.. . ,. ·- '.r .. ' .-:- tt• ..... .., ..... '·"- I . -..:ID ·t (C}. ltaiinCMI' OIGAIIIZAT JDW N:r IV II' US Ot!tttton tAm. IIYDI I I PAUL IIVDI I It PAUL DVIU IV 1 Aaplt 26 Auau•t 18 Oetober ,• 2' Auau•t Operation contlnulna a. (C) he ld11lon .. 111pd the 3<1 BTlpde· Taek POfte for eaeh Of,te!'atlon .U to •tntaift aut'Mlllance of the IVN C..- ltocllan border and areaa eut thereof • ·c:oncJact .OOahe•,. and block pene- trattona ll'to t'- Mriped are.t of h. (C) Operatloft.t ana for P.uJL IIYDI II_. Identical to that of Oplwatlon PACL nftU of tbe _... ol. .,.ration wn the tbe -.t, IGaa 14 ta tlk ta. ••• wet. plft fiM YA-ZA .50 in the nor_jL, enct &M eae& wn-r.1f·1tM' ft-ZV-IQ""SS-tft-t)te aaRh. The areA of operation 2040 aquare •11••·) I . c:. (C) Control: The brtpde tuk fot"ee wat r loa fML 11¥111 II c• LlneM. Tbe technique r ..,... fi'CII ODit CliiiiiMJred 10,000 IM!ter artd to ar.other)' -- effectlft durlna prevtoue operationa, we bri- aeda Which had control of I Field Foree Vtetnea waA plac@d thft cont 1 ftuthorftv of the tirt Air Di'lf.eion on 2 Auaust contf,...!fl'd 1 thftt t.ure ont. U tenrlrwt ion of (Ter«t ion PAUL I I on 2 5 Au p:o.: ":. On 2 r., PAUL I Vft!l! iN: in th-- r-""'•i,..:•' :· ('n r. .... .... 15 /lnfl' ... ot 1-,r_r,. -- , ,. ...--···-:--"'•- ....-·- , .. -- .. , .... -. - "-··- ... -/ ..
Transcript
.. . ,. ·-
'.r ..
' .-:-tt • ..... .., ..... '·"- ~.::..-J I .
-..:ID ·t (C}. ltaiinCMI' OIGAIIIZAT JDW N:r IV II' US
Ot!tttton
tAm. IIYDI I I PAUL IIVDI I It PAUL DVIU IV
1 Aaplt 26 Auau•t 18 Oetober
,•
2' Auau•t l~October
Operation contlnulna
a. (C) ~•lon: he ld11lon .. 111pd the 3<1 BTlpde· Taek POfte for eaeh Of,te!'atlon .U to •tntaift aut'Mlllance of the IVN C..ltocllan border and areaa eut thereof • ·c:oncJact .OOahe•,. and block penetrattona ll'to t'- Mriped are.t of Of'!~"atlon~
h. (C) Operatloft.t an~:~ ana deal~t@d for Optr-~ P.uJL IIYDI II_. Identical to that of Oplwatlon PACL nftU I~;peeHle ~lea of tbe _... ol. .,.ration wn the JYI~9cUan bo~..t..!_n tbe -.t, IGaa 14 ta tlk eu~ ta. ••• wet. plft fiM YA-ZA .50 in the nor_jL, enct &M eae& wn-r.1f·1tM' ft-ZV-IQ""SS-tft-t)te aaRh. The areA of operation eae~Jra~••~ ~oz~t•l1 2040 aquare •11••·)
I . c:. (C) Control: The brtpde tuk fot"ee wat enp~d wtt~n r
loa fML 11¥111 II c• LlneM. Tbe technique ot''"ctW!ckerb~rdtng' r
..,... fi'CII ODit CliiiiiMJred 10,000 IM!ter artd aq~are to ar.other)' whl~h -effectlft durlna prevtoue operationa, we contlnuedk-~ bri-
aeda tat~_foree Which had ~n u~~r operatt~l control ·\~rlty of I Field Foree Vtetnea waA plac@d u~~r thft operati~l cont 1 ftuthorftv of the tirt Air Ca~lcy Di'lf.eion on 2 Auaust '"~ contf,...!fl'd 1 thftt po~t-t.ure ont. U tenrlrwt ion of (Ter«t ion PAUL ~~ I I on 2 5 Au p:o.: ":. On 2 r.,
~-c-~ticm PAUL Jr!P.\'~".'9! I Vft!l! iN: ltH~~d in th-- r-""'•i,..:•' :· ~tf~~l '-"~t ('n ~~~""""' r. .... ~ .... ,..,..~, 15 /lnfl' ... ot 1-,r_r,.
~ cal.-~ _t.tllk fane ra•ec:c.t to op.rattonal control aatbori.ty of I 'heid .,_.- ftetaw fur tM .. at loa of Operat ton IAIJL ~ III.
··· r• Wf.8lda __. -••• lllnti-.1 ~rol atbortty t1l 4th. Iiafat~try Dtnelon • II ·Oetc6.r eDd eoett_., Ia th.t .utua t~t the reA
·, ..t.-r til tlae Y ... tbl period • . - - ·-·---- .. ·..........:.:.. ... .
/ -_ __. .- . --- ..... .. d. (C).--!.- oqantutf.oa: ·-The or,e1ut1on of the 3d Brigade
Tuk hr'ce r.al.-1 tM - ~~ Operation PAUL 11\'111 II and III. ln eoejuaetlon trltb Operation PAUL IIYDI IV, tbe let Battalion, 69th Anlo't • ... nleaead fra. ~at tonal eontrol authority of 18 Oetober 1966. Tbr,.akut all tlwee operation., -ny aatta wen placed llllder the t-.porary operatlGMl control -.atJ.oroltJ of. the 3d lrtaade Taak Force for varytna perfoda of tw.·. Tha prtnelp&l unite of tbe Sd Brtaade Ta•lt Force, with o..-ra" J~ and dat•• ol. e~nd, and tbl Mjor npporttna and operational eoetrol ~~ltJ anlt• are aa followa:
.... qaartera, 3d ~la-de Talk Force, 25th Infantry DiY111on · lriaadter OeDeral Clenn D. Walker, 1 Auau1t - 20 October
Colcmat J-.a1 C. Shanahan, 20 October - 31 Oetober
lat Battalion, 14th Infantr~ Lieutenant Colonel Cilbert Proctor, Junior
l1t Sattalion, 35th Infantry Lleuten~nt Colonel lobert C. ~in&•ton
2d Battalion~ 35th Infantry Lleutentnat Colonel Philip R. F~tr
let Battalion, 12th Infantry COCA 16 leptellber - 28 leptetlber)
•· Jrl,..te bue c:.-p .-c:arity: TbrouJhoat the pert')(!, the 3d kif*le t .. k rar~ .. tntalned an 8dequat• c!•f•n•h•• poeture to pr'<Widft eontinaoaa Melft lty for ita brl,ede baH e.., Yiei•tty ,of Plelku. Ttt.. force• and .,...ataatf.cn ••t.ablts'-d in the lnlt lot defenaive plan, OP'LAN 00. IIIID. wn ...... alae~~ tmd on 15 Sept~ 01""~ STElL CLAV we• t.pl-nted. Tha bt'la4d~ will eontlmM to i"Cot'J'Ot"'te reftne..enta ln thl• plan to efthanee th8 d~f@nciY@ eapebllitiea of tbe foree• et t~ brigade baM f'-.p.
f. (U) ~T""t ~em PAUL 'RZ\1"-~ II eonduet""<! durir"~ th!! P"'!" !.""' 1 to 25 An~"t h C(.""r-.,.,.._., t., th- Aft~r Act1~ F.,..r('!"t PAUL YU~Vr!'.~ IT. ,.-:-
a~ ~ .ettYltt. I - 1S As?Fat are conta10114 1ft After Action lepart O,.attor\ lAm. av1• tt attae .. d u lfteloea~• 1. ltptfteant .,_, aett'lttn 26 hi'~ • .Jl r'~"lli•--. • .foll-:
(I) ... .._ ~ Mafnntaa of tt. repor tt• period eot .. -eidect .Uh a '*'••- !• Xlw :~~rat NOUttl and etpt;iea• related to t ........... .., twenaaee .r. o.•rt ancl eooart •t• .. t• u 4l.rupt GIS
· 4t~1t on etatleu tllhli-..Ja wn eet.daled f« II lept-"r 1966. The ••• eoedttS.. eontiaMd to· .... illllwrM effeeta on fl'f.eft1111y operatf.ODe f.a tile 81'Ne 'laylftl ,.-tlealar U.OC with land line• of e• tmldatl.on.
(2) 26 - Sl Aaplt 1966: n. l•t Jattallon, lStb Infantry, operatlJII aartll of ltJII sa, Itt -... to heft conalderable M~eee•• ln break'- t down tha Yiet Cona illfrutraet~... In t• area. Operatlna with a '-lDC ~l.t fro. flet DjaN111, the NttaltGD - fnltr.Jntal In tt. aprreben1ton of ene Ylet tea& &ad the ldll tna of a neither' who wre • .,...~Hrl of tbe local Ytet ~·C.a. One -.11 llorth Ytet~W~e• ~ ontt .u contacted tn tbr .... ncll"tb of lt ..... y 19 n-nlttna ln foar IIVA riA and one lfVA cap-tured. !'be fJI"lMMr of ftl' •a fr• the 17th Tranapartatlon Jattalton: lued 011 Itt• cth.etaneea Df eaptut"e and tnterroptlon re~alt•. It ... cletanrlned that • IIYA bat tal ton wa• poe•tbly located l.n tbe ruged terrain about '-10 kU~•r• aa1t of 1'1•1 DJer•nc• Majot" IWA untta of the 630th front wr:e ~lt.wd t~ be tn their C.,.boclian eanc:tuary yfelntty Cbu Pong lilountaln.
(3) 1 ~ 6 ~-.ber 1966: ~nt repert1 of up to one ~ne.y reat.nt retnforeecl t.y loeal foree1 wre ~K:Wln& to dtlt'upt ·CVN election• and tnctdent•• all alnar, at the bt-11-Je forwerd .,. .. ot operation and baM c.-p, u wll aa the 4th Infantry Dt•taton baae are.-. It vee t!worl~~d that the 'let Ccna ~ld poatfbly att~ to ~~1~ ~=~ eOYertly influence the CYJif elections.
It "-ttU · ., ... t tlllt M _, .. fl" lartb Viet,._ .. lltwy nJ{.alent1 wre 1•••~ Ia· ...... , .. II ..,_ D-ZA 00 ..n~t-..-t.b arid line on U• aut, • ,_ liwr ... ,u -'0 -*'t--- artd line on tb ~tb, IVlf/C..-Itedl• .... OJ .-talll ._, ,af, 'f& 70 .ut--.t Ftd line on the north. Of t.._ 6neUJ:f .... -_. ~ ra&--... e-iderecf pw•ibly located ln .... eat flf ·ftd !ljentta.. ra.•fble ..... , eoarM• of action at thit U. were eonela.r.ct to bl .. follow:
(a) Oaina !lei Djerena u the "bait," .Sopt ''Bait aDd a ... teettea" to eaa .. US Foree• to .,.,. into the area deacrlbed .. tift. 'J"'ata tfGDld afford the • ...., .at.. tetrain edvantapt • .
