND PROTOCOLS FOR

INFORMATION AND CASE MANAGEMENT.

Manyhavepoorskillsincaseanalysis,whichisparticularlydetrimentalin

atrocitycases.Theyareunfamiliarwithinternationalstandardsontorture

anddisappearances,andhavenofamiliaritywithrelevantjurisprudence.

Manyprosecutorsareunskilledintheproperuseofforensicevidence,or

documentaryevidence,andhavenocapacitytoperforminvestigations

consistentwiththeIstanbulProtocolincasesofallegedtorture.Theyareill-

preparedtofunctionintheadversarialsystem.

Theylackskillsorprotocolsfortheproperquestioningofwitnesses,including

vulnerablewitnesses.Andmanyareclearlyunawareofrequirementsto

respectdefenserights.Fewprosecutorsandinvestigatorsarefamiliarwiththe

rulingbyMexico’sSupremeCourtfromNovember2013,ontheprocedurefor

theassessmentoftortureallegationsduringprosecutorialinvestigations,which

increasedthelikelihoodoftestimonygainedthroughtorturebeingexcluded

fromtrials.205TheyarealsounawareofGuerrero’sownlegalprohibitionagainst

obtainingevidencethoughtorture.206

Toaddressthisdiresituation,thepresidentoftheJusticeCommissioninthe

stateCongresssaysthatnewinvestigatorsneedtoberecruitedandproperly

trained.207Otherspointtotheextensiveinfiltrationofthepolicebyorganized

crimetomakethepointthatevenpriortothehiringofnewprosecution

police,structuralfailuresmustfirstbetackled.208

Beyondquestionsofskillsandprocedures,ifstateprosecutorsandpolice

areevertobeabletoeffectivelyinvestigateatrocities,seriousresource

shortcomingswillneedtobeaddressed.Prosecutorshavenospecificresources

orbudgettodealwithenforceddisappearanceinvestigations,andmustrely

onexistingstaff.209Prosecutionforensicservicesarecentralized,andforcrimes

committedinremotetowns,ofteninaccessible.Incasesofkillings,bodiesmust


betransportedfromacrossthestatetomorguesinAcapulcoorChilpancingo,

andthoseadvocatinginvestigationsarecalledupontopayforthetransport.210

Intherural,largelyindigenousMorelosjudicialdistrictofGuerrero,thereare

justtwoforensicdoctorsforcriminalinvestigations,bothofwhomaremen—

includingthedoctorresponsibleforinvestigatingsexualcrimes.Thereareno

interpretersormedicalstafftoservevictimneeds.Prosecutorslackthemost

basicofsupplies,andaskvictimstoprovidesuchitemsaspaper,andpayfor

fuelforthepolicecarinordertoenforcearrestwarrants.Themoremoneygiven

byavictim,themoreattentionacasereceives.211

IV.B. JUDICIARY

Theprosecutionhasintroducedmanymurdercasesintothecourts,but

itsfailuretobringmanyotheratrocitiesbeforethecourtsmeansthatto

alargedegree,thejudiciary’scapacitiestohandlethemremainuntested.

Performancetodateprovidesgoodreasontobelievethatifprosecutors

begandoingtheirjobsbetter,manyjudgeswouldstraintohandletorture

anddisappearancecases,justastheyhavestruggledwithmurdercases.212

Further,whilejudgesarewellpaid,theirstaffmembersarenot.Thishas

ledtojudiciarystaffstrikesandprotests,tensionbetweenjudgesandstaff,

andhasmadethejudiciarymoresusceptibletocorruption.Bribesmayflow

morefreelywhenthestakesarehigher,astheyareinatrocitycasesthatmay

involvestateagentsororganizedcrime.

Judgesandtheirstaffshavesomebasicskillsinconductinglegalresearch,

matchingpresentedevidenceagainstthecharges,weighingevidence,and

draftingjudgments.Judiciarystaffmaintainalargelypaper-basedsystemof

preparingandfilingjudicialrecords,anddosowithsomecompetence.But

eveninverysimpleareas,judgeshaveshownlapses.Judgessometimesfailto

verifytheageofaccusedpersonsappearingbeforethem,andtherehavebeen

caseswherejudgessentminorstoregularprisoninsteadofseparatejuvenile

facilities.213Judgeshavefacedcriticismforfailingtoexpediteproceedings,

whichhasexacerbatedtheproblemofpretrialdetentioninthestate.214

Theseseriousshortcomingscastdoubtonmanyjudges’abilitytohandle

atrocitycases.Inpartduetoalackofresources(discussedbelow),Guerrero’s

judgesstruggleunderanenormousbacklogofmurdercases.215Mostjudges

andtheirstaffsareunfamiliarwithinternationalstandardsongravehuman

rightsviolationsemanatingfromtheInter-Americansystemorothersources.

Manyareunskilledinhandlingtestimonyfromvulnerablewitnesses,or

evaluatingforensicanddocumentaryevidence.Theyhavehadsomelimited


traininginpreparationforthetransitiontotheadversarialsystem,butlack

knowledgeandexperienceinsuchareasashandlingdisclosurerequirements.

Mosthavenoexperiencewithhearingcomplexcases.

Forthemostpart,thejudiciaryhasadequatestaff,infrastructure,and

equipmentinurbanareasandtouristzones,butthereareresourceshortfalls

inruralregions.Officeequipmentisbasic,andtechnicaldifficultiesmeanthat

staffroutinelyrelyonpersonalratherthanofficialemailaccountsinorder

toperformtheirjobs.Thecourtshavetoofewinterpreters,whichcreates

additionalbarrierstotheparticipationofindigenouscitizensinthejustice

processasplaintiffs,witnesses,oraccused.

IV.C. PUBLIC COMMUNICATION AND OUTREACH

Intheaftermathofthedisappearanceof43Ayotzinapastudentsin

September2014,itwasobviousthatthefamiliesofthedisappearedand

mostofthepopulationofthestatehadnoconfidenceinthejusticesystem

toappropriatelyinvestigateacrimeperpetratedbystateofficials.The

problemsofviolentcrime,corruption,andimpunityhavebeenentrenched

inGuerreroforsolongthatevenapartfromthespecificsofthecase,state

governmentofficialsenjoyedlimitedtrust.

Ifthegovernmentweretoembracereformstoimprovethefunctioningof

thejusticesystemsothat,amongotherthings,ithadanabilitytoeffectively

handleatrocities,itwouldstillfacetheimmensechallengeofgainingpublic

trustinthelong-discreditedsystem.Todoso,thejusticesectorwouldneedthe

capacitytocommunicatewithcitizenseffectivelytoshareinformationrelated

tothesystemandaboutindividualcases,andtodemonstrateanewopenness

tolisteningtoconstituentconcerns.Guerrero’sjusticesystemcurrentlylacks

thiscapacity.EachofficialinstitutionofGuerrerohasasocialcommunications

departmentthatmaintainswebsites,butthoseareirregularlyupdated.Thestate

HumanRightsCommissiondoesnotpostitsrecommendationsonline.Tothe

extentthereisinformationonjustice-sectordevelopmentsonline,itisnotwell

organized,oftenverygeneralinnature,andusuallyoutofdate.Perhapsnot

surprisinglyinastatewithsuchapoliticizedjusticesector,itislargelypoliticians,

notprosecutors,whocommunicatewiththepublicaboutcrimeandjustice

issues.Whilethismaynotdeviatemuchfrominternationalstandardpractice,if

Guerreroweretoadoptdeepjusticesectorreforms,improvedtransparencyand

communicationcouldplayanimportantpartinestablishingpublictrust.

45 BROKEN JUSTICE IN MEXICO’S GUERRERO STATELEGAL FRAMEWORK

V.LEGALFRAMEWORK

SOME STATE OFFICIALS CLAIM THAT GUERRERO’S LEGAL

FRAMEWORK IS ADEQUATE FOR THE INVESTIGATION AND

PROSECUTION OF ATROCITIES, A VIEW SHARED BY AN

INFLUENTIAL MEMBER OF THE STATE CONGRESS.216 IN SOME

RESPECTS, GUERRERO’S LEGAL FRAMEWORK PROVIDES

A SUFFICIENT BASIS FOR WILLING PROSECUTORS WHO

WOULD SEEK TO INVESTIGATE AND PROSECUTE ATROCITIES.

BUT IN OTHER RESPECTS, NOTABLY TORTURE, IT FALLS

SIGNIFICANTLY SHORT.

Thestatecriminalcodeincludesastandarddefinitionofthecrimeofmurder,

butperpetrationbyapublicservantisnotconsideredanaggravating

circumstance.217Thecodeandotherlawsencompassactsofsexualviolence,

includingrape,sexualabuse,forcedsterilization,andforcedpregnancy.218In

January2015legislatorspassedavictims’lawharmonizedwiththefederal

victims’law.219

Guerrero’sstateCongresspassedalawonenforceddisappearancesin

2005withinputfromthestateHumanRightsCommissionandcivilsociety

thatmeetsinternationalstandards.220Thestate’sdefinitionofenforced

disappearanceconformstothatintheInter-AmericanConventionon

ForcedDisappearanceofPersons.221Specifically,thestatedefinitionof

thecrimecontainstheelementsofdeprivationofaperson’sorpersons’

liberty;thattheactisperpetratedbystateagentsorthoseactingwithstate

authorization,support,oracquiescence;andthatfollowingthedeprivation

ofliberty,thereisalackofinformationorrefusaltoacknowledgethe

deprivation,ortoprovideinformationontheperson’slocation,sothat

theyhavenorecoursetolegalremediesorproceduralguarantees.Unlike

Guerrero’storturelaw,thestatelawonenforceddisappearancealignswith

internationalstandardsbyexplicitlystatingthatthecrimeisnotrestrictedto

anyspecificmotivations.Therearenoexceptionalcircumstancesthatwould

allowforactionsconstitutingenforceddisappearance,andthelawcannotbe


waivedforanyreason,includingamnesty.222Nevertheless,althoughthestate

HumanRightsCommissionhasprovidedsometrainingonthelaw,Guerrero’s

prosecutor’sofficehasfoundawaytowaivethelawineverycircumstance

byclaimingthatitcannotapplyspeciallaws(asopposedtocrimesdirectly

definedwithinthetextofthecriminalcode).223

InJanuary2014,Guerrero’sstateCongresspassedanewlawonthe

preventionoftorture,butstaffatthestateHumanRightsCommissionview

thedefinitionoftortureunderthenewlawaslimitedandinadequate.224

Thenewlawdefinestortureastheinflictingofphysical,psychological,or

sexualsufferingonapersonbyanypublicservantinthedirectorindirect

exerciseoftheirpowers.Thedefinitioncodifiestortureasoccurringforthree

specificpurposes:obtaininginformationoraconfessionfromthatperson

orathirdperson;punishingthepersonforanacthehascommittedoris

suspectedtohavecommitted;orcoercingthepersontoengageinorrefrain

fromengaginginaparticularconduct.225TheInter-AmericanConventionto

PreventandPunishTorturedoesnotrestrictthedefinitionofthecrimeto

suchalimitedsetofintentionsbytheperpetrator.226

Thenewlawincludesalistofaggravatingcircumstances:tortureofwomen,

children,theincapacitated,theelderly,andthedisabled,andtorturecausing

permanentphysicalorpsychologicaldamage;insuchcases,penaltiesare

increasedby50%.Tortureinvolvingrapemeansthatbothchargescanbe

pursued.227Butthepenaltiesfortortureestablishedinthenewlaw—from4to

12yearsimprisonment,withthepossibilityofearlyrelease—arenotnecessarily

greaterthanthoseforlesseroffenses,suchastheabuseofauthority.228

Thenewtorturelawmakesthenon-reportingoftortureacriminaloffense.229

Italsoestablishesthat,withinthelimitedsetofpossibleintentionsbythe

perpetrator,tortureisnotallowedunderanyconditions:notininstancesof

internalpoliticalinstability,nottosupporturgentinvestigationsorinany

otherexceptionalcircumstances,notinresponsetoorders,andnotduring

insurrectionsinprisonfacilities.230However,incontrasttoGuerrero’slaw

onenforceddisappearances,thetorturelawincludesnoprovisiononthe

criminalliabilityofseniorofficialswhoarelegallyobligatedtopreventthe

perpetuationoftorture,butfailtoexercisetheirautoritytodoso.231

Thelawcreateda“TechnicalCommitteeforAnalysisandEvaluation,”which

meetstwiceayeartoadviseprosecutorsontheinvestigationofalleged

casesoftortureandtomonitortheirprogress.232Thecommitteeiscomprised

almostexclusivelyofgovernmentofficials,withonlyasinglerepresentative

ofcivilsociety.233Civilsocietyorganizationshavecriticizedthecommittee

becauseitlackstheauthoritytoconductautonomousinvestigations


ofofficialssuspectedoftorture,andbecausewithgovernmentofficials

dominatingitsranks,itremainsanexercisein“authoritiesinvestigating

authorities.”234

Inpractice,thenewtorturelawhashadnoapparentimpactinitsfirstyear.By

interpretingthelawtomeanthattortureonlyhappensduringtheinvestigative

phaseofacriminalcase,prosecutorshavenarrowedanalreadynarrow

definition,andnotpursuedevenasinglecriminalprosecution.Theadvisory

technicalcommitteehasfulfilledcritics’fearsofitspoliticizationbyfailingto

conveneevenonce,despitealegalrequirementtomeettwiceperyear.235

Despiteitsobviousshortcomings,prospectsforimprovingthenewlawappear

remote.TheheadoftheHumanRightsCommissioninthestateCongress

insistedthatthelaw’sdefinitionoftorturewasgood,andthatitwasnecessary

tolimitthelaw’sdefinitionoftorturetothreespecificpurposesinorderforthe

lawtobepassed.Askedwhetherthatmightberevisited,hesaid,“Idon’thave

aninterestinchangingthedefinitionoftorture,andneitherdoothersonthe

congressionalHumanRightsCommittee.”236AsofJuly2015,lawmakershad

madenochangestothetorturelaw.

48 BROKEN JUSTICE IN MEXICO’S GUERRERO STATEMANIPULATION OF JURISDICTIONAL AMBIGUITY

VI.MANIPULATIONOFJURISDICTIONALAMBIGUITY

AsalleyesturnedtoGuerreroaftertheSeptember2014killingsand

disappearancesof43teachingstudents,thefamiliesofthedisappeared

weremakingurgentanddesperatepleasforvolunteerstohelpthemfind

theirsons.Thefamiliesknewthatfederalandstatepolicehadkilledand

torturedadifferentsetofAyotzinapastudentsinDecember2011.Withthis

memory,andasallegationsquicklyemergedthatheavilyimplicatedpolice

andorganizedcrimefiguresinthelatestatrocities,thefamilieshadevery

reasontodistruststateauthorities.Nevertheless,iftherewastobecriminal

accountabilityforthedeathsanddisappearances,therecouldbenoother

optionthanstate-conductedinvestigations.Woulditbestateorfederal

authoritieswhotookresponsibilityfortheinvestigation?Intheensuing

days,theansweremergedthatitwouldbeamish-mashofboth:adisplayof

jurisdictionalcomplexityanditsmanipulation.

IN MEXICO’S FEDERAL SYSTEM, STATES HAVE BROAD

AUTHORITY TO CONDUCT CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS. BUT

WHEN A CASE INVOLVES THE PERPETRATION OF FEDERAL

CRIMES OR WHEN A LOCAL CRIME IS RELEVANT FOR A

FEDERAL INVESTIGATION, FEDERAL PROSECUTORS MAY

ASSERT JURISDICTION.237 SO WHILE MEXICO DOES HAVE SOME

LAWS THAT PROVIDE SPECIFIC GUIDANCE IN DETERMINING

JURISDICTION, THERE IS EXTENSIVE ROOM FOR OFFICIALS

TO EXERCISE DISCRETION, OFTEN ARBITRARILY. A LACK

OF CLEAR RULES HAS OPENED SPACE FOR THE IMPROPER

ASSERTION OF JURISDICTION, OR A FAILURE TO ASSERT

JURISDICTION WHEN DOING SO WOULD BE IN THE BEST

INTERESTS OF JUSTICE.


WithregardtotheAyotzinapacase,thestateprosecutor’sofficeopened

aninvestigationintofirst-degreemurderandattemptedmurder,andby

lateOctober2014hadbroughtchargesagainstfugitiveIgualaMayorJosé

LuisAbarcaand23municipalpolice.238Meanwhile,usingitsprerogativeto

assertjurisdictionincasesinvolvingorganizedcrime,theFederalProsecution

(PGR)openedaninvestigationleadingtoarrestwarrantsfortheleaderofthe

GuerrerosUnidoscrimegroup239and25othersonchargesrelatedtoorganized

crime,possessionofillegalfirearms,kidnapping,crimesagainsthealth,and

bribery.240Additionalarrestsfollowed.ExtensivemediareportslinkedAbarca

andhiswifetoGuerrerosUnidosmembers,andonOctober22,theFederal

ProsecutorannouncedhisrequestforfederalwarrantsforAbarcaandhiswife,

aswellasMinisterofPublicSecurityforIgualaFelipeFloresVelazquez.241

Byallaccounts,stateandfederalinvestigatorswereexaminingthesame

eventsandmanyofthesameactors.Butinthoseearlydaysfollowingthe

disappearances,whennooneknewthestudents’fateandtimewasofthe

essence,prosecutorsfromthetwojurisdictionswereformallyengaging

inentirelyseparateinvestigations.Theyconductedinterviewsseparately,

carriedoutseparateforensicinvestigations,failedtocommunicatewitheach

other,andissuedcontradictorystatementsaboutthestateoftheirfindings.

Forexample,whiletheFiscalíaofGuerreronotedtherolesoffederalArmy,

NavyandFederalPoliceinfindingbodiesandintimidatingvictimsinthe

case,federalaccountsomittedsuchinformation.242Surely,thefederal

governmentdidnotwanttobroadcastitsowndesperatelyineptandabusive

investigation,whichwaslargelybasedoncoercedconfessionsandtorture.243

AsthePGRstatedthatitwasonlyrelyingoninformationgatheredthrough

itsowninvestigations,itremainedunclearwhetherandhowanyevidence

collectedbylocalinvestigatorsimmediatelyaftertheattack—including

forensicevidenceandinterviewswithvictims,witnesses,andmunicipal

police—mightbeused.244

Thelackofcoordinationpreventedprosecutorsfrommakingthebestuse

ofavailablelegalframeworks.Federalprosecutorsapproachedthestudent

disappearancesasacaseofkidnappingratherthanenforceddisappearance

becauseofgravedeficienciesinthefederallawonenforceddisappearances.

Atruecollaborationinthefederalandstateinvestigationsmighthave

allowedGuerreroprosecutorstopursuechargesofenforceddisappearance

underthestate’ssuperiordefinitionofthecrime.

Thefailuretocoordinateoverlappingfederalandstateinvestigations

wasnotuniquetotheAyotzinapacase,oreventoGuerrero’sexperience

withthefederalgovernment.245Ayotzinapawassimplyamuchmore


visiblemanifestationofanongoingphenomenon.246Sometimes,state

prosecutorsopenacaseandthensendcopiesofthefile(desglose)tothe

PGR’sspecializedunitonorganizedcrime(SubprocuraduríaEspecializada

enInvestigacióndeDelincuenciaOrganizada,SEIDO),incasethePGR

wantstoassertjurisdiction.Ifitdoes,thenstateprosecutorstypically

stoptheirinvestigationsandhearnomoreaboutthecourseofthefederal

investigation.SometimesthePGRsendscasestostateprosecutors,butin

thosecircumstances,SEIDOexpectstobekeptapprisedofdevelopments.

Totheextentthereiscollaboration,ittakesplacebeforethetransferofthe

casefile,whenthereceivingauthoritymayasktheofficethatinitiatedthe

investigationtotakespecificinvestigativestepspriortothetransfer.The

OpenSocietyJusticeInitiativeisunawareofanycaseinwhichtherehas

beenatruejointinvestigation.247

Totheextentthatthereiscommunicationbetweenstateandfederal

prosecutors,itislikelytobepersonaland“informal.”248Andtherearemany

personalconnectionstoworkwith.Manyseniorjustice-sectorofficialsin

Guerrerohavebackgroundsinthefederalprosecutor’sofficeorthefederal

securityapparatus.GuerreroProsecutorIñakiBlancoCabrerahadpreviously

servedasheadofthePGR’sregionalofficeinthestate.249Hissuccessor,

MiguelÁngelGodinez,previouslyworkedinSEIDOandotherpositionsatthe

PGR.250Andseniorpolicethroughoutthestate,includingformerAcapulco

PoliceChiefAlfredoÁlvarez,havealsohadexperienceatthefederallevel.251

CommunicationsrelatedtotheAyotzinapacasebetweenseniorofficials

inGuerreroandthePGRincludedtextmessagessentviathesmartphone

applicationWhatsApp.252Buttheseinformalconnectionsarenoreplacement

forthekindofofficialcommunicationandcollaborationbetweeninstitutions

thatissorelylackinginMexico.

