Origin Explanation of Life

8/12/2019 Origin Explanation of Life

1/18

The ritish Society for the Philosophy of Science

Origin Explanations and the Origin of LifeAuthor(s): Frank B. Ebersole and Marvin M. ShrewsburySource: The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 10, No. 38 (Aug., 1959), pp.103-119Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of The British Society for the Philosophy ofScienceStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/686002 .Accessed: 23/02/2014 14:09

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms

of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

.

Oxford University Press and The British Society for the Philosophy of Science are collaborating with JSTOR todigitize, preserve and extend access to The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 181 .118.153.57 on Sun, 23 Feb 20 14 14:09:57 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=ouphttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=bspshttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=bspshttp://www.jstor.org/stable/686002?origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/stable/686002?origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=bspshttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=bspshttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=oup


2/18

ORIGIN EXPLANATIONS

AND THE ORIGIN OF LIFE*

FRANK B. EBERSOLE nd MARVIN M. SHREWSBURY

THEperennial uestion f the origin of life has been opened up for anew

round of discussion. Several rticles have appeared ithin thepast our years, differing n detail and emphasis, ut sharing commonpurpose, o bring this chronically ifficultsubject within the scope ofscientific explanation. The authors of these articles share a con-fidence hat recent discoveries n biophysical hemistry ow put us ina position o offer-in outline at least-a scientifically atisfactory x-planation f the origin of life.

In reading hese articles we came to feel somewhat disoriented;we

developed complaintwhose source was not clear. In

discussingit together, we agreed hat we had no objections o the geological,astronomical, iophysical, r biochemical acts or theories presented.On most of this neither writer eels competent o judge, and we arehappy o be informed. Neither have we complaints hat the offeredexplanations f the origin of life are incomplete r sketchy--for oneof the articles makes any pretence at completeness. It becameapparent hat the scource of our complaint was with the style of theexplanations ffered-not with the stuff-with certain

conceptsand

the way these were used n the explanations. In short he disorienta-tion was philosophical, ogical. This article s an attempt o get atthe sources f this disorientation.

* Received 8.vii. 581J. D. Bernal, The Origin of Life , New Biology, 954,No. 16, 28; H. F. Blum,

'Perspectives n Evolution', American cientist, 955, 43, 595; Melvin Calvin,'Chemical Evolution and the Origin of Life', American cientist, 956, 44, 248;J. B. S. Haldane, The Origins f Life , New Biology, 954,No. 16, 9; H. Jacobson,'Information, Reproduction nd he Origin of Life ', American cientist, 955,43,I19; N. W. Pirie, The Meaninglessness f the Terms Life and Living , Perspectivesin Biochemistry, ondon, 1937; N. W. Pirie, On Making and Recognizing Life',New Biology, 954,No. 16, 41; J. W. S. Pringle, The Evolution f Living Matter ,New Biology, 954,No. 16, 54; George Wald, The Origin of Life , The Physics ndChemistry f Life, New York, 1955.

103

http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp


3/18

FRANK B. EBERSOLE AND MARVIN M. SHREWSBURY

At times we felt that the form of the explanations was disarmingly-and confusingly-simple. Explaining the origin of life is not

logically the same kind of enterprise as explaining the origin of thecustom of shaking hands. Nor is it the same sort of thing as explain-ing the origin of species. It shares some logical features with each.We try in this article to get clear about the logical character of an

explanation of the origin of life by comparing and contrasting t withother kinds of origin explanations. In doing this, we think we can

bring out the source of a confusing feature of these recent discussions,viz. a mixture of abstract biochemical theory with seeming concern

aboutthe nature of some

particular iving things.At other times, in reading these articles, we felt that we were

being given too much: that in addition to an explanation of the originof life, some other extraneous things were added, and that these addi-tions were not necessary o a satisfactory explanation. Indeed, theydetracted from it. Some of these extraneous ingredients were 'thenature of life ', 'primal life', 'the first cell'. In 1937, N. W. Piriewarned against definitions of' life '. We accept his warning as good

methodologyon this

point.But we

tryto show here how

very verytempting it is when giving an explanation of the origin of life, to

indulge in something, which if not giving a definition of life, is verymuch like giving one.