(b) Attack teTpta ..tlf.eh would havd a •l~J'lflcant ,.,cholt~Peal/pnltl• efff'ct neh a• Plellw, Pl•t Djenna, Due Co, Plet .... Thaftb ~.
(e) If US roree1 entered area, exflltrate and avoid contact airtna _.,..1he1, deeoyt, ••11 antt attack• and •tealtb.
(7) Oetober 14 - 17 1966: Friendly for-eel beca.e enp~d ln area eut of flel Djeran~ .nd the •MII'J 1ltuatton coattnued to develop alon1 the 11ne1 de.crlbed tn pa-aar•ph 2a(6), ab~.
(8) 20-29 October 1966: Stptftcant contact• wre aade on the bl&h around eatt of Plel Djeren& with up to cc.pany 111., eneay !orce1. nocu.entt and prltonert of var tden~tfted ~oe.y forcft ln con~a~~ a1 el~nt1 of tbe 958 (alto known at Song~~) Regt~nt. It vas det~r•lned that at lea1t ~battalion retnfo~d vAa locat8d in th~ ftr~a of contAct, and that thetf' unit• hltd croet8-! ~hfa Se S8n R.ivttr f~a. thf, ""'"t durtna the period 1 • 9 Oct~r 1966. Stated •l~•ton~ of t~ e~~y forc~n were to attaek P1e1 Djeren1 and allbuth US Foret!&. Du!" 1ng tht• Pf'I"lod, friendly force• Wit of the ~ San River beg~An to hllVf" lpot'Adir.: contft~t which developed into battalion tlu ene~~ey attae '- aplntt friendly ca.tp~tny/ bat tal ton baH I d11r 1n1 the hoort of dark~•• and thArp. •Ill I unit eng"~llf!ntl durtna dayltaht. Sllf11f'1cAnt, rl!latiVf' to t~ night att~tdo•, '"'"' the fact that the eneay va• tn poaitlon to attack in Appro:.:f ...... trty thlrty •lnutet to two houri after~. even thou~h frt~ndly unit• h•~ not pr~vloully uaed eneay obj~tl.-e at'~A• for bAtfll. Thl11 tttnd-: co ~~~tantt,t,. prtaoner of -.r report• thllt enf'lsy Vftl u~lnR •~11 (Approxl~trly 10 ~~r) reconnattaanee el~n~~ to obs~rV@ a~ r~port frt~ndly unltA' .av~~nt allowing ene.y aail.a. poeAiblfl t"fli\C~lon tl~, end/or t~ f!~my h~d prr
vlously wtade a reconnalsean~ for liltely areAs the US Fcrrces would occor-y. Durin8 thte period it wss d~t~r~i~d that t~ total enPmy fryrc~ c~ittr~
in t~ &n"A of ~ration d4!1Jcrtb~d in pa~agrl'\rh 21\(6) ,.h.ov~. inclwi"r ~,_.,~
to six regiMents. Ieong th~ unitR identtfi-..d V"'r-"!: 9S(P.) J.r.? p .... ~f-~.·. 635"h ~"t~t~.lion, 32d ~TVA R~!F,!.-~t. "'~d 111n untd,.ntt!'fp~ C"":!::~> 1 {,... ... , 7Y' ~-~·
IVA a.1tmet, SJd 119'A ~. 66tb IYA a.p.mt. ele.f!nta of 24(~) ".._. \ latl•nt, el-llt'a fill lith IVA le~. and el-nta of lft(B) P!VA J..t!~~_.,y..-~.
(f) ~ • 31 Oeteber 1966: Durlna tbta period en,~.-r .. " with en.~ f~• '-eTaaMCI ln ttrtenc1ty tc; Dill, IJX'!"&<He eontt''=tfl. :':r.cHeatf.wA of pGeef.ble •MUJ i80taaent to the north and tMat ~l"f! cb~r'V'f!···. but tM tne.ntlmta ef the •ne.y were not clear.
a. Plant: The brigadf! hat contln~ncy plans for the relief of CIDG c .. pt Plei He, Plei Djereng, Due Co, Dak Pek, etc. Concurrent planntna continue• for aubtequent oper-ation• 1" P~UL REVERE IV.
b. (C) Operattona:
(1) Operation PAUL MVERE II c~nced 010001 August. Thf! 3d Sria~e Tatk Foree vat deplored tn the operational area in a tactical potture reaulting fro. Operation PAUL REVER£ I. During the lattf!r part of July, contactt indicated aajor North Vi@tn~se Army fore~• verc active in the area of operation. Based on this, additional units from t~ let Air Cavalry Oivition vere •oved into the area of ~ration arid placed under operational control authority 3d Brigade Tatk Force, which was aubtequently redeaianated Tatk Forcf! WALKER. On 2 August, Task Fo~ce WALKER vat dittolved and the 3d Brigade Tatk Force came und~r the operational control authority of the l•t Air Cavalry Divl~lon. The briaade task force raaatned in thlt ttatut until termination or 0pf!ration PAUL REVERE II, 25 Auruat. A detctled chronological account of all facet' of Operation PAUL REVERE II lt provided in the after action report w~lch is appended as inclC\aure 1.
(2) aper ... tion PAUL RT.VF.RE III e~nc~d 260001 Augtut with the 30 Br11ad@ Taak ~oref! r~verttn~ fro. und~r t~ o~r~tlonal control authority o! the lat Air Cav~lry Divi~ion to I Fl~ld Fore~ Vi~~nAm. ThP itt Battallo~, 7th Cav.tlry, w~~ plftc~d und~r o~rfttion~l control nuthorlty to the 3d Br11ade Task Fore~ ft~ t~ o~rfttion Rt~rt~~. D!~poAltion of tactical unlt1 of the task fore~ ~t th~ out~~t of th- o~r~tfnn ~rP ftA
£hown on inclosure 2.
l. (: ... ~,..~.-1: D-J!'if'l~ t~tc:: r"~(.y' ':'1" borlt>,d~ tv·~·
b«der tn atnftlth .ad coatlactlna eearch and deetroy operation• durtn1 d&ylf.aht laoure. 'tan•J eont.act. althoa&h oec:urtaa on an all.oat daily buie, conaisted prJMrllJ of enipara and .-11 F'OUI'• of 1nd1Yiduale. 0.11 Ollee charta& tt. ,.rlod we a anlt of -wroz!Mt.ely platoon •u• atpt.cl. n. petten Of oparatlana eoace".t!.11'~ effort• prtaeip&lly in tM tii"N. .oath ...t ... t of DQc:·Co. Otller poef.tlotM: tJf "the area of operation-.-.. Ji.i.riodicQt.y. ...-ct.d u depte .. 41d on the -operation• ~bluttc at tnc:to.Ure ~. ·
.!· l.t latt• • 14th '1-r - '.cry: Tbe battalion, leu oc. flfl• CCIII •ny, prCHiclecl ~ .. .c itJ. for the «ipde baM eap Ytcinlty of Plelb aDd refitted fOI' aab•quent operation• fro. 26 Aupet tbraqb 1 •pt akr. Iarina thia period tile rifle cc.paniea rotated to the brtpde forwrd beNet operation. at CA!'Im and were pleced under the operational control aut~lty of let lattall~, 69th ~. to aeat1t In it& ueurtty. On 2 lept...,.r, the battalion c~need air lift• into areae of operation 36 and 44, where March operations wre conducted thrnugh .5 Sept_..r, nnltina In only ainor contacte. On 6 s.,u.ber_~~~- _
. battalion .. eonduc:ted an dr lift into~ of operatten "'5riDCI operated ----- -lll that area Until a .pteaber .without 8lpiflcant contact. After Mveral
watber clelaya the battalion lifted into area of operation 30, cloetna there on 10 Sept.-.r.
}. let Battalion, 3Stb Infantry: Froa 26 Auguat throuah 2 S.pt_,.r, tbe battalion conducted •arch operation• lnroughout period the battalion aleo prOYtded eeeurity for nvere.l "Round tJPf' operation• condaeted in that area and wot'bd in conjunction vttb CIDG 11l..ent1 therein. On 3 Sept•ber, the bat tal ton 'te11 Co.pany 8, lifted to the v.tclnitu of Plet Ml and c:onduc:ted local p&trole at th.ttt location. Co.pany ~ IIOftd to OASIS and provided eecurity for an artillery battery located thet2. On S Septe.ber, the battalion conducted air lift• into area• of ope~~tlon 48 and SS. Operation• were 1ub1oqu~ntly c:onductf'd in areal of ~ration 4ft. SS and 56 until 10 Sept~r without contact.
~· .l~t Battalion, 69th Antot~tna thia period el .. ntl .of tba Nttalioa ~ e.earlty at the bt-lpde fCIE'V&rd basE of operatlona and .tbla .CIDG ~ at Plei • and bac Co. The battalion conatituted Taak Force JIIC coastatfita W an a.r.or e<ape.ny, c:ualry troop, Mlf propelled uttllery N.tter7, an illfantry platooc. and CIDG el ... nta froa 26 Auau•t to 7 .S.ptn!xtr. !'he battalion pr.W:I\ed Hcurlty and conducted road operatna operation• alOft& a~, 19 &t.oet ·eiauy throuabout the .per1o.i. Fro. 2 to 6 leptsnt-4r, · Coapeny·c, 2d Battalion, 3Sth Infantry vaa placed under tiM opu-atioa&l control •tbority of tbe ~ battalion to aaaiat ln lta ~y aiUlons. ___ .... -· ~·
!· Tdk Pore• IUC: Tbia taak force conducted acreenlna, ~tllaaee and IIOUtlted reconnaiaaance operation• fro. 26 Aupat throqh 6 Septe.ber. Tbe ... k force operated pr1nc1pally in tbe area eouth and wn of Due Co.
------~- ··- · ~ 1· lat Battalion, 7th Cavalry: This unit vaa placed under operAtional contr.ol authority of tbe bril6de taalt force on 26 AuJuat and prot.'ded MCUrity for inatallationa at OASIS until ita releaae 29 Auauat.
8. 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry: !l ... nta of the battalion vere air lifted i•• the operatlnnal ana on 19 ~guat and the battalion e~ under the operational control authority of the 3d Brigade Taak Force on 30 Auauat. The bat tal ion eond~ted aearch and de a troy OJM"rat1ona in areaa of operation ..!1 and 22 throu1hout the period without aignifieant contact.