GuerreroisastatewhereMexicanmilitaryforceshavebeenextensively

linkedtoextrajudicialkillings,disappearances,andtorture.Itisalsoa

statewherefederalpolicehavejoinedtheirstatecolleaguesincommitting

variousatrocities,includingthekillingandtortureofAyotzinapastudentsin

December2011.Someofthesecrimesfallclearlyunderfederaljurisdiction,

buttherearefewguidelines.Ifthecoordinationofatrocityinvestigations

betweenstateandfederalprosecutorstoagreatextentreliesnotonformal

protocols,but“informal”communications,thisraisesafundamentalquestion:

aresuchcommunicationsbeingmadeinthegenuineinterestsofjustice,or

thecontinuationofself-servingimpunity?

51 BROKEN JUSTICE IN MEXICO’S GUERRERO STATEPOOR SECURITY FOR LEGAL PROCEEDINGS

VII.POORSECURITYFORLEGALPROCEEDINGS

IfGuerreroisevertodevelopthecapacitytoproperlyinvestigate,prosecute,

andtryatrocitycases,thenitmusthaveanabilitytoensurethesecurityof

alltrialparticipants.Problemsofwitnessprotection,especiallyinprisons,are

alreadyevident.However,becausetherehavebeensofewinvestigationsand

prosecutionsofpowerfulstateagentsororganizedcrimefigures(whoinsome

casesarelinkedtostateagents),todatethesecurityofinvestigators,prosecutors,

andjudgeshaslargelybeenanon-issue.Ifpoliticalobstaclestothepursuitof

justiceforatrocitiesinGuerrerocanbeovercome,thesituationmaychangeand

stateagentsmaycomeunderthreat.Thethreatstheymightfacearelikelysimilar

tothethreatscurrentlybeingexperiencedbythosewhohavesoughttoadvance

thejusticeprocess,includinghumanrightsdefendersandjournalists.

VII.A. WITNESS PROTECTION

ARMANDO CHAVARRÍA BARRERA, A SENIOR CONGRESSIONAL

REPRESENTATIVE FROM THE LEFTIST PARTY OF THE

DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION (PRD), WAS THOUGHT TO BE THE

STRONGEST EMERGING CANDIDATE FOR GUERRERO’S 2011

GUBERNATORIAL ELECTION WHEN HE WAS SHOT WHILE

SITTING IN HIS CAR IN AUGUST 2009.253 ALTHOUGH THEY WERE

FROM THE SAME PARTY, CHAVARRÍA HAD PREVIOUSLY FALLEN

OUT WITH THEN-GOVERNOR ZEFERINO TORREBLANCA

GALINDO, WHO HAD REMOVED HIS SECURITY DETAIL.

InJune2011,anofficeroftheinvestigativepolicenamedTrinidadZamora

Rojo254gaveastatementtoinvestigatorsinwhichheclaimedtohave

participatedintheassassinationofChavarría,alongwithcolleagues—andon

GovernorTorreblanca’sorders.255Zamoraexpressedfearforhislife.


Hewasnevergrantedprotection,butwasmadepolicecommanderofthe

municipalityofChilapa.Twodaysafterhisstatement,andonhisfirstdayinhis

newposition,gunmenreportedlyfromthedruggangLosRojosattackedthe

ministerialpoliceheadquartersinChilapawhilecolleaguesfailedtocometohis

aid.256Thefollowingday,hisbodywasfoundonaroadneartheprosecutor’s

officeinthecapital:skinned,beheaded,andwithhisseveredfingersstuffedin

hismouth.Notesamongthebodypartswarnedothersofbetrayal.257

WithsuchscenesplayingoutinGuerrero’smedia,howmanycitizenswith

informationonatrocities—whethercommittedbystateagents,organized

crimefigures,orothers—wouldrisksupportinginvestigations?Guerreromust

provethatitcanprotectwitnessesifitistoeffectivelydeliverjusticefor

killings,torture,disappearances,andotheratrocities.Currentlythestatehas

manyelementsofagoodlegalframeworkonwitnessprotection,withfurther

improvementsexpectedsoon.Eventhen,however,someweaknessesinthe

frameworkwillremain.AndtheglaringAchillesheelofthewholesystemis

itsrelianceonjusticesectoroperatorswhoareunskilled,unaccountable,and

toooftenimplicatedincrimethemselves.

Thestate’scurrentframeworkforwitnessprotectionisrootedinthreelaws.

Alawon“protectedpersons”(Law480)callsforthecreationofawitness

protectionprogramandcontainsprovisionsfortheprotectionofwitnesses

incriminalproceedings.258Avictim’slaw(Law479)thatpassedinJuly

2014mandatesemergencymeasuresforvictims,aggrievedpersons,family

members,andwitnesses,aswellasproceduresfortheextensionofsuch

precautionarymeasures.259Andahumanrightsdefenders’law(Law391)

from2010mandatesprotectionforindividualswhowitnessorhavedirect

knowledgeofhumanrightsviolations,iftheirtestimonyiscredible,and

regardlessofwhetherprosecutorshavepursuedrelevantproceedings.260

Forwitnesses,thestateattorneygeneralisresponsibleforconductingrisk

assessments,factorsforwhichareenumeratedinthelaw;healsocontrols

accesstothewitnessprotectionprogram,andisrequiredtotakeemergency

preventivemeasureswhenevernecessary.261Defensewitnessesareeligible

forprotection,262butasGuerreromovestoanadversarialsystem,this

arrangementcouldpresentaconflictofinterest(albeitonereplicatedin

manysystemsaroundtheworld).263Thosedeniedprotectionorofferedlesser

protectionthandesireddohavetheformalpossibilityofjudicialreview.264

Stateofficialsandprotectedpersonsarerequiredtokeepprotective

measuresandtheprogramconfidential.265Witnessprotectionmeasuresmay

includevideotaping,providingthewitnesswithanemergencyphone,and

lesscommonly,occasionalpolicecheck-insorescortingofthewitness.266


Thestatehasnosafehouses,267butthelawprovidesforthepossibility

ofchangingawitness’sidentity.268Whilethelawstatesthatprotective

measuresforwitnessesshallremaininplacewhilethereasonsfortheir

necessityexist,269officialshaveinterpretedthisasallowingprotectiononly

throughtheendofaprotectedwitness’stestimony.270Protectedwitnesses

aregrantedarighttofreepsychological,psychiatric,judicial,social,or

emergencymedicalassistance.271Intheimplementationofwitnessprotection

measures,allstateagenciesandrelevantprivateandpublicbodiesarelegally

boundtocoordinatewitheachother.272

Thisframeworkiscurrentlychanging.Guerreroisintheprocessof

implementingthenew,uniformNationalCriminalProcedureCode(Código

NacionaldeProcedimientosPenales)passedbythenationalCongress

onMarch5,2014.273Thenewcodeshouldexpandthepossibilityforthe

grantingoftemporaryprotectionmeasuresthatcanbeextendedtovictims

andaggrievedpersonsatriskduringacriminalproceeding.274Beginningin

2014,consultationswerealsounderwayonanewdraftstatelawonwitness

protection,275butasofJuly2015,afinallawhadnotbeenofficiallypublished.

Theproposednewstatelawforeseesthepossibilityofextendingprotection

beyondthewitness’stestimony.Itwouldextendthecircleofeligibilityfor

protectiontoall“peopleinasituationofrisk,”potentiallyincludingactivists,

journalists,religiousfigures,publicservants,victims,andwitnessesofhuman

rightsviolations.Itwouldextendthepossibilityofwitnessprotectiontothe

timeperiodpriortotheopeningofcriminalproceedingsandincaseswhere

nocriminalproceedingispursued.276However,asofSeptember2014,thebill

didnotincludeanyprovisionforprotectionbeyondtheendofthetrial.277

Althoughgenerallytheframeworkforwitnessprotectionisrobust,weaknesses

remain,evenaftertakingaccountofpendingimprovementsthrough

implementationoftheNationalCriminalProcedureCodeandthenewdraftlaw(if

passed).Thegrantingofprotectionmeasuresshouldbepeggedtorisk,including

threatsthatpersistbeyondtheendofatrial,andnotthelengthofproceedings.

Inthissamevein,missingareprovisionsfortheperiodicreassessmentofriskfor

thosedeniedorgrantedprotectivemeasures.Therearenoexplicitsafeguardsfor

witnesseswhofacethreatsrelatedtocaseswherestateandfederalauthorities

havenotyetresolvedwhowillhavejurisdiction,andthereisnodetailon

Guerrero’scoordinationofwitnessprotectionneedswithotherMexicanstatesor

withforeigncountries.Finally,thelegalframeworkcontainsnoprovisionsrelated

totheprotectionofwitnesseswhoareprisoninmates,forexamplebycreating

proceduresforthetransferofthreatenedwitnessestootherprisons,orotherwise

segregatingthemfromtheirtormentors.


Despiteitsstrengths,inmanywaysthecurrentframeworkremainsproneto

abusebytheprosecutorsandpolicewhoarecalledupontoimplementit,

andwhoseofficeshavebeenlinkedtokillings,torture,anddisappearances.

Currentfactorsforeligibilityintheprograminclude“importanceofthe

case,”and“valueofthetestimonyorintervention,”278butthesevague

categoriesareinherentlysubjectiveandleavedecisionsabouteligibility

ripeformanipulation.Stunningly,thelawfailstocreateclearcriminal

liabilityforpublicservantswhoviolateprotectivemeasuresunderthelaw,

includingthroughissuanceofthreats,intimidation,orharassment,orthrough

disclosureofparticipationintheprogram.279Anothermajoromissionfrom

theframeworkisanysetofcriteriafortheemploymentandtrainingof

officialscalledupontoimplementwitnessprotectionmeasures.Inastate

withahistoryofstatecorruption,violence,andimpunity,thisomission

providesanopendoorforcontinuedwitnessendangerment.

Incaseswherestateofficialsaretheallegedperpetrators,thefederal

governmentcanbecalledontoprovideprotectionmeasures.Thenational

mechanismforprotectionofhumanrightsdefendersandjournalists,

administeredbythefederalInteriorMinistry(SEGOB),hasbeenusedin

someGuerrerostatecases.280However,therehavebeenstatecasesforwhich

FederalPolicehavebeencalledontoprovideprotectiontokeywitnesses,

andthosewitnesseshavedisappeared.281Undercurrentcircumstances,many

potentialwitnessesinGuerrerocriminalcasesremainjustifiablydistrustfulof

stateandfederalauthorities,andtooafraidtotestify.282

VII.B. HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDERS, ACTIVISTS, AND JOURNALISTS

AfterstatepolicekilledtwoprotestingAyotzinapastudentsandtortured

othersinDecember2011,thehumanrightsorganizationTlachinollanoffered

legalrepresentationtothestudentsandagitatedforjustice.Although

therehaveneverbeenconvictionsrelatedtothecase,severalofficersof

theprosecutionwereremovedfromtheirposts.In2012,Tlachinollanlawyer

VidulfoRosales,wholedtheorganization’seffortsonthecase,received

threatssevereenoughtocausehimtofleethecountry.Previousthreats

againsthimhadalreadyspurredtheInter-AmericanCommissionofHuman

Rightstogranthimprecautionarymeasures.283Therewereechoesofthis

historyin2014,followingthekillingsofthreeAyotzinapastudentsand

disappearanceof43others.AsTlachinollanagainofferedrepresentationto

thefamilies,ActingGovernorRogelioOrtegapubliclyblamedtheorganization


forobstructingthefamilies’cooperationwithstateauthorities,insinuatedthat

theorganizationhadlinkstoviolence,andaskedTlachinollanDirectorAbel

BerreratodistancethegroupfromviolentdemonstrationsinGuerrero.Atthe

federallevel,thesecretaryoftheNavyechoedthesesentiments.284

Inastatewheretheauthoritieshaveshownnoinclinationtogenuinely

investigateandprosecuteatrocities,oftenduetocorruptorcriminal

motivation,civilsocietyorganizationsadvocatingforjusticeareregardedas

anuisance,orworse.Suchorganizationshaverepresentedrural,indigenous,

andpoorcommunitieswhoserightsandinterestsotherwisegetverylittle

hearinginGuerrero.Theyhavefoughtforjusticeinthestate’scourts,federal

courts,andbeforeinternationalbodies,includingtheInter-AmericanCourt

ofHumanRights.Indoingso,theyhavehadsignificantsuccesses.285By

sheddinglightonindividualandsystemicwrongdoinginGuerrero,including

rampantgovernmentcorruptionandinfiltrationbyorganizedcrime,they

haveembarrassedandchallengedtheeconomicandpoliticaleliteswho

controlthestate.Theirworkhasoccasionallyledtosuchconcessionsas

passageofalawonenforceddisappearances.

Ithasalsocausedthemtocomeunderthreat.Thosewhoaskquestionsabout

atrocitiesandcorruptionhavefaceddanger.AstheTruthCommissionof

GuerrerohasexaminedhistoricalabusescommittedduringMexico’sDirtyWar

andconcludedthatcrimesduringthatperiodamountedtocrimesagainst

humanity,itsstaffmembersandtheirfamilieshavereceivedthreats.286

JOURNALISTS INVESTIGATING ORGANIZED CRIME AND

HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES HAVE BEEN THREATENED AND

KILLED.287 BETWEEN 2013 AND NOVEMBER 2014, CODDEHUM

RECEIVED 38 COMPLAINTS OF ATTACKS ON JOURNALISTS

AND HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDERS.288 THOSE WHO DISCUSS

WHETHER CONTEMPORARY CRIMES IN GUERRERO MIGHT

QUALIFY AS CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY—WHICH WOULD

SUGGEST THAT ORDERS MAY HAVE COME FROM MORE SENIOR

OFFICIALS—RECEIVE THREATS ISSUED BY POLITICALLY AND

ECONOMICALLY POWERFUL INDIVIDUALS IN THE STATE.289

AfterthedisappearanceoftwohumanrightsdefendersinFebruary2009,

andmorethan10othercasesfromGuerreroinvolvingkillings,torture,

disappearance,andarbitrarydetention,theInter-AmericanCommission

ofHumanRightsgrantedprecautionarymeasuresfor107otherpeoplein


Guerrero.290FifteenhumanrightsdefenderswereattackedinGuerrerofrom

2011-2013,withtenofthemkilledafterreceivingthreats.291Perilousconditions

forhumanrightsdefendershavedrawntheattentionoftheinternational

communitytoMexico,includingspecificattentiononGuerrero.Diplomatic

missionsinMexicoCitycoordinateinformationonreportedattacksagainst

humanrightsdefenders,andraisetheircaseswithMexicangovernment

officials;theEuropeanUnioncoordinateswithnon-governmental

organizationsonsecurityconcernsintenstates,includingGuerrero.292

Followingsuchattention,Guerrero’sstateCongresspassedalawonthe

protectionofhumanrightsdefenders(Law391)in2010,293alawonthe

protectionofjournalistsin2002,294andarelevantvictim’slawin2014.295The

draftlawonprotectedpersonswouldofferexpandedprotectionsforhuman

rightsdefendersandothersunderthreat.296

Theframework,however,canonlybeasgoodasitsimplementation.Law

391createsaCouncilfortheProtectionofHumanRightsDefenders,to

bechairedbythepresidentofthestateHumanRightsCommission,who

alsohasaroleinappointingfiveofthesevenothermembers.Thecouncil

hasamandatetocoordinatedefensestrategies,protecthumanrights

defenders,andpromotetheiractivities.ButasofApril2015stateHuman

RightsCommissionofficerinchargeRamónNavarrete,appointedthroughan

irregularprocedurebyformerGovernorAguirre,hadfailedtoconvenethe

councilonce.Law391alsomandatestheexecutive,throughtheprosecution,

todesignatespecializedpolicefortheprotectionofhumanrights

defenders.297Fiveyearsafterissuanceofthelaw,thisspecialpoliceunithas

notbeencreated.298Indeed,stateofficialsshowlittlesignoftakingviolence

againsthumanrightsdefendersseriously.Askedaboutpastviolenceand

threats,oneofficialtoldtheJusticeInitiative:“Incaseswheresocialleaders

havedied,it’sbeenprovedthatthesearelocalcrimesandthattheyweren’t

killedbecausetheyweresocialleadersorhumanrightsdefenders.Alotof

casesofhumanrightsdefendersorsocialmovementmembersarisefrom

internalquarrels.”299


VII.C. PROSECUTORS AND JUDGES

Instarkcontrasttothoseagitatingforthejusticesystemtoworkincases

ofatrocity,neitherprosecutorsnorjudgeshavefacedsignificantthreats

inGuerrerorelatedtocontentiouscases.Prosecutorsseemunconcerned

abouttheirownsecuritysituation.300Securityattheprosecutor’sofficein

Chilpancingois,byallappearances,lax.301Courthousesandjudicialoffices

havenotbeenfrequenttargetsofviolence,althoughpopularoutrage

followingtheSeptember2014disappearancesdidleadtoviolentprotestsat

governmentoffices,includingthatoftheprosecutor.302

THAT PROSECUTORS AND JUDGES GENERALLY HAVEN’T

BEEN ENDANGERED FOR PURSUING JUSTICE, BUT HUMAN

RIGHTS DEFENDERS, JOURNALISTS, AND TRUTH COMMISSION

MEMBERS HAVE, LIKELY SAYS SOMETHING ABOUT THE

EXTENT TO WHICH THEY’RE PERCEIVED AS THREATS TO

PERPETRATORS.

Thisisnottosaythattherehavebeennothreatsorviolence.Some

prosecutorsappeartobecomplicitincriminalityandcorruption,andfailedto

investigateandprosecutepowerfulperpetrators.Withincreasingcompetition

amongdruggangsstartingin2008,prosecutorsactingonbehalfofone

criminalorganizationcanangeranotherandfindthemselvesindanger.

IfandwhenGuerrero’sprosecutorsandjudgesdidcomeunderthreat,the

state’slegalframeworkcreatesabasisforprotection.Law480on“protected

persons”foreseesprotectionforalltrialparticipants,includingexperts,

prosecutors,defenseattorneys,police,andjudges.303Likewise,thenew

proposeddraftlawonwitnessprotectionforeseesprotectionmeasuresas

beingapplicabletoabroadrangeofpeopleatrisk,includingpublicservants

involvedintheproceedings.304


VII.D. PRISONS

WHEN SIX ARMED MEN ENTERED THE STATE PRISON IN

IGUALA ON JANUARY 3, 2014, THEY TOLD A GUARD THEY

WERE STATE AGENTS.305 ALLOWED INSIDE, THEY OPENED

FIRE ON INMATES, AND IN THE ENSUING VIOLENCE FIVE

OF THE INTRUDERS AND FOUR INMATES WERE KILLED.

STATE PROSECUTORS LAUNCHED AN INVESTIGATION IN

RELATION TO THE ATTACK AND PLACED 24 PRISON GUARDS

INTO PROLONGED PRETRIAL DETENTION (ARRAIGO).

FURTHER VIOLENCE IN TWO OTHER STATE PRISONS IN THE

FOLLOWING DAYS BROUGHT THE DEATH TOLL FOR THE

MONTH TO 15. THE STATE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION’S

ACTING PRESIDENT, HIPÓLITO LUGO, PUBLICLY STATED THAT

THE SITUATION WAS DRIVEN BY OVERCROWDING AND THE

COLLUSION BETWEEN PRISON STAFF AND INMATES THAT

RESULTED IN PRISON SELF-GOVERNANCE. HIS REMARKS

BROUGHT NEW ATTENTION TO AN OLD ISSUE.

Between2011and2013,77inmatesdiedincustodyinGuerrero’sprisons.306

Allofthesedeathswereinvestigatedwithintheprisonsystem,andnone

resultedincriminalinvestigationsortrials.307

Organizedcrimeprisonersareco-mingledwithregularprisonersacrossthe

state’s15prisons,whichholdbothstateandfederalinmates.Althoughstatelaw

providesthatinmatescanbeseparatedbyvariouscriteria,includingsex,age,

theseriousnessoftheoffense,andfirst-timevs.repeatoffenders,308inreality

thereisverylittleseparationalongtheseorotherlines.309Pretrialdetainees

andconvictsareco-mingled,andmaleandfemaleinmatesarenotalways

separated.Regularprisonersareroutinelyextortedinordertoavoidabuse.310

Someperceivebroadcomplicityofprisonofficialsinrunningthisracket;indeed,

itiswidelybelievedthattheprisonsofAcapulcoandChilpancingoarehighly

vulnerabletoinfiltrationbyorganizedcrime.311Familiesofinmateswhocome

underthreatappealtothestateHumanRightsCommissiononadailybasis;in

turn,itsstaffappealstoprisondirectorstoauthorizetransferstootherfacilities

orotherwiseensurethesecurityofinmates.312


Guerrero’sprisonsystemisnotonlyriddledwithcorruption,including

extensiveinfiltrationbyorganizedcrime,butalsoseriousshortcomingsin

capacity.Indeed,prisonstaffarelargelyill-trainedtoperformtheirduties.313

Theylackskillinfundamentalareas,including:transportinginmatessecurely

toandfromcourtrooms,detectingsmugglingintoandoutofprisons,

anddetectingsignsofmentalillnessamonginmates.Therearenoproper

proceduresinplacetodealwithinmates’complaints.

Prisonsareovercrowded.AsofSeptember11,2014,thestate’s15prisons—

designedtohold3,875people—actuallyhoused5,975.Theproblemis

largelyduetothehighpercentageofinmatesinpretrialdetention:untried

prisonersmakeup60%ofthetotalprisonpopulation.314Anotherfactorin

overcrowdinghasbeenthelargenumberoffederalinmatesinGuerrero’s

prisonpopulation.