We need not, we feel, speak of explanations-in the plural-of the

origin of life. From the standpoint of our present enquiry the ex-

planations have the same form. Hence, we shall speak of all theauthors cited as presenting an explanation of the origin of life. Theoffered

explanationseems to consist of the following elements (with

differences n detail noted):

(I) Organic compounds are known to be produced out of inorganicby non-organic processes.'

(2) Once formed they would survive, because

(a) at the right time the atmosphere of the earth had little or no

oxygen.2(b) there were no organisms able to destroy them.3

1Bernal, op. cit.; Blum, op. cit.; Calvin, op. cit.; Pirie, Perspect. n Biochem.;Pirie, New Biology.

2Bernal, op. cit.; Calvin, op. cit.; Haldane, p. cit.; Pringle, op. cit.; Wald,op. cit.

3 Calvin, op. cit.; Wald, op. cit.

104



4/18

ORIGIN EXPLANATIONS AND THE ORIGIN OF LIFE

(c) certain orces are present which promote heir formation.There s a spontaneous ormation f aggregates f differenttypes (processes f biochemical election begin).1

(d) structures tilisesurrounding rganic molecules, irst by:(i) fermentation, using energy-rich phosphate bonds.2

Then by:(ii) photosynthesis hich produces xygen,3 and so:

(iii) respiration.4(A) Suppose omeone were to say, When walking along he street

with women, men customarily walk on the outside. What is the

originof this custom?' How would one answer? If he knew a few

facts about history here should be no difficulty. He could say, forexample, In the Middle Ages, refusewas hrown rom house windows.Someone walking close to the building was less likely to be splatteredwith it than someone walking on the outside. Hence, men wishingto protect the dignity and finery of their women, took to walkingalways on the outside. It became an item of chivalry, nd men whodid not observe he courtesy were criticised.'

(B) Suppose ext that a child has been studying he early history ofthe United States, nd a lesson ends with, ' and we can still earn a lotabout our history by studying he customs f New England . Whatif the pupil now asks, How do customs riginate? This s a bit moredifficult nd one might be hesitant o give an answer, ut for purposesof our discussion ry this: At a certain ime people do things or whatis, or is believed o be a good reason. These things become anctioned,and violators re criticised, stracised, r even killed. Because f theconservative ature of man in his society, hese modes of behaviourare preserved ven after the reasons o longer apply and are neveragain given, after no sanctions emain except he reminder, That'sjust the way it's done , etc.'

Each of these answers o questions bout origins eems o be a per-fectly satisfactory ype of origin explanation. They are very differentin many respects; ome of the relevant ifferences ill be brought utpresently. Since we are going to use these explanations slandmarks

1 Bernal, op. cit.; Blum, op. cit.; Calvin, op. cit.; Pringle, op. cit.; Wald,op. cit.

2 Blum, op. cit.; Calvin, op. cit.; Haldane, op. cit.; Wald, op. cit.3 Bernal, op. cit.; Haldane, op. cit.; Wald, op. cit.4 Haldane, op. cit.; Wald, op. cit.

H IO5



5/18


or reference places, it is important to note that they are kinds of ex-planations about which we could have no radical misgivings. They

answer the questions; they do their jobs; they explain in familiarways. Any disagreements with them would be disagreements ndetail, not objections in principle. We would know-if we onlyknew enough of the facts-what disagreements o bring against theexplanations, and how to settle the matter.

There is an obvious and close relationship between the two. Thesecond (B) 1 gives the plan or pattern which the first explanation (A)follows. When making the first explanation t is tacitly understoodthat there is such a

planto follow.

Althoughone

mightfollow or use

it, he still might not be able to state t. Stating t is difficult or severalreasons, among these, that it makes explicit certain things which gounmentioned in the first explanation, viz. human beings being whatthey are, certain modes of behaviour will continue when no reasoncan be given for them. We shall refer to this element in (B) bysaying that explanations of this type state a ' principle of persistencewhich is presupposed by any explanation of the first (A), type. Notethat the

principles not assumed

byone who makes an

explanationof

the first type (he knows perfectly well that human beings have therequired conservative character); it is just not mentioned. The firstexplanation s the proper answer to a certain question. In order toanswer that question, a person does not have to answer some otherrelated question. It would be quite mistaken to say that the answerto the first question was incomplete.