(b) PeriNI 11 Septnber - 27 S~pte.ber:
1. Ce~ral: TM brlgftdf' taak fore~ continued aurveUlance, •~arch and d~atroy ~ration• throughout t~ o~r~ttion~tl ar~a. The area• of operation c~rf!d were prmclattt~ to tho~tfl! of t~ prevloul ~riod, apeciffcally tiM! area south a~ @aet of Due Co and north of Highway 19 betve~n Due Co and OASIS. No aignif icant rontact VIlA d,..-~loped during the period and unite ~r~ dtapoa~d a• f.r..4i<::•t~ on inclosu&.·~ 4.
2. L&t Battalion, 14th Infantry: The battftllon cont1!T~ aearcb and d~st;oyoperulons in ar~a of operation 30 fr011t 10-16 Sept~~r. ~any C vsa placed under ~rational control authority to 1st Battalion, 69th Arw:Jr on 12 SeptetPtb@r e.nd ~uuJist,..d in securir.t.( th,. C~EC~~ compl~x ere&. With little contftct resulting frOM ~tA ~~~ti~~ in i"r"~a of o~ration 30, th~ b,l\ttl't1.1o., lift..,d to a~~l'\ c: c~r.."'.tic., tJ 0.,
17 ~ ... ..,.t~"~r vith tt-- Y"'i""'!on of de~troy~ Ill\ Viet Ccn~ i ~:.r.!!~'t~t·c~IJ'=""' !.n
area adj.cent to Rl.ihWJ 19. The bittal!on ~timed Ofl!ratf.ons f.n this area, perlodieally rotat1na. the c:c.p&ny aud~.r operational control authority to the M'llor batt-alton and aleo partlc:lpatton f.n "Round-Up" operat!'-'"B Yillqea vithl~ tbe area of cperatlon~ On 27 -September, the battalion conducted alr lift1 Into area of operation 20.
3. l•t Battalion. ·35th tnf~n~ry: The batt~lf.on waa oper&:.!.n:: in ar.a of operation 8 at tb8Dig1n;,ing of t~ ~riod and on 13 Sept811Der liOMd by helicopter 1h~o are4 of ~ration 4. T~ ._"'ttalton continued to conduct eearcb and de3troy operations !n areas of ~ration 2, 3, 4, 5, 10, 11 and 12 throughout th@ period vithout signtricant contact. CIOO eoapanles froa the CIDG e•ps ttt Due Co and Pl~f. _'Jj~r1ng_ petl.Ml,.·g,lly.-'=~~~tftd ~rat1~s in conjunction vith th~ bttttalf.on
~· 2d Battall~n. 35th Tnf~ntry: Throughout t~ period the battalion vlth operation~! COhtr~l authority for ·c Troop, Jd · Squadron, 4th Cavalry continued to provide ·~l~~!llancP along th~ bord~r. condqcted aabu5~s. and •~arch and d~~troy ~rationh ~ur1ng daylight hour• in area of ~ration 27 nnd adjacent Ar.Pft~ of or~r~t:vr~ fJ~. 19, 26, 34 and 35). Operation" during th~ pt'rl <Yf in t~ 1'\r"" rPr.•Jltrd tn
•roradtc light contact.
~ !~t Batt~lion, 69th A~o~: T~~ ~~~r h.~t
t~tlion continu-d provtdinR ,.,..curtty fC'rc•1111 for. r.r-t:~l'"''J ,.t CTT'r: ~,.., ... ~,·1-lations ond t:,.,... brlt,~d~ b~P~ of OP""'rlltior,R. t:l",_,..,...,~~ "r th" bl"~t,Uo, ~rf~d t~ vari(!ty of tlHtlo~ flluch IUJ convoy .-"cn .... t. '"'r-w·ity for f"n~fT""·"
6. 7.d B~ttAlton, Rth Infantry: Th~ bnttnlion ~onttn~d •@arch and deRtroy ~rfttionft tn ftr~AR of oprrnicn 21 nod 29 with light eneay contact.
~ lat BAttalion, 12th Infantry: On 16 s~pt .. mhPr thie unit ca..enced ~~nt into t~ ~ration~l ar~ft And b~R"" RP~rch and destroy operations in area of ~ration 36. T~ bAttalion cont1nu,.d operatlona 1D that .... without significant contact until 26 S•ptr.~~Pr wh,..n lt conducted a heliborne a•eautl into area of o~ration 44 where it o~rnt~d until th4 erd of the period.
(~} ~riod 28 Septe.b~r - 18 October:
1. ~~ral: Durlrg this period of O~t'nt ion ~MTL P.EV'f.RE III, 1~aek Force VALIXR. vaft a~i., conetitutt-c. It "'""~
c~!"""•d of the 3d Brl~"d~ T~~k Fot"c~, 25th Inftt.n':r.y Dh·!.don.
:~~ ~t<~~ r;· ~:;:~- .. ~..: ~~0:::~!~6 I~ · -.- .. -Aief,..,..,s> . . ;1 --~~-;~~-~~~-4th··.-~ Diriat. •til ti.. 2d Battalion, 8th Infatry and tM -lat l&ttal ..... .llt1a hc-tl'J• cll--tl ef t'Mk Perea WALDR tboroutbl!' .. turate4 t .. ltantt..el at"M ta the coMuet of 1urwtllaca, aNreb aod de•troy, --.h, _. Wtdd• .,aratteea. fte -~ area Wit of Due Co wa ,.rtteularly •11 ,_,.lW. ~ -IIINtlGM wn eeat.ct..S further north ad lOUth within tile -~t'IJJtl~ dla at •1 t• pnyloaaly duriq the operation. !1-nta ef tM tult _,__ . .._nd a portloa of ll .... y 19 fi"OIII Plelku eut to the Yietnlty of . .... Y-a ~· &r lfll'OitiMtelJ A WMk. De1pite the eoneentratccl aeareh afforte t ••) peRJ.tt•tb ~ _,.,._t end the period wa• not~ by it• htek of elptfteiat .,.fttaet. ·the cowrqe of the operational area c.'.orh'a the ·period !a ~epic~ ta t\e .,.retloa. 1e~ti~ at inclo1ure 5.
2. !aak Poree 3/251 Tbe let Battalion, 14th Infantry, ~ntttally operatt tn areaa of operatioft 17, 18, 19, and 20 p~icling surv•1llanee along Highway 19 and tbe borcSer area s-dlately wat of Due Co. On 9 October tbe battalion vas 11£ DOrth to aria of Operation 4 and ~rated in ~hat ~rea for the remainder of th~ period. The lat Battalion, 35th Infantry, eoncentrat~d its eurveillanc@ effort~ atone the border ft6rt~lt of Due Co,· speetftcally in areas of operation 1, 2, 3, 9 10, ·~~ 11. On l{·October, the battalion vat lifted northeant and operated in Ar~r of operation 6 and 506 through lA October. n~ ,,. l\Att" lio-n, 35th Infantry CC'~": ir") ..,rerat10M in ana of OJHlr&ticn 30 frOM 28 Sf"pt~h,.r UT'ti l 1 O<:tob,..r. Th'.' b~tt-•1 fr· th~ rf"tvrned to the brtga~e b•"'~ c""'T, ~~rf" f.t r,_ff.tt~t _,.,d tr11in"rl f"!:' fntu-r-" op.rationft.. On tO October, the batt~lion •~PitrrNLd the l!!i"''l ion of provtdin~ !H"ct:ri. ty aleng Rl1hway 19. It aeeur•d thfl higmnay until 15 Octob"'' vhen it v.:t~ r,..li~Y"'d -~ jof.n~ the lat kttalion, 35th Inf.-ntry in op•r11tionc: 1rl.thin ~trf.'.'\ of op~rt·t{C'~ 506. tlte let ~ttalfon, 22d Inf'antt'~ join~d th~ t11~\.: for .... ,. unitct ~n~ re-v~(} ir':" rr· t:~f or~ratton 6 and 7 '!1r'tth of CATf.CV.J. (''1 16 Octol:-,..r. lt r:~""\'t:t"·~ t::"r"'r·-:_.n ..... ., ~~
that ar-.• until the end of tM\ r~r-t,.,r~. ThrMJr,~o'tt th• r"'-'"~, tr .. 7.,t r"'!':t~,~ ... --. ~'lth AT'M!Or eontf.nu~ its "'i~~t!-:>!"''IIJ ~r PT<'v1"1f\tt "-.:til 1~-:--:-:- ·'"'~ 1""'''"'"' ..... c:u:"'i":~· ... ~ ct.nTYOy ftscort. 'Mte variety of t~tr.llot t'•r[o~ .. d by th1~~t ""'~t 1'-t:t" ... t"' ,..('it·"' ~~atility and eff•ctiVP.ne~~.
•~.,.._...~ ...... f~ ("of th"" or ... -·,.._,, __ _
- ----· ~·---..'
_ (3) ~Wil PAUL 1cft'lll IV -.s iftitiat.ct at U51000 O.:tober. •~ ~tlta -rma·~·fOree atDI -.. dia•ol,.. aDC! tiM Jd !riaac!a Tuk Foree wa plaCed UDder the __ oper~tlcmal control of tbe 4tb Infantry Df.Yilf.oa. 'r.ba bt lattalloo, 69th· Amor _. nl.....t frc. operational control authority t1f
3d lrl~He Tuk FOree ae4 plaeed wder the opent1on•l control authority of the 4th Infantry Dlrialon. Tbe tuk Of'llmlutiD'l of th~ 3d !ria-de Tuk Ft1!'ce •• PAIJL Jt!V!J! IV e «Mneed "" aa follt'ft:
a .. ctqu~rten , 3d Brl,tt'.!e "rask rorce Itt !attalion, l~th Infant~ 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry 2d Battalion, ~5th Inf•ntrJ 2d Jattalian, 9th Artillery C Troop, 3d Squadron, 4th C.-Yalry 34 Support Battalion (PrOY111~•1) Company D, 65th Ensineer !attalion
The area of operatioDa waa ~ed north of tJ.e prf!'V!oue operational area. The "ebeckarboard11 cGDeapt wa• ad~pt•d for the "" a!"ea. The c!iapot~itton of the 3d !risade Tatk Force elea.nt8 at the b4!!g1nn1ng of tbit op@ration waa at abown at lnclc.ure 6. Th~ brt~•d~ ta~k fore~ c~c~trated ita operational ftffortt in the arfla nort~•t ~~ ... "t of. Pi,.1. nJ"""'"'n~, al<Y.lr. Root'l 509 and nort~st of the Se S•n P.1v•r. Cont~ct ~Jri~r. t~~ ~~rty portion of tb• ~eration rang~d fr~ li~ht to ~~~r•t~ thr~,,~~ t~~ ~~riod.
(a) Pflriod l8 - 31 Octoh~r=
1. ht 1\att•liM'I, 1'-th Inhntry: Th~ batt"l1C'n op~rated initially in area of o~r~tlcn 4 and ~t-r~~ ~r~~ of op~raticn 504 on 20 October. Durin~t a ~ d-.y f"!t'lod in thifl It!'"~ of oper'-lt!o.n, th~ battalion ba~ light contact with ~~11 grou~ of ~orth Vi,.tnam~!~ Army fore~~. On 23 October eleaentt of tb~ battAlion ~·~@ cont~ct Yith the en~y in ar*A of ~ration 4 resulting in 16 I'VA KIA. Sporadic Utht contact continuf>d within the area of operation. On 25 Octob@r tlte battalion llft•d the ceenand at"oup, 4.2" MOrtar Platoon, leeonnaittance Platoon and auprortin~ artill~ry battery fr~ ar~a of operation 4 into area of ~ratlen 504. The battalion eontlnued to operate in' that area of op.ratfon with 11Rht contact thr~·~h 31 October.