ThestateHumanRightsCommissionlongagoproposedmeasuresto

addressthediresituationofprisonsinGuerrero,includingrequestingthat

newfederalpenitentiariesbebuiltinordertoseparateallfederalprisoners

fromstateinmates.315ButitisunclearhowmuchsupportexistsinGuerrero’s

stateCongressforbuildingnewprisons,orundertakingalternatemeansto

addressovercrowding—forexamplebyreducingtheuseofpretrialdetention.

Byoneaccount,legislatorshavemajorconcernsaboutGuerrero’sprisons,

haverecommendedtheconstructionofnewprisons,arewillingtoprovide

newresourcestothisend,andasofSeptember2014,wereplanningtohold

hearingsonthesituation.316Byanothertelling,theissueisnotapriority:

“[Prisons]aresobadthatit’snotworththeinvestment.There’snointerestin

Congresstoaddresstheproblemsofovercrowding.”317

Aslongasthesituationpersists,itwillseriouslyimpedeeffortstoprevent

orprosecuteatrocitiesinGuerrero.Prisonswillremaindangerouslocations

inwhichinmatesaresubjectedtotorture,murder,sexualviolence,andother

violations.Therightsofsuspects,accusedpersons,andconvictedpersons

willcontinuetobetrampled.Totheextentthatproceedingsagainststate

actors,organizedcrimefigures,orothersrelyontestimonyfromwitnesses

whoarealsoinmates,thosewitnesseswillcontinuetoliveingreatperil.

60 BROKEN JUSTICE IN MEXICO’S GUERRERO STATECONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

VIII.CONCLUSIONSANDRECOMMENDATIONS

Thedisappearanceof43studentsonSeptember26,2014andthestate’s

subsequentmishandlingoftheinvestigationmayhaveshockedtheworld,butin

Guerreroitwasnotsurprising.Nationalandregionalactorshaveraisedserious

doubtsabouttheversionofeventspresentedbytheFederalProsecutor’s

Office.318WhetheronebelievestheexplanationprofferedbytheFederal

Prosecutor’sOffice,accordingtowhichtheperpetratorswereonlymunicipal

policeandorganizedcrimememebers,oroneofthedarkerscenariosthatmore

heavilyimplicatefederalforces,includingtheArmy,theeventsofthatdayandthe

botchedinvestigationsthatfollowedfitwithlong-establishedpatterns,practices,

andincentives.TheAyotzinapastudentscommandeeredbusesandsoughtpublic

donationsbecausetheywerefedupwithstateneglectoftheirimpoverished

teachers’college,andstaterepressionoftheirpolitics.Amayorallegedlyordered

policeto“teachthemalesson”becauselikesomanymunicipalandstateofficials,

hewasinbusinesswithorganizedcrimeandpublicprotestersarebadfor

business.Municipalpoliceshotstudentsandbystandersincoldbloodbecause

theyweretoldto,andtherehaveneverbeenconsequencesforfollowingunlawful

ordersinGuerrero.Accordingtofederalauthorities,membersoftheGuerrero

Unidosdruggangallegedlyslaughteredthestudents,whoweredeliveredto

thembythepolice,oraccordingtootherindications,stateactorsthemselves

disappearedthestudents.Eitherway,thecontinuedenforceddisappearanceof

the43studentsreflectedpervertedmoresbredofthedrugtrade,militarization,

andGuerrero’spoverty,lawlessness,andcorruption.

ThemoonscapeofmassgravesaroundIgualathatonlycametolightfollowing

thenationalandinternationaloutcryovertheAyotzinapacasesurelyregistered

intheperpetrators’minds.Giventhatthesedeathpitshadbeenignoredin

thepast—andthattherehadbeennoinvestigationintotheDecember2011

Ayotzinapacaseoruncountableotherincidentsofkilling,disappearance,and

torturereachingbacktotheDirtyWar—thenwhywouldtheperpetratorsexpect

theabuse,disappearance,andkillingofafewmorepoor,ruralMexicansto

promptastateresponse?Indeed,theunexpectedspotlightofworldattention

turnedonGuerrero’sstateinstitutionsovertheensuingdaysandweeksrevealed

ajusticesystementirelyunsuitedtothechallengesofthisinvestigation,orthat

ofanyothercaseofseriouscrime.Thejusticesystemwasunsuitednotprimarily

becauseofalackofresources,butduetoalackofwill.


ThejusticesystemofGuerreroisfundamentallyflawedbecauseitsincentives

areallwrong.Policearehiredtointimidateandsuppressopponentsof

politicalpowersortoreactwithforcetocrime,anduncheckedcorruption

meanstheytoooftenserveasmuscleforcriminalnetworks.Theyare

nothiredtopreventcrimeorinvestigateit.Totheextentthatpolice

andprosecutorsneedtoshowresultsincourt,theyroutinelydependon

unreliableconfessionscoercedthroughtorture.Theygetawaywithit

becausetheseverysamepoliceandtheirclosecolleaguesaretheoneswho,

intheory,areresponsibleforinvestigatingsuchabuse.Inthisinstitutional

culture,whatincentivedoprosecutorsandpolicehavetolearnprofessional

investigativeandlegaltechniques?Guerrero’sineptitudeatinvestigatingall

formsofseriouscrimehasatitsveryroottherelianceonstatetorture.

Whatabouttheinstitutionswithstatutoryresponsibilitytoactasacheckon

thestate’sprosecutorsandpolice?Thebodieswithamandatetodefendstate,

federal,andinternationallawhavealmostentirelysuccumbedtotheexecutive

branch,whichpracticesanauthoritarianismgreasedbypatronage,cronyism,

andnakedcorruption.Thejudiciaryiswidelyperceivedasanarmofthehighest

bidder,oroftheexecutive,aperceptionthatduringthetermofGovernorAguirre

wasreinforcedthroughthebrazendouble-hattingoftheinteriorministerasthe

once-and-futurepresidentofthejudiciaryandstateSupremeCourtofJustice.

Inthepast,thestateCongresshasbeendominatedbythesamepartiesthat

formedthepowerbaseforthegovernor,andlegislatorshavefailedtosufficiently

pressformeasuresnecessarytoproperlyinvestigate,prosecute,andtryserious

crime.Congresshasfailedtoaddressmanyinadequaciesofthelegalframework,

especiallywithregardtotorture;ithasneglectedprisons,whichareunderfunded,

overcrowded,violent,andlargelyself-governing;andithasfailedtoquestion

dubiousoroutrightillegalassertionsofexecutivepoweraffectingthejustice

system.ChiefamongthesewasGovernorAguirre’sneutralizationofthestate

HumanRightsCommission,whichuntil2014hadbeentheonlystateinstitution

thatcouldclaimtorepresentthevictimsofkillings,disappearance,torture,and

otherseriouscrime.Withitsownmanifoldinadequaciesindealingwithserious

crime,thefederalgovernmenthasalsofailedtoprovideaneffectivecheckonthis

southernstate’sspiralofviolenceandimpunity.

SustainedpublicattentiontothisdebacleofgovernancepresentsGuerrero

withanopportunity.Ifthestate’snewleadersrespondeffectivelytotheir

constituents’demandsanddemonstratepoliticalwill,theycanbeginto

establishtrustinthethoroughlydiscreditedjusticesector.Inordertodevelop

thecapabilitytocrediblyinvestigate,prosecute,andtrycasesofkilling,

disappearance,torture,andotherseriouscrimes,policymakerswillneedto

undertakedeepreformsinfivekeyareas:


VIII.A. STRENGTHEN SYSTEMIC ACCOUNTABILITY

Thisshouldbeaprerequisitetomuch-neededtechnicalcapacitybuilding.

Aslongasprosecutors,police,judges,andotherofficialsrespondto

inappropriateinfluencebytheexecutiveorbyorganizedcrime,andaslong

astheyarenotheldaccountablefortheirperformancethroughappropriate

democraticmeans,therewillbelittleincentiveforthesejusticesectoractors

tolearnandapplynewskills,ortousenewresourcesasintended.

1. ENSUREASTRONG,WELL-RESOURCED,TRANSPARENTHUMANRIGHTSCOMMISSION.TheCongressshouldamendthelawofMarch

20,2015givingeffecttothenewHumanRightsCommissionand

provideitthepowertofilecriminalcomplaints(denuncias)withthe

Fiscal.Thelawalreadystatesthatthecommission’sdecisionsshallbe

public,butshouldfurtherspecifythatallrecommendationsshouldbe

publishedonline,redactedonlyasnecessarytoprotecttheidentities

ofvictimsandwitnesses.Congressshouldamendthelawtocreate

anoversightcommitteefortheHumanRightsCommissionmadeup

ofcitizenrepresentatives,includingcivilsocietyrepresentatives,and

includeaformalrolefortheUNOfficeoftheHighCommissionerfor

Humanrights.CongressshouldprovidetheHumanRightsCommission

withadequatefundingtotrainandrecruitstaffandinvestigateall

complaintsofhumanrightsabusereportedtoit.Thecurrentlaw’s

restrictiveprovisionfortriggeringaninvestigationofenforced

disappearance,andlimitinginvestigationstothedisappearanceof

personswithdomicileinGuerrero319shouldbeamendedtoalignwith

thethresholdestablishedinthestatelawonenforceddisappearance

andtheInternationalConventionfortheProtectionofAllPersonsfrom

EnforcedDisappearances.

2. IMPROVETHECOLLECTIONANDTRANSPARENCYOFDATAONTHEJUSTICESYSTEM.TheFiscal,thejudiciarypresident,the

ministerofpublicsecurity,andotherjusticesectorleadersshould

ensureimprovedcollectionofdatainfullcompliancewithfederal

andstatelawsontherighttoinformation,andacttoimprovepublic

transparency.TheCongressshouldensuretheautonomyofthe

InstituteforTransparency,AccesstoInformationandProtectionof

PrivateData.


3. CREATEANINDEPENDENTDEPUTYPROSECUTORFORHUMANRIGHTSABUSESANDATROCITIES.Congressshouldestablishanewunitwithin

theFiscalíadedicatedtotheinvestigationandprosecutionofhuman

rightsabusesandatrocities,andwithinwhichtherelevantspecialized

FiscalíasalreadyforeseeninlaworcreatedbytheFiscalshouldsit.320

Toexpandbeyondthelimitationsofcase-by-caseanalysis,itshould

includeadedicatedunitforcriminalanalysisthattakesintoaccountthe

contextinwhichatrocitiesarecommittedandestablishesapatternof

criminality.TheorganiclawoftheFiscalíashouldbeamendedtogrant

Congress(insteadofthegovernor)thepowertoappointanindependent

deputyprosecutortoheadtheunit.Theindependentdeputyprosecutor

shouldbeselectedfromalistofcandidateswhohaveworkedinthe

fieldofhumanrightsforatleast10years,proposedbythepresident

ofthestateHumanRightsCommission,andvettedbytheNational

HumanRightsCommissionforpasthumanrightsabuses.Aspartofthe

legallyprescribedappointmentprocess,thecongressionalhumanrights

commissionshouldholdpublichearingstosolicittheviewsofhuman

rightsorganizationsandvictims,andtoquestionthecandidates.The

unitshouldrecruitall-newstafffromacrossMexico,separatefromother

staffoftheFiscalía,whohaveabackgroundintheinvestigationofhuman

rightsabusesandatrocities.Allprosecutorsandinvestigatorswithin

theFiscalíashouldbevettedbythestateHumanRightsCommission.

Thespecialprosecutorshouldberequiredtoregularlybriefthehead

oftheHumanRightsCommissionandthecongressionalHumanRights

Committee.ThelawshouldspecifythatevidencefromtheHumanRights

Commission,includingthroughinvestigationsconductedaccordingto

theIstanbulProtocol—performedaccordingtointernationalstandards—

hasfullprobativevalueinprosecutorialinvestigations.Congressshould

provideboththestateHumanRightsCommissionandthespecial

prosecutorwithadequatemandates,staff,andresourcestoperform

IstanbulProtocols.IntheeventofinvestigationsthatimplicatetheFiscal,

thespecialprosecutorshouldbeauthorizedtowithholdinformationfrom

theFiscal.CongressandtheFiscalshouldprovidetheunitwithhuman

andbudgetaryresourcesadequatetoinvestigateallrecommendations

fromtheHumanRightsCommission,casestransferredfromfederal

jurisdiction,anditsownleads.


4. MAKEFORENSICSERVICESINDEPENDENTOFPOLITICALAUTHORITIESANDTHEPROSECUTOR.Congressshouldpass

legislationestablishinganindependentagencytoprovideforensic

servicesandexpertisetotheprosecution,defense,andjudiciary.

Itshouldprovideadequateresourcestoreducethetemptation

ofcorruption,andcreateprovisionfornationalandinternational

forensicexpertstooccasionallyaudititswork,unannounced.Victims

shouldhavearighttointroduceintoevidenceindependentforensic

evaluationsfromlocalornationalhumanrightscommissions,aswellas

privateexperts,includinginternationalexperts.Thelawshouldspecify

thatthatprosecutorsandjudgesgranttheseevaluationsprobative

value.Thelawshouldrequiretheofficetoprovidesufficientnumbers

ofbilingualforensicexpertstoservetheneedsoftheindigenous

population.

5. STRENGTHENDEFENSERIGHTS.Asacriticalstepinendingthe

prosecution’srelianceontortureandrealizingfairtrialrights,the

Congressshouldprovidefundingadequatefortheprovisionofearly

androbustlegaldefensetothoseinneedacrossGuerrero,with

specialattentiontoimprovingservicesinimpoverishedruraland

predominantlyindigenouscommunities.Thisshouldincludeenhanced

accesstojusticethroughthephysicalpresenceofjudicialofficers

andinstitutionsinremotepartsofthestate,arebalancingofjudicial

assets,andsuchmeansascircuitcourts.Thelawoftheprosecution

anditsregulationsshouldrequiremaintenanceofapublicrecordof

detention.Theregulationstothelawonthejudiciaryshouldrequireit

tomaintainanupdated,publicrecordofoutstandingarrestwarrants

andtonotifysuspectsandaccusedpersonswhosewarrantsandcases

havebeendismissed.

6. STRENGTHENTHE“TECHNICALCOMMITTEEFORANALYSISANDEVALUATION.”Asafurthersteptoendprosecutorialrelianceon

forcedconfessionsthroughtorture,theCongressshouldamendthe

statetorturelawtoenhancetheindependenceandeffectiveness

oftheTechnicalCommittee.Itsmembershipshouldbeextended

toincludeanadditionalrepresentativeofcivilsocietyanda

representativenominatedbytheNationalCommissionofHuman

Rights,andtheUNOfficeoftheHighCommissionerforHumanRights

shouldbeinvitedtosendanobservertoeachcommitteemeeting.The

presidentofthecommitteeshouldfacesubstantialdailypersonalfines

intheeventheorshefailstoconvenethebodyasrequiredbystatute.


7. STRENGTHENJUDICIALINDEPENDENCE.Theorganiclawofthe

judicialbranchshouldbeamendedsothatasittingSupremeCourt

justiceshallnotserveasthepresidentoftheCounciloftheJudiciary.

Judgesshouldbeprohibitedfromtakingleavesofabsencetoservein

theexecutivebranch.

8. ENSUREACCOUNTABILITYFORPASTCRIMESINGUERRERO.Inaccordancewitharticle25ofthelawthatcreatedtheTruth

CommissionofGuerrero,theFiscalshouldopeninvestigationsinto

crimesagainsthumanityperpetratedbystateagents,asdocumented

bythecommission.TheFiscalshouldalsoinvestigateanyotherleads

relatedtoDirtyWaratrocitiesthatcometoitsattention.

VIII.B. STRENGTHEN THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK

1. AMENDTHETORTURELAW.ThenewCongressshouldamendthe

statetorturelawsothatitaccordswithinternationalstandards,

includingbyadoptingthedefinitionoftortureintheInter-American

ConventiontoPreventandPunishTorture,andbyestablishing

provisionsonthecriminalliabilityofindividualswhoarelegally

obligatedtopreventtheperpetrationoftorture,butfailtoexercise

theirauthoritytodoso.Inrevisingthetorturelaw,Congressshould

holdhearingstosolicittherecommendationsofcivilsocietyandthe

stateHumanRightsCommission.

2. INCLUDESPECIALLAWSINTHECRIMINALCODE.Congressshould

placethedefinitionsoftortureandenforceddisappearancedirectly

intothestatecriminalcodeinordertostrippotentialexcusesfrom

unwillingprosecutors.

3. STRENGTHENACCOUNTABILITYFORSTATEPERPETRATORS.Congressshouldamendthestatecriminalcodesothatbeingastate

agentisconsideredanaggravatingcircumstance,includingincasesof

homicide.

4. ACCELERATEADOPTIONOFTHEADVERSARIALSYSTEM.Congress

shouldprioritizethepassageoflawstofaithfullyimplementthe

transitiontotheadversarialsystem,andappropriateadequatefunds—

includingearmarkedfederalfundsreceivedbythestate—forthe

trainingofinvestigators,prosecutors,defensecounsel,andjudges.


VIII.C. STRENGTHEN SECURITY

1. REDEFINEPOLICINGANDRESTRUCTUREPOLICEFORCES.TheexecutiveandCongressshouldcommittotherestructuringof

policinginGuerrero,withinternationalassistanceasnecessary,in

ordertofocustheforceoncommunitypolicing,respectofjudicial

pluralism,andinvestigationofcrime.Theyshouldstructurethe

recruitmentandtrainingofpoliceforthesemainpurposes,and

vetapplicantsinaccordancewithinternationalbestpractices.The

governmentshouldestablishacommission,includingnationaland

internationalexperts,todeveloppolicereformplans—includingshort,

medium,andlong-termindicatorsintheareasoftransparencyand

accountability.

2. STRENGTHENWITNESSPROTECTION.Giventheextentof

prosecutionandpolicecriminalityinthestate’shistory,Congress

shouldpasslegislationcreatinganindependentWitnessProtection

Agency,whosedirectorshouldbeselectedinaccordancewithstrict

professionalcriteriaandanswertoatechnicalboardthatexcludes

politicalactorsandhasnoaccesstooperationaldetails.Congress

shouldpasslegislationcreatingclearcriminalliabilityforanypublic

servantwhoviolateswitnessprotectionmeasures;createcriteriafor

theselectionofwitnessprotectionofficialsthatreflectinternational

bestpractice;defineatrainingprotocolforallwitnessprotection

officersinlinewithinternationalbestpractice;createclearcriteriafor

protectioneligibilitybasedsolelyonrisk,withperiodicreassessments

ofriskforthosegrantedanddeniedprotectivemeasures;andensure

thatvictims,witnesses,andothertrialparticipantsareeligiblefor

protectionaslongastheyremainatrisk—evenifthisisafterthe

investigationortrial.

3. REDUCEPRISONVIOLENCE.Congressshouldurgentlyadoptreforms

toreducepretrialdetentioninordertoreduceprisonovercrowding

andrelatedextortionandviolence.Thesemeasuresshouldinclude

enhancedguaranteesofearlyaccesstodefenseandaccesstolegal

aid(seeabove),andexpandeduseofalternativestopretrialdetention,

includingbail.Theexecutiveshouldacttoseparatepretrialdetainees

fromconvicts,statefromfederalinmates,juvenilesfromadults,and

womenfrommen.Withinternationalassistance,thestateshould

deviseaschemeforthelustrationofprisonstaff,includingdirectors,

andavettingschemeforthehiringofnew,professionalstaff,andthe

Congressshouldprovideresourcestoadequatelypayallprisonstaff.


4. PROVIDESECURITYGUARANTEESFORHUMANRIGHTSDEFENDERS.Guerrero’snewgovernmentshouldcommittoprotecting

thesecurityofhumanrightsdefenders,evenwhen–asexemplified

bythisreport–theydrawattentiontohardtruths.Thegovernment

shouldseekconstructiveengagementwithcritics.Thepresidentofthe

stateHumanRightsCommissionshouldregularlyconvenetheCouncil

fortheProtectionofHumanRightsDefenders,asforeseenunderlaw

391of2010.TheCongressshouldamendlaw391toimposesubstantial

personalfinesonthepresidentofthestateHumanRightsCommission

foranyfailuretoconvenetheCouncilinaccordancewiththelaw.The

executiveshouldactimmediatelytoimplementtheprovisionoflaw

391thatforeseesthecreationofaspecializedpoliceforceforthe

protectionofhumanrightsdefenders.Membersofthespecialized

forceshouldberecruitedfromacrossMexicoandvettedforpast

abusebytheNationalHumanRightsCommission.

5. STRENGTHENSECURITYPROTOCOLSATJUSTICEINSTITUTIONS.IfGuerrerotacklesthereformagendaaboveandbeginsproper

investigationsofkillings,disappearances,torture,andotherformsof

seriouscrime,justicesectorofficialswillnolongerbeassusceptible

toinfluencebyorganizedcrime,andhencewillfacemuchgreater

danger.Withnationalandinternationalassistance,asneeded,the

stateshouldreviewsecurityprotocolsforpolicestations,prosecutors’

offices,courthouses,prisons,andotherinfrastructureofthejustice

sector,includinginformationsecurity.