Anyone who gives the first explanation A) or who accepts t as anexplanation of the appropriate ype is bound to accept the secondone (B)-at least in principle. One can disagree with (B) in only twoways, in principle, or in detail: (I) He might insist there are humancustoms which are explained n an entirely different way, or (2) hemight insist that there are human customs whose origin is not inreasoned action. The first objection would be to the effect that theplan could not (would not?) be applied as broadly as was stated. Incollecting evidence to support his objection, one would need to surveyhuman explaining behaviour, as much as the actions involved in thecustoms explained. The second objection s to the effect that the planfollowed, in so far as following gives an explanation, s not properly

1 We shall follow the practice of using a letter to stand for the explanation givenas example at the beginning of the lettered section. Thus, '(A) ' is an abbreviationfor ' the example explanation given in A ', etc.

Io6



6/18


stated. The proposed statement of plan mentions an element extran-eous to explaining he origin of a custom. In short, t is not the correct

statement of the master plan which it pretends o be.When (B) is looked at by contrast with (A), it seems appropriateto say that (B) does not primarily give information about history orhuman actions or customs. It does not primarily give information atall. Rather it gives guidance in how to make A-type explanations-which do give information. Secondarily, however, (B) does give in-formation about customs and origins, for it does have the subsidiaryforce of a generalisation o the effect that all human customs do havecertain features n

common. The subsidiary 61e of this generalisationis shown by noting that the features which all customs are asserted ohave in common are only those, specific nstances of which would bementioned in an A-type explanation. Had the child's question beenraised in other circumstances, an answer in the same words wouldhave made the generalisation more prominent. Suppose the pupilhad just been given the first origin explanation (A), and then asked,'How do customs originate?' Then the same words used in (B)would have had more

prominentlythe force of 'All customs

beginwith some reasoned action..In the original context such an explanation contains a generalisation

about all customs but only in so far as they are matter for explanationby a certain pattern. It certainly does not contain a generalisationabout explanations, o the effect that every proper origin explanationof a human custom always has and always will be of such and such aform. We cannot generalise o the plan-explanation y looking overa random assortment of instances of

particular explanations,because

the relevant nstances all presuppose and apply it. The main questionabout (B) it seems s whether we have got properly stated what we haveall along been using in explanations uch as (A).

The point we are trying to make is this: the first type (A) explainsthe origin of a specific custom. The second (B) has conspicuousamong its functions the statement of a plan which when followed bythe first makes it an acceptable ype of explanation. Note that it isnatural to ask questions calling for specific origin explanations witheither question 'What is the origin of. . .?' or'How does .originate?' but it is more natural to ask for the plan by 'How do

. . s originate?'. Compare: 'What is the origin of the earth?'with 'How do planets originate?'

With these two landmarks laid down, (A) and (B), we think it canlo7



7/18


already be seen that answers o questions bout he origin of life aremore ike the second (B) than the first (A) kind of explanation. Are

those who write on the origin of life concerned with any specificliving form? This seems o be the source of some confusion. It isat least clear hat they are not answering he question How do livingforms originate? . That was Darwin's question. Perhaps beforelooking at the origin of life question, t would be helpful o considerit. We wonder if a little mischief has been worked by Darwin'sphrase origin of species , so that we tend to phrase his question,' What sthe origin of species? rather han' How do species riginate?'

To bring out the character f Darwin's uestion, et's consider irst heexplanation f the origin of a specific iving form.(C) Consider he question What is the origin of man? It has

been reasonably ell answered n outline. Fossil evidence eems odemonstrate hat there were forms very early n geological ime thatclosely represent common ancestor f apes and man. These ormshave anatomical tructures ommon o both groups, et lack many ofthe unique haracteristics hich are features f each. On the basis of

such evidence,man and

apes appearo have followed

separateines of

evolution rom a monkey-like uadruped or ape-like quadruped) sfar back as the Oligocene r Miocene pochs of time.

(D) Now compare his with Darwin's question, How do speciesoriginate? A satisfactory ummary f Darwin's answer might golike this. There s random ariation mong he progeny of any ivingthing, and these variations re inherited. The environment xacts aheavy oll,killing a large number f living hings before they can repro-duce. Those best suited to the environment urvive; hence thevariations f survival-value repassed n to future enerations. Givenlong periods f time these changes rom generation o generation, ddup to a new species.