2. Itt Battalion, 35th Infantry: The battalion w.e init1•1ly located ill arMa of opnatlon 6 and 506. 0:-t 1<) October th~ battaliMl lifted illto areat of op~ration 3 and ~03 and c~nccd op"r•t1on• in tho~e ~T~•~ The batt•lion continued p.trt:'l ltnv. throu~~t thf! •c:!' iP.'Tl-~ l'\!'4"ft of ~ratief' ·-"l~- 1 • f'!•"halling ita forc~s to ~fl't it" t•~~ ~"' the r""'~n- T"""-::tion fore" for. tl,,. t!f.vision. On 30 Oc:t·o~r the b4tt~l10"1 c<m~.,ct~t1 ,.. h"'U.bn~'"' """'"·'.alt into ,.n,. of ~ration 502, wb~r~ it <'T'~r"-t"d until t~"' ""'~" or: ~""· p,.i"if."d.
3. 2d ~ttalion, 3Stb Infantry: This ~it lifted 1nt~ ,."~ of. ~rl.tion 3 On 1~ Octo~r and lub.equtlntly condtt~t~d ef'~rrrh1nr. .-n-' r•t!"oll tng operatiou in a!"f'att of Opt! rat ion 3 and 503 wf. th •rt'rndic 1 ip~t contact. TP lfaxJOIEi.L, ecapoced of the battalion nconnAilsance platoun ""'1 ,. C!DG ~y, coaducted exten.iYe patrolling to t~ nort~tt in areas of o~-r~~1~-511 and 512. Durtna the last •~rat days of th~ period, the battalion M'l •rnrat eontaeta raft1i1ll fra~~ li~ht ;.to ltod~ate. Tll~k Force MCD<.?TN!LL hat! sfP'ftral eontaeta with nriou' aiae enemy f(\rces. During ita search and destroy opera tiona it diaeovered aewral ~nit ion and supply cachet.
4. C Troop, 3d Squadron, 4th Cavalry: The troop waa !nlt.ially located in the Yici~ity of Plei Djerang providing security for 8rtlllery and auppliea at that installation. Thla unit, alnus one platoon, .0Yed aouth into area of operation 3 and conducted ~nt~d reconnaissance in that area. A f.v ainiDI incidents tndicatetJ the entmy had ;..een active vi thin the area. 11M! troop ecmtinued to operate tn support of the brigade tuk force until 30 October vhen lt vu plac~d un~'!t" the operational eontrol authority of the: 4th In~antry Di~ion to aasist in route security in the area of operation.
(b) The operational report period for ninety-two consecutive daya ended with the 3d :Brigade Task Force, 25th Infantry Division under the operatimal eontrol of the 4th Infantry Dtrlaion and Operation PAUL REVERE IV cor-~tbmiD& with aporadic, but algnificant contact. The kill ratio of friendly to en-Y ... ,- lr8 or .54 friendly JCIA nnua 464 en_, Ja.A.
e. (C) Training Activitiea z
. (1). Cenerah The 3d Bripde Tuk Force Replacaaent Training ~ wu initiated 17 July. Since 1 Ausuat, a total of 1134 rep1aeeent ,."ormel haft 1uecaaafully cc.pleted the training progrm. The training, which La oraant••d on a fi.e day cycle, eGN&ence• with orientation aubjecta, progreaaes ~brouah ec.bat technique• of the individual aoldier, ... 11 unit tactiea, wapona >attleaipt firtn;, wapona f•iliariaation firlll8, and eubdnate•. in a eo-bat a.abuah patrol. The ia.t;tion preaent•d in the training progr• aaphaai••• ~actleal ~Which ta lied at aelected locations within the brigade perimeter md at the replae..-nt t nir.g range. The cCJDbat ambu1h patrol is conducted ._yond tbe eoaff.nu of the brlpde baae camp in the adj&cfmt brigade operational il'M• a.port.a fro. cemumdera of the unit• to which the nplact!l'lenta "-'" ~tm ~•floed ~eqaent to the ecmpletlon of th~lr training, attettts to the valu~ of lM trainina and orientation and itfll "'"rked 11uccess.
(2) Cadre: Th .. ~~plecem~nt D~tftc~nt Training cadre c~~ist~ r on~ officer and ten non-c~!~~ton~d office~. Thi~ c~dre is orgftnir.~d ~~ ollOV"':
...
Oporaticoal bport for Quarterly Period ~~in,~ 31 Octt:-~!' 1~~,-;, (RCS CS~-65) (U)
After aewral traill1aa C)"Cl .. of the proarta Wftre ecapleted it va~ d~!':~ d_.-~ that thla orpniaettoD ... beat aoited to proYf.de the depth and eontimlity r.qu1nu to efftci.atlJ 8Dd effeetlftlJ coe.tuct tbl nplac••t training.
(3) A tnta•• acla•iale nflectf.Da aubjecta, tiM phuu, trai,d.q ..... , ... t..tractor n.plrlmlnta ia atteeW .. ~loeun a.
•• Cllr<cala fteN wrc .• •lplficaat operati0111 CODducted wherein ela•teal -ta wn aeed. Periocllc iMpeetioaa of protectf:n ... b aupport the -..al.r•••t-"'fer proper atonp of the ... b to preclude tleterioratioll of the fllten.
•• PI!OPSt
(1) Darba C;.&-aciOD.· PAUL DVID III and tbe early portion of PAVL .,mftl'l .. ll~ IV, PSlOPS appeal• wn ·priMrilJ directed at apecifie rillagea aDd iadtriduala. ~rattDa the earr•t iDtellipnee aituation, the PSYOPS Proar- aapportecl the daily tactical operatiau to 4Htroy the Viet Cong lafraatructan. Croaa4 PBJOPS t.,.. ~ tl• PS1'WAJt aircraft ware coordinated .-ni aaecl to aappor;t t ... e UCtical operatiou. Leaflet dropt aDd around preaatatimWft CODdactecl at.ultaaeoualy.
(2) Pietal'* leafleta of retameea ad· priaooen of war wre u~~d durir iaitlal qa•ttnitla ia the Yillaae•,. rua teclmique was quite auceeasful in aataiDg tafoa.tloll fr. the ,-ople abtlut ..-.n within V1et Cong infrutructun
(3) Aircraft (U-10) IUppGrt for PAUL R!V!Il III wu only fair. Thfl Mjor probl- wen aircraft 'lftil&b111ty, laelc of tS..lineas, and bad ~ftther. Dariaa PAUL Uftii IV,. the .. jor pmbl• area wu bad 1N&tber.
(4) PB!OPS s-.-ryr
(a) PAUL ~"~ III:
1. Total •l"""lc,.r boun: 24.
2. ~..,fl,..~: 1,0.54,000.
1.5
(b) PAUL II'VDI IV I
1. TOtal apubr hoianr 6
2. LMfietat 600,000
l. btaneet 1.
f. Taetleal ·atr aupportz
(1) ltatf.atlea for Operation PAUL IIV!R! II an contained in Incloeun 1.
(2) Statiatiea fOT Operatiou PAUL I!Vn! III ad PAUL 1!VD! IV are aa followa
PAUL IIV!U III PAUL UVIU IV
Man flown U2 15
Sky srt 34 44
FAC 84
20
Trp in contact 16 11
_(a) Sky Spota wre utlll••d prbaarlly to interdict lcnovn rout•• of tnflltratlon •cl •aru• fnque!lted by _.., forcu and u reaction to clall~ Yiaual neonnaiaaanee a!a"tlnp not within artillery range.
(b) Then wu DO d{ffleulty aperleneK in obtainin1 taetieal air aupport aeept clurf.aa that period wbeft tb• antlabillty of ~tn:raft wu aewrely lflllted.
I• A'riattoaa A chap in internal func:tiou of the aviation aectton ,,~"1liAttoe wu eec-.llahed clurifta thta period. One chan~ tmolved eoaaoltclatiaa of •tat.-ce erws 1ato t•- to prOYf.de a ~pltt Mtntenance eapabf.lity at tbe brtpde forward bue of opertttona and the fix~d bua .. lnttMDCe ana. A nceecl ehr....- wa t The aection aalum•d the reapon.ib11 tty of cocmtlnatlfta aupportfnl aerial ruuppl)' alreraft for the bricad~. nte aviatftm 1aettaa abo UeuMd the rMpoMibility for broadeutirt8 artillery adrlsori•f'l o'V'8r· UBI' radio. Prior to thla, the taak wu aece-pltaiMd by •upportlnR aviation unit.~ with a poruble CGfttrol towr. A hot lin~ vu utablia~ l>fttw.tm t~ brlpcte PSI alld tt.e Matton aec!f':.ll to pua adviaory infonuttan. Tbia ayaten vol'b Will and b within the capability of the niation aection.
b. AlntO'bile operations: Tbe fcllowin8 statistics ~~ ccrtp:! i~f! duri"R the report: in1 period:
16
.. ,.._ .. _ .. _ ...... ~--~
,l·::..·~·--- ~--0~ 4 ~~ . . . . . .. - ~ ,, " ~,
s i.':-Ji-Ct: Operattc.&l lepot't for Quarterly Period too in~~ J 1 C-:t- ·- ·- l ~ . ~ CSPall-65)
'· leturDMI: 14.
(b) PAUL UVIU IVz . f
1. TOtal apubr hau ra z 6
2. Leafletet too,ooo
3. ieturM&z 1.
f. Taetteal air au~rtt
(1) Statiatiea for Op.ration PAUL Rr.vr.~r. II •r~ cont•innd in Inclowre 1.