VIII.D. URGENTLY CREATE INTEGRATED TEAMS TO INVESTIGATE DISAPPEARANCES

1. Theproposeddeputyprosecutorforhumanrights(recommendation

A.3.)shouldoverseeintegratedunitstosearchfordisappeared

personsandconductrelatedcriminalinvestigations.Eachunitshould

havemultidisciplinaryexpertstaff,includingatleastoneprosecutor,

investigators,andsocialworkers.Detectivesandotherstaffofthe

unitsshouldberecruitedfromacrossMexico,vettedbytheNational

HumanRightsCommissionforpasthumanrightsabuses,andoffered

trainingbynationalandinternationalexperts.

2. Theunitsshouldhaveresponsibilityforliaisingwithallrelevantfederal,

state,andmunicipalauthorities,humanrightscommissionsacross

Mexico,andfamiliesofthedisappearedandtheirrepresentatives.

Withnationalandinternationalassistance,theyshoulddevelopa

transparentprotocolforthesearchofthedisappeared.Anoversight

boardshouldincludethepresidentoftheHumanRightsCommission,

theFiscal,tworepresentativesofcivilsociety,andanappointeeofthe

NationalHumanRightsCommission.

3. CongressandtheFiscalíashouldprovidetheunitswithadequate

personnelandfinancialresourcestoestablishandmaintainastate

databaseonmissingpersons,andvictimsofdisappearanceand

enforceddisappearance.Thedatabaseshouldbecreatedwith

assistancefromnationalandinternationalactors,andincoordination

withthefederaldatabase(RENPED).Congressandtheexecutive

shouldmandatetheunitstoconductproactiveinvestigationsby

detectivesfollowingallavailableleadsineachcase.Theyshould

ensurethattheunitsareprovidedwithfullinformationonsuspected

perpetrators,includingstateagents.

4. Thedeputyprosecutorandoversightboardshouldholdmonthly

meetingswiththefamiliesofthedisappearedandstaffoftheunits

toprovideupdatesonprogressincasesandsolicitfeedbackonthe

workoftheunitswithregardtospecificcases,andtheirgeneral

performance.TheUNOfficeoftheHighCommissionerforHuman

Rightsshouldbeinvitedtosendanobservertoeachmeeting.

5. Theoversightboardshouldhaveresponsibilityforsolicitingoutside

technicalexpertise,asneeded,toimproveinvestigationsgenerallyor

inspecificcases.


VIII.E. URGENTLY LOCATE, EXHUME, AND INVESTIGATE CLANDESTINE AND MASS GRAVES

1. MAPALLCLANDESTINEANDMASSGRAVES.TheFiscalíashould

coordinatewithfederalauthorities,includingtheNationalHuman

RightsCommission,toproduceapubliclyavailablemapofall

clandestineandmassgravesfoundinthestate.

2. DEPLOYNEWTECHNOLOGYFORLOCATINGMASSGRAVES.The

Fiscalíashouldseeknationalandinternationalassistancetoensure

thatallavailablemethodstoexpeditethelocationofclandestineand

massgravesarebeingfullyexploited.

3. EXHUMEANDINVESTIGATEMASSGRAVES.Toensureexpeditious

andreliableresultsthataretrustedbyvictimfamilies,theFiscalía

shouldseeknationalandinternationalassistancetoexhumeand

investigateclandestineandmassgraveswithproperforensicmethods.

TheFiscalíashouldcoordinatewithfederalauthoritiesandprovidea

regularlyupdatedlistspecifyingthestatusofinvestigationintoevery

exhumedcadaver.

OnceGuerrerocommitstowideanddeepjustice-sectorreformalongthese

lines,itwillstillneedextensiveassistancefromthefederalgovernment

andinternationalcommunityinbuildingcapacityacrosstheboard.Such

assistanceismorelikelytobeforthcomingifthegovernorandCongress

canmustertheleadershiptobreakthestate’stragiccycleofviolenceand

injustice,andbegintobuildtrustwiththecitizensofGuerrero.

70 BROKEN JUSTICE IN MEXICO’S GUERRERO STATEENDNOTES

ENDNOTES

1 ThereismorethanonedefinitionoftheDirtyWar’sduration.ThelawcreatingGuerrero’struthcommissiondefineditasencompassingtheperiod1969-1979.Byotherdefinitions,itstartedasearlyas1964andwasnotoveruntil1982.

2 TotalcalculatedbasedondataretrievedfromtheExecutiveSecretariatoftheNationalPublicSecuritySystem,availableat:http://secretariadoejecutivo.gob.mx/incidencia-delictiva/incidencia-delictiva-fuero-comun.php [accessedonJuly17,2015].ThepopulationofGuerreroin2010,accordingtoMexico’sstatisticsagency(INEGI),was3,388,768.See:www3.inegi.org.mx/sistemas/mexicocifras[accessedonJuly22,2015].

3 ResponsetoOpenSocietyJusticeInitiativeright-to-informationrequesttotheFiscalía,number51615,June3,2015.AccordinganotherFiscalíadocument,forunintentionalhomicidesoverthesameperiod,prosecutorsopened3,438investigations,leadingto846indictments(24.6%ofinvestigations)and529convictions(15.4%ofinvestigations).ResponsetoOpenSocietyJusticeInitiativeright-to-informationrequest,number51715,June3,2015.

4 UntilApril2014,thebody’sofficialnamewas“CommissionfortheDefenseofHumanRightsoftheStateofGuerrero”(ComisióndeDefensadelosDerechosHumanosdelEstadodeGuerrero),or“CODDEHUM.”InApril2014,thestateCongressamendedGuerrero’sConstitutiontoreformCODDEHUM.TheinstitutionisnowcalledtheHumanRightsCommissionoftheStateofGuerrero(ComisióndelosDerechosHumanosdelEstadodeGuerrero).Exceptwhereadistinctionisrelevant,thisreportreferstoCODDEHUMandthereformedinstitutionasthe“stateHumanRightsCommission.”

5 ResponsestoOpenSocietyJusticeInitiativeright-to-informationrequeststotheFiscalía,numbers187214and188514,February6,2015.

6 FiscalíaofGuerreroresponsetoOpenSocietyJusticeInitiativeright-to-informationrequestnumber187114,January30,2015.

7 Guerrero’sprocedurallawremainsinthemidstofenormouschange,asitalignsitselfwiththeshiftfromaninquisitorialtoanadversarialsystemofjustice.Itisalsoadoptinganew,unifiedMexicancriminalprocedurecodepassedbythenationalCongressinMarch2014.BothreformsaresupposedtobeimplementedbyJune2016.

8 Thefollowingrecommendationsaresummarizedhere,butdetailedattheendofthisreport.

9 “Los28cuerposdelasprimerasfosasenIgualanosondenormalistas:PGR,”CNNMéxico,October14,2014,availableat: http://mexico.cnn.com/nacional/2014/10/14/14-policias-de-cucula-son-detenidos-por-desaparicion-de-normalistas [accessedonJuly16,2015].

10 Thisreportusestheterms“massgrave”and“clandestinegrave.”Clandestinegravesareunmarked,unofficialgravesoutsideofcemeteries,regardlessofthenumberofcorpsestheycontain.UnderMexicanlaw,“massgrave”canmeanpublicgraveswithincemeterieswhereunknownremainsareburiedtogether.However,ininternationalusage,theterm“massgrave”commonlyreferstoagravewithmorethanonebody.Thisreportusestheterminthesenseofthecommoninternationalusage.

11 FederalProsecutionvideowithimagesofstudentsbeingtakenawayinmunicipalpolicecars,availableat:www.youtube.com/watch?v=vaBxcRx5Qlo[accessedonJanuary28,2015].

12 “Mexicopolicesuspectedoverdeathsof28peoplefoundmutilatedinsecretgrave–closetowherestudentsdisappearedlastweek,”AssociatedPress,October6,2014,availableat:http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/mexico-police-suspected-as-secret-grave-found-with-28-mutilated-bodies--close-to-where-students-disappeared-last-week-9778310.html[accessedonJuly18,2015].

13 “ParentsinMexicoWait,andHope,asMassGravesProbed,”Los Angeles Times,October6,2014,availableat:www.latimes.com/world/mexico-americas/la-fg-more-bodies-mass-graves-mexico-20141006-story.html[accessedOctober7,2014].

14 “MexicoPoliceHelpedGangKill17Students,ProsecutorSays,”BloombergNews,October6,2014,availableat:www.businessweek.com/news/2014-10-06/mexico-gang-killed-17-with-help-from-police-prosecutor-says[accessedonOctober7,2014].

15 SesióndepreguntasyrespuestasenlaconferenciadelprocuradorJesúsMurilloKaramsobrelos43normalistasdesaparecidos,October7,2014,availableat:www.radioformula.com.mx/notas.asp?Idn=454311&idFC=2014[accessedonJuly16,2015].

16 “ManifestantesquemanoficinasgubernamentalesenChilpancingo,Guerrero,”CNNMéxico,October13,2014,availableat:http://mexico.cnn.com/nacional/2014/10/13/normalistas-toman-el-congreso-y-el-palacio-de-gobierno-guerrerense[accessedonJuly16,2015].

17 See“México:enbuscadelosotrosdesaparecidosdeGuerrero,”Animal Político,December2,2014,availableat:www.animalpolitico.com/2014/12/mexico-en-busca-de-los-otros-desaparecidos-de-guerrero;“HallanfosasclandestinasenIguala;vinculanhomicidiosconcártelypolicías,”Excélsior,October5,2014availableat:www.excelsior.com.mx/nacional/2014/10/05/985187;“Hallan4fosasmásenIguala;habríaestudiantesdeAyotzinapa:PGR,”Excélsior,October10,2014,availableat:www.excelsior.com.mx/nacional/2014/10/10/986060,and“MassGravesDotHillsidesAroundIgualaasSearchforMissingStudentsContinues,”Vice News,October19,2014,availableat:https://news.vice.com/article/mass-graves-dot-hillsides-around-iguala-as-search-for-missing-students-continues[all


accessedonJuly16,2015].Thestudentdisappearancesalsocallednewattentiontopreviouslydiscoveredmassgravesinthestate.Thestateprosecutor’sofficetoldreportersthattheywereawareof21clandestinegravesdiscoveredinthethreeyearsfrom2012through2014,butcouldprovidenotallyfortheperiod2006-2014.FederalPolicewereawareofeightmassgravesdiscoveredin2014alone.See:“Nobody,EspeciallytheGovernment,KnowsHowManyMassGravesHaveBeenFoundinMexico,”BuzzFeed,March26,2015,availableat:www.buzzfeed.com/karlazabludovsky/nobody-knows-how-many-mass-graves-are-under-mexico#.ga9MYxLP5 [accessedonMarch31,2015].TheFederalPoliceannouncedthediscoveryof100bodiesandhumanremainsinmassgravesinGuerreroinMay2014.Theagencylaterretractedthestatement,sayingthat19bodieshadbeenfound,not100.See:“Hallan100cuerpos¡ynadieinvestiga!,”Reforma,February6,2015,availableat:www.reforma.com/aplicacioneslibre/preacceso/articulo/default.aspx?id=458090&urlredirect=http://www.reforma.com/aplicaciones/articulo/default.aspx?id=458090[accessedonFebruary9,2015].AlsoonFebruary6,2015,localmediareportedthat60bodieshadbeenfoundinalocalmorgueinthemunicipalityofAcapulco.See:“Hallan61cuerposenuncrematorioprivadoinactivoenAcapulco,”El Sur de Acapulco,February6,2015,availableat:http://suracapulco.mx/archivos/250792[accessedonFebruary9,2015].ThatsamedaytheFiscalíaofGuerreroconfirmedthediscoveryandannouncedtheopeningofacriminalinvestigation:http://guerrero.gob.mx/2015/02/c-o-m-u-n-i-c-a-d-o-2/[accessedonFebruary9,2015].Finally,accordingtoTlachinollanandCentroProdh,asofJulyof2015,104bodieshadbeenfoundintheIgualaarea.

18 “Lanochemástriste,”Nexos,January1,2015,availableat:www.nexos.com.mx/?p=23809[accessedonFebruary9,2015].SubmissionofNGOTlachinollantotheCommitteeonEnforcedDisappearances,page2,January8,2015,availableat:http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/Treaties/CED/Shared%20Documents/MEX/INT_CED_NGO_MEX_19222_S.pdf. [accessedonFebruary9,2015].

19 ThisparagraphreliesoninformationintheFinalReportoftheTruthCommissionofGuerrero,datedOctober15,2015,pp.21-22,28-30,32-33,47-50,89and95,availableat:http://congresogro.gob.mx/files/InformeFinalCOMVERDAD.pdf[accessedonFebruary9,2015].

20 Forexample,in1995,morethan400policeambushedunarmedpeasantsinAguasBlancas,Guerrero,killing17.Thepeasantswereprotestingthedisappearanceofacommunitymemberandalackofgovernmentsupport.AspecialinvestigationbytheSupremeCourtofJusticeandarecommendationfromtheNationalHumanRightsCommissionidentifiedinformationimplicatingseniorpoliticiansinthecrime,buttherehaveneverbeenprosecutionsofthoseofficers,andrestitutionforthevictimshasbeenlimited.See:Case3/96ofthePlenaryoftheSupremeCourtofJusticeoftheNation,investigationintothegravehumanrightsviolationsperpetratedinAguasBlancas,GuerreroApril23,1996:http://200.38.163.178/sjfsist/Paginas/DetalleGeneralScroll.aspx?id=3650&Clase=DetalleTesisEjecutorias;RecommendationNo.104/1995oftheNationalHumanRightsCommissionontheAguasBlancascase,August14,1995:http://www.cndh.org.mx/sites/all/fuentes/documentos/Recomendaciones/1995/REC_1995_104.pdf;andLauraReyes,“AguasBlancas,ungenocidioqueaúnesperajusticiaenMéxico,”CNN,June28,2011,http://mexico.cnn.com/nacional/2011/06/28/aguas-blancas-un-genocidio-que-aun-espera-justicia-en-mexico.Seealso“MassacreinMexicoKillingsandCover-upintheStateofGuerrero,”MinnesotaAdvocatesforHumanRights,December1995,availableat:http://wwww.theadvocatesforhumanrights.org/uploads/guerrero_1995_2.pdf[accessedonJuly17,2015].

21 In1960GuerrerowasthepooreststateinMexico.FinalReportoftheTruthCommissionofGuerrero,pp.6and7.

22 PeaceBrigadesInternationaldefinestheterm“cacique”as“apowerfulfigureinmanyregionsofMexico.Thispersonfrequentlycontrolspoliticalandeconomiclifeinanentireregionasaresultofthetacitordirectsupportoflocalauthoritiesandstatesecurityforces,thusallowingforcompleteimpunityintheiractions.”See“HumanRightsDefendersintheStateofGuerrero:CasesofresistanceandinitiativesfromcivilsocietyregardingthedefenseandpromotionoffundamentalrightsinMexico,”PeaceBrigadesInternational,MexicoProject,2007,p.10,availableat:www.peacebrigades.org/fileadmin/user_files/projects/mexico/files/Defenderes_Guerrero_PBI_Mexico_ENG.pdf[accessedonJuly16,2015].

23 SeetheNationalHumanRightsCommission’sfirst-everrecommendationforgravehumanrightsviolations,RecomendaciónNo.1VG/2012,sobrelainvestigacióndeviolacionesgravesalosderechoshumanosrelacionadaconloshechosocurridosel12dediciembrede2011enChilpancingo,Guerrero,availableat:www.cndh.org.mx/sites/all/doc/Recomendaciones/ViolacionesGraves/RecVG_001.pdf [accessedonOctober7,2014].Seealso:MaureenMeyer,“Mexico’sPolice:ManyReforms,LittleProgress,”WashingtonOfficeonLatinAmerica,May2014,pp.16-18,availableat:www.wola.org/sites/default/files/Mexicos%20Police.pdf[accessedonOctober7,2014]andAmnestyInternational,“OutofControl:TortureandOtherIll-TreatmentinMexico,”September2014,pp.53-54,availableat:www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/AMR41/020/2014/en/468aee5a-ecc3-470f-9387-a8a10b5670cc/amr410202014en.pdf[accessedOctober7,2014].

24 ChrisKyle,“ViolenceandInsecurityinGuerrero,”WilsonCenter,January2015,pp.11-14,availableat:http://wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/Violence%20and%20Insecurity%20in%20Guerrero.pdf[accessedonApril19,2015].

25 Ibid.,pp.14-21.SeealsoLuisAstorga,“Estado,drogasilegalesypodercriminal,retostransexenales,”Nexos,November2012,availableat:www.letraslibres.com/revista/dossier/estado-drogas-ilegales-y-poder-criminal-retos-transexenales?page=full[accessedonFebruary9,2015].

26 InOctober2014,GovernorAguirreclaimedthatmostpoliceinthestatehadbeeninfiltratedorcooptedbyorganizedcrime.See:“MexicanfederalpolicetakeovertroubledGuerrerocityamidmayhem,killings,massgraves,”AssociatedPress,October7,2014,availableat:www.foxnews.com/world/2014/10/07/mexican-federal-police-take-over-troubled-guerrero-city-amid-mayhem-killings[accessedonJanuary17,2015].AccordingtotheheadoflegalissuesattheFederalMinistryoftheInterior,almost75percentofthemunicipalitiesinMexicocouldbevulnerabletoorganizedcrimeinfiltration.SeeappearancebeforetheSenateonJanuary21,2015:http://comunicacion.senado.gob.mx/index.php/informacion/versiones/18178-version-estenografica-de-los-trabajos-de-la-mesa-3-en-el-segundo-dia-de-las-audiencias-publicas-en-materia-de-seguridad-y-justicia.html[accessedonFebruary9,2015].


27 Documenttitled“Criminalgroupsinthecountry,”datedMarch25,2013,obtainedinresponsetoright-to-informationrequestnumber0673800166014fromtheOpenSocietyJusticeInitiativetotheFederalInstituteofAccesstoInformationandProtectionofData.Seealso:“EnGuerrero,26cártelesdelnarcotráfico,”Contralínea,October13,2014,availableat:http://contralinea.info/archivo-revista/index.php/2014/10/13/en-guerrero-26-carteles-del-narcotrafico[accessedonFebruary9,2015].

28 “12alcaldesdeGuerrero,bajolupa‘antinarco’,”Milenio,November11,2014,availableat:www.milenio.com/politica/12_alcaldes_de_Guerrero_bajo_lupa_antinarco-alcaldes_relacionados_con_el_narco_0_410958901.html[accessedonNovember18,2014].

29 StatementoftheHeadoftheAgencyofCriminalInvestigationofPGRbeforetheSenateonJanuary21,2014,availableat:http://comunicacion.senado.gob.mx/index.php/informacion/versiones/18178-version-estenografica-de-los-trabajos-de-la-mesa-3-en-el-segundo-dia-de-las-audiencias-publicas-en-materia-de-seguridad-y-justici-a.html?start=2[accessedonFebruary9,2015].

30 “RadiografíadelasorganizacionescriminalesqueoperanenGuerrero,”Contralínea,November19,2014,availableat:www.animalpolitico.com/blogueros-causa-en-comun/2014/11/19/radiografia-de-las-organizaciones-criminales-que-operan-en-guerrero/#_ftn1[accessedonNovember18,2014].

31 SeeAlmaGuillermoprieto,“Mexico:WeAreNotSheeptobeKilled,”New York Review of Books,November9,2014,availableat:www.nybooks.com/blogs/nyrblog/2014/nov/05/mexico-not-sheep-to-be-killed/?insrc=hpss[accessedonNovember14,2014].

32 AgreementbetweenrelativesandvictimsoftheAyotzinapacaseandseveralfederalofficers,includingthePresident,datedOctober29,2014,availableat:www.tlachinollan.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/141029-Minuta-de-Acuerdos-Presidencia-Ayotzinapa.pdf[accessedonFebruary9,2015].

33 PublicstatementofPresidentPeñaNieto,followingthefirst—andonly—meetinghehasheldwithvictimsoftheAyotzinapacase,October29,2014availableat:www.youtube.com/watch?v=6bjWs3b1Peo[accessedonFebruary9,2015].ThesetofreformsproposedbyPresidentPeñaNietoinresponsetotheAyotzinapacaseisavailableat:http://sil.gobernacion.gob.mx/Librerias/pp_ContenidoAsuntos.php?SID=ab8cf755cbc459a4aa9923604dc4a82f&Clave=3180893[accessedonFebruary9,2015].

34 TheCongressauthorizedhisleave.SeeLegislativeDecreenumber521,datedOctober25,2014thatauthorizestheleaveofabsenceofGovernorÁngelAguirre,availableat:http://periodicooficial.guerrero.gob.mx/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/DECRETO-NO.-5211.pdf[accessedonFebruary9,2015].

35 OntheallegationsofMayorAbarca’stiestoorganizedcrimepriortotheAyotzinapadisappearances,seeU.S.DepartmentofState,Mexico2013HumanRightsReport,pp.2-3,availableat:www.state.gov/documents/organization/220667.pdf [accessedonFebruary9,2015].InNovember2014,PRDfounderCuauhtémocCardenascalledontheparty’snationalleadertoresign.See:“MexicanPoliticsinDisarrayamidCaseofKidnappedStudents,”Washington Post,November18,2014,availableat:www.washingtonpost.com/world/mexican-politics-in-disarray-amid-case-of-kidnapped-students/2014/11/18/bd1898a6-6f3b-11e4-a2c2-478179fd0489_story.html[accessedonNovember18,2014].