It is quite clear hat Darwin's urpose was to work out a new plan,the plan for a 'scientific' explanation s opposed o mythological rtheological nes. He did not get it stated quite right; we have sincelearned hat there are very great difficulties ith any plan as simple asDarwin's. We are not here trying to get it stated adequately; wewant to point out that in explaining he origin of man, we pre-supposed ome such Darwinian plan and applied t. The relationbetween Darwin's nswer nd the explanation f the origin of man s

parallel o the plan for customs B) and its application o a specialcustom (A). Also, the Darwinian plan plainly states what is pre-

Io8



8/18


supposed n the explanation f the origin of man, a principle f per-sistence, ia nheritance. This plays a r1le analogous o the conservative

nature f societies n the explanation f the origin of customs. In theDarwinian plan another principle s also mentioned: random varia-tion and survival. We shall efer o this type of principle n an origin-plan explanation s a ' principle f complication . No such principleentered nto the statement f the origin-plan or customs explanation-presumably because he required rinciple s universally nderstood,and not called nto question.

Now what does one do when he gives an explanation f the origin

of life? Mostly plan-giving, t would seem.All recent writers

arein agreement, pparently, hat what is needed are principles f com-plication y which organic ompounds ould arise rom non-organicones, amino acids from simpler compounds and elements, proteinsfrom amino acids, etc., etc., and principles y which these could beexpected o persist nce ormed: tendency oward liquid rystallisation,large size molecules, nergy-capturing ransformations uch as the useof energy-rich hosphate molecules. It is agreed by all that some ofthese

principlesre now understood. There s no concern with what

specific crystalline tructures may have been floating on the surfaceof the sea four billions of years ago. We are not yet ready or theminute, precise details. We do not know which details o look foruntil we have some plan to apply. The present roblem would seemto be using what is known about biophysical hemistry o constructthe plan.

Yet there s more than hat. Whereas hese recent articles re notconcerned with

specifichemical ombinations, hey are concerned n

general with chemical onditions n the earth our billions of yearsago. They are reporting n conditions which ed to the emergence flife much as one reports on the refuse pots and muddy streets at acertain ime in history n explaining he origin of the male-outsidecustom. Is the concern with past chemical conditions merely theconcern over whether he emerging plan will be applicable? If oneof the likely principles f complication an be applied nly to inorganiccompounds n an oxygen-less atmosphere, t is important o knowwhether he atmosphere t the time this complication rocess mighthave been going on was of the right kind.

Still, there s a greater ote of specificity han his n these articles.At times they seem to be talking about some specific life-form, orsome definite event in pre-history.

Io9



9/18


As theseproperties ccumulated n some ime n the past, hey wouldhave eached degree f development n some ingle ystem f whichhad we been here

viewingt from he outside,we

mighthave said,

' that, now, s living .1. . since he origin of life belongs o the category f at-least-oncephenomena, ime s on its side. However mprobable e regard hisevent, or any of the stepswhich t involves, iven imeenough t willalmost ertainly appen t east nce. . .2,3

(I) They are right to be concerned (to some extent, at least) withprehistoric articulars. The landmarks e have set up so far are mis-leading. There are many species nd many customs, o one expectsto follow a common pattern n explaining he origin of each of them.As far as we presently now, there s only one 'life' and accountingfor its origin is explaining he origin of a special hing. Yet onecannot explain a special hing by using a pattern which fits no otherthing. The pattern s one for biochemical complications f all kindswhich produce iving things among other complex products. Thenthe plan supplied y these recent writings n the origin of life is not ananswer o the question How does life originate?', but an answer othe question How do complex protein-systems riginate?'. There-fore, much (in fact most) of these articles s not concerned with theorigin of life but with the plan to be used n explaining he origin oflife. We can answer he questions What is the origin of x1x, x293,etc.?' only when we can appeal o the plan which is given in theanswer o 'How do x's originate?'

Then these articles attempt o do two things: I) state a new planfor explaining he origin of biophysical nd chemical complexes, nd

(2) apply he plan n giving an explanation f one of these complexes,life. The rubric ollowed by these articles s this: they collect to-gether certain ecent discoveries n biophysical hemistry nd bringthem to bear on an explanation f the origin of life. When weplace this against he landmarks o far discussed, ne feels nclined osay it contains hidden complexity: a mixture of plan-stating, ndplan-applying oing on reciprocally. Nothing is wrong with that.Certainly ot; but we hope that putting t this way may help to reveal

why these authors lso get concerned ith other disturbing nterprises.When we attempt o give an account f the origin of life in com-bination with the drawing up of a novel, incompletely ormulatedplan or the origin of protein ystems, we are naturally ed to wonder