(2) Statiaticl for OperatiOM PAUL F.!Yl':m: &II and. {)AIJL RlMtP:E IV are aa follawz
PADL 11901 III PAUL D9ID IV
Man req J3f 100
Man flown m
75
Sky srt 34 44
PAC Trp in contact 84 - 16
20 11
_(a) Sky Spot• wre uttltud p~~.rtly to interdict known roatu of taltltNttoa eacl ear-• fnqanted by _..,. foreu and aa n•ctf.on to dallJ 'ftMial.ne•.ata.-c• a!ahttap not within artillery raqe •
• f •
(tl) '!~~ere wu • d{fftealty aperleneed tn obtainina tactical atr aapport acept durtaa that period when the availability of aircraft wu • .,.Nlj -Ififtia~
I• ~toru A chen .. tr. fnterMl f1metiOM of tha aviation aection orpnuatlOil _. acc-.lubed durf,.4 thta perlod. One etwmae ilrf'OlYed a••olt'-doe ef ..tat••ce cr.~ 111t0 ~ to pronde a apltt .. intnanc• ca,abtU.tJ at the ~ forw1..t .,._. of operation• and the fixed baae ..tcti'\IDee ...... A·••c•ct e-..• war The aeeti('ft u~d the reaponatbtlity
I
of eoonHutbt aupportlq eert.al nnpplJ aircraft for tiM briaade. The aviation aeeioll aleo .... nul tM r•,.etbtlitJ for broadcutins artillery a+n.aortes .,.-nr UBP. nfto. Prior to tlda, tM tuk wu .ee~liahed b)· •upporting aviation units ..-sw•• Yltla a pore.ble eoatrol tower. A bot line wu e.atabluh~ betwten th4 brfle .. fSI _. t .. ariatt• eeetton to ,... advisory infonutt<m. -;: • .:.. ays t~ wMb wll aD4 f.a wttld.D tiMI ~bility of the ariatic:"ft aGtcttcm.
b. All'IIObtle operationat The followin~ at•t111tic8 w..n compilf'~ d•J":"~..,r
A. (U) Cener~lt Support for ccabat operations has been 1110re tbal'l adequate, ADd no Mjor probl- hrie dne1o~d. At no ttm. y,._a the taetic:al operation alpificantly affected by logiatical problems.
b. (U) Supplys Supply of the. brlpde tulc force el...nta is aec_,ltabed throaah a couinatioa of unit and aupply point distribution. lulk Claaa I .ad V aappliea w.re diatribated to briaade unita by or,anic t~portatt.l f~ tbe 3d Support Battalion (Proriatonal). Bulk Clua III aDd IIU haw been transported frc. the Pleiku Sub Area ec-and to the bri ... • fozward bue of •ntion. Clua II itea includina repair part• ~ mr~lly ~ diatributed by aupply point diatr1bution directly from Qat Ibn or netku to 3d Support: Battalicn (Pro'riaicmal). Diatribution of Clua II lt- to ltUbcmtiDate unit• ia nomally ude directly fr.w the brlaade baa• cap.
c. (U) Trn.portatiO!U
(1) The Md1• truck aquad bu ~en utilised primarily for liM haul operatiOM between Pleiku and Qui Jfbml.
(2) The liaht truck aquad baa been utiliaed for task force. troop haul, ration pick-up aDd diatributloa, and aeneral cargo d1atr1but1on.
d. (C) llaf.atnanc:e:
(1) the aew f•f.ly of radtoe hu created aerloua probl ... Oft7: a ateoded period of tiDe due to a ahort:ap of atgnal repair parta.· Altboup tbl abort•• of atpal parta 11nd ClOtiPC'Mfttl preclud.c! the attaiTJMnt of an aeceptable operational readt• ... ·atatua cfur1c& the early Y@e!:.s of thb period, ·lnereaed ..,U.f.• by lat to« eo-sand on repair p~rta delivery hat coaaf.derebly ~ro.-4 the af.tuation in the latter pa~t of tbe ~riod.
(2) Altbough ~ro-.-.ent hafll b~~ tUdt.. since tM le.!tt p~riod, tlM ~tr of fin control in•trmtfltt" continu~d to b• ,. probl~. AJtt in th~ C"-'<1'"
of •irnal f.t ... , the prt-ary difficulty w.s non-ftvail~btlity of r~~-ir pArt~.
*Car80 (tonnage) 1rU based em 1000 ~d1 ~r mn I"Orti~ l'!'t:! 7('01) ~-,un~l'! rr--C'R 47 Iortie. All artillttry b~tt~ry lifts arto t~t,.t!"~tic~l!; r<-ror.t,.1 ,.. c,. ... _r-""
~"·
,....,......~·-·~-··-·-'
._, A9DC..C.cP 4 ~ber 1966 SUIJIC!'a O,.ntteed laport for q..arterly hrtod IDdina 31 October 1966
(aCS CSPOI-65) (U) .. ,
•• (C) .. i,...tr Dart .. th fi:-at quarter of 'T 67, intufficle.t m nEt. tiltn ncei9M to ~late a 1001 replac-.nt of Ml4 rif1• ta t .. ••• of c_..t troopa M b.t been planned.
f. (V) CoMtnc:tf.oar
(1) lae c., COMt~tloe tDCruaed abarply u the rain atappecl _.. tiM Mil dried oat. llld.-,.nMneat ••• balb, troop btlleta, Mid offlcee an JftHIItlJ aatler eo.tnc:tion.
(2) eoa.tructtoa of the apprOYed central water aupply for Pletku area la alated to atart clurtna tiM ••cond quarter FY 67.
(3) !he iutallatloa ad operation of a aecoad 100 IV aeaerator baa ,reat1y t.prO?ed the c.atral power .upply within the briaact• beH c., area.
(4) Aft lee pleat la naerina c~letlon within the brlaad• base ~ and ia expected to-W ia-~ration by the end of lifove.ber. Thil plat wtll be operatH by PleUaa Sub Area tc.und for all troopt ln the fsnedlate area, but the 3d Briaade, 25th Infantry Divioion will be the .. Jor uaer.
I• (U) Stat1at1ea for tha period 1 Auguit to Jl October:
(c) C ration~: 324,000 ~~~le. Tt')tal 1, 440, 720 t.1eal".
5. CIVIL AFFAIRS:
a. Civic actions ~re conducteo tbrou~hou~ Pleiku Province duriQg PAUL R!VDE Ill and IV. Major emphasis t'""'s placed on "Round Up" type operationa. The brigftde'a civic action teftms worked with military lntelliaence peraonnel, PSYOPS around teams, PSYWAR ~ircr~ft, Pleiku Sector liaison te .. s, and infantry unita in eupport of tactical ~~eration.
b. Wbenaer possible, CVM repre•entation acca.ranied CA/PSYO'P'S t ... s into raaote areas. In aany of theM •tllagea, the Thanh An District Chief bro-.ht the GVN taqe to the Montqnard trlbe•en for the first time.
c. Civil affairs •~ary:
(1) 3000 (+) received •tdical treatment.
(2) Public worka pcojecta:
(a) A Montagnard aehool houAe fa being built vicinity Thanh An Diatrlct.
(b) .Two apltlw.y• were eon~tructed.
(3) '00 (+) civilian laborers ~re hired.
(4) Food, clothlnR, a~d blMnk~t mAt~rlal ~re distributed to the needy.
(S) Coordination ~~ ~d~ far operRtions with the National Pollee.
(6) Extensive c~ur.{cations/PSYOPS programs were conducted.
(7) Band c~n~~~t~ ~re conduct~d for HontAgnnrds.
6. {C) PERS~L:
"· (U) G-:on.,.t"~ 1:
J.O
AVDC.C-OP. 4 Jllovtaber 1966 SUIJ!Ct1 · ~atlOraal t~t for Qa.rter1J Period ladi• 31 October 1966
(tcS CSPal-65) (U)
(1) 1be attact.•t of the lat Bat tal ion, 69th Azwor, to the 4th Iafaatr)' Di•i•loa Oil 18 October 1966, effected a nb•tantial cleereaM iD the kfaade .tr .. th.
(2} !tae 40th IDfaatry natooD (Scout Dogj, couieting of 1 officu ancl 26 nliated ~~en, •• attadaecl to the brigade on 7 Sept.-ber 1966.
b. (C) Unit atrqthr
(1) ~ of 31 Octobu, the •treoathl of the uni ... l of the talk force were •• follow.:
UIIT AIJTR ATCH ASG Pv.:4 A'l'CH ~f - - - -C'lfl vo IN . C1fP w 1M C1tl wo IH orr w - - - -d Ide Tr 34 9 240 1~ 3 233 .54 8 462 so 8 nf 37 2 790 0 0 0 43 1 860 42 1 nf 37 2 790 & 0 0 41 2 815 40 2 nf 37 2 790 c 0 0 40 2 853 39 1 ty 38 3 4.52 0 0 0 47 2 514 45 2 3/4 Cav 5 0 179 0 0 0 5 0 183 5 0
(2) The talk foree strength fluctuated daily during thil'l period· '11le fo11ovi~ are ~eriodie strength fiKures:
A~t.r.)T
ASSIGM!D PRESF:NT FOR DVTY
DA'I! orr wo EM OF1" wo EM
S Aug 244 21 4848 223 15 4152 12 Aug 250 21 491J 230 16 4329 19 Aug 259 21 4883 232 15 4313 26 Aug 265 2C 4886 253 17 4325 31 A1.tg 280 19 4914 252 16 !,33!3
EM
433 779 763 803 481 177 212 148 70
101 23 4
3994
... . .. .- .-··-.\·· ..-~1IT:ll
(1) !be att.chr•t of the lat Battalion, 69th Armor, tn the 4th lafutry D1via101l 011 18 October 1966, effected a aubatantial deereaM ta tlae brqac!e atr .. th.
(2} fbe 40th Infantry Platoon (Scout Dogj, consisting of 1 offieK and 26 enltated IMil, wa attached to the brigade on 7 Sept~!'"" 1966.
b. (C) Unit atrenathr
(1) As of 31 Octob&r, the strengths of the uni-s of the taak force were as foll~:
UNIT Atml ATCH ASG PL';.; A~H - --OFF WO EM OF1 wo EK OFF WO Eli orr
. (7) On 26 Octv~r 1966, the USARV Patient Casu~l Company ••• activated. Thi1 helped con•iderably by reducing the brlg•de'A asalgned strength by the number of per"onn~1 in in-country hospitals. A total of 358 personnel ~re drop~d effectlv~ 26 Octo~r 1966.
(8) This h~adquarter8 publis~d R~Rulation Num~r JJ5-2 Oft the OO~UCt o( quarterly .Uiter formation. Th~ NUAter report Compl.6·4fd with the unf.t morning report should a!utf.!'lt f.nneasurably in pro.otlng accurate stP~Rth accounting.
co.aand.
(1) H8il:
$1,533,677.81.
.. ...
(2)
.2·
J. R A R:
S.~bvs CJ+...h, 14th, 20th and 25th.
Octobert 5th, !th, 13th, 18th and 26t.h.
(,.) ~.llo~tions 1l}'Pett to be 8dequate and are dcfini toly & poalt~ ~rale factor.
Air 1+.1 ti vi th "V" Dm.=o /t.1"f""Y Co-"'""' J 'l t 1 on t4'-J "1 A!'T"'Y Cct--"'JY.l"-t!ion ~n.l vf_ t,; '"!"' D""~C" Pron~~ S~"-.r
~ft s~ vith "V" DAvie" 111cn or Ketri t ""o]~jnre H""':ln1
/1 ~ TT'"";' .. . :~' ·.,.
;.o 1.3
1 (,
0 11 rr., 1 0 .., _.)