36 DataretrievedfromtheExecutiveSecretariatoftheNationalPublicSecuritySystem,availableat:http://secretariadoejecutivo.gob.mx/incidencia-delictiva/incidencia-delictiva-fuero-comun.php; http://secretariadoejecutivo.gob.mx/docs/pdfs/incidencia%20delictiva%20del%20fuero%20comun/IncidenciaDelictiva_FueroComun_Estatal_1997-022015.zip[accessedonJuly17,2015].

37 PriortoAugust2014,theofficewascalledtheGeneralProsecutor’sOfficeofJusticefortheStateofGuerrero(ProcuraduríaGeneraldeJusticiadelEstado,PGJE).SeethesectionbelowonlackofprosecutorialautonomyforinformationaboutthetransitionofthePGJEintotheFiscalía.

38 Informationobtainedinresponsetoright-to-informationrequests51615and51715fromtheOpenSocietyJusticeInitiativetotheFiscalíaofGuerrero,June3,2015.

39 HumanRightsWatch,Neither Rights nor Security,p.128.

40 OpenSocietyJusticeInitiativeinterviewwithHipólitoLugo,chiefinvestigatorofthestateHumanRightsCommission,Chilpancingo,September17,2014andaHumanRightsCommissiondocumentondisappearances,onfilewiththeOpenSocietyJusticeInitiative.UnderthelegalframeworkofGuerrero,arecommendationisanon-bindingdocumentfromthestateHumanRightsCommissiononactionsoromissionsfromauthoritiesthatmayconstitutehumanrightsviolations.Seearticle7ofLawnumber696oftheHumanRightsCommissionoftheStateofGuerrero,availableat:http://periodicooficial.guerrero.gob.mx/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/PERIODICO-23.pdf[accessedJuly17,2015].

41 Insomecasesmorethanoneauthoritywasinvolved.PowerPointdocumentofthestateHumanRightsCommission,“DesapariciónForzadadePersonas:Gráficas,1990-2013,”onfilewiththeOpenSocietyJusticeInitiative.

42 OpenSocietyJusticeInitiativeinterviewwithHipólitoLugo,chiefinvestigatorofthestateHumanRightsCommission,Chilpancingo,September17,2014.SeealsoresponsestoOpenSocietyJusticeInitiativeright-to-informationrequeststotheFiscalía,numbers187214and188514,February6,2015.

43 NoneofthesecriminalinvestigationswereopenedinresponsetoarecommendationfromthestateHumanRightsCommission.ResponsestoOpenSocietyJusticeInitiativeright-to-informationrequeststotheFiscalía,numbers187214and188514,February6,2015.

44 FiscalíaofGuerreroresponsetoOpenSocietyJusticeInitiativeright-to-informationrequestnumber187114,January30,2015.

45 “MexicogovernordeniesroleinIgualaviolence,”EFENewsAgency,October9,2014,availableat:www.laprensasa.com/309_america-in-english/2742692_mexico-governor-denies-role-in-iguala-violence.html [accessed on October 17, 2014].


46 ChrisKyle,“ViolenceandInsecurityinGuerrero,”WilsonCenter,January2015,pp.36-43,availableat:http://wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/Violence%20and%20Insecurity%20in%20Guerrero.pdf[accessedonApril19,2015].

47 SeepressreleaseoftheStateProsecutor’sOfficeofGuerrero,availableat:www.pgjeguerrero.gob.mx/casos-relevantes/policias-turisticos-de-la-ciudad-y-puerto-de-acapulco-implicados-en-el-delito-de-desaparicion-forzada-de-personas[accessedJanuary5,2015].Seealso,“DesdeeljuevesnoapareceunagentedelaPolicíaTurísticaPreventiva,”El Sur de Acapulco,January9,2014,availableat:http://suracapulco.mx/archivos/126667[accessedonJuly16,2015].

48 Videooftheabuse,uploadedonApril3,2014,isavailableat:www.youtube.com/watch?v=FVDI54yjYCE.[accessedonNovember11,2014].

49 Thesecondvideoisavailableat:www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZTbkNgp7oIk[accessedonNovember19,2014].

50 Accordingtolocalmedia,Álvarezhimselfshowedjournaliststhissecondvideothatcontainshisvoice,butdoesn’tshowhisface.“AcusanenvideoaljefedelaPolicíadeAcapulcodehaberordenadolatortura;AlfredoÁlvarezloniega,”El Sur de Acapulco,April5,2014,availableat:http://suracapulco.mx/archivos/137595[accessedonJuly16,2015].

51 ThatvideowasalsopostedtoYouTube:https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sY1D9n4JVEA[accessedonMay8,2015].

52 “AcusanenvideoaljefedelaPolicíadeAcapulcodehaberordenadolatortura;AlfredoÁlvarezloniega,”El Sur de Acapulco,April5,2014,availableat:http://suracapulco.mx/archivos/137595[accessedonNovember19,2014].

53 “ExSecretariodeSeguridadPúblicadeAcapulco,acusadodetorturayabusodeautoridad,esdetenidoenelDF,”Sin Embargo,July26,2014,availableat:www.sinembargo.mx/26-07-2014/1069420[accessedonNovember11,2014].ItisnotclearwhytheNavymadethearrest.ItmayrelatetothefactthatÁlvarezisaformermemberoftheNavy,orbecausetheNavyisfrequentlyinvolvedinenforcingwarrantsinhigh-profilecases.OpenSocietyJusticeInitiativeinterviewwithamemberofcivilsociety,MexicoCity,March2015.

54 PressreleaseoftheStateProsecutor’sOfficeofGuerrero,July31,2014,availableat:www.pgjeguerrero.gob.mx/noticia/apelara-pgje-resolucion-de-juez-sobre-el-auto-de-libertad-dictado-a-alfredo-alvarez-valenzuela-por-su-probable-responsabilidad-en-los-delitos-de-desaparicion-forzada-y-abuso-de-autoridad-en-que-incurr[accessedonNovember11,2014].Seealso:“ExSecretariodeSeguridadPúblicadeAcapulco,acusadodetorturayabusodeautoridad,esdetenidoenelDF,”Sin Embargo,July26,2014,availableat:www.sinembargo.mx/26-07-2014/1069420[accessedonJanuary15,2015].

55 ThesestatisticsandothersinthisparagrapharebasedondocumentsfromthestateHumanRightsCommission,onfilewiththeOpenSocietyJusticeInitiative.

56 Notablyinthe2011attackagainsttheAyotzinapastudentsbyfederalandstatesecurityforces,theNationalHumanRightsCommissionfoundthatauthoritiesperpetratedactsoftorture.SeeRecomendaciónNo.1VG/2012,sobrelainvestigacióndeviolacionesgravesalosderechoshumanosrelacionadaconloshechosocurridosel12dediciembrede2011enChilpancingo,Guerrero,paragraphs293to298,availableat:www.cndh.org.mx/sites/all/doc/Recomendaciones/ViolacionesGraves/RecVG_001.pdf.

57 ThiswastheNationalCommission’sfirst-everrecommendationrelatedtograveviolationsofhumanrightsinMexico.SeeNationalCommissionofHumanRights,RecomendaciónNo.1VG/2012,sobrelainvestigacióndeviolacionesgravesalosderechoshumanosrelacionadaconloshechosocurridosel12dediciembrede2011enChilpancingo,Guerrero,paragraphs52to65,availableat:http://www.cndh.org.mx/sites/all/doc/Recomendaciones/ViolacionesGraves/RecVG_001.pdf[accessedonOctober7,2014].Thearrestswerenotjudiciallyauthorizedandtherewerenooutstandingwarrantsagainstthestudents.Federalconstitutionalamendmentspassedin2008allowprosecutorstomakearrestsin“urgentcases”withoutjudicialauthorization.

58 OfficialdocumentSEGOB/CNS/IG/DGAJ/759/2013datedAugust9,2013obtainedbytheOpenSocietyJusticeInitiativethrougharight-to-informationrequesttothestateCongress.OnÁlvarezastheofficerinchargeofoperation“GuerreroSeguro,”seealso:“Designanapolicíaintegrantede‘LaHermandad’comojefepoliciacoenAcapulco,”Proceso,November14,2013,availableat:www.proceso.com.mx/?p=357945and“DesairanmandosdelaPolicíaFederalalaComisiónInstructoradelCongresolocal,”El Sur de Acapulco,availableat:http://suracapulco.mx/archivos/100116[accessedonNovember19,2014].RecommendationNo.1VG/2012oftheNationalHumanRightsCommissionrelatedtotheDecember2011incidentassignsthemoniker“AR14”tothe“CoordinatoroftheoperationGuerreroSeguro”(Álvarez),andfoundthatinthecourseoftheoperation,“AR14”wasresponsibleforviolatingtheprincipleoflegalityandengaginginfurtherabusesincludinginhumantreatmentandexcessiveuseofforce.TheOpenSocietyJusticeInitiativeissuedinformationrequestsfortheuneditedversionofthisrecommendationtotheNationalHumanRightsCommission(RTIrequest69514),totheMinistryoftheInterior(RTIrequest400392214),andtothestateCongress(responsetoRTIrequestbymailonJanuary7,2015).Allauthoritiesrefusedtoprovidetheuneditedversiononthegroundsthatnamesofallegedperpetratorsidentifiedintherecommendationareconfidentialinformation.WhenthestateCongressconvenedinAugust2013toopenimpeachmentprocedures,itsummonedÁlvareztoappear.TheFederalMinistryoftheInterior(SEGOB)sentalast-minutecommunication(OfficialdocumentSEGOB/CNS/IG/DGAJ/759/2013,datedAugust9,2013)sayinghewouldbeunabletoappearbecausehewasonleavethroughtheendofthemonth.DocumentsoftheimpeachmentprocedureandofficialcommunicationofSEGOBobtainedthroughright-to-informationrequeststothestateCongress.Formoreinformationontheimpeachmentprocedure,see:“DesairanmandosdelaPolicíaFederalalaComisiónInstructoradelCongresolocal,”El Sur de Acapulco,August15,2013.

59 DocumentofthestateHumanRightsCommission,onfilewiththeOpenSocietyJusticeInitiative.From1999throughearly2014,theCommissionreceived929reportsofmissingpersonsand/orunlawfuldeprivationoffreedom.Ofthese,796(86%)werereceivedintheyears2006onwards.SeparatestateHumanRightsCommissiondocumentonfilewiththeOpenSocietyJusticeInitiative.

60 Videoofofficersexpressingfearfortheirlivesandintegrity,availableatat:https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sY1D9n4JVEA;andOpenSocietyJusticeInitiativeinterviewwithaGuerrerostateofficial,Chilpancingo,September2014.


61 Pursuanttoarticle2oftheInter-AmericanConventiontoPreventandPunishTorture,towhichMexicoisparty,theinflictionofphysicalormentalpainorsufferingasameansofintimidationorpersonalpunishment,ortoforceaconfession,amountstotorture.

62 SeeNationalCommissionofHumanRights,RecomendaciónNo.1VG/2012,sobrelainvestigacióndeviolacionesgravesalosderechoshumanosrelacionadaconloshechosocurridosel12dediciembrede2011enChilpancingo,Guerrero,paragraphs52to56and293to318availableat:http://www.cndh.org.mx/sites/all/doc/Recomendaciones/ViolacionesGraves/RecVG_001.pdf[accessedonOctober7,2014].

63 Tlachinollan,IntentaelgobiernocriminalizaralosestudiantesdeAyotzinapa,advierteelCentroTlachinollan,pressrelease,July13,2012,availableat:www.tlachinollan.org/respaldo/index.php?option=com_k2&view=item&id=2634%3Aintenta-el-gobierno-criminalizar-a-los-estudiantes-de-ayotzinapa-advierte-el-centro-tlachinollan&Itemid=641&lang=es [accessedFebruary9,2015].

64 OpenSocietyJusticeInitiativeinterviewwithJorgeCamacho,presidentoftheJusticeCommissionofGuerrero’sCongress,Chilpancingo,September18,2014.

65 Articles53to57oftheformerlawoftheHumanRightsCommissionoftheStateofGuerrero(CODDEHUM)setforththedefinitionandpenaltyofthecrimeoftorture.Lawavailableat:www.coddehumgro.org.mx/sitio/archivos/leyes/ley_coddehum.pdf.

66 OpenSocietyJusticeInitiativeinterviewwithHipólitoLugo,chiefinvestigatorofthestateHumanRightsCommission,Chilpancingo,September17,2014.

67 OpenSocietyJusticeInitiativeinterviewwithDeputyProsecutorforHumanRightsAlejandroMojicaNava,December2013.

68 TheOpenSocietyJusticeInitiativefiledrighttoinformationrequestsforinformationonthenumbersofinvestigations,prosecutions,andconvictionsforeachofthesecrimesfrom2005to2015.InitsresponseofApril27,2015,theFiscalíasentlistsofcasesforeachcrime,andmerelynotedthatsometimestheyresultfromreclassification.Therewasnoindicationofwhich,orhowmanyofthesecasesresultedfrominitialallegationsoftorture.Right-to-informationrequestnumbers00037415and00037615.

69 CalculationbasedondocumentsfromthestateHumanRightsCommission,onfilewiththeOpenSocietyJusticeInitiative.

70 Responsetoright-to-informationrequestnumber187114totheFiscalíaofGuerrero,January30,2015.

71 “Vaaresistir,dijoenTepicSuástegui;tienesecuelasdelatortura,denuncian,”El Sur de Acapulco,June24,2014,availableat:http://suracapulco.mx/archivos/169226[accessedJanuary16,2015].

72 OpenSocietyJusticeInitiativeinterviewwithlawyersforMr.Suástegui,fromTlachinollan,April14,2015.

73 SeeAmnestyInternational,“OutofControl:TortureandIll-TreatmentinMexico,”September2014,p.15,availableat:www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/AMR41/020/2014/en[accessedonNovember11,2014].Seealso:Tlachinollan:DenunciaTlachinollananteJuezdeDistritoilegalidaddetrasladoaunpenalfederalaMarcoAntonioSuástegui,líderhistóricodelCECOP,August13,2014,availableat:www.tlachinollan.org/comunicado-denuncia-tlachinollan-ante-juez-de-distrito-ilegalidad-de-traslado-a-un-penal-federal-a-marco-antonio-suastegui-lider-historico-del-cecop[accessedJanuary15,2015].

74 OpenSocietyJusticeInitiativeinterviewwithHipólitoLugo,chiefinvestigatorofthestateHumanRightsCommission.

75 Article39oftheLawofCODDEHUMandarticle20ofthenewlawoftheHumanRightsCommissionofGuerreroprovidethattheprosecutionshallhaveaspecializedagencyforhumanrightsviolationsanddisappearances,withtherequiredmaterialandhumanresources:www.coddehumgro.org.mx/sitio/archivos/leyes/ley_coddehum.pdf.

76 “Lawontheprevention,sanctioning,anderadicationoftortureinthestateofGuerrero”(Leyparaprevenir,sancionaryerradicarlatorturaenelEstadodeGuerrero),articles19-21:http://periodicooficial.guerrero.gob.mx/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/PERIODICO-08-ALCANCE-I.pdf.ThecommitteeispresidedoverbytheheadofthestateHumanRightsCommission.OthermembersincludethepresidentsofthehumanrightsandjusticecommissionofthelocalCongress,thepresidentoflocalcourts,thesecretaryofgovernment,theMinistryofPublicSecurity,theprosecutor,theombudsmanofthepublicuniversityandarepresentativefromcivilsocietywithexperienceinhumanrights.Moredetailonthetechnicalcommitteefollowsinthesectiononthelegalframeworkfortorture.

77 OpenSocietyJusticeInitiativeinterviewwithaGuerrerostateofficial,Chilpancingo,September2014.

78 ResponsefromtheProsecutor’sOfficeofGuerrerotoarequestforinformationfiledbytheOpenSocietyJusticeInitiative(request00167514),November12,2014.AsofApril2015,thecommitteehadstillnotmet.OpenSocietyJusticeInitiativeinterviewwithformerchiefinvestigatorofthestateHumanRightsCommission,HipólitoLugo,Chilpancingo,April12,2015;andasofApril23,2015—almost11monthsafterthelegaldeadlinehadlapsed—therewasstillnoproposedprotocolontorture.ResponsefromtheFiscalíaofGuerrerotoarequestforinformationfiledbytheOpenSocietyJusticeInitiative(request00037515),April23,2015.

79 Seethesectiononlegalframework,below,fordetails.

80 OpenSocietyJusticeInitiativeinterviewwithastategovernmentofficial,Chilpancingo,September17,2014.

81 The“ManualonEffectiveInvestigationandDocumentationofTortureandOtherCruel,InhumanorDegradingTreatmentorPunishment,”or“IstanbulProtocol,”isawidelyaccepted,UN-endorsedguidetobestpracticesintheinvestigationoftortureandill-treatment.Themanualisavailableat:www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/training8Rev1en.pdf.

82 OpenSocietyJusticeInitiativeinterviewwithastategovernmentofficial,Chilpancingo,September17,2014

83 ResponsefromFederalProsecution(PGR)toarequestforinformationfiledbytheOpenSocietyJusticeInitiative(request1700327214),January29,2015.


84 OpenSocietyJusticeInitiativeinterviewwithastategovernmentofficial,Chilpancingo,September17,2014.Theextentoftheforensicanalysisisunclear.Thesamegovernmentofficialsaidthatthestatedidn’tconductanytortureinvestigationsinaccordancewiththeIstanbulProtocol.

85 OpenSocietyJusticeInitiativeinterviewwithstaffofTlachinollan,whorepresentMr.Suástegui,Chilpancingo,April13,2015.

86 Ibid.

87 Article30,sectionXIIIoftheOrganicLawoftheProsecutionofGuerrero(Law193)setsforththatforensicservicesareundertheauthorityoftheprosecutor.Article25providesthatforensicserviceshavetechnicalautonomytoissuetheiropinions.

88 OpenSocietyJusticeInitiativeinterviewswithGuerrerogovernmentofficialsandrepresentativesofcivilsociety,Chilpancingo,September2014.

89 OpenSocietyJusticeInitiativeinterviewwithacongressionalrepresentative,Chilpancingo,September17,2014.

90 OpenSocietyJusticeInitiativeinterviewwithformerchiefinvestigatorofthestateHumanRightsCommissionHipólitoLugoChilpancingo,April12,2015.

91 Accordingtoarticle11,sectionVIoftheRegulationsoftheOrganicLawoftheProsecutionofGuerrero,theprosecutorshallreviewthedecisionsnottofilechargesandarticle32sectionI.a)statesthattheDeputyProsecutorofRegionalControlandCriminalProcedures(SubprocuradordeControlRegionalyProcedimientosPenales)shallruleonthechallenges(inconformidad)againstthedecisionsnottofilecharges.Further,article62oftheCodeofCriminalProceduresofGuerrerosetsforththatinspecificcases,priortothedecisionnottofilechargesagainstanaccusedperson,theprosecutionofficer(MinisterioPúblico)mustconsulttheprosecutorandthevictim.

92 AsofApril20,2015,therehadbeennoresponsestoformalrequestsforinformationontheseissues,whichtheOpenSocietyJusticeInitiativemadetotheprosecutor’sofficeandjudiciary,respectively.

93 Article18oftheRegulationsoftheOrganicLawoftheProsecutionofGuerrero:http://guerrero.gob.mx/wp-content/uploads/leyesyreglamentos/211/RLOPGJEG193.pdf.

94 Article1oftheformerLawoftheProsecution,availableat:http://i.guerrero.gob.mx/uploads/2012/06/LOPGJEG.pdf.SeealsoArticle1oftheOrganicLawoftheExecutiveBranch,availableat:http://i.guerrero.gob.mx/uploads/2014/11/LOAPEG433.pdf.

95 Article80oftheformertextoftheConstitutionofGuerrero,availableat:www.ordenjuridico.gob.mx/Estatal/GUERRERO/Constitucion/GROCONST01.pdf[accessedonJanuary17,2015].

96 Forexample,in2009-2010,then-GovernorZeferinoTorreblancakeptAlberticoGuintoSierraasofficerinchargeofthestateprosecutor’sofficeforninemonths.See:“DejacargoresponsabledeProcuraduríaenGuerrero;llevabanuevemeses,”Noticias Terra,June18,2010,availableat:http://noticias.terra.com.mx/mexico/estados/deja-cargo-responsable-de-procuraduria-en-guerrero-llevaba-nueve-meses,d0b8d4be680df310VgnCLD200000bbcceb0aRCRD.html[accessedonApril20,2015].Torreblanca’ssuccessor,formerGovernorAguirre,appointedJuanManuelHerreraCamposasdeputyprosecutorandofficerinchargeofthestateprosecutor’sofficefortheperiodJanuary-May2012.See:www.cnpj.gob.mx/prensa/2007/fich12/Ene/f05012012.shtm[accessedonApril20,2015]and“MarthaElbaGarzónnuevaprocuradoradeJusticia,”UltraNoticias,June1,2012,availableat:www.ultra.com.mx/noticias/guerrero/Local/48045-martha-elba-garzon-nueva-procuradora-de-justicia.html[accessedonApril20,2015].Asdiscussedbelow,AguirreappointedRamónNavarreteMagdalenoasofficerinchargeofthestateHumanRightsCommissioninJanuary2014inviolationoftheprocedureestablishedinthelawontheHumanRightsCommission.Navarreteremainsinthatposition.OnJuly1,2015,thestateCongressofficiallyappointedhimaspresidentofthestateHumanRightsCommission:“RamónNavarretefueratificadocomopresidentedelaCoddehum,”La Jornada Guerrero,July1,2015,availableat:www.lajornadaguerrero.com.mx/2015/07/01/index.php?section=sociedad&article=004n1soc[accessedonJuly17,2015].