1 Calvin, op. cit.2 Wald, op. cit. 3 See quotations on pp. 112, 115

IIO



10/18


how the plan fits. We must ask, 'What sort of protein system s aliving thing?' In order to bring out the nature of this question,

consider nother example.(E) Suppose quarry-worker ays to a visiting geochemist, See

these egg-shaped imestone nodes sticking out of the sandstone liffs.How did they originate?' The geochemist nswers omething ikethis. ' A substance, alcium bicarbonate, hich s soluble n water, sfound widely distributed n the earth. When water percolates hroughsand or sandstone, t often carries his substance n solution. In pocketsor openings where evaporation akes place, t accumulates nd under-

goes a chemical hange nto solid, nsoluble alcium arbonate.' Hereis an origin-explanation or which he plan sa simple, well-understood,chemical ransformation; t is part of a broad, heoretical rameworkfrom which similar plans can be taken by the dozen. The plan ispresupposed nd applied. The particular xplanation ssumes hatthe listener s a theoretically ophisticated erson. Suppose, owever,that he is not, and that he replies, I can see that you have accountedfor something-I believe you called t calcium-carbonate-coming obe in these holes. But how about his imestone?

There s no simple answer o this. If the geochemist s patient, hebegins essons n chemistry. However, before the lessons begin, byway of insisting hat his explanation was a good one, he might say,'Calcium carbonate s limestone'. In order to explain how chem-istry will give the questioner n understanding f the origin of lime-stone formations, he might add, 'If you could see the substanceresulting rom the changes am talking about, you would recogniseit as limestone . Of course he is not

givinga definition f the word

' limestone , nor discussing ow the novice recognises imestone whenhe sees t. The quarry-worker ndoubtedly nows how to use theword 'limestone , and the geochemist s certainly not trying todisturb his linguistic habits, nor to express doubts about his masteryof the word.1

The geochemist, while giving an origin explanation f limestone,cannot possibly have the question, Is calcium-carbonate imestone?'It is a layman's question. However, the question, What sort ofprotein-complex s life?' is not just a layman's question. Here the

1 We realise hat statements ike ' Calcium carbonate s limestone ', i.e. abbreviated

expressions of bridges between theoretical and everyday concepts, often have analmost irresistible metaphysical pull'. We do not think it necessary o go into thisdifficult business here.

III



11/18


plan is not presupposed as part of some simple, fairly fixed theory, noris its application a routine matter. To make clear the application of

the plan, an answer is required. One could not pretend to give anexplanation of the origin of life unless he could give an answer. True,the answer might be vague, but that would be in keeping with the

degree of finish and completeness f the plan, which is admittedlysketchy.

Note the style of some of the answers:The critical vent which may best be called he origin of life was theenclosure f several ifferent elf-reproducing olymers ithin semi-

permeable embrane.1If somemechanism aintainshe upply ftrypsinogen here s 'growth'of trypsin, ut this s not looked n as a sufficiently rganised ctivityto make he system ualify s living. If, however, he system wereable o make he trypsinogen swell, when upplied ith amino cidsand sugar r with acid derivatives, t would be difficult o defend heexclusion ogically.2... Leading inally o the emergence f localised eaction entreswhich merit he title of organism.3

Why do we have here he phrases may best be called', and' difficultto defend he exclusion logically , and merit he title of '? Supposethe geochemist ad said Calcium arbonate may best be called ime-stone , or 'It would be difficult o defend not applying o calciumcarbonate he word limestone '. Perhaps we can bring out thedifficulty ere by comparing he origin of life explanation ith someother andmarks. One of these s chosen because t is a notoriouslyunsatisfactory rigin-explanation.

(F) Take the question, What is the origin of Christianity?' Avery incomplete answer would run something ike this. Jesus ofNazareth, n his early ife, was a member of a monastic ommunitywhich taught purity of life, and studied he writings of the prophetswith fervour. In particular he community nterpreted ertain pro-phetic writings as predicting he coming of a holy man-saviour.Jesus, at some time, broke with the community and went aboutteaching ts moral code to the masses. He became onvinced hat he

was the predicted aviour, nd was put to death because f this reli-gious presumption. Some of his disciples ame o believe hat he wasGod, and that his life and death were actions f God n bringing boutthe salvation f believers rom sin and death.