0
~~,_........_,.., s;r;r_r~""' ·'
l~) rJ J5 52
l 1 ')f" '- .. ) ?]~~
~0 J2 .,.., 1:~ ... /'-_, ~-'' - I
.... 1 ,_ '"'
,... ,_ 1('\ ' '
n "
~J
,.~~-~ 4 rc~:l~."'9r 1966 f~:a:tE~z Opera~icmal. &tport tor Qwt.rter]J" Period !rxl~ 31 October 1966
(R:S CSP'Oa-65) (U)
(1) V11.h ~el v14e~ diapereed it is ~uen ditticult to p.rm14e oc.plete ~llaiou ocm.race. ~l.Ns, the chat~la1na b.l"" ~17 O'NtMIJ W.. obetacle and t:be relJ«1oua Hr't'ices have been ~ tbl!l.a.q.te.
- . . ·(2) !he Ub1t chaplains -.de JUN~WI trips to V1e1 t brigade hoep1tal1sed peremrtel.
(3) Jevlah pereoDDel ill1"e ginn an opportunity to attend Ic. Iipper slrrlou in lila fraDg. ,
I•. BemUetwntz
(l) !he hil.:h reenl.ist.mt rate in the llrigade is a positiw 1Ddioat1on ot tbe high mral.e vhich prec!alinates this unit.
(2) Reenlistments:
Lut Prior Serrl.oe R.l (Cftl"ee:..) r..st Prior Serri.ce wt Prior Service AUS
7. J.RfiLI.IRY I
TOI'AL
PERCENTAGE
.AIXjUST
l2 1
..2 15 28%
10 9
...2 21
33%
pcTORlljR
9 11 ..l 21 25%
a. ?J! Battalion, 9th Art11l.ery oontinued as the direct support artillery battalion tor the brigflde. The brigade vas supported bjr additiooal utillerr u indicated in paregrr..pb ld, above.
b. During +.he period 1 August to 18 October an aerial obeerver 1IU a1rborDe ec.ntiDowlly during ill flyable daylight bount. 'l'his vas emtailed eubeequent to that date bec&Uf!e of tbft ~uetioc ot airera...~ lU,~ts.
C. Counteftlortar ndar VI!UI e111plo;"fJd. throughout the period, but there 1M1"'8 no reported eDei!Y mort.n- incidents vithin range of the radar.
d. l.nten-og&tion ~port~! 1\ttf.tot to tbflt fl'f.r~ctivenese of interdiction tiree. !beB& t'irf'e ~ phn7'Ad in conjunction \lith the brigndo S2 and wre bttu.d on e-.ll'Tnnt irtt-,111.g~c~/1nfo~'ltion.
8. DGIID'J!R:
a. Cot'!~ D, 65-th :P"'R,'in(' ... !" p.,_tt"tlicn cc.,ti...'7t~"'~ in f7"""1"'r-:!l fn.:f'?"rt Of tbe t~slc fore-!~ J:"'"., .. '"5t::!~J':'~ t"':!'PJX'!"t 1:-ot."l. in t~ ... "'-'"""' 0~ O!'"~t.:_c:"' ,._ .... 'i ~.t Hr..,1,_ b-tl'llq (".,-'0.
.-.r ,. - ...
ArC-c-OP ~~:!'-';!:
/ 4 l'~'y)r 191·t.~ ~ratioM.l. &-port tor Qut\rl.el"ly Period EOCing .31 Octob<9r 19,...r1 ( RCS CS10ll-65) ( U)
b. (C) 0penltione:
(1) Pllm8: The c~pmy vill continue to provid() engin~pr 8Upport both in the area of open. tion am btee c~. ·
(2) Snp~ in the area of operation consisted of bunker deetru'!tion, Em, aseieting in pntpu!ltion of defent!i ve perimetere, clearing landing 1onee and other gene1"al engineer support. Tvo combat engineer eqwJde are normally employed vi tb each courni tted aneuver ~ttlllion.
(3) Briga.df.. b~ee oamp support included the conetruction of eeai-penaancmt buildinge tor the ~ade; i.e., .esshalls, billete and he~ quarters. This work 1• bQing dor:.e on a self-help bulie vi tb engineer teclmioal. uaietance. Larout, siting, ~ concrete work is being done by tbe engiDHr Oa.paD7. Mater1ala tar Tert10al construction 1a prefabrioa ted b7 the engineer ooapanr tor the using tm1 t.
c. (C) Logistics:
(1) Md..nten&nce of. 5 ton bridge trucks, Ml39, became a Mintenanoe problem because ot a fthortege or repsir parts. Authorization to cannibalize one truck to remove others tram deadline pnn"ided short term relief.
(2) Mater18le for brigltde base camp construction are nov receim trom both Pleiku Sub Area COftllland (PSAC) and let U>gie+.ioal ConiM.m in Qui Mhon. Prior ":.a opening of tbe Class IV yard at PSAC, all uterials ve~ hauled from Qui lfhon to t.he l-'r'gade ~eo clmlp by this eompmy.
(3) The Bridge Pl,.toon or the engineer company h'lrt been used a great deal tor tranrtportine ~ruppliee and pen.onnel.
(4) Jlo Mjor logisticA probl~A, directly affecting th11 qineer ca&pmy, vere noW e-,:c,..pt t~ ~borl-".C:~ "nd d:lff1C1Jlty of receiving eonetructi~ ~qui~nt. H~~qu~rt,..r~, J~t Lo~istical Comm~nd is knovledgea~le or this probl~.
. . · •r1a1 n oeRPJR•s lJA'\iA'l'I<IEi •Ill fttPf&'IWI!lWOIIS
Pa-rt I: Chtervation (Les80DS Learned) (C)
1. (C) Per-..OIO•lz
a. · lHir Na1ntain1ng Current Indirlclual DA Form 41, Record of -18!1'7 Dattt.
Dilgpyicm t 01 maeroua oocasions, proeptl,- subrl t ted and wll oc.poeed letters at l)&pathy han been returned by USARV because admaeee 011 letter - contrary to intorMtion oontained on dece&sed eerrlo• n'e DA 1'01'11 U, Record or !llergenc:r D&ta. Regardless of intormtiOD OODt..1Md 1D ~recorda, 1Dtor~~at1on obtained from personal aoquaintaDoe vith deceaMd serrlc-.n, or intol'IIIJ.tion of specific circumstano., US&RV v.Ul DOt forward letter to sarrl.TOrs unless name and addres!! ot DeXt at tin 18 mcUX as stated 011 their copy ot DA Form 41.
<l.wec qt1cm: ~ nc!ere 1111st ensure that the iDdividual 's DA Fora 41 is kept aurrent ·aDd that all letters or fii'11ZIP!tlly eonfol'l! 8Jllctl.y to t.be data oontainecS therein.
b. It;w: llature or wound.
Pifguaricm: C&sualty reports renecting inacCU1"8te information in the "nature ot votmds" entry have e&ueed considerable contusion wen letters or .,..tby llDd a\IU'ds have been vr1 ttel'). Commanders \lbo ha't"8 penonal knovledge or ex~tctly how their men ver., killed have righttully refwled to OOIIpi'OIIlise tboir flCeotmt or the injury to conform vi th m inaccurate oasual.ty rerort. The brig11de casualty reporting team takes their int~tion traa dootot"e lo~tftd in the brig~tde clearing station. A ..Ul ~ vorll'Jd lillY AJZPettt to be f1 gunehot WOt}'ld • Chly if th~ Md1o 011 the spot indioetes llh~tt type wound it is, vill the doctor be able to oonlirB it.
~rut10D: ComPflllY ~tidftlfJn must t~t'k" ~at care to eneu~ t.Mt it• 14 dlagnoais) or DD Fora 1300. US Fi,.ld M--dic~tl Card, 8 :.tnchoo to evacuee clefll"ly indioa.tes ~tppropri~tte injury, 1.,. •• "GS" or "FRAG". All doctors ADd O&S'Wll ty reporting ~~:mnnel 8bould t~tke th~ timo nfl!ceAsary to read this card before 11.8kinr; ~tn arTC'-:-•'JtHIJ ftnd irn-voc8ble entry on the official oasual ty report.
StiB.TE::r1 Operaticmal Report tor~~ Period Ending 31 October 19M (~S~) (U)
hi ta b.r he&Tf. artUlerr or hea1'1 bmlbe. Destruction or theee bunk ere aro tunnel.a ie a taat tor llhich the ~ tM81ble eolution is the expert u~ o! d.ali ticma.
tlesz:rat1mJ A sret- prorlding mx:1mum destroet1on per unit or exploaifta 18 lftJtioUl.y portra:red belov:
AVD()-()..(p 4 llcrraRber 1966 SU&Jmt OpefttiODal Report tr.r Quarter~ Period lnd1J\: 31 October 1966
(~ CSP(&.6S) (U)
b. Dat Jlten1 tar pUot~ to identity t~ locatiOIUI to friendly unit. 1Jider hM't'J -. 'H canopy.
Piema••~-c: Inrantry units are frequently required to operate 1n ueu eere the tree oanoP11S extrem!'l.y dense. They are often reQUired to aal't their locations tor aircraft fiying OV.!rhead to reeeift artillerr tire support, tactical air support, air-dropped resupply, or na'ficational assist&nce. The fmlOlce genented !rom smoke ffrenad~e CUlTtmt~ issued often tails to penetrate the CH%10py or, wen it doee Pftnetrate, hfls tre':)Uentl.y driftfltd vi th the vind from the point wberf" it
"'"'' acti wt8d •
Qb~emtion: A pyrot~~ic devi~ ,..S,1 eh prcduce!l colored 11t0lce and also propels the etnokf' upvnrd •hould t'4' ~-~n available for issue. Consideration should be given t.o cwir~ th,. ~r-9 ft~ the launcher.
c. .lis: Field expooien~ u~~~~ of Cl"Y'"'~.,._ ~"ln•e to ~lear LZ.
:Oiaewtaion: \rlhen an inf~ntry ~ny nP.fllde to exp&nd a l.Mding mone and dooe :1ot h:1ve pro~r d~olit1<m~ rf'ttdlly a'V8illlble, A
properly pll'.ced. Cl~ore 1-f..in~ vill quicldy ttT'!rl ,.ffA~t ively de~ troy A tree trunlc. By pl19.Cing th_, mine at;~tint-t th"' t~~ "~ if t.h" ~,ree \lA!") th~ enemy Md then securing the m1.n~ 1'1?,-'linst tb., t~,. u~inss tne cnrryine ca!:lo, t.M mine vill blov dovn a tre~ t'r•o to t\ll~V'fll inch"~ in dit>..m~ter.
~e~tiQ.n: CltcymoM M1ne~ are a good E'"tl"ere~ncy sub!!ti tut~ tor C4 vben treee must ~ felled to cle'-!.:r 1!\ lP.ndi nr: ~onn.
d. ~: Punrui t.