97 AccordingtoinformationprovidedbytheNationalHumanRightsCommission,asofApril2015,thePGRhasopenedthreeprosecutorialinvestigationsrelatedtotheincident,thestateFiscalíahasopened10prosecutorialinvestigationsandsevenadministrativeproceedings,thefederalMinistryofPublicSecurityhasopenedtwoadministrativeproceedings,theGeneralInspectionofGuerrerohasopenedfouradministrativeprocedures,andthestateMinistryofPublicSecurityhasopenedtwoadministrativeproceedings.Overthreeyearsaftertheincident,therehavebeennoindictmentsatfederalorstatelevel.DocumentCNDH/DGSR/UE/676/2015,April10,2015,providedinresponsetorequest00019115filedbytheOpenSocietyJusticeInitiative.

98 Thefederalgovernmentappearedtobecomplicitinobstructingthesoleattemptbylocalauthoritiestoholdaccountableperpetratorsofthe2011Ayotzinapaattackwhen,inAugust2013,SEGOBsentalast-minutedocumenttotheCongressstatingthattheofficersfromtheFederalPolicewouldnotbeabletoappearbecauseonewasontemporaryleaveandtheotherhadresignedfromtheinstitution(officialdocumentSEGOB/CNS/IG/DGAJ/759/2013,datedAugust9,2013,andallotherdocumentsissuedbylocalCongressinthecontextofthisprocedureobtainedbyOpenSocietyJusticeInitiativeinFebruary10,2015inresponsetoaright-to-informationrequesttotheGuerreroCongress).

99 EvenasfederalandstateauthoritiesapparentlyimposedÁlvarezonthemunicipalityofAcapulco,withoutregardtotheprerogativeofmunicipalauthoritiestomakesuchappointments,themunicipalcouncil(cabildo)wouldlater“validate”thisirregularappointment.See“SelobrincaronperopropondráalCabildoaAlfredoÁlvarezparaSeguridadPública,anunciaWalton,”El Sur de Acapulco,November16,2013,availableat:http://suracapulco.mx/archivos/120025[accessedonFebruary9,2015]and“RatificanaAlfredoÁlvarezValenzuelacomotitulardelaSSPenAcapulco,”El Occidental,December6,2013,availableat:www.oem.com.mx/eloccidental/notas/n3217096.htm[accessedonFebruary9,2013].


100 “MexicanfederalpolicetakeovertroubledGuerrerocityamidmayhem,killings,massgraves,”AssociatedPress,October7,2014,availableat:www.foxnews.com/world/2014/10/07/mexican-federal-police-take-over-troubled-guerrero-city-amid-mayhem-killings[accessedonJanuary17,2015].

101 OpenSocietyJusticeInitiativeinterviewsinChilpancingo,JanuaryandSeptember2014.

102 ConstitutionofGuerrero,article141andOrganicLawoftheFiscalía,article53.

103 TheappointmentprocessissetforthinArticle142oftheamendedstateConstitution.


105 http://periodicooficial.guerrero.gob.mx/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/PERIODICO-75-ALCANCE-I.pdf.

106 Article16oftheTransitionalProvisionsoftheConstitutionandArticle4oftheTransitionalProvisionsoftheOrganicLawoftheFiscalía.

107 Godinez’sprofessionalbackgroundincludes:theFederalSpecializedProsecutionOfficeorganizedcrime(SEIDO),DeputyProsecutionfortheinvestigationofcrimesperpetratedbyPublicServants,OfficerofPGR(AgentedelMinisterioPúblicoFederal),agentofInterpolMexicoandspecializedinvestigativeagentoftheUNforCentralAmerica.Seewww.fiscaliaguerrero.gob.mx/noticias/miguel-angel-godinez-munoz-abogado-penalista-y-academico-de-38-anos-el-nuevo-fiscal-general-de-guerrero[accessedonApril20,2015].


109 Ibid.


111 OpenSocietyJusticeInitiativeinterviewwithHipólitoLugo,chiefinvestigatorofthestateHumanRightsCommission,Chilpancingo,September17,2014.

112 Althoughtherecanbemultiplecausesforhighratesofpretrialdetention,ithasbeenshownthatadequatelegalrepresentationcanreduceleadtoreductionsinitsuse.SeeOpenSocietyJusticeInitiative,Improving Pretrial Justice: The Role of Lawyers and Paralegals,December2010,availableat:www.opensocietyfoundations.org/fact-sheets/improving-pretrial-justice-role-lawyers-and-paralegals.Seealso:UnitedNationsOfficeonDrugsandCrime,Earlyaccesstolegalaidincriminaljusticeprocesses:ahandbookforpolicymakersandpractitioners,2014,availableat:www.unodc.org/documents/justice-and-prison-reform/eBook-early_access_to_legal_aid.pdf.

113 OpenSocietyJusticeInitiativeinterviewwithJorgeSalazarMarchán,presidentoftheHumanRightsCommissionofGuerrero’sCongress,Chilpancingo,September17,2014.

114 OpenSocietyJusticeInitiativeinterviewwithformerchiefinvestigatorofthestateHumanRightsCommissionHipólitoLugo,Chilpancingo,April12,2015.

115 OpenSocietyJusticeInitiativeinterviewwithstafffromTlachinollan,Chilpancingo,April13,2015.

116 “Justiciaparaindígenas,sintraductoresnidefensoresdeoficio,”Los Ángeles Press,May8,2013,availableat:www.losangelespress.org/justicia-para-indigenas-sin-traductores-ni-defensores-de-oficio[accessedonJanuary19,2015].SeealsotherecommendationbyFinland(accepted)toMexicointheframeworkoftheUPR,2009:ReportoftheWorkingGroupontheUniversalPeriodicReview,December11,2013,documentA/HRC/25/7,paragraphs36,148.124,148.166availableat:www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/RegularSessions/Session25/Documents/A-HRC-25-7_en.doc.

117 TheNationalHumanRightsCommissionexpressedconcernaboutthispracticeinrelationtothedetentionoftheheadsofinformalcommunitypolicesuspectedofcrimes.See:CNDH,InformeespecialsobrelosgruposdeautodefensaylaseguridadpúblicaenelestadodeGuerrero,2013,para.269,availableat:www.cndh.org.mx/sites/all/fuentes/documentos/informes/especiales/2013_IE_grupos_autodefensa.pdf[accessedonApril15,2015].

118 Articles10,19sectionIand25ofLaw848:PublicLegalAidoftheStateofGuerrero.


120 OpenSocietyJusticeInitiativeinterviewwithHipólitoLugo,formerchiefinvestigatorofthestateHumanRightsCommission,Chilpancingo,December13,2013.

121 InsomeEuropeanstatesandSouthAfrica,theriskofconflictsofinterestareminimizedbyhavingnationallegalaidboardsthatareindependentexecutiveagencies,directlyaccountabletonationalparliaments.

122 See,forexample:“Confrontacióndeasociacionesybarradeabogados,”Agoraguerrero,February21,2013,availableat:http://agoraguerrero2.over-blog.es/article-confrontacion-de-asociaciones-y-barra-de-abogados-115561276.html [accessedonJanuary19,2015].

123 Articles106Bisto106NoftheOrganicLawoftheJudicialBranchofGuerrero(Law129),availableat:http://congresogro.gob.mx/index.php/organicas.



126 OpenSocietyJusticeInitiativeinterviewswithstateofficialsandcivilsocietymembersinChilpancingo,December2013.

127 ThereformissupposedtobeimplementedacrossMexicobyJune2016.Seethe2008constitutionalamendmentsthatintroducedtheadversarialsystem,availableat:http://dof.gob.mx/nota_detalle.php?codigo=5046978&fec


ha=18/06/2008[accessedonApril23,2015].SeealsotheNationalCodeforCriminalProcedures(CódigoNacionaldeProcedimientosPenales)thatimplementstheNSJPandwaspublishedintheFederalOfficialGazetteonMarch5,2014,availableat:www.diputados.gob.mx/LeyesBiblio/pdf/CNPP_291214.pdf[accessedonApril23,2015].Thisnewnationalcodeistoreplaceallexistingstate-levelcriminalproceduralcodes.

128 Mexico’sSupremeCourtruledinFebruary2014thatarraigoisonlyapplicableincasesofsuspectedorganizedcrime,whichfallsundertheexclusivecompetenceofthefederalgovernment.Thisdecisionmadeitnolongeravailabletostateauthorities.Seejudgmentsofconstitutionalchallenges(accionesdeinconstitucionalidad)ontheissue:29/2012(www2.scjn.gob.mx/ConsultaTematica/PaginasPub/DetallePub.aspx?AsuntoID=138009)and22/2013(www2.scjn.gob.mx/ConsultaTematica/PaginasPub/DetallePub.aspx?AsuntoID=156333).

129 Article23,sectionIIoftheOrganicLawoftheJudicialBranchofGuerrero(Law129)setsforththerandomassignmentofcases.FifthSection(articles107to140)oftheOrganicLawregulatesdisciplineproceduresforjudgesandjudicialstaff.OrganicLawavailableat:http://congresogro.gob.mx/index.php/organicas.

130 Documentavailableat:www.sitios.scjn.gob.mx/instituto/sites/default/files/documentos/codigo-de-etica-del-poder-judicial-guerrero.pdf[accessedonJanuary19,2015].

131 Article77,sectionVofLaw674ofResponsibilitiesofPublicOfficersoftheStateofGuerrero(Leynúmero674deResponsabilidadesdelosServidoresPúblicosdelEstadodeGuerrero),availableat:www.ordenjuridico.gob.mx/Estatal/GUERRERO/Leyes/GROLEY72.pdf[accessedonApril20,2015].

132 Articles16,sectionXVIII;17,sectionXXI;79,sectionXVII;106andrelated,141-145oftheOrganicLawoftheJudicialBranchofGuerrero(Law129)refertothepracticeofvisitstooverseetheperformanceofcourts.Lawavailableat:http://congresogro.gob.mx/index.php/organicas.OnFebruary3,2015,inresponsetoaright-to-informationrequestfromOpenSocietyJusticeInitiative,thegeneralinspectoroflocalcourtsrepliedthatbetween2006and2014ithadcarriedout228inspections:136“ordinary,”81“extraordinary,”and11“special.”

133 Article106,sectionVIIoftheOrganicLawoftheJudicialBranchofGuerrero(Law129).


135 OpenSocietyJusticeInitiativeinterviewwithHipólitoLugo,formerchiefinvestigatorofthestateHumanRightsCommission,Chilpancingo,April12,2015.

136 EncuestaNacionaldeVictimizaciónyPercepciónsobreSeguridadPública(ENVIPE)2014,availableat:http://www3.inegi.org.mx/sistemas/tabuladosbasicos/tabdirecto.aspx?c=33685&s=est[accessedonFebruary23,2015].

137 “TSJdeGuerrerobuscará‘salidajurídica’aconflictodeparistas,”Proceso,April8,2015,availableat:www.proceso.com.mx/?p=400645[accessedonApril18,2015].Seealso:“AcusannepotismodejuecesenGuerrero,”Agencia Reforma,July6,2014,availableat:www.am.com.mx/m/mexico/acusan-nepotismo-de-jueces-en-guerrero-115070.html[accessedonApril18,2015].

138 “DesvióMartínezGarnelo3millonesqueeranparasuaumentosalarial,señalantrabajadoresdelTSJ,”El Sur de Acapulco,February21,2015,availableat:http://suracapulco.mx/archivos/132219[accessedonFebruary23,2015].

139 “ApruebaelCongresolalicenciadeMartínezGarneloalTSJ,”El Sur de Acapulco,September7,2014,availableat:http://suracapulco.mx/archivos/106237[accessedonFebruary23,2015].SeeinterventionofDeputyÁngelAguirreHerreraonSeptember6,2013,justifyingthegrantingofapermanentleavetoMartinezat:http://congresogro.gob.mx/diario/index.php/intervenciones-en-tribuna/lx-legislatura/ano-i/tercer-peridodo-de-receso/doc_view/5529-intervencion-en-tribuna-6-sep-2013.

140 “NiegaMartínezGarneloacusacionesdetrabajadoresdelTSJyanunciaquelosrecibiráelgobernador,”El Sur de Acapulco,February25,2014,availableat:http://suracapulco.mx/archivos/132664[accessedonJuly17,2015]andOpenSocietyJusticeInterviewswithastateofficial,civilsocietyrepresentatives,andamemberofthestateCongress,Chilpancingo,September2014.

141 “AcusannepotismodejuecesenGuerrero,”AgenciaReforma,July6,2014,availableat:www.am.com.mx/m/mexico/acusan-nepotismo-de-jueces-en-guerrero-115070.html [accessedonApril18,2015].

142 Byanothertelling,itwasLópezCeliswhoaskedforaleaveofabsenceforhealthreasons.OpenSocietyJusticeInitiativeinterviewwithJorgeCamacho,presidentoftheJusticeCommissionofGuerrero’sCongress,Chilpancingo,September18,2014.Inanycase,thePlenaryofLocalCourtsappointedLambertinaGaleanaasinterimpresidentoftheLocalCourtsofGuerreroonJanuary31,2014.See“RenunciaLópezCelisalapresidenciadelTSJynombrancomointerinaaLambertinaGaleana,”El Sur de Acapulco,February3,2014,availableat:http://suracapulco.mx/archivos/129858[accessedJanuary19,2015].

143 “DesvióMartínezGarnelo3millonesqueeranparasuaumentosalarial,señalantrabajadoresdelTSJ,”El Sur de Acapulco,February21,2015,availableat:http://suracapulco.mx/archivos/132219[accessedonFebruary23,2015].

144 “JesúsMartínezGarnelo,sequedacomoencargadodeldespachoenGuerrero,”El Financiero,October24,2014,availableat:www.elfinanciero.com.mx/sociedad/jesus-martinez-garnelo-se-queda-como-encargado-del-despacho-en-guerrero.html[accessedonNovember17,2014].

145 LegislativedecreedatedOctober26,2014,appointingMr.OrtegaasgovernorofGuerrero,availableat:http://periodicooficial.guerrero.gob.mx/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/DECRETO-N%C3%9AMERO-522.pdf[accessedonFebruary23,2015].

146 Ortegaappointedanacademic,DavidCienfuegosSalgado,tothepostonNovember3,2014.SeepressreleaseofGuerrerogovernmentontheappointmentofDavidCienfuegos,datedNovember3,2014,availableat:http://guerrero.gob.mx/2014/11/rogelio-ortega-designo-a-david-cienfuegos-salgado-como-secretario-general-de-gobierno[accessedonFebruary23,2015].Seealso“DavidCienfuegosasumelasecretaríageneraldeGobiernodeGuerrero,”


El Financiero,November3,2014,availableat:www.elfinanciero.com.mx/sociedad/david-cienfuegos-asume-la-secretaria-general-de-gobierno-de-guerrero.html[accessedonJanuary19,2015].Thesameday,MartínezappliedtotheCongressfortheliftingofhisleavefromthejudiciary,explainingthatnowthathewasnolongeractingasministerofinterior,“itwashispre-establishedprerogativetoretakethepresidencyoflocalcourts”(lettersentbyMartíneztolocalCongressonOctober30,2014,obtainedbyOpenSocietyJusticeInitiativeonJanuary7,2015inresponsetoaright-to-informationrequest).OnNovember3,2014,judgesofGuerrero’sSupremeCourtofJusticevotedtoremovehimasitspresident(alsovotingto“ratify”MagistrateLambertinaGaleanatoleadthecourtandthejudiciaryuntilApril30,2015).(Officialdocument9568,datedNovember3,2014,obtainedbyOpenSocietyJusticeInitiativeonJanuary7,2015inresponsetoaright-to-informationrequest.)ThejudgesvotedMartínezoutinresponsetothereleasedaudioofaconversationbetweenhimandthemayorofIguala,JoséLuisAbarca,recordedjustdaysaftertheSeptember26,2014disappearanceofthe43AyotzinapastudentsinwhichAbarcaandhiswifeweresuspects.TheconversationtookplacethedaybeforetheyfledfromGuerreroandamonthbeforetheirarrestinMexicoCity.See“TSJGuerrerorelevaráalmagistradopresidente,JesúsMartínezGarnelo,”El Financiero,November4,2014,availableat:www.elfinanciero.com.mx/sociedad/tsj-no-permitira-que-martinez-garnelo-regrese-como-magistrado.html[accessedonNovember8,2014].OnNovember4—thedayafterthevotebythejudges—thestateCongressvotedtoapproveMartínez’srequesttoendhisleaveofabsencefromthejudiciary.AsofApril2015,heremainsajudgeontheSupremeCourtofJustice.

147 Article97,section1oftheConstitutionsetsforththatmagistratesaretobeappointedbythegovernor.Article16,sectionXLIIIoftheOrganicLawsetsforththatPlenaryoftheSupremeCourtofJusticeshallrequesttothegovernor“theappointmentofmagistratesoftheSupremeCourtofJusticeoftheState.”Article17,XVordersthepresidentoflocalcourtstonotifythegovernoroftheresignationorcompleteabsenceofmagistrates.Finally,accordingtoarticle76,thegovernorhastheauthoritytoappointonecounseloroftheJudiciaryCouncil.

148 FormerConstitutionofGuerrero,Article89,VII,availableat:http://guerrero.gob.mx/wp-content/uploads/leyesyreglamentos/CPG.pdf.

149 OpenSocietyJusticeInitiativeinterviewwithastateofficial,Chilpancingo,September2014.SeealsothepressreleaseontheissuefromtheWorldOrganizationAgainstTorture(OMCT)andInternationalFederationforHumanRights(FIDH),July4,2014,availableat:www.omct.org/es/human-rights-defenders/urgent-interventions/mexico/2014/07/d22753,andthemediareport“OrdenaunajuezaeltrasladodeSuásteguidelacárceldeTepicalpenaldeLaUnión,” El Sur de Acapulco,January30,2015[accessedonFebruary23,2015].

150 Docket649/2014-IIoftheThirdDistrictJudgeintheStateofGuerrero,January26,2015.

151 UndertheRegulationstotheLawofCODDEHUM,thechiefinvestigatorcoversanyabsenceoftheHumanRightsCommissionpresidentnotinexcessoftwomonths,anditisfortheCouncilofCODDEHUMtoappointaninterimpresidentforabsencesovertwomonths,untiltheappointmentofanewpresident.RegulationstotheLawofCODDEHUM,Article48,availableat:www.coddehumgro.org.mx/sitio/archivos/leyes/reglamento_coddehum.pdf [accessedonJanuary20,2015].

152 OpenSocietyJusticeInitiativeinterviewwithHipólitoLugo,formerchiefinvestigatorofthestateHumanRightsCommission,Chilpancingo,September17,2014.

153 “Enmenosde7días15muerenenpenalesdelEstado,”Novedades de Acapulco,January7,2014,availableat:www.novedadesacapulco.mx/guerrero/en-menos-de-7-dias-15-mueren-en-penales-del-estado[accessedJanuary20,2015].

154 NationalCommissionofHumanRights,pressreleaseCGCP/012/14,nolongeravailableonline,butonfilewiththeOpenSocietyJusticeInitiative.

155 DocumentoftheCODDEHUMTechnicalCommittee,availableat:www.coddehumgro.org.mx/sitio/archivos/consejo-tecnico/acuerdo-consejo-ramon.pdf[accessedonJanuary20,2015].ThedocumentwithNavarrete’sappointmentbythegovernorwasreceivedbytheCommissiononJanuary7,2014.DocumentprovidedbythestateHumanRightsCommissiononNovember18,2014(communicationUTAIP-CODDEHUM/050/2014)inresponsetoarequestforinformationfiledbytheOpenSocietyJusticeInitiative.Further,theexecutivehasimplicitlyadmittedthattherewasnobasisforthegovernortomaketheappointment.WhentheOpenSocietyJusticeInitiativefiledarequestforinformationonNavarrete’sappointment,theMinistryoftheInteriorrespondedthat,“InformationontheappointmentofRamónNavarreteMagdalenoasofficerinchargeofthelocalhumanrightscommissionmustberequestedtotheCongress,asitisthecompetentauthoritytoappointofficersofthelocalhumanrightscommission.”Communication1279,October30,2014inresponsetorequest00161214.InresponsetoafurtherrequestforinformationfiledbytheOpenSocietyJusticeInitiative,thestateHumanRightsCommissionstatedthatthereisnodocumentissuedbythestateCongresswithregardtoNavarrete’sappointmentasofficerincharge.CommunicationUTAIP-CODDEHUM/050/2014,November18,2014.OnememberofCongressblamedJesúsMartínezGarnelo—Aguirre’sinteriorministerandonce-and-futurejudiciarypresident—asbeingthesourceoftheirregularappointment,andcalledforhisresignation.See“DiscrepandiputadosporinjerenciadeAguirreenladesignacióndetitulardelaCoddehum,”La Jornada Guerrero,January9,2014,availableat:www.lajornadaguerrero.com.mx/2014/01/10/index.php?section=politica&article=004n1pol[accessedonJanuary20,2015].Formediacriticismofthegovernor,see:“Guerrero:nombramientodeNuevotitulardelaCoddehumgeneradiscusión,”BlogSIPAZ,January10,2014,availableat:http://sipaz.wordpress.com/tag/Hipólito-lugo-cortes[accessedonJanuary20,2015].