1 Haldane, op. cit.2

Pirie, New Biology3 Pringle, op. cit.

112



12/18


(G) Now, how about the plan question 'How do religionsoriginate?' A likely answer would refer to a leader of unusual

powers who brought about reforms n the existing religion or religionsof a people and after whose death was believed to be divine or apossessor of divine powers. It is clear that this sort of explanation ofhow religions originate is related to the explanation of the origin ofChristianity s plan to application, .e. as (B) was to (A). But now wehave in this area a third origin question.

The question 'What is the origin of religion?' has been muchwith us. This question s not a request or an explanation of the origin

of any specific religion or group of religions (like F), nor is it a requestfor a plan or programme for explaining the origin of each and everyreligion (like G). It is like the origin of life question n being a requestfor a pre-historical story. It is unlike in that it presupposes a planwhich is so well understood hat there is rarely need for it to be stated.The question has been given many answers: none of them has beenaccepted by many at any time, or by any for long. Speculativeanswers have been so wild, that present-day anthropologists have

generallythrown the

questionout of court-for the reason that we

have no significant nformation on the required pre-history and arenot likely to get any. Consequently he question can only provokeuncontrolled speculation. Anthropologists have seldom seen a morefundamental defect in answers to the question.

(H) Consider a typical (though out-of-date) answer. Primitivemen believed that when they dreamed they were actually doing whatthey dreamed they were doing-while, of course, they were sleeping.

Theybelieved a ' second self' had left their

sleepingbodies and had

done what had been dreamed. By a slight extension they came tobelieve that this ' second self' left the body at death and never returned.So they imagined that the ghosts of the dead were somewhere aroundand operative. When an important eader died, a leader upon whomthe society was greatly dependent, hey came to believe that his powersand his counsel were still available, f techniques could only be foundto use them. Hence, ritual, prayer, and a professional class of thosespecialised n making available he powers of the departed eader. Astime goes on dependence upon these invisible powers increases-andthey come to be considered powers of some superhuman gency.

Of course, this is a crude account, but it is difficult o see how fussingwith the details would make it more satisfactory. It is difficult o seehow anything of the kind could give a satisfactory xplanation. We

113



13/18


know what the great world-religions re, and we know somethingabout he origins of each of them. If we assume hat we have already

given in (G) something ike the correct plan of explanation or theorigin of a religion, hen we are prepared n principle o understandhow one religion can emerge rom another. What an explanationof the origin of religion H) pretends o give is an account of how areligion grows out of non-religion. The above proffered xplanation(H) seems deficient precisely ecause hat whose origin s explained snot clearly dentifiable s a religion.

This defect has generally een elt by writers n speculative nthro-

pology, and they have ried o complete heir xplanationsn

two ways:(I) By adding some such statement s: seeking assistance rom thesuper-natural owers of a departed eader s the first n a series f moreand more complex activities which ends with religion as we know ittoday. This manoeuvre s a barely isguised dmission hatno explana-tion of the origin of religion has been given. A gap is felt betweenthat for which an origin has presumably een given and that forwhich an origin s wanted. A pretence s made at bridging he gap

bya series of'

and-so-forths'.This is

obviouslya

bogusform of

supplement.Compare his with the way Calvin explains what sort of protein-

system a living thing is. He discusses ow an auto-catalytic ystemwith a phosphate inkage might originate. Then, instead of tellingwhat sort of system a living thing s, he writes:

Finally, s the systems volve n complexity, t some period f timethey may acquire llof the collection f qualities hat are usually ttri-buted o

living hings,ndwe can

ayhe

hingsalive, r that here sa

living ystem resent.'Note also that Wald, after discussing he possibility f natural orma-tion of colloidal aggregates, ays:

We suppose that all these forces and factors, and others perhaps yet tobe revealed, together give us eventually the first living organism.2

(2) Speculators n the origin of religion have more frequentlyadded o their account another bogus supplement which runs some-

thing like this: Religion s basically or essentially, r primarily) neffort to get assistance rom imaginary powers. Unlike 'Calciumcarbonate s limestone' this is meant to bridge a gap felt by thetheorist s well as the layman-learner. An explanation f the origin