Di"cmeaion: Wh"n pnrnninP: 1:VA am VC ,...lr"!'"'nt~ in th,... h5.r,hlande, it bae been noted thl!lt tb~ PnP"!J" oftf"n rA.pirHy dionrpPnr~ eVE'!l in dene" undergrovth. Sub!.'lequA.nt IJTN\ "'"'lTCh ort~n r"""""-ls trn.il~ th.'"l t. ~tllo~ the fm""'Y r'lp1d mov~m,.nt,. On on" orr.n.n1(m, " plnt00n WH, '"hlP tc r.:ove back t.o ite base 1n 40 m1nut~~ lTJ 11 tr'lll ov~r n. dietn.nc'-~ that had required three houre 1olh"n movin~ cro~g count.1--y.
tbsomtion: Wh~n th" NVA b~nk cont'lct. nnd dis'ln'N:tr ~ loo'k tor poesible trails on vhicb to f'tlMU"; pur~11i t Phould be ex~cuted ...rlth ee.ution 1llen using prominent traile vi th l!lliximum PT.!Ipbn.sis on security ~~~~tru.:res to preclude wlki.n.c:r into rm 111tnbuf1h.
. lbm'.z:m.t-lto.: To llWid eon.ru~ the bout1d~ ~ mdtl'l liT' · tM fire ~tlort l.iJM tdloold be one tmd t.be ~-
JH _..,. : It 1.8 arten aeee.-ary to nre art1l.Jar.r extt&kll7 cleat to ~ Uldte (50-100 aeters).. Durmg 111q nrmg to .L--ecoil or u.e wapm, .,..,. )XJirt MJiplamasJt; or ~ at tra1la -.;, ca se the DIIJ'Gl to be a hw ldh aat f4 lq. !Ide cH.f't'mence am ~ ~ boops when el!OFI! iD firlDg ~ reqa1J'ed.
JIMx •aU•= A tecfwdqne 1IIMC! 1lhMl ~ nrmg u proY.f.dsl, 1a to~ eiMd: u. 1a;r or ..m p1ece 111th the a1-'• cdrcle ..t n-lq tllaiDvJ.t.-r 1f' IIGa!IIINt)'. ~ firlDg t.ht. 1a ~ plffllw! b.r GR]]f..r; CJUt Gilt pleoe at & t1Jie, ehed:i~ it, ftt-~ it ~.ana oant1md. em to tha aarl ~-
J. (C)~:
•• ~ 106 mn. -~ semmg.
IHa• dga• !Jill hll.llJrt1c dlrmreter.!Jrtie ditt'SftiiD08 bet:.n~ t.ll5 bl1J. 11114 ti'WMir d Fdti.on M.etate tbrt the ~ 0. ~ to ~ ane ar tiM oUMr. ~ l~ 'lllho OOitti~Uy ftnt ~~ aaunn1tim """al" tllfl'tab1JIJil t.be1r hlttl~ .,..., wtUt ~ ..m. ~ ~ ao JY't wwJ,- fin tnw.r ~d ~"UJII'I ~ b\ttl~ lrlln"' vUlt bill - a;ftftm. tb1JI JMft ~ ,.,.,1~ :ht t.h:{, ~~f''fl J""Ppl.Ac:P!I!<IIlt
romd 1D the pradld.ti)" ot tbe target. fi)at individuals are oapnble or .ul:ai tti.Dg nbMquat tire requests.
QwtrAUon: The e~atts ot tile initial tire request should be streuec1 in bu:io and at!ftnoed individual tndn1.ng to oYe:roome tbis ahortoc:.iDg.
c. 1.f8: Grelr!a.ier training in the tiring ot the IM576 round.
Pilgua•' m: Dle silht on· the Pf79 vas not decigned to .fire the JK576 abotcun round.
CJwnat;1mu Orenadiers should undergo a twliarization t:\~ program tor tbe !.iring of 1'fl9 vith the shotgun round.
4. (C) Intell1 genee:
a. lts: lnflli!IY obeerration of friendly units.
Diamaigp: P~I!Jonere or war :t>eported that they maintained contact vi th fri.-ndly forces through uee of reconnaisannco unite which reporW location, d i..J:"t'ction of mo~ent, a.nd e~rength to higher hoadquartere. These ~conruds11umee unite a.llegoo1s- ropor~ by both land line fUld radio to higher beadqu~rs. Theil- "mod,~l! operandi" ~ ..1cluded es~bliebet! outpoi!Jts/list,ening poste or ft.ctttlllly i'ollov:f.n6 wrl te. The en~ Ull~ or tb&se element-8 could explAin in p!lrt hov th.q enf'lfi'IY ""'·" l'lble to att.~J.clc triend.ly po~itions vlthin thirty m.inuteB to tvo bou.nt af~r ~ vitb up to battalion size etMngtbR. Theb~ f'n~'f ~conn~tie~~nc.,
J"ltrol", pltu~ e~ p~pu"1ition of th" bflttlll'fl~ld And knovlA(],::.q of th~ t,..r:N\1n, wuld h'!V'fll nllOVf)d th111 "'"P"'!Y to rottici~t.f" """"!"' fri">J~~l.'"t'" fore(\~ \ll:'lt.lld nt:Jtnd dovn for t.h_, nlr,l-Jt.. Th" ~TI""'S C'JU)d t.h"!"l po~itlon h:tm~~J.r fer f\!1 ~~!+.tRc1c.
,at.a_t:~rru.icm: tJ3 }"'-'r~,,m.,~J l'lhoulcJ ~ nppr·-drtC~d of thl ~ Pn"'~ t,.,_~t.1e ~tnd tbo M""'Y' fll Pthili ty to ('"p1t,'tl1."1n on th~ inf(1Jil'l'lti ('., r:•d !1"{1.
op-NI.mi" !ruch a" th" utlli~n.t.ion of nt."'Y ~hind fc:-rc,..., to ,. ... r-, ... '1, Y'Y"~~-"~
U".....-J •
b. ~: Th"" ~tio of ,....,r-y KIA (rr,) •.,.., V'\ .. ';"":',...., f'"t'~'T-....,~ r·,,-,.,~
PATJL ftPJI:Y-.'"1'!"'~-... IV bJ!e bMr. n~--.rly 1:1.
P!.c~!d,.cn: PMtt ~i('.,cn h.'\n ,hcvn th'lt. n. ,;cxxl 1-ody count. to """·pan~ ~ptured ntio ~" J: 1. It iA Mli,..V'f"":l t.hott tb~ .faV'OMblt> ill'!f'1"1'7....,.,t or thifll t"fttio C'tTl 0., "t.trlbut.N:l to tvo prl1'1l'U'Y C,UI"~~. Fir!'lt. ll!.p~T"''"'~ .. ~-"""' ptt1""'!1i t by frifltT'Idl.y forcn~~t m•in~ .fil""" A.nd trl!\n(\11"\""t'!' vhj ch rrt:'c)n~-'1 t"'"' ~,...,- t'rn1t r-.lt:i"P: , tho,-.ouph jC'Ib of MttJ(\fi~lcl ~ .. ,:t t.t~-tt.10~. r: . .-~"'""1, ._,_,"' influx of l,_"""J': ... m_,..,...._,..,. t:'f r~Pl""~""nt.!"' 1"'1'\."' 1...,. l'"''='"..-_T'"': ,~ ,.r, - .. ~...... ,.rr~~t M t,,r~ r1"' "'"1 ;"] i !!"' ~ t.l, i., ,. n-y U',-1 t.r-.
AVDC-0-CP 4 lovember 1966 ~ \ StJBJ!m': 0perat10Ml Report tor ~rl-7 Period Ending 31 October 1966 0{'
(RlS csrca-65) (U)
AwonatiAP: This intorM.tion ahould be -.de available to oo.andera and oonaidered as an it. tor exploration in PSYOPS.
c. .Dta: Viet Cong inrraatructllr';.
DiaQWJaign: The aigniticant lack or Rorth Vietnamese Army contact during portions or this pnriod afforded ecwnandere or US Forces the opportunity to OOIIDit torces to destror the Viet Cong intrastructure tor the first time. The 1n1 tiation or operations against the Viet Cong inrraatruoture is difficult tor several reasons: There is little information/intelligence uintained by ARVN from \drlch US Forces can get a good start J this is umerstandable since 1 t is ditticul t to penetrate the Viet Cong int:raatructure.
<lmomt1QD: The problem or attacking the inf'rastructure has to be approached on a long range basis and as a joint effort wit. both ARVN and lE Forces participation. The lE Forces should be used to suppress overt guerrilla activities, wile the ARVll concentrates on the collection ot necessar.y 08 information to root out the Viet Cang.
d. .Ita: M!lps.
Diacwssion: Battalions have been unillg both th8 standard 1:50,000 topographic maps and the nev 1:25,000 pictomJJ.ps. It has been found that it onl.y one IMP is used, t.~ 1:50,000 map is the best. Bovever, wen using ~ pietomaps as a 8Uf•plement to the 1:50,000 map, many details or the terrain are brought out which definitely aid the man on the ground in determining his location. It should be pointed out that the new 1:50,000 11111p series incorporate some of the faults of the old serie!!l. The terrain in mountaino!ls, heavily junglAd l'l.Tf\as is o:t~n V8gllely depicted. Prominent ridg~tl, ravines~ etre'l!!'ls, etc. are found on the ground which do not appear t "\ the maps. This oometimes mnkos for difficult land navigation.
C!>servation: Junior le,.ders should bn appraised of tb')s~ f~tcts.
5. (C) Logistic~:
a. .It.ma. Use of th~ 250 gru.lon rubb~r vtt~r drum.
~..c:u!'~: Thf:>~') dl:"lJ"l~ a~ ~line ~-o"d"d t.o for;..~rd LZ. 'fh_, MP.rll"'Um CI!J>"lCi ty that ''"'-Y ~ C-'\rrif'ld by R HlJ-lT) sircrrtft 1~ 1~5 p;n}Jt.:'n!:'. T~ Lhf!l C"\1~ is lov, tho Iro-lD "'ircr~:t-. P"" dii:'fjcnlt; c.,~-~~-: +.~n .r;lin~ lo!!?d'-'d d:rt.tm Mcaune tb" R.irc!"f>_ft i~ not. r>~J.n t,,., c"'-~r:-u_r ._.: 4
Aft it 1.8 eu111' brobm ad ..._ ~ eaail7 l.oflt. Four 'Yfttel:' ~ aro ~to 1app0rt the fatr tQ~t•les at each battalion.
0 •tat:1m: ~ 8hoald DOt b UlMd 1lhen the eeiJj_rw ~ :'I.DV. ro -..ate u.t all ater ill tbe cbua ill ued, a hoiltt emuld be 0011!1~• tlater c.- -.t be npfdl7 tmdlabl.e far use -.a wathar oonSStfoM Jhc].D!e U. ._ ot the •ter draa.
P'rn...Sa~: Vater .~••latee in the frcmt sight. It not r• :Pf .. , it v.lll oaue the ~ to rut aD! beOCIIe inoperable.
C • lf'aJ Celltral.1sed emtrol Of n1a tioo eection p8l"'BODDel ftDd Mi.Dteamoe PM<*!a:t•.