156 OpenSocietyJusticeInitiativeinterviewswithamemberofthestateCongress,astaffmemberofthestateHumanRightsCommission,andcivilsocietyorganizations,Chilpancingo,September2014.

157 OpenSocietyJusticeInitiativeinterviewwithHipólitoLugo,formerchiefinvestigatorofthestateHumanRightsCommission,Chilpancingo,January2014.



159 ThelawcreatingCODDEHUMestablishedthecommitteeinitsarticles36to39.See:LeyquecrealacomisióndedefensadelosDerechosHumanosyestableceelprocedimientoenmaterialdedesaparicióninvoluntariadepersonas,availableat:www.coddehumgro.org.mx/sitio/archivos/leyes/ley_coddehum.pdf [accessedonJanuary20,2015].

160 Officialdocument377/2007ofCODDEHUManddraftamendmentstotheOrganicLawoftheProsecutionforthecreationoftheSpecializedProsecution,onfilewithOpenSocietyJusticeInitiative.

161 UndateddocumentsprovidedbythestateHumanRightsCommission,onfilewiththeOpenSocietyJusticeInitiative.Ofthe54recommendationsfortorture,48wereaddressedtotheprosecutor’soffice,fivetotheSecretaryofPublicSecurity,andfourtomunicipalpresidents.

162 LeyparaPrevenirySancionarlaDesapariciónForzadadePersonasenelEstadodeGuerreroNúmero569,availableat:http://www.ordenjuridico.gob.mx/Publicaciones/CDs2010/CDEquidad/pdf/GRO19.pdf[accessedonApril20,2015].

163 OpenSocietyJusticeInitiativeinterviewwithCODDEHUMstaffmember,Chilpancingo,September2014.TheCouncilfortheProtectionofHumanRightsDefendersinGuerrero,installedonFebruary20,2012,ischairedbytheCODDEHUMpresident,whoalsohasaroleintheappointmentoffiveofitssevenmembers.See:www.coddehumgro.org.mx/sitio/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=661&Itemid=436[accessedonJanuary20,2015].



166 CODDEHUMpressrelease,undated,availableat:www.coddehumgro.org.mx/sitio/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1217:comunicado-de-prensa&catid=104:boletines-2014&Itemid=746[accessedonJanuary20,2015].

167 OpenSocietyJusticeInitiativeinterviewwithHipólitoLugo,Chilpancingo,April12,2015.

168 “RenunciaLugoCortésalaCoddehumenprotestaporelpobrepapelqueasumióenlamatanzadeIguala,”El Sur de Acapulco,October10,2014,availableat:http://suracapulco.mx/archivos/215863[accessedonJanuary20,2015].

169 ConstitutionofGuerrero,article76bisandtheLawofCODDEHUM,article4.

170 ConstitutionofGuerrero,article105(1)(l).

171 ConstitutionofGuerrero,articles117-118.

172 ConstitutionofGuerrero,article65,andtransitionalarticlesoftheamendmentstotheConstitution,article12.

173 Availableat:http://periodicooficial.guerrero.gob.mx/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/PERIODICO-93.pdf.

174 Law696oftheHumanRightsCommissionoftheStateofGuerrero,March20,2015,availableat:http://periodicooficial.guerrero.gob.mx/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/PERIODICO-23.pdf[accessedonApril20,2015].Accordingtothelaw’stransitoryprovisions,opencallsfortheappointmentofthepresidentandadvisorycouncilaretobeissued30daysfromthelaw’sentryintoforce;thecouncilistobeinstalled60daysfollowingappointmentofthepresident;regulationsaretobeissuedwithin90days,atwhichpointthenewbodywouldofficiallyreplaceCODDEHUM;provisionsforacivilservicecareertrackatthecommissionaretobeissuedin180days.

175 “RamónNavarretefueratificadocomopresidentedelaCoddehum,”La Jornada Guerrero,July1st,2015,availableat:www.lajornadaguerrero.com.mx/2015/07/01/index.php?section=sociedad&article=004n1soc[accessedonJuly17,2015].


177 Article27.

178 Article18ofCriminalCodeofGuerrero,amendedinAugust2014.



181 “Cuestionanactivistaslaaprobacióndeleycontralatortura,porquenohuboconsulta,”Diario de Guerrero,January17,2014,availableathttp://www.agenciairza.com/2014/01/cuestionan-activistas-aprobacion-de-ley-contra-tortura-porque-no-hubo-consulta[accessedonJanuary21,2015].

182 LeyquecrealacomisióndedefensadelosDerechosHumanosyestableceelprocedimientoenmaterialdedesaparicióninvoluntariadepersonas,Article17,sectionX,availableat:www.coddehumgro.org.mx/sitio/archivos/leyes/ley_coddehum.pdf[accessedonJanuary20,2015].

183 OpenSocietyJusticeInitiativeinterviewwithastateprosecutor,Chilpancingo,December13,2013.

184 Leyparaprevenir,sancionaryerradicarlatorturaenelEstadodeGuerrero,availableat:http://i.guerrero.gob.mx/uploads/2014/02/L439PSETORTURA2.pdf.

185 Thesubstanceofthelawsonenforceddisappearanceandtorturearediscussedinalatersectiononlegalframework.

186 OpenSocietyJusticeInitiativeinterviewswithcivilsocietyrepresentatives,Chilpancingo,December13,2013.

187 OpenSocietyJusticeInitiativeinterviewwithJorgeCamacho,presidentoftheJusticeCommissionofGuerrero’sCongress,Chilpancingo,September18,2014.In2012,theUNCommitteeAgainstTortureexplicitlycalledonGuerrerotoincludethecrimeoftortureinitscriminalcoderatherthaninaspeciallaw.See:UNCAT,ConcludingobservationsonthecombinedfifthandsixthperiodicreportsofMexicoasadoptedbytheCommitteeatitsforty-ninthsession


(29October–23November2012),CAT/C/MEX/CO/5-6,December11,2012,paras.C.8andC.8.a,availableat:http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CAT%2fC%2fMEX%2fCO%2f5-6&Lang=en[accessedonApril20,2015].

188 OpenSocietyJusticeInitiativeinterviewwithJorgeCamacho,presidentoftheJusticeCommissionofGuerrero’sCongress,Chilpancingo,September18,2014.TheheadoftheHumanRightsCommissionintheCongresssaysthathumanrightsarenotapriorityforthebody,andthathiscommissionisnotacovetedcommitteeassignmentforlegislators.Overtwopreviouslegislativeperiods,thecommissionproducednodraftlawsoramendments.OpenSocietyJusticeInitiativeinterviewwithJorgeSalazarMarchán,presidentoftheHumanRightsCommissionofGuerrero’sCongress,Chilpancingo,September17,2014.


190 Ibid.CamachosaidthathewouldprovidetheJusticeInitiativewithacopyoftheletterofcomplainthesenttothegovernor,butasofJanuary2015,hisofficehadnotdoneso.Inresponsetoaright-to-informationrequestfromtheOpenSocietyJusticeInitiative,thestateHumanRightsCommissionstatedthatithadnodocumentissuedbythestateCongresswithregardtoNavarrete’sappointmentasofficerincharge.CommunicationUTAIP-CODDEHUM/050/2014,November18,2014.

191 PressreleaseofthestateCongressontheapprovalofthenewliabilitylaw,availableat:http://congresogro.gob.mx/index.php/boletines/2988-tiene-guerrero-ley-de-responsabilidades-de-los-servidores-publicos.

192 “PorfaltaderecursoselTSJ-Guerreronoaplicaráal100%juiciosorales,”Crónica,May20,2011,availableat:www.cronica.com.mx/notas/2011/579681.html[accessedonApril20,2015].

193 OneoftheonlystepstheCongresshadtakenby2012waspassageofalawonlegalaid,Law848ofPublicLegalAidoftheStateofGuerrero(LeyNúmero848deDefensaPúblicadelEstadodeGuerrero),whichhadpassedin2011:http://congresogro.gob.mx/index.php/lix-legislatura/intervenciones-en-tribuna-2011/doc_view/3688-ley-numero-848-de-defensa-publica-del-estado-de-guerrero.

194 CentrodeInvestigaciónparaelDesarrollo(CIDAC),ReportedeHallazgos2013paraelseguimientoylaevaluacióndelaimplementaciónyoperacióndelnuevosistemadejusticiapenal,availableat:http://cidac.org/esp/uploads/1/Hallazgos_implementacio__n_Reforma_Penal.pdf.SeechapterVofthisreportforadditionaldetail.


196 Ibid.



199 OpenSocietyJusticeInitiativeinterviewwithGuadalupeBarrena,CIDE,June26,2013.


201 In2011,aformermemberoftheArmy,MarcosEstebanJuárezEscalera,wasappointedasdirectorofpoliceinvestigationsoftheprosecution.HereplacedanotherformermemberoftheArmy,AntonioValenzuelaDíaz,whohadbeenoustedforhisparticipationinthe2011Ayotzinapaattacks.“ElactualdirectordelaPolicíaMinisterial,lapropuestaparanuevojefepoliciaco,”El Sur de Acapulco,August20,2014,availableat:http://suracapulco.mx/archivos/198444.AfterJuárezEscalerawasappointedasMinisterofPublicSecurityofGuerrero,AlejandroSalomónVelmar,aformermemberoftheNavy,wasappointedasofficerinchargeofthepoliceinvestigationsoftheprosecution.RenunciaeldirectordelaPolicíaMinisterialtrasataqueaestudiantesdelTec,El Sur de Acapulco,October15,2014,availableat:http://suracapulco.mx/archivos/216553.


203 AmnestyInternational,ConfrontingaNightmare:DisappearancesinMexico,June4,2013,p.12,availableat:www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/AMR41/025/2013 [accessedonNovember19,2014].

204 Exceptwhereotherwisenoted,thefollowingiscompiledfromOpenSocietyJusticeInitiativeinterviewswithDeputyProsecutorforHumanRightsAlejandroMojicaNava,Chilpancingo,December13,2013;HipólitoLugo,formerchiefinvestigatorofthestateHumanRightsCommission,Chilpancingo,December13,2013;andmembersofcivilsociety,Chilpancingo,December2013.

205 IsraelArzatecase.Judgmentofamparoprocedure703/2012andnon-bindingjudicialprecedents:1a.CCVI/2014(10a.),1a.CCVII/2014(10a.),1a.CCV/2014(10a.),1a.CCIV/2014(10a.).Availableat:http://sjf.scjn.gob.mx.

206 Articles12,13,and17.IIIoftheTortureLawofGuerrero,Leyparaprevenir,sancionaryerradicarlatorturaenelEstadodeGuerrero.


208 OpenSocietyJusticeInitiativeinterviewwithcivilsocietyrepresentatives,Chilpancingo,September2014.


210 OpenSocietyJusticeInitiativeinterviewwithacivilsocietyrepresentative,Chilpancingo,December,2013.


211 OpenSocietyJusticeInitiativeinterviewwithrepresentativesofcivilsociety,Chilpancingo,December,2013.

212 Exceptwhereotherwiseindicated,informationinthissectioniscompiledfromOpenSocietyJusticeInitiativeinterviewswithjusticesectoractorsandcivilsocietyrepresentativesoverthecourseof2013-2014.


214 ASILEGAL,“InformesobrelasituacióndelaspersonasprivadasdelibertadenMéxico,”March23,2012,p.22,availableat:http://asilegal.org.mx/index.php/es/bibliotecta/libros[accessedonJuly18,2015].

215 OpenSocietyJusticeInitiativeinterviewwithGuadalupeBarrena,June26,2013.

216 OpenSocietyJusticeInitiativeinterviewswithastategovernmentofficial,Chilpancingo,September17,2014,andJorgeCamacho,presidentoftheJusticeCommissionofGuerrero’sCongress,Chilpancingo,September18,2014.

217 Article130ofGuerreroCriminalCode.

218 CriminalCodeoftheStateofGuerrero,availableat:http://congresogro.gob.mx/index.php/codigos.Thestatehasaseparatelawonwomen’saccesstoalifefreefromviolence.SeeLeynúmero533deaccesodelasmujeresaunavidalibredeviolenciadelEstadoLibreySoberadodeGuerrero,availableat:http://i.guerrero.gob.mx/uploads/2011/12/Ley-n%C3%BAmero-553-de-acceso-de-las-mujeres-a-una-vida-libre-de-violencia-del-Estado-Libre-y-Soberano-de-Guerrero1.pdf.

219 PressreleasefromCongressontheapprovalofthevictimslaw,availableat: http://congressgro.gob.mx/index.php/boletines/2975-aprueba-congreso-de-guerrero-ley-de-victimas-3[accessedonFebruary24,2015].Thedraftofthe“LawofAttention,SupportandProtectiontoVictimsofCrimesfortheStateofGuerrero”(Leydeatención,apoyoyprotecciónavíctimasyofendidosdeldelitoparaelEstadodeGuerrero)isavailableat:http://congresogro.gob.mx/files/reforma-penal/PROYECTO-LEY-DE-ATENCION-Y-APOYO-A-VICT_IMAS-Y-OFENDIDOS.pdf[accessedonNovember23,2014].In2004GuerreroadoptedaLawofAttentionandSupporttovictimsofcrimesfortheStateofGuerreronumber368”(LeydeatenciónyapoyoalavíctimayalofendidodeldelitoparaelEstadodeGuerreronúmero368),availableat:www.ordenjuridico.gob.mx/Estatal/GUERRERO/Leyes/GROLEY07.pdf[accessedonApril20,2015].

220 LawforthePreventionandPunishmentofForcedDisappearanceofPersonsintheStateofGuerreroNumber569(LeyparaPrevenirySancionarlaDesapariciónForzadadePersonasenelEstadodeGuerreroNúmero569),availableat:www.ordenjuridico.gob.mx/Publicaciones/CDs2010/CDEquidad/pdf/GRO19.pdf[accessedonApril20,2015].

221 LawforthePreventionandPunishmentofForcedDisappearanceofPersonsintheStateofGuerreroNumber569,article16Inter-AmericanConventiononForcedDisappearanceofPersons,Article2,availableat:www.oas.org/juridico/english/treaties/a-60.html.

222 LawforthePreventionandPunishmentofForcedDisappearanceofPersonsintheStateofGuerreroNumber569,article3Inter-AmericanConventiononForcedDisappearanceofPersons,Article3.Guerrerohadanamnestylawinplacein2002-2003tocovercrimesofcrimesofinsurrection,riots,rebellions(uprisings)andconspiracy.SeeAmnestyLawfortheStateofGuerrero,Number592(LeydeAmnistíaparaelEstadodeGuerreronúmero592),availableatwww.ordenjuridico.gob.mx/Publicaciones/CDs2006/CDProcesal/pdf/GR10.pdf.[accessedonApril20,2015].

223 Seediscussionabove,inthesection“LackofIndependentInvestigations.”


225 Leyparaprevenir,sancionaryerradicarlatorturaenelEstadodeGuerrero,article4.

226 Thedefinitionexplicitlyallowsthattorturecanbeconductedwithvariousintentions,“orforanyotherpurpose.”Inter-AmericanConventiontoPreventandPunishTorture,Article2,availableat:www.oas.org/juridico/english/treaties/a-51.html[accessedonNovember22,2014].

227 Law439ontheprevention,sanctioning,anderadicationoftortureinthestateofGuerrero(Leyparaprevenir,sancionaryerradicarlatorturaenelEstadodeGuerrero),article5.

228 Law439ontheprevention,sanctioning,anderadicationoftortureinthestateofGuerrero,article4.Abuseofauthorityispunishedwith2-8yearsofprison(article274ofthecriminalcodeofGuerrero).

229 Article6.

230 Article7.

231 Article10ofLaw569topreventandsanctiontheenforceddisappearanceofpersonsintheStateofGuerrero.

232 Law439ontheprevention,sanctioning,anderadicationoftortureinthestateofGuerrero,articles19-21,availableat:http://i.guerrero.gob.mx/uploads/2014/02/L439PSETORTURA2.pdf.

233 ThepresidentofCODDEHUMpresidesoverthecommittee,whichalsoincludes:thepresidentsoftwostatecongressionalcommittees(HumanRightsandJustice,andPoliticalLiability);thepresidentofthelocalcourts;theministerofInterior,theministerofPublicSecurityandCivilProtection;thestateattorneygeneral;theombudsmanofthelocalpublicuniversity;andarepresentativeofthecivilsociety“withexperienceinhumanrights.”“Lawontheprevention,sanctioning,anderadicationoftortureinthestateofGuerrero”(Leyparaprevenir,sancionaryerradicarlatorturaenelEstadodeGuerrero),articles19-21.http://i.guerrero.gob.mx/uploads/2014/02/L439PSETORTURA2.pdf

234 “Cuestionanactivistaslaaprobacióndeleycontralatortura,porquenohuboconsulta,”Diario de Guerrero,January18,2014,availableat:www.diariodeguerrero.com.mx/incio/pagina-principal/10216-cuestionan-activistas-la-aprobacion-de-ley-contra-la-tortura-porque-no-hubo-consulta.html[accessedonNovember21,2014].


235 “Lawontheprevention,sanctioning,anderadicationoftortureinthestateofGuerrero”(Leyparaprevenir,sancionaryerradicarlatorturaenelEstadodeGuerrero),article20,availableat:http://i.guerrero.gob.mx/uploads/2014/02/L439PSETORTURA2.pdf.


237 Federalcrimesincludekillingsperpetratedbyfederalofficersoragainston-dutyfederalofficers,orkillingsanddisappearanceslinkedtoorganizedcrime.

238 InformedelaFiscalíaGeneraldelEstadosobrelainvestigaciónrelacionadaconloshechosacontecidoslanochedel26yprimerashorasdel27deseptiembrede2014enlaciudaddeIgualadelaIndependencia,Guerrero.AvailableinthewebsiteoftheFiscalíauntiltheendofJanuary2015.DocumentonfilewiththeOpenSocietyJusticeInitiative.

239 Statementofthefederaljudiciary,October27,2014,onthearrestwarrantagainsttheleaderofGuerrerosUnidos,SidronioCasarrubiasSalgado,availableat:www.cjf.gob.mx/documentos/notasInformativas/docsNotasInformativas/2014/notaInformativa141.pdf.

240 Statementofthefederaljudiciary,October23,2014,availableat:www.cjf.gob.mx/documentos/notasInformativas/docsNotasInformativas/2014/notaInformativa139.pdf.

241 PressconferenceoftheFederalProsecutor,October22,2014.Transcriptavailableat:www.pgr.gob.mx/Prensa/2007/bol14/Oct/b19814.shtm[accessedonJanuary22,2015]and“Exalcaldeyesposasonresponsablesdedesaparicióndenormalistas:PGR,”CNNMéxico,October,22,2014,availableat:http://mexico.cnn.com/nacional/2014/10/22/exalcalde-y-esposa-son-responsables-de-desaparicion-de-normalistas-pgr.

242 Onlocalprosecutorialinvestigations,see:InformedelaFiscalíaGeneraldelEstadosobrelainvestigaciónrelacionadaconloshechosacontecidoslanochedel26yprimerashorasdel27deseptiembrede2014enlaciudaddeIgualadelaIndependencia,Guerrero.AvailableinthewebsiteoftheFiscalíauntiltheendofJanuary2015.DocumentonfilewiththeOpenSocietyJusticeInitiative.Onfederalprosecutorialinvestigations,seetranscriptofpressconferenceheldonJanuary27,2015,availableat:http://www.pgr.gob.mx/prensa/2007/bol15/Ene/b01715.shtm[accessedonFebruary24,2015].

243 AccordingtothegroupofexpertsoftheInterAmericanCommissionworkingontheAyotzinapacaseatleast40personsdetainedinconnectionwiththecaseweresubjecttotortureandill-treatmentduringtheirdetention.See“ReprochanexpertosqueseretrasensusentrevistasconmilitaresdeIguala,”El Sur de Acapulco,June29,2015,availableat:http://suracapulco.mx/archivos/286302[accessedonJuly17,2015].ThefederalinvestigationoftheAyotzinapacase,andothercases,willbediscussedinaforthcomingreportfromtheOpenSocietyJusticeInitiativeandMexicanhumanrightsorganizations.Seealso:AnabelHernandezandSteveFisher,Lahistorianooficial,Apro,December14,2014,availableat:www.eldiariodecoahuila.com.mx/notas/2014/12/14/historia-oficial-475018.asp[accessedonMarch26,2015];and:“DamningReportClaimsMexicanFederalPoliceParticipatedInDisappearanceOf43Students,”HuffingtonPost,December14,2014,availableat:www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/12/14/missing-students-mexico_n_6321866.html[accessedonMarch25,2015].

244 PGRpressconference,ibid.

245 ThelackofclarityregardingcriminaljurisdictionsbetweentheMexicanfederationandthefederalentitieswillbeexaminedinaforthcomingreportfromtheOpenSocietyJusticeInitiativeandMexicancivilsocietypartners.

246 ThefollowingisbasedonanOpenSocietyJusticeInitiativeinterviewwithastategovernmentofficial,Chilpancingo,September17,2014.