1 Calvin, op. cit.2 Wald, op. cit.

II4



14/18


of religion is offered. It takes the form of explaining in some detailthe origin of x. But now how about the origin of religion? The

answer is, ' x is religion, the very essence of it '. Unlike 'calciumcarbonate is limestone' this answer insinuates that without specialtutoring we cannot be depended upon to correctly identify religiousbehaviour when we are confronted with it. It casts doubts upon thecorrectness f our non-theoretical alk about religious rituals, religiousorganisations, and religious doctrines. It disturbs our confidence inour mastery of certain regularly used parts of the English vocabulary.But we can and do read about religious conferences and religious

leaders. We distinguish one religion from another, and we knowsomething about the origin and distinctive features of each. Werealise also that religious behaviour, iterature, etc., shades off into thenon-religious. We are aware that many things people say or do areneither clearly religious nor non-religious. All of this does not makeit impossible to explain the origin of religion, nor does it lead us towant a definition of' religion'.

We do not know what to do with one when it is offered. Weare

puzzled asto

howit fits into

any scheme which explainshe

originof religion. We also know that some things people do are a result offorethought, some things are reasonably based habits, some customs.These shade nto one another, but it does not follow that one needs toknow the essence of' custom' in order to explain the origin of one.

What r6le do such statements as these play in an explanation of theorigin of life?

[a living organism s] . . . the site of a continuous nflux and outflow

of matter nd energy. This s the very sign of life, its cessation he bestevidence of death.'Life, then, s a temporary eversal f a universal rend by means of theproduction f information mechanisms.2

The style of such statements strongly suggests that the authors feela conceptual gap in their explanations. They attempt to close it bytelling what life is. Compare this with the other gap-closing devices.Gaps were closed in (E) by telling what limestone is, and in (H) by

tellingwhat

religionis. But the

gapsin

(E)and

(H) are not of thesame kind. (E) is a two-level origin explanation. The origin is dis-cussed n the technical vocabulary, and involves the conceptual appara-tus, of a branch of one of the sciences. This second-level explanation

1 Wald, op. cit. 2Jacobson, op. cit.

II5



15/18


is then applied in answering a first-level question, i.e. a question in-volving only plain, every-day concepts, and stated in untechnical

language. A gap existed only in the layman's ack of understandingas to how the technical and un-technical were to be connected. Anindication of how they were in fact connected could be made by comingstraight down from a technical conception to a layman's conceptionby means of the formula 'Calcium carbonate is limestone . Theorigin of religion is a one-level affair. The words used n the explana-tion are understandable without tutoring in symbolically expressedequations, geometrical models, or in the use of special instruments.

The road, a straight and easy road, ends before we get to our destina-tion. Instead of extending the road, an attempt is made to move thedestination closer by word magic; but it cannot be done.

The origin of life is a two-level explanation. It runs up and downbetween the conceptions of everyday affairs nd those of the biochemist;but in the end, that whose origin is explained s an entity understood

only by the biochemist. All of the authors seem cognisant of a gap.It is not clear whether this is because they are writing for laymen; or

whether,because of the

noveltyof the

plan, theywish to make its

application more than usually plain. In any case their language is

disturbing. Some come directly down from the conception of a

protein system to life, but they do so with such phrases as 'may bestbe called ife ', or ' merits the title of life '. Others descend rom theirbiochemical talk not directly to life, but to certain traits which couldbe exhibited by a protein-system whose origin they have explained,an exchange of energy and matter with the outside. They have returnedto the common road, but

theyseem to feel-and

quite correctly-thatthey are not at their destination. But do they finish the journey?Some seem just to promise that they will arrive. Others seem to turnto word magic, and tell us that life really is just a matter of exchangeof energy with the environment. Part of the trouble seems to be thatit is forgotten how vague a word 'life' is. If one thinks there mustbe a sharp line between the living and non-living, it is tempting tolocate the line so as to just include the system whose origin has been

explained.A picture of a sharp ine between the living and the non-living may

also explain the disturbing particularity f these stories of the origin oflife. It is almost at times as if an attempt were made in applying the

plan, to translate t totally into a one-level account, tracing a straightline development from inorganic compounds to the living organism.