Dilggaaiql: Io!Wlly a crev-c.hier ill nssigned per aircraft ad .. Man1C8 1 helpe:-e U88d in general anpport or the aection. The crevchiet rwe1ne4 vitll his drcntf't l~Mther 1n the finld or 1n the rear area. Problas .experhooed vith this organization \Mre:
(1) Inability to uae Cl"8V-c.hiefs for irurpecticin or other
(2) Crc-.: rotation betwen the field wrl..nten.e.nce baBe and the forward baee ot operation VIIS bftsed upon aircraft avail.abili ty &nd led to an incoDeietent Mplo;J~~M~t ot enN-ehiefa.
(3) !he tra1n1.ng or weclumi eft' helpere Vtlft hlpomJible since qualltied crev-chiets wre not l'Mdi]7 aft!Jable.
ConsoWaticm ot lll!dntfm.ftne8 .crevB into t.,hn)e 8epro:ste temae llllevin~ t.lde. QM qualified ~teclvmic 8~ vi th tvo ~chnn:tee' belJ>"Tn dRY a.fttlr dalr psnli tting oontinni ty in their tn1 nj ng. The Byl'tem. or tvo tmmn IIJ)eC1alis1Dc in iDterlledia~ irurpe eti~, 11M onn apecin.li~ 1nr. in J)f:'ri odic iupeotiou, iapro•ed imrpeetion qwU..i~. Personnel are rot.atoo eys~ . atical.l7. An additimal product or this system YruJ too ~titivo spirit ~fm the te.s.
1bto.tnst1sm: Tb"' re~ t~ ~ vortby of coDnid~ratic"l ror ~td~¢1on in other «Tiation a~cti~.
~ ,.. .... ---.----· .... "
~ ..
Dtez 3 1m: !he IIC'I ratiae&1 are \ioo bwf7 tor tiM :IDdi"f'i~ 80ldicr to oaft7 Clll patrols lutbr \110 ar -.roe~. !h:la 1a ~ tn. lMle ~ b. ~tdiWJU ~. Dte probl.-. 1a ~~- by the edYII Ill ot t.p&rature aft! the .S.aitf' ot tiM~ oaftr .. Wll..":r.wtima of me -.1 per cJq of II(:• fttiODa JMs DtJt ~f'P!l Mtift!'&ct..ory ft't.nM
thia !-.p-inw tlM PM'f'onMmOtl or th. iMirldnf!t.l ~1" a '" ~tr. ~rtc-1 olc::Jr\!er. OM ~ ntion 1111 ~ S!V.l ~d~ ~ro.fti'Xf_,.t·t~ !'oo-:1 tr:"!" two IMI'l tcxr- a~M ~ Jmd ... ~ ~d~~T 1~,~ t.Mn tV> ttc~ ~.tl~ · ..u.s.
~tJ.m: I~ ~ 1w.tl~~Jt:tl' ~tim~ a.., ll t!Ub"titut-, iw- tvo "C" ration~~~ """'-lld ~t.ly rw!v.., th~ ~~t f'fl't{'h i.MiTldu.U tiOQ}d b8 ~ to MTI) for ~-"'~ OP"'~.t.~_{""''t.
e. .lHft: llie-rht-.. t~ M~~ or ,anch.-,r bolts ~~r U!'._ in bni Jd:h~ cmetruction.
PJ,m:mtsipn: Dttring thft OOM~rue+,fon of OOildinp in tM brigade bMe a.p, a e~ or Meh<>r bolU! V'\~ experifl\!1~. ~ anc"'o:rbo1t, l6Moh is 1l8ed to ~TWVtt borlt~ontJ.~ di~pl~t~~t or build~ dur~ tmrl . ..rter et"ftotion, w~ t11.2~hiOTWJ ~ ~tl'\1 t"''lt't fouTY.l in tbfl 105~. bovltt· .... ~ -mrltion ~8. ~~f\ MS ~ cut in e in'lh le~~~ Md bt'Wded in rn."b eon~t~.
rrobetitute.
6. Ot:.Mr:
D1aquaa1QR: To provid8 t~J~ ftnd ac~t~ info~~tion, spot reports as input tor D~MJ ~ or ~ brigl!rl't Utr!lc !oro" aoti Ti tieet, •reporters• are req-:.ired at the battalion leru. ~" indiTidt.ale can be d"fMr'rlng rin~ \lbo ~ e~rftd aix aonths in that oapaoit,. and han a vriting ability. These representatins 110nitor their respective unit's aotidties aDd 1Dsure oc.prehenein reporting or all items or n~\11P 11lt6rest.
<Jvermticm: Thie f!T!It81l or reporting VIle 1JI\pl"""nt8d ftDd ha,e proten ~or to previous MthodS or ~port~ ite~~tl!l of novs in~r-tt'lt.
~: Th~ clMning rod nhould be "e~ to tb,., h"'.nd gum of t,bQ Kl.6 r1fle. This providen Mf!Y ftC~es when need('(] and m.iniaiSN the ohanoes Dt d-.ge •
Part n, ~tiotla lteo4 cum. the obeenationa noted in Part 1, Section II abcve, be
OODaiderecl appropriate.
JAMES G. SHAR.AHAN Co10De2 , Inrantr,y C<wtanding
• ~n«r1 w/ t/. · . 1 - Coabat Operations Arter Action Report tor Period 1 August through
2S .lug\.lat 1966 2 - Diapoeiti011 ot Task Force Uaita PAUL REVERE IIJ ;t;t> August 1966 3 - Operatima ScMutio PAUL RKvERt III Period 26 August - 10 September 4- Operati01111 &m.latio PAUL R!VIRE III Period 11 - 'Z1 September 5 - Operatiaaa Sob-tic PAUL RXVERE III Period 28 September - 18 October 6 - Diaposi tim ot 1'aek Foree th1 te PAUL REVERE IV 18 October 7 - Operaticma Scheu tic PAUL REVERE IV Period 18 - 31 October 8 - Replaoeaaent 1'ra1n1ng Schedule
Distribution: ACSFOR, . DA 3 CI~t&RPAC 1 DCG, mARV 3 CO, J71V . 1 CO, 2Sth Int Div 1 1/)1. 1 J/3S 1 2/35 1 2/9 1 .3d Spt Bn (Prov) 1 D/65 1 co 1 S1 1 S2 1 S3 1 S4 1 S5 1 S'i.f: 0 1 ATD 0 1 CG, 4th Inf Div 1
... ,._
J.~..C~ (25 J!ov 66) lat IDd (. SUBJtcr1 ~tioaal Slport tor Qurterl.r Period lndh11 .ll October .1966
7o (ES ~) (U)
B'MlRISk3, ilth Iotantrr Dirialoo, A.PO US Forces 96262
1. (U) Forwarded 1.8 tbe Operatioaal Deport at !MaOGIJ Learaed tor qurterly per-iod eodi~ 31 October .1.966, aubaittea br the 3D Bri;;;ade Task: Force, 25tb Intaatrr D1rts10ft.
2. (U) Tbe repcrt.ed unit wu placed UDder operational eont.rol or the 4th Infantry Dirlaioo 011 US October 1966.
). (C) Tbe report 1a eooaidered adequate and bas been 1"8'Y'i.ned bf t.bi.8 beadquarters. Speei!ie ea.eotA foJ.lov:
a. ~ .17C, Incloeure 1, Co.llbat Operatioas AttAr Action .Report tor hr10C1 1 Aupst tbroach 2S .&ucuat 1966, :..'8C~Dd.· llpiradiag or Route 19 ~of Rout.e 14 t? Due Co. Tbe 9J7tb ~Group cc1 20tb JDgtDMr Battal1oo reeei.Yed tbe aission 01' upg:radiac Route 19 to a CJ.aaa SO ro.S oo J..S ()ct.ober J!}66. Progress tws been rapiti aDCl Route J.9 w1.J.l soon be elMs SO tor two-wq trattic.
b. Paraerapn l7!, Ioeloeure .1, Ca.bat Operations .&.tter 4ct.1on ~port tor Period 1 Aacuat tnrougb 25 August 1966, ree~ c-~ airetnpa be prepa-ed aDd u.1Dt.a1Ded at PJ.e1 Ke1 Ouis, Cat, Cat.eek&, and :We Co. 0.1.8 bu a c-J.)O strip presently being rt!paired bT tbe 4th ln&iDMr a.tt•l1oo. .&. c-lJO airstrip 1s being prepared at DOc Co by the uth En.~ Batt.al.1oo. 1'be 9J7th Engtoeer Groap be been tasked vitb the. m:lasioo or preparing additional C-lJO airstrip~. &net loeatioos of these airatr1pt are DOt. lmown at tb~ be.-tdqu~re.
APO "'" . 1. · !Ida ~ •• red.-.ct UM !lpftttoaaJ. aepor~
Jan«~ tor tM ,.-1od ...,. 31 Ootober f~ trca B~, 3d IJia!lde. 2,u. Iwfutir7 Did.,_ U b&Jr.-L .
2. P..u-t oa ate.,.. u tollons
•• hha~Doe P~ U(2), 8eet101l I, PA«• 18a the oetnl•\lr Jllftllll .,.t• llu bee ~let..! and ooad.te ot a to- l1De ~a 1,000 C8l J1iiW'B& lt&Uoo at Late Bien Ho to" S-2,000 .llCil n•• tal* 1D tM Yicdld.f-7 of AIYJI II Corpe Readqaarten. BUtCetw, taewh .. t1te 3d Brlpd•, 25th IDfant..7 Dlrld.oo, obt.alDa .n .ot lt.e •ter "'1'1r•mt. trea a ~ lldjacwtt to it• oantoo..:a\ area, tld.a eeatra1 •t.er q.t.. u ot pri8arT iDt.ere.t to aaaorted other 11111\e aa4 aeUritt .. 1a the Pletlal ar..
b. let•-.. P&rql"'lpb 2b, Part I, s.ction II, Pqe )Ot llJw•t1Jrc, --., ad 11fbit.e .tar claater proJectU• tar the K79 ar.-1114• .t.aober are~ bel.nl te.t.ed and nalMted. IYaluation ha• DO\ bee -..letecl. Rowwer11 oUter twe podt.ion .u'ker• are be1n« .nl.eated ~-\1.7.
o. leterenee Paracrapb ~. Part. I, Section II, Pqe 3St The obMCwaticD oa 1.8•• ot ~·ratione to OS Arrq perecxmel .1• not approncl b7 tit• 9vpoD General. U" ot the Loa« Rance Patrol Food Paent. 1a rM~ tllded tor ue 1h patrol aetiona. On 27 Df'Cfllber 1966, t.be brl&ad• ec m u••er •• intOI"'Md on tbe a-uabillt7 aDd uH ot th1• 'food paa.t.
d. lef.-.aoe Pa.rqroaph 6b, Part I, Section n, P&«" JS and )6r !bU a.-dqurt.-. baa reqa..ted tbat Ute et.odc ot the H-t6 R1!18 -~te .,.Ul.led to protide a receptaele tar tlJ• el~ rod and &llltOOiated el•Dina aqaipMnt.