247 Ibid.Whenaskedaboutinformationonlocalprosecutorialinvestigationsinthe2014Ayotzinapacase,theFiscalíaofGuerrerorespondedthatitdidnothavejurisdictiontoprovideanyinformationonthembecausetheFederalProsecution(PGR)hadassertedjurisdictionoverthosecases.DocumentFGE/VPS/DGAJ/ITAIG/6826/2014,November26,2014,obtainedinresponsetoright-to-informationrequest177314filedbytheOpenSocietyJusticeInitiative.


249 CurriculimvitaeofIñakiBlancodatedJune25,2013,availableatthewebsiteoftheNationalConferenceofProsecutors:www.cnpj.gob.mx/prensa/2007/fich13/Jun/f25062013.shtm[accessedonFebruary24,2015].Seealso,“Guerrerodesignaasunuevoprocuradordejusticia,”Excelsior,June20,2013,availableat:www.excelsior.com.mx/nacional/2013/06/20/905133[accessedonFebruary24,2015].

250 Seewww.fiscaliaguerrero.gob.mx/noticias/miguel-angel-godinez-munoz-abogado-penalista-y-academico-de-38-anos-el-nuevo-fiscal-general-de-guerrero[accessedonApril20,2015].

251 ÁlvarezformerlyservedwiththeMexicanNavy,aswellastheFederalPolice,asconfirmedbyofficialdocumentSEGOB/CNS/IG/DGAJ/759/2013datedAugust9,2013,obtainedthroughright-to-informationrequeststolocalCongressfiledbytheOpenSocietyJusticeInitiative.OnhismembershipintheNavy,see“DetienenalexjefedelapolicíadeAcapulco,AlfredoÁlvarezValenzuela,”El Sur de Acapulco,July26,2014,availableat:http://suracapulco.mx/archivos/187468[accessedonFebruary24,2015].

252 ConversationsonWhatsAppbetweenanofficialinthePGR’skidnappingunit,andDeputyProsecutorRicardoMartínezChávezsurfacedinthemedia.“LaOmisión,”PuntodePartida,NoticierosTelevisa,minutes3:40and4:55,November26,2014,availableat:http://noticieros.televisa.com/programas-punto-de-partida/1411/omision[accessedonApril20,2015].

253 Thefollowingaccountreliesontwoarticles.“ZeferinoTorreblancaordenóelasesinatodeArmandoChavarría,revelóunimplicado,”El Sur de Acapulco,August18,2014,availableat:http://suracapulco.mx/archivos/197127[accessedonJanuary23,2015]and“Hallanrestosdejefepoliciaco‘levantado’enGuerrero,”Proceso,June17,2011,availableat:www.proceso.com.mx/?p=273104[accessedonJanuary23,2015].


254 Thiscaseisamatterofcontroversy,describedheresoleytoillustratetheshortcomingsandfailuresofwitnessprotectioninGuerrero.NeithertheOpenSocietyJusticeInitiativenoritspartnersclaimtoknowthetruthaboutcriminalallegationsassociatedwiththestorythathavebeenreportedbythemedia.

255 Torreblanca’stermhadendedinMarch2011,andÁngelAguirre(alsofromthePRD)wasnewlyinoffice.

256 ChrisKyle,ViolenceandInsecurityinGuerrero,WilsonCenter,January2015,pp.37-38,availableat:http://wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/Violence%20and%20Insecurity%20in%20Guerrero.pdf[accessedonApril19,2015].

257 Thecasehasneverbeensolved,andatsomepointStateProsecutorAlbertoLópezRosas,thefirstofGovernorAguirre’sappointeestothatposition,announcedthatthedocketoftheprosecutorialinvestigationofthemurderofArmandoChavarría“gotlost”duringthechangeofadministration.Twoformermembersoftheprosecutionpolicewerearrested,butthechargesagainstthemhavenotbeendisclosed.See“ZeferinoTorreblancaordenóelasesinatodeArmandoChavarría,revelóunimplicado,”El Sur de Acapulco,August18,2014,availableat:http://suracapulco.mx/archivos/197127.

258 LeyNúmero480DeSujetosProtegidosDelEstadoDeGuerrero,availableat:www.guerrero.gob.mx/consejeriajuridica.

259 LeyNúmero479DeAtención,ApoyoYProtecciónAVíctimasUOfendidosDelDelitoParaElEstadoDeGuerrero,availableat:www.guerrero.gob.mx/consejeriajuridica.

260 LeyNúmero391DeProtecciónDeLosDefensoresDeLosDerechosHumanosEnElEstadoDeGuerrero,availableat:www.guerrero.gob.mx/consejeriajuridica.Article2ofthelawdefineshumanrightsasthefundamentallibertiesrecognizedinthePoliticalConstitutionoftheUnitedStatesofMexico,domesticlaws,theUniversalDeclarationofHumanRightsandinternationalagreementsortreatiesonhumanrightsexistinginMexico.

261 Law480,Article3(V).


263 TheUNOfficeonDrugsandCrimenotesthatsuccessfulwitnessprotectionprogramsaroundtheworldhavebeenlocatedwithinvariouspartsofgovernment,includingunderpoliceandprosecutors.Regardlessofwheretheprogramislocated,thethreemaindeterminantsofsuccessare:separationofprotectionfunctionsfromtheinvestigation,operationalandproceduralconfidentiality,andorganizationalautonomyfromtheregularpolice.UnitedNationsOfficeonDrugsandCrime,Goodpracticesfortheprotectionofwitnessesincriminalproceedingsinvolvingorganizedcrime,2008,pp.45-46,availableat:www.unodc.org/documents/organized-crime/Witness-protection-manual-Feb08.pdf[accessedonMarch4,2015].

264 Law480,Article37.

265 Law480,Article3(IX).

266 OpenSocietyJusticeInitiativeinterviewswithastategovernmentofficial,Chilpancingo,September17,2014,andHipólitoLugo,formerchiefinvestigatorofthestateHumanRightsCommission,Chilpancingo,September17,2014.



269 Law480,Article3(X).



272 Law480,ChapterII.

273 CódigoNacionaldeProcedimientosPenales,March5,2014,availableat:www.diputados.gob.mx/LeyesBiblio/pdf/CNPP.pdf.

274 CódigoNacionaldeProcedimientosPenales,Articles137,170,139and367.

275 Ley489paralaProteccióndepersonasensituaciónderiesgodelestadodeGuerrero.

276 ProposedLaw489,Article5.

277 DraftlawasofSeptember2014showntotheOpenSocietyJusticeInitiativebyastateofficial.

278 Law480,ChapterIII.

279 Law480,ChapterXIIistitled“OfResponsibilitiesandSanctions,”butitstwoarticlesonlysetoutadministrativesanctions—includingsuspension,removalfromoffice,fines,ortemporaryineligibility—toholdpublicserviceemployment.Article48makesvaguereferencetopunishmentunderrelevantlawforcasesofdivulginginformationonthewitnessprotectionprogramwithoutauthorization.AsofJune2015,twoofficershadbeenadministrativelysanctionedsincethebeginningof2014:oneaninvestigationpoliceofficer,andanotheraprosecutionofficial.Onewasfired,andoneputonleavefor60days.Responsetoright-to-informationrequest00051915fromtheFiscalofGuerrero,June3,2015.




283 “TlachinollanyVidulfoRosalesSierra,”La Jornada de Guerrero,June1,2012,availableat:http://www.lajornadaguerrero.com.mx/2012/06/01/index.php?section=opinion&article=002a1soc[accessedonJanuary23,2015]and“AbogadodeTlachinollan,segundoactivistaquesaledelpaísporamenazas,”Proceso,May23,2012,availableat:www.proceso.com.mx/?p=308544[accessedonJanuary23,2015].


284 “CulpaOrtegaaTlachinollanyCETEGdeobstaculizardiálogo,”Despertar del Sur,November4,2014,availableat:www.despertardelsur.com.mx/estado/3900-culpa-ortega-a-tlachinollan-y-ceteg-de-obstaculizar-dialogo [accessedonJanuary23,2015].Seealso:“GobernadordeGuerrero:nohabrárepresiónyllamaalaunión,”NoticierosTelevisa,November9,2014,availableat:http://noticieros.televisa.com/mexico-estados/1411/gobernador-guerrero-no-habra-represion-llama-union[accessedonJanuary23,2015].Seealso:“ElsecretariodeMarinave‘manipulación’y‘lucro’conelcasoAyotzinapa,”CNNMéxico,December10,2014,availableat:http://mexico.cnn.com/adnpolitico/2014/12/10/el-secretario-de-marina-ve-manipulacion-y-lucro-con-el-caso-ayotzinapa[accessedonApril20,2015].

285 TlachinollanrepresentedvictimsintheFérnandezOrtegayotrosv.MéxicocasebeforetheInterAmericanCourtofHumanRights.Inits2010judgment,thecourtconcludedthat,inthecourseof“institutionalizedviolenceinthearmy,”twoofitsmembersrapedandtorturedtwoindigenouswomenfromtheme’phaacommunityofGuerrero,InésFérnandezOrtegaandValentinaRosendoCantú.Judgmentavailableat:www.ordenjuridico.gob.mx/JurInt/STCIDHM2.pdf.InthecaseofBonfilioRubio,anindigenousmanfromthenauacommunityofGuerreroextrajudiciallykilledbysoldiersatacheckpoint,Tlachinollansucceededinchallengingmilitaryjurisdictionandforcingthecaseintotheciviliancourtsystem.SeeOrdenalaSupremaCortealEjércitoremitirelcasodelindígenaBonfilioRubioalfuerocivil,Agosto24,2012,availableat:www.tlachinollan.org/nota-informativa-ordena-la-suprema-corte-al-ejercito-remitir-el-caso-del-indigena-bonfilio-rubio-al-fuero-civil[accessedonFebruary23,2014].

286 Oncrimesagainsthumanityseepages27and47-50oftheFinalReportoftheTruthCommissionofGuerrero,October15,2014,availableat:http://congresogro.gob.mx/files/InformeFinalCOMVERDAD.pdf.Onthreatsagainstcommissionersandstaff,seeSection8and8.1ofthefinalreport(pages73and74).

287 InMay2014,12gunmenkidnappedjournalistJorgeTorresPalaciosfromhishousenearAcapulco,andhisdecapitatedbodywasfoundinanearbyshallowgravefourdayslater.Hehadbeenworkinginthecommunicationsdepartmentsofseveralgovernmentoffices.“BodyofkidnappedjournalistfoundoutsideofAcapulco,”JusticeinMexico,June7,2014,availableat:http://justiceinmexico.org/body-of-kidnapped-journalist-found-outside-of-acapulco[accessedonNovember19,2014].

288 OpenSocietyJusticeInitiativeinterviewwithformerstateHumanRightsCommissionchiefinvestigatorHipólitoLugo,April12,2015andlistofcomplaintsonfilewiththeOpenSocietyJusticeInitiative.

289 OpenSocietyJusticeInitiativeinterviewwithastateofficial,Chilpancingo,September2014.

290 Tlachinollan,AdditionalReportfortheHumanRightsCommittee:IssuestoAttendtointheFifthPeriodicReportonMexico,(CCPR/CMEX/5),January2010,availableat:www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrc/docs/TLACHINOLLAN_en.doc[accessedonApril20,2015].

291 RedTDT,ElderechoadefenderlosderechoshumanosenMéxico:Informesobrelasituacióndelaspersonasdefensoras2011-2013,January9,2014,availableat:http://redtdt.org.mx/2014/09/el-derecho-a-defender-los-derechos-humanos-en-mexico-informe-sobre-la-situacion-de-las-personas-defensoras-2011-2013[accessedonApril20,2015].

292 OpenSocietyJusticeInitiativeinterviewwithNataliaBarretoandDelphineMalard,EUDelegationinMexico,MexicoCity,February21,2013.

293 LeyNúmero391DeProtecciónDeLosDefensoresDeLosDerechosHumanosEnElEstadoDeGuerrero,availableat:http://i.guerrero.gob.mx/uploads/2012/08/Ley-de-protecci%C3%B3n-de-los-defensores-de-los-derechos-humanos-de-Guerrero1.pdf.

294 Law463onthecomprehensivewellbeingofjournalistsoftheStateofGuerrero(Leynúmero463paraelbienestarintegraldelosperiodistasdelEstadodeGuerrero):http://i.guerrero.gob.mx/uploads/2012/01/17-MAY-2002.pdf.

295 LeyNúmero479DeAtención,ApoyoYProtecciónAVíctimasUOfendidosDelDelitoParaElEstadoDeGuerrero,availableathttp://i.guerrero.gob.mx/uploads/2014/10/L479AAPVICTIMASEG.pdf.


297 Law391,thirdtransitoryprovision.

298 Responsetoright-to-informationrequest00051915fromtheFiscalofGuerrero,June3,2015


300 OpenSocietyJusticeInitiativeinterviewwithDeputyProsecutorforHumanRightsAlejandroMojicaNava,Chilpancingo,December13,2013.

301 ObservationbasedonavisitbyOpenSocietyJusticeInitiativestafftotheprosecutionofficeinDecember2013andSeptember2014.Visitorswerewaivedthroughwithnocheckoftheirbagsorscrutinyoftheiridentification.

302 “ManifestantesquemanoficinasgubernamentalesenChilpancingo,Guerrero,”CNNMexico,October13,2014,availableat:http://mexico.cnn.com/nacional/2014/10/13/normalistas-toman-el-congreso-y-el-palacio-de-gobierno-guerrerense[accessedonFebruary23,2015].

303 LeyNúmero480DeSujetosProtegidosDelEstadoDeGuerrero,availableat:www.guerrero.gob.mx/consejeriajuridica.


305 Forthefollowingaccount,see:“Enmenosde7días15muerenenpenalesdelEstado,”Novedades de Acapulco,January7,2014,availableat:www.novedadesacapulco.mx/guerrero/en-menos-de-7-dias-15-mueren-en-penales-del-estado[accessedonJanuary20,2015].

306 InformationprovidedbythePublicSecurityMinistryofGuerreroinresponsetoaninformationrequestfromtheOpenSocietyJusticeInitiative,requestnumber00080014,May2014.Therequestwasforstatisticsondeathsincustodybetween2000and2013,buttheministryonlysuppliedfiguresfor2011to2013.CODDEHUMhasdocumentedatleast10casesofdeathincustody(documentondeathsincustodyandrecommendationsonfilewithOpenSocietyJusticeInitiative).


307 Ibid.Between2000and2013,theprosecutor’sofficeregistered20deathsinprison.InformationprovidedbytheOfficeofthePublicProsecutorofGuerreroinresponsetoarequestforinformationfromtheOpenSocietyJusticeInitiative,requestnumber00076614,May27,2014.

308 Article146oftheLawoftheSystemofEnforcementofConvictionsandSecurityMeasuresfortheStateofGuerreronumber367(LeydelSistemadeEjecucióndePenasyMedidasdeSeguridaddelEstadodeGuerrero),availableat:http://i.guerrero.gob.mx/uploads/2006/02/LSEPMSEG367.pdf.

309 NationalHumanRightsCommission(ComisiónNacionaldeDerechosHumanos),DiagnósticoNacionaldeSupervisiónPenitenciaria2012,pp.152-164,November19,2013,availableat:www.cndh.org.mx/sites/all/fuentes/documentos/programas/DNSP_2012.pdf[accessedonJanuary22,2015].


311 OpenSocietyJusticeInitiativeinterviewwithcivilsocietyrepresentatives,Chilpancingo,September2014.InAugust2014,thedirectoroftheChilpancingoprisonandhissecretarywerekilledoutsidetheprisonwalls.See“Seinvestigayaelasesinatodeldirectordelpenalcapitalino,dicevocerodelgobiernosindardetalles,”El Sur de Acapulco,August27,2014,availableat:http://suracapulco.mx/archivos/201575[accessedonFebruary23,2015].

312 OpenSocietyJusticeInitiativeinterviewwithHipólitoLugo,formerchiefinvestigatorofGuerrero’sHumanRightsCommission(CODDEHUM),Chilpancingo,September17,2014.

313 Exceptwhereotherwiseindicated,thefollowingreliesonanassessmentofstateprisonsconductedbytheNationalHumanRightsCommissionin2012.NationalHumanRightsCommission(ComisiónNacionaldeDerechosHumanos),DiagnósticoNacionaldeSupervisiónPenitenciaria2012,pp.152-164,November19,2013,availableat:www.cndh.org.mx/sites/all/fuentes/documentos/programas/DNSP_2012.pdf[accessedonJanuary22,2015];CODDEHUMrecommendationsVG/246/2002-IIand010/2013,onfilewiththeOpenSocietyJusticeInitiative,containingadetailedaccountofillegalpracticesinGuerrero’sprisons.


315 CODDEHUMrecommendation010/2013,onfilewiththeOpenSocietyJusticeInitiative.



318 AnInterdisciplinaryGroupofExpertssentbytheInter-AmericanCommissionofHumanRights,attheinsistenceofAyotzinapastudentfamiliesandtheinvitationoftheMexicangovernment,isduetopresentfindingsontheAyotzinapainvestigationinSeptember2015.Inpreliminaryreports,thegrouphassuggestedthattherehavebeenshortcomingsinthefederalinvestigation,includingafailuretofollowallavailableleads.See:“ExpertosdelaCIDHpidennuevaslíneasdeinvestigaciónparaAyotzinapa,”CNNMéxico,April20,2015,availableat:http://mexico.cnn.com/nacional/2015/04/20/expertos-de-la-cidh-piden-nuevas-lineas-de-investigacion-para-ayotzinapa[accessedonJuly18,2015].Forensicexpertshavealsocastseriousdoubtonthefederalgovernment’snarrativeofthecrime.See:FranciscoGoldman,“TheMissingForty-Three:TheGovernment’sCaseCollapses,”The New Yorker,June8,2015,availableat:www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/the-missing-forty-three-the-governments-case-collapses[accessedonJuly18,2015].

319 Article104,sectionIIofLaw696ontheHumanRightsCommissionoftheStateofGuerrero,availableat:http://periodicooficial.guerrero.gob.mx/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/PERIODICO-23.pdf[accessedonApril16,2015].

320 SpecializedunitsalreadyforeseenunderthelawontheFiscalorcreatedbytheFiscalarespecializedunitsforhumanrights,femicide,sexualcrimes,gravecrimes,andfortheinvestigationandcounteringofkidnapping,andfortheattentionofindigenouspeople.See:http://www.fiscaliaguerrero.gob.mx/fiscalias-especializadas/[accessedonApril16,2015].

OPEN SOCIETY JUSTICE INITIATIVE

The Open Society Justice Initiative uses law to protect and empower people around the world. Through litigation, advocacy, research, and technical assistance, the Justice Initiative promotes human rights and builds legal capacity for open societies. Our staff is based in Abuja, Amsterdam, Bishkek, Brussels, Budapest, The Hague, London, Mexico City, New York, Paris, and Washington, D.C.

www.JusticeInitiative.org

OPEN SOCIETY FOUNDATIONS

The Open Society Foundations work to build vibrant and tolerant democracies whose governments are accountable to their citizens. Working with local communities in more than 70 countries, the Open Society Foundations support justice and human rights, freedom of expression, and access to public health and education.

www.OpenSocietyFoundations.org

CENTER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS OF THE MOUNTAIN TLACHINOLLAN

Tlachinollan Human Rights Center is a non-governmental organization that for more than 20 years has promoted and defended—with a cultural diversity approach—the rights of indigenous peoples in the Montaña region of Guerrero, Mexico, aiming to construct legitimate and peaceful paths to guarantee their individual and collective rights.

http://www.tlachinollan.org/

CENTER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS MIGUEL AGUSTÍN PRO JUÁREZ

The Center for Human Rights Miguel Agustín Pro Juárez (Centro Prodh) is a non-profit civil society organization founded in 1988 by the Roman Catholic Society of Jesus to advocate for the respect of human rights. Its mission is the promotion and defense of the human rights of the excluded and of groups in situations of vulnerability or poverty, to contribute to the formation of a more just, equal, and democratic society that fully respects human dignity.

http://centroprodh.org.mx/en/

Open Society Justice Initiative

On September 26, 2014, dozens of student activists from a teachers’ college in Ayotzinapa were detained and loaded into police vehicles by armed men in the town of Iguala, in Mexico’s Guerrero state. None of the students—43 in all—has been seen since.

The disappearances of the 43, blamed on corrupt collusion between local politicians, drug gangs, and police, galvanized protests across Mexico, fueled by frustration over the lack of justice. The atrocity became a symbol of Mexico’s wider failure to protect its citizens from killings and disappearances, and to hold accountable those responsible.

Broken Justice in Mexico’s Guerrero State examines the elements of that failure, and offers recommendations for change.

The result of over two years of research and analysis by Mexican and international experts, this report provides the most comprehensive analysis to date of the structural deficiencies of Guerrero’s justice system—flaws that have enabled perpetrators of violence to operate with almost absolute impunity.

Broken Justice in Mexico’s Guerrero State exposes the profound lack of political will to address abuses, including the failure to prosecute state actors implicated in extrajudicial killings, torture, and enforced disappearances. It also sets out an agenda for reform—the first steps needed to rebuild trust in justice and the rule of law in Guerrero.

Date post:	31-Jul-2020
Category:	Documents
Upload:	others
View:	0 times
Download:	0 times