116



16/18


It sometimes seems as if we are told a prehistoric tory of a sequence of

systems, each more complex than the one before, until at last, the very

first living thing has appeared. The idea of the sharp ine between theliving and non-living could encourage this picture, but it will notaccount for it. We need to make a connection between some conceptused in the plan of biochemical complication, and the concept of a

living thing; but there is another reason which tempts us to make thatconnection with the first, simplest living thing. The plan for bio-chemical complication is meant to complement Darwin's plan.Darwin's plan (without the later supplementation f genetic theory) isa one-level

explanation.In

explainingthe

originof

any species,it

calls for tracing ts ancestry o a preceding species, hen to a precedingone, etc. There is an inclination to conclude that there must be one

species to which Darwin's plan does not apply, viz. the very first. Itis the origin of this which needs to be explained; this is the goal of the

theory of biochemical complication. The applied story of bio-chemical development s the story which leads up to the first form oflife. We easily became possessed by a picture-understanding ofDarwinian

theory: diverginglines which branch off from one trunk

line which itself begins at some definite point.Of course this picture is misleading. One cannot even describe t

without the flavour of caricature. No one would think of finding andreporting records of some one species, the very first species, to whichthe Darwinian plan did not apply. Compare the problem of theorigin of life with that of the origin of a custom. Like living things,customs change in time. Since its origin a given custom has probablychanged considerably. We have principles to explain these changes,and they are not the same principles used to explain origins. Withcustoms, however, we have no tendency to think that some one per-formance, some one certain movement was the very first enactmentof the custom. We have no temptation to ask 'Which man's walk,and on what date, and at what hour and place was the first outside-walkthe performance of a custom? We know this is a joker-question ike' Which hair was it, when lost, that made him bald? or 'Which brickmade the load too heavy, and broke the springs?'

Asking about the first form of life is the same sort of question.Even so, there is a great temptation to think that when explainingthe origin of life, one is explaining the emergence of the first livingthing. And we suspect hat some of our writers have yielded to thistemptation.

II7



17/18


For the primal organism, generated under the conditions we havedescribed, . .x

Oneis

asking,n

effect,or an

apparatus hichs

the unique propertyof cells n order o form the first cell.2It is between this stage and the first recognizable rganism hat thelargest gap still exists. . . 3Long particles . . , spherical particles, . . Both may have oc-curred n the first ormation f preorganismal ife.4Aggregates . . interact . . to form larger and more complexstructures. In this way we imagine he ascent, ot by jumps or masterstrokes, but gradually iecemeal, o the first living organisms.

Nevertheless, t is very difficult to dispel the picture of the explainedappearance f the first living organism, especially when it is so stronglyabetted by other features of the explanation.

We think that we have pointed out what some of these featuresmight be. In the first place the origin of life cannot be a simplenarrative ike the story of the origin of Christian baptism. There isno well-understood plan, no known principles of complication andpersistence which it can apply. So, the explanation must state ts own

plan. Secondly, the plan is a selection from and a quasi-narrativeassembly of, principles of biochemistry; its statement involves themodels, technical terminology, and abstruse symbolism of one of themore abstract ciences. But an explanation of the origin of life requiresa plan narrative; it must be something ike an explanation of the originof a custom, or an institution, or a geological formation. The ex-

planation of the origin of life cannot be just a second-level plan state-ment; it must also be a plan application n the form of a first evel story

of the past.Admittedly the requisite knowledge of pre-history s lacking. The

application can at best be made at a few critical past epochs; itmust be sketchy and speculative. Since the explanation positivelyrequires a pre-historical tory, there may well be a temptation to givethe speculative uggestions a sound of particularity which is misleading.Regardless of how partially or completely the plan can be applied atcertain points in the pre-historical ccount, t must not fail of application

to the end-product of the developmental tory, the living thing. Twokinds of gaps may have to be bridged: (I) the conceptual, rom protein-systems to living things or to something simpler han living things, and(2) the pre-historical, from some simpler-than-living system to the

1Wald 2 Ibid. 3 Bemal, op. cit. 4 Ibid. 5Wald, op. cit.

II8



18/18


living thing or at least to the kind of thing to which Darwinian

principles apply. At these points temptations might arise to bridge

the gaps by odd formulae like, 'x may best be called life ', or bypromises and etceteras. Or again it may seem possible to close the

gap by properly plumbing the essence or nature of life. There maybe temptations to complete the explanation with incantations.San Jose State CollegeSan Jos6, 14Calif.,U.S.A.

119

Date post:	03-Jun-2018
Category:	Documents
Upload:	angelita2687
View:	215 times
Download:	0 times

Origin Explanation of Life

Documents